MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Follow-up interview of Jack SJ I former FAA liaison to the FBI

Type: Interview

Date: June 14, 2004

Special Access Issues: SSI

Prepared by: JohnRaidt

Team: 7 \s (non-Commission): Jack 3 I FBI: Bob Sinton, FBI G

office.

Participants (Commission): John Raidt, Lisa Sullivan, and Bill Johnstone

Location: FBI Headquarters, Washington, DC

Background ,--"""//9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

See memorandum for the record of first interview of Jack

FBI's Civil Aviation program

[U] fl inote'd that Bev Wright who served as manager of the FBI's Civil Aviation
Program was very conversant with FAA operations. If there! were anything alarming
regarding civil aviation security she would share the information with him. He stated that
she had an "open door" policy and was always calling him V/ith information. She had
good relations with the field offices and the agents who served as liaisons with local
airports. He said that he did riot recall Ms. Wright expressing any concern that she might
not be receiving information from the field pertinent to civil javiation.

Ressam \] Mr. a Iwas told by Mr. Raidt that the FAA re

(who was seeking to attack Los Angeles Airport) as an example of where the FBI failed
to share with FAA threat information of direct interest to Has agency. In previous
interviews, FAA officials told the Commission they learned from news reports, not the
FBI, that Ressam was seeking to attack civil aviation. SI Jsaid he was aware the FAA
thought that the FBI was holding back information but he said the charge was absolutely
untrue. He recalled that FBI did find a map in Ressam's possession that had a circle
around Los Angeles, but there was no way to discern that his target was the airport.
9 Isaid that Ressam's plan to attack LAX came out during the prosecution and
everyone (including the press, the FBI and the FAA) learned about the plot at the same
time.

Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC

[U] 9 Isaid he recalled the Libyan threat to slam a plane into the WTC and that he
officially assessed it as unrealistic. He said the threat information was that the Libyans
were considering frying a Libyan plane into the WTC. There was an embargo on Libya
at the time and the Libyan's were riot allowed to fly outside of certain airspace. He didn't
believe that they had the aircraft that had the range to get to the U.S. or the ability to
carry-out the threat since they were restricted to certain airspace. When asked whether at
the time he considered the possibility that the Libyans might hijack an airplane to conduct
the attack, Mr. SI Iresponded that there was nothing in the intelligence reporting to
suggest that was what they had in mind. ..

UBL flight training in the U.S. ;;,

,.•••'9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
[U] Mr. SI tsaid that he started looking at UBL when he fyas assigned to the State
Department in 1992. He has always been aware that UBL d^rjended on pilots so that he
could engage in extensive private air travel. He was also aw^re ih a general sense that
because the U.S. trained so many of the world's pilots, UBLfmight have associates
training in U.S. flight schools. He said.it was simply a matte^ of common sense.
However, he was not aware of any particular individual whope FBI knew to be affiliated
with UBL or al Qaeda in flight training, but whom the BureaU let alone because they
were training for transportation purposes rather than terrorist Attacks.

Phoenix EC \] Mr. 3 Isaid that he remembers receiving a c

asking if the FAA had a database of Arab students enrolled in flight training. SI I told
her they did not have such a database, but asked if they were interested in any particular
person or if there was some specific concern. The agent told a • Ithat their seemed to
be a lot of Arab students in flight training in the Phoenix area. ^ i told us that in the
pre 9/11 environment it would not have occurred to anyone to keep track 6f such things.
He believes doing so would have been a violation of the privacy act. Mr. Si I renal led
that "profiling" was considered a dirty word. This was the reason the name of CAPS
(computer assisted profiling system) was changed to CAPPS (computer assisted
passenger prescreening system) in 1998.

[U] Because he received the call prior to the issuance of the Phoenix EC, he believes it
was a precursor to the memo. He reiterated that he did not see the Phoenix EC until after
9/11. He agreed that it had been received by individuals within the FBI's Radical
Fundamentalist Unit where he worked, and that he should have been given the
information. He's not sure why he didn't.
9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

FBI's 1998 tasking of field offices to examine flight schools

(U] S| Istated that he does hot remember being informed of the tasking, but that such
a tasking would be the kind of information that.either he or Bev Wright should have
received. The interviewers told Mr. Si I that agenift "~ jwho worked on the
tasking stated that he had run the information past him. Mr. S\ ^aid it is possible that
he saw it, but hie just doesn't recall.

Moussaoui

[U] Mr\I beiterated what he previously told the commission that he saw a draft and
the distributed copy of the £sC from the FBI Minneapolis Field Office regarding the
Moussaoui case. He said that the EC did not include any analysis about the extent of the
terrorist threat that Moussaoui might pose; He said that EC's convey facts not conjecture.
The communication laid out the facts of the case and said nothing about the possibility
that Moussaoui Wight be working with others in a terrorist plot.

