FAMV No.

9 of 2000

IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 9 OF 2000 (CIVIL)
(ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
FROM CACV NO. 339 OF 1999)
_____________________
Between:
WONG TAK WOON

Applicant

- and SECRETARY FOR PLANNING,

ENVIRONMENT AND LANDS

Respondent

_____________________
Appeal Committee:

Mr Justice Litton PJ, Mr Justice Bokhary PJ

and Mr Justice Silke NPJ

Date of Hearing:

27 June 2000

Date of Determination:

27 June 2000

D E T E R M I NAT I O N
Mr Justice Bokhary PJ:
We will refer to the applicant as the landowner and to the
respondent as the Secretary. The Secretary is empowered by s.15 of
the Land Development Corporation Ordinance, Cap. 15, to recommend to
the Chief Executive in Council the resumption of land under the Lands
Resumption Ordinance, Cap. 124. The Secretary decided to so

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recommend such resumption of the landowners land at 19 Cross St in

Wanchai. On 6 October 1999 the landowner was informed of that
decision. And on 8 November 1999 she took out an application for leave
to apply for judicial review thereof.
On 15 November 1999, for the reasons which he gave in
writing on the following day, Cheung J refused such leave.
On 11 January 2000 the Court of Appeal (Keith JA and
Ribeiro J) handed down a judgment affirming the judges refusal of leave
to apply for judicial review. On 3 March 2000 the Court of Appeal
refused the landowner leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.
The landowner now seeks this Committees leave to appeal
to the Court of Final Appeal.
In the Court of Appeal Keith JA decided against the
landowner on one ground. Ribeiro J agreed with Keith JA on that ground
and, in addition, decided against the landowner on two other grounds.
This is how Keith JA stated the ground on which he and
Ribeiro J were agreed:
it was not arguable that, in assessing the compensation for land resumed
pursuant to a recommendation to the Chief Executive under the Land
Development Corporation Ordinance (Cap. 15), account may be taken of the
value of such property as would be built on the land under any proposed
development.

In stating the two grounds upon which he proceeded on his

own, Ribeiro J said that the first was that:
a judicial review of the offer of acquisition was precluded by the
Ordinance because it provides the intended machinery under the Lands
Resumption Ordinance for determining the value at which land should be
acquired when an offer of acquisition is unacceptable to the land owner [and]
this left no room for an application for judicial review of an offer considered

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to be too low.

Secondly, Ribeiro J said that:

it was entirely proper for the [Land Development Corporation] to be
guided by the amount of compensation achievable under the prescribed [Lands
Resumption Ordinance] machinery when deciding what would be a fair and
reasonable offer since that was the fallback position if agreement could not be
reached.

Unless the Court of Final Appeal were to take a different

view on all three of these grounds, an appeal to the Court would fail.
We see no reasonable prospect of the Court of Final Appeal taking a
different view on any of those grounds let alone all three of them.
Leave to appeal is refused.

(Henry Litton)
Permanent Judge
Applicant in person
Respondent absent

(Kemal Bokhary)
Permanent Judge

(William Silke)
Non-Permanent Judge