Copenhagen: Climate of Mistrust Author(s): NAVROZ K DUBASH Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No.

52 (DECEMBER 26, 2009-JANUARY 1, 2010), pp. 8-11 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663931 . Accessed: 22/11/2013 05:22
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Copenhagen:
NAVROZ K DUBASH

Climate

of Mistrust

From 'Hopenhagen' to to 'Brokenhagen' Tokenhagen"

The posed mandate Copenhagen to deliver negotiations an "agreed at Bali were sup to ad outcome"

dress climate change, issued

following a negotiation in December 2007.

Twoweeks of wrangling and at theUnited grandstanding

Nations climate change

The

concluded Copenhagen recently talks under the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate

conferenceendedwith the
"Copenhagen Accord", which was a paper-thin cover-up ofwhat was a near complete failure, tomove forward.

Change (unfccc) came at the end of an

intense two-year negotiation process, dot

The two years of negotiationshave been withmuch of theavailablemeeting fraught, time takenup by procedural issues.By early
November of this year, itbecame clear that a

tedwith additional high-levelmeetings, and blessed by the presence ofmore than

legallybindingoutcomewas near impossi ble to achieve in Copenhagen, and discus to alternativeformulations sion shifted and a failure. to ways of avoiding theblame for
The procedurally Rumours were intense approach various conti

though itdoes enable theprocess

130 heads of state.Despite this, the final "CopenhagenAccord" onlybarelypapered

was an almost The complete outcome col calls lapse of negotiations. in fact,

over what

nued through theearlydays ofCopenhagen.

rife about texts be

on the climate These reflections first negotiations provide a brief by a discussion of thekey
negotiation issues that took centre encapsulation of events, followed

intoquestion whether the communityof

nations response can, craft an effective to climate change.

ing prepared, particularlyby the Danish on developing countries hosts, tobe foisted
at the last moment. While many in industri

with alised countriesexpressed frustration the subject of climate change, theword by perceived stonewalling, particularly Afri "community" is singularly inappropriate can nations and small island developing
to capture relations between countries. At states, this view portance failed to appreciate safeguards the im as weap the root, there is a structural tension around of procedural

Part of the problem is that,at least on

stage. It thenprovides a political of theCopenhagen interpretation

and its future prospects.

Accord

ons of the whether and how, the global climate re weak ininternational negotiations. assertivenessof both groups of should reflect the fact that different the Indeed, gime
countries carry different construct levels of respon as one countries, g-77, was sometimes in contradiction to the

The reflections locate theprocess in the contextof the larger, and

unresolved tensions between the North and the South. The article

sibilityforcausing the problem.Develop

ing countries Industrialised the problem

large developing country leaders of the

a political development there was, of note.

of equitable sharingofdevelopment space.

countries frame it as a techno

By thetime theheads of statearrivedfor

the last few days, consensus There followed in essence, no text available for them to sign.

what with an outline of concludes

the Copenhagen

suggests isneeded in the Indian

experience

managerial problem tobe solvedwith the aid of markets.The festering of thistension

has, tween matters was over time, led to deep mistrust be the "North" and the "South". Making more interesting at Copenhagen compris of a new bloc,

when heads of state plunged into direct

negotiation

an extraordinary

24 hours, to some re

climate debate.

A small group of text. ports,directdrafting

of 26 or so countries was of commitment" However, were to pulled resolve into a "circle contentious

and even, according

the emergence

ingChina, India, South Africa and Brazil (basic), which collectivelypushed back
against industrialised countries.

issues. decisions

some reportedly

of the final hard made at a meet

on theCopenhagen In these reflections

negotiations, I locate the Copen

climate

hagen process in the context of these theNorth and the South. I first provide a briefencapsulation of events, followedby a discussion of the key negotiation issues
that took centre stage. I then provide a larger and unresolved tensions between

I remain often through creative disagreement. responsible for all errors and interpretations. Navroz K Dubash with is (ndubash@gmailcom) the Centre forPolicy Research, New Delhi.

