• Event: Dr.

Walter Andersen
Type of Event: Interview
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Date: Aug. 14, 2003

Special Access Issues: Treat as TGP-sECRE'f
Additional notes: NA
Prepared by: Scott Allan
Reviewed by: Tom Dowling
Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy)
Location: 2100 K Street .
Participants - Commission: Scott Allan and Tom Dowling

Interviewee Background

Dr. Andersen has spent the last 15 years at the State Department. From 1993 to 2003, he
was chief' of INR' s South Asia Section. Prior to this, he was a special assistant to the
American Ambassador to India. He retired from State in May and is now at The School
for Advanced International Studies. [U]

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Pakistan's Role in Afghanistan

Pakistan has always sought a stable and friendly Afghanistan. An Afghanistan "left to
itself is dangerous to Pakistan" because of border disputes with Pakistan ("no Afghan
government has ever recognized the Durand Line") and previous Afghan governments
which warmed relations with India. These insecurities shaped Islamabad's Afghan policy,
which eventually led to an alignment with the Taliban. [U]

While immediate security is the primary objective, Pakistan's secondary goals for
Afghanistan relate to a possible confrontation with India. Should war with India break
out Pakistan's milit would want the securit of a friendl Afo-hanistan at their backs.
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Andersen mentioned that economics did playa role in Pakistan's policy, but it was by no
means a primary objective. Securing trade routes with Central Asia was a "positive
advantage' of a stable and friendly Afghanistan; but the ISID drove Pakistan's Afghan
policy and they were "focused on security, not economics". [U]

Ever fearful of an antagonistic Afghanistan, Pakistan, through the ism'. favored Islamic
radicals in the 1980's because they were the best fighters. Gulbuddin Hikrnetyar was the
ISID's favorite, though the ISID aided roughly a dozen groups. [tf]

The 1SID was created after Pakistan's defeat by India in 1973. It is staffed by military officers
who often serve multi-year stints in the organization before returning to formal military duty.
• As the Soviet war was coming to a close, Pakistan felt that the Mujaheddin factions
would work together, but this was not the case. Islamabad again faced a chaotic and
potentially threatening situation to its west. I

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During the civil war of the 1990's, Pakistan cast their lot with the Taliban and supported
their military campaigns. Without the Taliban's efforts to secure the country, Pakistan
faced serious problems such as increased refugee traffic, smuggling and IranianlIndian
meddling on Pakistan's western border. [UJ

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Andersen mentioned an internal USG debate over the extent of ISID members fighting in

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Afahan battles durin the 1990's.
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Afghan Arabs and UBL

Andersen said that UEL's arrival in Afghanistan was a major turning point that was
overlooked in the US. Taliban leader Mullah Omar became more radicalized in the mid
1990's, which Andersen connected to UBL's arrival and influence. UBL brought large
amounts of money and good soldiers with him, two things Mullah Omar desperately
needed. UBL also brought a "moral perspective" which appealed to Omar who was
"seeking to legitimize his role and purify society." Soon the relationship grew very
strong and Ornar refused to turn over UBL even when "he knew hell would have to be
paid" for the protection. [U]

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USG Policy Towards AfghanistanIPakistan

In the early to mid 1990' 57 Afghanistan was a low priority issue for the USG. Andersen
said that many in the government "didn't want to hear about Afghanistan", a view which
persisted until 9-11.1

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I
Andersen thinks that special interest
~g~ro~u~p~s!""'c~O!"!"u~llO~e~xe~:n~a--lls!"""p~ro~p~o~lrt~ll~o~n~al"'l~n"PIIl1~Ulllllllle""nc"""""e~on
USG Afghan policy at this time because
"Afghanistan never seized the attention of top policymakers."pr'

• After the 1998 East Africa bombings, Afghanistan and the presence of VBL received
more attention but was still not a top priority for two reasons. First, the May 1998
nuclear tests, seen as a "major sin" at State, consumed attention. Strobe Talbott
personally intervened in the area; but at regional meetings, the focus was not on
terrorism. The subsequent sanctions levied against Pakistan made them feel that the US
would never be a loyal and reliable partner. Second, the USG lacked options. To pursue
the UBL problem "we needed sticks ... but where were the sticks?" To engage this issue
we would have to involve Pakistan but we had no sticks here because of our sanctions
against a government which had warmed to the Taliban and was distrustful of an
unreliable Washington.;.s1

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During the period leading up to 9-11, Washington settled on two instruments to pursue
UBL. First, a series of demarches were issued to Pakistan, but as discussed above we had
little leverage. Many of these came from high levels of the USG, but Pakistan would
always resist saying they couldn't control the Taliban and that the Taliban would
moderate after they won the civil war. Pakistan didn't do as much as they could have
Andersen said. Second, the USG tried to engage the Taliban directly but "at the end of
the day, not much happened." Andersen indicated that economic incenti ves for Pakistan
were not used and that a "boots on the ground" military campaign would require US

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• cooperation with the Northern Alliance, which was aligned with Iran and Russia. "You
had all the bad eu 5" on their side, he said and this made it difficult for us to a roach
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er prob em WHn a formal munary campaign was that troops cou
e p ace In Afghanistan without the cooperation of Pakistan and the Central Asian
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republics. Pakistan would not concede on this issue and the republics would resist so as
not to upset Russia or China. ,.f51 .
Future Relations with Pakistan

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There are still, he mentioned, ties between certain levels of the ISID and Taliban fighters
based on old relations and a shared regional goal. Andersen mentioned that the ISID

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chief was dismissed immediately after 9-1 ~ 9/11 Classified Information

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Miscellaneous

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Had the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, US forces would have had a "horrible
time" defeating the Taliban after 9-11. The Northern Alliance was tremendously helpful
to our post 9-11 operations. ,¢

./~
AHA