Time to Know Your State Terrorism

Falery Mustika
Tue, 01 Aug 2006 11:57:42 -0700

Weten dat het tijd is de staat Terrorisme

by John Pilger
De wereld is verdeeld in twee strijdende kampen: de islam en? Ons??. Dat is de
boodschap die zich van westerse overheden, de pers, radio en televisie. Voor
de islam moeten lezen: terroristen. Dit zijn de overblijfselen van de koude
oorlog, toen de wereld is verdeeld tussen? Red Team? en wij, en zelfs het
verdwijnen van mensen is gerechtvaardigd indien gedaan voor de verdediging.
Nu weten we, of we moeten weten, dat veel van het is gewoon een
woordspeling; officiële rapporten uitgegeven waarin wordt uitgelegd dat de
Sovjet-dreiging was gewoon voor publieke consumptie.

Elke dag weten we, zoals in de Koude Oorlog, is de spiegel een kant altijd
gepresenteerd aan ons als een reflectie op de gebeurtenissen die gebeurd.
Nieuwe bedreigingen worden altijd de nadruk op de terroristische gruweldaden
begaan, of het was in Beslan of Jakarta. Als vanuit de ene kant van de spiegel,
onze leiders maakte een grote fout, maar hun goede bedoelingen geen twijfel
bestaan. ? Idealisme? en?? fatsoen? een Tony Blair, die vaak klaagden over een
incident weergegeven in de media meer dan de werkelijke gebeurtenis
plaatsvindt. Het is als een scène in een Griekse tragedie. Hebben deelgenomen
aan het doden van 37.000 Iraakse burgers, die het nieuws dat de heer Blair is
ongerust gevoel over iets anders, niet de slachtoffers: vanaf het begin de
concurrentie met de minister van Financiën Gordon Brown maakte, totdat hij
een klacht in om verdere opwarming van de aarde had. In de wrede
gebeurtenissen in Beslan, is Blair meer te zeggen, zonder ironie of een
afwijkende mening, dat niet? Het internationale terrorisme moet worden
voortgezet?. Het is de woorden gesproken door dezelfde Mussolini snel nadat
hij gebombardeerd burgers in Abessinië.

Slechts een paar mensen die zien de ene kant van de spiegel en al die
oneerlijkheid dat zal Blair en zijn medewerkers in de uitdrukking als een oorlog
crimineel te zien, zowel letterlijk als recht. Uitdrukking Blair toonde ook het
bewijs van cynische en geen gevoel bermoralnya, maar het uitzicht dat Blair
nog maatschappelijk draagvlak, dat in mijn ervaring, deden hun politieke
bewustzijn niet verbeteren. Dit kan het Britse publiek onverschilligheid of zelfs
spelletjes en politieke belangen tussen de Blair / Brown.

Laten we eens enkele voorbeelden van hoe de wereld wordt weergegeven en

hoe de wereld zou moeten zijn. Weergegeven als de bezetting van Irak? Chaos?
in plaats van de Amerikaanse militaire incompetentie in de omgang met
islamitische strijders daar. In feite is de bezetting is een systematische en
wrede aanval op burgers door Amerikaanse militaire functionarissen dat slecht
is, het recht krijgen om te doden door superieuren in Washington. In mei heeft
de U. S. mariniers gebruikte tanks en gevechtshelikopters de aanval van de
sloppenwijken in Fallujah. Ze bekende het doden van 600 mensen, een aantal
dat veel groter is dan het totaal aantal burgers gedood door? Rebels? tijdens de
oorlog vorig jaar.

De komende Amerikaanse generaals; bloedbad was wraakactie voor de moord

van 3 Amerikaanse mariniers. Zestig jaar geleden, de deling van Duitsland, de
SS Das Reich, doodde 600 Franse burgers in Oradour-sur-Glane als wraak voor
de Duitse militaire officier penculilkan door opstandelingen. Wat een verschil
twee gebeurtenissen?