I am grateful to Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Girish Sant and Lavanya Rajamani for discussions that have shaped the views expressed here,

The resulting 2.5-page Copenhagen slim Accord,extraordinarily byun standards, was presented to theConferenceof Parties would (cop), with the expectation that it
be adopted as part of the consensus However, ensued. such as out come from the meeting. session another Latin

ing between the United States president who and the leaders of thebasic countries meet thepresident together. decided to

of theCopenhagen political interpretation Accord and itsfuture prospects.The article concludes with reflectionson what the Copenhagen experience suggestsisneeded in the Indian climatedebate.
8 December 26, 2009

fiery night-long American

Some

countries,

Venezuela,

Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia expressed their strongdispleasure at being excluded from
vol xliv no 52 weekly I32S3 Economic& Political

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the process on

and

renounced and

the agreement grounds.

substantive

Others, such as the small island nation of Tuvalu, rejected the Accord as failing to
meet the climate challenge. Yet, others, no

procedural

effect... It's the wrong way to look at this. We absolutely recognise our historical role in putting emissions in the atmosphere that are there now. But the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations, I categorically reject that.3

countriespressed hard, includingthrough

use

con countries African industrialised Instead, Union, theEuropeanUnion tablythe as struct nations the around what island such and other small (eu), they see problem as pragmatic politics aimed at changing went theMaldives, seeminglyreluctantly alongwith theAccord as a necessary first future emission trends rather than around step,albeit a highlyinadequateone. principles to redress past wrongs. This Given the consensus-based nature of the fundamental inconsistency continues to

to demand a second commitmentperiod fortheKyotoProtocol. The nth hour resolution of theCopenha Accord left both gen options open, but somewhat tipped thebalance towards the first. The Accord allows fortwo schedules, one which will contain economy-wide emission targets byAnnex 1 countries,and the other which will documentmitigation tion on both tracks- Kyoto Protocol and
is to continue, leaving open the pos by non-Annex 1 countries. Negotia actions

of procedural

obstacles

and walkouts,

process, thevociferousobjectionsof thefew holdouts seemed to doom adoption of the

Accord. was It

dog thenegotiations andwas only incom pletelyaddressed at Copenhagen.

One Track, Two Track, Train Wreck? Deve

of a second commitment sibility period for lopingcountries foughthard to enshrine the Kyoto Protocol. However, the dual in theBaliActionPlan a "two track" process schedule approach of theAccord suggests a legally thata single,ifsomewhat separated trackis The legal implications of this compromise maintaining strict differentiation: are still Annex 1 likely in the future. out, but itappears to binding Kyoto Protocol track for being figured Developing countries a enable of negotiations, and forward movement have sought to re-inject differentiation countries, "Long-Term Cooperative by albeitwithout the full weight of theParties behind thecompromiseformulation. By any
accounts, it does the result was a near a paper-thin complete tomove cover up of what was enable failure, but forward. Action" countries.

compromisethatthe cop would "takenote of the thanformally Accord rather adopting with an appended list Parties. ofapproving it,

only salvaged

by a last-minute

lca

linkingtheirschedule toArticle 4.1 of the Convention,which provides for far less would be pullingon a string stringentaction than Article 4.2, which ingcountries,
(lca) process for non-Annex 1 Combining unravel tracks, argue develop the entire architecture covers actions by non-Annex 1 countries. In

that would

the process

'Crunch' Copenhagen The concretenegotiation issues that led to parlance of the talks mitigation commit
ments, financing, and measurement, report this impasse, or "crunch" issues in the

of theunfccc built around differentiation between theNorth and the South. But preservationof differentiation in its runsagainst anotherprincipleof pure form significant practical political (ifnot legal)
importance comparability of action. Ever

brief,in response to thechallengeof recon and comparability, the cilingdifferentiation Accord somewhat blurs differ Copenhagen entiation through the schedule approach, and allows for comparability byharmonising
necessary actions by all countries.

us legislative process has constructed "com ingand verification(mrv) reflecttheun overdifferential treatment parability" between themitigation actions What Price Low-Carbon Development? derlyingtension of industrialised and developingcountries.2 of industrialised as The second crunch issue forCopenhagen, and developingcountries 1 countries' stance is a preconditionforitsown domestic climate financing, Central to non-Annex also has itsroots indifferentia theprincipleof "commonbut differentiated legislation. This stanceposes therestof the tion. The principle that industrialised and respective capabilities". world with an unfair choice between sacri countries should pay for the "agreed full responsibilities "Differentiated and hence equity,or cost" of developing incremental countries differentiation, responsibilities" places the ficing on industri providing the world's largest emitter an ex burden of measures is enshrined in the unfccc. The mitigationprimarily
alised countries that are

since itsrejection of theKyotoProtocol, the

downwardandmaking less legallystringent

themajority (75%) of current stocks of

greenhouse phere. Many gas emissions in the atmos point to developing countries

responsible

for

cuse

other Annex demand tions and

to stay out of the regime. In addition, 1 countries quite reasonably comparability erode between Both their ac pressures ei those of the us.

problem standing

was,

and

remains, "agreed" The

that notwith there is no

the word

clarityon thebasis onwhich incremental

costs are to be defined. tice, has been a result, process. in prac bargaining

low per capita emissions, which in India's case is about a tenththatof theus, as evi
negotiation stance around

for comparability ward

differentiation, or downward.

dence of limitedcapabilities.The resultisa

principle-based

ther through harmonisingboth tracksup

to the Kyoto Protocol

the decision rules for sharing climate or

"space" in an equitable way.

