RULE 62: INTERPLEADER 1. Ocampo v.

Tirona Facts: Ocampo bought the subject parcel of land from Rosauro Breton, heir of the registered owner Alipio Breton Cruz. Tirona, tenant of Breton, was informed of this arrangement and started paying Ocampo rent. ome months thereafter, Ocampo recei!ed a letter from Callejo "aw Office stating that Tirona will stop paying rent because the area has been declared under area for priority de!elopment. Ocampo then wrote a demand letter for payment of rental. #espite receipt of said letter, Tirona failed and refused and still fails and refuses to heed Ocampo$s demands. Ocampo then filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against Tirona before the %TC. Tirona answered by asserting that #ona &aneza was the owner, not Ocampo. Tirona subse'uently filed a motion for lea!e to amend her answer because a lawyer did not assist her in her initial answer. (n her amended answer, Tirona maintained that Ocampo is not the owner of the subject land. Tirona also alleged that she has a right of first refusal in case of sale of the land. %TC ruled in fa!or of Ocampo because of non)payment of rent and because of the termination of Tirona$s right to possess and occupy the subject land. Tirona changed theory in the RTC and raised that it was Rosauro$s sister %a. "ourdes who could !alidly sell the land to Ocampo. The court did not belie!e her and still ruled in fa!or of Ocampo. CA considered partition of the estate of Alipio as a prere'uisite to Ocampo$s action so it re!ersed the decision of the %TC and RTC. Issue: *ho has the right of possession of the subject land+ *hat should ha!e been filed by Tirona to show good faith of Tirona in not paying rent+ Decision: Ocampo has a better right. All the elements of unlawful detainer are present. Tirona ob!iously is in bad faith. The good faith of Tirona is put in 'uestion in her preference for %aria "ourdes Breton)%endiola when Ocampo informed her earlier that the land has already been sold to him. As a

sta e!o"#er$ Tirona s!ou"# !ave use# reasona%"e #i"i&ence in !ai"in& t!e conten#in& c"aimants to court. Tirona nee# not !ave a'aite# actua" institution o( a suit %) Ocampo a&ainst !er %e(ore (i"in& a %i"" o( interp"ea#er. An action (or interp"ea#er is proper '!en t!e "essee #oes not no' t!e person to '!om to pa) renta"s #ue to con("ictin& c"aims on t!e propert) Note: The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and as,s that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themsel!es entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be re'uired to litigate among themsel!es, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double !e-ation in respect of one liability. *hen the court orders that the claimants litigate among themsel!es, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross)complaint 2. Pra*e#es A"vere+ v. ,ommon'ea"t! Facts: .laintiffs alleged that they are bringing an action in behalf of themsel!es and / thousand other persons in that they are in possession for many years of lots on which they now ha!e their houses and agricultural land. These lands are found within 0acienda de an .edro Tunasan. They do not claim to be owners of the said lands but rather only of the impro!ements thereon. They allege that they are entitled to occupy the same because it is where they ha!e li!ed as well as their predecessors in interest and that they recognize in fa!or of someone their obligation to pay reasonable rent o!er their occupation and that the true owner is the go!ernment by

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

!irtue of escheat. This was ac'uired by the go!ernment through the death of Rodriguez de 1igueroa without lea!ing any heir and his 2 minor daughters not lea!ing any heirs also. Colegio de an 3ose and Carlos &oung are claiming the estate. 0owe!er, defense alleged that Colegio de an 3ose, through the 3esuits, had practiced 4 ubstitucion .upilar5 and had administered and managed the estate until they succeeded to appropriate the same, considering it as part of the temporal property of the church. But after the 3esuits were e-pelled, it was confiscated by the panish go!ernment and after the .hilippine go!ernment passed laws, the ownership of such lands passed on to the current go!ernment and that the municipality of an .edro has a right to a hacienda for the e-clusi!e benefit of its inhabitants6 and that the Colegio de an 3ose should render an accounting of the rentals which it has been collecting from the hacienda, which should not be less than .78,888. Issue -1 alleged that an interpleader is a petition, hence cannot be subject to demurrer. The action of interpleader, under section 928, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, comes to court and as,s that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themsel!es entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be re'uired to litigate among themsel!es, in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to protect him against a double !e-ation in respect of one liability. *hen the court orders that the claimants litigate among themsel!es, there arises in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in suc! a case t!e p"ea#in& '!ic! initiates t!e action is ca""e# a comp"aint o( interp"ea#er an# not a cross. comp"aint. 0ence, demurrer is proper.

