Vagueness

Many peope thnk that ogc shoud be abe to accommodate vague

predcates (ke bad' and heap') and that ths gves us a reason for
departng from cassca ogc. See Roy Sorensen, Vagueness'
http://pato.stanford.edu/entres/vagueness/, and Mark Sansbury, Paradoxes,
(2nd ed. Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1995) chapter 2, for an
ntroducton. See T. Wamson, Vagueness and Ignorance', Proceedngs of
the Arstotean Socety Suppementary Voume 66 (1992): 145-162, for the
vew that vagueness need not requre gvng up cassca ogc. See aso
Wamson's book Vagueness, (London: Routedge, 1994) for an exhaustve
survey of approaches to the probem snce ancent tmes and Wamson's
own souton to t. A good crtque of Wamson s Mark Sansbury's
Vagueness, Ignorance, and Margn for Error', Brtsh |ourna of Phosophy of
Scence 46 (1995): 589-601. The Southern |ourna of Phosophy, Supp. Vo.
33 (1995), contans a number of mportant essays on vagueness ncudng
essays by Sansbury, Tye, Wrght, and Wamson. One mportant sub-debate
n ths area s whether there can be vague ob|ects: for an argument that there
cannot be see Gareth Evans's short (one page) paper n Anayss 38 (1978):
208, reprnted n hs Coected Papers, (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1985) and n
Crane and Farkas (eds.) Metaphyscs: A Gude and Anthoogy ; ths ssue s
dscussed by Wamson n hs book, and by Sansbury n the above
mentoned artce; see aso Terence Parsons and Peter Woodruff, Wordy
Indetermnacy of Identty', Proceedngs of the Arstotean Socety 95 (1995):
171-191. An ndspensabe coecton s R. Keefe and P. Smth, eds.,
Vagueness: a Reader (Cambrdge, Mass.: MIT, 1997).
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Truth and Ob|ectvty
Theores of truth
What s truth? That s, what s t for somethng to be true (or fase)? A
premnary queston s: what sorts of thngs are true or fase? What, for
nstance, shoud we understand the p s and q s n our truth-tabes to be
standng n for? Some canddates for truth-bearers' are sentences,
statements, propostons, assertons, beefs or |udgements. A usefu
dscusson s E. |. Lemmon, Sentences, Statements and Propostons', n B.
Wams, ed., Brtsh Anaytc Phosophy, (Routedge & K. Pau, 1966). See
aso Strawson, On Referrng', n Moore, ed., Meanng and Reference, and
Rchard Cartwrght, Propostons', n hs Phosophca Essays, (Cambrdge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1987). For the bearng of these questons on ogc, Rchard
E. Grandy, What do O and R stand for Anyway?', n Hughes, ed., A
Phosophca Companon to Frst-Order Logc, s a very usefu ntroducton.
The next queston s: what s t about a true statement, proposton (or
whatever) that makes t true? There are varous tradtona answers: truth
conssts n a reaton between the proposton and a fact (the correspondence
theory: see Maran Davd, The Correspondence Theory of Truth'
http://pato.stanford.edu/entres/truth-correspondence/ ); the truth of a
proposton conssts n ts membershp of some specfed coherent set of
propostons or beefs (the coherence theory: see |ames O. Young, The
Coherence Theory of Truth' http://pato.stanford.edu/entres/truth-
coherence/ ); truth |ust s the property of propostons or beefs whch
enabes us to succeed n our endeavours (the pragmatc theory: see |erome
Dokc and Pasca Enge, Truth and Success London: Routedge 2002); the
whoe nature of truth can be expaned n terms of the prncpe P s true f
and ony f P ' (the redundancy, defatonary or mnmast theory: see Dane
Sto|ar, The Defatonary Theory of Truth'
http://pato.stanford.edu/entres/truth-defatonary/).
