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Table of contents
1. Corporate capital structure in the United kingdom: determinants and adjustment....................................... 1 2. Agency problems and debt financing: leadership structure effects.............................................................. 2

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Document 1 of 2

Corporate capital structure in the United kingdom: determinants and adjustment

Author: Bunn, Philip; Young, Garry Publication info: Bank of England. Quarterly Bulletin 44.3 (Autumn 2004): 327. ProQuest document link Abstract: The balance sheet position of non-financial companies goes through phases of strength and weakness. At the end of 2003 the amount of debt on corporate balance sheets was at a historically high level in relation to the market value of the capital that ultimately provides the means by which the debt is serviced. Past patterns would suggest that such high gearing situations do not persist and that companies act to bring down their indebtedness. The factors that determine the level of gearing that companies appear to aim for over time and what actions companies take to adjust when their debt gets out of line with their desired level are addressed. Full text: Headnote Working Paper no. 226 The balance sheet position of non-financial companies goes through phases of strength and weakness. At the end of 2003 the amount of debt on corporate balance sheets was at a historically high level in relation to the market value of the capital that ultimately provides the means by which the debt is serviced. Past patterns would suggest that such high gearing situations do not persist and that companies act to bring down their indebtedness. This paper addresses the factors that determine the level of gearing that companies appear to aim for over time and what actions companies take to adjust when their debt gets out of line with their desired level. Our analysis provides an empirical test of the 'trade-off theory of corporate capital structure, which suggests that firms have an equilibrium level of capital gearing that is determined by trading off the advantages of holding debt against the expected costs of financial distress, which becomes more likely at high debt levels. We consider only the tax benefits of holding debt, since the other factors that make debt an attractive form of business finance are difficult to quantify. The tax advantage of debt arises from the deductibility of interest payments against corporation tax payments, but the magnitude of the benefit depends in a complex way on the personal tax rates faced by shareholders. This paper uses a theoretical model of corporate behaviour to derive an expression for the tax gains to corporate gearing, which we construct for the United Kingdom from 1970 onwards and use as a basis for the empirical part of the paper. The tax gains to gearing were high in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s when corporation tax rates were high, but they have fallen since and are currently at a historically low level. We find evidence that firms in the United Kingdom have target levels of capital gearing at the aggregate level, which in the long run depend on the tax advantages of debt and on the probability of bankruptcy (which will be related to the expected costs of financial distress). This finding provides empirical support for the 'trade-off theory of corporate capital structure, and it reinforces the results of previous firm-level work at the Bank which also found that firms have target levels of gearing. The current level of long-run equilibrium capital gearing at market value for the UK PNFC sector implied by our model is approximately 16%. The paper then goes on to test how firms adjust their balance sheets to eliminate deviations in actual gearing from the implied equilibrium level. We find that most of the adjustment in response to above-equilibrium gearing takes place through reduced dividend payments and increased equity issuance. There is only weak evidence that firms adjust through more restrained capital investment. This is consistent with the 'new view' of corporate behaviour which suggests that real adjustment will only take place once dividends cannot be reduced any further. These findings are also consistent with firm-level work for the United Kingdom which has found 24 October 2013 Page 1 of 11 ProQuest

evidence of adjustment in dividends and new equity issuance, with the proviso that investment appears to be more responsive to a flow measure of financial pressure than a stock measure of balance sheet disequilibrium. Illustrative simulations show how firms may adjust their balance sheets in response to shocks that move gearing further away from its implied equilibrium. Although firms appear to respond quickly and make relatively large adjustments to the flows, the actual adjustment process is likely to be protracted because the flows of dividends, equity issuance and investment are all small in relation to the stock of debt. Subject: Balance sheets; Corporate finance; Debt management; Studies; Location: United Kingdom, UK Classification: 3100: Capital & debt management; 9175: Western Europe; 9130: Experimental/theoretical Publication title: Bank of England. Quarterly Bulletin Volume: 44 Issue: 3 Pages: 327 Number of pages: 1 Publication year: 2004 Publication date: Autumn 2004 Year: 2004 Publisher: Bank of England. Economics Division. Bulletin Group Place of publication: London Country of publication: United Kingdom Publication subject: Business And Economics--Banking And Finance, Business And Economics--Economic Situation And Conditions ISSN: 00055166 CODEN: BEQBDP Source type: Scholarly Journals Language of publication: English Document type: Feature ProQuest document ID: 215016691 Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/215016691?accountid=27544 Copyright: Copyright Bank of England. Economics Division. Bulletin Group Autumn 2004 Last updated: 2010-06-08 Database: ABI/INFORM Complete