Issue -2 alleged is that the interpleader is effecti!e against the go!ernment despite it not gi!ing its consent. P!i"ippine ,ommon'ea"t! /overnment cannot %e compe""e# to "iti&ate 'it!out its consent$ '!ic! a"so !o"#s true in an action (or interp"ea#er. T!ere is no su%stantia" #i((erence %et'een ma in& it #e(en# itse"( a&ainst it 'i"" in a case '!ere it is a #e(en#ant an# compe""in& it$ 'it!out its consent$ to interp"ea# in an action commence# %) anot!er person. (n one and the other case it is compelled, without its consent, to maintain a suit or litigation, and this is what the legal principal prohibits. Issue -0 alleged that Colegio de an 3ose, %unicipality of an .edro and the :o!ernment are contending o!er the right of collecting the rents o!er the hacienda, hence interpleader proper. An action of interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for "ac o( t!e %asis o( reason re"ie# upon %) t!e p"ainti((s in t!eir comp"aint$ name")$ t!at t!ere are t'o entities$ t!e ,ommon'ea"t! o( t!e P!i"ippines an# t!e ,o"e&io #e 1an 2ose$ conten#in& over t!e !acien#a an# c"aimin& to %e entit"e# to co""ect t!e rent or canon comin& t!ere(rom. ,ar"os 3oun& is not inc"u#e# %ecause accor#in& to !is o'n a#mission$ !e is a mere "essee o( t!e ,o"e&io #e 1an 2ose$ Inc.$ an# #oes not c"aim an) ri&!t o( o'ners!ip a#verse to t!e "atter. (t also appears from the allegations said complaint of interpleader that the municipa"it) o( 1an Pe#ro a"so a#mits t!at t!e ,ommon'ea"t! o( t!e P!i"ippine is t!e o'ner o( t!e !acien#a %) trans(er an# ri&!t o( esc!eat. Issue -4 has to do with the holding of the court that the comp"aint o( interp"ea#er o( t!e municipa"it) o( 1an Pe#ro is premature inasmuc! as t!ere !as %een no or#er )et t!at t!e #e(en#ant "iti&ate amon& t!emse"ves. (n the opinion of the court it is necessar) t!at t!ere %e a #ec"aration to t!is e((ect %e(ore t!e #e(en#ant

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

ma) "iti&ate amon& t!emse"ves an# (i"e a comp"aint o( interp"ea#er. ection 928 of the Code of Ci!il .rocedure in truth re'uires such and good practice demands that the defendants be not permitted to file claims or complaint of interpleader until after the court has ordered that they should litigate among themsel!es. This procedure will do way with groundless suits, and will sa!e the parties time, incon!enience, and unnecessary e-penses. 0. 5ac 5ac /o"( v. 5on FA,T1: *ac, *ac, :olf ; Country Club <4Corporation5=, a non)stoc,, ci!ic and athletic corporation organized under the laws of the .hilippines, filed a complaint of interpleader. (t alleged, for its first cause of action, that defendants "ee *on and Bien!enido Tan were both claiming ownership o!er the Corporation$s membership fee certificate <4%1C5= 289> *on, by !irtue of the decision of the C1( of %anila in ci!il case 278?? and by %1C 289)serial no. 9?@A issued on Oct. 9@, 9B7C by the deputy cler, of court for and in behalf of the president and secretary of the corporation and of the .eople$s Ban, ; Trust Company6 Tan, on the other hand, by !irtue of %1C 289) serial no. 99BB issued on 3uly 2?, 9B/8 pursuant to an assignment in his fa!or by wan, Culbertson and 1ritz, the original owner of %1C 289. 1or its second cause of action, the Corporation alleged that %1C 289)serial no. 9?@A issued by the deputy cler, of court in behalf of the Corporation is null and !oid because it was issued in !iolation of the Corporation$s by)laws, which re'uire the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding %1C 289 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the C1( of %anila in ci!il case 278?? is not binding upon defendant Tan. The Corporation prayed for the issuance of an order re'uiring "ee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims, declaring who the lawful owner of %1C 289

is, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of %1C 289) serial no. 9?@A issued in the name of "ee. The trial court dismissed the complaint upon motion of the defendants on the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. I11UE: *hether or not the action of interpleader was proper and timely filed. 6ELD: Do. The upreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. The action of interpleader, under E928 of the Code of Ci!il .rocedure, is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and as,s that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themsel!es entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be re'uired to litigate among themsel!es in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double !e-ation in respect of one liability. A sta,eholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. 0e need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. 0e should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in !iew of the en!ironmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. (f a sta,eholder defends a suit filed by one of the ad!erse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on ha!e that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. (n the case at hand, the Corporation allowed ci!il case 278?? to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory e-planation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. (n this factual

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late. A successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated ad!ersary in an interpleader suit and compelled to pro!e his claim anew against other ad!erse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attac, upon the judgment. (n fine, the interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in ci!il case 278?? and, therefore, its application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attac, upon the final judgment in the said ci!il case6 "ee had already established his rights to %1C 289 in the ci!il case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said ci!il case might e!entually be ta,en away from him6 and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed ine-cusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay. 4. Ramos v. Ramos Facts: .etitioners are children of the late .aulino F. Chanliongco, 3r., who was the co)owner of a parcel of land in Tondo. The other co)owners were his siblings> Darcisa, %ario and Antonio. By !irtue of a .A e-ecuted by the co)owners in fa!or of Darcisa, her daughter Adoracion had sold the lot to respondents. Because of the conflict among the heirs of the co)owners as to the !alidity of the sale, respondents filed with the RTC a Complaint for (nterpleader to resol!e the !arious ownership claims. The RTC upheld the sale insofar as the share of Darcisa was concerned. (t ruled that Adoracion had no authority to sell the shares of the other co)owners, because the .A had been e-ecuted in fa!or only of her mother Darcisa. The CA held that the sale was !alid. This 9BB/ decision was not appealed6 it became final. (n 9BBB, petitioners filed with the CA a %otion

to et Aside the #ecision, contending that they had not been ser!ed a copy of either the Complaint or the summons, nor been impleaded as parties to the case. CA denied their motion. Issue: *GD the CA erred in denying petitioners$ motion and allowing its decision to ta,e its course, inspite of its ,nowledge that the lower court did not ac'uire jurisdiction o!er the person of petitioners and passing petitioners$ property in fa!or or respondents, hence without due process of law. 6e"#: The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader to determine the ownership of the real property in 'uestion. pecifically, it forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among themsel!es as to which of them owned the property. Hssentially, it sought to resol!e the ownership of the land and was not directed against the personal liability of any particular person. (t was therefore a real action, because it affected title to or possession of real property. As such, the Complaint was brought against the deceased registered co)owners, as represented by their respecti!e estates. Clearly, petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of .aulino. They had no standing in court with respect to actions o!er a property of the estate, because the latter was represented by an e-ecutor or administrator. Thus, there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case, inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co)owners had already been made parties. Inder the former rules <when the complaint was filed=, an e-ecutor or administrator is allowed to either sue or be sued alone in that capacity. (n the present case, it was the estate of petitioners$ father .aulino, as represented by ebrio Tan Juiming and Associates, that was included as defendant and ser!ed summons. As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Dot being parties, they were not entitled to be ser!ed summons.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

7. 8e"tran v. Peop"e9s 6omesite

Facts: An interpleader suit was filed on August 29, 9B72, by plaintiffs 3ose Beltran, et al. in their own behalf and in behalf of all residents of .roject ? in Juezon City, praying that the .eopleKs 0omesite ; 0ousing Corporation <.00C= and : ( be compelled to litigate and interplead between themsel!es their alleged conflicting claims in!ol!ing said .roject ?. .00C leased out housing units to plaintiffs in 9B/C. The lessees, paying monthly rentals therefor, were assured by competent authority that after / years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase these units. (n 9B79, the .00C announced that the management, administration and ownership of .roject ? would be transferred to : ( in payment of .00 debts to : ( . .00C also as,ed the tenants to signify their conformity to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the bac, thereof, agreeing to credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling price, C8L of what had been paid by them as rentals. The tenants accepted the .00C offer, and on %arch 2@, 9B79, the .00C announced in another circular that all payments made by the tenants after %arch C9, 9B79 would be considered as amortizations or installment payments.

.laintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between .00C and : ( caused them great incon!enience and incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not ,now to whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments.

TC> #esignated the .eopleKs 1irst a!ings Ban,, JC Mto recei!e in trust the payments from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on .00C lots and to be released only upon proper authority of the Court.M

.00C and : ( filed a %otion to #ismiss the complaint of Beltran, et al. for failure to state a cause of action as well as to lift the CourtKs order designating the .eopleKs 1irst a!ings Ban, as trustee to recei!e the tenantsK payments on the .00C lots.

By the end of 9B78, administration and ownership of .roject ? was turned o!er to : ( . .00C, howe!er, through its new Chairman):eneral %anager, Hsmeraldo Hco, refused to recognize all agreements pre!iously entered into with : ( , while : ( insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the :o!ernment Corporate Counsel and the ecretary of 3ustice.

TC granted the %otion, ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the allegations in his motion and made of record that GSIS has no objection that payments on the monthly amortizations be made directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute as to whom the residents pay and therefore no cause of action for interpleading. Counsel for defendants went further to say that whate!er dispute, if any, may e-ist between the two corporations o!er the lots and buildings in .roject ?, payments made to the .00C will not and cannot in any way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited by either of the two defendants.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit, contending the allegations in their complaint Mraise 'uestions of fact that can be established only by answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral manifestations in open court,M and that they Mdo not ,now who, as between the : ( and the .00C, is the right and lawful party to recei!e their monthly amortizations as would e!entually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling units.M

monthly payments and amortizations should be made directly to the .00C alone.

6. 1).:uia v. 1!eri(( o( I"ocos 1ur Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the heriff of (locos ur to proceed with a chattel mortgage foreclosure sale. On C 1eb 9B9/, Cheng)"aco and Cheng) Niangco e-ecuted a chattel mortgage in fa!or of the petitioner, y)Juia on their mercantile establishment, including the merchandise therein, as security for a 7, debt. The mortgage was recorded on the date of its e-ecution and fell due on C 1eb 9B9@. An agreement was made that the mortgagors were allowed to sell the merchandise replenishing their stoc, and that the new stoc, brought in should also be subject to the mortgage. On / %ay 9B2?, Cheng)"aco e-ecuted another chattel mortgage on the same establishment and all its contents in fa!or of the respondent #e "eon <#e "eon= as security for the sum of .?,B88, which mortgage was recorded on ? %ay 9B2?. The petitioner, in writing, re'uested the sheriff to ta,e possession of the mortgaged property and to sell it at public auction under ec. 9? of the Chattel %ortgage "aw <Act Do. 9/8A=. The sheriff seized the establishment and fi-ed the date of the sale on 2 3une 9B2?. Afterwards, #e "eon presented an ad!erse claim to the property by !irtue of his chattel mortgage, alleging that all the goods on which the chattel mortgage of y)Juia was gi!en had been sold long before the chattel mortgage in fa!or of #e "eon was e-ecuted and that the earlier chattel mortgage was of no effect. The sheriff, in doubt as to the conflicting claims, suspended the foreclosure proceedings and brought an action

Issue: *hether the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader was proper+ &H . Ru"in&: .laintiffs entirely missed the !ital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 72, section 9 of the Re!ised Rules of Court re'uires as an indispensable element that Mconflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be madeM against the plaintiff)in)interpleader Mwho claims no interest whate!er in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants.M *hile .00C and : ( may ha!e conflicting claims between themsel es with regard to the management, administration and ownership of .roject ?, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they in!ol!e or affect the plaintiffs. Do allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the .00C which was the only entity pri!y to their lease)purchase agreement, e!er made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The 'uestions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition or non)enforceability and non) recognition of the turno!er agreement of #ecember 2@, 9B79 between the two defendant corporations are irrele!ant to their action of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so) called, are between the two corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

under section 928 of the Code of Ci!il .rocedure re'uiring the two claimants to interplead.

