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J U I L L E T

THE GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS FOR FRANCE

The economic crisis undoes Frances game plan for European defense, while the new deal strengthens Germanys hand
Pierre Verluise, Director of research at IRIS, Director of the geopolitics Web site www.diploweb.com1

The shock waves of the crisis imported from the USA in 2007 2008 are rippling through the underpinnings of the economy and the balance of power. Things will never be the same again. So what are the geopolitical consequences of the economic crisis for France?2 1. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS UNDOES FRANCES GAME PLAN FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE A. Frances hidden agenda on rejoining NATOs integra ted military command A founder member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, General de Gaulles France left NATOs integrated military command structure in 1966. Since then, Paris has developed a hopefully subtle posture, with one foot in NATO and the other outside. France has for long pretended and some still do today that this singular stance has enabled the country to express, with a singular voice, its own peculiar national genius. A French officer bold enough to query it significantly imperiled his career prospects. This did not prevent NATO from surviving the end of the Cold War (1990)

and worse still from a Paris perspective expanding several times. On January 1 2007, 21 of the European Unions 27 member nations were also members of NATO. Could there be a relation of cause and effect here? During the runup to the May 2007 presidential election, the candidate Nicolas Sarkozy announced that, if elected, he would openly reexamine relations bet ween France and NATO. Hands untied by the mandate bestowed on him by universal suffrage, he was able to break the taboo and set in motion with strangely very little debate the dynamic for Frances return to NATOs integrated military command structure, effective as from April 2009. It looked very much as though the aim of Frances return to NATOs integrated military command structure was to remove an obstacle to the potential development of European defense by the European Union itself. This is a project close to Frances heart but whose development seems, till now, to have been hindered by the fact that other EU members have seen in it a desire to compete with or even destroy NATO, perceived as the unmovable cornerstone of European defense. By removing the stumbling block, Paris has hoped to see the members of the European Union take more responsibility on defense issues. Now that it has committed to normali zing its situation with NATO, Paris has now, however, had to come up with some guarantees.

(1) Doctor of Geopolitics at ParisSorbonne University, Author of numerous articles published in eight languages and a dozen books, including 20 ans aprs la chute du Mur. LEurope recompose, Paris, Choiseul, 2009. verluise@irisfrance.org (2) This is the English translation by Alan Fell of an article originally written in French and initially published in Italian in the review Limes, 3/2012, Le lezioni della crisi: Europa pi debole, Germania pi forte, pp. 107114.

B. Staying in Afghanistan: a proof of good will and the price of bloodshed Since 2001, France has been involved in operations in Afghanistan, even though consecutive governments have not been able to offer a meaningful explanation of this presence. Yet it is manifestly a political gesture, a sign of FrancoAmerican solidarity in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. French public opinion has never manifested much enthusiasm for this distant war, the motives for which remain unclear and the perspectives confused. Paris had started to cut back on the number of troops com mitted in the latter stages of Jacques Chiracs term as French President. Once elected, Nicolas Sarkozy had to offer some pledges to NATO and partially satisfy the pressing demands to supply troops. The result was that France stepped up its footprint in a theatre that it knew was tough. The number of casualties rose. The televi sion news reported each death in a politically damaging toll. The French President attended funerals on several occasions in an attempt to infuse some meaning into the price of the bloodshed. In a society that believes in zero risk, the task became difficult. The Vigipirate natio nal security plan for long contributed to keeping the risk of a terrorist response to the French deployment in Afghanistan at arms length. However, in March 2012, Mohammed Merah killed seven people, including chil dren after twice staying in AfPak training camps. Surely these seven deaths can legitimately be added to French losses in Afghanistan. On June 9 2012, these had amounted to 86.3 Whatever the case, this drama was followed by several announcements that the return of French troops from Afghanistan was being fasttracked. In the contempo rary view, the price paid was becoming too heavy for an insufficient strategic payback. Having lost dozens of its sons in the Himalayas and some of its children to Merahs bullets, can France at least reap the reward of pushing forward the agenda for European defense? C. The economic crisis is leading the EU member states to cut back defense spending, prefer NATO and neglect European defense The 21 states that are members of both the EU and NATO have for long been accused by the US of devoting

