Delos Santos, James Carl M.

ME 31A1
Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law

Research Paper: Martial Law September !, "13

#n September 1, 1$% , Marcos iss&e' Proclamation 1"(1, 'eclarin) martial law o*er the entire co&ntr+ , claimin) that it was the last 'e,ense a)ainst the risin) 'isor'er ca&se' b+ increasin)l+ *iolent st&'ent 'emonstrations, the alle)e' threats o, comm&nist ins&r)enc+ b+ the new Comm&nist Part+ o, the Philippines -CPP., an' the M&slim separatist mo*ement o, the Moro /ational Liberation 0ront -M/L0.. #ne o, his ,irst actions was to arrest opposition politicians in Con)ress an' the Constit&tional Con*ention. 1nitial p&blic reaction to martial law was mostl+ ,a*orable e2cept in M&slim areas o, the so&th, where a separatist rebellion, le' b+ the M/L0, bro3e o&t in 1$%3. Despite hal,hearte' attempts to ne)otiate a cease4,ire, the rebellion contin&e' to claim tho&san's o, militar+ an' ci*ilian cas&alties. Comm&nist ins&r)enc+ e2pan'e' with the creation o, the /ational Democratic 0ront -/D0., an or)ani5ation embracin) the CPP an' other comm&nist )ro&ps. 6n'er martial law the re)ime was able to re'&ce *iolent &rban crime, collect &nre)istere' ,irearms, an' s&ppress comm&nist ins&r)enc+ in some areas. At the same time, a series o, important new concessions were )i*en to ,orei)n in*estors, incl&'in) a prohibition on stri3es b+ or)ani5e' labor, an' a lan'4re,orm pro)ram was la&nche'. 1n Jan&ar+ 1$%3 Marcos proclaime' the rati,ication o, a new constit&tion base' on the parliamentar+ s+stem, with himsel, as both presi'ent an' prime minister. 7e 'i' not, howe*er, con*ene the interim le)islat&re that was calle' ,or in that 'oc&ment. 6n'er the presi'ent8s comman', the militar+ arreste' opposition ,i)&res, incl&'in) 9eni)no A:&ino, ;o&rnalists, st&'ent an' labor acti*ists, an' criminal elements. A total o, abo&t 3",""" 'etainees were 3ept at militar+ compo&n's r&n b+ the arm+ an' the Philippine Constab&lar+. <eapons were con,iscate', an' =pri*ate armies> connecte' with prominent politicians an' other ,i)&res were bro3en &p. /ewspapers were sh&t 'own, an' the mass me'ia were bro&)ht &n'er ti)ht control. <ith the stro3e o, a pen, Marcos close' the Philippine Con)ress an' ass&me' its le)islati*e responsibilities. D&rin) the 1$% 4(1 martial law perio', Marcos, in*este' with 'ictatorial powers, iss&e' h&n're's o, presi'ential 'ecrees, man+ o, which were ne*er p&blishe'. Li3e m&ch else connecte' with Marcos, the 'eclaration o, martial law ha' a theatrical, smo3e4an'4 mirrors :&alit+. ?he inci'ent that precipitate' Proclamation 1"(1 was an attempt, alle)e'l+ b+ comm&nists, to assassinate Minister o, /ational De,ense Enrile. As Enrile himsel, a'mitte' a,ter Marcos8s 'own,all in 1$(@, his &nocc&pie' car ha' been ri''le' b+ machine)&n b&llets ,ire' b+ his own men on the ni)ht that Proclamation 1"(1 was si)ne'. Most 0ilipinosAor at least those well positione' within the economic an' social elitesAinitiall+ s&pporte' the imposition o, martial law. ?he risin) ti'e o, *iolence an' lawlessness was apparent to e*er+one. Altho&)h still mo'est in comparison with the 7&3 ins&r)enc+ o, the earl+ 1$B"s, the /ew People8s Arm+ was e2pan'in), an' the M&slim secessionist mo*ement contin&e' in the so&th with ,orei)n s&pport. <ell4worn themes o, comm&nist conspirac+AMarcos claime' that a networ3 o, =,ront or)ani5ations> was operatin) =amon) o&r peasants, laborers, pro,essionals, intellect&als, st&'ents, an' mass me'ia personnel>A,o&n' a rea'+ a&'ience in the 6nite' States, which 'i' not protest the 'emise o, Philippine 'emocrac+.