Issue: *GD the sheriff was correct in suspending the sale and bringing an action re'uiring the 2 claimants to interplead

6e"#: &H . Court held that it would$!e been better practice for the sheriff to sell the property and hold the proceeds of the sale subject to the outcome of the action of interpleader, the court would still not justify interference by mandamus. The sheriff might lay himself open to an action for damages if he sold the goods without the consent of the holder of the last mortgage, and it does not appear that the petitioner offered to gi!e bond to hold him harmless in such an e!ent. 0is action in suspending the sale pending the determination of the action of interpleader seems justified. (n cases li,e this, the petition for mandamus should be addressed to the Courts of 1irst (nstance rather than to this court. The petition is denied with the costs against the petitioner. ;. De 2esus v. 1ocie#a# Aren#enteria Facts: A partnership composed of Aragon, Cuneta and de la Cruz, owned a coc,pit which it rented to the !efendant company. Both Cuneta and Aragon sold each their 2G/th interest in the partnership to the de 3esus. Cuneta sold his interest subject to the right to repurchase. 0a!ing failed to e-ercise his right to repurchase, the sale became absolute in fa!or de 3esus who now owned ?G/th the interest in the partnership. #e 3esus in this action see,s to reco!er of the !efendant company the amount of the monthly rental which

he claims be due him as the owner of Cuneta$s interest The trial judge recognized the right of de 3esus to the monthly rental from the !efendant company (rom t!e #ate o( t!e <u#&ment entered by him but declined to gi!e judgment for the monthly rental (rom t!e #ate o( purc!ase o( ,uneta9s interest to t!e #ate o( t!e <u#&ment. The trial judge reasoned that since there had been no formal adjudication of de 3esus$ ownership of Cuneta$s interest prior to the date of the judgment, the !efendant company was not obligated to pay de 3esus the monthly rental corresponding to that interest pending the adjudication of this 'uestion, since to ha!e done so might ha!e e-posed it to the ris, of ha!ing the contract terminated by Cuneta for failure to pay to him the stipulated rental, in the e!ent that it should later be judicially determined that Cuneta and not de 3esus was the true owner. Issue> *as the ruling of the trial judge correct+ Ru"in&:The trial judge erred. The !efendant company had due and sufficient notice of the sale. #emand was formally and promptly made upon it for the payment of the rent to which de 3esus was thereafter entitled. Inder its contract it was the !efendant company$s duty to pay the stipulated rent to the owner of the interest. (f with due notice of the purchase of this interest by de 3esus, it paid any other person than the true owner, such payment in no wise relie!ed it of its obligations under the contract to pay the true owner. (t must fulfill and comply with the terms of its contract, and de 3esus is entitled to reco!er the stipulated rent from day of the perfection of his purchase of Cuneta$s interest. 3udgment for the rent in 'uestion from the date of purchase to the date of the judgment should ha!e been rendered in fa!or of de 3esus. 3ust bec the right of ownership was in dispute, doesn$t mean the !efendant company could lawfully refuse to pay the rent because it might ris, paying the wrong person and suffer the conse'uences.(f the !efendant company had any sufficient ground to be in doubt as to which of the claimants was entitled to the rent, it could ha!e protected itself from the danger of ma,ing payment to the wrong person by re'uiring the contesting claimants to interplead, thus lea!ing the determination of the doubt to the courts. The !efendant

