Bangsamoro (political entity)

Bangsamoro is a proposed new autonomous political entity within the Philippines. The proposal is part of a framework agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines, the new entity intended to supersede the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), described byPresident Benigno Aquino III as a "failed experiment".[1] This new political entity seeks to bring closure to the 15-year peace process between the Philippine government and the Muslim secessionist groups in thesouthern part of the Philippines. On 15 October 2012, the historic GPH-MILF framework agreement was signed by GPH chief negotiator Marvic Leonen, MILF peace panel chair Mohagher Iqbal, andMalaysian facilitator Tengku Dato Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed along with President Aquino, Prime MinisterNajib Razak of Malaysia, Chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Secretary-General Ekmeleddin hsanolu of theOrganisation of Islamic Cooperation at Malacaan Palace in Manila. This document outlines general agreements on major issues, including the extent of power, revenues and territory granted for the new Muslim autonomous region. [2]

The agreement was sealed at about 15:00PST. President Aquino, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim and SecretaryGeneral Ekmeleddin hsanolu of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation were all present in the signing of the agreement. [3] [edit]International reactions Australia - Australian Foreign Minister, Bob Carr welcomed the development and said the Philippine government's announcement of the agreement "offered hope that the 28-year conflict in Mindanao could be drawing to a close." He particularly acknowledged the leadership of President Benigno Aquino III whom he described as a "strong advocate for peace." [4] European Union - EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in a statement, congratulated the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on the successful conclusion of the framework peace agreement. Ashton said the EU also recognized the contributions of the Malaysian facilitator in the peace talks, Tengku Datuk Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed, as well as members of the International Contact Group. The EU foreign affairs chief also said "the EU, as a member of the International Monitoring Team and major development partner in poverty alleviation in Mindanao since 1990, will continue to lend its full support." [5] Indonesia - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia said that Indonesia "warmly welcomes" the development and described this agreement as well as the previous peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996 as a reflection of the "strong commitment of the Philippine government to create comprehensive peace in the Southern Philippines." It also added that Indonesia "stands ready to provide support and assistance including in exchange of experiences."[6] Indonesia earlier sealed a similar peace agreement with its decades-long secessionist group GAM in Aceh region in 2005. Japan - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan said that Japan "heartily welcomes" the Framework Agreement, which it described as the first step towards the realization of the peace process in Mindanao. Japan also pays respect to the Philippines and the MILF, as well as to Malaysia for it role as facilitator. The ministry also added that Japan hopes for the steady implementation of the agreement and expects more difficulties must be overcome to reach a final agreement. Finally, it said that Japan continues to offer full support to the Mindanao Peace Process.[7] Turkey - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey "congratulates the Parties on the constructive attitude they have demonstrated during the dialogue process which has paved the way for this important agreement." It also stated

Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamorois a preliminary peace agreement signed in theMalacaan Palace in Manila, Philippines on October 15, 2012. The Framework Agreement calls for the creation of an autonoumous political entity namedBangsamoro, replacing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which was described byPresident Benigno Aquino III as "a failed experiment".[1] [edit]Announcement of an Agreement The Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Philippinesheld peace talks in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia from 2-6 October. On 7 October, President Aquino announced that the two parties have agreed to sign a preliminary peace agreement which calls for the creation of an autonoumous political entity named Bangsamoro, superseding the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). He criticized that the ARMM is a "failed experiment" that did not address issues such as electoral fraud, political patronage, poverty, war and warlordism. Aquino claimed that structural reform is necessary, with the creation of Bansangmoro solving these issues while upholding national sovereignty. The agreement was reached after 32 peace talks between the two parties that spanned a period of nine years. [1][2] [edit]Signing The Philippine government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front signed the agreement on 15 October 2012 in the Rizal Ceremonial Hall of Malacaan Palace in Manila.