The New Society Marcos claime' that martial law was the prel&'e to creatin) a =/ew Societ+> base' on new social an' political *al&es. 7e ar)&e' that certain aspects o, personal beha*ior, attrib&te' to a colonial mentalit+, were obstacles to e,,ecti*e mo'erni5ation. ?hese incl&'e' the primac+ o, personal connections, as re,lecte' in the ethic o, &tan) na loob, an' the importance o, maintainin) in4)ro&p harmon+ an' coherence, e*en at the cost to the national comm&nit+. A new spirit o, sel,4sacri,ice ,or the national wel,are was necessar+ i, the co&ntr+ were to e:&al the accomplishments o, its Asian nei)hbors, s&ch as ?aiwan an' the Rep&blic o, Corea -So&th Corea.. Despite Marcos8s o,ten percepti*e criticisms o, the ol' societ+, Marcos, his wi,e, an' a small circle o, close associates, the cron+ )ro&p, now ,elt ,ree to practice corr&ption on an awe4inspirin) scale. Political, economic, an' social policies were 'esi)ne' to ne&trali5e Marcos8s ri*als within the elite. ?he ol' political s+stem, with its parties, ro&)h4an'4t&mble election campai)ns, an' a press so &ninhibite'

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Delos Santos, James Carl M. ME 31A1

Research Paper: Martial Law September !, "13

in its *it&perati*e an' libelo&s nat&re that it was calle' =the ,reest in the worl',> ha' been boss4ri''en an' 'ominate' b+ the elite since earl+ American colonial 'a+s, i, not be,ore. ?he elite, howe*er, compose' o, local political '+nasties, ha' ne*er been a homo)eneo&s )ro&p. 1ts ,e&'s an' tensions, ,&ele' as o,ten b+ assa&lts on amor proprio -sel,4esteem. as b+ 'isa)reement on i'eolo)+ or iss&es, ma'e ,or a pl&ralistic s+stem.

Marcos8s sel,4proclaime' =re*ol&tion ,rom the top> 'epri*e' si)ni,icant portions o, the ol' elite o, power an' patrona)e. 0or e2ample, the power,&l Lope5 ,amil+, who ha' ,allen o&t o, Marcos8s ,a*or -0ernan'o Lope5 ha' ser*e' as Marcos8s ,irst *ice presi'ent., was strippe' o, most o, its political an' economic assets. Altho&)h alwa+s in,l&ential, '&rin) the martial law +ears, 1mel'a Marcos b&ilt her own power base, with her h&sban'8s s&pport. Conc&rrentl+ the )o*ernor o, Metro Manila an' minister o, h&man settlements -a post create' ,or her., she e2ercise' si)ni,icant powers.