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

company not ha!ing e-ercised this right, it !oluntarily assumed the ris, of payment to the wrong person, and of course payment to the wrong person under such circumstances <e!en if it were actually made, which does not affirmati!ely appear from the record in the case=, would not relie!e it of liability to the person lawfully entitled to recei!e payment under the rental contract. =. >esina v. IA, FA,T1: 3ose :o ?/o@ purchased from Associated Ban, <AB= CashierKs Chec, Do. 899C82 for .A88,888.88. Infortunately, :o left said chec, on the top of the des, of the ban, manager when he left the ban,. The ban, manager entrusted the chec, for safe,eeping to a ban, official, a certain Albert Iy <U)@, who had then a !isitor in the person of Ale-ander "im <Lim@. Iy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after which he proceeded to the menKs room. *hen he returned to his des,, his !isitor "im was already gone, along with the chec,. Iy ad!ised :o to go to the ban, to accomplish a M TO. .A&%HDTM order. Iy also made a police report, pointing to the person of Ale-ander "im as the one who could shed light on it. .olice records that AB recei!ed the lost chec, for clearing on #ecember C9, 9BAC, coming from .rudential Ban, <.B= Hscolta Branch. The chec, was immediately dishonored by AB and sent it bac, to .B, with M.ayment toppedM stamped on it. ? days thereafter, the same was again returned to AB. &et again, AB dishonored it. e!eral days later, AB recei!ed a letter from Atty. "orenzo Da!arro ?Att). Navarro@ demanding payment on the cashierKs chec, being held by his client, whose name he refused to re!eal. Atty. Da!arro threatened to sue if payment is not made

AB in its letter replied saying the chec, belonged to :o who lost it in the ban, and is laying claim to it. The police sent a letter to the %anager of the .B re'uesting assistance in identifying the person who tried to encash the chec,, but it refused. .B said it had to protect its clientKs interest and the identity could only be re!ealed with the clientKs conformity. Insure of what to do on the matter AB filed an action for (nterpleader naming as :o and 43ohn #oe5, Atty. Da!arroKs unnamed client. AB recei!ed summons and copy of the complaint for damages of %arcelo A. %esina ?>esina@ from the RTC of Caloocan City. AB mo!ed to amend its complaint, ha!ing been notified for the first time of the name of Atty. Da!arroKs client and substituted %esina for 3ohn #oe. imultaneously, AB thru representati!e Iy, informed Cpl. :imao of the *estern .olice #istrict that the lost chec, of :o is in the possession of %esina. Cpl. :imao went to %esina to in'uire on how he had possession of the chec,. %esina answered that it was paid to him by "im in a Mcertain transactionM but refused to elucidate further. An information for theft and warrant of arrest was issued to "im. <said warrant up to the date of the filing of this petition remains unser!ed since "im couldn$t be found=. %eanwhile, :o filed his answer in the (nterpleader Case and mo!ed to participate as inter!enor in the complaint for damages. Iy also filed a motion of inter!ention and answer in the complaint for (nterpleader. #uring pre)trial conference in the interpleader case, it was disclosed that the M3ohn #oeM is actually %esina. %esina, instead of filing his answer to the complaint in the interpleader, filed on an Omnibus %otion to #ismiss H- Abudante Cautela alleging lac, of jurisdiction in !iew of the absence of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lac, of personality to sue.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

o o o

denied by TC and ruled that AB$s complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for interpleader %R of %esina denied 3udge :onong declared %esina in default

T0I , records of the case show that AB had to resort to details in support of its action for (nterpleader. Before e!en resorting to (nterpleader, AB too, precautionary and necessary measures to bring out the truth. C. D#a. De ,ami"o v. Arcamo Facts: .etitioner .etra had been in peaceful, open and ad!erse possession of a parcel of public foreshore land situated in %alangas, Oamboanga del ur. A commercial building was erected on said property and respondent Ong .eng Nee was a lessee of one of the apartments of said commercial building. Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against both #e Camilo and Nee but for his failure to appear at the trial, he was declared in default. .etitioners 1ranciscos had also been in possession, peaceful, open and ad!erse of a parcel of public foreshore land, adjoining that land occupied by #e Camilo. On this parcel, a commercial building was erected by the 1ranciscos. The two commercial buildings were burned down. Two wee,s thereafter, respondents Nee and Ong, constructed a building of their own which was so built that portions of the lands pre!iously occupied by petitioners were encroached upon. #e Camilo filed a case for 1orcible Hntry against the respondents with respect to portion belonging to her wherein the building of Nee was erected. The 1ranciscos filed a similar case. The respondents claimed that the land where they constructed their building was leased to them by the %unicipality of %alangas. .ending trial of the two cases, the respondents filed a complaint for (nterpleader against #e Camilo, Hstrada, the 1ranciscos, Bannister, the %ayor and Treasurer of %alangas, alleging that the filing of the cases of forcible entry, indicated that the defendants in the (nterpleader had conflicting interests, since they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the lot in 'uestion and they <Nee and Ong= could not determine without hazard to themsel!es who of defendants was entitled to the possession. (nterpleader plaintiffs further alleged that they had no interest in the property other than as mere lessees.