Op deze dagen, Amerikanen blijven raketten vuur in Fallujah en andere

gebieden zijn dichtbevolkt, ze doodde het hele gezin. Als het woord terrorisme
moderne toepassing is het staatsterrorisme. Engeland had een andere stijl. Er
zijn 40 gevallen bekend waarin orang2 Irak gedood in de handen van Britse
soldaten, maar slechts een soldaat is vereist. In de laatste uitgave van het
tijdschrift De Journalist, Lee Gordon, een freelance journalist, schreef? Werken
als een Engels persoon in Irak erg gevaarlijk is, met name in de zuidelijke
gebieden waar onze troepen hebben een slechte reputatie (maar niet
gerapporteerd in het land) vanwege hun wrede behandeling.? ? Dit maakt
betreft de minister van Defensie, totdat hij de familie David McBride, 17
bewogen-jarige soldaat, en vroeg hem te vertrekken toen hij weigerde om de
oorlog in Irak te sluiten. Bijna alle families van soldaten gedood in Irak heeft
zich verzet tegen de bezetting en Blair, dit alles is nog nooit eerder gebeurd.

Alleen door kennis van de staatsterrorisme dan kunnen we de terroristische

aanslagen gepleegd door groepen en personen die, hoewel keek wrede
begrijpen, maar staat in vergelijking met terrorisme is niet veel. Bovendien, de
bronnen van nieuws over hen is de deskundige ambtenaren van terrorisme
waar er geen medium voor deze bron. Zo heeft de staat Israël in staat geweest
om veel buitenstaanders ervan te overtuigen dat hij het slachtoffer is van
terrorisme, terwijl het in feite terrorisme meedogenloos en gepland om te doen
was het resultaat van vergelding door Palestijnse zelfmoordterroristen. En toch
is er vaak verzet van Israël tegen de BBC? dat is een vorm van intimidatie? BBC
verslaggevers maar nooit gemeld Israël als een terrorist: een specifieke term
die geldt voor Palestijnen opgesloten in hun eigen land. Dus geen wonder,
zoals geopenbaard in het onderzoek universiteit van Glasgow dat veel tv-
kijkers in het Verenigd Koninkrijk die geloven dat de Palestijnen zijn de
indringers en aanvallers grond.

Op 7 september, een Palestijnse zelfmoordaanslag 16 Israëli's gedood in de

stad Beersheba. Elke televisie nieuws gemeld dat de Israëlische regering
woordvoerders gebruik van deze tragedie tot de bouw van de muur apartheid
te rechtvaardigen? want de muur is belangrijk om over het geweld van de
Palestijnen te verminderen. Bijna elke nieuws markeert het einde van de
periode als een van vijf maanden? Rustig en vredig? en?? geweld verdwijnen??.
Gedurende de vijf maanden was het stil en rustig, ongeveer 400 Palestijnen
werden gedood, 71 van hen gedood. Tijdens meredanya kekesaran, meer dan
73 Palestijnen gedood anak2. Een 13-jarige jongen werd gedood door een kogel
die doorboorde zijn hart, een kind 5 jaar oud Ik schoot in haar gezicht toen in
liepen arm in arm met zijn zus die twee jaar oud was. Lichaam van Mazen
Majid, een 14-jarige, verscheurd door 18 kogels als hij en zijn familie vluchtte
bulldozer naar het huis niveau.

Geen van de gemelde incidenten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk als terrorisme. De

meeste zijn zelfs helemaal niet gemeld. En het is rustig en vredig periode,
meredanya geweld. Dd 18 mei tank2 en Israëlische helikopter vuurde een kogel
in de groep van de demonstranten, doden 8 van hen. Deze wreedheden
hebben demostrasi belang en is onderdeel van de geweldloze beweging van de
Palestijnse bevolking, die vaak wordt gezien doet vreedzaam protest met
gebed langs de apartheid muur. De opstanding van deze beweging Gandhi
ontsnapt uit het nieuws in de media.

Waarheid over Tsjetsjenië ook werd onderdrukt op een vergelijkbare manier.

Datering februari 4, 2000, Russische gevechtsvliegtuigen vielen het dorp Katyr
Yurt in Tsjetsjenië. Ze dragen? Vacuüm bom? die mengeluarakan olie en stoom
menyedut longen uit, en is verboden in de Conventies van Genève. De Russen
bombardeerden een konvooi van de overlevenden die droeg een witte vlag. Ze
vermoordde 363 mannen, vrouwen en kinderen. Dit is een klein deel van
talloze terroristische daden begaan in Tsjetsjenië, de Russische staat, waarvan
de leider Vladimir Putin, memiiliki "volledige solidariteit" van Tony Blair.

