Capital & Class

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Welfare State struggles, consumption, and the politics of rights

M. L. Harrison
Capital & Class 1990 14: 107
DOI: 10.1177/030981689004200106
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M . L . Harrison'

Welfare State
struggles,
consumption, and
the politics of
rights
For more than a decade, cherished institutions of the
welfare state have been under attack . Governments have
eroded direct public provision in a range of fields, including
transport, council housing, income maintenance, health care
and education . Yet most responses from the British left in the
welfare sphere have lacked the imagination or the confidence
to look ahead constructively . Some have depended on a hope
that the old welfare state would be restored through a
resurgence of organised labour, or by a new class unity
transcending divisions of race, religion, region or skill . Others
have focussed on the evident difficulties facing state institutions, so that since the late 1970s 'crisis' has been one of the
dominant themes in social policy debates . None of this has
been very productive as far as strategies are concerned .
Trapped in the mire of welfare state crisis theory, often
committed to simplistic models of class action and welfare
structures, and sometimes mesmerised by the rise of the new
right, Britain's social policy specialists of the left have failed to
make convincing responses at either theoretical or practical
levels . This paper suggests that the time has come for new
thinking, based on a more realistic understanding of what
social policies have become in western societies, and paying

Arguing for a fresh

approach to the
welfare state which
focuses on the
politics of
consumption and
the rights of
consumers, the
author contends
that the
management of
consumption and
household welfare
creates potential
communities of
interest capable of
forming bases for
collective action
and resistance .
107

Capital & Class

108

particular attention to the issue of rights . Central to the paper

is the argument that both theory and strategy for the left
should take far more account of what has been happening in
consumption politics, which is presented below as a crucial
aspect of the social policy scene . There is no suggestion of
abandoning more traditional class-based analyses . Rather, the
aim is to supplement or qualify such work, and to indicate
some prospects for political action .
The views set out in this paper rest on a conception of
western states which emphasises the importance of the
management of consumption carried out through the state
apparatus and through its interactions with a range of private
sector institutions . Like some parallel characteristics of labour
markets, the processes of managing consumption open the way
for the maintenance or construction of political constituencies,
and contribute to the marginalisation of weak groups . This has
been understood well, intuitively, on the political right,
where it is taken advantage of in divisive social policies . On
the other hand, management of consumption and household
welfare also creates potential communities of interest capable
of forming bases for collective action and resistance . This
prospect tends to be undervalued by the British left, where
there is some natural suspicion of the apparently growing
dominance of individualistic 'consumerism' in fields like
housing, pensions or health care . Yet this consumerism, with
its high expectations and notions of consumer rights, is not an
unmixed blessing for Conservative politicians . Indeed, individual and household rights claims here can form important
components of a strategy for the left . Even private property
rights may play a significant part in grass roots resistance to
corporate power .
Left-wing programmes should give more prominence to
the building of solidaristic political constituencies through
creating individualised grass roots rights allied with participatory systems of choice for consumers . This would complement
rights won in the industrial sphere, and contribute to notions
of citizenship as embracing sets of rights claims in a number of
settings . If a new kind of welfare state is to emerge which is
more than a collection of polarised market-led systems, then
solidarities must be built at least partly around the notion of
individual rights . A long-term strategy which could combine
moves towards securing underlying universalistic rights with

Welfare State Struggles

109

the mobilisation of private material consumption interests

could usefully supplement other more conventional approaches
to political action . This point is applicable in fields as diverse
as education and pensions, but will be illustrated below
mainly by reference to housing .
On the theory side the paper will argue that the
conditions for collective consumer mobilisation and resistance
in fields like housing are to some extent a product of state
characteristics which can be seen as 'structural' . That is to say,
they derive from deep-seated features of the modes of
'representation' and 'intervention' which make up modern
welfare states . Seeing consumer rights claims in this context
means that we can place them within a broader pattern of
conflicts and institutions . Rights are thus important as an
aspect of political struggle, but not a substitute for the politics
of class, gender or race . A reconstituted class politics,
however, must take account of the characteristics of consumption, and of the importance of rights claims here .
The paper is in five parts . Firstly, readers are reminded of
some recent debates about consumption, and the idea of
managed consumption is considered . Secondly, a brief
comment is made on differential incorporation, gender and
race : the conclusion here is that attempts could be made to
enmesh the rights enjoyed by privileged groups within
universalistic systems which would cater for presently marginalised groups too . Thirdly, the paper focusses on the nature of
consumption politics, and the role of private rights claims .
The link between property and participation is noted . This is
followed by some housing illustrations . Finally, there is a
short conclusion .

In a short paper it is not possible to review the consumption

literature comprehensively, but it is necessary to mention
some key themes . In particular, we need to distinguish
approaches which stress 'new' forms of social fragmentation,
differentiation and political cleavages, from those which
emphasise economic structures, the abiding significance of
traditional class divisions, and the determining effects of the
sphere of production . One important implication of sociological debates on consumption has been that in highlighting
either new social movements or intra-class and sectoral

Towards a new
theory of
consumption?

