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969 - Farrington Motion For Acquittal
969 - Farrington Motion For Acquittal
969 - Farrington Motion For Acquittal
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, Defendant Sheila Hill files this
motion for judgment of acquittal with brief in support as to the charge against her in Count 16.
INTRODUCTION
Count 16 of the Indictment charges that Sheila Hill aided and abetted Don Hill and
D’Angelo Lee in an alleged extortion scheme to take $22,500 from Bill Fisher, through Darren
Reagan (of BSEAT). The Government has not, however, presented even a theory as to exactly
how Sheila Hill aided and abetted this crime, much less any evidence to support it. The only
facts proven during its case that even involve Mrs. Hill are that she received $5,000 from Darren
Reagan, and that a BSEAT invoice was found at her apartment. This creates more questions for
the Government’s case than it answers. The Government could not possibly contend that she
received the money in order to launder it for Don Hill or D’Angelo Lee, because Hill had the
money first, when it was already in cash form (the money was part of the $10,000 he received
from Reagan at Friendship West Baptist Church). Her deposit of the cash would only serve to
document it and would have done nothing to advance any criminal scheme. Because there is no
DEFENDANT SHEILA HILL’S MOTION 1
FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ON COUNT 16 AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
DAL01:1095803.1
Case 3:07-cr-00289-M Document 969 Filed 09/02/2009 Page 2 of 8
possible explanation for how this deposit advanced the alleged criminal scheme, the only rational
one is that Sheila Hill believed the payment to be for legitimate services. The evidence—
Even if Mrs. Hill’s deposit of the money did somehow advance the scheme, it is not
nearly enough to prove “purposeful” participation in the crime, as required. Fifth Circuit case
law demonstrates that mere proof that she picked up money that happened to advance an alleged
crime, without more, is insufficient to support a conviction. The Government cannot build its
case on “inference upon inference . . . mere suspicion[,] and innuendo.” United States v.
BACKGROUND
Count 16 charges Defendants Don Hill and D’Angelo Lee with extorting $22,500 from
Bill Fisher by threats of economic harm and under color of official right, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1951. See Indict., Count 16, ¶ 2. Based on the evidence presented in the Government’s
case in chief, this refers to money that Mr. Hill received on February 22, 2005 from Darren
Reagan in the parking lot of Friendship West Baptist Church (“Friendship West”). The
indictment also charges Mrs. Hill with aiding and abetting the same offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 2. See Indict., Count 16, ¶ 3. The Government proved two facts in support
of its view that Mrs. Hill was somehow involved with the crime: a deposit by Mrs. Hill of $5,000
into the Farrington & Associates bank account, which Don Hill initially received from Reagan at
Friendship West, and that a BSEAT invoice was found at her apartment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment of acquittal should be granted if the court determines that a
rational trier of fact could not find “the essential elements of the offense to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt” based on the evidence presented in the Government’s case in chief. United
States v. Armstrong, 550 F.3d 382, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a) (“After
the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the
defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a conviction.”). A motion for judgment of acquittal “tests the sufficiency
of the evidence against [the defendant], and avoids the risk that a jury may capriciously find him
guilty though there is no legally sufficient evidence of his guilt.” 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d § 461, pp. 637-38 (West 1982). The role of the court in a
Rule 29 motion is to provide a vital check against jury irrationality and safeguard the defendant’s
rights. Id.
ARGUMENT
The evidence linking Mrs. Hill to the extortion alleged in Count 16 is simply too
attenuated to establish that she knowingly aided and abetted the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. A finding of guilt would be “based on inference upon inference,” which is legally
impermissible. Menesses, 962 F.2d at 427 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing aiding and abetting
To prove an offense under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: “(1) the defendant induced a person to part with property; (2) the
defendant acted knowingly and willfully by means of extortion; and (3) the extortionate
Stephens, 964 F.2d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212
(5th Cir. 1997). Congress’s definition of extortion draws a distinction between two different
types of extortion: those in which actual or threatened force, violence, or fear is wrongfully used
(including fear of economic harm); and those which are committed “under color of official
right.” See United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1991). In this case, the
Government has alleged both fear of economic harm and color of official right.
B. The connection between Mrs. Hill and the alleged extortion of Count 16 is too
tenuous to support a conviction for aiding and abetting.
To “aid and abet” means to assist the actual perpetrator of the crime while sharing the
perpetrator’s criminal intent. United States v. Jarmillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1995). In
order to convict Mrs. Hill of aiding and abetting the crime charged in Count 16, the jury would
have to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that (1) Mrs. Hill intentionally associated with the
alleged criminal venture; (2) purposefully participated in it as something she wished to bring
about, and (3) sought by her actions to make it succeed. United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d
308, 313 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 2001).