? Slechts een paar van ons? toneelschrijver Arthur Miller schrijft? die
gemakkelijk kan geloven dat de samenleving moet doen wat zinvol is. Het
verlies van gezond verstand en het land te straffen zo veel mensen onbewust
getolereerd. Dus dat het bewijs moet worden afgewezen.?

Het is tijd om te stoppen met ontkent dit feit.

Bron: http://www.antiwar.com/orig/pilger.php (17 september 2004)

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Paper no. 1654

28. 12. 2005

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO 6
LTTE EMULATES IRAQI RESISTANCE-FIGHTERS

by B.Raman

In my earlier paper of November 26,2005, on the likely scenarios involving the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the face of the repudiation by President Mahinda Rajapakse of the
commitments made by the previous Governments to work for a political solution of the Sri Lankan
Tamil problem within a federal set-up ( http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1628.html ), I had
stated as follows:

Quote What are the likely ground scenarios involving the LTTE?
SCENARIO NO.1: The LTTE pockets its pride and agrees to the new conditions (sought to be
imposed by Mr. Rajaspakse). Percentage of likelihood of the scenario---25 or even less.
SCENARIO No.2: The LTTE resumes its conventional war against the Sri Lankan army. Percentage
of likelihood---50
SCENARIO NO 3: The LTTE steps up its acts of terrorism directed against important political
targets. Sixty per cent.
SCENARIO No.4: The LTTE steps up its covert war against important strategic and economic
targets. Seventy per cent.
The future does not bode well for Sri Lanka. Unquote

2. While continuing to proclaim its adherence to the cease-fire agreement with the Government of
Sri Lanka, which will shortly be four years old, and expressing its willingness to hold talks for a
review of the cease-fire agreement with the Government under the auspices of the Norwegian
facilitators anywhere in Europe, preferably in Oslo, the LTTE has at the same time stepped up
guerilla attacks against the Sri Lankan Army and Navy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
These guerilla actions have been of a classical nature focussed on combatants and not involving
suicide terrorism, in which the LTTE specialises. They have involved tactics such as the use of
claymore mines and hand-held weapons. Since the beginning of December, about 70 persons (about
40 of them from the Army and the Navy) have been killed as a result of the guerilla actions
mounted by the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces have not so far been able to find an answer to
these guerilla actions.

3. The LTTE continues to follow its past policy of denying any responsibility for these actions.
Instead, in emulation of the PSYWAR tactics followed by the Iraqi resistance-fighters, it has been
projecting them as spontaneous acts of resistance by autonomous cells of Tamil resistance
unconnected to any central command and control, in the Tamil areas under the occupation of the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces. The responsibility for some of these actions has been claimed in the name of
an organisation calling itself "the Roaring Tamil Force" or "the Roaring People's Force". These
actions have come in the wake of intensified "search and capture" operations mounted by the Sri
Lankan Armed Forces after Mr. Rajpaksa assumed office. To pre-empt any attempt by the LTTE to
resume its "war" against the Armed Forces because of his hardline, the Armed Forces had allegedly
mounted strikes against suspected pro-LTTE Tamils living in the areas under the control of the
Government.

4. The Iraqi resistance has been directed as much against the Iraqis collaborating with the US
occupation troops as against the US troops themselves. Similarly, the resistance movement in the
Tamil areas is being projected as against the Sinhalese occupation troops as well as against the
Tamils collaborating with them, such as the Eastern Province's dissident group led by "Col".
Karuna. It has not yet been directed against the Tamil-speaking Muslims collaborating with the
Government, but there have been isolated acts of violence directed against the Muslims.

5. The LTTE, which has got a capability for terrorist strikes in Colombo, has not so far stepped up
its operations in Colombo, apparently because there could be difficulty in projecting them as
operations of autonomous Tamil resistance cells not under the LTTE's control. But, it is only a
question of time before it resorts to spectacular terrorist strikes in the capital.

6. The rigid stand taken by the Government as well as the LTTE on the question of the venue of the
proposed talks to review the ceasefire agreement has led to a deadlock. The Government, which
was initially insisting that the talks should be held in Sri Lanka, is now prepared to accept their
being held anywhere in Asia, but it continues to reject the LTTE demand for their being held in
Europe. The Government is apparently afraid that if high-profile talks were held in Europe, the
LTTE could exploit them for once again softening its image in Europe. The LTTE had come in for
considerable negative publicity in Europe after the ruthless assassination of Laxman Kadirgamar,
the former Foreign Minister, in August last. The LTTE has been strongly suspected in the
assassination, though it continues to deny responsibility for it. After the assassination, the Europen
Union (EU) Governments have taken a decision not to receive any visiting LTTE delegation in
future.

7. The principal sponsors and co-chairs of the so-called donors' conference held in Tokyo in 2003---
Japan, the US and the EU --- have taken a much stronger line against the LTTE for its recent
violations of the cease-fire agreement than in the past and conveyed their concerns in strong terms
to the LTTE. It is doubtful whether this would have any impact on the LTTE unless and until they
pressurise Mr. Rajapakse to reiterate the Government's commitment to finding a solution to the Sri
Lankan Tamil problem within a federal set-up.

8. Despite the sharp deterioration in the ground situation since Mr. Rajapakse assumed the
Presidency, he still seems to be confident that he can ultimately enforce his hard-line against the
LTTE. His apparent calculation is that since the assassination of Kadirgamar, the international
community has been disenchanted with the LTTE and, as such, his hardline is unlikely to be
opposed by the international community.

9. While strongly condemning the intensification of guerilla actions by the LTTE, India and other
members of the international community should equally strongly reiterate their support for the
formula followed by Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga, former President, and Mr. Ranil
Wickremasinghe, former Prime Minister, of seeking a solution within a federal set-up. There cannot
be a solution within the present unitary set-up. The longer Mr. Rajapakse continues on his hard-line,
the greater will be the bloodshed.

10. Since Mr. Rajapakse took over as the President, the Sri Lankan intelligence agencies and
security forces also seem to have stepped up their covert actions directed against the LTTE---not
only through the Eastern Tamil dissidents headed by Karuna, but also through Sinhalese extremist
elements which had formed part of the coalition which had supported Mr. Rajapakse during the
recent elections. The needle of suspicion for the brutal murder of Joseph Pararajasingham, a pro-
LTTE member of the Parliament, at Batticaloa in the Eastern Province on December 25,2005, while
he was attending X'Mas services in a local church, points to these elements and not to the LTTE, as
alleged by some official sources.

(The writer is former Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, and, presently,
Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com)
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Copyright South Asia Analysis Group

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duplicated for commercial purposes.

Paper no. 1962

22.09.2006

READING MUSHARRAF BETWEEN THE LINES-

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.126
By B.Raman
A careful reading of the various statements made by Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf
during his current world tour, which has taken him to Brussels, Havana for the non-aligned summit
and for his summit with the Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and to the US for the UN
General Assembly session and his summit with President George Bush indicates two careful
evolutions in his thinking.

2. The first relates to the on-going US-led war against international terrorism and Pakistan's role in
it and the second to Pakistan's stand on jihadi terrorism in Indian territory.

3. A significant change in Pakistan's perception on the US-led war against international terrorism is
discernible. When he agreed to assist the US in its military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11
terrorist strikes in the US, he did not question the US perception that both Al Qaeda and the Taliban
constituted terrorist organisations and that, therefore, the war against terrorism had to be directed
against both.

4. He has now started making a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban as it has re-
emerged since 2004. While he continues to project Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation which needs
to be combated militarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt, he has begun viewing the Neo Taliban as
an Afghan resistance movement, which should not be viewed with the same glasses as Al Qaeda
and which needs to be combated more politically than militarily.

5. He avoids giving the impression that he is trying for a reinstatement of the Neo Taliban in power
in Afghanistan. Instead, he wants that the Hamid Karzai Government should seek a political
accommodation with the Neo Taliban, which would give it a place of honour in the new Afghan
political landscape. He does not address the question as to how the Neo Taliban's advocacy of an
Islamic state based on a rule according to the Sharia can be made compatible with a modern, liberal
democratic state, which is the objective of the Karzai Government and its international backers.

