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POLITICS OF ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE IN SOUTH ASIA

By: Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
13-19 Sep 2002 The Friday Times
1. South Asia has seen asymmetrical warfare for more than a decade. The
continued presence and involvement of non-state actors in conflict, diverse
politico-strategic agendas of the two traditional rivals, India and Pakistan, and the
indecisive nature of their conventional war-fighting capabilities are some of the
factors that have led to, and would continue to make asymmetrical warfare a
possibility in the region.
2. What adds to the complexity of the situation is the presence of the United
States in the region and its obvious interest in keeping things quiet.
Consequently, while one conflict equation involves India and Pakistan, the other,
again in asymmetrical mode, involves the US in relation to any other actor that
might come to threaten US interests should a conflict spiral out of hand along the
first tier, i.e., India-Pakistan conflict.
3. Clearly, then, there are two varied though possibly inter-connected
sets of conflict equation, with one being more problematic than the other. The
comparatively easier one relates to asymmetrical warfare involving India and
Pakistan in which the conventional inferiority gap has been traditionally bridged
through low-intensity warfare and war through proxy mechanism in order to
achieve a political objective. This is not to suggest that this is a less problematic
design, but, at least, the issue is of primary importance to both states and works
within a defined framework (here is a case of, at least, some balance between
the political designs of the actors). The more difficult part is the second level, the
likely involvement of the United States to protect its own interests in the region
and the potential threat perception by the US to its interests.
4. This logic underpins the report of the American National Intelligence
Council of December 2000, which sought to project emerging threats through the
year 2015. The report speaks of a scenario in which the US forces may have to
intervene to avoid a nuclear conflict between India or Pakistan, or another one in
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which American forces might have to play a role in case of the weapons of mass
destruction landing in the hands of rogue elements. It must be noted that rogue
here does not refer to non-state actors only, but also to the use of such weapons
by possibly ideologically crazy commanders. A conventional war leading to a
nuclear conflict in South Asia is seen as jeopardizing regional peace and stability
that, in turn, would be damaging for the international environment. (This
assessment has not changed even after 9/11.)
5. This is one of the typical cases where the US might be inclined to
intervene to save the region from disaster. Clearly, this is a case of asymmetrical
political objectives where Washington is not threatened directly, but has to move
in to secure a region. From this perspective, the case is also similar to that of
Bosnia where humanitarian goals convinced military commanders to take an
action against an aggressor. Clearly, there was a disparity between the political
objectives of the US government and Milosevics forces.
6. In the other case of WMD capability falling into rogue hands, there would
be less political disparity because an ideologically motivated force could be
aiming eventually to harm the US, its interests or its forces in foreign lands. It
must be noted that after Sept 11 the US is effectively also a South Asian military
power. What is important to remember in this case is that the analysts do not
necessarily view the motivations of WMD producers as following a linear
trajectory. This means that the ultimate motivation to acquire and use such
weapons may not be directed towards an immediate local or regional threat, but
could expand in a manner as to ultimately impact US strategic interests.
7. This analysis throws up the obvious question: What guarantees there
might be that the weapons India or Pakistan seem to have built to fight each
other might not be used against America? In this respect, there is not a huge
difference between the WMD capabilities of either India or Pakistan. While the
current debate appears to be focused on Pakistan and the religious mindedness
of its military, there should be no doubt that Washington would be equally
concerned about New Delhi and its possible ambitions to develop strategic
weapons capability.
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8. It is possible that Indian policymakers, as opposed to some Indian
analysts, may not be looking at this possibility. Surely, at this juncture, Pakistan
appears to be a matter of greater concern for American asymmetrical warfare
planners who could be seriously worried about the link between ideology and the
use of WMD capability. Islamabad was not a serious concern to American
military planners a few years ago when the nation and its armed forces were still
considered as moderate. However, that perception seems to have undergone a
shift. Not only is there a greater concern on that score, there is also a sense that
ideology could have impacted the thinking of the Pakistani military. This erodes
the element of possible faith in a situation or in adopting a complacent attitude
towards a country or a region.
9. Surely, the sceptics would tend to argue that it would be difficult even for
the US military to know the exact location of all strategic sites in both India and
Pakistan. But this is exactly where the complexity of the new asymmetrical
warfare lies. Unlike the past asymmetrical wars fought in Vietnam, Korea or
Afghanistan, the new scenario building looks at eventualities where a superior
military force may be up against a technologically inferior set of actors but one
that could be possessing highly destructive weapons.
10. This is a potential threat that cannot be brushed aside with the traditional
South Asian brashness. In such cases, the main issue would not be to avoid
collateral damage in a country or a region where military operation is conducted,
but how to minimise damage to the free world. Interestingly, what links India and
Pakistan directly is the understanding that without managing India it would be
difficult to manage Pakistan.
11. Now, if one were to take a macro view of this kind of military planning, it
would become obvious that the two conflict equations mentioned above are
directly linked. Any future or further conflict between India and Pakistan would be
damaging for both states, especially in the long term. Again, there are two
perspectives on this threat. First, any prolongation of war through proxy or other
means is potentially destabilising. The pursuance of political objectives by one
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state could be in conflict with the political interests of a superior military power. A
small spark could light a fire and result in external intervention.
12. Second, the continued involvement of non-state actors that, in any case,
have become suspect due to their ideological leanings makes the WMD issue in
the region more problematic. Furthermore, the pattern of war fighting, logistics
and networking in the case of non-state actors operating in Kashmir appears too
similar to such networks in other parts of the world considered dangerous by the
US. The longer the situation continues the more destabilising it could get.
13. Possibly, the safest option for both India and Pakistan, at this stage, is to
negotiate a settlement of disputes and avoid conflict. For those that are averse to
the idea of mutual give and take on both sides of the divide, the only convincing
argument one can offer is that a continuation of bilateral conflict might push both
into a far complex and dangerous situation than has been envisaged so far.