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Agency problems and debt financing: leadership structure effects

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Author: Fosberg, Richard H Publication info: Corporate Governance 4.1 (2004): 31+. ProQuest document link Abstract: In previous research, Friend and Hasbrouck theorized that managerial insiders (officers and directors) have a personal incentive to cause the firm to use less than the optimal amount of debt in its capital structure. They suggested this occurs because officers and directors have a large proportion of their personal wealth invested in the firm in the form of common stock holdings and firm-specific human capital. This makes managerial insiders reluctant to use the optimal amount of debt financing for the firm because of the additional bankruptcy risk higher levels of debt engender. I test FH's theory and find evidence that supports it. Specifically, the amount of debt in our sample firms' capital structures declines as the percentage of the firm's common stock held by the CEO and other officers and directors increases. A direct relationship is found between blockholder share ownership and our sample firms' debt/equity ratio. This suggests that monitoring by blockholders is effective in controlling the suboptimal debt usage agency problem. Further, for any given level of blockholder share ownership, the greater the number of blockholders a firm has the less effective blockholders are in raising the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Lastly, some weak evidence was found suggesting that a dual leadership structure was effective in increasing the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT] Full text: Headnote Abstract In previous research, Friend and Hasbrouck theorized that managerial insiders (officers and directors) have a personal incentive to cause the firm to use less than the optimal amount of debt in its capital structure. They suggested this occurs because officers and directors have a large proportion of their personal wealth invested in the firm in the form of common stock holdings and firm-specific human capital. This makes managerial insiders reluctant to use the optimal amount of debt financing for the firm because of the additional bankruptcy risk higher levels of debt engender. I test FH's theory and find evidence that supports it. Specifically, the amount of debt in our sample firms' capital structures declines as the percentage of the firm's common stock held by the CEO and other officers and directors increases. A direct relationship is found between blockholder share ownership and our sample firms' debt/equity ratio. This suggests that monitoring by blockholders is effective in controlling the suboptimal debt usage agency problem. Further, for any given level of blockholder share ownership, the greater the number of blockholders a firm has the less effective blockholders are in raising the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Lastly, some weak evidence was found suggesting that a dual leadership structure was effective in increasing the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure. Keywords Corporate governance, Senior management, Leadership, Shares Introduction Agency theorists have long recognized that the separation of ownership and control common in most corporations creates conflicts of interest between a firm's managers and shareholders. These conflicts (agency problems) arise because managers have the opportunity to use the assets of the firm in ways that benefit themselves personally but decrease the wealth of the firm's shareholders. Examples of this type of opportunistic behavior by managers include consuming an excessive amount of perks, shirking of their responsibilities, and investing in negative net present value (NPV) projects that offer personal diversification benefits to the firm's managers. Amihud and Lev (1981) and Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) believe that some of this opportunistic behavior results because many managers have large proportions of their personal wealth invested in their firm's common stock and in firm -specific human capital. Because their personal wealth is heavily invested in their employers, these managers will lose a large part of the their personal wealth if their employer goes bankrupt. Risk-averse managers may seek to mitigate this risk by acting to reduce the bankruptcy risk of the firm. Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) suggest that one way to accomplish this is to use less than the optimal amount of debt in 24 October 2013 Page 3 of 11 ProQuest

