International Community and the Balkan Wars Sonja Biserko The emerging new post-cold war international setting

had a strong impact on the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The break-up of the former Yugolavia was the outcome of a long process and of set of internal and international circumstances that determined its character, but also collapse of communism and of the federal state. The sui generis position of Yugoslavia throughout the Cold War period, a position resulting from the military balance between East and West e erted a ma!or influence on the character of Yugoslav state and its geo-strategic position, which provided advantages over the other states in the "ocialist block. #or almost fifty years it was the scene of the Cold War competition with constant presence of the risk and fear that it could end with a direct East-West confrontation. $ecause of that Yugoslavia possessed a leading military potential in Europe %supported both by West and East& that was later to strongly influence the character of the war, the army having become a dominant political factor in the Yugoslav crisis during the early '()*s amid advanced disintegration at the time of Tito+s death. ,otentials of the democratic aspects of Yugoslav communism and benefits from its sui generis position held for fifty years did not provide a sufficient foundation to ensure peaceful transformation and modernisation of this comple country. The change of geostrategic priorities of the West were soon made clear to Yugoslavia. The new -" ambassador to $elgrade, Warren .immerman, arrived with the message that Yugoslavia was no longer accorded the geo-political importance attached to her by the -nited "tates during the Cold War.' The world raised the issue of human rights, particularly in /osovo, and e pected Yugoslavia to meet some international norms and standards. 0owever, despite the fact that the socialist federation could not survive or morph into a democratic, looser federation %confederation&, as advocated by "lovenia and Croatia, disintegration and war might have been prevented had "erbia considered peaceful option and had it not based its decision on the fact that the 1rmy took its side. 1

The collapse of the real "ocialism freed international relations of their ideological content. #or more than fifty years, the security of the world had been kept in a fragile balance by an idea shaped by 2eorge #. /ennan, who designed the doctrine of deterrence in order to keep the world+s superpowers in a perpetual stand-off, relegated to their separate spheres of influence, forced into peace by the threat of a nuclear war. 3Containment3 became the phrase, which symbolised the fifty years of world peace. The breakdown of the once-rigid international structure had many effects on the situation in Europe and the world as a whole. The new correlation of forces made possible the reunification of 2ermany but it also brought about destabilisation by upsetting the balance of established organisational differences between Western states and those belonging to the former East block. The political changes in Europe led to radical changes on the military plane that resulted in a reduced role of the military factor. Throughout 44 century international society has been organised on the principle of sovereign states whose territorial integrity and political independence were guaranteed by international law. The -nited 5ations Charter reflected the values of the state system, but also reaffirmed the principles of non-use of force across international boundaries and nonintervention in internal affairs. Changes that took place in the (*s gave rise to the necessity to look into the sources of instability within the states with more e plicit commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms. This led to closer linkage between the protection of basic human dignity and the preservation of peace and security as was understood in the past decade. The -5 Charter intersects the two sets of values, which can be defined as 3state system values3 and 3human rights values3. 0owever, since its inception the -5 system in the preservation of world peace was minimal. Yugoslav wars, among others, brought up the ma!or issue of preservation of peace and international law and order and challenged the e isting -5 rather petrified mechanisms. 5ew reality led to substantial changes in the functioning of international organisations such as the Conference on "ecurity and Co-operation in Europe %C"CE, later 6"CE&, 51T6, -5 and others. The whole of the past 2

decade witnessed their efforts to adapt to the new circumstances by reformulating their priorities and mandates and setting up new mechanisms. Conse7uently, the two action slogans took root in international politics during the early '((*s, namely the one relating to a new European architecture %E-& and to a new world order %-"&. They emerged simultaneously and e pressed the respective ambitions of the E- and the -", with the E- laying claim to primacy in Europe and the -" to world primacy while preserving its position in Europe. This attitude of the currently two most powerful political factors in the world was manifested also at the ,aris C"CE summit in '((*, with the -" insisting that the Charter of ,aris should reaffirm the transatlantic dimension of the C"CE as a chief determinant and the E- asserting its vanguard role. 8 The collapse of -""9 and Yugoslavia showed that the most serious challenges to peace and stability were the growth of ethnic and tribal violence. :rive for self-respect and identification resulted from the collapse of authoritarian regimes, but they also pressured that certain rights of groups %collective rights& be fully acknowledged. The process of emancipation threatened to get out of hand and that led to discussion on the Wilsonian principle of 3self-determination of peoples3 in the new international conte t. This accelerated taking of a more elaborate approach to minorities. 1t the 6"CE meeting of e perts on national minority problems %2eneva& it was stated that 3issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and conse7uently do not constitute e clusively an internal affair of the respective state3.; Council of Europe also speeded up adoption of the #ramework Convention on <inorities %'((=& the first document to deal in more detail with the rights of minorities. The Yugoslav crisis generated putting in place of new mechanisms and compelled international organisations to read!ust their mandates to better deal with the newly-emerged situation. Yugoslavia also forced the international community to endorse strong collective actions throughout the whole decade on issues such as> '.2enocide, 3ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity3 %Croatia and $osnia&? 8. @nterference with supplies of humanitarian 3

relief aid to civilian population and protection of "afe heavens %$osnia&? ;. Aiolations of cease-fire agreements %Croatia and $osnia&? B. @mposition of ,eace 1greements and 5ation-$uilding process %$osnia and /osovo&? 51T6 intervention to prevent new genocide %/osovo&? preventive measures %<acedonia&? consolidation of institutions %"erbia&? fight against impunity %The 0ague Tribunal&. The principal factor, as far as the West was concerned, was the new room for action based on humanitarian and moral principles and not only on geo-strategic considerations. 0owever, what soon became manifest was a huge gap between the mandates of the new mechanisms and their implementation in case of Yugoslavia, as well as in the recognition of the early warning sign on the ground. @n an interdependent and interconnected world, the solidarity concept is shaping into a universal model which, despite the present uncertainties that surround it, and is increasingly e pressing mutual and common interests regarding terrorism, migrations, 1@:", ecology, etc. The new interests are still in a stage of elaboration, definition and reformulation in the face of emerging new problems. The increasing articulation of these mutual interests as e istential is necessarily leading to a strategy of solidarity. @t could be said that in the post-Cold War era international relations have evolved on two levels> articulation of new %geo& strategic interests and an ever-greater realiCation of the interdependence manifested as new forms of solidarity in international relations. Yugoslav crisis from its very outset had an important international component. The influence of the international factor has always been and remains crucial. The key factors deciding the Yugoslavia+s future were the -" and EC. 1 delicate and as yet unfinished geopolitical process would continue to preoccupy the -nited "tates along with other issues, such as the evolution of the new 9ussia, the creation of a single united 2ermany, and events in the <iddle East. The -nited "tates was in the process of redefining its national interests in the post-Cold War era, therefore the 1dministration was trying to formulate its overall strategies and its responses to specific crises. Yugoslavia apart from the official statements was in fact placed on the back burner by the 4

-" foreign policy.B @n fact, <ichael <andelbaum+s words best illustrate the feelings of the then position on Yugoslavia. 0e said, DWhen $aker talked about the necessity of keeping the federation intact, it was a refle of the old Cold War mentality which regarded Yugoslavia as an important piece in the power struggle between the -nited "tates and the "oviet -nion. With the Cold War over, it began to dawn on -" officials that what happened in Yugoslavia was important for Europe - particularly for neighbours like @taly or 2reece or $ulgaria - but it no longer had any real strategic or political importance for the -nited "tates.+= @n view of the foregoing, the chief priorities of the -", as the only remaining global superpower, may be defined as follows> developing a global strategy, ensuring an influential position in Europe, and addressing the problems of the e istential crisis of the former -""9, especially 9ussia. This role was to be implemented through 51T6 as a resultant of the common interest and compromise of the -" and the E-. The $ush administration did, however, warn <ilosevic that his government could face such forms of international ostracism as possible e pulsion from the Conference on "ecurity and Co-operation in Europe, but such warnings did not impress <ilosevic in the least. @n Eune '((' "ecretary of "tate Eames $aker visited $elgrade to make clear his preference for the preservation of Yugoslavia and warn of dangers of the constituent republicsF declaration of independence. The fact that the Yugoslav 1rmy attacked "lovenia and Croatia !ust three days after $akerFs departure showed that <ilosevic was 7uite confident that the -" use of threat of military force was not likely. The E- attitude to Yugoslavia over the last decade showed that the -" and Europeans no longer shared a common 3strategic culture3. Yugoslav crisis revealed European 3military incapacity and political disarray3. <oreover, /osovo conflict e posed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare. The most Europeans did was to provide peacekeeping forces in the $alkans, while the -" carried out the decisive phases of military mission and stabiliCed the situation. #reed from the re7uirement of any military deterrence, internal or e ternal, Europeans 5

developed a set of ideals and principles regarding the utility and morality of power different from 1mericans.G -nited "tates and its European 1llies have carefully followed the situation in Yugoslavia, especially after <ilosevic+s advent. <any reports have been published to that end. The most dramatic was, however, the -" @ntelligence one of 5ovember '((*, which predicted that Dfederal Yugoslavia will break apart, most probably within the ne t ') monthsH. civil war in that multinational $alkan country is highly likely+. I The basic findings of the C@1 report were that the DYugoslav e periment has failed, that the country would break up+ and that Dit is likely to be accompanied by ethnic violence and unrest which could lead to civil war+. The authors of the intelligence report blamed <ilosevic as the Dprincipal instigator of Yugoslavia+s troubles, and both for initiating the latest clamp-down on the /osovo 1lbanians and for stirring up "erbian nationalist passions+. <any -" officials had a somewhat more cautious view, notably :eputy "ecretary Jawrence ". Eagleburger, as well as many -" scholars. The Western policy in the $alkans in the (*Fs suffered from four principal failures, notably the ones 7uoted by Eane "harps> the failure to heed early warning and invest in conflict-prevention strategies? the failure to punish and isolate "lobodan <ilosevic as the key perpetrator of ethnic cleansing throughout the former Yugoslavia? the failure to back up Western diplomacy with credible military force? and the failure to build consensus within the Western security community on long-term goals in the $alkans. This led to a reactive piecemeal approach, with recurrent intra-Western disputes about how to deal with each crisis once it erupted.) Western ambivalent reactions at the time contributed to regional dynamics, since the local actors understood well the weaknesses of EC foreign policy coordination and -5 mechanisms. "lobodan <ilosevic, in one of his interviews, made it clear that 3we %"erbs& have to achieve the unity if we want, as the biggest nation, to dictate the coarse of events. @t is the 7uestion of borders, the essential state issues. 1s you know, borders will be dictated by the strongest, never the weak ones3(. 6

#rom hindsight, the following 7uestion arises> could the West have pursued a different policy. The lack of an institutional framework, as noted previously, was compensated by West European countries+ enthusiasm, particularly strong after the signing of the "ingle European 1ct of '()I and the emergence of prospects for fuller European integration. 0owever, the advent of <ikhail 2orbachev and the break-up of the "oviet -nion steered this enthusiasm in a different direction, namely in the direction of Eastern Europe. The European, the -" and -5 responses to the war took shape of several actions aiming to persuade Yugoslav protagonist to opt for a peaceful resolution. They came up with series of peace plans, each representing efforts and formula aimed at preserving multiethnic communities. 0owever, those peace plans reflected reluctance of the -" and E- to use military force to uphold principles and goals they had declared, especially in the light of ,aris Charter. -ndecisivness of both the -" and E- in early (*s can be described as 3the -" refused to act and Europe could not act3. That brings us to the 7uestion of solidarity in this new constellation which is not based on a geo-strategic interest of the region. "olidarity as has been shown in the case of the former Yugoslavia is based on specific interests and guided by the concept of human rights. #or Europe and the West the $alkans is a de-stabilising factor and in those terms perceived as a hindrance to their long-term goals in the broadest sense. Europe today does not face classical dangers, it is more threatened by internal instability, like the recent one in former Yugoslavia %and it took her a decade to find a solution to that crisisK&, plus by instability of the newly-emerged states, notably <acedonia, $osnia and /osovo and by terrorism. That is why it has, among other things, renounced the concept of non-interference in internal affairs and transformed the concept of sovereignty. 1rticulation of this new broader approach in dealing with international problems has revealed over the last years though in the case of Yugoslavia not always timely and successfully. Jooking retrospectively, international community did pacify and stabiliCe the $alkans. The E- is slowly overtaking 7

the responsibility of 3taming3 the region along the principles and standards that 7ualify the region for integration. The 0elsinki 1ccords, the ,aris Charter and the 6"CE Copenhagen :ocument make clear that political membership in the Euro-1tlantic community re7uires minimum guarantees, especially for the rights of minority communities. 0owever, it is difficult to !udge how the Eintegration itself will stand the challenges of the emerging world. The clear interest the E- has in the $alkans is to fight the problems such as corruption, trafficking, migrations etc., which could affect the stability of the E- itself. The first phase of international engagement was characterised by support of an integral Yugoslav state and readiness to provide help in finding solution to the crisis without imposing any option. 1t this stage, 1nte <arkovic, #ederal ,rime <inister, and the federal institutions were still looked upon as vehicles of transformation and his efforts were supported by the international community. The West was waiting for the first multiparty federal elections to take place after the republican elections %which were held in late '((*&. @t was a precondition for Yugoslavia+s inclusion in the European processes %membership in the Council of Europe, ,019E and $E9:? association with the EC and E#T1 arrangements, etc&. 0owever, the reform-oriented government of 1nte <arkovic failed to win Western governments backing for a programme, which was already yielding initial results. 1t the time no republic was in favour of independence and the possibility of a confederation was on the table. The fact that the 7uestion of /osovo had become the main obstacle to substantial financial support played into the hands of "lobodan <ilosevic and, in his assessment, augured well for his planned march on the rest of Yugoslavia. @n those critical moments for Yugoslavia the international community paid lip service to Yugoslavia+s survival without considering tougher measures on <ilosevic and "erbiaFs obvious designs. 5either Yugoslav ,eople+s 1rmy %Y,1& was pressurised to stay neutral. 1t that stage the EC acted as a key factor in Yugoslav crisis and used it as a test for its own concept of a common foreign policy. @ts mediating role was confirmed at the summit of the "even by the C"CE and especially by the -". 1t the time "lovenian war over and the EC was insisting on 3stopping the 8