Taking these elements in reverse, there is absolutely no proof that Sheila Hill sought by
her “actions” to make the alleged extortion scheme “succeed.” In fact, it is unclear exactly how
her receipt of $5,000 did anything to make the scheme succeed. Don Hill already had the
$10,000 (in cash) after receiving in from Darren Reagan, so Sheila Hill’s deposit of half that
money did nothing to help. In fact, it only served to document the money and create a trail. The
Government has introduced zero evidence that the alleged perpetrators knew they were being
photographed, but even if they had known, it is unimaginable how Sheila Hill’s deposit of some
of the money would have concealed it or otherwise advanced the alleged crime. If the money
was for D’Angelo Lee, they could have given the cash to him directly. There was no need for
Mrs. Hill’s involvement. It only hindered the alleged scheme; it did not help.
Turning to the purposeful participation and association elements, Fifth Circuit law is
clear that mere presence or association with the alleged perpetrators is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for aiding and abetting, even if the defendant knows that a crime is being committed.
See United States v. Martiarena, 955 F.2d 363, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1992); United States Fifth
Circuit District Judges Association, Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) 86 (2001)
(instruction 2:06) (“Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime
is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and
abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a participant
and not merely a knowing spectator.”). In order to prove that Mrs. Hill criminally “associated”
with the venture, the Government must establish that she acted knowingly and willfully to
accomplish the crime of extortion. See Stephens, 964 F.2d at 429 (describing necessary intent
behind extortion); Garcia, 242 F.3d at 596 (holding that aider and abettor must share the
principal’s intent). The meager evidence presented by the Government’s case-in-chief does not
do this.
The Government offered no evidence during its case-in-chief regarding Mrs. Hill’s state
of mind with respect to the $5,000, a deficiency which alone dictates acquittal. The only
evidence on this issue has been offered by the defense—an FBI wire tap of a phone call that Mrs.
Hill placed to D’Angelo Lee shortly after receiving the money. In that call, she tells Lee that she
understood the money to be a payment for work. See Sheila Hill Ex. 12611-T (“[H]e mentioned
that this is the work we’re supposed to, not that we have done but that we are going to do.”).
The location of the BSEAT invoice at her apartment does nothing to affect the analysis.
There are non-criminal explanations for why this invoice would be found there, and the
Government has not disproved any of them. It would require too much conjecture and
speculation to infer from the mere location of this invoice that Sheila Hill had criminal intent:
specifically, that Sheila knew the invoice concerned alleged criminal conduct, and then sought to
assist that conduct. Agent Sherman himself testified that he was speculating on this.
In Martiarena, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment of acquittal for a woman who was
charged with aiding and abetting the willful failure to file a currency transaction report (CTR).
See Martiarena, 955 F.2d at 364. The defendant’s father, who operated a currency exchange at
the United States/Mexico border and was charged with the underlying offense, had agreed to
exchange $12,000 dollars (for undercover agents) for pesos without filing a currency transaction
report. The stated purpose of the money was to pay a bribe. Id. at 365. Although the defendant
(“Monica”) worked at the exchange for her father, and had initially telephoned her father to tell
him that the undercover agents wanted to do business with him, the Government (as here)
offered no evidence that she was either present during or aware of the alleged criminal
discussion. Id.
Pursuant to the scheme, her father had gone to Mexico to retrieve the necessary pesos
and, at Monica’s request, her boyfriend met him there to retrieve half the money so that neither
of them would have $10,000 to report to customs agents at the border. Id. When the boyfriend
arrived at the exchange, the undercover agents were waiting, and voiced concern about the
balance of pesos. Id. Monica responded by explaining that her father had divided the pesos
“half and half so they didn’t have to report it.” Id. One agent then told Monica that they wished
to avoid any documentation on the currency. The record did not indicate that she responded to
this statement. Id. When her father arrived with the balance of the pesos, he did not request the
information needed to complete the CTR, and no such report was filed. Id. at 366.
The Government charged Monica with aiding and abetting this willful failure to file a
CTR. Id. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and on a post-conviction motion, the trial court
granted a judgment of acquittal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. The court explained that
there was no evidence that “she lied about the amount involved, [had] given assurances that no
CTR would be filed, or otherwise actively aided her father’s failure.” Id. at 367. Therefore, the
Thus Sheila Hill’s mere association with the alleged offense is insufficient to support a
guilty verdict. Had the Government offered any evidence that she knowingly did something to
assist with the crime, this case would be different. But they did not. While the Government’s
case-in-chief may lead one to “suspect that [Sheila Hill] may have been aware of the conspiracy,
juries must not be allowed to convict on mere suspicion and innuendo.” Menesses, 962 F.2d at
427 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing aiding and abetting conviction on this basis). Mere suspicion and
innuendo is all we have here. The Government is not allowed to build its case on “inference
CONCLUSION
Because the Government’s case against Sheila Hill is too attenuated to allow a jury to
find her guilty beyond all reasonable doubt, she requests that the Court grant her motion for
judgment of acquittal.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE