Hannah Cris A.

Echavez
LAURO G. VIZCONDE vs. CA, RTC, & RAMON G. NICOLAS G.R. No. 118449. Februar 11, 1998

gorgeous hannah
without the courtAs :nowled6e and permission.

succession

Fa!"#$ Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had 2 children, viz., Carmela and Jennifer. Estrellita, is one of the 5 children of spouses afael Nicolas and !alud Gonzales-Nicolas. "he other children of afael and !alud are #ntonio Nicolas$ amon Nicolas$ "eresita Nicolas de Leon, and icardo Nicolas, an incompetent. #ntonio predeceased his parents and is now sur%i%ed &' his widow, (enaida, and their four children. )n *a' 22, +,-,, Estrellita purchased from afael a parcel of land located at Valenzuela, .ulacan /Valenzuela propert'0 for 1+25,333.33. 4n %iew thereof, "C" No. V-555 co%erin6 the Valenzuela propert' was issued to Estrellita. )n *arch 23, +,,3, Estrellita sold the Valenzuela propert' to #melia Lim and *aria Nati%idad .alictar Chiu for 12,535,7+2.330. 4n June +,,3, Estrellita &ou6ht the 1ara8a9ue propert' usin6 a portion of the proceeds was used in &u'in6 a car while the &alance was deposited in a &an:. "he followin6 'ear, Estrellita and her two dau6hters, Carmela and Jennifer, were :illed on June 23, +,,+, an incident popularl' :nown as the ;Vizconde *assacre<. "he findin6s of the in%esti6ation conducted &' the N.4 re%eal that Estrellita died ahead of her dau6hters. #ccordin6l', Carmela, Jennifer and Lauro succeeded Estrellita and, with the su&se9uent death of Carmela and Jennifer, Lauro was left as the sole heir of his dau6hters. Ne%ertheless, Lauro entered into an ;E=tra-Judicial !ettlement of the Estate of >eceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde ?ith ?ai%er of !hares<,@ with afael and !alud, EstrellitaAs parents. "he e=traBudicial settlement pro%ided for the di%ision of the properties of Estrellita and her two dau6hters &etween Lauro and spouses afael and !alud. "he properties include &an: deposits, a car and the 1ara8a9ue propert'. "he total %alue of the deposits deductin6 the funeral and other related e=penses in the &urial of Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer, amounts to 12,333,333.33. "he settlement 6a%e 53C of the total amount of the &an: deposits of Estrellita and her dau6hters to afael, e=cept !a%in6 #ccount No. +35-+++2++-3 under the name of Jennifer which in%ol%es a to:en amount. "he other 53C was allotted to Lauro. "he 1ara8a9ue propert' and the car were also 6i%en to petitioner with afael and !alud wai%in6 all their ; claims, ri6hts, ownership and participation as heirs< in the said properties. )n +No%+,,2, afael died. "o settle afaelAs estate, "eresita instituted an intestate estate proceedin6 listin6 as heirs !alud, amon, icardo and the wife /(enaida0 and children of #ntonio. "eresita pra'ed to &e appointed !pecial #dministratri= of afaelAs estate. #dditionall', she sou6ht to &e appointed as 6uardian ad litem of !alud, now senile, and icardo, her incompetent &rother. Derein pri%ate respondent amon filed an opposition pra'in6 to &e appointed instead as !alud and icardoAs 6uardian. .arel' three wee:s passed, amon filed another opposition alle6in6, amon6 others, that Estrellita was 6i%en the Valenzuela propert' &' afael which she sold for not les than 17,333,333.33 &efore her 6ruesome murder. amon pleaded for courtAs inter%ention ;to determine the le6alit' and %alidit' of the inter%i%os distri&ution made &' deceased afael to his children,<@ Estrellita included. amon filed his own petition, entitled ;4n *atter )f "he Guardianship )f !alud G. Nicolas and icardo G. Nicolas< and a%erred that their le6itime should come from the collation of all the properties distri&uted to his children &' afael durin6 his lifetime. amon stated that herein petitioner is one of afaelAs children ;&' ri6ht of representation as the widower of deceased le6itimate dau6hter of Estrellita.<@ "C appointed amon as the Guardian of !alud and icardo while "eresita, in turn, was appointed as the !pecial #dministratri= of afaelAs estate. "he courtAs )rder did not include petitioner in the slate of afaelAs heirs. Neither was the 1ara8a9ue propert' listed in its list of properties to &e included in the estate. !u&se9uentl', the "C remo%ed amon as !alud and icardoAs 6uardian for sellin6 his wardAs propert'