%esina filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with (AC o dismissed by (AC o %R of %esina also denied

T, DE,I1ION ON INTERPLEADER: ordered AB to replace CashierKs Chec, in fa!or of :o or its cash e'ui!alent with legal rate of interest from date of complaint. I11UE: *GD interpleader suit is proper+ 6ELD: &H . #ecision affirmed in toto. RATIO: >esina insists t!at t!ere is no s!o'in& o( con("ictin& c"aimsA t!us$ interp"ea#er is out o( t!e Buestion. 6o'ever$ A8 mere") too t!e necessar) precaution not to ma e a mista e as to '!om to pa) an# t!ere(ore interp"ea#er 'as its proper reme#). It !as %een s!o'n t!at t!e interp"ea#er suit 'as (i"e# %) A8 %ecause >esina an# /o 'ere %ot! "a)in& t!eir c"aims on t!e c!ec . >esina 'as even as in& pa)ment t!ereon an# /o as t!e purc!aser or o'ner. AB filed the interpleader suit not because petitioner sued it but because %esina is laying claim to the same chec, that :o is claiming. On the !ery day AB instituted the case in interpleader, it was not aware of any suit for damages filed by %esina against it as supported by the fact that the interpleader case was first entitled "ssociated #an$ s. %ose Go and %ohn !oe.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

0erein petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for (nterpleader but the same was denied and they were ordered to interplead. .etitioners instituted the present proceedings for certiorari and mandamus, against 3ustice of peace Arcamo and herein respondents. They allege that Arcamo gra!ely abused his discretion in gi!ing due course to the complaint for interpleader, and that he unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which was specifically enjoined by law, and for which there was no plain, speedy and ade'uate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The C1( ruled that Arcamo had no jurisdiction to try the case of interpleader. Issue: *as the filing of the interpleader proper+ #oes the 3ustice of the .eace Court ha!e jurisdiction to ta,e cognizance of the (nterpleader case+ 6e"#: Do to both. ection 9, Rule 9? pro!ides that an (nterpleader is proper whene!er conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no interest whate!er in the subject)matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, such person may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their se!eral claims among themsel!es. The petitioners did not ha!e conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respecti!e claim was separate and distinct from the other. #e Camilo only wanted the respondents to !acate that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them when they erected their building. The same is true with Hstrada and the 1ranciscos. They claimed possession of two different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other. 1urthermore, it is not true that respondents did not ha!e any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them. (t is, therefore, e!ident that the re'uirements for a complaint of (nterpleader do not e-ist. The complaint as,ing the petitioners to interplead, practically too, the case out of the jurisdiction of the 3. court, because

the action would then necessarily Min!ol!e the title to or possession of real property or any interest thereinM o!er which the C1( has original jurisdiction. Then also, the subject matter of the interpleader would come under the original jurisdiction of the C1(, because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation, there ha!ing been no showing that rentals were as,ed by the petitioners from respondents. 1E. >a ati Deve"opment ,orp v. Tan<uatco Facts: .laintiff %a,ati #e!$t Corp and defendant Tanjuatco entered into a contract whereby the latter bound himself to construct a reinforced concrete co!ered water reser!oir, office and pump house and water main at 1orbes .ar,, furnishing the materials necessary therefor. Before ma,ing the final payment of the consideration agreed upon, plaintiff in'uired from the suppliers of materials, who had called its attention to unpaid bills of Tanjuatco, whether the latter had settled his accounts with them. (n response to this in'uiry, Concrete Aggregates, (nc. <supplier= made a claim in the sum of ./,9BA.@/, representing the cost of transit)mi-ed concrete allegedly deli!ered to Tanjuatco. *ith his consent, plaintiff withheld said amount from the final payment made to him and, in !iew of his subse'uent failure to settle the issue thereon with the upplier, plaintiff instituted the present action against Tanjuatco and the upplier, to compel them Mto interplead their conflicting claims.M Tanjuatco mo!ed to dismiss the case, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction o!er the subject)matter of the litigation, the amount in!ol!ed therein being less than .98,888.88. The lower court granted the same and dismissed the case. 0ence, this appeal. .laintiff contends that the C1( has jurisdiction because the subject)matter of this litigation is not the aforementioned sum of ./,9BA.@/, but the right to compel the defendants Mto litigate among themsel!esM. Issue: #oes the C1( ha!e jurisdiction o!er the case+