insufficient investment to defense, and are now being forced by the economic crisis to chip away at this bud get like any other. Back in July 2010, the French govern ment announced a 3.5 bn cutback to be spread over three years. This was tantamount to writing Paris into a general European movement that prompted Etienne de Durand, deputy director at the Institut franais des rela tions internationales (IFRI) to lament: The current trend is suicidal. For the coming decade this probably means the end of any form of European defense.4 By the end of 2011, France was in good company. Germany announced a fouryear plan whereby it would be reducing defense expenditure by 8.3 and slashing personnel by 40% between now and 2014. The UK is to prune its budget by 8%, laying off 40,000 people over the next four years. Italy has decided on a 10% reduc tion for the period 20112013. The Netherlands is see king to save 1 bn on defense spending. Not to mention Greece, whose economic woes are forcing it to scale down the high military expenditure related to its tense relations with Turkey. In mid2012, most observers note that European defense is grinding to a halt, while NATO continues to gain ground, each summit bringing more grist to its mill. The problems in Afghanistan are not enough to mask the obvious: the economic crisis has added to the poli tical dilemma a new parameter that will be decisive in preventing the development of European defense that Paris was banking on in exchange for its return to the NATO integrated military command structure. The second geopolitical consequence of the economic crisis is the reorganization of FrancoGerman relations. 2. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS STRENGTHENS GERMANYS HAND A. Since the end of the 1950s, France has hoped that by building Europe it could tie down Germany 1870, 19141918, 19391945: three wars with Germany left a mark on French collective memory. Witness the war memorials still to be seen in any French town or vil lage. At the end of WWII, Germany, the loser, was divi ded into four zones: Soviet, American, British and French. In 1949, the Berlin Blockade crisis spawned two

(3) Source: icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx?hndQry=France Consultation le 9 juin 2012. (4) Quoted by Nathalie GUIBERT in La diminution du budget de la dfense ouvre un dbat stratgique, Le Monde, July 3 2010. (Our translation).

nations, East and West Germany, or officially, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), respectively under Soviet and US influence. Against the backdrop of the iron cur tain a complex new dynamic appeased FrancoGerman relations, firstly in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), then in the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957), of which France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were the six founder nations. Though in the France of the 1960s memories of the war were still fresh, its president was Charles de Gaulle, the former exiled leader of Free France. This track record gave de Gaulle the historic legitimacy that was a prere quisite for stretching out a hand to West Germany with the signature, on January 22 1963, of the Elyse Treaty, strengthening FrancoGerman cooperation. So what was General de Gaulles hidden agenda in offering the Treaty of Friendship to the FRG? As far as we can gather, the founder of the 5th Republic intended Frances parti cipation in the construction of the EEC and then the Elyse Treaty as a doublebarreled geopolitical project. Everything suggests that General de Gaulle hoped to tie up, or perhaps even tie down, Germany by building a Europe that he envisioned as independent from the USA, explained the diplomat JeanMarc Boegner, a close collaborator of General de Gaulle in an interview5. The concern was deeprooted. JeanPaul Bled writes: As from the 1950s, Frances European option was dic tated by the obsession with Germany. Since the Schuman plan, the aim was to tie down Germany in a supranational structure to prevent it from developing a new policy of power.6 General de Gaulle was, however, undermined when the Bundestag added a preamble referring to close coope ration between the US and Europe, placing common defense within the compass of NATO. The preamble also opened the door to the EEC for the UK, an option to which de Gaulle was opposed. In the following decades, FrancoGerman relations became a roller coaster but happily remained pacific, and often key for the advancement of European construction. When Germany was split into two, France of course felt the pain7 but remained diplomatically wary of the Ostpolitik

