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Questions for GAO Interviews on U.S. Embassy

Non-Immigrant Visas (NIV) Policies and Procedures (as of 4/17/02)

Name: Andrew B. Mitchell

Date: 19 April 2002 Post: AMEMBASSY Algiers

1) Has your post made any of the following changes to the NTV application and approval process
since September 11, 2001 ? (Check all that apply)

Yes No N/A
a. Strengthened anti-fraud programs X
b. Instituted new or changed existing standards on how closely an X
applicant's name and date of birth must match the name and date
of birth returned by CLASS (before consular officers submit
requests for a Security Advisory Opinion)
c. Reduced the availability of personal appearance waiver X
programs
d. Increased the percentage of NIV applicants who are X
interviewed
e. Other (please specify)

f. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

AMEMBASSY Algiers operates on a manned drop-box basis. Applications are very
thoroughly screened before they ever enter the consulate. The consulate's entire work-load
would likely qualify as drop-box in most embassies in the world.

Post already thoroughly scrutinizes all cases for signs of fraud. Staffing limitations
(Algiers has no full-time consular officers) make any increased anti-fraud efforts non-feasible.
2) About what percent of NIV applicants were interviewed at your post (a) in the 12 months
prior to September 11, 2001, and (b) since September 11, 2001?

a. 12 months prior to September 11,2001 16 %

b. Since September 11,2001 28%

Please provide additional comments, if any.

3) In your opinion, to what extent, if any, do the following security procedures and requirements
help your post's consular officers identify potential terrorists?
(Please check one box in each row.)

Great extent Some extent No extent Not sure No basis to judge

a) Security Advisory X
Opinion for selected
individuals from States
Sponsoring International
Terrorism (see State
109933)
b) Visas Viper Committees X
c) CLASS name check s X
d) The 20-day waiting X
period for selected
applicants (see State
196355)
e) Requirement that X
applicants provide
information on the DS-157
form
f) The Visas Condor X
process (see State 015702)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

The Visas Condor process, although difficult is a great comfort to consular officers. It is good to
know that applicants are being broadly screened throughout the USG.
4) For your post, to what extent, if any, would the following proposed changes to the NIV
application process help identify potential terrorists? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some-whal Not

helpful helpful helpful Not sure
a. Interview a greater percentage of all applicants X
(If you check very or somewhat helpful, please
indicate the percentage %)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying X
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
g. Make the visa process a law enforcement X
function (If you check yes, please elaborate in the
comments section on how this should be
accomplished, e.g., should the function remain
within State or be moved to another agency)
h. Other (please specify)

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Fingerprinting of applicants would only be effective if a mechanism were put in place to

compare the fingerprints to those of known criminals or terrorists in a timely manner. In the
absence of drastic technological improvements (i.e. immediate electronic fingerprint comparison
at post), fingerprinting applicants will cause serious delays to legitimate (non-terrorist) travelers
without guarantees of increased protection. I personally have doubts that fingerprints sent in to
Washington would get appropriately screened.
The Visa function should be made a law enforcement function only to the extent that it
gives consular officers access to the full store of information available to the law enforcement
agencies. In fact, there is no real need to change the visa function. The failure of the law
enforcement agencies to fully open their record to be used in the CLASS lookout system is a
demonstration of the kind of arrogance that puts protection of "turf" at a higher priority then
protecting the borders. There is no way a consular officer doing a line interview can catch a
determined terrorist through interview alone. If someone in our government knows the identity
of a terrorist and does not put that information in the system, they are blinding the officer who is
in the position to keep the terrorist out.
5) How feasible would it be for your post to implement the following proposed changes to the
NTV process? (Please check one box in each row.)

Very Some- Not Not

feasible what feasible feasible sure

a Interview a greater percentage of all applicants (If X

you check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate
the percentage 90 %)
b. Interview all applicants X
c. Fingerprint a percentage of all applicants (If you X
check very or somewhat helpful, please indicate the
percentage %)
d. Fingerprint all applicants X
e. Improve training for consular officers in identifying
suspected terrorists, cooperating with other agencies/
international organizations, and cultural sensitivity
f. Make the visa process a law enforcement function X
g. Institute a secure travel document that incorporates a X
biometric such as fingerprints
h. Other (please specify)

i. Other (please specify)

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Training to identify suspected terrorists would be good if it would work, I strongly doubt
that it will. Trained, professional terrorists are not going to give themselves up under simple
questioning at a consular window. Those who would give themselves up are likely to already be
spotted during interview. The key is not training but information sharing. If a certain social
organization has terrorist links, the entire consular core should be notified. The same goes for
specific businesses. If the "law enforcement agencies" do not want to share the information that
they have with consular officers, then there is no way we ca act on it.
6) Would any of the following factors make it difficult for your post to fully implement the
proposed changes listed in questions 4 and 5? (Please check one box in each row.)

Yes, to a great extent Yes, to some extent No Not sure

a. Consular staffing shortages X
b. Lack of space, facilities X
c. An adverse effect on U.S. interests X
in the host country (please elaborate
in comments section)
d Host country would require same X
of U.S. citizens (reciprocity)
e. Other (please specify) X

Please provide additional comments, if any.

Other, not only would staffs and spaces have to be drastically increased (two or three
fold) but equipment would also have to be added. More interviews = more windows = more
computers = more applicants = more guards = more admin staff to handle guard HR needs .

US interests would no doubt be affected but, in my view, that is of a lesser importance than
keeping terrorists off of US soil.