bloodshed and turning to dialogue3. The guidelines for resolution of the crisis were stated in the EC :eclaration from The 0ague %1ugust G,'(('& and later reconfirmed at the #oreign <inisters <eeting %1ugust 8*&. 1nd they were> establishment of a lasting cease-fire under international monitoring? negotiations based on two principles L the inviolability of internal and e ternal borders - and respect for human and minority rights. 1fter the reunification of 2ermany, adoption of the <aastricht Treaty %'(('& and setting up a monetary union, Europe addressed the Yugoslav crisis with great enthusiasm, seeing the undertaking as a test of its unity. 0owever, it became immediately clear that the E- member-states had no common foreign policy that they operated under a loose system of foreign policy co-ordination through the European ,olitical Co-operation %E,C&, a shortcoming skilfully e ploited by the local protagonists. The EC did try to mediate between the republican leaderships and the federal government but, in the absence of a common foreign policy, age-old alliances resurfaced. The #rench and $ritish governments took a pro -$elgrade stand, #rance on the account of her special World War 6ne ties with "erbia and $ritain on the account of its World War Two alliance. 0owever, the E,C committed its member states to co-operate in the foreign policy domain that e cluded any discussion of security issues. The assumption was that the -" and 51T6 would take the lead in the province of security issues. <ilitary intervention was under consideration in the summer of '((' but since calculations were that between '**,*** to '=*,*** troops in combat would be re7uired to enforce cease-fire, none of E- members could afford that e cept to some e tent -/ and #rance. <ost of the Western governments at the time held rather cynical and contemptuous attitude towards Yugoslav crisis that was additionally augmented by the local leaders+ irresponsibility, ineptness and narrowmindedness.'* :espite the attempt to reach a common and co-ordinated approach, differences soon surfaced among EC members, not only because of different historical, geographic and ideological reasons, but also because of different approaches to the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination, which reflected each country+s own internal considerations. These differences 9

became more evident in the face of deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia. The first effort to prevent the war was the Common :eclaration on the ,eaceful 9esolution of the Yugoslav Crisis known as Brioni Declaration was signed in Euly '((' by the federal ,residency, "lovenia and the European Community. @t confirmed the cease-fire in "lovenia and enabled the Yugoslav 1rmy to pull out from "lovenia and paved the way for negotiations 3on all aspects of the future of Yugoslavia without preconditions3 which started in "eptember. @t was, however, clear at the time that "erbia was not concerned with "lovenia leaving the federation. :obrica Cosic, the writer, and later the first president of #9Y, suggested that 3"erbia should allow "lovenia to leave without delay3''. The EC mediators did not understand the Yugoslav dynamics, and failed to perceive that "erbia was bent on establishing control over part of Croatia and $osnia L0erCegovina. The official propaganda was deftly playing on "erb emotions throughout Yugoslavia, by evoking the memories of the "erb suffering during the "econd World War. The EC ministerial threesome believed that their intervention was successful but it soon became clear that they were wrong and that three months were lost in failed attempts to reach a comprehensive settlement. 1t the same time Yugoslav army was regrouping in Croatia and $osnia and was unimpeded preparing for the future war. This first failure led to the convening of The Hague Peace Conference in "eptember '((' sponsored by the EC. @t was a last-ditch attempt to preserve the Yugoslav framework and find a comprehensive solution satisfying the two fundamentally opposed concepts of the future arrangement of Yugoslavia, namely a con-federal and a federal one, envisaging a loose federation and a strong central government respectively. The :eclaration laid down the principles, which were to Densure the satisfaction of the opposing aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples in a peaceful way+. The underlying principles were that there would be no alteration of boundaries by use of force, that the rights of all peoples in Yugoslavia would be protected, and that all legitimate interests and legitimate aspirations would be fully respected. 10

6n "eptember 8=, the -nited 5ations "ecurity Council passed resolution I'; e pressing its full support for the EC initiative as well as imposing an embargo on the delivery of arms and military e7uipment to all Yugoslav republics. 1s it turned out, the -5 decision placed all republics e cept "erbia at a disadvantage because "erbia had inherited almost the complete armoury of the E51 and had thus compelled the other constituent units to ac7uire weapons illegally. 1s early as on 6ctober ') '((', the 0ague Conference adopted 1rrangements designed to effect a general solution on the basis of the following> sovereign and independent republics en!oying international personalityMstatus if they so wished? free association of republics having international personality, as provided for by the 1rrangements? comprehensive arrangements, including supervision mechanisms, to protect human rights and the special status of groups and regions? European involvement where appropriate? as part of a general solution, recognition of independence within the e isting boundaries unless republics which so wish agree otherwise. ,articular attention was paid to the link between security and minority rights. The 1rrangements envisaged special status for regions with a ma!ority national minorities well as the following rights pertaining to such groups> the right to have and display national symbols? the right to a second citiCenship in addition to that of the home republic? the right to a system of education respecting the values and needs of the group. 1t the same time an arbitration process was started at the end of 5ovember '((' through an 1rbitration Commission known as the Badinter Commission. @ts mandate was to resolve constitutional issues under dispute. The 1rbitration Commission presented its view that Yugoslavia was in a Dprocess of disintegration+ and that republics ought to Dsolve the succession problems of the states emerging from this process+ while upholding the 3principles and rules of international law3 with special regard for human and minority rights. 1t the same time an arbitration process also envisaged secession. "erbian 2overnment re!ected those findings. EC foreign ministers on 'G :ecember '((' set a deadline by which republics could apply for 11

recognition as independent ones. This decision was a turning point in European diplomacy and was apparently the watershed in international mediation of the conflict. $adinter Commission resolved the ambiguities of the '(IB Constitution by deciding that self-determination belonged to the republics instead to peoples as "erbs have claimed. The 1lbanian re7uest to be recognised as an independent state in :ecember '((' was re!ected by the EC re!ected thus removing the future status of /osovo from the agenda while <acedonia was not recognised because of 2reek obstructions. :espite her fragility, <acedonia was left to pressures of her neighbours. The -nited "tates recognised $osnia0erCegovina, Croatia and "lovenia as independent states on I 1pril '((8 within their republican borders. The -nited "tates too denied recognition to <acedonia though the Christmas Warning of the $ush 1dministration which helped remove the threat of aggression from "erbia, but also automatically put off settlement of the 1lbanian 7uestion both in /osovo and in <acedonia. 1s the war in Croatia escalated, only the recently united 2ermany under tremendous domestic political pressure compelled the EC to recognise the independence of "lovenia and Croatia. $ut the EC could not follow through by policing the new order. :uring the "trasbourg "ummit %:ecember '(('& under #rench presidency EC agreed to recognise "lovenia and Croatia under the 2erman pressure. 2ermany was the first to announce this decision on the Christmas :ay of '((' while other members followed suit on '= Eanuary '((8. 9ecognition of "lovenia and Croatia came after destruction of Aukovar and shelling of :ubrovnik. Western public opinion sided with the victims and urged their governments to take action. The EC recognised Croatia as an already partitioned country since "erbs had seiCed its territory %about ;*N& in the course of '(('. $ut the EC, pretending that Croatia was preserved as a whole? sent in its peace-keepers only after being invited by the 9ump Yugoslav ,residency headed by $orisav Eovic. $ut there was no peace to keep since "erbs have already cleansed all Croats from the so-called 9epublika "rpska /ra!ina. 1ccording to $orisav EoviO, the then ,resident of 9ump Yugoslavia, they invited the -5 troops in order 3to create buffer Cone 12

and separate sides in the conflict, until resolution of Yugoslav crisis is made possible through peaceful and !ust means, based on international law with engagement of the -53.'8 The EC had at least several opportunities to take into consideration the use of strong political pressure. @nstead, the political climate within EC discouraged any !oint military moves. #rance and 2ermany were at odds with 51T6, WE- or 6"CE over defence issues. That dispute lasted throughout the (*s and affected the EC engagement in the Yugoslav crisis, especially in $osnia. "olutions or peace plans for $osnia and 0erCegovina faced the following dilemma> how to reconcile the conflicting ob!ectives of the three ethnic communities and at the same time preserve the sovereignty of $osnia. $ut it turned out that ethnicity was accepted by the international community as a basic organising principle, conse7uently embedded in all offered peace plans from the so-called Cutilheiro ,lan, Aance-6wen ,eace ,lan, 6wen"toltenberg ,lan, European -nion 1ction ,lan, Contact 2roup ,lan to :ayton ,eace 1ccords. Cutilhero ,lan produced principles for new constitutional 1rrangements for $osnia and 0erCegovina by which three sides %"erbs, Croats and <uslims& agreed on $osnia as a state of 3three constituent units, based on national principles3. $efore signing the agreement @Cetbegovic repudiated the plan in the face of 1merican pressure on the EC states to recognise $osnia and 0erCegovina on G 1pril '((8. 9ecognition of $osnia and 0ercegovina led to the biggest diplomatic debacle. ,rocedure under which $osnia became independent was conducted under instructions of the EC. 0aving told the elected government how to prepare independence, the EC walked away from the scene once the "erb forces %E51 and paramilitaries from "erbia and <ontenegro& invaded and attacked the newly-recognised country. The pattern of human rights violations that followed was described at that time by :r. Wiesenthal as genocide. 0owever, the -" and E- governments did not react to that, western intelligence did not use resources at its disposal to detect and e pose those, according to many Fmost blatant abuses of human rights in Europe after 13

WW8F. <any intelligence reports in the period 1pril-Eune '((8 have been kept in drawers of different ministries and the -5 offices. The first story describing the horrors of detention camps, massive ethnic cleansing and gang rapes was written by 9oy 2uttman, 5ewdays reporter in 1ugust '((8. '; Western failure to respond could be e plained in both political and strategic terms, but is still not morally !ustifiable. :espite all the aforementioned, the West was nevertheless compelled to resort to sanctions against "erbia %the #9Y& over unacceptable war crimes, massive ethnic cleansing and a genocide against <uslims early in '((8. 9eports of "erb crimes had long been kept under wrap, because their disclosure would have committed Western countries to take action under the 2enocide Convention. 5umerous lower-rank "tate :epartment officials who urged a more active policy resigned 'B over their country+s passivity. @n <ay '((8 the -nited 5ations imposed sanctions against the #9Y and the EC and the -nited "tates recalled their ambassadors from $elgrade. $ut sanctions were not enough to deter <ilosevic from aggression and siege of several $osnian towns. The siege of "ara!evo caused the outrage of the whole world while the genocide in eastern $osnia passed largely unnoticed. 1s early as '((8, "rebrenica became the symbol of the "erb policy in Eastern $osnia. The -5 "ecurity Council has reacted on the basis of the -5 Charter, Chapter A@@ focusing on the measures not involving military forces, but sanctions.'= "anctions were imposed because the #9Y posed a threat to peace. Yugoslavia was seen as responsible for taking part in the conflict in $osnia and 0erCegovina. "anctions were comprehensive and their implementation was conducted in several phases. -5 "ecurity Council 9esolution I'; %'(('& introduced a general embargo on all arms and military e7uipment deliveries of the #9Y %and the embargo covered all the warring factions& 'G, while the subse7uent resolution I;8 %'= <ay '((8& demanded an end to all the hostilities by all sides in $P0 and the others, notably the 3Y,1 units and elements of the 3Croat army3 to stop interfering into that conflict. '= days later the -5 "ecurity Council adopted 9esolution I=I %'((8& in which it was concluded that 3Yugoslav %"erb and <ontenegrin& authorities including the Yugoslav ,eopleFs 1rmy 14

%Y,1& did not take efficient measures to comply with resolution I=8 %'((8&. 0ence the -5 members were ordered to impose sanctions on Yugoslavia %under article B' of the -5 Charter in the spheres of commerce, finances, transport, sports and scientific-cultural co-operation and reduction of diplomatic personnel in diplomatic representative offices&. Jater two more 9esolutions took effect, no. I)I %'((8& and )8* %'((;& and they were related to "erb-held territories in Croatia and $osnia and 0erCegovina. 1nd finally the -" "ecurity Council suspended provisionally the aforementioned embargo, after acceptance of the Contact 2roup plan. 'I @n 1ugust '((8 the E- and the -nited 5ations !ointly sponsored a conference in Jondon, which brought together regional leaders and international foreign ministers. 1s massive war crimes, camps and ethnic cleansing have already made the headlines the Jondon Conference asserted strong principles, including non-recognition of territorial gains achieved by force, protection of minorities, release of civilian detainees, closing of detention camps, an end to "erbian military flights over $osnia, international monitoring of the "erb-$osnian border, recognition of $osnia by all former republics of Yugoslavia, acceptance of the e isting borders, respect of all international treaties and agreements. Jondon Conference established @nternational Conference on the #ormer Yugoslavia %@C#Y& with the two -5appointed chairmen Cyrus Aance and Jord 6wen who were tasked with pursuing a negotiated settlement based on principles agreed in Jondon. The placing of the Conference under the -5 auspices entailed involvement of 9ussia and China. @t was an important decision that nevertheless complicated the procedure of decision-making. @C#Y led to Aance-6wen ,eace ,lan, which was aiming at recasting $osnia as a decentralised state of three 3constituent peoples3, ten provinces, a special status for "ara!evo and a loose central government. The idea behind the plan was to challenge the nationalist strategies but it did not succeed since the three sides understood that under the ,lan each province would be controlled by one or another nation. The new wave of ethnic cleansing followed as the ,lan had no enforcement dimension. The plan was re!ected at the Conference of #ive <embers of the -5 "ecurity Council in Washington, <ay '((;. 15