Crony Capitalism D&rin) the ,irst +ears o, martial law, the econom+ bene,ite' ,rom increase' stabilit+, an' b&siness con,i'ence was bolstere' b+ Marcos8s appointment o, talente' technocrats to economic plannin) posts. Despite the 1$%3 oil price rise shoc3, the )rowth o, the )ross national pro'&ct -D/P. was respectable, an' the oil4p&she' in,lation rate, reachin) !" percent in 1$%!, was trimme' bac3 to 1" percent the ,ollowin) +ear. 9etween 1$%3 an' the earl+ 1$("s, 'epen'ence on importe' oil was re'&ce' b+ 'omestic ,in's an' s&ccess,&l ener)+ s&bstit&tion meas&res, incl&'in) one o, the worl'8s most ambitio&s )eothermal ener)+ pro)rams. Claimin) that =i, lan' re,orm ,ails, there is no /ew Societ+,> Marcos la&nche' hi)hl+ p&blici5e' new initiati*es that res&lte' in the ,ormal trans,er o, lan' to some 1(!,""" ,armin) ,amilies b+ late 1$%B. ?he law was ,ille' with loopholes, howe*er, an' ha' little impact on local lan'ownin) elites or lan'less peasants, who remaine' 'esperatel+ poor. ?he lar)est, most pro'&cti*e, an' technicall+ most a'*ance' man&,act&rin) enterprises were )ra'&all+ bro&)ht &n'er the control o, Marcos8s cronies. 0or e2ample, the h&)e b&siness con)lomerate owne' b+ the Lope5 ,amil+, which incl&'e' ma;or newspapers, a broa'cast networ3, an' the co&ntr+8s lar)est electric power compan+, was bro3en &p an' 'istrib&te' to Marcos lo+alists incl&'in) 1mel'a Marcos8s brother, 9en;amin =Co3o+> Rom&al'e5, an' another lo+al cron+, Roberto 9ene'icto. 7&)e monopolies an' semimonopolies were establishe' in man&,act&rin), constr&ction, an' ,inancial ser*ices. <hen these )iants pro*e' &npro,itable, the )o*ernment s&bsi'i5e' them with allocations amo&ntin) to h&n're's o, millions o, pesos. Philippine Airlines, the nation8s international an' 'omestic air carrier, was nationali5e' an' t&rne' into what one a&thor has calle' a =*irt&al pri*ate comm&ter line> ,or 1mel'a Marcos an' her ,rien's on shoppin) e2c&rsions to /ew Eor3 an' E&rope. Probabl+ the most ne)ati*e impact o, cron+ capitalism, howe*er, was ,elt in the tra'itional cash4crop sector, which emplo+e' millions o, or'inar+ 0ilipinos in the r&ral areas. -?he cocon&t in'&str+ alone bro&)ht income to an estimate' 1B million to 1( million people.. 6n'er 9ene'icto an' E'&ar'o Co;&an)co, 'istrib&tion an' mar3etin) monopolies ,or s&)ar an' cocon&ts were establishe'. 0armers on the local le*el were obli)e' to sell onl+ to the monopolies an' recei*e' less than worl' prices ,or their cropsF the+ also were the ,irst to s&,,er when worl' commo'it+ prices 'roppe'. Millions o, 'ollars in pro,its ,rom these monopolies were 'i*erte' o*erseas into Swiss ban3 acco&nts, real estate 'eals, an' p&rchases o, art, ;ewelr+, an' anti:&es. #n the islan' o, /e)ros in the Gisa+as, the re)ion 'e*elope' b+ /icholas Lone+ ,or the s&)ar in'&str+ in the nineteenth cent&r+, s&)ar barons contin&e' to li*e li*es o, l&2&r+, b&t the ,armin) comm&nit+ s&,,ere' ,rom 'e)rees o, maln&trition rare in other parts o, So&theast Asia. 0er'inan' Marcos was responsible ,or ma3in) the pre*io&sl+ nonpolitical, pro,essional Arme' 0orces o, the Philippines, which since American colonial times ha' been mo'ele' on the 6nite' States militar+, a ma;or actor in the political process. ?his s&b*ersion occ&rre' 'one in two wa+s. 0irst, Marcos appointe' o,,icers ,rom the 1locos re)ion, his home pro*ince, to its hi)hest ran3s. Re)ional bac3)ro&n' an' lo+alt+ to Marcos rather than talent or a 'istin)&ishe' ser*ice recor' were the ma;or ,actors in promotion. 0abian Ger, ,or e2ample, ha' been a chil'hoo' ,rien' o, Marcos an' later his cha&,,e&r, rose to become chie, o, sta,, o, the arme' ,orces an' hea' o, the internal sec&rit+ networ3. Secon'l+,

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Research Paper: Martial Law September !, "13