Capital & Class

110

cleavages writers have posed challenges to deterministic

Marxian accounts of conflict and political interests . Saunders,
for example, in describing housing divisions linked to tenure,
stresses the differentiation of life chances which he sees being
grounded as much in the use of state power as in existing class
inequalities (Saunders, 1990, 334) . Differential access to
property rights amongst consumers plays an important part in
his account, and he uses what he feels is the strong consumer
demand for private ownership as a springboard from which to
assault the academic left . Some consumption literature is of
course much more bland than the recent work of Saunders . For
instance, in a journal issue devoted to the subject, Urry
introduces his paper by remarking simply that,
'To the extent to which there can be said to be a sociology
of consumption it has been mainly concerned with the
differential purchase, use and symbolic significance of
material objects' (Urry, 1990, 23) .
Nevertheless, one underlying theme has been that social
divisions associated with consumption (and sometimes community) may cut across or replace social classes as key
dimensions of social stratification, and as foundations for
political action or commitment . Some critics have challenged
the significance given to consumption or have re-asserted the
importance of conventional class demarcations and the
organisation of production (for relevant work see Ball, 1986 ;
Busfield, 1990) . No critique, however, has yet successfully
disposed of the argument that consumption politics and
divisions cannot merely be read off in a straightforward way
from industrial relations and a unified notion of class . The task
to be faced in the future, therefore, is to link analyses of the
politics and sociology of consumption in a detailed way with
broader structures, and with the more conventional class-based
accounts of conflict and power .
To find a sharp contrast with British social science debates
we may turn to regulation theories . 2 In particular, work by
Aglietta illustrates some possibilities and limitations of an
analysis via structures, traditional class concepts, and the
sphere of production, as a means of accounting for consumption characteristics . As Bagguley points out, Aglietta sees
consumption as being largely determined by developments in
production (Bagguley, 1989, 10-11 ; Aglietta, 1987,

Welfare State Struggles

158-159) . I am uneasy about the abstract notions of a 'mode of
consumption' and 'norms' of consumption partly because such
approaches imply a 'top-down' perspective which begins with
developments at the level of general economic features in
production, and largely assumes welfare and social policies substantial elements in consumption - to be crudely dependent variables . Furthermore, analyses of this type might
appear to down-grade the roles played by specific conflicts and
grass roots actions in the politics of consumption (even though
Aglietta is aware of spatial variations in the success of
struggles : Aglietta, 1987, 243) . Nonetheless, although
extensively criticised (see Jessop, 1990 ; Bagguley, 1989 ;
Clarke, 1988), Aglietta's work is interesting in trying to put
certain consumption issues on the agenda . In the long term
some theorists will probably wish to analyse the details of
consumption and welfare within an overview that recognises
the significance of the production sphere (from which
consumption in any case cannot be straightforwardly separated) but which develops the idea of the reproduction of social
relations in such a way as to take full account of action,
institutional variations and agency, as well as structure .
This paper cannot resolve the difficulties of consumption
theories by offering a synthesis . Instead the aim is to bring out
some features of consumption and welfare which have
implications for political strategies . Even so, there are at least
some starting points here for a fresh theoretical perspective . A
basic assumption is that there is much to be gained by taking
full account of cleavages and differentiation, but at the same
time recognising the significance of 'structural' issues for the
study of consumption relationships .
To begin with, it is crucial to appreciate that 'welfare'
does not necessarily stand in some straightforward way as a
contrast or challenge to capitalistic structures (a view which
unfortunately has led to simplistic notions about the role of
welfare in so-called 'fiscal crisis') . Welfare itself is inevitably
an ambiguous term . One of the less normative ways of
considering it may be to see it as involving a variety of systems
through which consumption by or within households is
enhanced, conditioned or maintained . This may mean controls, supports, services, tax concessions or other benefits,
supplementing, magnifying or substituting for direct wages .
This casts welfare and consumption primarily in institutional

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Capital & Class

112

terms, but also implies a variety of potentially distinctive

social and political relationships . (These extend their influence
into the home itself, notably in respect of gender roles and
expectations inside households) . Within the network of
institutional forms, household welfare is frequently supplied
through markets underpinned by state regulation and subsidy,
and by political structures of privileged corporate representation or intermediation . In effect what we commonly call
'welfare' is bound up closely with household consumption that
is highly organised by the modern state's institutions .
Sometimes this consumption can be a firm part of the making
of profits, and of investment processes . Elsewhere, helping the
welfare of consumers appears to undermine profit-making
opportunities . State agencies are not outsiders in the first case
and participants in the second, but are likely to be actors in
both situations . Private consumption is rarely determined by
choices made in markets in isolation . Consequently it is
misleading to theorise welfare in terms of a strict contrast with
markets and private investment processes . This understanding
has important implications for our interpretation of recent
developments .
Conventional discussions of welfare often rest on the
assertion that a post-war social policy consensus ended with
the advent of fiscal difficulties and the emergence of a revitalised new right in politics . Perhaps there may be merits in
this view, but there can be a danger of underestimating
continuities within the welfare state . If political support has
been weakening for universalistic services in Britain, that is
not the same as a decay of the welfare state as such . To assume
so would mean accepting the misleadingly narrow stereotype
of welfare systems so often deployed on the political right . As
writers like Titmuss (1958) and Sinfield (1978) have shown,
the welfare state is much more than simply a universalistic
social insurance structure added to a redistributive support
system for the disadvantaged . Direct cash benefits and
universal services have long been parallelled by a range of other
types of assistance for households, often enjoyed disproportionately by the better-off . Even if we were to construe the welfare
state fairly narrowly (leaving aside expenditure on industrial
reconstruction, subsidies for industries and infrastructure,
etc .), its scope would extend far beyond the safety nets and
universal services that are the focus for so much political

Welfare State Struggles

debate (and around which 'crisis' discussions seem to revolve) .