To reconcile this issue in their favour, industrialised countriessoughtto merge the

tracks through what became known as the "schedules which

development

The issue is constructed quite differently Australian in the industrialised world. As the lead us allowed Todd Stern,put it in the midst negotiator, of theCopenhagen talks:
.. .for most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, people were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions cause the greenhouse

adaptation and mitigation.Many develop and analysts approach" ingcountries place therequired to inscribe each country its na much The Indian figure government higher.4 tionalactions in a schedule, with provision has consistently demanded that industri foronly a soft formof differentiation by alised countries contribute 0.5 to 1% of
economy-wide actions commitments between versus Annex their gdp

Building on analysis by Nicholas Stern, earlier this year theuk governmentfloated thefigure of$100 billionperyearby 2020 as the cost of supportfordeveloping country

action

a range of national 1 and non-Annex

1 countries.

Developing

tation. Interestingly, in the course of the two both India and China indicated weeks,

for climate mitigation

and adap

weekly Economic & Political

[3353 December 26, 2009

vol xliv no 52 9

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thatthey did notanticipate that defining business-as-usual benefiting greatly to provision of finance, technologyand trajectories on themas a fromthese funds, but insisted coun from industrialised isa highlyuncertain exercise. Collectively capacity support matter of principle,particularlyon behalf tries,but the exact legal drafting leaves however, these are estimated to pledges of smaller developing countries. to on us on a set the 2 well track above open dispute (based interpreta degrees celsius The debate revolvesaround not only the tion of a strategicallyplaced comma!) warming, and perhaps as high as 550 ppm amount of money, but also on questions of whether and how these actions are to be concentrations and 3 degrees celsius, ac mrv. to and as India's an to also that internal secretariat document additionality, predictability governance. subject position, cording
Developing

leaked during the negotiations, a range consistent with independent projections.8 to international mrv, unsupported actions A different and more optimisticview is undertaken as part of a development thatCopenhagen should be judged lessby polluters for past emissions. But at the same strategy as industrialised countries if would time, argue, onlybe subjecttodomesticscrutiny. whether it locked in emission reductions, This issue rapidly became one of the and more bywhether itunlocked thedoor addressingclimatechange requiresrethink to a future and productive deal by address ing development practices, aid patterns potential Copenhagen deal-breakers. Driven over time should also reflect climate con by itsdomesticpolitics,theus insistedthat ingkey sticking points. From thisperspec
countries are correctly con

cerned that climate funds should be addi tional to aid, since these are paymentsby

ofChina,was that while actions supported international finance would be subject by

siderations.

Developing

countries

stress

that climate funds should be predictable, mar and not subject to thevagaries of the
ket. Here, gested Mexico and Norway mechanism have sug a useful of "assessed

(butparticularly China) developingcountries also subject theiractions to international

scrutiny. Under the final compromise, non

tive, articulated among same on a others,

by the un Secretary General that major emitting was coun

Annex 1countries would report upon their

mitigation national actions, with consultations "provisions and analysis for inter under

triesall agreed toplace their pledges on the

record, financing that agreement number, and reached that agree now

contributions" by all on thebasis of a bas ket of criteria.5 However, citingdifferenti ated responsibility, developing countries are strongly funds, opposed to contributing

will ensure clearlydenned guidelines that

that national sovereignty is respected".

mentwas struckon thekey stickingpoint

of international low the process verification to move will al forward.9 Those

This formulation allows the issue to be who see the climate problem throughthe even if it is less than theyreceive. Finally, set aside, but also leaves much scope for lensofus domesticpoliticsare particularly over exactly conflict how to reconcile enthused.10 That the road to passage of us developing countries stronglyargue that future climate funds should not be construed as differentiation with comparability. More domestic legislationis substantially cleared not it even is clear the while aid, but as a response to historical responsi critically, compromise large developing countries, at and India, can declare bility for past emissions, and therefore will pass muster in domestic politics. For notably China should be governed in substantialpart by example, the detailed rules need to allow least a partial victory, is seen as testament to India to claim ithas retained controlover the skilful formulation of a compromise. recipient countries. Of particular contention is thatthe World Bank, controlled bydonors, not be allowed to controlthese funds. Dis
pute over all three issues are closely tied to

itscarbon destiny, while also allowing the us toclaim it now has theright tohold India
to account, a difficult trick to pull off.