Genera readng on these ssues shoud ncude: Raph Waker, Theores of
Truth' n Bob Hae and Crspn Wrght, eds., A Companon to the Phosophy of
Language (Oxford: Backwe 1997); Smon Backburn, Spreadng the Word,
chapters 7-8; Haack, Phosophy of Logcs, chapter 7; Pau Horwch, Theores
of Truth', n Hughes, ed., A Phosophca Companon to Frst-Order Logc ; Pau
Horwch, Truth (Oxford: Bas Backwe, 1990; 2 nd edton Oxford Unversty
Press 1998; see especay the postscrpt); M. Dummett, Truth', n Strawson,
ed., Phosophca Logc, aso reprnted n Dummett's Truth & Other Engmas,
(London: Duckworth, 1978); Donad Davdson, True to the Facts' n hs
Inqures nto Truth and Interpretaton (Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press 1984);
the anthoogy, edted by Smon Backburn and Keth Smmons, Truth, (Oxford:
Oxford Unversty Press, 1999), contans cassc papers by Austn and
Strawson, and some usefu contemporary matera on
mnmasm/defatonsm. A huge and usefu coecton s Mchae Lynch, ed.,
The Nature of Truth (Cambrdge, Mass.: MIT Press 2001).
More advanced readng woud ncude: F. P. Ramsey, Facts and Propostons,'
Proceedngs of the Arstotean Socety 27 (1927); reprnted n hs coected
papers, D. H. Meor, ed., Phosophca Papers, (Cambrdge: Cambrdge
Unversty Press, 1990) and n Backburn and Smmons; An Gupta, A Crtque
of Defatonsm' Phosophca Topcs 21 (1993): 57-81, reprnted n Backburn
and Smmons; D. Grover, |. Camp, and N. Benap, A Prosententa Theory of
Truth', Phosophca Studes 27 (1975): 73-125, reprnted n Grover's The
Prosententa Theory of Truth, (Prnceton, N. |.: Prnceton Unversty Press,
1992); Donad Davdson, The Structure and Content of Truth' |ourna of
Phosophy, 87 (1990): 279-328; and hs The Foy of Tryng to Defne Truth'
|ourna of Phosophy 93 (1996): 263-278 (reprnted n Backburn and
Smmons); Scott Soames, Understandng Truth (Oxford and New York: Oxford
Unversty Press 1997); Davd Wggns, What Woud be a Substanta Theory
of Truth?' n Z. Van Straaten, ed., Phosophca Sub|ects (Oxford: Oxford
Unversty Press 1980) and hs Truth, and Truth as Predcated of Mora
|udgements' n hs Needs, Vaues, Truth (3 rd edton Oxford: Oxford Unversty
Press 1998); Crspn Wrght, Truth & Ob|ectvty (Cambrdge, Mass.: Harvard
Unversty Press, 1992) chapters 1-2.
In addton to these ssues there s the ancent puzze of the ar sentence,
Ths sentence s fase'. For an ntroducton to the paradox, see Sansbury,
Paradoxes, (2 nd edton Cambrdge: Cambrdge Unversty Press, 1995)
chapter 5; for more advanced dscusson see the ntroducton to R. Martn,
ed., Recent Essays on Truth & the Lar (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1984)) and
among the dffcut but mportant papers coected there, ook n partcuar at
those by Krpke, Burge and Parsons.
One mpact of the ar puzze was the probem of provdng a defnton of
truth for forma anguages. See Tarsk, The Semantc Concepton of Truth', n
Feg and Sears, eds., Readngs n Phosophca Anayss, (New York:
Appeton-Century-Crofts Inc.,1949)). For an eementary ntroducton, see
secton 6 of Mark Sansbury, Phosophca Logc', n A. C. Grayng, ed.,
Phosophy. See aso Oune, Phosophy of Logc, (Engewood Cffs: Prentce-
Ha, 1970). Tarsk's theory of truth has nspred a number of dfferent
accounts of truth n genera, and there s a vey debate over the status and
sgnfcance of Tarsk's theory of truth for forma anguages for an account of
the nature of truth n genera. For contrastng (rather dffcut, but rewardng)
treatments see Hartry Fed's Tarsk's Theory Of Truth', |ourna of Phosophy,
69, (1972): 347-375 and Rchard Heck, Tarsk, Truth, and Semantcs',
Phosophca Revew 106 (1997): 533-554.