1lthough the war was raging in $osnia, the -" administration continued to treat the issue as an European affair. "enator Eoseph $iden denounced European Dindifference, timidity, self-delusion and hypocrisy+ with respect to $osnia. 0e also said that the fighting in $osnia was not a civil war but a Dblatant act of "erbian e pansionism and aggression, which in turn has unleashed Croatian appetites as well+. 0e also attacked the European allies for opposing military intervention to end $osnia+s war, calling their behaviour bigoted and hypocritical. 0e conceded that the -nited "tates could not intervene on its own and might be forced by European reluctance to abandon military options.') This was however a view which at the time European allies did not share because they had their troops on the ground. The -" endorsed rearming the <uslims, 3lift and strike policy3, to enable them to balance the "erbian military superiority. <any younger civil servants, especially in the "tate :epartment, were pushing for more pro-active -" role in the $alkans. <any have resigned because of the Dimmoral -" policy+ in the $alkans and !oined 526s, which have been e tremely influential in shaping -" foreign policy such as the $alkan 1ction ,lan, the @nternational Crisis 2roup, 0uman 9ights Watch. @t also indicated that the undercurrent developments over the last ten years showed the future direction of the -" foreign policy. There was a manifest discrepancy between the -" ac7uired position of the leading power in the world and its performance abroad over the last ten years. @t always was a limited and piecemeal designed policy. 1s it turned out during the Conference, most Europeans, like the 1mericans, were 7uite ill-prepared for the events to come. They did not really know Yugoslavia. They were familiar with the illusion created by Tito and, like the 1mericans, they had 7uite eagerly accepted it. 1s Tony Eudts put it, DTito+s model was unusually popular across a broad political spectrum in both Europe and 1merica. The left liked it because Yugoslavia was as close to a success as the communist world had been able to produce in Europe, and it presented a relatively humane face of the European communism. @f it was not e actly an economic success, it was not an obvious total failure like the rest of Eastern Europe and the "oviet system. 1nd the political right always had a certain 16

sympathy for Yugoslavia because Tito had severed ties with <oscow and negotiated a path of substantial independence+. '( Europeans were greatly overestimating the military muscle of Yugoslavia %"erbia& and their own ability to handle a crisis that was going to be brutal and therefore primarily a military one. They had been cutting back on their defence budgets always content to let the -nited "tates carry the burden financially. Europeans over time became more and more aware of their lack of power in this difficult and complicated area. The election of $ill Clinton introduced further confusion into -" $alkans policy. Whereas during the election campaign the $ush 1dministration had been criticised for its inactivity in the $alkans, Clinton did not seriously consider -" involvement in the crisis areas, his two main worries being the recession and the huge budget deficit he had inherited. The arms race dating back to the reign of 9onald 9eagan had seriously depleted both -" and 9ussian economic resources. The break-up of the "oviet -nion and the removal of the 9ussian threat did much to divert attention from foreign-policy 7uestions in the decade to come. Whereas the $alkans as a region posed no threat to -" interests, the failure to resolve the crisis seriously tarnished the image of the -nited "tates as a global power. The absence of a comprehensive policy on the $alkans was compensated by threats of force - force being increasingly used as a deterrent - although every threat was in conformity with Chapter A@@ of the -5 Charter which sanctions the use of Dall necessary means+ including the use of force. -p until '((= such threats were only half-hearted and the targets more that symbolic> a tank here, a rocket installation there, beside the airstrip at -dbine. The "erbs interpreted these threats correctly as being-toothless. The main argument against any serious intervention, were rather awkward, notably possible casualties among -" and other 51T6 troops. 8* @n his polemic with ,addy 1shdown, who advocated the use of force, Eohn <ayor felt certain that Dforce cannot be used without considerable risk to the lives of civilians and allied troops+. 51T6 alleged, for e ample, that the opening of !ust one ground corridor would involve deployment of '**,*** troops, a price the West was not prepared to pay. The irony was all the greater as the 17

resolution, which slapped an arms embargo on all in Yugoslavia hit hardest the <uslims who were not prepared for the conflict and therefore suffered enormous losses. The ' Eune '((= report of the -5 "ecretary-2eneral, $outros 2hali, is the best illustration of the ambiguities surrounding international engagement in the $alkans, especially with regard to the mandate of an international force. The report underlined that -5,96#69 was saddled with a mandate it could not fulfil and that the boundary between peace-keeping and peaceenforcement was blurred. 2hali stressed that Dsome confusion has arisen as a result of references to Chapter A@@ in some "ecurity Council resolutions+. 0e also criticised members of the "ecurity Council for not providing the necessary means for the tasks it wanted -5,96#69 to carry out. 2hali, who had already e pressed an unwillingness to become so broadly engaged in the $alkans, argued that the mission could only be successful if it acted clearly as a peacekeeping operation and en!oyed the consent of the parties to the conflict. 0e had been convinced from the outset that Drecourse to air power could lead to serious conse7uences for -5,96#69 as a whole+. 0is report showed clearly the discrepancy between Western rhetoric and the West+s resolve to achieve something on the ground. Every resolution passed was ambiguous in that it gave -5,96#69 no clear mandate to use force as and when necessary. The restrictions, which undermined the efficiency of the troops on the ground were so numerous that their security of the troops on the ground became the primary concern of all the governments involved. #or e ample, the mandate to ensure security of "ara!evo airport had no reference to Chapter A@@. The deployment of -5,96#69 in "ara!evo was in conse7uence, the report underlined, conducted in accordance with regular peacekeeping rules. Without co-operation of the parties, -5,96#69 was unable to provide for their security. 1nother illustrative e ample concerns a "ecurity Council resolution, which established safe-heaven areas although the -5,96#69 mandate did not include any provision for their enforcement. 2iven a choice between ;B,*** additional troops to effect deterrence through muscle and a Dlight option+ to deploy some I,G** troops, the "ecurity Council opted for the latter. 18

The report was published at the time when the "erb aggression had escalated and negotiating efforts had come to a standstill. The analysis focused on the basic 7uestion of whether -5,96#69 should be a peacekeeping or an enforcement operation. 1 number of resolutions did provide some elements of enforcement, but not nearly enough to enforce the will of the international community. The threat of force nevertheless helped establish a "ara!evo heavy weapons e clusion Cone in #ebruary '((B. $ut the $osnian "erbs 7uickly realised that they had the capacity to make -5,96#69 pay an unacceptably high price should air power be used on its behalf. That capacity, the report indicated, was demonstrated after close air support was provided at 2oraCde in 1pril '((B and again after air strikes near ,ale on 8=-8G <ay '((=. Jarge numbers of -5 personnel were taken hostage, further restrictions were placed on the force+s freedom of movement, and negotiations were brought to an abrupt halt e cept for those re7uired to secure the release of the hostages. $osnian "erb leaders were in the habit of withdrawing their consent for co-operation with -5,96#69 in response to the -5 sanctions on the $osnian "erbs and often retaliated with Dsanctions+ of their own against the -nited 5ations. #or three years the $osnian "erbs en!oyed superiority not only on account of their overwhelming firepower, but also thanks to the attitude of the international community. The -5 resolutions could not have any appreciable effect because the -5,96#69 mandate provided merely for peacekeeping, and not for peace enforcement. #or this reason, several resolutions calling for access to prisoner-of-war camps by humanitarian organisations and for establishing Dno-fly Cones+, as well as various operations such as D,rovide ,romises+ where food was air-dropped to the <uslim population in isolated enclaves in Eastern $osnia, were of limited success. The dropping of food to "rebrenica and other enclaves surrounded by "erb forces benefited the besiegers more than the hungry population inside those enclaves. :uring the whole $osnian war those European allies, which had contributed ground troops to -5,96#69 deeply resented the -nited "tates+ refusal to send its own troops. Their line of argument was that Dwords must be matched by deeds, which does not include !ust aircraft+. This is why the -" 19

proposals for 51T6 air strikes were not received with enthusiasm among the allies. @t was clear that without the -" coercion the "erbs could not be brought to heel, and that a ground force with no combat capability to secure territory was hardly a credible threat to "lobodan <ilosevic. @t was not before -5,96#69 had been reinforced with a rapid reaction force with combat capability in the summer of '((= that the "erbs were faced with a serious military threat. @t was only under growing pressure in '((B that the -nited "tates became more seriously involved in the $osnian conflict. The -" proposed that the <uslims and Croats, who began fighting, in Central $osnia the year before, should create a #ederation. The proposal later served as the basis for the :ayton 1ccords. The "erbs declined to enter into any negotiations then but were forced to give up their siege of "ara!evo under pressure. This in turn increased the "erb pressure on 2oraCde, intensified "erb-<uslim fighting on all fronts, and resulted in an even more hostile "erb stance towards the international force. The capture of two hundred -5,96#69 members by "erbs in <ay '((= resulted in a further deterioration of "erb--5,96#69 relations. The Contact Group, comprising 9ussia, #rance, $ritain, the -nited "tates and 2ermany, was set up during a meeting of -" and European foreign ministers in Jondon in '((B. @t was yet another mechanism devised to deal with the Yugoslav crisis which envisaged formal 9ussian participation. 1lready at its first meeting in 2eneva on '; <ay '((B, the Contact 2roup adopted a :eclaration providing for a common platform to end the conflict in $osnia-0erCegovina. The :eclaration earmarked fifty-one per cent of territory for the Croat-$osniak #ederation and forty-nine per cent for the "erb entity and was later used as a basis for the :ayton 1ccords. The take-it-or-leave-it plan was re!ected by the $osnian "erbs. 1 period of unsuccessful shuttle diplomacy ensured, with the "erbs continuing to attack even protected enclaves. 1lthough -5,96#69 had a mandate to protect the safe heaven areas such as "rebrenica, $ihac, 2oraCde, .epa and TuCla, neither its presence nor 51T6 threats offered protection to the population confined within them. The international community took limited action when $ihac fell 20

by bombing the airfield at -dbine from where /ra!ina "erbs were shelling the town in support of their $osnian kin. Emboldened by the indifference of the international community, the "erbs continued to harass the protected areas. @n '((=, they killed some seventy young people in a single shelling of TuCla cafes and then went on to deliver the coup de grace to "rebrenica. @t was only then that the international community, primarily the -nited "tates, decided to employ a new strategy dubbed Endgame, which had been in the making for several months. "rebrenica had been targeted by 2eneral 9atko <ladic since '((8. @n "erb opinion, "rebrenica, together with 2oraCde and .epa, was located in an @slamic corridor linking "ara!evo with Turkey through "andCak, 1lbania and /osovo. The foregoing made <ladic e pel %Euly '((=& from these defenceless enclaves 'B,*** people of whom ),*** went missing. The :utch battalion in "rebrenica re7uested no assistance from -5,96#69 and let the "erbs e pel the helpless <uslim population and shoot down males of all ages. Though the reaction of the international community came too late for the population of "rebrenica, it saved 2oraCde from a similar fate. 9esponsibility of the international community in the case of "rebrenica , especially the role of the -5 representative Easushi 1kashi, is still being debated. #rom a moral point of view, "rebrenica was both a turning point in the $osnian war as well as a symbol of the impotence and indifference of Western foreign policy. The West which simply ignored genocide in 9wanda, now reacted differently. The special -5 9apporteur for human rights for the former Yugoslavia, TadeusC <aCoviecki, in his letter of resignation to the -5 "ecretary 2eneral stated inter alia> 3$osnia is the issue of stability of international order and civilised principles3. 0e accused international community and its leaders of inconsistency and lack of courage to defend human rights in $03.8' "rebrenica <assacre raised many 7uestions, notably why 51T6, whose soldiers made part of -5,96#69, did not intervene. $y e tension the entire concept of the -5 operation, in other words its reliance on co-operation with and pressures on the concerned parties %"erbs, <uslims and Croats& was brought into 7uestion. "uch a stand caused Eastern enclaves 21

%"rebrenica, Qepa and 2oraRde& to completely depend on good will of $osnian "erbs, which in turn meant that those safe heavens could not function. @nternational community did not resolve a ma!or moral dilemma. 5o government, notably the 1merican, the :utch and $osnian, which had backed the resolution on safe heavens managed to solve that dilemma. $osnian government tried to maintain control over those enclaves for they were seen as an important bargaining chip in negotiations with "erbs. That stance was backed by the Clinton 1dministration whose hobby-horse was at that time a highly moral policy, but who was simultaneously not ready to assume any responsibility. -" 1dministration insisted that the -5 should take tougher action against "erbs, but was not ready to back that action with the -" troops on the ground. Essentially the -" 1dministration renounced the Eastern enclaves but was fanning false hopes among <uslims that it would prevent an easy "erb capture of those enclaves. :utch government sent in its troops, but their battalion in "rebrenica was not operational. $ut the fall of "rebrenica is still a ma!or moral and internal issue troubling 0olland, and it has even caused this yearFs collapse of :utch government. The fall of "rebrenica finally persuaded the Europeans to throw their weight behind the new -" strategy which this time envisaged robust use of force against the $osnian "erbs. 1s it happened, the "erbs had provoked the West at the time when, for the first time, it wanted to be provoked. The ensuing 51T6 strikes and the Croat-<uslim offensive threatening to Dliberate+ $an!aluka reduced "erb territorial possessions to forty-si per cent. The Croat-<uslim push was halted outside $an!aluka because the West, having witnessed the "erb e odus from /ra!ina, feared a new refugee crisis. @t was then that <ilosevic realised for the first time that negotiations alone could save the tottering "erbs from an utter rout. The use of force had created a new reality on the ground, enabling -" diplomacy at long last to force all the parties to sign a peace agreement. The 1ccords were reached in :ayton and then ratified in ,aris on 'B :ecember '((=. The -5 "ecurity Council ne t passed a resolution envisaging deployment of peace forces %@#69& under Jayton "mith in $osnia. Their principal task was to implement the military component of the 1ccords. 1t the 22

start of its mandate, @#69 consisted of G*,*** troops %later reduced to some 8*,***&. 0aving fulfilled its mission on time, @#69 was replaced with a "tabilisation #orce %"#69& numbering some ;=,*** troops. The civilian component of the 1ccords were the responsibility of the 0igh Commissioner for $osnia-0erCegovina. The !ob was entrusted to the young "wedish politician, Carl $ildt. :espite all efforts of the international community to find solutions for $osnia and Croatia along the principles of multi-ethnicity, it, at the end, forgave ethnic-cleansing and made it a basis for the :ayton solution. The Dayton Accords had been a face-saving gesture on the part of the West whose credibility had been seriously shaken by its inefficiency in $osnia. The <uslims who had suffered long were the losing side and nobody wanted to hear their grievances. "lobodan <ilosevic regarded :ayton as a victory. "o did Clinton, who was !ust about to start a new elections campaign and was happy to have $osnia and the $alkans forgotten. :ayton was viewed as a considerable accomplishment. The observation that DClinton had a settlement in $osnia but no foreign policy+ was fully vindicated by a new crisis, this time breaking out in /osovo. The :ayton 1ccords were viewed by many as a Dde facto partition+ though some parts of them, had they been implemented, would have reversed some aspects of the $osnian tragedy. 0aving brought peace to $osnia, the 1ccords achieved the most under the circumstances. @ts fundamental worth lay in establishing peace in $osnia and securing it militarily, committing all three parties to an integral $osnia within its internationally recognised borders, reaffirming its international status, and establishing the right of refugees and displaced persons to return. @t also committed the parties to pursuing and punishing war criminals and co-operating with the 0ague Tribunal. "ignificantly, the 1ccords laid the foundations for military stabilisation of the region through confidence-building measures and arms control aimed at achieving a military balance based on reduced armament. The principal flaws of the 1ccords are its constitution of $osnia as a federal state based on a territorial division recognising the effects of ethnic cleansing, and its concentration of power to deal with certain vital issues in the entities rather than at federal level. 23