>urin6 the trialE it was esta&lished that ;"he centerpoint of oppositor-applicantAs ar6ument is that spouses Vizconde were then financiall' incapa&le of ha%in6 purchased or ac9uired for a %alua&le consideration the propert' at Valenzuela from the deceased afael Nicolas. #dmittedl', the spouses Vizconde were then li%in6 with the deceased afael Nicolas in the latterAs ancestral home. 4n fact, as the ar6ument further 6oes, said spouses were dependent for support on the deceased afael Nicolas. #nd Lauro Vizconde left for the Fnited !tates in, de-facto separation, from the famil' for sometime and returned to the 1hilippines onl' after the occurrence of %iolent deaths of Estrellita and her two dau6hters. ;"o dispute the contention that the spouses Vizconde were financiall' incapa&le to &u' the propert' from the late afael Nicolas, Lauro Vizconde claims that the' ha%e &een en6a6ed in &usiness %enture such as ta=i &usiness, canteen concessions and 6arment manufacturin6. Dowe%er, no competent e%idence has &een su&mitted to indu&ita&l' support the &usiness underta:in6s ad%erted to. ;4n fine, there is no sufficient e%idence to show that the ac9uisition of the propert' from afael Nicolas was for a %alua&le consideration. ;#ccordin6l', the transfer of the propert' at Valenzuela in fa%or of Estrellita &' her father was 6ratuitous and the su&Bect propert' in 1ara8a9ue which was purchased out of the proceeds of the said transfer of propert' &' the deceased afael Nicolas in fa%or of Estrellita, is su&Bect to collation.< I##ue$ ?)N there should &e collation. %e&'$ No Ra"(o$ #rticle +37+ of the Ci%il Code spea:s of collation. 4t statesE ;Ar". 1)*1. E%er' compulsor' heir, who succeeds with other compulsor' heirs, must &rin6 into the mass of the estate an' propert' or ri6ht which he ma' ha%e recei%ed from the decedent, durin6 the lifetime of the latter, &' wa' of donation, or an' other 6ratuitous title, in order that it ma' &e computed in the determination of the le6itime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.< Co&&a"(on is the act &' %irtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who inter%ene in the di%ision of the inheritance of an ascendant &rin6 into the common mass, the propert' which the' recei%ed from him, so that the di%ision ma' &e made accordin6 to law and the will of the testator. Collation is onl' re9uired of compulsor' heirs succeedin6 with other compulsor' heirs and in%ol%es propert' or ri6hts recei%ed &' donation or 6ratuitous title durin6 the lifetime of the decedent. "he purpose for it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in ma:in6 a donation or 6ratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to 6i%e him somethin6 in ad%ance on account of his share in the estate, and that the predecessorAs will is to treat all his heirs e9uall', in the a&sence of an' e=pression to the contrar'. Collation does not impose an' lien on the propert' or the su&Bect matter of collationa&le donation. ?hat is &rou6ht to collation is not the propert' donated itself, &ut rather the %alue of such propert' at the time it was donated, the rationale &ein6 that the donation is a real alienation which con%e's ownership upon its acceptance, hence an' increase in %alue or an' deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. @ "he attendant facts herein do no ma:e a case of collation. F(r#"E "he pro&ate court erred in orderin6 the inclusion of petitioner in the intestate estate proceedin6. 1etitioner, a son-in-law of afael, is one of afaelAs compulsor' heirs. #rticle GG- of the Ci%il

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

Code is clear on this pointE ;Ar". 88+. "he followin6 are compulsor' heirsE /+0 Le6itimate children and descendants, with respect to their le6itimate parents and ascendants$