the firm's capital structure. Further, the authors argue that the greater the proportion of personal wealth that managers have tied up in the firm's common stock and firm -specific human capital the greater their incentive to minimize the use of debt in the firm's capital structure. Friend and Lang (1988) and Berger et al. (1997) tested to see if there is a relationship between managerial wealth invested in the firm and the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Friend and Lang (1988) used as their measures of managerial wealth invested in the firm the proportion of the firm's common stock owned by the firm's largest insider and the market value of the largest insider's stock holdings. They found an inverse relationship between both of these variables and the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. However, the market value of the insider's shares was found to be more strongly correlated with the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Friend and Lang (1988) also found that the presence of a blockholder, one who owned at least 10 percent of the firm's common stock, was associated with higher levels of debt financing by the firm. Berger ei al, (1997) also found that the presence of a blockholder (5 percent) is associated with higher levels of debt financing. Neither of the previous studies investigated whether the number of blockholders or the total share ownership of blockholders affects the amount of debt financing a firm employs. Berger ef al. (1997) also found that the percentage of a firm's shares owned by the CEO (chief executive officer) is directly related to the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure. This is in conflict with results reported by Friend and Lang (1988). In this study, I seek to expand on the previous research by seeking to resolve the conflict over the relationship between managerial share ownership and firm debt financing, by testing for the effect of the number of blockholders and total blockholder share ownership on the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure, and by seeking to ascertain whether there is a relationship between firm leadership structure and the amount of debt financing the firm employs. I found that both the percentage of shares owned by the CEO and other officers and directors are inversely related to the amount of debt financing a firm employs. Further, it was found that the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure is directly related to total blockholder share ownership and is inversely related to the number of blockholders a firm has. Some weak evidence was found that indicates that firm leadership structure influences the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. section I contains a discussion of the theories to be tested while section Il presents the sample selection procedures used in this study. The empirical results are contained in section III and a summary of findings is presented in section IV. Debt financing and its determinants Most firms use some debt in their capital structure. The primary reason for doing so is that the tax deductibility of interest lowers the cost of debt financing and makes debt capital the cheapest type of outside financing available to most firms. The major disadvantage of debt financing is that it increases the risk that the firm will go bankrupt if it can not service its debt. This bankruptcy risk is not particularly worrisome for an investor who holds a well diversified portfolio of investments because the bankruptcy of any one firm in their portfolio of investments will not have a large impact on their wealth. Consequently, a well diversified investor will prefer that most firms use significant amounts of debt capital in their capital structures. Amihud and Lev (1981) and Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) believe managerial insiders (officers and directors) have a somewhat different perspective since many of them have large portions of their personal wealth invested in their employers. The personal wealth a managerial insider has invested in their employer is composed largely of their employer's common stock and the firm -specific human capital they have accumulated while working for their employer. Because these items tend to represent a large proportion of an insider's total wealth, the bankruptcy of their employer would have a major impact on their personal wealth. As a result, Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) argue that managerial insiders should be much more sensitive to the bankruptcy risk debt financing induces and may be inclined to minimize this risk by using less than the optimal (shareholder wealth maximizing) amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Further, the more wealth a managerial insider has invested in their employer the greater the incentive they have to minimize the use of debt financing. 24 October 2013 Page 4 of 11 ProQuest