@n so far as the :ayton 1ccords are construed as a process, then the survival of $osnia depends first and foremost on its implementation, especially with regard to the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and co-operation with the 0ague tribunal. 1lso, it will be necessary over time to modify and interpret some provisions of the 1ccords according to the developments on the ground. 1nne I of the 1ccords, relating to the return of refugees, was not taken seriously, especially its provision on the minority return. 9efugees were encouraged to return to their ethnic communities in what contributed to further consolidation of the ethnic partition. Those few refugees who attempt to return are met with terror, bombings, shootings and arson, some of which are stagemanaged by the 9" police. The provisions on co-operation with the 0ague tribunal could also have been important had they been implemented. The arrest of /aradCic and <ladic has become a matter of dispute between the civilian and military operations in $osnia. $ecause the 1merican+s ma!or concern is to avoid casualties in $osnia, it is the $ritish who have arrested most of the war criminals there. 6n the other hand, #rench troops have avoided making arrests although /aradCic and <ladic are believed to move mostly in the #rench sector. The international community, says @C2, has applied 3a lesser standard to the 9" which may prove fatal both for the entire international e periment in $osnia and to the $osnian state. 5ot daring to risk or admit failure, the international community has not dared to win. @nstead, it has coddled, ca!oled, e pressed concern, and paid through the nose for a semblance of cooperation on the part of the $osnian "erb political class. 5ot wanting to provoke that class to reveal the depths of its enmity and recidivism, the international community has preferred caution to confrontation and concessions to conditionality. $ut time is in increasingly short supply. $oredom with $osnia has set in. 1nd the 9" remains fundamentally unreconstructed388. The establishment of an ad hoc tribunal for !ugosla"ia has accelerated the establishment of the @nternational Criminal Court which had 24

been in making for decades. The Yugoslav crisis has provided an opportunity to establish new mechanisms for dealing with crisis situations without actually ever contributing towards the resolution of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. When the war broke out in $osnia, the world preferred not to acknowledge the war crimes being committed in spite of an abundance of crimes-related reports and evidence. 1 -5 Commission of E perts was set up in '((8 to investigate war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 1t first, its e istence was predominantly of a formal nature because most Western countries had a vague idea about the tribunal and its mandate. The first chairman of the Commission was #rits /alshoven who proved rather non-committal. 1fter he had resigned, "herif $assiouni, a professor of law at the Chicago -niversity, was appointed his successor. 0aving failed to obtain sufficient -5 support, he turned to :e ,aul -niversity in Chicago, sought financial support from private sources, and engaged a volunteer group of young lawyers as investigators. @t was on the basis of his report that the decision to set up the 0ague Tribunal was taken. 8; 1ccording to his report, )= to (* per cent of war crimes in $osnia had been committed by "erbs, a clear indication of the primary culpability of the "erb party. 1yreh 5eier, the president of the 6pen "ociety @nstitute in 5ew York, believes that the Donly reason the 0ague tribunal was established were the crimes in $osnia which reminded the world of what had happened in World War Two, especially the discovery of 6marska and Trnopol!e camps+8B. The Western countries+ saturation with the $alkans affected their attitude to the Tribunal. Western agencies were not ready to provide available evidence %largely telephone intercepts between <ilosevic and his military and paramilitary commanders& crucial to indict <ilosevic for specific war crimes. 6n the contrary, many governments treated him as their chief interlocutor and guarantor of peace in the $alkans. <any believed that the Tribunal ought to have a balanced attitude towards all the parties, that is, moral responsibility should be apportioned e7ually. :avid 6wen 8= in particular insisted on an such an e7ual apportionment of blame, by saying Dit does not matter who 25

committed the crimes, what matters is that the graves on all sides should be investigated+. $y putting his signature on the :ayton 1ccords, <ilosevic had de facto accepted co-operation with the tribunal, as e plicitly laid down in point ( of the #ramework 1greement. The latter says> Dthe ,arties shall co-operate fully with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the 1nne es to this 1greement, or which are otherwise authorised by the -nited 5ations "ecurity Council, pursuant to the obligation of all ,arties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law+. 6ne of the ob!ectives of the Tribunal is to deter the warring sides from committing war crimes. 0owever, by the time of the outbreak of the /osovo crisis the Tribunal had not been effective in this regard. "everal ma!or indictments had been raised such as those against 9adovan /aradCic, 9atko <ladic and the Aukovar Threesome, but no principal suspect had been handed over by the "erb side. Croatia had shown greater co-operation with respect to $osnian Croat indictees. "#69 for its part feared an armed "erb rebellion and did not wish to risk the life of any of its soldiers. 1s it turned out, arrests of that nature were greeted with indifference. ,eople had grown indifferent to the fate of war criminals mostly because they had also been the chief war profiteers. @n an impoverished society such as that of 9epublika "rpska, this fact obviously carried much greater weight than the defence of "erbdom. @nternational communityFs engagement in Yugoslavia+s crisis till (= was contradictory. @t was torn between the two concepts geo-strategic and solidarity which greatly affected developments in the region, but also the international public, outraged by the brutal atrocities in the heart of Europe. 6n the one hand there was full understanding that the international community can and must play a more active role based on the principle of fundamental civil rights as superior to claims of sovereignty. The growing inter-dependence of the world raised the awareness that all conflicts pose a threat to international peace and security. -nfortunately, in the case of $osnia this aspect was supported only by bold rhetoric followed by half measures and 26

an unwillingness to risk. 51T6 strikes brought local protagonist to the peace agreement in :ayton.
8G

Those strikes were mostly motivated by the fact that

Western policy had become highly discredited in $osnian war thus threatening the dominant role of the West in the world politics. These ambiguities to some e tent were clarified later in /osovo crisis because more Western interest were at stake. #oso"o$ %acedonia$ &lbania The refusal of the :ayton negotiators to discuss the future status of /osovo, while at the same time rewarding the $osnian "erbs with their own 9epublika "rpska within $osnia, made the /osovo 1lbanians realise that a non-violent protest was less likely to lead to independence than a military option. :ayton was a key factor in bolstering support for the /osovo Jiberation 1rmy in '((I. $ut the :ayton 1ccord, added to peace, also brought the new involvement of the -" in the region. The West became aware of the fact that a potential for conflicts stemmed from the late emancipation of the $alkans people and constant national radicalism. @t also realised that the regional stability had to be based on the 0elsinki principles and obligations for every state. 9elevance of the 6"CE Copenhagen :ocument '((* grew in view of its focus on the 3human dimension3 and territorial integrity as the basis of the European security. This led to several initiatives and actions by the West notably in the wake of collapse of 1lbania in '((I. This brought about new dynamics in the relations between /osovo 1lbanians and "erbs. "everal meetings were arranged by different international 526s who mediated on behalf of Western governments, as $elgrade continued to treat /osovo as an internal issue. Council for #oreign 9elations of 5ew York, Carnegie Endowment for @nternational ,eace, Elemetias #oundation from 2reece, and many others offered their good services in order to bringing the two sides to the same negotiating table. "aint Edigio brokered the Education 1greement, one of the most politicised issues.8I 0owever, internal dynamics of "erbia and three27

month-long,

election

rigging-motivated

civil

demonstrations

deflected

<ilosevicFs attention from /osovo as his stronghold %small number of "erb votes and /osovar 1lbanian abstention brought him victory in many elections&.8) 0e shifted his focus on his undermined position in "erbia proper, and in order to politically survive he staged to a veritable terror campaign %notably, the stranglehold on the electronic and print media&. $ecause of the new turn of events, 6"CE re-emerged as a mediator between "erbian government and opposition. 1nd the outcome was the Lex Specialis. This brought the opposition back to parliamentary benches, but <ilosevic lacked courage to resume /osovo negotiations. @nstead he increased the police repression in the province, en!oying full support of the opposition parties. The latter provoked the emergence of the /osovo Jiberation 1rmy in '((G and its '((I and '(() pro-active stance and actions. The -" "pecial Envoy for 0uman 9ights in the $alkans, together with European partners %European ,arliament, Council of Europe, 6"CE, and various governmental and non-governmental organisations& tried unsuccessfully to get negotiation back on track, but to no avail. 1t the same time the West was very much involved in <acedonian and 1lbanian developments. <a!or Western governments solved the <acedonian issue by simply recognising that country while collapse of 1lbania %'((I& raised new concerns over regional stability. These new developments in "erbia also brought back 6"CE as a mediator between "erbian government and opposition which ended with Lex specialis. :espite the solution that brought back opposition in the parliament, <ilosevic radicalised and increased even more the police repression in the province of /osovo. This led to emergence of /J1 %/osovo Jiberation 1rmy& which firstly appeared in '((G but became very active end of '((I and '((). The -" "pecial Envoy for 0uman 9ights in the $alkans, along with active involvement of European partners %European ,arliament, Council of Europe, 6"CE and different governmental and non-governmental delegations&, tried to broker negotiations, but to no avail. 1t the same time West was very much involved in <acedonia and 1lbania. 5on-recognition of <acedonia by EC and the -" raised several 28

problems though $adinter Commission had a positive opinion on <acedonia claiming that she met all conditions for independence. <acedonia was admitted to the -5 in '((; under the name 3The #ormer Yugoslav 9epublic of <acedonia3 %#Y96<& which speeded up its recognition by E- members, Turkey and 1lbania. The -" recognised <acedonia in #ebruary '((B, while 9ussia recognised <acedonia under the name of 39epublic of <acedonia3. @n the West it was understood that recognition of <acedonia was in function of preventing the conflict, thus stabilisation of <acedonia was an imperative. /iro 2ligorov, president of <acedonia, also undertook steps to prevent the spill-over of the conflict into <acedonia by inviting the -5 monitors to the country in '((8. $uthros 2hali, -5 2eneral-"ecretary, recommended to the "ecurity Council to adopt 9esolution I(= on '' :ecember '((8, the follow up of which was deployment of '=* Canadian troops to <acedonia. :uring '((; those troops increased in number, when the -" sent ==* troops. "ince the border issue between <acedonia and #9Y was not settled, the -5 declared the military-administrative border in order to better control the border incidents between <acedonian and #9Y forces. 6"CE has established the permanent mission in "eptember '((8. @nternational troops had preventive character and contributed considerably to the 1greement on <utual 9ecognition and 5ormalisation between <acedonia and #9Y. #9Y and <acedonia have established diplomatic relations in 1pril '((G. 8( Collapse of 1lbania %'((I& brought new concerns for the stability of the region and EC was given the mandate for the institution building in a completely failed and devastated state.;* 0owever, the -nited "tates had been focused on /osovo as a potential flash-point for more than a decade. @n '((I the -nited "tates opened an @nformation Centre in ,ristina, the first international diplomatic office in /osovo, and provided nearly ;* million -" dollars a year in humanitarian aid to /osovo from '((8 to '((I. /osovo was kept on the agenda of the -5 "ecurity Council, the Contact 2roup, 51T6 and other prominent international discussions. @n '(() there was no longer any doubt as to the direction in which /osovo events were headed. Western countries tried through their mediators, 29

1mbassador Chris 0ill and Wolfgang ,etritch, to bring about a settlement of the /osovo crisis based on the province+s pre-'()( autonomy. Conflicts escalated despite all the threats made by the international community. The -5 "ecurity Council responded to the escalation with its resolution ''((, especially after <ilosevic cracked down on the civilian population of /osovo %'(()&, internally displacing about 8=*,*** and forcing G*,*** to live in the open. The resolution demanded that all the parties cease hostilities at once, start a meaningful dialogue without preconditions, and help the -50C9 and the @C9C to ensure the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. 51T6 announced that it would launch air strikes to enforce "erb compliance. The -" special envoy, 9ichard 0olbrooke, holding out the threat of 51T6 air strikes, hammered out with <ilosevic an agreement which halted the Yugoslav 1rmy offensive in /osovo, averted a possible humanitarian catastrophe, enabled deployment of an unarmed civilian 6"CE mission in /osovo to verify compliance with the agreement, prepared the ground for the later deployment of a 51T6 E traction #orce %made up (( per cent of Europeans& in <acedonia and of a 51T6 Aerification <ission in /osovo, and bound <ilosevic to comply with -5 "ecurity Council resolution ''((. 1 subse7uent -5 resolution, 5o. '8*;, endorsed the creation of an 6"CE /osovo Aerification <ission and 51T6 1ir Aerification <issions. 5one of these efforts was taken seriously by the warring parties. The "erbs failed to complete their troop withdrawal under the agreement, their repression of the civilian population continued, and violence remained at an unacceptable level. Aiolence culminated in the massacre of forty-five /osovo 1lbanians in the village of 9acak on '= Eanuary '(((. 51T6 responded by demanding, on Eanuary 8), that the parties complied with their international commitments. 6n the other side, the -nited "tates and other members of the Contact 2roup put forward a peace proposal in which they summoned Yugoslavia and "erbian government officials and /osovo 1lbanian representatives to 9ambouillet %#rance& on #ebruary G. The proposal offered to the two parties to the conflict was the result of several months of intensive shuttle diplomacy by -" 1mbassador Chris 0ill and European "pecial Envoy 30

Wolfgang ,etritch. The two, together with 9ussian envoy $oris <ayorskiy, were the chief brokers for the agreement which was to include> a high degree of self-government for /osovo with its own legislative, e ecutive and !udicial bodies? full !udicial protection of human rights and the rights of all national communities in /osovo? and a local police force reflecting the ethnic composition of the /osovo population. 0owever, 51T6 presence on the ground was essential for ensuring the effective implementation of the agreement. The negotiations collapsed mainly because of <ilosevic+s refusal to allow a 51T6-led force to guarantee the process. 0e refused to let 51T6 troops cross Yugoslavia+s territory although he green-lighted such a possibility in the :ayton 1ccordsF 1nne 1greement with 51T6. This prompted the intervention which lasted seventytwo days and was halted by the /umanovo military agreement. 6pponents of the intervention based their criticism on the sovereignty arguments. They argued that <ilosevic was right to re!ect the 9ambouillet 1greement because 1nne on <ilitary aspects was a clear interference in the #9Y internal affairs. 6n 8B <arch '(((, <rs "adako 6gata, the -5 0igh Commissioner for 9efugees, told the ==th session of the -5 Commission for 0uman 9ights that DE pectations of peace rose again with the 9ambouillet and /leber negotiations. $ut instead, the humanitarian situation on the ground is getting worse, and could 7uickly be approaching the level of the humanitarian catastrophe that was narrowly averted in 6ctober. The fear of insecurity among /osovo+s population is now at least at the level of the worst period of last year. The cease-fire under the <ilosevic-0olbrooke accord has unravelled, and -5 "ecurity Council resolutions have been ignored on the ground... Terrified civilians continue to flee the shelling of villages by forces that had been re7uired to withdraw. The presence of government security forces in the province is increasing under the imminent threat of 51T6 intervention. The results of this situation, in terms of displacement, are appalling. "ince the end of the 9ambouillet talks on #ebruary 8;, well over )*,*** people have been newly displaced from their homes. 6ver 8G*,*** persons are now displaced within /osovo. #or the first time since last summer, we are once again seeing people spending the night in the open.+ 31