that "Turkey believes in the importance of mediation for the prevention and settlement of conflicts and stands ready to provide support also to the subsequent phases of the Mindanao Peace Process." [8] Turkey is a member of the International Contact Group involved in the peace talks. United Kingdom - UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague said the United Kingdom"wholeheartedly welcomes" the framework agreement which he calls a "testament to the commitment and vision of the parties." It also stated that "full implementation of the agreement by 2016 can bring about peace, security, and development which will be good not only for Mindanao, but for the whole of the Philippines." The secretary also reiterated his government's commitment as a member of the International Contact Group for the peace process and said the UK "stands ready to provide further assistance if such a role would be valuable to the parties."[9] United States US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton affirmed that "the United States welcomes the announcement of the framework agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front" and said that the agreement "is a testament to the commitment of all sides for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the southern Philippines". The secretary also added that the next step is for the full implementation of the agreement and "encourage all parties to work together to build peace, prosperity and greater opportunities for all the people of the Philippines". [10]

Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act 6734 creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, out of the 13 provinces and 9 cities that participated in the plebiscite, only the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi opted to be part of the ARMM. Instead of bringing the Muslim leaders together, this agreement further fragmented the MNLF because some factions within the group preferred independence over autonomy. Thus, a group of officers led byHashim Salamat broke away and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to continue their armed struggle for an independent Bangsamoro (Moro nation) in Mindanao. Though the combined strength of these two rebel forces has not reached a point of posing any real threat to the government in Manila, their existenceand the reasons for their resiliencecertainly brings lots of headaches for the government. For nearly five decades, five presidents have tried to completely end these two rebellions, utilizing both force and diplomacy. So far, no combination has succeeded. Perhaps the most remarkable effort to bring closure to these movements was that of the RamosAdministration, which tried to reach out to both the communist and Muslim rebels through peaceful means. Highly-uncharacteristic for a soldier who actually saw combat against both communist forces (in Korea,Vietnam, and southern Luzon) and Muslim separatists (in Lanao del Sur), Ramos eagerly sat down with the rebel leaders in an attempt to solve both problems at their roots. [edit]Efforts to reach peace with Islamic separatists [edit]MNLF signs peace pact, fragments the movement Even before being elected president, Fidel V. Ramos had actively pursued the assistance of foreign Muslim leaders to solve the problem in Mindanao. Thus, he strongly sought the intercession of Gaddafibecause of his instrumental role in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement earlier in 1976. Indeed, wit h Gaddafis assistance, the Philippine government was able to sign the Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996 in what was supposed to be the end of the Moro armed struggle in Mindanao. Misuari was elected governor of the ARMM and was tasked to supervise the implementation of the peace pact. Unfortunately, other factions within the MNLF were not satisfied with this peace pact and saw this as a deviation from the framework of the Tripoli Agreement. Their desire for complete secession from Philippine sovereignty led to the establishment of the MILF, which will be another challenge to Ramos efforts to bring peace in Mindanao after two decades of negotiations with the MNLF. [edit]Ramos negotiates with the MILF, Estrada balks The exploratory and preparatory talks between the government and the MILF started in August 1996, followed by low-level negotiations commencing January the following year.[7] Ramos term as president ended in June 1998, but the low-level negotiations pushed through under the new administration of President Joseph Ejercito-Estrada. By October 1999, the formal peace talks would commence, only to

Peace process with the Bangsamoro in the Philippines From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia In the late 1960s, a geopolitical revolutionary movement in the Philippines arose from the atmosphere of activism that characterized that decade. Sometime during the late 1968, at least 28 Muslim volunteers from Sulu who were being trained for a covert commando mission to conquer Sabah were massacred to silence by government troops in what would popularly be known as the Jabidah Massacre. The outrage that resulted from this butchery has been widely considered as the catalyst that gave birth to the Islamic separatist movements in Mindanao, pioneer of which was Nur Misuaris Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). [edit]The rise of the Moro liberation movement In pursuit of their goal of liberating theBangsamoro, the MNLF engaged thegovernment forces in extensive armed collisions, peaking in the early 70s when the rebels blitz-like operations brought them control of a substantial number of municipalities surrounding Cotabato City and its airport complex. This prompted the Marcos regime to beef up military presence by deploying almost three-fourths of the army in most Muslim parts ofMindanao. Things took a different turn in 1976 when Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi brokered an agreement that led to the signing of the Tripoli Agreement that introduced the concept of an autonomous Muslim region in Mindanao. On August 1, 1989, under the mandate of the new 1987

be suspended by Estradas sudden policy-shift by waging an all-out war against the MILF. Estradas all-out war policy indeed led to the capture of Camp Abubakar, MILFs main headquarters. The president himself led the military in raising the Philippine flag in the erstwhile rebel stronghold, bringing trucks of lechon (roasted pig) and beer for the triumphant soldiers in what was considered as an insult to the MILFbecause eating pork is prohibited in Islam. [edit]Arroyo resumes peace talks Areas in southern Philippines underactual political control of Muslims are in red. When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the presidency in January 2001, the peace process was revived with a unilateral declaration of ceasefire on the part of the government. With the assistance of the Malaysian government, Presidential Adviser on the Peace ProcessEduardo Ermita and MILF Vice-Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim signed the Agreement for the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks between the government and the MILF. On March 31, 2001, Republic Act 9054 lapsed into law without the signature of the president. This law amended theOrganic Act of the ARMM to provide for the regions expansion from the original four provinces under its jurisdiction. The Provinces of Basilan, North Cotabato,Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Palawan, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga del Norte,Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, and the cities ofCotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi,Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga, Digos, Koronadal,Tacurong, and Kidapawan participated in the plebiscite. However, only Marawi City and Basilan (excluding Isabela City) voted to be included in the ARMM. Later that year, the peace process fell apart when the military attacked the MILF just a day after the ancestral domain aspect of the Tripoli Agreement was signed in Libya. This attack was based on intelligence reports that the MILF has been aiding the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, which at that time held some American and Filipino hostages in Basilan. A ceasefire would once again ensue after informal talks between the government and the MILF through the intercession of Malaysia. On October 29, 2001, the MILF and the MNLF hold unity talks, but this would fall apart barely a month later when Nur Misuari allegedly led a rebellion in Sulu and Zamboanga City to stall the scheduled ARMM elections. A hundred people died in the incident. The government quelled this rebellion and Misuari escaped to Sabah, but the Malaysian government later on deported him back to the Philippines to face rebellion charges. On May 6, 2002, the fourth round of formal peace talks between the government and the MILF resulted in both parties agreeing to veto criminal syndicates and kidnap-for-ransom groups in Mindanao, and to implement the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development aspect of the Tripoli Agreement.

A final draft of the peace accord was presented to the leaders of Congress on February 10, 2003, but on the next day, a setback would ensue as the military launched an offensive in Buliok Complex against the MILF which would last for more than a week. Ceasefire was enforced three weeks later. By March, the parties began exploratory talks in Malaysia with a commitment from both sides for a mutual secession of hostilities. The aspect of a Muslim ancestral domain was laid down as the next agenda for the peace talks. Until the end of 2008, the peace process remained in a deadlock due to constitutional and legal issues surrounding the ancestral domain aspect. [edit]Muslim Ancestral Domain and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity On July 27, 2009, a Memorandum of Agreement on the Muslim Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was finalized in Malaysia. Under this agreement, some 700 villages in Mindanao would hold a referendum within a year to determine if they intend to join the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, an associated state which would be formed after the necessary constitutional amendments are undertaken by the government. This agreement was scheduled to be signed on August 5, with the final peace agreement set to be concluded by November. Three days before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, local officials of North Cotabato filed a case asking the Supreme Court to block the signing of this agreement. On October 14, the Court voted 9-6 to strike down the MOA-AD as unconstitutional. According to the decision penned by Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Constitution does not recognize any state within this country other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for the possibility of any transitory status to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Likewise, the Court held as unconstitutional the guarantees under the MOA-AD that the government will implement the necessary constitutional amendments to create a framework for its implementation. According to the Court, the peace panel and even the president do not have the authority to make such guarantees because they do not have the power to propose amendments to the Constitution, such power being vested exclusively in Congress. The junking of the MOA-AD marked another setback for the peace process, with the armed conflicts for the year 2008 reaching a record-high of 30 incidents in Mindanao. In an effort to salvage the negotiations, Arroyo declared the suspension of military operations against the MILF on July 2009. [edit]Noynoy Aquino resumes peace talks The administration of Benigno Aquino III continued the peace talks with the MILF after the rebel group announced that they were no longer seeking secession from the Philippines. But the prospects for peace remained elusive as rogue MILF forces conducted sporadic attacks against government forces in several areas in Mindanao despite the existing ceasefire agreement. Worst of these attacks came on October 18, 2011 when MILF forces ambushed an Army contingent in Al-Barka, Basilan killing 19 young soldiers and wounding 12 others. Despite the MILFs half -hearted efforts to make these rogue leaders answer for their attacks, the president and the military hierarchy rejected calls for an all-out-war approach to this problem.

The Al-Barka attack came just two months after Aquinos controversial meeting with MILF chairman Al Haj Murad Ebrahim in Tokyo. This gave rise to concerns that the real reason for the stalled peace process is not just the governments lukewarm effort to make peace, but also the lack of sincerity of the rebel groups in negotiating lasting peace with the government. [edit]The Ten Decision Points in establishing a new Bangsamoro Entity [edit]Breakthrough in the peace process In late April 2012, news emerged of a breakthrough in the 15-year-old peace process. This breakthrough revolved around a document, GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles, that mentions a new autonomous political entity that would ultimately replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This comes two months after lead negotiators from both sides expressed pessimism about concluding negotiations in the near future. Just a month earlier, chief government negotiator Marvic Leonen warned both GPH and MILF panels that the peace process was already on the verge of reaching a stalemate because of both parties disagreement on what constitutes genuine autonomy, as it had been made apparent by MILF chief negotiator Mohagher Iqbal that what they want is a Muslim sub-state distinct from the already autonomous ARMM. Thus the sudden turn of events after the 27th Round of Exploratory Talks in Malaysia is indeed a welcome development in the ailing peace process, especially after the Aquino administration refused to order military operations against rogue MILF members who ambushed a military contingent in Basilan in October 2011. The three-year impasse that followed the junking of the MOA-AD was marred with violence as clashes between government troops and rebel forces escalated. It was during the 27th Round of Exploratory Talks that new hope sprung forth as a document entitled Decision Points on Principles surfaced with much enthusiasm from both sides. Under this document, a new autonomous political entity governed by a ministerial form of government shall be introduced as a replacement for the current ARMM. This new setup would be introduced during a transition period through the institution of transitional mechanisms under the new entity. One of the most special aspects of this new entity is its power -sharing and wealthsharing rights vis--vis the national government, with an accompanying power to to create its own sources of revenue, i.e., to tax. The existing Shariah courts would also be strengthened by expanding their jurisdiction and giving them competence over the Shariah justice system. The document also mentions basic rights ought to be afforded the citizens residing in the new political entity. Considering that the 10 points are vague declarations regarding the new entity, we cannot yet assess whether it can survive any constitutional challenge similar to that successfully posed against its predecessor. Nonetheless, as the points have been

made public, it might be a good idea to consider them carefully, in the hope that they not suffer the same fate as befell the BJE. [edit]Compliance with the existing legal framework Implementation of these Ten Points would of course need to comply with the existing legal framework under Philippine law, most important of which is the Constitution. Section 18, Article X of the fundamental law explicitly provides that the power to create an autonomous region rests in Congress subject to the favorable vote of the people through a plebiscite. Thus, ARMM Organic Act (RA 6734) created the ARMM out of the four provinces that favorably voted in the plebiscite called by Congress in 1989. Another plebiscite was held under the ARMM Expansion Act (RA 9054), with only one other province and one city opting to join the ARMM. A new Bangsamoro political entity, should it replace the ARMM, must comply not only with the Constitution, but also with the ARMM Organic Act as amended by RA 9054. In addition to this, any attempt to create the entity must not require any amendment to the Constitution for it to be effective. It should be remembered that the main reason that the Supreme Court struck down the MOA-AD was because of the governments commitment to the MILF that the necessary constitutional amendments would be made to implement the MOA-ADs provisions. Justice Conchita Carpio Morales saw this as outright illegal, considering that the executive branch of government, which has no power whatsoever to propose any amendment to the Constitution, was then trying to guarantee something that it does not even have the power to do by itself. For the new entity to survive any constitutional challenge, its creation should not be based on any commitment on the part of the government to touch the Constitution. The 10 points, which were signed by both Leonen and Iqbal, laid down the general principles to guide the negotiations until the signing of a final peace pact. Decision Point No. 1: The Parties recognize Bangsamoro identity and the legitimate grievances and claims of the Bangsamoro people. The first decision point concerns the recognition of a Bangsamoro identity. Whatever identity that is would heavily depend on how most of the country would accept a radical change in the image of Muslim Filipinos. According to Philippine Council on Islam and Democracy (PCID) director Amina Rasul, implementation of Decision Point 1 means the whole nation will now have to look at fellow citizens in Muslim Mindanao and accept that Philippine history books have sold a story that is different from reality. There should not be any legal issue regarding the adoption of this Decision Point because it requires no legislation whatsoever. The task of the government here involves information dissemination and media conditioning to paint a whole new image of the Moro people to the rest of the country.

