Amig able v s Cu en ca

Facts:

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. No annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government
used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are
now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925."

March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by
the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958. A copy of said
indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the Office of the President on January 7, 1959.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways. The lower
court decided in favor of the defendant and further stated that It did not have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its
consent to be sued.

Issue:
Whether or not the state is immune from the suit charged.
Ruling:
No, the state is not immune with regards to the suit charged.
Rationale:
Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu,

…where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit without its consent.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the
due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

Judgement is set reversed and set aside.

Sant iago v s R ep ubli c

Facts:

January 1971 – plaintiff Ildefonso Santiago executed a deed of donation to the Bureau of Plant Industry with terms of the donation, to "install lighting
facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an office building and parking [lot] thereon which should have been constructed and
ready for occupancy on or before December 7, 1974.

August 9, 1976 – Plaintiff Santiago filed a petition with the Court of first instance of Zamboanga for revocation of the property donated because the
donee failed to comply with the terms and conditions aforementioned.

Respondents asked for the dismissal of the case in lieu with the principle that the state may not be sued without its consent. The court decided in favor
of the accused and dismissed the case.

Issue:
Whether or not state can claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation.

Ruling:
No, the state cannot claim immunity if it violated the conditions of a donation.

Rationale:

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Here, the alleged failure to
abide by the conditions under which a donation was given should not prove an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent likewise being
presumed.

Our decision, it must be emphasized, goes no further than to rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, is entitled to go
to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, the fundamental
postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of procedural due process, which is the negation of
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical standards,
which can only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the repository of the sovereign power.

Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside.

Torio vs F ont an illa

Facts:

Municipality of Malasiqui passed resolution number 159 to manage the 1959 town fiesta. Jose macaraeg was appointed as chairman of the committee
concerning the entertainment and construction of stage for the said event. The committee constructed two stages for the event, one for the sarzuela
and the other for cancionan, bamboo were used for the construction of both.

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal.
The troupe for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening
with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage
collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where
he died in the afternoon of the following day.
Heirs of the deceased filed a complaint against the municipality of malasiqui, municipal council and all the members thereof. Answering the complaint
defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and
the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents.
Trial court ruled that the defendants exercised diligence of a good father of a family and therefore they are not liable for damages as the undertaking
was not for profit. Appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Vicente Fontanill.

Issue:
Whether or not the municipality and its councilors are liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla.

Ruling:
The municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla, however the councilors acted as mere agents of the municipality thus are not liable.

Rationale:
We hold that of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the
municipality. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente
Fontanilia if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
“The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in
the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions
herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability
co-exist. “
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. . .
Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible. . .
When it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants
or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the
can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for
the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior
applies."
The Holy Se e v s Hon . R os ar io Jr .

Facts:
Parcel of Land was donated by the archdiocese of Manila to the Holy See for the Construction of a residence of the Pope located in the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. The said parcel of land was adjacent to the parcel of lands registered
to the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

April 17, 1988 - Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per
square meters with the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters
who were then occupying the same.
Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilo and assigned his rights over the property to Star Bright Sales Enterprises, inc and informed the
sellers of the said assignment. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property
of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private
respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter.
Private respondent counter proposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of the lots should be reduced
from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter. Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven
days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash.
Private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without
notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana.
Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent. Private respondent
demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and private respondent is willing and able to comply with
the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost
profits of not less than P30,000.000.00.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and asserts its sovereign immunity from suit but the trial court issued an order denying, among others,
petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question"

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in claiming sovereign immunity being a foreign state and on behalf of the Papal Nuncio.

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner has sovereign immunity from suit.

Rationale:
As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even
without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of
our admission in the society of nations

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis

Thi s Co ur t h as con sid er ed t he f ollowing trans ac tio ns by a forei gn st at e wi th pr iv at e pa rt ies as a ct s jure impe rii :
(1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]
(2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); (3) the change of
employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).

Thi s Co ur t h as con sid er ed t he f ollowing trans ac tio ns by a forei gn st at e wi th pr iv at e pa rt ies as a ct s jure ges tio ni s :
(1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John
Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990])
(2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).

– The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States
government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of
the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
The land in question was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property,
real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15,
1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell
the land for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use
it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Petition is granted and decision of the lower court is set aside. The Petitioner has sovereign immunity.

U.S .A v s R ui z

Facts:
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests.