The shareholders problem is to make certain that managerial insiders do not succumb to their own personal financial incentives and use less than the optimal amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. In this study, the ability of two mechanisms to control this agency problem are examined. These mechanisms are share ownership by blockholders and a dual leadership structure. Shareholders of a corporation have a residual claim on the earnings and assets of the firm and therefore bear, proportional to their share ownership, the economic consequences of actions taken by the firm's managers and directors. If managerial insiders engage in opportunistic behavior, shareholders bear a pro rata share of the costs of such actions. Consequently, a shareholder's incentive to monitor insiders and make certain the firm is being properly managed is directly related to the proportion of the firm's shares that the shareholder owns. This implies that a particular type of shareholder, blockholders (those who own at least 5 percent of a firm's common stock), have a strong incentive to seek to control the opportunistic behavior of the firm's insiders. Consequently, greater blockholder share ownership in a firm should lead to greater monitoring of the firm by blockholders and result in more debt financing being used by the firm than its managerial insiders desire. Another way to ensure that managers use the optimal amount of debt in the firm's capital structure is to have the firm employ a dual leadership structure. A dual leadership structure is one in which the chair of the board of directors and the CEO positions are not held by the same person. The rationale for this was suggested first by Fama and Jensen (1983). Fama and Jensen (1983) define decision management as the right to initiate and implement new proposals for the expenditure of the firm's resources and decision control as the right to ratify and monitor those proposals. By not allowing an insider to have both decision management and decision control authority over the same proposals, a series of checks and balances are imposed that make it more difficult for managerial insiders to engage in any type of opportunistic behavior. At the highest levels, this implies that the person with the senior decision management authority (the CEO) should not be allowed to exercise the senior decision control authority as well. Since the board of directors is the highest level decision control structure in the firm, this requires that the board must not be under the control of the CEO. If the board is controlled by the CEO, "this signals the absence of separation of decision management and decision control ..." (Fama and Jensen, p. 314). Since the chairman has the greatest influence over the actions of the board, the separation of decision management and decision control is com promised when the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the firm. Thus, requiring the chair and CEO positions to be held by different people (a dual leadership structure) should more effectively control the agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and control typical in the modern corporation. Therefore, firms with a dual leadership structure should be more likely to employ the optimal amount of debt in their capital structures than firms in which the CEO is also the board chair (a unitary leadership structure). Alternately, managerial share ownership could also provide managers with an incentive to use the appropriate amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Managers who own shares of their company suffer wealth losses ( just like other shareholders) if the firm uses less than the optimal amount of debt financing. Since these wealth loses are proportional to managers' share ownership, the more shares managers own the more wealth they lose if they do not employ the optimal amount of debt financing. Therefore, the more shares managers own the greater their incentive not to engage in wealth reducing activities like suboptimal debt usage. Whether the risk reduction incentive or the wealth loss incentive is the stronger motivator of managerial behavior is an empirical question. Sample selection Because only about 15 percent of firms actually employ a dual leadership structure, any random sample selection procedure is likely to result in few dual leadership firms being included in the set of sample firms. Consequently, to ensure that an adequate number of dual leadership firms enter the set of sample firms used in this study a matched -pair sample selection procedure is employed. The firms used in this study were taken from the Business Week executive compensation studies. Each year Business Week reports the annual 24 October 2013 Page 5 of 11 ProQuest

compensation and the titles held by the two highest paid executives of approximately 350 of the largest US corporations. For each year from 1990 through 1996,1 construct a sample of firms matched by leadership structure, size, and industry classification. To be included in the sample for a given year, a firm with a dual leadership structure and a firm with a unitary leadership structure had to be found that were of approximately the same size (measured by sales) and were in the same Business Week industry grouping. Each firm was also required to have the same leadership structure and the same CEO for the sample year (year O) and the previous year (year -1). And lastly, all necessary data had to be available for both firms. Data used in this study was obtained from Business Week, Forbes, and Disclosure. This procedure yielded a sample of 142 firms, half with a dual leadership structure and half with a unitary leadership structure. Firms in the banking industry were not included in this study. Summary statistics for selected variables for the sample firms are contained in Table I. As expected, the sample firms are quite large, with mean sales (total assets) of $4.909 ($5.493) billion. The firms had moderate amounts of debt in their capital structures as indicated by their mean long -term debt divided by the book value of common stockholder's equity ratio (debt/equity) of 0.9 499 4. On average, the sample firms are also profitable, with a mean three year average return on equity (average ROE) of 17.4 percent. The sample firms' CEOs own a mean 1.32 percent of their firm's common stock and other officers and directors have a mean share ownership of 5.84 percent. Blockholders (those owning 5 percent or more of the firm's shares) own, on average, 16.8 percent of their firm's common stock. There are, on average, 1.72 blockholders per sample firm. Empirical analysis We begin the empirical analysis by ascertaining if managerial insider wealth invested in the firm is correlated with the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. Two measures of insider wealth are employed, the percentage of the firm's common stock owned by the firm's CEO and the percentage of the firm's shares owned by other officers and directors. First, the sample firms were ranked by CEO share ownership and placed into share ownership quartiles. The mean value of the debt/equity ratio was calculated for the firms in each quartile. The results of this analysis are presented in panel A of Table II. The data indicate that the mean value of the debt/equity ratio declines as the level of CEO share ownership increases. For example, the mean debt/equity ratio for firms in the first quartile (those with the lowest CEO share ownership) is 0.623 as compared to a mean of 06 .268 for firms in the fourth quartile (those with the highest CEO share ownership). The difference in the means of 0.355 is statistically significant at the 00 .0 01 level. The sample firms were then ranked by other officers and directors share owner ship, placed into share ownership quartiles, and the mean value of the debt/equity ratio was calculated for the sample firms in each quartile. The results of this sorting are contained in panel B of Table II. The data indicates that the mean value of the debt/equity ratio generally declines as other officer and director share ownership rises. For example, the mean debt/equity ratio for the firms in the first quartile (those with the lowest other officer and director share ownership) is 0.578 compared to 0.345 for firms in the fourth quartile. The difference between the means of 0.233 is significant at the 00 .0 05 level. Both of the above results support Friend and Hasbrouck's theory that debt usage and insider share ownership are inversely related.

