The central concept of logic is the concept of a valid argument: an argument in which the truth of the premises in some

way guarantees the truth of the conclusion. An argument can be valid without its premises being true; validity demands only that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be. (A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises.) How should we understand validity !or one traditional account see "uine, #hilosophy of $ogic, (%nglewood &liffs: #rentice'Hall, ()*+), chapters (, ,, and -. A good general introduction to the issue is .ainsbury, $ogical !orms, chapter (. Also central is Alfred Tars/i0s Truth 1 #roof0, in Hughes, ed., A &ompanion to !irst' 2rder $ogic.

A very clear introduction to the concept of logical conse3uence is 4.&. 5eall and 6reg 7estall, $ogical &onse3uence0 http:88plato.stanford.edu8entries8logical'conse3uence8. This also has a useful bibliography. !or a more advanced, controversial and partly historical (but nonetheless very clear) treatment, see 4ohn %tchemendy, The &oncept of $ogical &onse3uence (&ambridge, 9ass.: Harvard :niversity #ress, ())+), which challenges Tars/i0s account; for one response (of many) see ;illiam Hanson, The &oncept of $ogical &onse3uence0, #hilosophical 7eview, (+<, (())*): =<>'-+).

A related 3uestion is the 3uestion of what it is for something to entail something else. 2n the standard interpretations of entailment, anything follows from a contradiction. .ome philosophers have ta/en this as reason to revise our notion of entailment. !or a classic statement of these issues see #eter 6each, %ntailment0, in his $ogic 9atters, (2?ford: 5lac/well, ()*,) and @. H. 7ice, %ntailment0, 9ind )> (()A<): =->'=<+. 2ne revision is relevance logic: see .tephen 7ead, Thin/ing about $ogic: an Bntroduction to the #hilosophy of $ogic, (2?ford: 2?ford :niversity #ress, ())-) ch. <; and %dwin 9ares 7elevance $ogic0 http:88plato.stanford.edu8entries8logic'relevance8. 5A&C T2 T2#

Alternative $ogics

!or various reasons, philosophers have proposed alternative logics to the standard or classical0 logic that one is taught in elementary logic classes. !or an introduction to these difficult issues start with .usan Haac/, #hilosophy of $ogics, chs. )'((, and her @eviant $ogic, !uDDy $ogic: 5eyond the !ormalism, (7ev. ed. &hicago: :niversity of &hicago #ress, ())<). Alternative logics may add elements to classical logic or they may subtract them. .tewart .hapiro0s, &lassical $ogic0 http:88plato.stanford.edu8entries8logic'classical8 is an account of the basic assumptions of classical logic, but re3uires some technical ability.

;e can distinguish between the basic elements of classical logic being supplemented and its basic assumptions being revised.

Three notable ways in which logic may be supplemented include (i) modal logic, which is used to formalise tal/ of possibility: see further the entry below on modal logic, and the .ymbolic $ogic section of this 6uide; (ii) tense logic, to handle means we have in natural language of tal/ing of the past or present: see the entry below on time and tense for more on the philosophical significance of this; (iii) and second'order logic which includes 3uantification into predicate position as well as subEect position in sentences for more on this see the .et Theory and !urther $ogic and 9athematical $ogic sections of this 6uide, and the entry on .et Theory in the #hilosophy of 9athematics section of this 6uide.

2ne other way in which classical logic may be revised is by removing some of its assumptions about what can e?ist: free0 logics allow for the occurrence of empty terms within well'formed formulae, re3uiring conse3uent modifications of the rules for the e?istential and universal 3uantifiers. !or outlines of various forms of free logic, and their philosophical significance (i.e. to issues of reference, descriptions and e?istence) see Carel $ambert, ed., #hilosophical Applications of !ree $ogic (2?ford: 2?ford :niversity #ress, ())(). .ee in particular, the editor0s introduction and the papers by van !raasen and 5urge.

2ther modifications to classical logic: intuitionists refuse to endorse the law of bivalence, that every sentence is determinately true or false for an introduction to these issues see 9ichael @ummett, The #hilosophical 5asis of Bntuitionistic $ogic0, in his Truth 1 2ther %nigmas ($ondon: @uc/worth, ()*A) and also the reading later in this section under 7ealism, Bdealism, and Anti'

7ealism; 3uantum logicians deny the distributive law for disEunction, for an introduction to this see Hilary #utnam0s Bs $ogic %mpirical 0, in his 9athematics, 9atter 1 9ethod, #hilosophical #apers, Fol. (, (, nd ed. &ambridge: &ambridge :niversity #ress, ()*)); and paraconsistent logics even allow for the truth of contradictions: for this see T. .miley and 6. #riest, &an contradictions be true 0, #roceedings of the Aristotelian .ociety .upplementary Folume <* (())=: (*'==, =>'>-) and 6raham #riest and CoEi Tana/a, #araconsistent $ogic0 http:88plato.stanford.edu8entries8logic' paraconsistent8. !or scepticism about alternative logics, see "uine, #hilosophy of $o