Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Briefing, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Border and

Transportation Directorate, DHS. Responsive in part to DHS Briefing Requests No.3
(BCIS anti-fraud detection units) and 5 (adjudication of adjustment/change of status
applications)

Date: Thursday, July 24, 2003

Special Access Issues: [none]
Prepared by: Janice Kephart-Roberts

Team Number: 5 (Border Security)

Location: Legacy INS Headquarters, 425 Eye St., Washington, D.C.
Participants - Non-Commission: Bill Yates, Director of Operations, BCIS, DHS
(former chief INS crime squad and
director of LESC)
Karen Fitzgerald, Special Ass't to Director of
Operations, BCIS, DHS
Dan Brown, DHS point of contact for Commission

Participants - Commission: Team 5

Janice Kephart-Roberts
Betty Swope
Documents provided: none

NOTES:

Note: In italics are questions prepared by JKRprior to the briefing. Mr. Yates' answers
to the questions follow.

Topics as set out in briefing request:

• Types of adjustment of status available.
• Types of adjustments associated with known terrorists or affiliates of terrorists,
with focus on those known to be associated with terrorists, including religious
worker (nonimmigrant and immigrant), marriage, and green card holders.
• Processes in place to adjudicate adjustment of status applications.
• Ability of these processes to detector be subject to fraud.
• Anti-fraud unit investigations and the inter-agency relationships in place to pursue
investigations.
• Use of information derived from anti-fraud investigations in lookouts.

Types of change/adjustment of status:

Difference b/w change and adjustment of status.
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• "change of status" refers to status shift of a nonimmigrant to a different

nonimmigrant status. (example: B 1 tourist to F1 student).
o If come in as a B 1 visitor, for example, and have an employer who
wants to hire alien, can stay in US while employer files an H-1B
petition.
o Per-9f11: If come in as a B 1 visitor, for example, and decide want
to apply to a US school, B 1 could use an 1-539 change of status
form along with proof of legal current status to stay in US and
begin attending a certified school before the 1-20 issued and
student fully approved.
o Post 9/11: If come in as a B 1 visitor, and decide want to apply to
US school, must leave US and apply abroad using visa post and
SEVIS, etc., and return in hand to PoE with an 1-20 form.
• "adjustment of status" refers to a status shift of a nonimmigrant to
immigrant. (example: B 1 tourist to application for legal permanent
resident)
• there are numerous adjustment/change of status laws that aren't
summarized anywhere
• in certain nonimmigrant classes, can't change status

Types of adjustments associated with known terrorists or affiliates of terrorists: Any

reports or threat assessments?

"We weren't looking for terrorists pre 9/11."

Post 9/11, looked at areas of risk. No formal report, but some regulatory changes. Now
all adjudications require background checks, which has brought the adjudication process
"to its knees". Much more difficult for known persons to be eligible for an extension of
stay. "We have 800 people doing nothing but 'background' or 'national security' cases.
Backlogs not of concern now; IBIS checks required for every case."

Closest INS came to doing anti-fraud work pre-9f11 that could be associated with
terrorists was through the National Security Unit, who worked with DoS and FBI. An
anti-fraud NSU with liaison with enforcement and intel was never formally under INS.
All INS fraud work was focused in the service centers (which were indeed "remote").
Even in agency annual performance plan, there wasn't a focus on fraud. INS could never
answer basic questions for Congress, such as "what percentage of 1-1 cases are
fraudulent"? INS never could get a handle on the scope of the problem.

• religous worker (immigrant and nonimmigrant): (Source within INS tells JKR
these three statuses ~ religious, marriage, and green card holder- are the most
subject to fraud, and easily used by terrorists.) This is the worst form of fraud,
where there are substantial issues of misrepresentation. Hard to verify prior job
history and backgrounds, with religious institutions often not wanting to succumb
to immigration questions about legitimacy of clergy or workers. Very hard to get
a sense of the percentage of fraud here. However, there is ongoing criminal
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investigative interest from DoJ in these cases, via ICE. These cases are
adjudicated at remote service centers and religious workers, immigrant or non, are
not interviewed. Looking here for documentation on a bona fide religious
. institution. FBI flags institutions of interest. BCIS anti fraud unit and ICE run all
applications against the flagged institutions. Have had cases like that, but don't
know numbers. Don't know of any specific cases that involve terrorists. Any
cases of interest are referred to ICE.

• marriage: LPRs through marriages:- if obtain residence through marriage, given

LPR status for two years conditionally, and then bedcheck done, and graded C
"legitimate, process final LPR status through INS service center", graded B
"maybe fraud, maybe interview", graded A "likely fraud, must interview".

• green card holder: (ran out of time)

Processes in place to adjudicate adjustment of status applications:

Applications adjudicated in field offices, 33 district, 50 satellite. Naturalizations,

adjustment of status, removal of conditions all adjusted via field offices.

There are five remote service centers, responsible for employment applications, both
immigrant and nonimmigrant; extension of stay; arrival/departure cards; and preliminary
review of naturalization cases prior to transfer of case to field office. Service Centers do
NOT conduct interviews.