both o,,icers an' the ran3 an' ,ile became bene,iciaries o, )enero&s b&')et allocations. #,,icers an' enliste' personnel recei*e' )enero&s salar+ increases. Arme' ,orces personnel increase' ,rom abo&t B(,""" in 1$%1 to 1! ,""" in 1$(3. ?op4ran3in) militar+ o,,icers, incl&'in) Ger, pla+e' an important polic+4ma3in) role. #n the local le*el, comman'ers ha' opport&nities to e2ploit the econom+ an' establish personal patrona)e networ3s, as Marcos an' the militar+ establishment e*ol*e' a s+mbiotic relationship &n'er martial law. A militar+ whose comman'ers, with some e2ceptions, were rewar'e' ,or lo+alt+ rather than competence pro*e' both br&tal an' ine,,ecti*e in 'ealin) with the rapi'l+ )rowin) comm&nist ins&r)enc+ an' M&slim separatist mo*ement. ?reatment o, ci*ilians in r&ral areas was o,ten harsh, ca&sin) r&ral people, as a meas&re o, sel,4protection rather than i'eolo)ical commitment, to cooperate with the ins&r)ents. ?he comm&nist ins&r)enc+, a,ter some re*erses in the 1$%"s, )rew :&ic3l+ in the earl+ 1$("s, partic&larl+ in some o, the poorest re)ions o, the co&ntr+. ?he M&slim separatist mo*ement reache' a *iolent pea3 in the mi'1$%"s an' then 'ecline' )reatl+, beca&se o, 'i*isions in the lea'ership o, the mo*ement an' re'&ce' e2ternal s&pport bro&)ht abo&t b+ the 'iplomatic acti*it+ o, the Marcos )o*ernment.

Relations with the 6nite' States remaine' most important ,or the Philippines in the 1$%"s, altho&)h the special relationship between the ,ormer an' its e24colon+ was )reatl+ mo'i,ie' as tra'e, in*estment, an' 'e,ense ties were re'e,ine'. ?he La&rel4Lan)le+ A)reement 'e,inin) pre,erential 6nite' States tari,,s ,or Philippine e2ports an' parit+ pri*ile)es ,or 6nite' States in*estors e2pire' on J&l+ !, 1$%!, an' tra'e relations were )o*erne' therea,ter b+ the international Deneral A)reement on ?ari,,s an' ?ra'e -DA??.. D&rin) the martial law perio', ,orei)n in*estment terms were s&bstantiall+ liberali5e', 'espite o,,icial rhetoric abo&t ,orei)n =e2ploitation> o, the econom+. A polic+ promotin) =nontra'itional> e2ports s&ch as te2tiles, ,ootwear, electronic components, an' ,resh an' processe' ,oo's was initiate' with some s&ccess. Japan increasin)l+ challen)e' the 6nite' States as a ma;or ,orei)n participant in the Philippine econom+. ?he stat&s o, 6nite' States militar+ bases was re'e,ine' when a ma;or amen'ment to the Militar+ 9ases A)reement o, 1$!% was si)ne' on Jan&ar+ @, 1$%$, rea,,irmin) Philippine so*erei)nt+ o*er the bases an' re'&cin) their total area. At the same time, the 6nite' States a'ministration promise' to ma3e its =best e,,ort> to obtain con)ressional appropriations ,or militar+ an' economic ai' amo&ntin) to 6SH!"" million between 1$%$ to 1$(3. ?he amen'ment calle' ,or ,&t&re re*iews o, the bases a)reement e*er+ ,i,th +ear. Altho&)h the a'ministration o, Presi'ent Jimm+ Carter emphasi5e' promotin) h&man ri)hts worl'wi'e, onl+ limite' press&re was e2erte' on Marcos to impro*e the beha*ior o, the militar+ in r&ral areas an' to en' the 'eath4s:&a' m&r'er o, opponents. -Press&re ,rom the 6nite' States, howe*er, 'i' pla+ a role in )ainin) the release o, 9eni)no A:&ino in Ma+ 1$(", an' he was allowe' to )o to the 6nite' States ,or me'ical treatment a,ter spen'in) almost ei)ht +ears in prison, incl&'in) lon) stretches o, time in solitar+ con,inement.. #n Jan&ar+ 1%, 1$(1, Marcos iss&e' Proclamation "!B, ,ormall+ en'in) martial law. Some controls were loosene', b&t the ens&in) /ew Rep&blic pro*e' to be a s&per,iciall+ liberali5e' *ersion o, the cron+4'ominate' /ew Societ+. Pre'ictabl+, Marcos won an o*erwhelmin) *ictor+ in the J&ne 1$(1 presi'ential election, bo+cotte' b+ the main opposition )ro&ps, in which his opponents were nonentities.

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