Household welfare is assisted by numerous state involvements
outside the field of direct wages . In effect, the welfare state is a
complex of modes of 'intervention' and 'representation' which
embraces arrangements for subsidised private pensions, housing or cars, just as much as it covers the NHS or council
housing (Harrison, 1986) .
Given this perspective, our explanation of change must
stress continuity and transition as much as crisis . The
management of consumption has shifted so that privatised
forms of provision are more favoured than before, but state
support has not been withdrawn, nor have we entered a period
of 'non-intervention' . Britain has a structure of organised
consumption through which the state apparatus is deeply
implicated in a wide range of types of consumer support and
assistance . Although this structure ties in with stratification
patterns that are often rooted strongly in the sphere of
production, the politics of organised consumption cannot be
read off in a simple way as if it was only an extension of
industrial relations . A perspective centred on the labour
movement, industrial conflict and occupational groups is of
course essential as one way of understanding the welfare state .
It must be complemented, however, by specific analyses from
a consumption viewpoint . This is not because consumption is
a distinct sphere, but because it has some special features, and
because multiple starting-points for analysis generally lead to a
richer understanding . Furthermore, there are political lessons
to be learned from looking at incorporation, exclusion,
constituency-building and struggle here . The management of

consumption has become an essential element in the reproduction of the

social relations of capitalism, but at the same time generates new
possibilities for collective resistance to centralised power,
The key feature of the Thatcher period has been
opportunism, not a response to crisis . Taking advantage of
industrial changes and political weakness in the labour
movement, governments have sought to narrow and redefine
welfare . In doing so they have not needed to invent the social
division of welfare, for marginalisation and fragmentation have
been characteristics of the welfare state since its earliest years .
Rather, they have intensified divisions and disadvantage,
while maintaining the welfare state as an ensemble of
interventions .

113



Capital & Class

114 Differential
incorporation,
gender and race

One useful way of reviewing the relationships between

disadvantage and social policies is to adopt a concept of
differential incorporation . Assuming that social policy is
primarily about managing and organising consumption (as
implied above), we can apply notions of incorporation and
exclusion to it . Thus we could have a simplified picture of an
organised consumption structure within which some groups of
consumers are relatively more incorporated than others . Partly
through this structure, households are situated differentially
for access to resources, and may enjoy varying levels of status as
well . We could argue, for example, that this structure plays an
important part in constituting women and men differently as
far as `citizenship' is concerned . The same point applies to
black households, and in fact the term differential incorporation previously has been used chiefly in a race relations setting
(see Rex and Mason, 1986, xii) . An advantage of the approach
is that it does not require us to try to compress gender and
ethnic divisions into some unified notion of class . Rather, we
may anticipate that within the institutional structures of
consumption there are numerous points at which conflicts may
arise, sometimes along class lines but sometimes not . Intraclass divisions are important, and patriarchy and racism both
reflect and contribute to the development of the consumption
system .
The incorporation of consumers has material, political
and ideological facets (Harrison, 1990) . One probability is
that groups with good housing, transport, health care and so
forth are drawn into the political mainstream, while others less
fortunate tend to be politically marginalised . As far as housing
is concerned an argument is sometimes advanced that owneroccupation is a tool that secures compliant acceptance of
capitalism by the more prosperous of the working class, while
the remainder are confined to a 'residualised' council house
sector which is weakly represented politically . There is no
need, however, to adopt such a crude view of material or
political incorporation, and few serious scholars treat owneroccupation this way . Bearing in mind that owner-occupiers
have sometimes taken radical political action (see for instance
Craig, 1986, 97-105), and that some in any case lose out
financially through house purchase, we must be very wary of
attributing too much causative status to this (or any other)
single item of household consumption taken out of context .

Welfare State Struggles

Nonetheless, there are connections between political fragmentation and the organisation of consumption, even though the
links are complex . It hardly needs stating, furthermore, that
the organisation of consumption is tied partly to the
organisation of the world of work . The labour movement itself
has contributed to the development of divisions within
welfare, and has not always worked towards universalism and
unity (Mann, 1984) . Many welfare benefits depend on work
status, and in the present period there is a shift to strengthen
or re-assert the 'fit' between labour market fragmentation and
the organisation of welfare and consumption . This does not
make social policy a mere dependent variable of industrial
conflict, since consumption politics (as noted above) needs a
rather separate analysis . It does mean, however, that those who
are disadvantaged in the production sphere often also do
relatively badly within the sphere of institutionalised consumption . Differential incorporation may operate in both
settings .
The approach sketched so far emphasises institutional
power and social fragmentation in constituting individuals and
households as far as status and citizenship are concerned . Even
so, despite the potency of the management process, there is
always scope for a grass roots response seeking to challenge
central power . This will be discussed later . For the moment I
wish only to pose a single question . Are there approaches to
social policy which could help overcome or counter the
political fragmentation of consumers and the divide-and-rule
tactics of incorporation and exclusion? The answer would
appear to lie partly in a reconstruction of universalistic services
and support systems which would build around the rights and
entitlements already enjoyed by the privileged . This may seem
a dangerous strategy by contrast with planned interventions
which begin with a 'clean slate' and attempt to create a
straightforward state service! In an ideal world the latter would
no doubt be preferred, but what is required now is a process of
constituency-building and the development of new solidarities . If it were possible to enmesh the individualised
entitlements of the better-off within universalistic structures,
this would provide a foundation for political strength . An
example might be a housing rights system which extended to
most households the kinds of rights normally associated with
owner-occupation . Or perhaps we might consider a universal