6. The projection of the Neo Taliban as a resistance organisation and not a terrorist organisation
also tends to rationalise his inaction against the Neo Taliban elements operating from Pakistani
territory. He is trying to hint to the US that the obligations assumed by him in the US-led war
against terrorism in October,2001, will hereafter apply to Al Qaeda only and not to the Neo Taliban.

7. His sensational claim in a US television interview that during a meeting with Lt.Gen. Mahmood
Ahmed, the then Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was in Washington DC in
September,2001, Mr.Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened to
bomb Pakistan back to the stone age if it did not co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, is meant to convey a message to the Americans as well as his own people that the
obligations assumed by him under duress before the US started its military strikes in Afghanistan on
October 7,2001, no longer apply and needed a revision.

8. While he would continue to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda as before, his co-operation
with the US in relation to the Neo Taliban would be more political than military in order to pave the
way for an ultimate dialogue between the Neo Taliban and the Karzai Government.
9.His sensational claim is also meant to convey a message to his own people---particularly to the
Islamic political parties whose support he will need to retain power at next year's general elections
in Pakistan---- that his co-operation with the US against the Taliban in 2001 was under duress,
which could not be helped then, but which he would change now. The fact that he has openly
admitted that he acted under duress indicates his confidence in the stability of his position in
Pakistan and in its armed forces. He is confident of managing any adverse reaction in Pakistan as a
result of his admission.

10. It is unlikely that he would have made such an admission without prior consultation with his
senior military officers before embarking on his foreign tour. It was not an indvertent admission in
passing, but a calculated, pre-planned admission as a prelude to his meeting with Mr.Bush.

11. There have been reports of simmering unhappiness in Pakistan's Armed Forces ever since
Mr.Bush's visit to Islamabad in March last over three aspects of the US attitude to Pakistan. The
first is the continuing criticism in the US governmental as well as non-governmental circles over
what is perceived in the US as Pakistan's less than sincere co-operation in the war against terrorism.
The second is the US reluctance to extend to Pakistan the same kind of civilian nuclear co-operation
deal as the US has extended to India. The third is the US attempt to sell to Pakistan what is viewed
in Pakistan's GHQ as castrated F-16s to prevent their lethal use against India.

12. These are viewed in the GHQ as a failure on the part of the US to fulfill the obligations to
support Pakistan assumed by it in return for the obligations assumed by Pakistan. In Pakistan's view,
since the US has not fulfilled its part of the obligations in toto, there is no reason why Pakistan
should not have a re-look at its obligations. The General's talks in Washington DC and the
subsequent statements by him and Mr.Bush might give the impression that everything remains as
before, but it is not so.

13. There has been an interesting evolution in the General's position relating to jihadi terrorism in
Indian territory too. As I had pointed out in my articles in the past, Musharraf and the ISI make a
clear distinction between what India calls cross-border terrorism in J&K which Pakistan views as a
freedom struggle and jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Even in the past, long before
his meeting with Dr.Manmohan Singh in Havana, Gen.Musharraf and his spokespersons had no
problems in condemning jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K and in characterising it as
terrorism.

14. In fact, after the written commitment given by him to Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the then Prime
Minister, at Islamabad in January,2004, to stop the use of all Pakistani-controlled territory for acts
of terrorism directed against India, there was a significant drop in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian
territory outside J&K, which continued till July,2005. The position has been reversed since July,
2005, and over 300 innocent civilians have been killed in seven acts of jihadi terrorism since then.

15. Musharraf is now prepared to revert to the pre-July,2005 jihadi lull and co-operate with India in
the investigation of any acts which have taken place since July,2005, in return for Indian co-
operation in dealing with what the Pakistani authorities project as cross-border terrorism in
Balochistan. The Pakistani authorities have been consistently projecting the movement of the
Baloch nationalists as cross-border terrorism, with alleged Indian support and Afghan complicity.

16. He wants to project the admission of Dr.Manmohan Singh that Pakistan has also been a victim
of terrorism as applying to what has been going on in Balochistan and not to the usual Shia-Sunni
sectarian terrorism and the activities of Al Qaeda and its jihadi associates from Pakistani territory.
He feels he does not need India's co-operation against sectarian and Al Qaeda terrorism.He intends
making India's co-operation in putting down the Baloch nationalist movement a quid pro quo for his
co-operation against jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.