that gradually gained ground in West Germany. B. In 1989, Paris attempted to prevent German unifica tion before giving up on this and many other fronts The GDRs decision to open the Berlin wall on November 9 1989 completely wrongfooted Franois Mitterrands France. From December 20 to 22 1989, the French president8 went ahead with a visit to the leaders of the GDR, declaring at an official dinner: The German Democratic Republic and France still have a lot to do together! In other words, President Mitterrands initial reaction was to try to slow down German reunification, which, in his eyes, jeopardized Frances status in Europe. On December 31 1989 he even mooted the idea of a Big Europe a European Confederation espousing the USSR that would have enabled France to oversee German reunification with the discreet collaboration of the Soviet Union. Thus France would have held on to its international role. Bonn was not impressed9, but Chancellor Helmut Kohl pressed ahead, fasttracking the negotiations that led to unification on October 3 1990. The next task was to pick up the pieces. The Treaty of Maastricht was to be the response concocted by the French and German lea ders to the upheavals in the balance of power in Western Europe brought about by German reunifica tion. The negotiations that led to the treaty and the ini tial implementation became the opportunity for Germany to settle its differences with Paris. France lost a sequence of battles, notably on the subject of the defi nition of the criteria for admission to the single currency, the location of the headquarters of the European Central Bank, the currencys name, and the choice of the BCEs first president.10 Despite all this, the public is generally unaware of the saga of discreet confrontations, and FrancoGerman relations still seem relatively balanced. It is however worth noting that hardly had he been elected than Nicolas Sarkozy saw his project for a Mediterranean Union clipped back not to say emasculated by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who made it into a Union for the Mediterranean.11

(5) Interview with the author, Paris, 1997. (Our translation.) (6) JeanPaul BLED, Une trange dfaite, le pige de Maastricht. Lettre ouverte dun gaulliste Jacques Chirac, FranoisXavier de Guibert, 1998, p. 19. (Our translation.) (7) Though we could also quote French writer Franois Mauriac: I love Germany so much that I prefer to have two of them. (Our translation.) (8) According to former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, the French ambassador in Moscow sent a wire on December 18 1989 claiming that: Gorbachev can be expected to halt the process, enabling the East German authorities to gradually turn round the situation in the GDR. Roland DUMAS, Le fil et la pelote, Plon, 1996, p. 384. (Our translation.) (9) Cf. Horst TELSCHIK, 329 Tagen, Siedler Verlag, 1994, 380 p. See also Helmut KOHL, Ich wolte Deutschlands Einheit, Propylen Verlag, 1996, 488 p. (10) Cf. Pierre VERLUISE, 20 ans aprs la chute du Mur. LEurope recompose, Choiseul, 2009, Chapter 4. (11) Cf. Pierre VERLUISE, LUnion pour la Mditerrane, quel bilan dtape ?, IRIS, Actualits europennes, n35, June 2010, 6 p.

C. Since 2008, the economic crisis has clearly put Germany in a strong position Since the start of the financial crisis, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has been at the helm. He has made many speeches, sometimes iconoclastically castigating the banks and tax havens. He has made numerous pro posals and cast himself in the role of savior of Europe; a role that should be neither ignored nor underestimated. This should not blind us to the fact that the economic crisis offers Germany the opportunity to appear on at least an equal footing with France12 and indeed to enjoy a dominant position with regard to Paris and all the other member nations. Why? Because Germany has succeeded in setting up the euro to work in its favor, developing an exportoriented economy and making the necessary reforms in good time. Berlin has room to maneuver while others are on the edge of asphyxia. As a result, Chancellor Angela Merkel can give the impres sion that she is dragging her feet, just as President Sarkozy is straining at the leash. In fact, when each sum mit comes around, Germany proves that it can control both the timing and the scope of the acceptable com promises. There is no doubt that Paris has led Berlin into agreeing to the principle of supporting Greece and set ting up a European stabilization fund. However, President Sarkozy has had to give up on Eurobonds, the transformation of the European support fund into a bank supported in turn by the ECB, and has had to write off the idea of the latter being authorized to buy back sovereign debt. Germany has successfully institutionali zed budgetary stringency in the other member nations and has made the EU responsible for overseeing this. In a word, the economic crisis enables Germany to enjoy a form of leadership over the European Union, while having no qualms about not following Paris and London into the military operation in Libya in 2011. Lastly it is worth noting that the results of the first round of the French presidential elections on April 22 2012 provide food for thought in Germany as well as elsewhere in the world. That one in three voters chose an antiEuropean protest party the Front national or the leftist Front de gauche cannot fail to have conse quences for Frances image abroad. It is true that the other candidates were, for the most part, relatively