The evaluation of human rights situation in /osovo clearly led to the 51T6 intervention which was defined as a 3collective3 response to threats to international peace and security. 51T6 intervention became traumatic event both for the $alkans and for the Western countries since it was the first military intervention of 51T6 defined as a humanitarian intervention. <any 7uestions and dilemmas were raised, especially by the European and 1merican left. "everal Western commentators criticised the 51T6 action, many also challenged why /osovo was chosen among ;I wars raging around the globe. ,resident Clinton in !ustifying intervention in his speech on a national television said> 3We should remember that the violence we responded to in /osovo was the culmination of a ten year campaign by "lobodan <ilosevic, the leader of "erbia, to e ploit ethnic and religious differences in order to impose his will on the lands of the former Yugoslavia. ThatFs what he tried to do in Croatia and $osnia, and now in /oosvo. When our diplomatic efforts to avert this horror were rebuffed, and the violence mounted, we and our allies chose to act. 5ineteen democracies came together and stayed together through the stiffest military challenge in 51T6Fs =* year history. #inally, we have averted the wider war this conflict may well have sparked.3 %www.softmakers.comMfryMdocsM<claughin& Eavier "olana, 51T6Fs 2eneral "ecretry at that time !ustified decision on the grounds that we 3must stop an authoritarian regime from oppresing its own people in Europe3. %http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/jan-june99/solana_3-23.html "ince the intervention was morally deemed it provoked academic debate. Those who have been advocating intervention since '((8 understood it as a legitimate action as there were indications that $elgrade was preparing e pelling of a large number of /osovo 1lbanians %this claim was also raised during <ilosevic+s trial in the 0ague&;'. 0owever, discussion developed on the terms of its legality. The Jeft has especially warned about the dangers 51T6 intervention poses to Dinternational order+, insisting that Dno one but the -5 may intervene under Dinternational law+, that Dserious negotiations were not tried+ and that Dmatters were only made worse+ by -"M51T6 bombing. The "ecurity Council authoriCation, The "ecurity Council refused to condemn 32

51T6 military action despite the fact that it did not have its authoriCation. ;8 /ofi 1nnan in his statement acknowledged the breakdown of talks at 9ambouillet and e pressed 3deep regret that Yugoslav authorities have persisted in their re!ection of a political settlement, which would halted the bloodshed in /osovo and secured an e7uitable peace for the population there3. Even more is important his conclusion which goes on as+it is indeed tragic that diplomacy has failed, but there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace3.;; <adeleine 1lbright, the "ecretary of "tate, who is considered to be the main promoter of the 51T6 intervention, derived !ustification on past e periences in $osnia claiming that 3regional conflict would undermine 51T6Fs credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe. This would pose a threat that 1merica could not ignore3 ;B. <any pro-51T6 interventionists acknowledged force as a guarantee that all countries would respect a certain minimum of ethical standards. Aaclav 0avel, for instance, in his essay 3/osova and the End of the 5ation"tate3 places 3human rights above the rights of state. #9Y was attacked by the alliance without a direct mandate from the -5. This did not happen irresponsibly, a s an act of aggression or out of disrespect for international law. @t happened, on the contrary, out of respect for the law, for a law that ranks higher than the law which protects the sovereignty of states. The alliance has acted out of respect for human rights, as both conscience and international legal documents dictate3.;= 1part from the solidarity and humanitarian aspect of the intervention, there was an e7ually important aspect which bothered 9ussia i.e. e pansion of 51T6 to the East. 9ussia+s reaction to the /osovo crisis was partly motivated by internal considerations, above all the situation in Chechenia and the fear of separatist movements at home. The prospect of a humanitarian intervention alarmed the 9ussians who feared similar action on its own territory or in neighbouring countries where 9ussia had special interests such as 2eorgia and 1Cerbai!an, as well as 1rmenia and <oldova, countries which were given large support at the 51T6 summit marking the fiftieth anniversary of the alliance. 33

9ussian solidarity with "erbia over /osovo led "erbia to believe that in the event of a 51T6 intervention it would have the edge thanks to 9ussian support. "erbia actually went so far as to e pect 9ussian military engagement in such an eventuality, an e pectation no doubt fuelled by the military. 9ussia and China urged a resolution to halt the escalation of hostilities but failed to push it through the "ecurity Council. :uring the coarse of the intervention, which was emotionally difficult for the West, as well as for 9ussia, played the mediator role through Aictor Chernomyrdin, former prime minister and 2aCprom manager, only after they understood that West would not give up. 9ussian hysteria was perhaps best described in a leading <oscow newspaper 5eCavisimaya gaCeta %8= <arch '(((& which declared that hopefully the /osovo action would trigger off 3the collapse of the -" global empire3 and that it was in 9ussia+s interest to let 3the -nited "tates and 51T6 with its demented West and East European members bog down as deep as possible in a $alkan war3. 1 doctrine of humanitarian intervention may be growing considering the number of failed states throughout the world. :ebate has intensified over 1fganistan and @ra7 cases. Transatlantic debate in academic circles has been especially intensive over the 1fganistan war. 1merican scholars in their letter to European scholars 3What We 1re fighting #or3 claim that Dat times it becomes necessary for a nation do defend itself through force of arms. $ecause war is a grave matter, involving the sacrifice and taking precious human life, conscience demands that those who would wage the war state clearly the moral reasoning behind their actions, in order to make plain to one another, and to the world community, the principles they are defending+. ;G The European answer reflects their strategic culture which focuses on Dchallenges+ and less on power and military Dthreats+. Their answer to 1mericans is e actly along these lines 3We need morally !ustified, globally acceptable, and universally respected common rules of play for the way people live together, which emphasiCe cooperation instead of confrontation, and undermine an ieties created by the accelerating changes in our surroundings and the constantly growing potentials for violence, as well as the security obsessions resulting from them. This opportunities to structure the mainly business34

oriented globalisation more !ustly, to tackle worldwide poverty effectively, to defuse the global environmental haCards together, to resolve conflicts by peaceful means, and to create a world culture that can speak in not !ust one, but many tongues3.;I The issue of intervention will be and is ob!ected by weak states. @t will be sticking point in future 9ussia--" relations, especially in the light of Chechnya. 9ussia supports intervention only with the authorisation of a -5 "ecurity Council resolution otherwise it views the Western humanitarian interventions as assaults on the principle of sovereignty. =*th 51T6 1nniversary was held in Washington 8; and 8B 1pril '((( while 51T6 intervention was still going on in #9Y. Washington "ummit had a special importance in acknowledging new 51T6 strategic concept which was shaped over the last decade. Washington :eclaration has important innovations such as new 51T6 role in crisis management, an e panded geostrategic framework of actions beyond the 1lliance? enlargement of 1lliance and introduction of new forms of co-operation with other European countries, notably ,artnership for ,eace, 1lliance Council for Co-operation, a broader concept of international security inclusive of military, political, economic, social and humanitarian aspect. @ntervention in Yugoslavia was the best illustration of the 51T6 role in changed international circumstances. :uration of 51T6 intervention had a considerable effect on what followed after the signing of the #umano"o agreement, for obviously that part had not been thoroughly prepared. The chaos that the "erbian police and paramilitary and the Yugoslav 1rmy left in the wake of their withdrawal has radically changed /osovo+s society> having been deprived of all its institutions, it has survived in the last decade by e clusive reliance on clan and family ties. The destruction of villages %some ''*,*** homes were torched&, the killing of '*,*** civilians and the e pulsion of about )**,*** 1lbanians to <acedonia, 1lbania and <ontenegro has deeply traumatised the 1lbanian community, which upon its return to /osovo reacted with astonishing violence and revenge. The international mission was unprepared for such a turn and unable to prevent the e pulsion of 'I*,*** "erbs and members of other minorities from /osovo.When the 51T6-led /osovo #orce arrived in /osovo, it found no civil government or organised police force, only widespread 35

destruction of homes and of public infrastructure. The absence of an international police force created a law enforcement vacuum which had to be filled by /#69. The ne t step in managing of Yugoslav crisis was -5 "ecurity Council 'esolution ()** which was adopted '* Eune '(((. @ts ob!ective was to Dsolve the grave humanitarian situation in /osovo+ and, to this end, Dmake possible the safe and free return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes+. The resolution also sought to open a political process for the resolution of the /osovo crisis on the basis of a broad autonomy for the province %paragraph ''&. The immediate ob!ective of the resolution was de facto to halt the armed operations and legalise the envisaged international civilian and military %above all 51T6& presence in /osovo while bringing the process of settlement of the /osovo crisis back on the political track within the framework of the -nited 5ations. The basic e plicit demands of resolution '8BB of the #9Y were the end to the violence and repression in /osovo and the withdrawal of all military and police forces within the set timeframe. 6n the other hand, the /osovo Jiberation 1rmy %/J1& was asked to stop all its offensive actions and to decommission. The resolution also empowered the -5 "ecretary 2eneral to appoint his special representative for civilian presence in /osovo and to lay down the tasks of both the civilian and military mission in consultation with the "ecurity Council. The implementation of these provisions was entrusted to the international military and civilian missions. The civilian mission was e plicitly under the control of the -nited 5ations whereas the military mission was the responsibility of 51T6 which was described as the Dsubstantial participant in the international security presence+ authorised to appoint the commander-inchief. 9esolution '8BB is specific in terms of the situation it established in /osovo, which transcends the framework of known legal-political categories. $ecause of its e clusion of the #9Y army and police from /osovo and ban on their return to the province, it could be said that resolution '8BB effectively suspends #9Y sovereignty in /osovo and substitutes it with an international administration. 9esolution '8BB also commands Dfull compliance with the 36

9ambouillet agreement+, the same one the "erbian 5ational 1ssembly re!ected and thereby opted for the 51T6 intervention. Jike the :ayton 1ccords before it, the 9ambouillet agreement was enforced by the use of force. The $elgrade regime would not reconcile itself to the new situation on the ground and kept repeating that Yugoslav forces would return to /osovo. The e pulsion of "erbs and other non-1lbanians from /osovo was used as an e cuse to outrightly re!ect any co-operation with -5<@/, the new authorities in the province. The regime strove hard to hamper efforts of -5<@/+s mission in order to prove that the international community was impotent to deal with the D/osovo terrorists+. 1t the same time, it prevented the /osovo "erbs from co-operating with -5<@/ and instrumentalised them in a struggle against the Dnew world order+. $ishop 1rtemi!e and #ather "ava, who tried to further "erb interests by participating in the Transitional Council, were over time completely sidelined so that negotiating power remained in the hands of /osovska <itrovica, that is, $elgrade. Efforts of the international community in defining its mission in the /osovo were aimed at reversing the ethnic cleansing by giving the displaced an opportunity to return to their homes. $ut this has been great source of frustration for the international community e7ually in Croatia, $osnia and in /osovo. The /#69, -50C9, and 6"CE and other international agencies have managed to help stabilise situation in /osovo over the last three years though the issue of the refugee return does not seem to be solvable at this !uncture, because of lack of safety. 9adicalisation of both sides will continue as long as /osovo final status remains unresolved. @nternational community, namely some E- members, prefer the #9Y framework as the best solution in order to prevent further fragmentation which, in their opinion, is not desirable as most units cannot survive economically on their own. Jast <ontenegrin elections have contested that argumentation since the logic of Yugoslav dissolution proved to be stronger. The ethnic pattern of divisions which "erbs %and that pattern was 7uickly accepted by other sides as well& managed to impose since the very outbreak of crisis proved to have a boomerang effect on "erbia proper. The 37

1lbanian rebellion in southern "erbia united both governments, republican and federal, in resolve to crush it. Co-operation with the international community, i.e. 51T6, was of key importance for the suppression of the rebellion and the adoption of solutions for "outh "erbia. 1pparently over time, as events in Croatia and $osnia have shown, international presence shall be of crucial importance for "erbia who no longer en!oys the advantage she en!oyed over her neighbours in the early '((*s. This was aptly confirmed by 5ebo!sa Covic who said> D6ur interest lies in co-operation with /#69 and -5<@/ and in making sure that resolution '8BB is respected, that it should remain in force as long as possible while a long-term solution for /osovo and <etohi!a is being prepared. War which would break out upon the departure of the international forces would not be waged only on the territory of Yugoslavia. @t would surely spread to <acedonia, and one wonders how it would affect the problems in <ontenegro and whether it would not put ablaCe "andCak and $osnia and spread to places where old wounds are yet to heal.+;) 51T6 intervention did not bring <ilosevic immediately down despite the political vacuum which has emerged in its aftermath, mostly because the opposition sides with <ilosevic during the intervention. @t took almost a year to organise and unite the "erbian opposition, civic society, media and students before any serious strategy for toppling of <ilosevic could be developed. @nternational strategy was developed within the framework of "tability ,act. The Stability Pact was set up with the purpose of driving home a bigger vision for "outh Eastern Europe, or as ,resident 1rtti 1thisari has put it, one that would overcome mistrust between the countries in the region and bring them into the reality of European @ntegration. @t was launched in Cologne and "ara!evo in the summer of '((( by twenty-eight states and principal international organisations active in "outh Eastern Europe. #ollowing a decade of reactive crisis management, it was hoped that the ,act would be a turning point in dealing with the region. Eoschka #isher, 2erman #oreign <inister, the initiator of the ,act said> DThe /osovo war was the fourth war in the former Yugoslavia in !ust eight years, and @ hope it will be the last. $ut a political situation in /osovo will only prove 38

to be lasting within a general peace strategy encompassing the region as a whole and at today+s conference we would like to launch such a strategy.+ ;( The ,act has three visionary elements> integration into Europe, regional security, and promotion of democracy. "oon it became clear that a region suffering from lack of governance capacity could not so easily meet these ob!ectives. @t also became apparent that there was a significant gap between the vision articulated and the resources that the West placed at its disposal. The most important role so far was in helping "erbia+s 526s and alternative protagonists in general to bring <ilosevic down. "tability ,act de facto has proved to be ineffective since it was not financially supported and therefore could not deliver on reconstruction of the region. <arshall ,lan ambitions are not possible without structural reforms. Even after <ilosevic, the vacuum of authority caused by disputes over basic constitutional structures remains a continuing source of instability in "erbia as well as in the region as a whole. With the basic situation still unresolved in each of the entities or states in the region, little progress can be made in addressing the broader institutional problems in the region. 1n additional problem for "erbia+s democratisation agenda is the unresolved status of /osovo and <ontenegro which lack both a political agenda and energy necessary for transition. "uch a precarious situation nourishes the hopes of nationalists that they may get away with the re-composition of the $alkans. That is why the preservation of <acedonia and $osnia-0erCegovina is essential. These states represent an obstacle to hegemonic pretensions in the $alkans. #or the same reason it is necessary to prevent any attempt at the partition of /osovo. 1s long as the border issue is pending in the region, democratisation agendas will be obstructed both by political agendas and corruption. <acedonian crisis, thanks to e periences gained in the past decade was relatively 7uickly placed under control, notably the conflict was halted. $oth <acedonians and 1lbanians were compelled to make concessions in a relatively short period of time, notably after '' "eptember, the date considered by the -" as a turning point. They were forced to sign +hrid &greement which brought 1lbanians back to <acedonian political life. The 39

whole $alkans was then placed within an utterly new security conte t. @nterest for the $alkans developments are reduced to a more realistic measure. The -" priorities have been limited to reforms in $elgrade, war crimes in $osnia, and status of /osovo. @n the meantime the -" decided to withdraw its troops from the $alkans in the imminent future. Thus the concern for the $alkans has been definitively delegated to Europe.

Western Balkans and security concerns #or '= years the $alkans region was one of the principal challenges for the world, the one which reflected in the late 8* th century, new security risks. $alkans region was the scene of the most brutal conflict in Europe in the postWW8 period %from '((' to '((=> a short war in "lovenia, than the ones in Croatia and $osnia and 0erCegovina and finally the '((( 51T6 intervention in /osovo. 6nly after those terrible events under the auspices of the -", Eand -5, an essential overhaul of the region was !ump-started. ,eace of established with the support and thanks to the concerted efforts of international prime movers, in the shape of the :ayton 1ccords %'((=&, then the /umanovo 1greement %'(((&, and finally the 6hrid 1greement %8**'&. ,resence of international factors %above all the -5 and E-& and their pressure contributed to establishment of co-operation between the newlyemerged states, in progress is building of confidence measures, repatriation of refugees has only partly succeed, control over arms and borders has been established. <a!ority of countries in the region have already established a partnership relation with 51T6 %,artnership for ,eace&, the only key guarantee for an essential overhaul of armies in the region. The :ayton 1ccord has precisely laid out the scope of armies in Croatia, $osnia and 0erCegovina, and "erbia. @n the meantime the process of integration of the $osnian army into an unified army has begun %in the face of stiff resistance of 9epublika "rpska and $elgrade&. 40

The prospect of the E- membership is a ma!or galvaniCing factor for the democratic, political and economic transition. The E- ,eace and "tabiliCation ,rocess %8**'&, reaffirmed at the Thessaloniki summit %8**;&, and underpinned by the E- political, technical and financial support, has provided a practical framework for the transformation. "ome $alkans countries have made considerable progress in the process of approaching to E-. "lovenia became an E- member in 8**=, Croatia started E- membership-related negotiations in 8**= and should wind them up by 8**(? <acedonia became a candidate in 8**=? $osnia and 0erCegovina thanks to the -5, that is Epresence, is finaliCing its post-war reconstruction and a full transfer of power to the $osnian authorities is envisaged for the year 8**I. $osnia and 0erCegovina is still a key link in the chain of the overall $alkans security, since a full integration of $ and 0 is yet to be achieved. 0ence the paramount importance of revision of the :ayton 1ccords, which is still strongly contested by the "erb side. 8**G 6ctober elections have somehow hinted at new prospects, for the nationalistic parties, ":,, ,:1 and C:C were routed, and a considerable swing to the centre was registered. 1dded to that the ":, candidate @vo /omSiO won the race for a Croat president. 0e was the first candidate to win elections by running on a civil option ticket. @n parallel victories of <ilorad :odik and 0aris "ila!dRiO %regardless of :odik+s nationalistic rhetoric & suggest that ,:1 and ":" shall embark upon a more moderate policy. $osnia and 0erCegovina has in the meantime also started negotiations with E- on the "tabiliCation and 1ssociation 1greement. 1fter its independence <ontenegro very successfully continued its

negotiations with E- and 51T6 and prospects for its accession to the said organiCations are au par with those of other countries in the region. "eptember elections and decision of <ilo :!ukanoviO to retire are fully indicative of political maturity of <ontenegro, so fervently denied by many. "uch a turn of events in <ontenegro helped marginaliCe negative influence of "erbia and its attempts to considerably impact developments in the newlyemerged state. 41

/osovo which is under the -5 protection since '((( %large number of 51T6 troops are deployed there& is in the midst of formaliCation of its independence. The "ecurity Councild initiated the process which should resolve the future of /osovo %that is the issue of its status& at the latest by the end of 8**G or early 8**I %probably independence with a lasting presence of international civilians and military&. @nternational community does not only treat /osovo as an 1lbanian-"erb problem, but rather as a problem with broader implications for the region %hence the '((( intervention&. The ob!ective of international presence is to ensure a sustainable multi-ethnic, democratic society which is likely to !oin E- in the future. ,rocess of E- e pansion has become a matter for re-appraisal within the Eproper, notably after failure to adopt an E- constitution. @nclusion of 9omania and $ulgaria %8**I& and negotiations with Turkey and Croatia shall to a large e tent depend on the E- absorption capacity. ,olitical integration, after all deliberations within E- proper, shall be slowed down, due to weaker governments and divisions related to the nature of that integration. @n that regard E- is guided by the e perience it had had with its new members, notably ,oland and 0ungary. 1dded to that after the first stage of e pansion, E- has become increasingly concerned with its internal problems> refusal of new constitution and unemployment, differences between citiCens and governments, and fear of globaliCation. Eis also in the midst of its own ad!ustment to the new economic reality in which a new paradigm for a social state, as an European accomplishment, should be found. Serbia and the ne, security order in the Balkans "erbia is the only country in the $alkans which is yet to full embrace a proEuropean orientation. 1fter assassination of ,rime <inister :!ind!iO, who had shaped in a very short span of time "erbia as a pro-E- country, the new 42

government led by Ao!islav /oStunica started toeing a markedly antiEuropean and anti-liberal line. 9egardless of the foregoing E- in the past three years insisted on integration of "erbia into E- and all the progress achieved in the period after :!indic+s assassination, was made solely thanks to E- efforts and engagement. /oStunica-led government in fact continued <ilosevic era policy and enabled a political 9adicals, prime movers of the war policy. @n parallel /oStunica+s government deftly manipulated the E-+s interest to keep "erbia on :!ind!iO+s course? thus it morphed its ob!ective weakness into an argument of blackmail, both in talks with E- and all its neighbors. "erbia, as a geographically central country of the region, is still important as a factor of regional %in&stability. 1nd "erbia adroitly uses that fact in its communication with E- and other international factors. 5on-co-operation with the 0ague Tribunal and its negative stance on resolution of status of /osovo, make "erbia the only $alkans country unwilling to compromise and to honor international standards. @t is clear that "erbia, like the whole $alkans region, have good European prospects. $ut "erbia, even after resolution of the issue of state borders, shall continue to face serious problems, notably organiCed crime and corruption, which are also the most salient problems of the whole region. 0ence it+s imperative that "erbia embarks upon a consistent and genuine co-operation with the @CTY. 2eneral <ladiO is not Tonly one generalU, as they usually say in $elgrade. 0e is a symbol, engineer and e ecutor of the criminal policy which included the most heinous crime, the one of genocide. 0ence a society unable to single-handedly cope with the hydra of corruption and crimes needs a long-term and more sophisticated platform. Status of Kosovo the new security challenge $osnia is a prime e ample of how the ethnic principle, that is, division along ethnic lines does not yield good results in the contemporary conte t. 6n the 43 comeback of "ocialists and

contrary it !eopardiCes universal values urged by the democratic international community. Establishment and preservation of a multi-ethnic society is the only possible solution, hence the decision of the international community to impose solution in the case of /osovo, if principal protagonists fail to agree, is the only correct, albeit somewhat belated, decision. @n fact the "erb side e ploited the <arch 8**B unrest to ethnically

consolidate %with refugees from enclaves& the northern part of /osovo with 5orthern <itrovica as its centre. That part of /osovo, with an evident parallel administrative structure ruled from $elgrade, shall remain a potential source of instability even after resolution of status of /osovo. $y the way, independence of /osovo is a logical epilogue of position of the "erb state on /osovo throughout the 8* th century and especially in the past 8* years. The incumbent /ostunica-led government, alike the previous ones, ignores and subordinates the 1lbanians in all its proposals. /oStunica and his aides perceive the /osovo issue e clusively as a territorial one, thus transparently perpetuating <ilosevic policy in a bid to effect the restoration of the pre-'((( situation. "erb side is doubly interested in insisting on status quo. The first reason for such an insistence is the fact that an unresolved /osovo issue keeps the "erb nationalism alive as the only possible political vision. The second reason is lack of readiness of "erbia to tackle its own, internal problems, notably its internal arrangement and consolidation thereof. Thus the new constitution reflects unwillingness of political elite to reach the settlement of /osovo issue by compromise. @n its strategy the international community tended and tends, though now to a lesser e tent, to overrate the position of "erbia as a central $alkans country. "erbia is politically and geographically, and especially as a long-term source of instability in the $alkans, a very important regional country. $ut "erbia is yet to undergo the process of self-appraisal, and democratic transformation, in 44

order to become the factor which E- covets for it and which belongs to it. @t would be lethal to skip that process, for then the regional chances for normaliCation would be diminished and a potential for future disagreements would be created. @n fact /osovo is another historical test for Europe, it should confirm or negate its ability to resolve certain issues in a relevant way. @n finaliCing the $alkans issue, it is important to uphold principles guaranteeing a stable future. Jongterm prospects should not be sacrificed for the sake of short-term and swift solutions. @t is true that "erbs are frustrated by the outcome of wars and disintegration of Yugoslavia. They are losers in political and moral terms, but not in territorial ones. Thesis consciously launched by the $elgrade leadership, and which serve to blackmail the region and international public, namely that "erbia+s loss of /osovo should be compensated by staging of a $osnian referendum on secession of 9epublika "rpska, are lethal, politically dangerous and immoral.

New constitution of Serbia and regional security

5ew constitution reflects anti-liberalism of the "erb political elite, best seen in the constitutional status of minorities, constitutional position of Ao!vodina, high degree of centraliCation and position on /osovo. 1s regards /osovo, of special concern is the statement of Ao!islav /ostunica that Tevery country which recogniCe /osovo shall have to face conse7uences of that moveU. 1dded to that referendum was held under enormous pressure and in the wake of arrogant and strident pro-referendum media campaign. @ts very outcome is contestable. "mall number of observers %CE"@:& have stated that Tthe procedure was retrogradeU with respect to previous elections. 1bsence of the international community serious response leaves room for enormous manipulation in the forthcoming elections. 45

/ey ob!ection to the new constitution is its failure to make a clean break with <ilosevic regime and its non-transparent stand on new borders in the $alkans. "uch an outcome of referendum illustrates the true character of democracy in "erbia, and shows to which e tent it is contrary to the liberal values of the West. The foregoing shall continue to generate tension not only in the internal scene of "erbia, but also within E-, with regard to its strategy towards "erbia. @t is obvious that in "erbia there is no willingness to embark upon a serious reform course, that is, to take genuine reform measures necessary for the country+s integration into E-. The incumbent government which is already ideologically close to 9adicals, as of late has been indicating its intention to opt for a specific T"erb pathwayU, contrary to all the current rends in the continent and neighborhood. @f E- continues to ignore obvious violations of democratic procedure in everyday political life of "erbia, the danger of introduction of an authoritarian democracy in this country looms high.

Serb ar y and regional security

1fter <ontenegro went independent the former Yugoslav ,eople+s 1rmy was reduced to the "erb army, still opposing the genuine transformation and ad!ustment of its military doctrine to the new reality. That army has lost four wars, and it currently shares the loser+s frustration with the "erb people. @t is trying to re-establish in reality a non-e isting continuity with the "erb army from the early 8*th century. #inancially and morally devastated that army ob!ectively cannot pose a serious threat to the regional security. 0owever, huge amounts of ammo and weaponry from former Yugoslavia stored in numerous locations "erbia-wide, are a veritable time-bomb, threatening internal security %the recent case of a military storehouse e plosion in ,araOin&.