115

Capital & Class

116

mobility allowance, adjusted for household circumstances and

work needs, and including a company cars element . Once set
in motion, such universalistic structures might slowly erode
differentials within particular areas of consumption, and build
up a common sense of entitlements and rights at grass roots .
This might be especially helpful for women . Taking the
transport example, there could be a transition towards a
system of financial credits, reliefs or vouchers which in the end
would be aimed at increasing mobility most for those with the
clearest needs ; perhaps (for instance) single parents with
several young children, or low-income rural households . The
political objective of such programmes would be to match
some of the material advantages at present catered for by
company cars, mortgage tax relief, etc ., with similar benefits
for all households, in such a way as to create widely popular
grass roots systems of rights and entitlements . This possibility
of individualised rights forming a building block for the left
may seem novel, and will be pursued again below . First,
however, it is desirable to return briefly to the dangers of the
strategy outlined .
One obvious difficulty in building around existing
entitlements enjoyed by the more privileged is that two
systems might develop, one inferior to the other . Instead of
matching the advantages of the rich we might end up
providing everyone else with a lower-quality set of rights . This
risk must be recognised, but seems unlikely to be avoided by
any alternative strategy capable of political success . Indeed it is
characteristic of some welfare state struggles that they
themselves can reproduce or create inequalities : collective
mobilisations do not necessarily lead to wider solidarities . This
is certainly true in industrial settings, where effective trade
union negotiators have long sought to win workforces 'fringe
benefits' not available to other groups of workers . The best
hope is that these gains later become the basis for a more
general advance . If such a gradual approach is often politically
inevitable at present (as seems likely), then the key aim must
be to tie it to longer-term goals of greater equality . The
proposals above are intended to point in that direction . In the
absence of a clear strategy along the lines indicated, paternalistic and universalistic designs may tend to be eroded by group
actions and pressures . The fragmentation of class observed by
sociologists of consumption can all too easily connect with


Welfare State Struggles
117

practices which enlarge or secure privilege, while universalistic

systems become by-passed or undermined . Neither theorists
nor political activists should underestimate the potency of
potential intra-class divisions . Rights-based approaches to
consumption may offer one way of countering the tendencies
for fragmentation .

Four features stand out in British consumption politics .

Firstly, decision-making and power tend to be concentrated at
the national or 'peak' level . Secondly, negotiations over policy
are frequently characterised by regularised relationships
between governmental agencies and major external private
interests, while less powerful interests are relatively excluded .
Thirdly, the development of consumption arrangements has
tended to incorporate some groups of consumers more fully
than others at mass level . Finally, the very processes of
organised consumption create grounds for opposition and
resistance among consumers to corporate power . It is this last
fact - tied in with the development of mass level incorporation
and the building of political constituencies - that was the
reason for referring to 'structural' characteristics in the
introduction to this paper . The organisation of consumption and its underpinning with subsidies and acknowledged rights
claims - is functional for the reproduction of social relations,
but raises expectations and creates means of resistance .
In the present period the interpenetration of governmental and private sector agencies is being strengthened, while
there is a tendency to by-pass traditional electoral mechanisms . Thus local democratic participatory forms have been
down-graded in policy-making and implementation, in favour
or privatisation, direct business involvement, or QUANGOS able
to respond more readily to private sector demands (Urban
Development Corporations, Housing Action Trusts, etc .) .
Policies in housing, planning, urban renewal, education and
health suggest a desire to reduce those pluralistic elements
which have previously existed in decision-making . Although
there are precedents, the scale of changes is probably sufficient
to suggest that a transition is taking place to a welfare state in
which private/public agency interpenetration will be a more
dominant feature of consumption management in most fields .
At the same time distinctions between different categories of