17. While talking of "unease among intelligence agencies" over the proposed joint anti-terrorism
co-operation mechanism agreed to during his talks with Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana, he is
reported to have said at New York on September 21,2006:"There is also certain apprehension about
India sharing intelligence on Balochistan." ("The Hindu" of September 22,2006.

18. What he apparently means is that there is misgiving in Pakistan's intelligence agencies whether
India would share intelligence on Balochistan under this joint mechanism. As officials of the two
countries sit down to discuss the nuts and bolts of the joint mechanism, Indian co-operation in
putting down the nationalist movement in Balochistan is likely to assume importance. This is a
purely indigenous movement with no external involvement and no Indian Government, which has a
clear understanding of its national interests and its genuine allies in Pakistan, should even tolerate
such an idea.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,
presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com )

Back to the top

Home | Papers | Notes | Forum | Search | Feedback | Links

Copyright © South Asia Analysis Group

All rights reserved. Permission is given to refer this on-line document for use in research papers and
articles, provided the source and the author's name are acknowledged. Copies may not be
duplicated for commercial purposes.
Paper no. 1962

22.09.2006

READING MUSHARRAF BETWEEN THE LINES-

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR: PAPER NO.126
By B.Raman
A careful reading of the various statements made by Pakistan's President Gen.Pervez Musharraf
during his current world tour, which has taken him to Brussels, Havana for the non-aligned summit
and for his summit with the Indian Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh and to the US for the UN
General Assembly session and his summit with President George Bush indicates two careful
evolutions in his thinking.
2. The first relates to the on-going US-led war against international terrorism and Pakistan's role in
it and the second to Pakistan's stand on jihadi terrorism in Indian territory.

3. A significant change in Pakistan's perception on the US-led war against international terrorism is
discernible. When he agreed to assist the US in its military action in Afghanistan after the 9/11
terrorist strikes in the US, he did not question the US perception that both Al Qaeda and the Taliban
constituted terrorist organisations and that, therefore, the war against terrorism had to be directed
against both.

4. He has now started making a distinction between Al Qaeda and the Neo Taliban as it has re-
emerged since 2004. While he continues to project Al Qaeda as a terrorist organisation which needs
to be combated militarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan belt, he has begun viewing the Neo Taliban as
an Afghan resistance movement, which should not be viewed with the same glasses as Al Qaeda
and which needs to be combated more politically than militarily.
5. He avoids giving the impression that he is trying for a reinstatement of the Neo Taliban in power
in Afghanistan. Instead, he wants that the Hamid Karzai Government should seek a political
accommodation with the Neo Taliban, which would give it a place of honour in the new Afghan
political landscape. He does not address the question as to how the Neo Taliban's advocacy of an
Islamic state based on a rule according to the Sharia can be made compatible with a modern, liberal
democratic state, which is the objective of the Karzai Government and its international backers.

6. The projection of the Neo Taliban as a resistance organisation and not a terrorist organisation
also tends to rationalise his inaction against the Neo Taliban elements operating from Pakistani
territory. He is trying to hint to the US that the obligations assumed by him in the US-led war
against terrorism in October,2001, will hereafter apply to Al Qaeda only and not to the Neo Taliban.

7. His sensational claim in a US television interview that during a meeting with Lt.Gen. Mahmood
Ahmed, the then Chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who was in Washington DC in
September,2001, Mr.Richard Armitage, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, had threatened to
bomb Pakistan back to the stone age if it did not co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, is meant to convey a message to the Americans as well as his own people that the
obligations assumed by him under duress before the US started its military strikes in Afghanistan on
October 7,2001, no longer apply and needed a revision.

8. While he would continue to co-operate with the US against Al Qaeda as before, his co-operation
with the US in relation to the Neo Taliban would be more political than military in order to pave the
way for an ultimate dialogue between the Neo Taliban and the Karzai Government.
9.His sensational claim is also meant to convey a message to his own people---particularly to the
Islamic political parties whose support he will need to retain power at next year's general elections
in Pakistan---- that his co-operation with the US against the Taliban in 2001 was under duress,
which could not be helped then, but which he would change now. The fact that he has openly
admitted that he acted under duress indicates his confidence in the stability of his position in
Pakistan and in its armed forces. He is confident of managing any adverse reaction in Pakistan as a
result of his admission.

