'The Imperative Inherent in the Gift of Freedom": Kari Barth and Amartya Sen on Human Freedom

Chris Barrigar' I am deeply disturbed by the immense suffering and oppression that exists so endemically in the world. The p/7ys/ca/toll of back-breaking labour, for long hours day after day, under dangerous conditions, with no medical attention when needed, at exploitive 'wages'; the re/atona/toll of drunken men who beat their family because 'deep inside' they have neither purpose nor hope for the future; the psychological \o\\ of childhood lost to labour, of dignity and hope lost to oppression, and of being unable to provide for one's family; the social toll of community fighting community, not only majorities oppressing minorities but also oppressed minorities who oppress other minonties; the toll of ignorance that comes from the inability to read or to recognize the lies that keep the exploitation justified. The list, of course, goes endlessly on. I am deeply disturbed by all this not simply because I am human, but I am disturbed because I am a follower of Jesus the Nazarene. My discipleship to
Chris Banigar (Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion, McGill University, Canada) teaches theology at several institutions in Bangalore and Chennai (Madras), India. This paper was originally presented at the 14' Annual Kunchala Rajaratnam Endowment Lecture, Qurukul Lutheran Theological College and Research Institute, Chennai. 110

Asia Journal of Theology Jesus has shaped me such that my heart responds with compassion, indeed with great pain, to the suffering and oppression around me. And this makes me want to do something about it, to take action. Yet I am also a theologian, which means, in part, that I believe that action is linked not simply to behaviour but also to ideas, and thus that effective action requires, inter alia, right ideas. So I want to respond to human suffering and oppression by thinking through the ideas that will enable effective action for sustained change.

1.

Resources for Freedom: Barth and Sen

Over the past thirty years, the dominant form of theological idea conceming oppression and suffering has been called 'Liberation Theolog/. Yet, in recent years Liberation Theology has fallen on hard times. Other types of liberational theologies having taken the limelightfeminist, womanist, Dalit, Minjung, postcolonial, left-wing evangelical, and the like. Yet, despite the flaws of Liberation Theology as a movement and method (or set of methods), I continue to find the 'liberation' motif a useful /ocus around which to discuss the ideas and practk:es necessary for responding to the suffering and oppression around us.^ In effect, 'liberation' should remain a foundatkinal theological locus for responding to issues of oppression. It may be inferred that I will now make a defence of Liberation Theology yet in fact, while I share the motivating concerns of Liberation Theobgy, I shall not make such a defence, and in fact I do not count myself a Liberation Theologian.^ Indeed, I want to develop a liberating, freeing theology for the oppressed and exploited by means of resources different from those usually employed by Liberation Theologieswhich I propose to do by way of Karl Barth's theology of 'freedom'. But why choose 'freedom', and why choose Barth? In terms of 'why freedom?', I contend that issues of justice and oppression need to be embedded in a broader social-political-economic framework. Socialpolitical theology cannot be limited to issues of justice and liberation alone, crucially important as these arerather, social-political theology must be developed in the light of a comprehensive theological vision for human societies at large pre-parousia, which necessarily includes the full expanse of socialpolitical-economic issues, including, inter alia, issues of social plurality, political participation and representation, political legitimacy, social policy, fiscal objectives and instruments, economic objectives and structures, law and jurisprudence, and so forth: it is only within such a broadly comprehensive
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Asia Journal of Theology account of modern human societies that issues of justice, oppression, and exploitation can then be adequately addressed. What biblical-doctrinal categories then do we invoke for this broader, preparousia social-political theology? There are many that must be deployed collectively^Trinity, the life of Jesus, shalom, reconciliation. Church, justice, love, freedom, and so forth. Collectively, such categories provide a theological map, a systematic framework, by which to infer and develop the contours of an overall social-political theology, including implications for the full expanse of social-political-economic issues mentioned above. For purposes of this discussion, though, limitations of space dictate that my proposal be tested by use of a single theological category, even though, as I have just indicated, a whole panoply of doctrinal loci are needed to do the full job. Thus I have chosen 'freedom' for this discussion - partly because of the centrality of 'freedom' within the political ideas of modernity, and partly because it is a more comprehensive concept than 'liberation', thereby offering more expansive social-political possibilities than 'liberation' while at the same time including liberation within its purview. As for Barth, I choose him for two reasons. First, because his theological corpus provides a substantive theology of freedom. Second, he has a theological perspective that I think is rightthough one which is 'counter-intuitive' and hence frequently opposednamely that theology proper comes prior to anthropology. Yet the idea of a well-formed theology being 'counter-intuitive' may seem peculiar. Thus let me give an analogy from science, by citing Nancey Murphy: One of Newton's great discoveries was his laws of motion,,,But why did it take so long to discover this law? Why was it not understood much earlier by Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, or by such great intellects as Galileo, Francis Bacon, or Rene Descartes? The answer is because the laws are apparently contradicted by all our experience in everyday life [i,e,, the laws are 'counter-intuitive']. Newton's laws say that the natural tendency of a body is to keep moving forever; but our experience is that moving bodies on Earth always come to a stop, usually very soon, unless we keep pushing them. The explanation of this paradox (in Newton's temns) is simple: friction acts to prevent the body's doing what its natural tendency dictates., ..The point then is that the true (inertial) nature of matter is in fact deeply hidden, despite being right in front of us. To understand this nature, we must focus on the tendency of matter to keep moving (apparent when we throw a solid ball, for example), rather than the tendency for matter to stop moving (apparent when we move objects
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Asia Journal of Theology around, for example). Both tendencies are there; we have to discern which is the more fundamental. Before Newton, the greatest minds failed to see which was the essential feature.^ The parallel with theology is this: that what appears to us as the most jDrobable, most natural, or most intuitive, interpretation of something may actually be very wrong, for the truth might well be deeply hidden, even if right in front of our eyes. This is the epistemological core of Luther's fheologia crucisJesus' death on the cross appears, by normal human interpretive reason, to be weakness, defeat, and humiliation, yet in fact the deeper, hidden truth is that Jesus' death on the cross is actually the place of God's victory and glory. What has this to do with Barth? Within both modern and post-modern theology, the usual tendency, derived from our experience of everyday life, is to focus on, or begin our theology with, human experience; yet Barth is like Newton and Luther, helping us to see that the more fundamental reality, the true nature of theological reality, is in fact deeply hidden, despite being right in front of us: namely, to begin our theologizing not with anthropology but with God and God's Wordeven though this begins our theology with that which goes against all our usual human, including academic, intuitions. As we will see, I am no Barthian in the sense of wanting to be his disciple in the details of his theology," but I do think that in this regard Barth orients us properlyGod's Word (in both senses, as Jesus Christ and as Scripture) comes before, and indeed properly establishes the basis of, our anthropology.^ With this prior condition in place, I want to explore the nature of human freedom based on this prioritization. In short, Barth offers us a substantive theology of freedom, yet one which begins with God and only then moves to humanity. Having said this, unlike Barth I am concemed to identily specific practices, proposals for action in specific times and places, in response to poverty and oppression. My rationale for this is simply personal experience: in my own involvement in grassroots work on behalf of the poor and exploited, I have seen the necessity of identifying and implementing spec/ffc pracf/ces if change is actually to take placewithout such intentional, strategic, specific practices, change simply does not happen. Yet John Webster, Barth's leading interpreter in the Anglo-American world today, points out,^ 'Barth's reluctance to discuss in detail the concrete instruments and ends of political community'.^ This reluctance we will further discuss below; nonetheless, it is precisely to discern 'the concrete CrtnsWan/y instruments and ends of political community' which is my ultimate objective in this study. Indeed, by 'action' and 'concrete instruments' I mean not simply protest action, or grass-root community action, 113