Consumption
politics and
rights claims

Capital & Class

118

consumers are being emphasised, with poorer groups finding

their subsidies cut while some occupational and tax benefits for
the better off become more significant . This implies an
approach of 'divide and rule' by the political right, although of
course this may not always be a very conscious matter .
The close connections between public agencies and
private purposes have been of particular interest to neocorporatist theorists, who have long focussed attention on
private negotiations between powerful interests at 'peak' level .
Seen from such a perspective, consumption politics at present
looks a little like 'corporatism without labour' . Amongst the
features often highlighted by corporatist writers have been
privileged access by corporate bodies to government, exclusion
of less powerful interests, regularisation of relationships
between state agencies and major firms, trade unions and
financial institutions, and the claims to represent a set of
participants lower down in the political system - perhaps
individual firms, workers or 'clients' . Interpreting these points
in relation to consumption we can see not only a network of
relationships of power and influence at 'peak' level, but also
some implications lower down which suggest similarities with
the industrial sphere . Just as trade union involvements in
bargaining imply representation and efforts to incorporate
workers at mass level, so organised consumption also involves
claims about representation and attempts at incorporation .
The diversion of public funds into the growth of
privatised welfare, and the attribution of privileged status in
public policy-making to private institutions, rest to some
extent on a rhetoric about representation . It is frequently
asserted that building societies, pension funds, insurance
companies, and even private firms represent the interests of
millions of ordinary consumers . Building societies and
housebuilding firms, for instance, are presented as the
favoured deliverers of owner-occupation, reflecting the supposed aspirations of grass roots savers and buyers . Together,
governments and private corporations direct some real material
gains into the hands of these grass roots 'clients' (although
often with casualties too at that level) . Simultaneously
governments can legitimise the privileged access granted to
such corporations on the grounds of representation of mass
level interests, and can attempt to secure political support
amongst the apparent beneficiaries . The implementation of

Welfare State Struggles

what are really public policies is presented as more a matter of

the impersonal operation of markets than of the interplay of
institutions and their power resources . Thus in times of
difficulty, criticisms may be deflected away from government
itself, while in 'good times' it can take credit for fostering
conditions in which 'consumer choice' is enlarged by these
valued private institutions .
The rhetoric of representation fits closely with the
continuing flow of material advantages to the better-off
consumers, and thus has a tie to reality for many . There are
also some mechanisms of formal accountability - as in the case
of bodies with mutual status - which enhance the arguments
of their managers that they act and negotiate on behalf of grass
roots beneficiaries .
All this sounds very cosy as one way of managing aspects
of consumption, but it has three problems . For right-wing
governments there are political attractions in maintaining a
degree of stability in the supply of benefits to consumers, and
in trying to reach a large number of households . Yet this raises
problems of expense, has difficult side-effects for the economy,
and can create new points of political sensitivity . For owneroccupation, for instance, government faces a mounting
financial cost of tax relief, the awkward problem of massive
regional price differentials, distorting effects on investment
patterns in the economy, and the sensitive issues of mortgage
defaults and fluctuations in interest rates for purchasers . The
first problem in consumption management, therefore, is of
trying to reconcile political considerations (and incorporation
at mass level) with economic implications . A second problem
concerns representation . It is possible for challenges from
below via internal corporate systems of accountability or via
parliamentary processes, on the grounds that managers or
leaders are not taking full account of members, investors or
beneficiaries . Government cannot disregard such challenges
completely, especially since representation is part of the
legitimation for allowing corporate bodies a privileged role in
the first place . In effect some apparently individualised approaches
to social policy contain the potential for new collective forms of
representation and mobilisation . This might apply for occupatio-

nal pension funds as well as building societies (for a valuable

study see Schuller, 1986) .
The third problem connects closely with the first . Mass

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Capital & Class

120

level incorporation - even if selective - creates and extends

consumer expectations, patterns of individual rights, and
rights claims . These may become an obstacle not merely to
prudent national economic management, but also to specific
quiet negotiations for mutual advantage with private institutions . In seeking to carve out territory for profitable private
sector activity in social policy fields, government can come up
against material rights claims and potential collective mobilisations around such claims . Claims allied with the notion of
individually-held private property can be especially effective
against central power, because so much government activity
depends on widespread acceptance of that notion . There is a
link between property and participation which can be
exploited here from the grass roots . It is hard to refuse
demands for participation when the call comes from people
with a clearly defined property interest at stake . In town
planning, for example, over the years governments have
conceded various legal and customary rights of local participation largely because of deference to the rights claims of the
occupiers and owners of land and dwellings that might be
affected by development nearby . (For a discussion of the
conflicting property claims here, see Harrison, 1987) . Today
we find home-owners in the rural shires and commuting
hinterlands of the south-east able to inhibit and delay the
release of development sites for new housing, despite the
government's pleasant understandings with housebuilders at
'peak' level (Harrison, 1990) . People claim a right to exert
influence collectively over development processes in their
localities, and central government cannot deny them this
completely .
This issue of property should not be dismissed as
something only relevant to the well-to-do . Governments are
capable of conceding a range of citizenship rights which can
benefit the less prosperous too, and property is a dimension
here which should not be overlooked by the left . A sad feature
of the post-war period has been the failure of Labour
governments to encourage growth in some desirable forms of
property-owning democracy . For it is in combinations of
private property rights with collective participatory channels
that one of the strongest threats to capitalistic and corporatist
forms lies . A simple example may demonstrate the point . Let
us suppose that individual property holdings in water