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Next, the sample firms were ranked by blockholder share ownership and grouped into share ownership quartiles. The mean value of the debt/equity ratio was calculated for each quartile and the results of this analysis are presented in panel A of Table III. Here, the mean debt/equity ratio generally increases as blockholder share ownership rises. Specifically, the sample firms in the first quartile (those with the lowest blockholder share ownership) have a mean debt/equity ratio of 0.438 while the firms in the fourth quartile have an average debt/equity ratio of 0.788. The difference in means of -0.350 is significant at the 0.10 level. This result indicates that greater share ownership by blockholders can mitigate the ability of managerial insiders to use less than the optimal amount of debt in the firm's capital structure.

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Lastly, the ability of a firm's leadership structure to reduce the opportunistic behavior of insiders was examined. As expected, the mean debt/equity ratio of firms with a dual leadership structure ( see panel B of Table III) is higher than it is for firms with a unitary leadership structure (0.551 versus 0.438). The difference in means, however, is not statistically significant. As a further empirical test, a regression analysis was performed using the data from the sample firms. The dependent variable used in this analysis is the debt/equity ratio of the sample firms. The results of this analysis are contained in Table IV. Three control variables, total assets, sales, and average ROE, are used in the regressions. Total assets and sales were used as a size proxies. These variables are included because larger firms are thought to have better access to the credit markets and, therefore, should tend to have more debt in their capital structures than smaller firms. The three year average return on equity (average ROE), a profitability measure, is used because the more profitable a firm is the less need the firm should have for outside debt financing. To account for leadership structure differences among the sample firms, a binary variable (dual) is employed. Dual takes on a value of one if the firm has a dual leadership structure and zero otherwise. The other independent variables used are as previously defined, unless noted otherwise. The coefficients of the size proxies, total assets and sales, are positive and statistically signifi cant at the 0.01 level in both regressions. This supports the presumption that larger firms have better access to the credit markets. The coefficients of the profitability measure, average ROE, are negative (as expected) but are not significant in either regression. The next independent variable, CEO, has coefficients that are negative and statistically significant at the 00 .0 05 level or better in both regressions. The coefficients of other officers and directors are both negative and significant at the 0.05 level. These results support our previous findings that insider share ownership and debt financing are inversely related. The coefficients of blockholders are positive and significant at the 0.01 level in both regressions. This supports the contention that block holders are effective monitors of the firm's managers and directors and that they force managerial insiders to use more debt in the firm's capital structure than the insiders personally desire. The number of blockholders is also employed as an explanatory variable. We expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative because, holding blockholder share owner constant, the greater the number of blockholders the firm has the smaller the share ownership of each blockholder and the less incentive a blockholder has to monitor the firm's officers and directors. The coefficients on number of blockholders are negative and significant at the 00 .0 01 level in both regressions. As in the case of the univariate analysis, firms with a dual leadership structure are found to have higher debt/equity ratios. However, the relationship is not statistically significant.