However, deal with ciples,

even

we if

accept

that process over prin

is important foritsown sake, the failureto

deeper disagreement around particularly differentiation, themselves once of

theprincipleofdifferentiation. The Copenhagen Accord fails toaddress

adequately It does, in a more however, issues. any of these conceptual place money on the table manner than before,

Interpreting the Accord As the discussion of these crunch issues were able tohold suggests, political leaders
the process together and ensure its continu over, ation, but only by postponing, papering

suggeststhatdeeply ingrained oppositional

stances may well negotiations this perspective sents the worst reassert resume. An extreme version

substantial

nual amounts "approaching$30 billion" a

year for 2010-2020, and $100 billion a year

minute and highly stra triggered by a last us. In the announcement Accord, tegic by the developed countriespledge additional an

or deflectingareas ofdisagreement.Could
terms nonetheless be useful to an outcome?

continuation of the process under these There are multiple ways of asking

veneer of successover what isa layof a thin

deeply cess flawed outcome, From perpetuating a pro a naked that is unable to overcome entrenched

is that Copenhagen repre the over possible outcome

differences.

isnot explicitly additional by 2020. The latter and is tiedto"meaningful mitigationactions

and transparency on implementation".

whether

Copenhagen

was

a meaningful perspective,

failure, followed by a thorough rethink,

would have been a preferred outcome.

this perspective,

step. From a strictly emissions variety of country pledges 1 country pledges aggregate to 6-14% below

theCopenhagen process did culminate ina

to emission are estimated 1990 levels cuts. to by Annex

Measurement, Verification
One of the more

Reporting,
arcane but also critical

will have tobe gener Accord) any rethink

ated from national politics around climate

Whether induced throughabject failure or near failure (as with the Copenhagen

issues pertained to whether and how developing countryactions unsupported by financialaid would be subject tomrv. The Bali Action Plan links developing countries' appropriate mitigationactions" "nationally

short of the ipcc call for 2020, substantially

a 25-40% reduction.6 Non-Annex 1 countries

change, particularly in the large industri

alised and developing countries. In many

do better,with the aggregate of their ways, then,the implications ofCopenhagen pledges approaching the higher end of and its impact on the global climate re theirsuggestedrangeof a 15-30%deviation gime now rest with the domestic response
from business as usual,7 with the caveat 26, 2009

will unfold innational polities. that What

vol xliv no 52

10 December

weekly Economic& Political

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sortsofdiscussion and engagement should the Copenhagen Accord and the process that led to it, provoke in India? Copenhagen
Minister Forests, Jairam

being tagged as deal-breakers, in part world average.15 Engaging this problem thanks to the alliance with other basic will require developing a more sophisti countries and coverfromthe Africangroup cated and nuanced notionofdifferentiation, who foughtstrongly fortheKyotoProtocol.
At the same time, a clear lesson emerging is that, without a broader even while

Accord
Ramesh,

and India
and the has offered

As this example suggests, thereare no

easy mate answers in formulating is no reason, India's however, cli to policy. That

preserving

India's

interests.

of State

for Environment

from Copenhagen

conclusion that theCopenhagen Accord is a "good deal" for India. This perspective
seems to be based on the claim that India's specific verifi "redlines" peaking of no cuts, no nationally year, and no international

tensionaround thestructural political shift, versus comparability that differentiation dominates the climate negotiationswill
lead inexorably to a watered weak outcome. down And and en India's

duck asking the challenging questions. One important question thatemerges from Copenhagen is whether and how India
can both forge a climate national plans position, and in terms of international

vironmentally numerous

cationhad been met. And indeed,fromthe a debate in the and from earlynews reports on the Sabha Rajya Copenhagen meeting, it ison these redlines,and on thequestion
of international that the national Inter-country verification, debate equity in particular, a consequent is engaged.11 and

will be prominentand poor and vulnerable

amongst the losers. This is a

compellingreason forthenational political debate leading forwardfrom Copenhagen

to consider not only preservation of differ

strategythatnot only preserves differen tiation in the interests of equity,but also

promotes an environmentally effective

but also whether and how India entiation, can play a role in turning what isnow a vi
cious circle of environmentally weak meas

global process thatprotects thevulnerable in India and elsewhere. There may not be a good answer to thisquestion, but so far, ithas not received the focus itdeserves in
national climate debate. India's

need for differentiation in commitments ures towards a virtuous circle that rewards are indeed important and need to strong national environmental actions. To objectives, be maintained and discussed at thehighest do sowill be to seek creative ways past the to climate change, a point strongly empha
level. But given India's extreme vulnerability structural tension described here that cur in inter rently inhibits forward movement national

and how theCopenhagenAccordwill make a meaningfulcontribution to addressingthe

sised by the minister and otherpoliticians in theLok Sabha and in the media, surelyit is equally importantto discuss whether

