Contingency (philosophy) From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia "Contingency" and "contingent" redirect here.

For other uses, see Contingency (d isambiguation). In philosophy and logic, contingency is the status of propositions that are neit her true under every possible valuation (i.e. tautologies) nor false under every possible valuation (i.e. contradictions). A contingent proposition is neither n ecessarily true nor necessarily false. Propositions that are contingent may be s o because they contain logical connectives which, along with the truth value of any of its atomic parts, determine the truth value of the proposition. This is t o say that the truth value of the proposition is contingent upon the truth value s of the sentences which comprise it. Contingent propositions depend on the fact s, whereas analytic propositions are true without regard to any facts about whic h they speak. Along with contingent propositions, there are at least three other classes of pr opositions, some of which overlap: Tautological propositions, which must be true, no matter what the circumstances are or could be (example: "It is the case that the sky is blue or it is not the case that the sky is blue."). Contradictions which must necessarily be untrue, no matter what the circumstance s are or could be (example: "It's raining and it's not raining."). Possible propositions, which are true or could have been true given certain circ umstances (examples: x + y = 4; There are only three planets; There are more tha n three planets). All necessarily true propositions, and all contingent proposit ions, are also possible propositions. Contingency and relativism in rhetoric[edit] Attempts in the past by philosophers and rhetoricians to allocate to rhetoric it s own realm have ended with attempting to contain rhetoric within the domain of contingent and relative matters. Aristotle explained in Rhetoric, "The duty of r hetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without arts or syste ms to guide us " [1] Aristotle stresses the contingent because no one deliberates on the necessary or impossible. He believed that the "unavoidable and potentiall y unmanageable presence of multiple possibilities" or the complex nature of deci sions creates and invites rhetoric.[1] Aristotle's view challenges the view of P lato, who said that rhetoric had no subject matter except for deceit, and gives rhetoric its position at the pinnacle of political debate. Contemporary scholars argue that if rhetoric is merely about the contingent, it automatically excludes that which is either necessary or impossible. The "necess ary" is that which either must be done or will inevitably be done. The "impossib le" is that which will never be done; therefore, it will not be deliberated over . For example, the United States Congress will not convene tomorrow to discuss s omething necessary, such as whether or not to hold elections, or something impos sible, such as outlawing death. Congress convenes to discuss problems, different solutions to those problems, and the consequences of each solution. This again raises the question of contingency because that which is deemed neces sary or impossible depends almost entirely on time and perspective. In United St ates history, there was a time when even a congressman who opposed slavery would conclude that its retraction would be impossible. The same held true for those who favored women's suffrage. Today in the United States, slavery has been aboli shed and women have the right to vote. In this way, although rhetoric viewed acr oss time is entirely contingent and includes a broader definition, rhetoric take n moment-by-moment is much more narrow and excludes both the necessary and the i mpossible. When faced with decisions, people will choose one option at the exclu sion of the others.[2] This inevitably produces unforeseen consequences. Because of these consequences, decision makers must deliberate and choose. Another prob

lem arises when one asks where this knowledge of what issues are "necessary" and "impossible" originates and how the knowledge can be applied to others. Rhetorician Robert L. Scott answers this problem by asserting that while rhetori c is indeed contingent and relative, it is also epistemic.[3] Thus, for Scott, w hat should be debated is a matter of rhetoric, as individuals make meaning throu gh language and determine what constitutes truth, and therefore, what is beyond question and debate. Theorist Lloyd Bitzer makes five assumptions about rhetoric in his book Rhetoric, Philosophy, and Literature: An Exploration.[4] 1. Rhetoric is a method for inquiring into and communicating about the contingen t. 2. This inquiry does not yield certain knowledge, but only opinion. 3. The proper mode of working in this realm is deliberation that relies on reaso nable judgment. 4. This deliberation and decision making is audience centered. 5. This engagement with the audience is constrained by time. The study of contingency and relativism as it pertains to rhetoric draws from po ststructuralist and postfoundationalist theory. Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish a re leading theorists in this area of study at the intersection of rhetoric and c ontingency[citation needed].