10. It is unlikely that he would have made such an admission without prior consultation with his
senior military officers before embarking on his foreign tour. It was not an indvertent admission in
passing, but a calculated, pre-planned admission as a prelude to his meeting with Mr.Bush.

11. There have been reports of simmering unhappiness in Pakistan's Armed Forces ever since
Mr.Bush's visit to Islamabad in March last over three aspects of the US attitude to Pakistan. The
first is the continuing criticism in the US governmental as well as non-governmental circles over
what is perceived in the US as Pakistan's less than sincere co-operation in the war against terrorism.
The second is the US reluctance to extend to Pakistan the same kind of civilian nuclear co-operation
deal as the US has extended to India. The third is the US attempt to sell to Pakistan what is viewed
in Pakistan's GHQ as castrated F-16s to prevent their lethal use against India.

12. These are viewed in the GHQ as a failure on the part of the US to fulfill the obligations to
support Pakistan assumed by it in return for the obligations assumed by Pakistan. In Pakistan's view,
since the US has not fulfilled its part of the obligations in toto, there is no reason why Pakistan
should not have a re-look at its obligations. The General's talks in Washington DC and the
subsequent statements by him and Mr.Bush might give the impression that everything remains as
before, but it is not so.
13. There has been an interesting evolution in the General's position relating to jihadi terrorism in
Indian territory too. As I had pointed out in my articles in the past, Musharraf and the ISI make a
clear distinction between what India calls cross-border terrorism in J&K which Pakistan views as a
freedom struggle and jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K. Even in the past, long before
his meeting with Dr.Manmohan Singh in Havana, Gen.Musharraf and his spokespersons had no
problems in condemning jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K and in characterising it as
terrorism.

14. In fact, after the written commitment given by him to Mr.A.B.Vajpayee, the then Prime
Minister, at Islamabad in January,2004, to stop the use of all Pakistani-controlled territory for acts
of terrorism directed against India, there was a significant drop in acts of jihadi terrorism in Indian
territory outside J&K, which continued till July,2005. The position has been reversed since July,
2005, and over 300 innocent civilians have been killed in seven acts of jihadi terrorism since then.

15. Musharraf is now prepared to revert to the pre-July,2005 jihadi lull and co-operate with India in
the investigation of any acts which have taken place since July,2005, in return for Indian co-
operation in dealing with what the Pakistani authorities project as cross-border terrorism in
Balochistan. The Pakistani authorities have been consistently projecting the movement of the
Baloch nationalists as cross-border terrorism, with alleged Indian support and Afghan complicity.

16. He wants to project the admission of Dr.Manmohan Singh that Pakistan has also been a victim
of terrorism as applying to what has been going on in Balochistan and not to the usual Shia-Sunni
sectarian terrorism and the activities of Al Qaeda and its jihadi associates from Pakistani territory.
He feels he does not need India's co-operation against sectarian and Al Qaeda terrorism.He intends
making India's co-operation in putting down the Baloch nationalist movement a quid pro quo for his
co-operation against jihadi terrorism in Indian territory outside J&K.

17. While talking of "unease among intelligence agencies" over the proposed joint anti-terrorism
co-operation mechanism agreed to during his talks with Dr.Manmohan Singh at Havana, he is
reported to have said at New York on September 21,2006:"There is also certain apprehension about
India sharing intelligence on Balochistan." ("The Hindu" of September 22,2006.

18. What he apparently means is that there is misgiving in Pakistan's intelligence agencies whether
India would share intelligence on Balochistan under this joint mechanism. As officials of the two
countries sit down to discuss the nuts and bolts of the joint mechanism, Indian co-operation in
putting down the nationalist movement in Balochistan is likely to assume importance. This is a
purely indigenous movement with no external involvement and no Indian Government, which has a
clear understanding of its national interests and its genuine allies in Pakistan, should even tolerate
such an idea.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and,
presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: itschen36@gmail.com )

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