[U] He recalled that he orally briefed ClaudioManno and Pat Durgin of FAA's
intelligence bureau at FAA's office the Thursday or Friday following the 18th of August.
Hb told them that Moussaoui was engaged in advanced flight training and had raised
\. The subject was in custody on immigration charges. There were no
s. And the FBI needed a few days to find out what was going on.

[y] <j bald he did not tell Manno or Durgin about the specifics of why Mdussaoui
raised suspicions such as his lack of interest in learning to take-off and land, etc, a I
stated to the Commission that he was instructed by the FBI (possibleC t) not to
tell them too much. Mr. ^ Xhe^BI did not want information to get out that might
complicate the inyestigation!~3l_]said that if the FAA sent out a warning to airports
abo^t the arrest, it could interfere or damage the investigation. SI I never sent anything
in wiiting to the FAA about the case. He then went on a family vacation and returned the
Tuesday after Labor pay. He was not aware that a Minneapolis field agent had urged
headquarters to warn the Secret Service because of the threat Moussaoui might pose to
Washington DC, nor was he aware of the "brainstorming" sessions held in Minneapolis
where 6ne of the agents opined that Moussaoui might be training to slam an airplane into
the WTC. \] Mr. 3 |was asked abput the CIA product regarding Moussaoui including the

memo that went to CIA Director Tennant titled "Islamic Extremist Learns How to Fly,"
and the CIA cable to stations overseas calling Moussaoui a possible hijacker who might
be plotting to attack the U.S. 3 Idid not see this information. However he said that
we need to asld I who was the FAA liaison to the CIA whether he saw the
information and why he didn't pass it onto FAA Intelligence. §_ |said he did learn
about information provided by the French that Moussaoui had terrorist connections, but
only after he got back from vacation on the 4th. He added that it would be interesting to

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

9/11 Closed by Statute
_-,aw Enforcement
, , _ . . . Privacy
7
-*n /i i Law
'9/11 T ^ ^ j. Privacy
Enforcement ^•
Closed by Statute J

know if! I passed alone t6 FAA intelligence this infbrination as well as the
CIR from CIA about alHazmi arid Mihdar..that came in on August 23rd.

[U] 9 Isaid that in the midst of the Moussaoui issue the FAAifFBj was also dealing
with six Pakistani's in Bolivia who \Vere subjecte of great concern to aviation security.

[U] SI [stated that FAA did receive tbi Sept. 4th teletype sent out by the FBI to
agencies including the FAA giving details about the Moussaoui arrest. SI I stated that
neither he nor the FBI were tasked by the FAA to provide any additional information or
conduct any particular follow-up.

Workload / \] Mr. SI feaid that he was caught bet

detailee. He was trying to serve two fnasters who had very different expectations of him.
Mr. said that he didn't have written job description but that having one might have helped
clarify his role and expectations for everyone. He stated that he was grossly overworked.
His phone never stopped ringing at home and at work. He said the watch officers at FAA
would send volumes of question^ to him because it was easy for them to do. They did
not appreciate the difficulties and constraints of living hi the operational wofld. Part of
the problem is that the ClintonVGore administration downsized the intelligence
community wlu^h put too miich stress on the system. \i Flights

[U] SI tsaid that the Saudi Embassy arranged for charter transport of certain people
from the country in the, aftermath of 9/11 because of security concerns for their people.
He remembered that he was working in FBI Headquarter's Operations Center in the
aftermath of 9/11. He received a call from a desk officer at the State Department'^
counter-terrorism unit (SCT). They wanted to be sure that the FBI was in the loop \g the request from the Saudi

whatever action >vas necessary to ensure that people were cleared before they were
allowed to depart. This information was fed up the food chain to Director Mueller. Si
said that the FBI wanted everyone checked out and to his knowledge this was done. He
stated that the State Department did not press the FBI to take any shortcuts in checking
these people but.

[U] SI tsaid that the effort to assure that passengers were cleared was well coordinated
among customs/INS/etc. He remembered that he lashed up the FBI with FAA Air traffic
control. He stated that air traffic management would not clear any flights to depart until
the FBI gave the clearance.
il Law Enforcement Privacy

SEIBS

Si Isaid that the Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs mirrored the President's
Daily Brief and it would be interesting to see what the SEIB's on those days had to say
about the threat and the information about hijacking that the president received.

April 2001 Request for Information from FAA Intelligence Watch

[SSI] Mr. SI I was shown a watch log entry indicating that he/FBI had been asked
some questions regarding alQaeda's knowledge of technical aviation information,
including piloting skills(stemming from an al Qaeda threat to attack planes in Egypt with
surface to air missiles (SAM's). According to FAA intelligence officials the FBI never
responded to their questions. Mr. SI Isaid that he didn't remember the tasking but he
was sure that he would have passed it along. He allowed as perhaps the FBI didn't
answer the questions. He said FAA wrote lots of questions for FBI to answer.