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

6e"#: Do. .laintiff may compel the defendants to interplead among themsel!es concerning the aforementioned sum of ./,9BA.@/. The issue of who among the defendants is entitled to collect the same is the object of the action and is not within the jurisdiction of the C1(. The plaintiff in asserting the jurisdiction of the C1( relies upon Rule 7C of the present Rules of Court, prescribing the procedure in cases of interpleading, and section 9B of Rule /, which omits the Rules on (nterpleading among those made applicable to inferior courts. 0owe!er, the jurisdiction of our courts o!er the subject)matter of justiciable contro!ersies is go!erned by Rep. Act Do. 2B7, as amended, pursuant to which municipal courts shall ha!e e-clusi!e original jurisdiction in all ci!il cases Min which the demand, e-clusi!e of interest, or the !alue of the property in contro!ersyM, amounts to not more than .0.98,888. econdly, Mthe power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the !arious courtsM belongs to Congress and is beyond the rule)ma,ing power of the upreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Thirdly, the failure of said section 9B of Rule / of the present Rules of Court to ma,e its Rule 7C, on interpleading, applicable to inferior courts, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 7C in dealing with cases of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary ci!il action in said courts.

proceedings against it and in #ec. 9BB2, RCBC was the highest bidder. "H&COD as a response, filed an action for Dullificatoin of H-trajudicial 1oreclosure ale and #amages against RCBC but e!entually RCBC was able to consolidate its ownership o!er the property due to "H&COD$s failure to redeem. %etro Container Corporation <%HTROCAD= which was leasing the property from "H&COD was demanded by RCBC to ma,e rental payments. "H&COD filed an action for Inlawful #etainer against %HTROCAD. %HTROCAD, meanwhile, filed a complaint for (nterpleader against "H&COD and RCBC to compel them to interplead and litigate their se!eral claims among themsel!es and to determine which among them shall rightfully recei!e the payment of monthly rentals. (n the (nterpleader case, an amicable settlement was made between %HTROCAD and "H&COD with respect to bac, rentals. 0owe!er, in the Inlawful #etainer case, %HTROCAD was order to pay "H&COD whate!er rentals were due. %HTR.CAD claims interpleader case is moot and academic because of amicable settlement. RCBC alleges, howe!er, that the decision of the lower court in the ejectment case cannot render the (nterpleader action moot and academic. I11UE> *GD the .arty who initiates the interpleader action may be compelled to litigate if he is no longer interested to pursue such cause of action+ RULIN/> (t is undisputed that %HTROCAD filed the interpleader action because "H&COD was claiming payment of the rentals as lessor and RCBC was ma,ing a demand by !irtue of the consolidation of the title of the property in its name. The upreme Court said that the unlawful detainer case in!ol!es issue of material possession and not of ownership, therefore, the reason for the interpleader ceased when the lower court rendered judgment ordering %HTROCAD to pay "H&COD. (t should be remembered that an action for

11. R,8, v. >etro ,ontainer ,orp. FA,T1> ept. 9BB8, "ey Construction Corporation <"H&COD= contracted a loan from RCBC in the amount of .C8 million which was secured by a real estate mortgage o!er a Falenzuela property. "H&COD failed to settle its obligations prompting RCBC to institute e-trajudicial foreclosure

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)

interpleader is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double !e-ation in respect of one liability.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS (Atty. Melo, 1st Sem, 2010-2011)