Asia Journal of Theology on behalf ofthe poor and oppressed, but I also mean the formation of public policy, economic policy, bureaucratic policy, and judicial policy, along with the legal-political means for their implementation. This then requires engagement with the relevant scholarly-theoretical disciplines for each of these domains of social-political life. My objective then is fo expbre whether a U)eologyx)f freedom can guide our use ofexfemalsociai-economic resources fordisceming 'concrete instruments' and action for achieving iiberafion from poverfy and oppression. I have identified Barth as my theological protagonist for this; now where to turn for external sources for this? Within contemporary social-econom'c theory, the work which has most extensively employed the concept of freeoom is that of the Indian scholar Amartya Sen. For Sen, the concept of freedom is a central pillar of the social and economic theory for which he won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998, and so, on thfs basis, I will turn to Sen as my foil to Barth. My conclusion, which will no doubt surprise many, will be that a Barthian use of Amartya Sen provides a persuasive proposal for Christian action in response to poverty and oppression. However, a methodological issue must be addressed: can Barth even be used for such a project? There are two angles from which to ask this: first, whether he is relevant to issues of poverty and oppression; second, whether he would consider it valid to employ a non-theological resource, such as Sen, in conjunction with theology.

2.

Barth on Poverty, Oppression, and Political Action

Does Barth have anything of value to say to situations of poverty and oppression? Some would certainly say No. This response can be represented by James Cone, the doyen of American Black Theology, who did his Ph.D. dissertation on Barth but later repudiated Barth as being of no use to the social realities of racism in America;^ analogously, one might argue that, likewise, Barth has little or nothing of value to say to situations of poverty and oppression in such places as the Two-Thirds World or the former Soviet bloc nations. This interpretation may be further supported by Barth's general reluctance, as mentioned earlier, to engage in discussion of the concrete means and instruments of social-political activity. Furthermore, Hunsinger observes that, 'While it is certainly true that one can find passages in Barth's theology where the radical political imperatives of the gospel sound forth, it is also true that these imperatives are often muffled by the extraordinary expanse of other themes which he so prodigiously sets 114

Asia Journal of Theology forth'. And as Ron Sider points out, the sheer volume of material in the Bible that pertains to questions of hunger, justice and the poor is 'astonishing'yet one could not say the same about the volume of material or emphasis on these issues in Barth's writing.^ Nonetheless, another response is that Barth does have relevance to issues of poverty and oppression. Hunslngerhas noted a number of similarities between Barth and Liberation Theologians. For one, they both 'share a belief that theological integrity is subject to certain practical and political tests': [F]or Barth, from the beginning of his career to the very end, even the most doctrinally correct theologians were considered unworthy of their calling to the extent that they aligned themselves in practice with the forces of political reaction....Like today's liberation theologians, Barth believed that reactionary politics was a sign that the gospel had been left behind.^" As well, both Barth and Liberation Theology refuse to indulge in wholesale condemnation of communism. 'Western anticommunism generally struck [Barth] as self-righteous, hypocritical, irresponsible, and irrelevant...Barth believed that in their quest for world domination, the two superpowers were the mirror image of each other'. Third, Barth stands with the liberation theologians against the neoconservatives on the crucial matter of capitalism....The salient point about capitalism for Barth was not, as neoconservatives would contend, that it decentralizes power and therefore stands as a bulwark against totalitarian 'drives' of society. On the contrary, Barth rightly insisted that capitalism generates enormous disparities in wealth and power, concentrating life-and-death decisions 'in the hands of the relatively few, who pull all the strings... in a way completely outside the control of the vast majority'.^^ Furthermore, Barth and the Liberation theologians could concur with Barth's words from Church Dogmatics that the command of God is "in all circumstances a call for counter-movements on behalf of humanity and against its denial in any form, and therefore a championing of the weak against every encroachment on the part of the strong."^^ This is a particularly strong statement by Barth, one which gives him greater credibility on these issues, especially when set against his own activity against Bolshevism, Fascism, and nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, one can certainly regret Barth's reluctance to extend his discussions to the instruments and means, which we will examine in further detail below. 115

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3.

Barth on 'Faith and Reason'

The other angle from which to ask if Barth can be used for this project concerns Barth's valuation of non-theological resources in the task of theology the faith and reason' issue, to use more traditional tenninology, though 'reason' not in the narrow sense of philosophy alone, but in the broad, and modernitybiased, sense of ideas and concepts from any discipline outside of Christian One interpretation sees Barth's response to the possibility of faith using 'reason' as Nein. Support for this interpretation can come from Barth's opposition to the 'Social Gospel', along with his supposed opposition to philosophy. In the former case, Barth was opposing, rightly, equating social transformation with the Kingdom of God; in the latter case, his famous Nein was in opposition to natural theology as a basis for the knowledge of God. Furthermore, those who are aware of Barth's strident use of 'the command of God' as the central theme for his ethics may infer from such an assertive phrase that Barth's ethics is impervious to 'extemal' voices. From these perceptions, the implication is frequently drawn that Barth opposed the use of human abilities or nontheological resources in Christian theology, whether these serve reason (attempts at knowledge of God's nature or will), moral action (social or individual transformation), or any other theological purposes. In consequence of this view, there is no need for 'reason' to be employed by faith, and certainly no need for theologians to discuss concrete means and instruments. Another response comes, though, from a different reading of Barth, namely that he was open to the use of 'reason' with faith. The following comment proves illustrative:
understanding of man from the Word of God will be always effected in practice in the language, categories and framework of the possibilities of human self-understanding. In it we shall always and inevitably have before us the phenomena of the human, and to that extent make use of naturalistic, idealistic, existential, historical, psychological and similar thoughts and expressions.'"

Given the stereotypical views that exist of Barth, many theologians would be surprised to read such words from him. Yet, Barth makes numerous similar comments throughout his work. For instance, while he is widely thought of as rejecting philosophy in toto, this is a clear misreading of his position: 'A theologian does not deny, nor is he ashamed of, his indebtedness to a particular pMosop/iy or ontology, to ways of thought and speech. These may be traditional

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Asia Journal of Theology or a bit original, old or new, coherent or incoherent. No one speaks exclusively in biblical terms'.^^ In fact, similar examples from Barth's writing could be endlessly piled on top of each other. For the sake of illustration, one more example will suffice. In his discussion of criteria by which to determine whether we are obedient or not to the command of God, Barth contends that the Christian will find himself addressed by the existence of many others.... This orientation by others [i.e., non-theologicals], this readiness to learn, to follow, or to oppose, is fundamentally legitimate. It is not for nothing that both in the Church and the world we live alongside others.... Each must know openness to the ways of others. This is in the last resort indispensable. We should be fools if in making use of our opportunities we did not look for examples and teachers, for comrades and brothers [among our non-theological neighbours].... Indeed, since small or large conrections and completions are absolutely necessary for all of us in this matter right up to the very last moment, none can ever be too open to the ways of others'.'^ Again, such a quote calls for an openness that confounds the stereotypes of Barth. This is seen also in the realm of social-political thought: The Christian community both can and should espouse the cause of this or that branch of social progress or even socialism in the form most helpful at a specific time and place and in a specific situation. But its decisive word cannot consist in the proclamation of social progress or socialism. It can consist only in the proclamation of the revolution of God 'against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of man' (Rom.1:18), i.e., in the proclamation of his kingdom as it has already come and comes. ^^ Barth's logic here is that the Church's dec/s/Ve word must be the proclamation of the Gospel, yet the church should espouse (Barth's own words!), in a critical, provisional, non-decisive way, non-theological resourcesin this case, the social-economic-political proposals of secular social progress and even socialism^for purposes of being 'helpful at a specific time and place and situation'. In effect, Barth does not merely passively or grudgingly accept the use of non-theological resources in theologyhe actually espouses such use. As Hans Frei put it, Barth 'had recourse, and gladly so, to philosophy, for Christianity as a semiotic system does not bring its own technical conceptual tools with it'.^* Frei need not have limited this observation to philosophy, for Barth felt likewise for numerous other areas of human intellectual effort. 117

Asia Journal of Theology Delimitations

Of course, having pointed out Barth's espousal of using non-theological resources in theology, the story does not end there, for the stereotypes are correct in one sense, namely that Barth was not open to 'every wind of doctrine'his numerous statements of openness are almost always qualified in the light of two criteria: such resources must be doctrinally-circumscribed, and, such resources must also be instrumentally-provisional. For an example of the first criterion, being doctrinally-circumscribed, we may cite his comments on the indebtedness of theologians to philosophy, in which he describes the proper relationship between theology and philosophy, one in which theology norms philosophy: 'The theologian stands ready to submit the coherence of his concepts and formulations to the coherence of the divine revelation and not conversely....his ontology will be subject to criticism and control by his theology, and not conversely. He will not necessarily feel obligated to the philosophical kairos, the latest prevailing philosophy....'^* In other words, Barth's openness to, and use of, non-theological resources is delimited, or circumscribed by the results of exegesis and the content of doctrine. The second qualification Is that, use of extra-theological resources must also be instrumentally provisionalinstrumental in the sense of being used for Christian purposes, and provisional in the sense that such resources must be held with a certain lightness, unrigidity, etc. The reasons for provisionality are important to note: non-theological resources are not confessional to the Christian faith; such resources are incomplete because they are the product of postlapsarian reason; and the creational te/os of such resources is insufficiently accounted for in God's creative, redemptive purposes. In summary, we may call Barth's position on the use of non-theological resources in theology doctnnally-circumscribed and instrumentally-provisional espousal. To my theological intuitions, this seems to me to get the issue right. It is within these constraints that Barth would be willing to explore the use of Sen in orderfor Barth to achieve his desired actions by the stronger on behalf of the weaker.

4.

Karl Barth on Human Freedom

Throughout his corpus, Barth's use of the term freedom' is frequent. While this use is usually only en passant, yet the content of this term, in his own particular meaning, is provided in several substantial discussions.^^ Nonetheless, John Webster suggests that 'freedom' has only a secondary
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Asia Journal of Theology status in Barth's anthropology, secondary to more primary and developed themes such as faith, hope, love, justification and sanctification.^' On the other hand, Clifford Green considers freedom of such importance in Barth that he labels Barth a 'Theologian of Freedom'.^ My own view is somewhere in between these, though perhaps closer to Green: freedom' and 'liberation' are terms that Barth employs with regularity throughout his wnting, and Barth's theology would look quite different without the emphasis on freedom and liberation that is found in his work. Freedom can claim at least a strong secondary or supportive status in Barth's anthropology. Given the diverse locations of Barth's writings on freedom, for purposes of the following discussion I will employ the same three-part structure that Barth used for his final study on this theme, 'The Gift of Freedom'God's Freedom (under the doctrine of God), Man's Freedom (under the doctrine of Creation), and the Divine Call to Action (i.e, Ethics).

The Freedom of God

First, then, Goc/'s freedom: 'God's freedom is His very own. [God's freedom] is the sovereign grace wherein God chooses to commit Himself to man.'^^ For Barth, God's freedom is, not unexpectedly, the standard against which to understand human freedom. Not that human freedom will be an exact replica of divine freedom, but human freedom will not be properly understood without first understanding God's freedom. 'Where else can we learn that freedom exists and what it is, except in confrontation with God's own freedom offered to us as the source and measure of all freedom?'^* God's freedom is relational, which is not surprising, given God's Trinitarian nature: 'God's own freedom is Trinitarian, embracing grace, thankfulness, and peace. Only in this relational freedom is God sovereign, almighty, the Lord of all.'^^ In effect, "God's freedom is not merely unlimited possibility or formal majesty and omnipotency, [nor is it] empty, naked sovereignty". That is, God's freedom is not the hypothetical political or philosophical freedom of pure power or omnipotence to do whatever God feels like doingit is not some self-indulgent voluntaMst freedom simply to do whatever one so wants to do. Neither is God's freedom freedom from," as if there exists constraints externally imposed on God. Rather it is "freedom to and for.. .God is free for man, free to coexist with man and, as the lord of the covenant, to participate in his history'.'^
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The Freedom of Humanity

Humanity's freedom is certainly not identical to God's freedom, yet we first understand human freedom through God's freedom. Negatively, God's freedom is not certain modernist proposals for freedom. Modernity has advocated freedom in various forms, such as: the freedom of indifference', whereby one chooses indifferently between various possibilities or options unconstrained by competing interests; 'negative freedom', wherein freedom is seen primarily as freedom fromfreedom from interference by other individuals, as well as freedom from structures and systems (such as Locke's 'govemment', Weber's 'bureaucrac/, etc.), thus the individual is supposedly left free' from interference by others to choose as they will and to make of themselves what they will; and 'positive freedom', in which freedom is understood to be the ability or right to assert, preserve, and save oneself (perhaps even the cost of others). Barth provides particular responses to each of these as to why they are erroneous accounts of human freedom, but under all of them lie the same foundational problemnamely that these are not what constitutes God's freedom, thus these are not what constitutes humanity's freedom. But if modemit/s accounts of human freedom are false, then what is Barth's own constructive account of freedom? Above all, humanity's freedom is foremost to be seen as God's gracious gift: 'Human freedom is the gift of God in the free outpouring of His grace. To call a man free is to recognize that God has given him freedom.'^^ No doubt certain forms of freedom are humanly achieved, but their ultimate origin must be recognized: 'What else can we say to what God gives us but stammering praise of this gift and Giver?'^^ This gift exists for all in two waysas 'promised freedom', which is the freedom of eternal life, and as 'natural freedom', which is 'human existence in its creatureliness.'^ The proper standard for naturai human freedom is not some criteria independent of God's own action or nature; rather, "The source of man's freedom is also its yardstick".^" The //Ved standard of human freedom is the freedom ofthe Christian, for it is the Christian who, at least ideally, lives in the ideal pattern for all human freedom, namely freedom for the will of God'.^' This will of God is for thanksgiving, obedience and responsibility. So, freedom for God, that is, freedom for the will of God, is the foundational element of true human freedom. After this comes freedom in feiiowship'. Barth identifies various spheres in which this takes place, with male/female and parent/child relationships being 120

Asia Journal of Theology the foundational spheres of freedom-in-fellowship, though our collective existence with 'neighbours' (other peoples, both near and far) being another. 'Freedom in fellowship' means freedom to be with and act for others, that is, for the good of others. It is clear from these first two elements that, contrary to both modemity and general human self-interest, freedom is nof primarily freedom frvm limitations, norprimarily freedom foroneself, but ratherfreedom forothers for God and then for humanity. After freedom for God' and freedom for others', human freedom then consists of freedom for one's own life^that is,freedomfor choice foroneself and freedom from [non-divine] limitations. Such freedom is often the primary freedom in our human priorities, yet is tertiary in God's priorities. Nonetheless, freedom for ourselves is also the gift of God, and in fact is the means through which the first two priorities are actually enacted. In other words, this is the point at which one's own personhood and individuality enter in: "[Jlhe freedom of man for God in the community [i.e., with and for God and others] includes the freedom for existence as this [i.e., particular, individual] human creature... .[The individual] is always himself in these relationships."^^ It is precisely in this freedom of who one is in one's own individuality that choices and decisions are made for how to be for God, how to be for others, and how to be for oneself. 'Man becomes free and is free by choosing, deciding, and determining himself in accordance with the freedom of God.'^ Thus, despite freedom-for-oneself being the third priority, there remains within this a broad range of opportunity and choice. The final tone of Barth's account though lies with the limitation of responsibility. "Human life is to be lived as man's activity, not to be endured and withstood as a mere happening. It is to be accepted and accomplished anew every day".** Human freedom in limitation must be verified and practiced as [one's] ownfreedomin resolve and act.. .On all sides he has opportunity.. .The opportunity n^ust be grasped. This is what the command of God requires of him.' ^* 'Every act of man, therefore, must be measured and tested by the question whether it is a seizing or neglecting of the unique opportunity presented to him in his time'.^^ So there are limitations on human freedom, yet true freedom is only found in this God- and others-focused pattern; nonetheless, substantial breadth remains for individual choice, decision-making, and determining oneself. That is, recognition of limitation must not obscure recognition of possibility and opportunityfor, while limitations exist, there still exist wide diversity of possibilities and opportunities for how to exercise this freedom within both context and individuality.^^ '[Tlhe command of God is
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Asia Journal of Theology an appeal to [man's] freedom: not, of course, to a freedom of his choice, preference, or selection; but to his real freedom, which consists in his freedom for God, in his freedom to obey

Freedom and Ethics

Barth's account of human freedom lies at the intersection of three doctrinal loci, namely God, Creation, and Ethics, so it is impossible to discuss his account of freedom without a constant interaction with ethics. In recent years, there has been a salutary recovery of the centrality of ethics to Barth's overall theological programme.^ For Barth, ethics perse 'is theory and not practice, though it is the theory about practice. Its main problem is predsely the question of the ethos, of the right and wrong, in human action.'"" In that case, what constitutes specifically Christian ethics? Chnstian ethics is 'the reflection upon the divine call to human action which is implied by the gift of freedom,'"^ that is, 'howwe are obedient to the command of God'. Elsewhere, Barth describes ethics as 'what we do with our freedom'. These vanous descriptions may be combined into a single Barthian definition of Christian ethics as the theory of how we rightly use our freedom in obedience to the command of God. In Church Dogmatics, Barth places his whole discussion of freedom (c.600 pages) within the theme of ethics, that is, within 'The Command of God the Creator*. 'What is the command of God? It is the authentic interpretation in the imperative mood of man's being and nature by its Creator and Lord';"^ 'the imperative of the command... is the freedom of man within the limitation of his nature and being'."^ Indeed, the command of God is an 'imperative summons to freedom for human existence'."" Ethical freedom is exercised then in rtovvwe act^for, within our individuality and our historicity there are many ways to actforthe will and glory of God and forthe good of others as well as also for ourselves. This is true human freedom.

5. Amartya Sen on Human Freedom

Amartya Sen became widely known to the general public when in 1998 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics. Nonetheless, he was well-known within the field of economics long before winning the Prize, having to that point had a prolific publishing career spanning more than 40 years. More importantly for our purposes. Sen is not 'merely' an economist but is more accurately described as a social theorist, deploying social philosophy, ethics, and economics together in the service of his overall intellectual project^which may be called 'the human science of social-economic development'."^ Indeed,
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Asia Journal of Theology Sen is the prime figure behind the methodology of the United Nations' annual Human Development Report. It will help if we give a brief overview of Sen's career. His ultimate concern has always been the poor and oppressed, those whose lives are marked by inequality and deprivation. This ultimate concern is seen in his early interest in economic growth and planning, in his famous investigations of the causes of famines and of globally-endemic gender discrimination against women, in his numerous studies of many countries but of India in particular, and in his rejection of classical values of, and methods for measuring, economic growth. Sen has consistently contributed to both empirical research and theoretical proposals in both macro- and micro-economics that run against the grain, indeed that scrutinize thefoundational values of, mainstream economic theory, especially neo-classicism and 'techno-economics in the service of the free market, private property and footloose finance'.*^ This is not to imply that Sen is against capitalism, or in favour of it either, for he is far too sophisticated a thinker to make sweeping approvals or condemnations of any system of idea or practices. Rather, his style is to analyse for complexity, seeking the benefits and the deficits, the good and the bad, in the ideas or systems with which he engages. On this basis, capitalism is seen to bring both blessing and curse, and so needs to be analysed as suchas seen, for instance, in his efforts to 'meticulously to bring out the interaction between market and non-market phenomena, and between private and public action'."'' Nonetheless, Sen stridently opposes capitalism as the criterion of 'the sociai good', or as the basis of social ordera critique, we might note in passing, somewhat similar to that of Barth. Bagchi observes that by the 1970s, the net effect of Sen's work was that he had
demonstrated the surprising poverty of the so-called fundamental theorem of economics^* ....About the same time he was also demonstrating the informational, ethical, and behavioural deficiencies of an approach that takes individuals maximizing their utility as its sole foundation....Sen was breaching the ramparts of the narrowly confined space of traditional welfare economics and choice theory and allowing ethical considerations and interpersonal value judgements to enter that space. He was engaged, at the same time, in a closer examination of the nature and stmctures of inequality in existing human societies.^^

If Sen has been busy breaching past and current ramparts, then what is his constructive counter-proposal? His ability to provide such a counter-proposal has rested in part on one of his great virtues, namely the ability to recognize 123