Welfare State Struggles

121

resources and services had been distributed in the 1970s on a

regional basis to all households resident within the board
areas, and to all relevant employees . Suppose, further, that for
each region or board area there now existed a trust or similar
body on which these shareholders formed the dominant
elements . Such an arrangement would have been a far more
difficult one to unravel than the machinery which has recently
been privatised so hastily . There is an old lesson here .
Common rights find only limited protection where individual
private rights are much more difficult to dislodge, yet
individual rights can form a basis for collective mobilisations .
It would have been far harder for the present government to
start state schools, polytechnics or hospitals on the road to
privatisation if they had been 'owned' by the individuals in
their localities and controlled via some form of trust or mutual
body . Ownership of the type envisaged here does not include
all the features of a 'full' liberal notion . (For a classic account of
ownership see Honore, 1961) . Thus the rights would not be
bought and sold in an open market, although it is conceivable
that there might be some kinds of sharing of financial benefits
from the enterprise or service . Of course it is a little late to
speculate in this way, for we are in a period when a kind of 'new
enclosure movement' is in full swing on all sides . Public assets
have been hastily diverted into private hands . Nonetheless, the
rights and property dimension still has something to offer for
the left, as will be demonstrated by some references to
housing . Furthermore, if the Labour Party could abandon its
past obsession with centralised managerialism, it might still
be able to take advantage of the high consumer expectations
built up by organised consumption in a range of fields .

Housing is a key example to take because it is perhaps the

social policy area, above all, in which the Conservatives have
sought political gain by stressing the individual's rights and
choices . It is well worth demonstrating that this can be turned
against them . There are other fields in which consumer
mobilisation can occur - education, transport and health in
particular - but individual rights here have often been
perceived more in terms of entitlements to receive or seek
services than as rights of possession and control . This could
(and should) be changed, but it means that the most

Housing, rights
and mobilisation

Capital & Class

122

appropriate case studies at present remain those in the housing

field . Outside housing there is plenty of scope for building up
consumer property rights which could be exercised collectively
(over education services, hospitals, pension funds, and so
forth), but speculative detailed comments on the prospects
would be out of place in the present paper . Looking at
housing, I will begin with a brief section on building societies,
including some examples of political strategy and tactics . I
will then comment on council housing, again noting some
possible tactics .
Building societies play important roles in housing policy
and have close relationships with central government . Recent
legislation catering for building society diversification (Building Societies Act, 1986, ch . 53) has reflected the goals of
building society leaders as well as ministers . The government
has given the societies much greater scope for developing new
profitable activities both within housing and more generally in
financial services . The legislation also allows for conversions of
societies from mutual to commercial company status . This
specific issue attracted considerable public attention as a result
of the Abbey National's steps towards flotation, moves by its
leaders to turn the society into something closer to a bank or
finance company . For present purposes the most interesting
point concerns reactions from the grass roots . Building
societies are supposedly organisations owned by their members, to whom managements are responsible . The legislation
recognised this (at least up to a point), and provided for voting
procedures at membership level over conversions to company
status . The Abbey's leaders therefore were forced to face up to
a well-organised opposition movement which developed from
amongst those members who preferred the mutual tradition,
and to try to head off possibilities of an unsatisfactory vote .
The managers were able to exploit their control of information
and meetings, as well as preparing substantial financial
incentives to draw members into voting favourably . 3 Lacking
proper access to all the society's information, and the resources
to mount a campaign comparable with management, the
opponents of flotation had an uphill struggle . Furthermore,
ordinary members probably found it hard to perceive
important differences between mutual status and life with the
proposed new company . Public policy has done little to
prevent a blurring of the distinctions between societies and

Welfare State Struggles

banks . Given the financial inducements on offer, and the
vague nature of the benefits of mutuality, it was no surprise
that management won the ballot . Despite this, there are
significant lessons to be learned from these events .
The resistance to flotation came from grass roots holders
of property rights who attempted to act collectively against
'peak level' holders of power . Encouragement of owneroccupation (and government's close ties with the societies)
have connected with a model of building society practice
which implies that these are relatively benign organisations
representing and assisting millions of ordinary householders
and 'small investors' . The notion of mass level representation
here has become part and parcel of the conception of a
'property-owning democracy' . It has provided the legitimation
for privileged political access by building society leaders, as
well as for a shaping of public policy in their interests .
Government cannot easily dismantle this set of relationships
without risking political consequences . Formal rights of
representation for members cannot be abandoned completely,
and some supervisory machinery has to be provided for the
building society movement . At the same time, too rapid a
commercialisation might undermine political support if it
meant borrowers facing highly unpredictable interest rates,
and possibilities of foreign takeovers of mortgage portfolios .
For these kinds of reasons ministerial enthusiasms for
deregulation and commercial freedom have been tempered by
caution . In other words the organising of consumption in
terms of owner-occupation has created important political
constraints on the manoeuvrability of corporate interests and
government at national level . While right-wing politicians
hope that mass-level property ownership will help secure
Conservatism, owner-occupation in fact also creates large
expectations, material rights claims, demands for financial
stability, and even calls for real democratic participation . The
Abbey National issue, therefore, should not be perceived by
the left as a kind of trivial 'side-show' . Rather it demonstrates
tensions within the management of consumption which could
be exploited to the advantage of ordinary households .
This leads us to strategy and tactics . In the long term one
way of increasing opportunities for mobilising the grass roots
would be by developing new frameworks for financial
institutions at European Community level . Mutual bodies