Decision Point No. 2. The Parties agree that the status quo is unacceptable and that the Parties will work for the creation of a new autonomous political entity in place of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This, according to leading peace process luminary Judge Soliman Santos, is the most significant consensus point substance-wise as it would lead to a qualitatively higher form of self-determination/self-governance than the level of the ARMM. This is so because at the onset, the Muslim rebellion is really based on their demand for self-determination, and the decades-old problem rests in the fact that both the government and the rebel forces fail to agree on what kind of self-determination best fits the region. Rasul believes that The previous MILF demand for a sub-state in place of the present autonomous region was poisoned from the first, as the term evoked visions of an independent Bangsamoro nation within the Philippines. This is probably the reason why the Supreme Court itself rejected the sub-state proposed in the botched MOA-AD that introduced the associative relationship between the Philippine government and the BJE. The negotiating panels must take care not to risk another adverse Supreme Court ruling should the resulting entity be challenged in the High Court, especially with the MILFs insistence that such entity would still be a sub -state. Iqbal himself admitted that [Just like] the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, [the] sub -state, new autonomous political entity [as termed by the government] are descriptions, not specific names. He also stressed that The Muslim sub-state in essence is a form of federal state. In any case, it should be kept in mind that the creation of a new entity to replace the ARMM must still be the same autonomous region mandated by Section 15, Article X of the Constitution that would exist within the framework of t his Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Decision Point No. 3. The Parties agree to the continuity of negotiations in the context of agreed documents. This simply means both the GPH and the MILF agrees to adopt the previous documents signed in previous negotiations. This, of course, excludes the illfated MOA-AD. Decision Point No. 4. The Parties agree that the new autonomous political entity shall have a ministerial form of government. The present setup in the ARMM was established by the ARMM Organic Act, which provided a system of government similar to a presidential system with clear separation of powers between the executive (regional governor) and the legislature (regional assembly). Although the Constitution provides no specific instruction as to the form of government in autonomous regions established by Congress, the decision as to the adoption of a ministerial form government for the new entity must still

emanate from Congress as the sole body empowered to create any autonomous region in the country. While such provision in the peace pact may not require any constitutional amendment, still, the peace panel, which is under the executive department, may not be in a position to commit a ministerial form of government for the new entity. This was the same mistake made in the MOA-AD when the peace panel committed to something that only Congress can do. Decision Point No. 5. The Parties agree to the need for a transition period and the institution of transitional mechanisms in order to implement the provisions of the agreement. Logically, there needs to be a transition period during which the ARMM would pass on to the new entity its powers and responsibilities. This matter, however, should just be considered as vague propositions, considering that Congress would be the one with a final say on how the transition would be facilitated. Decision Point No. 6. There will be power-sharing and wealth-sharing between the National Government and the new political entity. In the matter of power-sharing, the National Government will have its reserved powers, the new political entity will have its exclusive powers, and there will be concurrent powers shared by the National Government and the new political entity. The parties agree that the following matters are reserved for the competence of the National Government 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Defense and external security Foreign policy Common market and global trade Coinage and monetary policy Citizenship and naturalization Postal service