Service Centers have had significant problems sharing information and tracking cases.
Without paper, were unable to alert on potentially fraudulent cases. Systems in different
centers didn't talk to each other. Now expanding ability to share information
electronically since all cases going through IBIS. IBIS (border inspection system)
permits data mining, and already flagged a number of cases. For past 8 years, could data
mine and identify cases within a certain fraud scheme, but couldn't alert inspectors at
PoEs of schemes. Now can. In malfeasance cases, inspectors now required to run full
name and all names with full background resolution from IBIS. At filing and
adjudications, IBIS also run now. IBIS does not have an Arabic language algorithm.

Pre- 9/11: In fraud investigations, would take 10 fingerprints of suspect seeking

an adjustment and conduct a criminal check. Background info would go to CIA, FBI,
and DoS posts. Did not do an IBIS or IDENT check; would only to IBIS if the case was
referred to anti-fraud or investigative units. "We weren't looking for terrorists pre 9/11."
In 8/01, slowly started increasing IBIS checks. INS couldn't use NCIC b/c got kicked
out of the system in late 1970s b/c couldn't adhere to NCIC standards.

INS work on the 19 hijackers: In looking at 19, all were run and found in IBIS,
but no reports. Found 251 variations of names and dates of birth of 19. Ran language
algorithm and 3.2 million records in search of 19. Could not certify w/in first 24 hours of
9/11 to the Attorney General that records found were of the 19.
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Ability of tit ese processes to detect or be subject tofraud.

Immigration document-related corruption. DoJ OIG in October 2001 testified infront of

Senate Judiciary Cmte. OIG found "deficient INS business practices" in re to (1) not
safeguarding the tools to create official documents, such as paper, stamps, and ink; (2)
easy access to INS computers to change entries, or issuance of INS card or benefit; and
(3) bribery. What done to curtail fraud and bribery?

Stamps for alien registration approval and adjustment to legal permanent resident status
are easily counterfeited, as is ink used in passports as temporary evidence of alien
registration. Working with the Forensic Document Lab to develop new stamps, paper
and ink, and employer authorization, re-entry permits (using DoS machinery) and
developing a passport book not as easily counterfeited. These efforts were in the works
pre-9/l1.

GAO report Jan. 2002.

(1) Inability to coordinate immigration and benefit fraud investigations and inability
to share information, track and manage investigations agency wide.

a. Have you set forth and implemented a national strategy to coordinate

fraud investigations?

Don Crocetti is heading up brand new BCIS National Fraud Unit. Just now standing it
up. What really need in this unit is intel and investigative officers; seeking 200 new
positions for 2005, but BCIS technically not supposed to do intel, so as to not to get
outright denial from BTS, Yates is renaming positions to fulfill mission within bounds set
out by BTS.

Motto is: "the right benefit to the right person in the right amount of time, and no benefit
to the wrong person".

b. Has this work been coordinated with ICE?

Fraud assessment started pre 9111, but stopped due to 9/11, and didn't start up again until
2003. Right now, BCIS and ICE are conducting a study to assess the depth of its fraud
problem. A random sampling often different fraud types are being reviewed by BCIS
staff, who run a variety of checks of files and identifying areas where believe
misrepresentation exists. No matter what the BCIS staff finds, the files then are assessed
by BICE investigators to determine if, in fact, any fraud exists. The point is to determine
what percentage of fraud exists in certain form types:
• 539 change of status applications
• extension of stay forms
• 129, change of 1M status
• petitions for temporary workers
• petitions for permanent workers
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• relative (family) visa petitions

(2) Working-level guidance. What guidance for opening immigration benefitfraud

investigations?

No. If find a scheme will notify anti-fraud component. Many standards, but with
fraud, filing may be complete; but nonetheless fraudulent in content. Foran
adjudicator to sniff out fraud takes training and experience. Now, if need more
information, will seek it. If question arises as to potential criminality, refers case to
BICE.

(3) What guidance for information in an application that would trigger an interview?

IF BICE 'National Security Unit receives information that an individual a terrorist,

BICE goes directly to BCIS to cease and desist adjudication.

(4) GAO Report discusses pressure to adjudicate cases quickly, and thus reluctantly
asking for assistance from the investigations staff on adjudications suspected of
fraud. Please respond.

Now pressure is on to "make the right decision, not just give a stamp of approval".

Training in document fraud.

• What training is there? Who receives it? How is it updated?

FLETC and FDL both provide the training. (FLETC's anti-fraud training is designed
by FDL.) Problematic especially for asylum officers. "We at BCIS don't have a
packaged course. We train on an ad hoc basis through our intelligence office." FDL
is willing to train the trainer and recommend to Yates to hire document examiners
who can be trained by FDL.

• How does the Forensic Document Lab now being housed in ICE affect BCIS work
in document fraud?

Now that FDL also has legacy Customs workto do and is bifurcated from BCIS
because it now resides in ICE, fraud priorities are necessarily reprioritized, and non
terrorist related fraud will be more difficult to deal with.