quiet on the subject of the European Union13, limiting themselves to questioning the application of the Schengen Agreement or the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, finalized at the summit on January 30 2012. *** Thus, the economic crisis that began in 2008 has major geopolitical consequences for France: it undoes Frances game plan for European defense, while the new deal strengthens Germanys hand. It is important first to open a parenthesis here about the collateral effect of the crisis, making the rapprochement between France and the UK more complex. There is no secret about how far relations between Paris and London go back, having, through history, traversed alternating times of rivalry and cooperation. Having twice vetoed the United Kingdoms entry into the EEC because he saw the UK as a Trojan Horse for the USA, General de Gaulle resigned in 1969 and died in 1970. With the historic figure out of the picture, his successor Georges Pompidous France raised the veto and, in 1973, the UK joined the EEC, at the same time as the Irish Republic. London demonstrated its sometimes remarkable diplomatic knowhow and developed a lead of several lengths in lobbying techniques to further the development of Europe as a market at the expense of Europe as a power. The UK has often been the lynch pin of a strong relationship between the EU and NATO, in opposition to the French idea of a European defense. The SaintMalo (1998) summit is generally presented in Paris as the starting point of a European defense but this assessment is based on an optical illusion. Paris then imagined that, with backing from London, the obs tacles preventing the pursuit of the European defense goal would be removed. European defense, however, remained under the NATO umbrella. This was confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), which reinforced the links between the EU nations and NATO, now the foun dation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation. The formula, if taken literally, drives the last nail into the coffin of a European defense initia tive or of any perspectives of independent action by the EU in this sphere.

(12) The press uses the portmanteau Merkozy to refer to the special relationship between Merkel and Sarkozy. (13) Cf. Pierre VERLUISE, La France estelle en Europe ? Published on the Canadian Web site Global Brief on April 8 2012 at this address: globalbrief.ca/pierreverluise/2012/04/08/la franceestelleeneurope/

This done, London and Paris have started to bridge the divide, the result being the signature of two treaties in October 2010, one on nuclear armament. The unders tanding made sense since France and the UK are the EUs two military big hitters, both now facing budgetary constraints. Their understanding became very real in the skies of Libya when the French and British armed forces collaborated in the combats of 2011. The economic crisis and its impact on the euro have nonetheless crossed some wires between the two capi tals. Effectively, on December 8 and 9 2011, the heads of state and government of the EU all except the UK reached an agreement on the contents of the measures introduced to reinforce budgetary discipline in the euro zone, with the golden rules to be applied in every country and nearautomatic sanctions for countries whose deficit exceeded 3%. Using his veto, David Cameron, the British prime minister, sparked strong res ponse, both in the UK and across the EU, notably in France. On January 30 2012, London14 still refused to

sign the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. True, the United Kingdom is not a member of the euro zone and is beneficiary of a clause enabling it to stay outside; Paris is still unhappy. Nations dont have friends, they just have interests, as Palmerston would have had it. It remains to be seen whether Paris and London will, in the coming months, succeed in ironing out their differences and continue to develop their recent revival of understanding. The economic crisis now in full swing in France and the European Union looks to be far from over. It appears probable that the economic slowdown in 2012 will speed up events in many areas: financial, social, politi cal and geopolitical. It is still too soon to assess the impact of the election of the new French president, Franois Hollande, who took office on May 15 2012. There can be no question that he has his work cut out. n

(14) The United Kingdom was joined in rejection by the Czech Republic.