46

0owever its senior cadres, ideologically still relying on the "erb territorial aspirations and conservatism, is an obvious hurdle on the road of a more accelerated overhaul of the army. 1dded to that its secret services are a serious destabiliCing factor within "erbia proper, for they are staunch e ponents of the conservative anti-0ague block %which refuses to hand-over 9atko <ladic&. 1dded to that through numerous manipulations they thwart articulation of the political alternative in "erbia. 1 serious and comprehensive reform of the "erb army shall not be feasible without its accession to the ,artnership for ,eace, and later to 51T6, like it was the case with other armies of post-communist countries. 0owever, the foregoing shall also depend on total orientation or course of the "erb society and its future stand on European integration. -uture security challenges in the Balkans 5ot only "erbia is a key state stability- and normaliCation-wise in the region, but also numerous other problems burden the regional security, notably, nonpunishment of those responsible for the war crimes, absence of genuine cooperation with the @CTY, and lack of serious trials of war criminals in the national courts. That part of the facing process has only !ust begun, and on that process hinges the one of restoration of confidence. The whole region is in the grip of full-blown, militant nationalism, which has somehow survived, most probably because of acceptance of ethnic principle in conflict-resolution. 1t the same time the foregoing is an indication of absence of a liberal elite in the region or of its sidelining in the places it e ists. 0aving in mind the afore-delineated security problems in the region, Eshould pay attention above all to a comprehensive and in-depth reform of education, or its fine-tuning to European values. "uch a reform would help constitute, in the long-term, a liberal elite in the region. 1dded to that Eshould focus on establishment of a moral minimum, notably for "erbia, in view of its role of generator of wars and instability. That means that E- should insist on transition !ustice as a vehicle for overhauling those societies into civil 47

societies. @n those terms of particular importance is formulation of a new cultural model and identity on a new pattern facilitating integration into E-. Conclusions @nvolvment of the West in the $alkans in (*s is an effort to define new strategy and principles that are not of geostrategic nature. The West+s interest in the $alkans should be viewed in a completely new conte t. 2eo-strategic reasons have disappeared but $alkans can still affect the internal stability of the E- -economic, political, social and criminal. %2erman government for e ample has spent B* billions :E< from '((8 to '((( on $osnian refugees in 2ermany, their return to $osnia, including costs for "#69 and various humanitarian actions, reconstruction&. The E- economic stability is still very fragile, therefore, to pacify and stabilise the $alkans in view of its geographic location and the porosity of its borders is a ma!or concern for E-. The -" interest in the $alkans is minimal, their main concern is stability of Europe and the latterFs capacity to fully assume responsibility for the $alkans. The -" wants the E- concept to be successful. @nternational community, the E- and the -" have resolved, although belatedly and not necessarily ade7uately, all conflict situations. E- was the first one to tackle all the problems, but the -" resolutely introduced and enforced solutions, like in the case of $osnia and later in /osovo. The -" succeeded in passing the Western leadership in the $alkans on to the European -nion %E-&, but as one former high ranking -" diplomat has indicated in his letter to $ush 3that may come back to haunt the -"3. B* 6n the other side the $alkans conflicts had a significant impact on -"E- relations which, in turn, influenced the nature of E- and -" policy towards the $alkans. Concerning the E-, the need to address the conflicts led to concern over the development of a European "ecurity and :efense ,olicy %E":,&, and ultimately to the emergence of a fledgling E":,. 6ne might also argue that it increased European unity, especially as the -.". began to turn its focus to the <iddle East. While the conflicts might have initially turned a spotlight on the absence of significant European influence and continued 48

-" dominance in southeastern Europe, they eventually provided the E- with a vehicle to promote E":, and ultimately unity. @n the past decade international community has applied many solutions in the $alkans, and fre7uently its initiatives overlapped. :ue to lack of coordination some initiatives were inefficient. @n the region at play were several initiatives> 9oyamont process, <ontenegrin initiative, :anube initiative, "EEC@, "tability ,act and Aisegrad initiative. <ost of these initiatives have more or less been ineffective or 7uestionable. Yet, the approach the E- has taken towards the West $alkan states differs significantly from the E-+s treatment of the newly admitted Central European member states, a fact that has implications for the e tent to which E- interaction and policy towards the $alkans will affect the region. The Ehas not applied strict conditionality to bring about reform. 2iven that political and economic development in the $alkans was below that of the recently admitted Central European countries, the Eopted for political encouragement via the invention of additional steps of progression rather than fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria established in '((;. B' $eyond offering funding and technical assistance to aid domestic reform, the E- has also taken a regional approach to the $alkans rather than to deal with prospective Central European members via bilateral relationships -- a techni7ue that tended to increase competition rather than cooperation among this group of states. The regional approach was urged when the international community approved the $russels-based "tability ,act to provide aid to the countries of the Western $alkans, aid that could be secured by meeting certain conditions. :riven by a 2erman initiative in '(((, the E--led ,act aimed to create stability through the pursuit of regional pro!ects in a number of areas including> local democracy and cross-border cooperation, energy and regional infrastructure, media, inter-regional trade and investment, migration and asylumMrefugees, media, and organiCed crime and corruption. B8 @t ultimately promised candidate status provided that certain democratic and economic standards were met by Western $alkan states, including Croatia, the #ederal 9epublic of Yugoslavia %#9Y&, <acedonia, $osnia and 49

0erCegovina, and 1lbania. The ,act emerged from the "tability ,act Conference held in "ara!evo, at a time when key E- members desired to develop an effective E":, to gain independence from 1merican help during then-e isting situations such as the crisis in /osovo. E- leaders came to view E- enlargement as the most advantageous tool to manage its immediate neighborhood.B; Yet, as ,ond notes, the "tability ,act Tis only a gentle enforcer of regional collaboration. @t has no e ecutive power and no money of its own to finance pro!ects. @t can only broker pro!ects between donors and recipients. <oreover, the pact has deliberately limited its own powers by insisting on the co-ownership of programs through e7ual representation of donors and beneficiaries in three decisionmaking Dworking tables+ that deal with democracy, economics, and security L and on its own replacement in 8**) by local leadership of a more structured 9egional Cooperation Council.U BB $eyond this, the European Commission and the E- more generally have pushed for a E--"outheastern Europe free trade agreement to end confusion over the large number of e isting bilateral arrangements. Thus since '(((, the clear possibility of membership has given elites incentives to develop and implement policies of ethnic tolerance, regional peace-building, and economic reform.B= 1ssuming membership criteria would be met,BG the E- offered the possibility of accession to the $alkan states at the autumn 8*** .agreb "ummit, the first summit comprised of all E- and $alkan leaders and held at the time of the #rench presidency of the -nion. BI @n 8***, the E- announced its primary mechanism for encouraging general reform -- the "tabiliCation and 1ssociation ,rocess %"1,& for the Western $alkans -- that began in the immediate aftermath of the /osovo war. @t ultimately represented the E-+s commitment to offer eventual E- entry to some or all of these countries if they are able to meet the conditions of membership. The "1, figures centrally in the E-+s stabiliCation policy in the $alkans and was intended to apply to the five countries considered as potential E- members, at least since the Eune 8*** #eira European Council -Croatia, <acedonia, "erbia and <ontenegro, $osnia-0erCegovina, and 50 1lbania.B)

1 key element of the "1, is the signing of "tabiliCation and 1ssociation 1greements %"11s&, agreements that were modeled after the Europe 1greements drawn up for the CEE countries making considerable progress on reform and thus given signals of potential E- entry. The "11s delineate legally binding rights and obligations both parties need to meet before the given country may !oin the E-. B( The conclusion of the "11s is at the very heart of the "1, which signals commitment to the completion of a formal association with the -nion after a transition period. =* 1iming at structural reforms over the long-term, the "1, aims to help countries increase their capability of implementing a "11 and to prepare for E- membership. $y laying down the framework for structural change, it was assumed that political and economic development problems will be resolved. @mproving border management, building administrative capacity, and harmoniCing trade policies are all emphasiCed. =' 1lso key in the "1, is the financial assistance program Community 1ssistance for 9econstruction, :evelopment and "tabiliCation %C19:"& that was made available in the "1, process in 8**'. =8 C19:"+ main aims include the> T%'& reconstruction, democratic stabiliCation, reconciliation, and the return of refugees? %8& institutional and legislative development, including harmoniCation with E- norms and approaches to underpin the rule of law, human rights, civil society and the media, and the operation of a free market economy? %;& sustainable and social development, including structural reform? %B& promotion of closer relations and regional cooperation among "1, countries and between them, the E- and candidate countries of central Europe.U=; Yet, while the C19:"-supported "1, has a regional strategy dimension, it has thus far played only a small role in regional cooperation due to its overall design and management.=B Jater at the Eune 8**; Thessaloniki summit, the E- reinterated its interest in offering membership to the countries of the Western $alkans, interest signaled at the European Councils of #eira and Copenhagen. E-+s Commissioner for E ternal 9elations Chris ,atten announced that the Ewould tie the "1, to a number of tried-and-tested pre-accession programs. ,rior to the "ummit, ,atten+s remarks were intended to increase the region+s 51

commitment to e pedited reform> TThessaloniki will send two important messages to the Western $alkans> The prospect of membership of the E- is real, and we will not regard the map of the -nion as complete until you have !oined us. We in the European Commission will do all we can to help you succeed. $ut membership must be earned. @t will take the sheer hard work and applied political will of those in power in the region. 0ow far you proceed along the road towards European @ntegration, and how fast, will be up to you.U== While the "1, -- the e isting framework for the E-+s relations with the $alkans -- will remain central, added to it would be aspects of the most recent process of enlargement, including greater support for institutionbuilding, strengthened political co-operation, developing trade reforms that would increase opportunities for e ports from the region to promote economic growth, and to open up possibilities for these countries to take part in some Community programs.=G To show the concrete ways the E- will help support the $alkan countries+ 7uest for membership, several areas of regional cooperation were also named at the "ummit, including the abolition of visa re7uirements for travel within the region, the development of transport and free trade systems, cross-border cooperation, the collection of small arms, efforts to fight corruption and organiCed crime, and developing regional markets for gas and electricity.=I While concerns were raised that the "tability ,act would be a means to keep Western $alkan countries out of the E-, the E- has indicated that such efforts toward regional cooperation are a pre-condition to !oin, but in no way are a substitute for accession.=) The "tability ,act and "1, ultimately provide support and mutual reinforcement for one another. =( #ocused on structural reform and the consolidation of peace and stability, G* the former has a broad focus by concentrating on a number of sectors not included in the latter such as concerning the development and support of cross-border cooperation, fighting crime and corruption, developing regional solutions to refugee issues, attention to issues of defense and security, in addition to other areas. G' 52

@n 8**;, the E- brokered a deal to assuage <ontenegrin independence claims and ultimately to stabiliCe $alkan borders, at least temporarily, by creating the -nion of "erbia and <ontenegro. Yet the deal contained the seeds of its own dissolution by allowing either of the two republics to hold referenda on the -nion after three years. While noting <ontenegro+s right to hold a referendum, $russels emphasiCed constructing clear guidelines so that the outcome would be clear. ,articularly controversial was the ma!ority re7uired. <ontenegro+s pro-independence government claimed that 8=-B*Nof all of the 9epublics registered voters voting in favor would suffice, in contrast to pro-union parties arguing for a minimum of =*N of eligible voters.G8 8**; also brought about a more e plicit division of labor in the region between the E- and 51T6. While the E- was to handle police reform and internal security, 51T6 would tackle military issues via the ,f, program. $egun in '((B, the ,f, program went from being a way for wary but interested parties to flirt with the idea of membership after the /osovo war, and was ultimately conceived as a key step on the way to far more demanding E- entry.G; Concerning financial assistance to prospective members, starting ' Eanuary 8**I a new financial tool will replace C19:" as well as other pree isting programs offering financial assistance %i.e. ,019E, @",1, and "1,19:& -- the @nstrument of ,re-1ccession %@,1&. The Commission hopes to increase fle ibility and impact by offering a singular set of rules and procedures. 1long with Turkey, West $alkan countries will be able from nearly ''.= billion Euros over the course of the ne t seven years. GB Yet, financial assistance will not likely flow as readily to the $alkans for pre-accession for two reasons> first, the weak economic growth in several of the E-+s heavyweights %#rance, @taly, and until recently 2ermany&, and second, the actual levels of funds dispersed are likely to be even lower that the =*-I*N for CEE countries given the even greater challenges to security E- funds in the $alkans.G= 5ot only is there the challenge of following Erules and procedures to secure funds, but also of absorbing the funds effectively.GG <ost critical is administrative absorption capacity which can be 53

defined as> Tthe ability and skill of central, regional, and local authorities %a& to prepare, on a timely basis, national plans, programs and pro!ects that meet E- standards? %b& to arrange the re7uired coordination among the principal partners? and %c& cope with the vast amount of administrative and reporting work re7uired by the Commission to property finance, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the programs and pro!ects.U GI ,rospective $alkan members will likely have an even tougher time gaining funding, particularly given limited administrative capacity. 5ot only is there a lack of well-prepared pro!ects that would meet the siCeable procedural and substantive re7uirements re7uired by E- rules on funding, but local administrations+ lack the e pertise in using the funds, among other reasons. G) @n contrast to the accession of Central European states, the countries of the Western $alkans have found themselves in a strikingly different situation given that support for further e pansion in the older E- member states is waning -- not to mention support within the would-be members. ,articularly with the demands of sending suspected war criminals to the @CTY, meeting the conditions has become highly politiciCed, making preparations for potential accession to appear more political than technical. ,rogress in the direction of membership appears to be made less by bureaucratic procedure than by political decisions both within the $alkans and in the E- countries. The $alkans has never claimed so much world attention as in the past ten years, when the world became truly aware for the first time of its diversity and comple ity, including its relevance for the stability of the region. The $alkans may be said to have become a paradigm for all the problems of the post-bipolar world. The world+s solidarity with the $alkan peoples during ten years of war was crucial in securing their survival. @ts future is also not possible without the further engagement of the West. The West has already established three-tiered mechanisms for Dnormalising+ and Ddisciplining+ the $alkans> membership of the Council of Europe, accession to a European -nion association and stabilisation agreement, and ,artnership for ,eace with 51T6. #urthermore, co-operation with the 0ague tribunal demanded former Yugoslav republics to help establish a set of values honoured from top to bottom. 54

European "tability @nitiative has come up with conclusion that any future assistance to the Western $alkans should be delivered in accordance with the development principles that underline the European -nion structural funds> local co-financing, institutional partnership between Commission, national and subnational authorities, and effective multi-annual programming of developing efforts.G( This long-term framework calls for a well-thought-out strategy, above all the creation of a cultural and intellectual elite, especially technocratic and managerial. Educational system is archaic and negatively affects the social and political order. 1lthough both the Jeft and the 9ight ideas and parties have been used up in the $alkans, no alternative liberal concept has been established. Communism has been superseded by anti-Communism, which is degenerating via numerous radicalMe treme phenomena. The $alkan countries today share the same problems in their confrontation with transition. @n the case of "erbia, there is an added problem of war crimes, which renders reforms and transition so much more difficult. Crime and corruption are two problems common to the whole region. Transition in the $alkans will not stand a chance without the rule of law and proper institutions. Without defined borders liberal democracy has no chance. Thus dissolution of Yugoslavia %<ontenegro-s referendum took place in 8**G and /osovo is under way& is a precondition for creating a new framework for integration of the region to the benefit of all states. 0owever, there can be no development without a substantial influ of foreign capital. West e pected that the post-Communist societies would embrace its values, and that the issue of democratisation was only the 7uestion of time. $ut things could not run that smoothly, because of undemocratic nature of those societies caused by devastation and deregulation of institutions %not only during the <ilosevic era& and their continuing disarray. 3"econd wave3 of democratisation is urgently needed. 6ne that both seeks to widen the democracy net to those parts of the world that still lagging while deepening the practice of democratic government in those states that are struggling to make it work. :espite all the efforts in the region the West is still facing the same problems and dilemmas. <ost of the interventions were based on the 55

concept of solidarity, but many states have individually reacted on the basis of their individual interest. The fact that Yugoslavia is still in the process of dissolution is indicated by still substantial disputes on how to treat the pending issues such as the final status of /osovo %or before independence of <ontenegro&. There are still many ambiguities in the Western strategy relating to the future of the $alkans %such as whether "erbia should be a leading country in the region etc.& or whether other states, such as Croatia, should !oin E- in the same package with "erbia. 1fter elections in Eanuary 8**I in "erbia it became evident that the "erbian political class is not E- oriented. The 7uestion for the E- is whether it will change the criteria and incorporate "erbia 7uickly in order to prevent its total collapse. ,liticiCation of the @CTY -and tying compliance with the possibility of E- accession, did not work out in the case of "erbia. 5ationalists have not been removed from power and have no interest for the european integrations. @nstead, they advocate TneutralU "erbia somewhere between East and West, with emphasis on 9ussia. @n late 8**=, the E- began talks with $elgrade to e plore possibilities for signing a "11. These were later called off because "erb authorities had not apprehended war crimes suspects 9atko <ladic and 9adovan /aradCic. 6ne should also keep in mind that prospects for E- membership are a key incentive within the /osovo status talks, another potential factor in the delay -- with the E- working on a package of incentives for "erbia to cushion the potential loss of /osovo and help diminish support for the 9adicals. $eyond that, "erb nationalists continue to have significant control with ,rime <inister /ostunica governing with the support of <ilosevic+s "ocialists and from the "erbian 9adical ,arty. /ostunica uses the /osovo issue for his political purposes, arguing that anti-democratic forces will gain power if the /osovo issue is not settled to $elgrade+s liking, and has hinted that $osnia+s "erbs may demand independence.