Asia Journal of Theology the complexity of human arrangements within which economics exists. A large part of this complexity concerns human motives, goals, needs, and restrictionsin other words, the elements of a comprehensive or substantive theory of human nature, including economics, yet elements which are felladously omitted from orthodox economic theory. This ability to recognize human complexity, and to thereby develop a substantive anthropology, is due not only to his training as an economist, but especially to his career-long engagement with philosophical and ethical thought. From early in his career, he has engaged the thought of such philosophers as David Hume, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Martha Nussbaum, and Bernard Williams. Along with his concern for poverty and the poor, his engagement with such thinkers has enabled him to put economics within a broader conception of human affairs. This integration of economics with social and moral philosophy can be seen in a statement such as this: 'Ultimately, the focus has to be on what life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be. I have elsewhere called the various living conditions we can or cannot achieve, our "functionings," and our ability to achieve them, our "capabilities"'.* This brings us to the key concepts of Sen's counter-proposal'capabilities' and 'freedom', for, in conjunction with the concept 'rationality', these provide the lynch-pins of Sen's moral-philosophical grounding of social theory and economics: the proper criterion of social welfare judgments, and the appropriate objective of policy interventions, is the fullest attainment of human capabilities in order that people can lead the lives they have reason to value. Note how vastly different a criterion and objective this is than various traditional criteria for judging social improvement, such as 'GDP growth' or 'wealth accumulation' or 'the greatest good for the greatest number of people' or even 'ownership of the means of production'. In other words, governments and others are most effective In their role of social-economic development when their development policies are directed at enhancing these capacities. But how is this expansion of individual capacities actually to be accomplished? Sen's answer is not any of the usual answers, whether interventionist or laissez-faire. Rather, Sen contends that some sort of intermediate guiding principle is needed by which to determine what sorts of policies will be effective and ineffective for achieving increased capacities. Of course, the issue of intervention-versus-non-intervention does eventually arise, but at the level of particular policies, not at the level of overarching guiding principle (which is where most political and economic theorists usually, and erroneously, place it).*^ And the guiding principle Sen employs is freedom'freedom to develop
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Asia Journal of Theology the capabilities people require in order to live the lives they have reason to value. Thus freedom is the crucial concept for achieving effective socio-economic devetopment.

Human Freedom
Sen's writing on freedom is so clear and succinct that it is almost impossible to summarize itone would prefer simply to reproduce the first 50 pages of Development as Freedom. Nonetheless, despite the clarity of his explanation, our task here necessitates that we give some summary, be it ever so brief. Sen's focus on human freedoms at the basis for social-economic development 'contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social modernization'.^ Because Sen conceives of development more broadly than do traditional development theories, he also recognizes broader impediments to such development, impediments which he calls 'unfreedoms': Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states...Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water and sanitary facilities. In other cases, the unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the absence of epidemiological programs, or of organized arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In still other cases, the violation of freedom results directly from a denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community'." We see here explicit illustrations of what freedom is or is not within contexts of social-economic development. But, being philosophically inclined. Sen provides a more substantive analysis of freedom than simply saying This and this are freedoms, but this Is not...' His analysis recognises human freedom as both an end in itself, and as a means to that end. In other words, the means of ae/j/ewng freedom is by c/eve/op/ng freedom, or, as Sen also puts it, by developing the free agency oi people.*" Sen labels these two aspects of freedom
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Asia Journal of Theology within development as consWuf/Vfreedom (freedom as an end in itself) and instmmentaiUeedom (freedom as a means to that end). However, Sen also observes another pairing of freedom-types, namely freedoms of process, which allow freedom of actions and decisions, and freedoms of opportunity. Unfortunately, he does not tell us how these two pairs fit together, so I will describe them and then make a proposal below.

Constitutive and Instruments^ Freedoms

CbnsWtrf/Vefreedom refers to freedom as itself the very objective, or end, of development. In political theory. Sen's concept of 'freedom as an end In itself would be considered an account of 'the social good', or 'the ideal societ/. But Sen's interest is not to provide a comprehensive account of 'the good society', for his interest is rather more limited, namely to indicate the conditions of a 'developed' society. 'The success of a society is to be evaluated primarily by the substantive freedoms that the members of that society enjoy'*^. In effect. Sen's account of constitutive freedom is of freedom from deprivations and forpersonal agency. This is different from how economists usually view the 'social good', which they usually tie to some measure of wealth. Sen quotes Aristotle, that 'wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else' (p.14; Nichomachean Ethics, Bk 1, sctn 5). In Sen's view, that 'something else' is 'to live the kind of lives we have reason to value', to 'make our lives richer and more unfettered.. .to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting withand influencingthe world in which we live.^ Wealth and freedom are not inherently the end in itself, but rather serve this end. In effect, constitutive freedoms are important on their own, and do not need to be justified in terms of their economic contribution to society. They are simply how humans seek to live and interact, and that alone is their justification. Achieving constitutive freedom requires instrumentalireedoms, for it is these that give direct guidance to the formation of govemmental development policies and practices. In fact. Sen identifies five different types of instrumental freedoms. Let us quickly look at each of them in turn.*^ Political freedoms refer to 'the opportunities people have to determine who should govern and on what principles, and also includes the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose between different political parties, and so on. They include the political entitlements associated with democracies in the broadest sense'. 126

Asia Journal of Theology Economic facilities refer to 'the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or exchange'.* For instance, one of many possible examples would be 'freedom of labour contract as opposed to slavery or the enforced exclusion from the labour market. [One of] the crucial challenges in many developing countries today is the need for freeing of labor from explicit or implicit bondage that denies access to the open labor market. Similarly, the denial of access to product markets is often among the deprivations from which many small cultivators and struggling producers suffer under traditional an^ngements and restrictions. The freedom to participate in economic interchange has a basic role in social living'.*^ Social opportunities refer to the freedoms gained by 'the arrangements that society makes for education, health care, and so on, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities'. For instance, illiteracy is an unfreedom because it not only constrains possibilities in one's personal life (such as the freedom to read for pleasure or for self-protection, eg., legal documents, etc), but it also greatly constrains one's ability to participate and influence economic and political activity,freedonfisand capabilities gained when social restrictions are removed, such as discnminations on the basis of gender, caste, tribe, etc. Transparency guarantees refer to the freedoms and capabilities gained through 'openness that people can expect [within society, government, business, etc.]: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity'. In other words, societies are most effective at development if they operate with some basic presumptions of trust among agents and participants: 'When that trust is seriously violated, the lives of many peopleboth direct parties and third partiesmay be adversely affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the right to disclosure).. .have a clear instrumental role in preventing corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhanded dealings'. Protective security reiers to thefreedomsand capabilities gained for personal agency by protection from externally-imposed harm or deprivation. This may include the military, police, and courts; but it also includes social safety-nets, 'such as unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the 127

Asia Journal of Theology indigent as well as ad hoc arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for destitutes'. With these five forms of instrumental freedom, it is important to note that they are not discrete and unconnected, but rather are highly interconnected and complimentary, supplementing and reinforcing each other.

Freedoms of Process and Opportunity

Sen observes that 'unfreedoms can arise either through inadequate processes (such as the violation of voting privileges or other political or civil rights), or through inadequate opportunities for achieving what they minimally would like to achieve (including the absence of such elementary opportunities as the capability to escape premature mortality or preventable morbidity or involuntary starvation)'. Sen obsen/es that Libertarians en-oneously focus solely on freedom as process (they fail to 'worry at all about whether some disadvantaged people suffer from systematic deprivation of substantive opportunities'), and that Consequentialists erroneously focus solely on freedom as opportunity (they fail to 'worry about the nature of the processes that bring the opportunities about or the freedom of choice people have'). In effect, emphasis of one at the expense of the other inhibits freedom, indeed creates unfreedoms; thus both freedonnsof process and of opportunityare essential to full human freedom and hence to social-economic development. How do these two types of freedoms fit with constitutive and instrumental freedoms? Surprisingly, Sen fails to address this, and thus leaves behind some confusion. Nonetheless, it seems that constitutive and instrumental freedoms include both freedoms of process and freedoms of opportunity. In other words, consf/fuf/Ve freedoms would be the freedoms of process and opportunity which we have reason to value for ourselves, and each of the five instrumented freedoms possesses both process and opportunity elements. For instance, 'political freedoms' would include freedoms of process such as freedom of elections or of public political debate, as well as freedoms of opportunity such as opportunity to vote, or to speak or to run for election. 'Economic facilities' would include freedoms of process such as to open a bank account or to sell one's produce in the local market, as well as freedoms of opportunity such as to actually have local banking facilities or to have sufficient local infrastructure to be able to take one's produce to market. Thus, for each of the five types of instrumental freedoms to be most fully effective, both the process and opportunity elements need to be recognized and enhanced. 128

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\Nhy Is Analysis by 'Freedom' Helpful?

Sen has provided us with his four-fold framework of freedomconstitutive and instmmental freedoms constituted by freedoms of opportunity and process. But what has this proposal gained for us? He contends that his 'freedom' proposal is helpful for two reasons. First, it provides the basis for developmental effectiveness, that is, for forming effective policies and practices for social-economic development. That is, recognition of these various components of human freedom provides substantive principles by which politicians, bureaucrats, businesses, NGOs, and other groups and organizations can develop specific policies, laws, regulations, and guidelines for achieving enhanced individual capabilitiesin other words, for overcoming economic suffering and social oppression. Of course, the specific forms such policies will take will be dependent on local or regional factors. Nonetheless, if this account of freedom is deployed as the guiding framework by which principles of legislation and policy formation are developed, and by which practices for their implementation are enacted, then social-economic development will be the inevitable outcome. Second, the freedom perspective provides a basis for evaluation of development policies, methods, and practices: to what extent are existing policies actually enhancing people's freedoms? Third, the freedom perspective highlights the issues of individual rationality and responsibility, that is, responsibility for the ways of action needed to achieve development. Here he identifies two distinct ways: One is assertion (or, more precisely, self-assertion) of the underprivileged through political organization. The other is solidaritywWh the underprivileged on the part of other members of society, who are...often better placed to advance the cause of the disadvantaged by virtue of their own privileges (e.g., formal education, access to the media, economic resources, political connections). Both self-assertion and solidarity may be regarded as important parts of the creation of social opportunities.^^

6. A Barthian Critique and Appropriation of Annartya Sen

We now arrive at our destination: a theology and practice of freedom for the poor and oppressed. From Barth's perspective, it might look something like this: Humanity is to live righteously, doing so by obedience to the Command of God, which most comprehensively is to love God and to love neighbour as Christ loved us. This love of God for humanity is seen in many ways, one of which is God's gift to us of freedomboth promised(tor eternal life) and natural
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Asia Journal of Theology (for this earthly life). Naturalfreedomis primarilyfreedomfo/=freedomto choose to act and how to act for God, then for others, then foroneself. This freedom is secondarily freedom fromfrom the impositions of sin, of oneself, of others. But it is always and unavoidably freedom withinwithin the constraints of reality, of being historically situated, of our human limitations, of God's will. Freedom /or God means giving God our gratitude and oar obedience, as well as using our freedom responsibly before God. Freedom forothers means using our agency for the freedom of others, doing this for two reasons. First, because of the model oi God: just as God has acted for us by granting us the gift of freedom, so too we are to do likewise for others; and second, on the command of God: God commands us to love others, and to do justice for others, which must necessarily include acting for both the promised and natural freedoms of others. Which particular natural freedoms are needed and by whom will always depend on individual circumstances and conditions. Howwe (individuals or the Church) then act for the sake of freedom and justice (whether of others or of ourselves) will begin with proclamationpronouncement of God's truth, or judgement, or justice, or love, or whatever is the divine message needed at a particular time and place. If in our freedom we decide that further action should be taken beyond proclamation, then any particular action will be determined by our own choices, preferences, decisions, and moral resolve within the delimitations of reality and of God's will as understood through Scripture and doctrine. In his own freedom to choose, Barth resolved to obey God's command to resist evil and love his neighbour by his efforts for particular freedoms forothers and for hinfiselfparticularly freedom from fascism, freedom from the threat of nuclear war, freedom from the exploitation of capitalism, freedom from the political myths of the Cold War. To achieve these, Barth chose to act in particular ways, primarily by proclamation by framing such documents as 'The Barmen Declaration' (1934) and 'The Petition of the Bruderschaften on Atomic Weapons' (1958). Yet, although Barth's choice for himself was to focus on proclamation, he nonetheless advocated other forms of action by others. For instance, he held that there should be Christians who enter politics, 'to act in accordance with the Christian approach and who will thereby prove themselves unassuming witnesses of the gospel of Christ.. .there are too few such Christians.. .'^ There are many spheres of human existence, each of which is subject to God's sovereign desires, and thus God's redemptive,healing agents are needed in the midst of them all.
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Asia Journal of Theology For Barth, whose world was primarily Europe, the threat of nuclear weapons was the greatest social concern of his dayindeed, of such serious consequence that he considered opposition to nuclear war a doctrinal status confessionis. Yet the horrors and the scale of economic suffering and social oppression around the world are so great that I think that, to be consistent, Barth would likewise need to view elimination of economic suffering and social oppression as also a doctrinal status confessionis. Nonetheless, within his own theological terms, his call for action on behalf of the weak against the strong is an example of what he called freedom for near and distant neighbours'.^ In effect, Barth's theology for the poor and oppressed amounts to this: Poverty and oppression are severe, sinful, and unjust limitations on the gift of freedom that God has given humanity and whidi God deeply desires for humanity to fully possess and enact. The Church, which is called to obedience to the Command of God within the totality of its members'lives, is called to carry out acts of proclamationto proclaim the sinfulness of such injustice, to proclaim true freedom in God to the poor and oppressed, and to proclaim both judgement and redemption to the oppressor. The Church is also called to identify those members who choose to act for the natural freedom of its neighbors, both near and far, who live in poverty and oppression; and the Church is to provide such members, who are God's agents ofjustice and freedom, every support they need in their resolve and action on behalf of the poor and oppressed. But what sort of freedoms do the poor and oppressed need? And what sort of actions should be undertaken for them? This is where we begin to engage with Amartya Sen. At a superficial, verbal level, Barth could agree with Sen that freedom is an end in itself; however, Barth and Sen would disagree on the content of such constitutive freedom, to use Sen's term. Here is where the 'doctrinally-constrained' element of Barth's view of faith-and-reason comes into play: Christian doctrine heavily constrains Sen's proposals for the content of 'constitutive' freedom. Barth would see constitutive freedoms as 'the freedoms fo/"for God, for others, for oneself, in that order. This is in direct contrast to Sen's view of the constitutive freedoms as 'those freedoms which we have reason to value' for our individual selves. For Barth, humans do 'the good' when they 'act according to the imperative to do good inherent in the gift of freedom'.^ But for Sen, there is no inherent imperative within freedom to do good; doing good is merely an option if one happens to value doing good. This is an example of the classic contrast between 'pragmatic liberalism' (in the social-political sense, not in the theological sense)^ and 'personal theism'Sen advocates a subjectively-determined set of freedoms as constitutive freedoms, and Barth
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Asia Journal of Theology advocates an externally-determined set of freedoms as constitutive freedoms. Not surprisingly, my own sympathies lie with Barth. Thus it may seem that Barth and Sen are like a whale and an elephant that stare inquisitively at each other from shore and from water, then turn away to pursue their separate interests (to borrow Barth's description of himself and Bultmann). But such a view would be a mistake, for we recall that Barth is also, though secondarily, concerned with freedom fromand this is where Barth and Sen can meet each other, for the poor and oppressed need many of the freedoms from', freedom from those constraints and impositions which keep them bound in poverty and oppression. This is the point at which Barth can happily borrow from Amartya Sen as a particularly helpful resource, for it is here that Sen's proposed instrumentai freedoms, including freedoms of process and opportunity, fulfill Barth's criteriathere appears to be little in Christian doctrine that would constrain Sen's proposals concerning instrumental freedoms. Here we may recall that Barth's provisional borrowing of socialism as his favoured form of political life was a life-long borrowing, socialism proving to be a robust ideological partner for Barth's political theoiogy. Likewise I suspect Sen's proposals concerning instrumental freedoms would prove an equally robust partner for Barth's social-economic theology. In effect, Barth's theology of poverty and oppression, as defined above, can espouse Sen's account of instrumental freedoms, and Christians who are in government, bureaucracy, NGOs, etc., having to form policies and procedures for, and assessments of, action on behalf of the poor and oppressed, can do well to employ Sen's proposals concerning instrumental freedoms. In short, Barth would suggest that Sen's account of 'constitutive freedoms' fails to provide any ground for moral responsibility or any imperative for moral action; yet Barth would also suggest that Christians can faithfully and fruitfully employ Sen's account of 'instrumental freedoms' as a provisional-yet-valuable means of guidance for achieving greater freedom for the poor and oppressed.

Here I am using locus in the historical Reformation sense of loci communes, literally 'common places' but in essence meaning topics' or themes' around which a theological discussion is shaped. See, for instance, Meianchthon's Loci Communes, B'' ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966; German original 1557), in which he empioys 36 lociXo organize his theology. I do not want to caii myseif a Liberation Theoiogian for several reasons: first, as wiil be seen, I do not share its anthropologicai starting point; second, I believe a wider, more comprehensive social-political theology is needed than Liberation Theoiogies seek to 132

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provide; third, the range of theological topics which interest me is much wider than Liberation alone (I am interested in such issues as historicai theology, dogmatic theoiogy, and theological engagement with such areas as philosophy, natural science, sociai science, culture, etc.); fourth, the theological meaning of 'liberation' is much wider than its sense in Liberation Theology, thus true 'Liberation Theoiogy' should include liberation not only from the 'pathologies of poverty and oppression' in the Two-Thirds World, but also from all human pathologies, including the 'pathologies of prosperity' in the Westem World and our spiritual pathologies as well. Of course, poverty and oppression are aiso found in the Westem World, and economic prosperity is aiso found in many parts of the deveioping worid. Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Eliis, On the Moral Nature of the Cn/verse (Minneapoiis: Fortress, 1996), 43-44. I do not want to be a Barthian because I disagree with him on a range of issues: i see naturai theoiogy, whiie not saivif ic, as ad A)oc/y usefui for evangeiism; I see natural law as a valid theologicai resource if fiitered through Christian doctrine and virtue; I see greater value in virtue ethics thctn does Barth, and, at the same time, I also see validity in 'secondary' casuistry; being a 'gender equaiitarian', i disagree with Barth's construal of gender relationships; as well, Barth is f requentiy seen to be either a universalist or an agnostic on soteriology, neither of which I am. Furthermore, we will see that I differ from him in certain methodological respects also. For one of Barth's many articuiations of this point, we may cite his essay The Gift of Freedom' (1956): 'I, too, have heard the news that we can speak about God only by speaking about man....This general statement is hardly disputed among Christian theologians. There is, however, sharp disagreement as to the priority of the two daims. It is my firm conviction that the counter-claim [namely that we can speak about man only by first speaking about God] is the true claim and must come first. Why deny priority to God in the reaim of knowing when it Is uncontested in the realm of being? If God is the first reality, how can man be the first truth?' (italics original); Karl Barth, The Gift of Freedom', in Karl Barth, The Humanity of God(Ridtitnond, VA: John Knox Press, 1960), 69-70. See John Webster, Barfh(London: Continuum, 2000); John Webster, ed.. The Cambridge Companion to Barth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); John Webster, Barth's Moral Theo/ogy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1998); John Webster, Barth's Ethics of RecondliaOon (Cambridge: Cetmbridge University Press, 1995). Webster is aiso the leading English-language interpreter of the German theologian Eberhard Jungel, having written and edited several volumes on Jungel. Webster is Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, University of Oxford, thus Indian readers should note that this is not John C. Webster of Dalit theology repute. Webster, Barth, p.161. Note Hunsinger's similarcommentthat, the later Barth simply did not deveiop a fuii-fledged doctrine of the state, or of Christian participation in its administration'; Hunsinger, 'Karl Barth and the Politics of Sectarian Protestantism: A Dialogue with John Howard Yoder' (1980), in George Hunsinger, Disniptive Grace: Studies in the Theoiogy of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). James Cone, "Looking Back, Going Fonrard," in Darren Mari<s, ed.. Shaping a Theoiogical Mind {MdershoX, UK: Ashgate), 5ff. 133