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Capital & Class

124

could be given a special tax and legal regime enabling them to

maintain and improve their position against commercial
companies . This would be allied with the imposition of more
effective processes of accountability to members, and a
framework of social obligations . For example, perhaps a
percentage of resources would have to be devoted to agreed
housing schemes with specific targets (such as for dwellings for
single parent households or single homeless young people) .
Over time the social functions of mutual bodies might grow,
and they would increasingly co-operate with other welfare
agencies and local authorities . Of course at present this looks
unrealistic, and the more immediate questions concern dealing
with conversions, etc . Why not borrow here from the
Conservatives the notion of 'opting out'? Thus I would propose
new legal provisions . Where a mutual converts to a commercial company, borrowers should be entitled to opt out and
choose another society of the conventional kind . The mortgage
would be transferred, at the converting society's expense, to
the new society (which would remain a mutual) . The borrower
would be entitled normally to transfer on equivalent terms,
and would still also receive an appropriate share of the capital
distributed to members as a result of the flotation or 'sale of
assets' . This would extend consumer choice and put a brake on
ambitious managers! Would Labour politicians take this up,
and give the proposal more force by making it retrospective? If
they really care about 'consumers', here is a chance to prove it .
Turning now to council housing we find similar tensions
between the centre and the grass roots . The 1980 Housing Act
right-to-buy legislation was a political success, generating
very little effective collective opposition . Building up or
enhancing the rights and material possessions of specific
households was bound to prove a fairly safe short-term
strategy, despite adverse consequences for tenants remaining
in residual estates and for people on waiting lists . It is quite a
different matter, however, to take away individual rights or to
cut across established claims and expectations . The shift in
national housing policy since the mid- 1980s has done this,
and there has been a strong reaction from tenants . Although
presented as providing an opportunity for council tenants to
'opt out', recent legislation in reality does not enhance their
rights . Instead it looks as if it has been designed to carve out
new territory for private investment by allowing various kinds

Welfare State Struggles

of landlords to bid for local authority estates . As the 1988

legislation went through Parliament, a number of concessions
were extracted from government . The issue of tenant voting
rights was a particular bone of contention . In the event, the
record of recent attempts at transfers, by those local authorities
anxious to pass over their stock to new landlords or housing
associations, has not been encouraging for ministers . Ballots
have indicated considerable support for council house tenure .
In addition the government's Housing Action Trust programme is in difficulty . This paper does not attempt to
chronicle these events, for here I wish simply to consider broad
political implications . What is striking is the amount of
collective mobilisation that has occurred since 1985 in defence
of local authority tenant rights . Tenants are keen to protect
their security of tenure, their rights as households to have
access to local politicians and managers, and their right to a
say on the future of their homes . These are individualised
property rights but have been a basis for group action against
right-wing local authorities and central government . Householder rights claims are less established for council tenants
than for owner-occupiers, but some of the same principles
apply . Tenants have claims and expectations that cannot be
completely denied by government, even though some ministers would no doubt dearly love to disregard them . In
managing housing consumption in this sector ministers have
often used the rhetoric of tenant choice, and in 1980 actually
put into law a tenants' charter . In encouraging the idea of
individual household choice and rights in this way, government has sought political advantage, but has also set up
potential obstacles to its own cosy deals with corporate
interests over housing privatisation .
In the long-term any defensive strategy for council
tenants faces the problem of finance . Government can lever
tenants into opting to leave local authority tenure if rents are
forced up by comparison with housing costs in other tenure
contexts . The strategic answer therefore is not to rely only on
defending council housing as such . Alongside such a defence it
would be desirable to enhance the individual rights claims of
tenants by trying to bring them closer to owner-occupation,
and by reinforcing systems of managerial accountability
wherever possible . Perhaps this is relatively uncontentious
when put in general terms, but at the tactics level there is

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Capital & Class

126

more difficulty. One idea, for example, might be to press for

recognition that councils have been holding property in trust
for tenants, and that consequently households who do not
exercise the right-to-buy nonetheless already 'own' part of
their houses . The Conservatives' right-to-buy arrangements
could be read to imply this already, but the logic has not been
followed through . Suppose some tenants collectively wished to
take over their estate from an authority . Should they be able to
'pool' their right-to-buy discounts when the transfer price (or
'dowry') was being calculated? Provided there were appropriate
financial compensations covering any subsequent individual
exercising of the right-to-buy, there would seem no obvious
objection in principle . The result would be to put tenants
almost always at an advantage against any predatory transfer
proposal : if one materialised they could mount another
themselves that would be financially more viable . Again, one
is looking for means of combining private material rights with
collective action . Would the Labour Party press for such an
amendment to the 1988 Act?