The company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest
Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners stating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in
Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties

The said company filed a suit against United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the
Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy to order the latter to allow the company to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

Herein petitioner raised the question of jurisdiction for the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action
asserted in the complaint. They also filed a motion to dismiss the case.
The lower court denied the motion and issued the writ prayed by edigio de Guzman & Co., inc.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant-appellant U.S.A has immunity from suit.

Ruling:
Yes, the U.S.A has immunity from suit in the said case.

Rationale:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule
is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign
and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

Judgment of lower court is reversed and set aside.

U.S .A v s G ui nto

Facts:
Several cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not impleaded in the
complaints below but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It is now contesting the
denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding
conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
In G.R. No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, Rose Cartalla and Peter Orascion
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation,
from the testimony of Belsa Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club
customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective
bargaining agreement between the Center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. This was
effected on March 5, 1986, by Col. David C. Kimball, Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group, PACAF Clark Air Force Base. Genove's reaction was
to file Ms complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City against the individual petitioners.

In G.R. No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a
buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners herein, namely, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and Stephen F. Bostick, officers of the U.S. Air
Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information
for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac. The above-
named officers testified against him at his trial. As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a
complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

In G.R. No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the United States of America),
for injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. 9 There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused
extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest, The defendants stress that the dogs were called off and the plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center for
treatment of their wounds.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of state immunity is applicable on the said cases.

Ruling:
The answer depends on each and every case involved.

Rationale:
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes that "there can be no legal
right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends." 12 There are other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In
the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet
imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated
case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." 13
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state
for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit
must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. 14 In such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent.
The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any legitimate
claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability. That is hardly fair, at least in democratic societies, for the state is not an unfeeling tyrant unmoved
by the valid claims of its citizens. In fact, the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any circumstance. On the
contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent. 16 Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied.

The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States.
However, this is a matter of evidence. The charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that their acts are imputable
to the United States of America, which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for personal torts
in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated
October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is LIFTED.
Min uc her Vs C .A
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is an Iranian national. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the
regime of the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran
was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
May 13, 1986 – Minucher came to know Arthur Scalzo private defendant which expressed his interest in buying caviar. Selling caviar, aside from that of
Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was the business of Minucher after Khoemeni government cut his pensions.

Upon knowing that defendant was working in the US embassy in the Philippines as special agent of Drug Enforcement Administration expressed his
desire to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per
visa.

May 26, 1986 - defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig.

May 27, 1986 – defendant visited petitioner for the payment for the visa. A while later the defendant was with a few Americans and arrested petitioner
for drug trafficking.
The petitioner’s arrest as heroin trafficker was well publicized throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central
Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. The arrest of defendant was likewise on television, not
only in the Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on TV with said news.

Minucher filed a case in the RTC for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo. Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial court set the case
for pre-trial. Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. RTC denied the motion.

Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction in this court(SC) but was referred to the C.A. asking that the complaint by minucher be dismissed.
C.A. sustained diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against him. S.C reversed the decision of C.A. and ordered the
continuance of the trial and ordered the trial court to decide on the case.

RTC ruled he should still be liable for the damages although he is an agent entitled to immunity for it is committed outside his official duties. C.A.
reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of
duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.

Issue:
Whether or not whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Ruling:
Yes, Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Rationale:

Vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters,
the hands of the courts are virtually tied. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an acknowledged
diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature

The pre cep t t ha t a S tat e c an no t b e s ue d i n t he co ur ts of a f or eign s ta te is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the
person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting
in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.

under the maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The
implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself,
although it has not been formally impleaded

While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not
be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers
and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.

This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-
bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but
they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent
Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform
local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Decision of C.A. is affirmed. Defendant has immunity.

Rep ublic of I nd on esi a v s V in so n

Facts:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent
James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain
specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador
Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and
water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless
cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

Petitioners informed respondents that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration
in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance
Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000.

Respondents claim that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence respondent filed a complaint. Petitoner being the accused at that time filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be
sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic
agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity

In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity
from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement:
“Any legal action arising out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by the proper court of Makati
City, Philippines.”

Respondent’s opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private
capacities for tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.

Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. C.A. affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or a stipulation in a Maintenance Agreement can waive the state’s immunity from suit.

Ruling:
No, the stipulation in an agreement cannot be a waiver of immunity from suit.

Rationale:

Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether
or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a
business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged,
the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act
jure imperii.

Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws
of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.

Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal. It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no
such waiver in this case.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic
mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials.

It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for
the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian
Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides:

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1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State
for the purposes of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on
behalf of the sending State;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the
diplomatic agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.

Petition is granted. Decision of lower court is reversed and set aside.