This is by no means
naivete, and argue

climate negotiations.

to succumb to
measures

for unilateral

that will win other countriesover onlyby

force of example the contrary. or moral suasion. has Quite Copenhagen reinforced

threatof climate change and India's role in achieving thisobjective going forward.
Indeed, there has been a growing demand

theperception that,other than theus and

China, no single country can shape the course of the climate negotiations. Constructing

fromcivil society within India to broaden

the climate only also concerns debate to take seriously not of inter-country threat as concerns equity, but of climate

the environmental as well

change,

equity.12 As the poorest climate

these

of intra-country statements emphasise, vulnerable in India

andwill requiregreater strategic skill than buildingone around a singleobjective,not

least because between there may well to preserve basic pressure be trade-offs the two negotiation objectives. the principle

a negotiating strategyaround the dual objectives of equity and environmental more challenging will be far effectiveness

NOTES_ 1 These were among the creative labels put out by the crowds of high energy and deeply committed civil society groups swarming the conference. 2 See Lavanya Rajamani, DifferentialTreatment in InternationalEnvironmentalLaw (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress), 2006, pp 138-44. 3 Quoted in Darren Samuelsohn, "No 'Pass' for Stern", Developing Countries in Next Treaty Greenwire, 12 September 2009. World Bank, Devel 4 See, forexample, Table 6.2 in opment and Climate Change, World Development DC: World Bank), p 260. Report 2010 (Washington 5 All Parties would contribute,but thatdeveloping countrieswould be net recipients. 6 http://www.climateactiontracker.org/developed.php 7 See, for example, the UNFCCC Executive Secre tary's press conference at http://wwwio.copi5. meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play. php? id_kongressmain=i&theme=unfccc&id_ kongresssession=2759 8 Climate Action Tracker places the likely range of temperature rise at 2.8 to 4.5 degrees C. http://

and most

will be the worst hurt fromthe impactsof

change; equity and environmental effectiveness However, dominant country are closely consistent political equity, linked. with emphasis the hitherto on inter strategy evolves

a strategic of differentiation, alliance with

China and other countries as a way and of maintaining for action

For example,

www.climateactiontracker.org/. 9 See UN Secretary General, "Outcome of theUnit ed Nations Climate Change Conference",21Decem ber 2009, Press release.UNIC/PRESS RELEASE/162 2009. 10 See, for example,http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ ddoniger/the_copenhagen_accord_a_big_st.html 11 The actual extentof thecompromise will only emerge when thedetails are drafted. The salientquestion is whether enough gainwas made fortheoffer of "con and analysis"on unsupportedactions. sultation 12 See, for example, "Memorandum to the Govern ment of India on theUNFCCC's 15thConference of the Parties at Copenhagen" of December 8, 2009 signed by over 120 groups, and a Statement ofTISS/AIPSN Workshop on "Breaking theDead lock in Climate Change Negotiations", Mumbai, with 31 July-iAugust 2009 (Note; Iwas involved, others, indrafting this second statement.) 13 The tension between keeping the pressure on the US and being aware of China's growing emissions is increasinglydiscussed in themedia. See Surya Sethi, "Succumbing to Pressure", Times oflndia, 21December 2009. 14 Using Waxman Markey Projections for the US, 20% cuts from 1990 forEU and 40-45% reduc tions in intensityfor China. 15 Prayas, "Comparing Climate Announcements", www.prayaspune .org.

so far has had a singleoverriding objective

of ensuring the climate regime

India's negotiation

preserving the Kyoto Protocol proved to be extremelyuseful, and was the right
thing to do. However, if environmental ef

in a manner tightlyconsistentwith the fectivenessisalso an objective, then in the principle of differentiatedresponsibility. near future,thehigh and growing levelof The strategy has, so far, largelydelivered emissions fromChina will also become a the objective sought: India has limited concern.13 Based on current pledges for
international commitments, process came we the architec remains two close action,14 by 2020, emissions will China's emissions will be ture of the climate track (although

2.4 times thatof theus, and itsper capita

be 55-60% as much as us

to losing thebattle fortheKyoto Protocol at Copenhagen) andwe managed to avoid

weekly Economic& Political Q3S9 December 26, 2009

perilously

levelsbut 15-30%higher thaneu per capita

emissions and well above the expected vol xliv no 52 11

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