Conclusions

In trying to cover so much ground this paper has had to sketch

issues in a preliminary way only . No doubt its assumptions
will provoke some hostile responses, and perhaps the examples
of tactics and strategy will not seem very practical . The
objectives of the essay, however, are not to design a fullyfledged theoretical framework or to map out a programme, but
to indicate potential points of development on both these
fronts . The approach outlined is certainly not meant to be a
total strategy for the left as regards welfare, nor should it
distract attention from areas such as homelessness where acute
problems cannot be solved by mobilising around existing
rights claims .
In conclusion seven points will be set out, partly as a restatement and partly to qualify and add to what was said
earlier .
(a) The management of consumption plays an important
part in the reproduction of social relations in Britain . It is not
possible to read off political dimensions here directly from
what happens in industrial relations (although the production
and consumption spheres areclosely connected) . Crisis theories

Welfare State Struggles

have paid too little attention to the separate complexities of
welfare politics .
(b) The mass level politics of consumption is amenable to
analysis partly in terms of incorporation processes which tend
to constitute different groups differentially, and which provide
material assistance in ways which tie up with intra-class
fragmentation . Racism and sexism may be highly significant
here (just as they are in the production sphere) .' It might be
worth thinking this through in relation to issues not touched
on in this paper (perhaps 'consumption of culture', etc .) .
(c) Consumer incorporation is a double-sided phenomenon, not only providing means for 'divide-and-rule' tactics by
elites, but also bases for organised grass roots resistance to
corporate power . Marxist analyses might benefit from treating
this as a possible 'structural' feature of the way consumption is
organised .
(d) Private rights claims can be an important lever against
corporate influence, especially when mobilised collectively .
Individualised property rights in particular offer a strong
means of resistance because mass level incorporation encourages them, and because so much within corporate activity
depends on recognition of similar rights . By contrast, vaguer
entitlements and 'common rights' are more easily eroded or set
aside by powerful corporate interests and governments .
(e) More stress could be placed on consumer rights in the
long-term and short-term policies of the left . Recent moves in
this direction should be welcomed, although it is vital not to
assume that simplistic concepts of 'market choice' need to be
taken on board alongside notions of individual property rights .
One must distinguish rights of use, access and control, on the
one hand, from the right to sell or otherwise dispose of assets .
Private consumer property rights do not necessarily imply a
market in which they are bought and sold .
(f) There are limits on the usefulness of private rights in
conflicts, and practical constraints are always required for any
rights system focussed on individuals . A legal framework of
duties and responsibilities can usually cope with any difficulties arising from exclusive access to resources implied in a
set of private property rights . For instance, where an estate is
transferred to ex-council tenants as a co-operative venture,
nomination arrangements may be needed in which a local
authority has some firm legal entitlements .

127

Capital & Class

128

(g) Our notions of citizenship should have dimensions

relating to consumption, as well as to industrial relations and
to political rights and obligations . Property claims should not
be overlooked as a useful component of citizenship in certain
settings . Neither consumption nor property have been dealt
with adequately in recent debates about citizenship (see for
instance Plant, 1988 ; Turner, 1990 ; Critical Social Policy,
1989) .
The way in which consumption is arranged by governments has often opened up prospects for grass roots resistance
to peak level and corporate power . Although consumption
struggles do not supersede industrial ones, there is a need for
some fresh thinking . The politics of welfare and social policy
largely concern the management of consumption, yet consumption politics hardly figures at all in books about the
welfare state . Theoretical analysis and political strategies
should take more account of what has been happening in this
sphere . There are consumption dimensions to the politics of
class, race and gender .

Welfare State Struggles

1.

The writer would like to thank Paul Bagguley, Peter Craig,

Notes

Diane Elson, Kirk Mann, Phil Lee, and members of the politics
theory seminar group at Leeds, for comments on ideas in earlier
versions of this paper .
2.

This section is included here largely as a response to

suggestions from referees . Jessop uses the term 'regulation theories' to

refer to a very broad group of approaches, and it is not possible to
engage with that wider literature now : for a lengthy account see
Jessop, 1990 .
The issues were the subject of a very large number of press
3.
reports, letters and comments : for example in The Guardian,
9 .11 .1987, 3 .12 .1987, 28 .4 .1988, 14 .5 .1988, 23 .5 .1988,
24 .5 .1988, 26 .5 .1988, 10 .1 .1989, 23 .3 .1989, 25 .3 .1989,
29 .3 .1989, 6 .4 .1989, 12 .4 .1989, and many more . Also, coverage
was given to the debate in 'The Money Programme', BBC 2,
22 .5 .1988 .

Aglietta, M . (1987) A

Theory of Capitalist Regulation,

translated by

Fernbach, D ., London (Verso) .

Bagguley, P . (1989)

Flexibility,

The Post-Fordist Enigma : Theories of Labour

Lancaster Regionalism Group, Working Paper 29

(University of Lancaster) .
Ball, M . (1986), Housing Analysis : Time For a Theoretical Refocus?

Housing Studies,

1, 3, July .

Busfield, J . (1990) Sectoral Divisions in Consumption : The Case of

Medical Care,

Sociology, 24,

1, February .

Clarke, S . (1988) Overaccumulation, class struggle and the regulation approach,

Capital and Class,

36, Winter .

Craig, P . (1986) The House that Jerry Built? Building Societies, the
State and the Politics of Owner-occupation,

Housing Studies, 1,

2, April .
Critical Social Policy( 1989)

Citizenship and Welfare,

Special issue, 26,

Autumn .
Harrison, M . (1986) Consumption and urban theory : an alternative
approach based on the social division of welfare,

Journal of Urban and Regional Research,

International

10, 2 .

Harrison, M . (1987) Property rights, philosophies and the justification of planning control, in Harrison, M . and Mordey, R . (eds . )

Planning Control : Philosophies, Prospects and Practice,

(Croom Helm) .

London

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Capital & Class

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