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Conclusion Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) theorize that managerial insiders (officers and directors) have a personal incentive to cause the firm to use less than the optimal amount of debt in its capital structure. They suggest this occurs because officers and directors have a large proportion of their personal wealth invested in the firm in the form of common stock holdings and firm -specific human capital. This makes managerial insiders reluctant to use the optimal amount of debt financing for the firm because of the additional bankruptcy risk higher levels of debt engender. I test Friend and Hasbrouck's (1988) theory and find evidence that supports it. Specifically, the amount of debt in the sample firms' capital structures is found to be inversely related to the percentage of the firm's common stock held by the CEO. This result indicates that CEOs will, in some instances, put their personal interests ahead of the those of the firm's shareholders. As a consequence, shareholders and the board of directors must be vigilant in monitoring managers to make certain they perform as shareholders desire. Further, a direct relationship is found between blockholder share ownership and our sample firms' debt/equity ratio. Additionally, for any given level of blockholder share ownership, the greater the number of blockholders a firm has the less effective blockholders are in raising the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure. These results suggest that monitoring by blockholders is effective in controlling at least some agency problems and the greater the share ownership of individual blockholders the more effective a monitor the blockholder becomes. This implies that shareholders can help protect their investments in a firm by encouraging individuals, institutions, and/or corporations to invest in large blocks of common stock of the firm. Lastly, some weak evidence was found suggesting that a dual leadership structure was effective in increasing the amount of debt in a firm's capital structure. The effectiveness of a dual leadership structure in controlling the opportunistic behavior of managers is of more than academic interest as recent corporate governance scandals at several major US corporations attest. The most prominent companies involved in these governance failures include Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia Communications. In each of these instances, the managerial malfeasance occurred at a firm where the CEO was also the chairman of the board (a unitary leadership structure). The results reported in this paper suggest that the likelihood of these types of managerial malfeasances occurring 24 October 2013 Page 9 of 11 ProQuest

could be reduced if firms adopted a dual leadership structure. Recently, a blue ribbon panel organized by The Conference Board concurred. The Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, composed largely of prominent business executives and government officials, recommended that firms consider adopting a dual leadership structure as one means of preventing corporate governance breakdowns like the ones cited above. References References Amihud, Y. and Lev, B. (1981), "Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers", Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 605-17. Berger, P., Ofek, E. and Yermack, D. (1997), "Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions", Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 No. 4, pp. 1411-38. Fama, E. and Jensen, M. (1983), "Separation of ownership and control", Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 No. 2, pp. 301 -25. Friend, I. and Hasbrouck, J. (1988), "Determinants of capital structure", Research in Finance, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 1 -19. Friend, I. and Lang, L. (1988), "An empirical test of the impact of managerial self -interest on corporate capital structure", Journal of Finance, Vol. 43 No. 2, pp. 271-81. AuthorAffiliation Richard Fosberg is at William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ, Tel: (973) 720 -2434 E-mail: fosbergr@wpunj.edu Subject: Corporate governance; Leadership; Studies; Debt financing; Upper management; Location: United Kingdom, UK Classification: 9175: Western Europe; 9130: Experimental/theoretical; 2200: Managerial skills; 2110: Boards of directors; 3100: Capital & debt management Publication title: Corporate Governance Volume: 4 Issue: 1 Pages: 31+ Number of pages: 8 Publication year: 2004 Publication date: 2004 Year: 2004 Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing, Limited Place of publication: Bradford Country of publication: United Kingdom Publication subject: Business And Economics--Management ISSN: 14720701 Source type: Scholarly Journals Language of publication: English

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Document type: Feature Document feature: tables references ProQuest document ID: 205137312 Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/205137312?accountid=27544 Copyright: Copyright MCB UP Limited (MCB) 2004 Last updated: 2010-06-07 Database: ABI/INFORM Complete

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