56

Yugoslavia en!oyed for decades pribvileged status in the West. The National Security Council Decision, Directi e !"", signed by 9onald 9eagan on 'B <arch '()B says> D-nited "tates policy toward Yugoslavia, an independent, economically viable, stable and militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and -" interests. Yugoslavia is an important obstacle to "oviet e pansionism and hegemony in southern Europe> Yugoslavia also serves as a useful reminder to countries in eastern Europe of the advantages of independence from <oscow and of the benefits of friendly relations with the West.+ @t also says that Dthe -" must work closely with its allies and the other ma!or industrial democracies in supporting Yugoslavia+s determination to remain an independent and viable force on the Warsaw ,act+s southern flank. @t is in -" interests that Yugoslavia be able to resist pressures from the "oviet -nion and the Warsaw ,act. The -" will continue to encourage Yugoslavia+s long-term internal liberalisation.+ To achieve these goals the following measures will be taken in Dclose cooperation with other friendly countries to support Yugoslavia+s efforts to overcome its financial difficulties? the -" will pursue well- established dialogue with Yugoslav leaders on mutual interest and concern? our policy will continue to encourage Yugoslavia to play a moderating role within the 5on-aligned movement and to counter Cuban and "oviet influence in that organisation? we will foster sales to Yugoslavia of arms and e7uipment re7uired for their legitimate defence needs on a case-by-case basis, sub!ect to appropriate technology safeguards and financial arrangements.+ 2 The Charter of #aris was a compromise, recogniCing a substantial role of the E- in the political and economic development of Europe while underscoring as a fundamental characteristic of the C"CE the importance of the !oint participation of 5orth 1merican and European states in the future of the process. 3 $eport of the %SC& 'eeting on National 'inorities, 2eneva, '((', p.B. 4 The -" at that time insisted on multilateraliCm in order to avoid antagoniCing 9ussia. The idea behind was to involve 9ussia into international organiCation and the decision making process within their framework. 5 (inancial Times, 8( :ecember '((8, T-" warns "erbia against military action in /osovoU by Eurek <artin and Jaura "ilber 6 9obert /agan, 3,ower and Weakness3, #olicy $e ie), 5o.'';. 7 :avid $inder, TEvolution in Europe> Yugoslavia seen $reaking up "oonU, Ne) *ork Times, 8I 5ovember, '((*, p. I 8 Eane "harp presentation for Eric 9emarke @nstitute, <arch '(((. 9 &xcerpts from the minutes of the meeting of "lobodan <iloSeviO with highest local officials held in $elgrade 'G <arch in $elgrade published by N+N, under the title T$ogami Oemo da se tuVemoU %"o, We shall 0ave to #ight& '8 1pril '(('. 10 #or e ample, the -" was under great pressure by the public opinion %C55 reports had a great impact& to interfere. @ts unpreparedness to act was !ustified by in fact adopting <ilosevic interpretation of the war as Tcivil warU, Tspontaneous conflictU, TtragedyU, Tproblem from the hellU with undefined aggressor and victim. @t was presented as Tsides in conflictU that all commit crimes. This -" attitude convinced <ilosevic to believe that he had Tgreen lightU to continue. 11 :obrica WosiO, a writer, one of the most ardent advocates of the 2reater "erbia pro!ect 12 $orisav Eovic, T#osledn,i dani S($-U %Jast :ays of "#9Y&, ,riCma, /ragu!evac, '((G, pp. B*I-B'* 13 Collection of his articles on ethnic cleansing in $osnia were published as a book .itness of /enocide, "imonP"chuster,'((; 14 1mong others Eohn #o and Eim 0ooper who later became advocates for the intervention in $osnia and /osovo 15 "anctions have been imposed in ten cases "outh 9hodesia, "outh 1frica, @ra7, #9Y, Jibya, 0aiti, Jiberia, "omalia, 1ngola, 9wanda. 16 This resolution affected mostly <uslim side in $osnia thus forcing them to buy arms from some muslim countries like @ran and accept the help of <u!ahedin groups 17 "arah <ac ,herson> +ssues of +mposition, 0dministration and &ffecti eness , background paper, Conference on the #uture of -5 Collective "ecurity, Centre for @nternational "tudies, 5ew York -niversity "chool of Jaw, '((;, p. => 1rticle B' "anctions> "anctions were a measure of compulsion designed to force Yugoslavia to comply with the -5 demands contained in -5 9esolution I=8M(8, namely 3to change conduct of the state and to establish status quo ante1 ,olitical elite and Yugoslav public thought that YugoslaviaFs engagement in the $osnian war was !ustified on moral, legal and political grounds. "anctions provoked a debate, both in Yugoslavia and in the world. The latterFs debate was more centred on the ethical aspect thereof, for, according to 0ans /ochler 3 measures of compulsion, like sanctions represent a kind of collective punishment, which is not compatible with ethic principle of individual responsibility3 and 3 in case of comprehensive economic sanctions civilian population becomes a hostage in their own country. "uch measures, which e plicitly aim to damage population at large, should be deemed as immoral.3, 0ans /ochler> 1&tische 0spekte Sanktionend im 2olkerrecht1, @nternational ,rogress 6rganisation, '((B, pages ( and ''.

"imilar polemics were conducted in other cases of sanctions, and the key argument was that it was more difficult to impact population in countries with a lower level of democracy, for the capability of population to bring pressure to bear on the government for the sake of shift in the official policy, is much smaller. 1lso important and relevant for this debate is the opinion of the "ecretary 2eneral $outros-2halli that 3 it is necessary to resolve the dilemma of legitimacy of sanctions vis a vis the most vulnerable population groups3 %$outros$outros 2hali, Supplement to an 0genda for #eace , ,osition ,aper of the "ecretary 2eneral on the 6ccasion of the #iftieth 1nniversary of the -nited 5ations, 1M=*MG*, Eanuary ;, '((=, page 'G&. 0owever at a large number of conferences the opinion prevailed that "ecurity Council should make efforts to implement sanctions more efficiently and rationally&. 18 The 3oston /lobe, '8 <ay '((;. T-" Weighs "ending ,eace Troops to <acedonia? $iden assails Europe Dtimidity+U by ,aul Xuinn-Eudge and <ichael /ranish 19 :avid 0alberstam, .ar in a Time of #eace, 5ew York, "cribner, 8**', p )(. %7uoting Tony Eudt& 20 The -" %but also Western governments& was not ready to engage but being under constant public pressure, it found e cuses that any military involvment would threaten peace-keeping forces. -ntil '((= it continued to be constant and efficient deterrent to military interfere. 21 #inal %thirtheen& ,eriodic <aCowiecki 9eportM 88 1ugust (=M,art 'MEMC5MBM'((GM( 22 @C2 9eport> The .ages of Sin4 Confronting 3osnia5s $epublika Srpska , "ara!evoM$russels, ) 6ctober 8**'? http>MMicg-beta.web.easynet.beMhomeMinde .cfm 23 Slobodna 3osna, 1n @nterview with "herif $assiouni, 'I <ay 8**'. 24 http>MMwww.b(8.netMinterview. 25 Slobodna 3osna, 7uoted by "herif $assiouni in his interview, 'I <ay 8**'. 26 1lthough the pro!ect was routed, unfortunately <iloSeviOic+s logic has won> multi-etnic and multicultural fibre of the $alkans has been torn asunder, and many decades will pass before it recovers. That logic emerged victorious because of the slow response of the international community and its failure to grasp the logic of disintegration of Yugoslavia. 1dded to that all the international community-imposed solutions are still weighted down by the fact that the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia is yet to be completed, and by the very e istence of 9epublika "rpska, which sanctions the war crimes and genocide against $osniaks. 27 6nly two meetings were convened in the country by the 6elsinki Committee for 6uman $ights in Serbia, 7oso o 6elsinki Committee, and #ri8tina Committee for 6uman $ights and (reedoms. The first conference was staged in -lcin! %<ontenegro&, in Euly '((I and it called for an international conference and mediation. The second one was held in $elgrade %"erbia& on 8'-88 5ovember '((), several months ahead of 51T6 intervention 28 @t is worthwhile mentioning that Council for (oreign $elations from 5ew York has invested effort during demonstrations to convince coalition TTogetherU to issue a statement on /osovo but had failed. 29 9ecognition of <acedonia was percieved by several opposition leaders as an act of treason because <acedonia was always seen as "outh of "erbia. <ilan "t. ,rotic, former #9Y 1mbassador to -", lamented over <acedonia+s recognition> T$y one move of pen all those who fell for liberation of <acedonia in the two $alkan and one World War were made senseless... This means that ,opular 1ssembly of "erbia should have passed a :eclaration 7uoting all historical and international arguments in evidence of <acedonia being an indisputable "erb territory..U %<ilan "t. ,rotiO> T'i i %N+U, 0irSOanska misao, $eograd, '((G, p '=(& /osta YavoSki maintains in a similar vein> T@t is hard to believe that "erbs could have recogniCed at all an independent and sovreign <acedoniaU, %/osta YavoSki, 9atiran,e Srpst a, $eograd,'((G, p.'8;&. 30 The "erbian political elite considered the collapse of 1lbanian state as a stroke of luck because the weakened 1lbania was seen as an advantage in solving the /osovo issue 31 9adomir TaniO, $(&:$L;s South Sla ic Ser ice, interview TThere was a plan for Ethnic CleansingU before 51T6 bombing, I <arch, '((( %he repeated the same thing as the witnesses in <ilosevic+s trial& claimed that Yugoslav 1rmy prepared an T6peration 0orseshoeU which meant wholesale deportation of eight hundred thousand /osovo 1lbanians and killing of many civilians, including the most prominent leaders of the 1lbanian community. The original te t is posted at>http>MMwww.danas.orgMprogramiMinterviewM 32 $elarus,@ndia and 9ussia offered a draft resolution which charged 51T6 for violating 1rticles 8%B&, 8B and =; of the -5 Charter. The vote was '8-; against the :raft. 33 /ofi 1nnan+s statement issued 8G <arch '(((. 34 <S+S .ashington (ile, B #ebruary '(((. 35 The Ne) *ork $e ie) of 3ooks, Aolume 4JA@, 5umebr '*, Eune '*.'(((, Aaclav 0avel T/osovo and the End of the 5ation "tateU 36 www.americanvalues.org and www.propositionsonline.com. 37 www.americanvalues.org This manifesto was published in #ebruary 8**8.

Nin, an interview with 5ebo!sa Covic T0ow to deal with 1lbaniansU by "tevan 5ikSiO %/ako sa 1lbancima&, p. ')-8*. ; <arch 8**'. 39 Xuoted in $eport =Democracy, Security and the (uture of the Stability #act for South &astern &urope> prepared by the East West @nstitute and European "tability @nitiative B 1pril 8**', can be found at www.esiweb.orgMreportsMstabilitypact 40 <orton 1bramowitC+s TJetter to $ushU, (oreign #olicy, <ayMEune 8**8 @ssue ';*, pI), 8 p. 41 ,ond 8**G,G. 42 www.stabilitypact.org 43 Aachudova 8**=,8BI 44 ,ond 8**G, 8B8 45 Aachudova 8**;, 'B8 46 Criteria defined at the Eune '((; Copenhagen European Council BI 2oCi 8**G, 8*; 48 Calic 8**B, 'I 49 <arer 8**G, ;B 50 Calic 8**B,'I 51 Calic 8**B,'I 52 Though later agreed on at the .agreb summit, the C19:" idea came from the Eune 8*** European Council summit at #eira, ,ortugal during which the notion that the genuine chance of !oining the E- should be put forth once the conditions are met. 1t #eira, the Council claimed that Tits ob!ective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of EuropeH 1ll the countries concerned are potential candidates for membershipU ZEuropean Council, ,residency Conclusions of '( and 8* Eune 8***, "5 8**M**, at ';[. 53 http>MMeuropa.euMintMcommMeuropeaidMpro!ectsMcardsMinde \en.htm 54 Calic 8**B,'I 55 The Thessaloniki "ummit 8**; 56 !+bid 57 Calic 8**B,'I 58 Calic 8**B, 'I 59 Calic 8**B,'I 60 !Calic 8**B, 8* 61 !"al#$!2004%17 62 !&asmuso'#$!2006%!246 63 !(on)!2006%!246 64 !*nlargment!+trateg,!2006%7 65 !-arer!2006%!38%!41 66 !-arer!2006%42 67 !-arer!2006%42 68 !-arer!2006%!41 69 +bid

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