This list is without prejudice to other powers, which the Parties may agree to reserve to the National Government in the course of the negotiation. National Government retains control (without prejudice to other powers which may be agreed on in future negotiations) over defense and external security, foreign policy, common market and global trade, coinage and monetary policy, citizenship and naturalization, postal service. Consistent with the constitutional mandate of devolution of powers to local governments, there is nothing new with Decision Point No. 6, considering that Article IV of the ARMM Organic Act itself established a system of devolution of powers to the ARMM. Nonetheless, whatever exclusive powers would be delegated to the new entity depend on what Congress would be willing to grant. Note the Decision Points express reservation of powers to the national government on matters concerning (a) Defense and external security, (b) Foreign policy, (c) Common market and global trade, (d) Coinage and monetary policy, (e) Citizenship

and naturalization, and (f) Postal service. The ARMM Organic Act actually has a much more exhaustive enumeration of reserved powers to the national government. Decision Point No. 7. The Parties agree that wealth creation (or revenue generation and sourcing) is important. The Parties also acknowledge the power of the new political entity to create its own sources of revenue, subject to limitations as may be agreed upon by the parties, and to have a just share in the revenues generated through the exploration, development or utilization of natural resources. Revenue-generation is also not a new concept, as Article X of the ARMM Organic Act already grants such power to the ARMM. In fact, the present setup is that a province or citys total collections of national taxes are distributed 30% to the province or city, 30% to the regional government, and 40% to the national government. Each province or city automatically retains its share then remits the 70% to the regional government, which, after deducting its share, remits the balance to the national government on a monthly basis. Whether the new entity would demand a larger piece of the pie remains to be seen in the course of the negotiations. Decision Point No. 8. The Parties recognize the need to strengthen the Shariah courts and to expand their jurisdiction over cases. The new political entity shall also have competence over the Shariah justice system. Although this is not a political issue, legal problems would most likely arise from this decision point. Judge Santos argues that expanding the jurisdiction of the Shariah courts may entail a constitutional amendment since the 1987 Constitution, Art. X, Sec. 18 refers to the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly and allows for the speci al courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws. Plus, it also goes to the core of the Islamic aspiration since Shariah is Islamic law, where there is, among others, n o principle of inviolable separation of Church and State but, on the contrary, the integration of religion and politics. This decision point would certainly be contentious because of the contrast between the constitutional mandate of a secular government and the religious character of Islamic law. How a concession could be achieved would certainly be a challenge to the peace panels. Decision Point No. 9. The Parties agree to the creation of (third party) monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, which may utilize competencies already available in existing mechanisms, e.g. International Contact Group (ICG), International Monitoring Team (IMT), Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). This is also already in effect as part of both parties d esire to minimize clashes between the military and rebel forces. While there have been countless alleged violations of ceasefires over the years, Amina Rasul believes that the existing mechanisms have been relatively successful as shown by its track record prior to the war over the MOA-AD in 2008.

Decision Point No. 10. In addition to basic rights already enjoyed, the following rights of all citizens residing in the new political entity bind the legislature, executive and judiciary as directly enforceable law and are guaranteed: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Right to life and to inviolability of ones person and dignity; Right to freedom of expression and of religion and beliefs; Right to privacy; Right to freedom of speech; Right to express political opinion and pursue democratically political aspirations; Right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means; Right of women to meaningful political participation, and protection from all forms of violence; Right to freely choose ones place of residence and the inviolability of the home; Right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination in social and economic activity and public service, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity; Right to establish cultural and religious associations; Right to freedom from religious, ethnic, and sectarian harassment; and, Right to redress of grievances and due process of law.

10. 11. 12.

These rights, already constitutionally recognized, were included in the decision points to highlight the demand of the Moros for equal treatment with non-Moros. Rasul found it interesting that enjoyment by the Bangsamoro of human rights, already accorded to all citizens by Philippine law, had to be part of the 10 decision points. [edit]The prospect for peace Main article: Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro On October 15, 2012, the Philippine government signed a much-hyped document touted as theFramework Agreement on the Bangsamoro, which culminates the Aquino Administration's effort to end the deadlock in the peace process. This new document, while merely providing for a general framework for the actual peace negotiations, announces that "the status quo is unacceptable and that the Bangsamoro shall be established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Bangsamoro is the new autonomous political entity (NPE) referred to in the Decision Points of Principles as of April 2012." According to President Aquino, this is the agreement that "can finally seal genuine, lasting peace in Mindanao."[8]