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Hunsinger, 'Karl Barth and Liberation Theoiogy', in George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theoiogy of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p.55; the comment from Sider is taken from Ronald J. Sider, Cry Justice (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), p.3. Hunsinger, 'Karl Barth and Liberation Theology', 42-59. For Barth, these forces of 'political reaction' or 'reactionary politics' included National Socialism (Nazism), communism, American messianism (ie., those Christians who viewed /Vmerica as God's speciallychosen nation), and anti-communism. (Barth could condemn both communism and anticommunism since t)oth were equaiiy reactionary against God's purposes). Theologians who failed this 'political integrity test', to use Hunsinger's words, included not only the German theologians who supported National Socialism, but also theologians in America like Reinhold Niebuhr who supported American messianism; George Hunsinger, 'Karl Barth and Liberation Theolog/, pp.44-5. For a contemporary critique of Niebuhr, see also Stanley Hauerwas, Within the Grain of the Universe {Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001). Hunsinger, 'Karl Barth and Liberation Theology", p.46, with quote from Church Dogmatics 111/4, p.532. Barth stated that Christianity I s fundamentally on the side of the victims of this disorder [i.e., the sodo-economic-political disorders in Westem society] and is to espouse thei r cause" (111/4, p.544). For more of Barth's critique of both Marxism and capitalism, see Church Dogmaticsm/4, pp.531 -544. Barth, Church Dogmatics, iii/4, p.544. In order to express my own refusal to bow down to the fallaciousness and arrogance of setting 'reason' in contrast to 'faith' (as if reason is not an element already within faith, and as if only the non-faithfui have the right to use the term 'reason'), when using the word 'reason" in the traditional philosophy-of-religion sense of faith-and-reason" I shall keep 'reason' in single quote marks. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.44 (note the word 'effected', not'affected'). Asperthe conventions of his day, Barth used the 'man' to include both men and women; in my direct quotes from Barth, I retain his use of 'man', though when writing in my own words I use 'humanity" or 'peopie'. Kari Barth, The Gift cf Freedom", 92 (italics in original). Barth, ChurchDogmatics\W4, p.585. Barth, Church Dogmatics \\\/A, 544f; italics added. Frei, Types, p.81 (italics added). Interestingly, Frei calls this use of other non-theological sources, third-level' language. I would suggest this helps us understand Barth's use of normal and compressed fonts in his Church Dogmatics: the normal-font discussions constitute his second-order language, that is, his systematic theology, whereas the compressed-tont discussions constitute his first-order (exegetical) and third-order (historicai and non-theological) language. Collectively, they constitute his dogmatic theoiogy. Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p.93. These substantial discussion are found particularly in certain sections of The Word of Gcd {Church Dogmatics 1/2; 19xx), in his discussions of the Freedom of God {Church DogmaticsWh; 19xx) and the Command of God the Creator {Church Dogmatics III/4; 1951), and in his iecture The Gift of Freedom: Foundation of Evangelical Ethics: Foundation of Evangelical Ethics" in Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, J.N. Thomas and T Wiesner, trans. (Richmond, VA; John Knox Press, 1960), pp.69-86. 134

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" John Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought {Grar\d Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), p.99. As to why Barth gives freedom this secondary place, Webster states 'Partly it is Barth's vision of the substance of the Christian faith, and thus his leading concepts and vocabulary are much doserto those of classical Christian theology than those of the dogmatics of modemity, in which freedom has enjoyed a much more conspicuous role,. .But more importantly, the indirectness of Barth's handling of the theme of human freedom derives from a decision,, .which prescribes for human freedom corollary rather than axiomatic status'; p.99,

=* Clifford Green, Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (London: Collins, 1989) " " 2 Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p.69, Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p,71. Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p,72.

'^^ Barth, 'The Gift of Freedom', pp.70-71. " " Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p.75 (italics in original). Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111/4, p,564,

2" Barth, The Gift of Freedom', p.75, ^ Barth, The Gift of Freedom', pp,78-77, "' Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.45

^^ Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.325 (italics added). 33 " 3 Barth, The Gift of Freedom', pp.76-77 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p,336. Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.58O.

3 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p,584, ^^ 'Hence it is by no means the case that God with his demand for obedience overtakes and tramples man to the detriment of his human nature and being, so that the man upon whom this claim is to be made is to be pitied' 566. 3 Barth, Church Dogmatics, lll/4,p.13. 3 In addition to the works by Webster, see also Nigel Biggar, The Hastening that Awaits: Karl Barth's Ethics {Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) and P,D, Matheny, Dogmatics and Ethics: The Theological Realism and Ethics of Karl Barth's 'Church Dogmatics' (Frankfurt am Main: Laing, 1990). *o Barth, T h e Gift of Freedom', p.87. *' Barth,'The Gift of Freedom', p.69 (italics in original). More accurately, Barth gives this as the definition of vanre//ca/(Protestant) ethics. Nonetheless, Barth extends this view of the moral task to all humanity: 'Ethics is reflection upon what man is required to do in and with the gift of freedom'; p,87, Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.568. Barth, C/)un;/i Dofirmafrcs, III/4, p.569. 135

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Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.326. The following overview of Sen's career is provided by Amiya Kumar Bagchi, 'Amartya Kumar Sen and the Human Science of Development', in Economic and Political Weekly, Vcl.XXXIII, No.49 (Dec.5-11,1998), pp. 3139-49. Bagchi'sphrase is the human science of human development'; however, wide as Sen's purview is, I find Bagchi's phrase too wide, for there are many areas of human development into which Sen does not enter, such as resolution of individual psychopathologies, developing creative arts, or enhancing one's spirituality and relationship with God (Sen is an atheist), i find my modification of Bagchi's phrase a more accurate description of Sen's enterprise. Bagchi, 'Amartya Kumar Sen', p.3139. Bagchi, 'Amartya Kumar Sen', p.3148. This fundamental theorem being that 'every Pareto-efficient system can be shown to be consistent with an equilibrium in a model of pure competition and conversely that every purely competitive system has an equilibrium configuration which is Pareto-efficient'; Bagchi, 'Amartya Kumar Sen', p.3144. Bagchi, 'Amartya Kumar Sen', p.3144. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Blaokwell, 1987), p.16 'What can be justifiably seen as overactivity in some fields has been inseparably accompanied by thoroughgoing underactivityin others. It is, thus, not a simple matter of 'more' or 'less' govemment. Rather, it is a question of the type of govemance to have and of seeing the role of public policies in promoting as well as repressing social opportunities'; Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, India: Participation and Development(Ue\N Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.21 (italics in original). Amartya Sen, Developmentas Freedom (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.3 Sen, Development as Freedom, 3-4. Note Sen's repeated point that 'Poverty is the unfreedom of deprivation of basic capabilities (rather than merely low income)' {Developmentas Freedom, 20). The use of ther term "agency" calls for a little clarification. The expression "agent" is sometimes employed in the literature of economics and game theory to denote a person who is acting on someone eise's beha (perhaps being led on by a "principal"), and whose achievements are to be assessed in the light of someone else's (the principal's) goals. I am suing the term "agent" not in this sense, but in its olderand "grander"sense as someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of some extemal criteria as well. This work [Developmentas Freedom] is particularly concemed with the agency role of the individual member of the public and as a participant in economic, social, and politicai actions' (Sen, Developmentas Freedom, p.19). Sen, Developmentas Freedom, p. 18. Sen, Development as Freedom, p. 15. Unless otherwise indicated, the following description of Sen's five instrumental freedoms (including direct quotes) are from Sen, Developmentas Freedom, pp.38-40. Sen, Developmentas Freedom, p.39. Sen, Development as Freedom, p.7. 136

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Sen, Development as Freedom, p.17. Amartya Sen, India: Development and Participation (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.29. Karl Barth, The Christian Community and the Civil Community', sctn.34. Barth, Church Dogmatics 111/4, sctn.54,3, Barth, The gift of Freedom, p,84 See Gary Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 1999),

137