gorgeous hannah

succession

T-(r'E "he order of the pro&ate court su&Bectin6 the 1ara8a9ue propert' to collation is premature. ecords indicate that the intestate estate proceedin6s is still in its initiator' sta6e. ?e find nothin6 herein to indicate that the le6itimate of an' of afaelAs heirs has &een impaired to warrant collation. ?e thus ad%ert to our rulin6 in U'arbe .. /ura'o, 5, 1hil. ++, +2-+5, to witE ;?e are of the opinion that this contention is untena&le. 4n accordance with the pro%isions of article +325 @ of the Ci%il Code, it was the dut' of the plaintiffs to alle6e and pro%e that the donations recei%ed &' the defendants were inofficious in whole or in part and preBudiced the le6itimate or hereditar' portion to which the' are entitled. 4n the a&sence of e%idence to that effect, the collation sou6ht is untena&le for lac: of 6round or &asis therefor.< Four"-E E%en on the assumption that collation is appropriate in this case the pro&ate court, nonetheless, made a re%ersi&le error in orderin6 collation of the 1ara8a9ue propert'. ?e note that what was transferred to Estrellita, &' wa' of a deed of sale, is the Valenzuela propert'. "he 1ara8a9ue propert' which Estrellita ac9uired &' usin6 the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela propert' does not &ecome collationa&le simpl' &' reason thereof. 4ndeed collation of the 1ara8a9ue propert' has no statutor' &asis. @ "he order of the pro&ate court presupposes that the 1ara8a9ue propert' was 6ratuitousl' con%e'ed &' afael to Estrellita. ecords indicate, howe%er, that the 1ara8a9ue propert' was con%e'ed for and in consideration of 1,33,333.33, &' 1remier Domes, 4nc., to Estrellita. afael, the decedent, has no participation therein, and petitioner who inherited and is now the present owner of the 1ara8a9ue propert' is not one of afaelAs heirs. "hus, the pro&ate courtAs order of collation a6ainst petitioner is unwarranted for the o&li6ation to collate is lod6ed with Estrellita, the heir, and not to herein petitioner who does not ha%e an' interest in afaelAs estate. #s it stands, collation of the 1ara8a9ue propert' is improper for, to repeat, collation co%ers onl' properties 6ratuitousl' 6i%en &' the decedent durin6 his lifetime to his compulsor' heirs which fact does not o&tain anent the transfer of the 1ara8a9ue propert'. *oreo%er, afael, in a pu&lic instrument, %oluntaril' and willfull' wai%ed an' ;claims, ri6hts, ownership and participation as heir< in the 1ara8a9ue propert'. F(0"-$ Hinall', it is futile for the pro&ate court to ascertain whether or not the Valenzuela propert' ma' &e &rou6ht to collation. Estrellita, it should &e stressed, died ahead of afael. 4n fact, it was afael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the %alue of the Valenzuela propert'. Dence, e%en assumin6 that the Valenzuela propert' ma' &e collated collation ma' not &e allowed as the %alue of the Valenzuela propert' has lon6 &een returned to the estate of afael. "herefore, an' determination &' the pro&ate court on the matter ser%es no %alid and &indin6 purpose.

/20 4n default of the followin6, le6itimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their le6itimate children and ascendants$ /20 /50 /50 "he widow or widower$ #c:nowled6ed natural children, and natural children &' le6al fiction$ )ther ille6itimate children referred to in article 2G-.

;Compulsor' heirs mentioned in Nos. 2, 5, and 5 are not e=cluded &' those in Nos + and 2$ neither do the' e=clude one another. ;4n all cases of ille6itimate children, their filiation must &e dul' pro%ed. ;"he father or mother of ille6itimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the e=tent esta&lished &' this Code.< ?ith respect to afaelAs estate, therefore, petitioner who was not e%en shown to &e a creditor of afael is considered a third person or a stran6er. #s such, petitioner ma' not &e dra66ed into the intestate estate proceedin6. Neither ma' he &e permitted or allowed to inter%ene as he has no personalit' or interest in the said proceedin6, which petitioner correctl' ar6ued in his manifestation. @ Se!o,'E #s a rule, the pro&ate court ma' pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a propert' which ma' or ma' not &e included in the estate proceedin6s. @ !uch determination is pro%isional in character and is su&Bect to final decision in a separate action to resol%e title. @ 4n the case at &ench, howe%er, we note that the pro&ate court went &e'ond the scope of its Burisdiction when it proceeded to determine the %alidit' of the sale of the Valenzuela propert' &etween afael and Estrellita and ruled that the transfer of the su&Bect propert' &etween the concerned parties was 6ratuitous. "he interpretation of the deed and the true intent of the contractin6 parties, as well as the presence or a&sence of consideration, are matter outside the pro&ate courtAs Burisdiction. "hese issues should &e %entilated in an appropriate action. ?e reiterateE ;= = = we are of the opinion and so hold, that a court which ta:es co6nizance of testate or intestate proceedin6s has power and Burisdiction to determine whether or not the properties included therein or e=cluded therefrom &elon6 prima facie to the deceased, althou6h such a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without preBudice to the ri6ht of the interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the 9uestion &earin6 on the ownership or e=istence of the ri6ht or credit.<

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Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah
Asigned# Segundo Seangio 4ilagdaan sa harap namin

succession

D 1(e,2 Sea,2(o, 3arbara D. Sea,2(o, & V(r2(,(a D. Sea,2(o .# %o,. Re e#, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO Fa!"#$ PRs filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia opposed the petition. hey contended that! "# Dy Yieng is still $ery healthy and in full command of her faculties% &# the deceased Segundo e'ecuted a general po(er of attorney in fa$or of Virginia gi$ing her the po(er to manage and e'ercise control and super$ision o$er his business in the Philippines% )# Virginia is the most competent and *ualified to ser$e as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant% and, +# Segundo left a holographic (ill, dated September &,, "--., disinheriting one of the PRs, /lfredo Seangio, for cause. 0n $ie( of the purported holographic (ill, petitioners a$erred that in the e$ent the decedent is found to ha$e left a (ill, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the (ill. 1n /pril 2, "---, a petition for the probate of the holographic (ill of Segundo, doc3eted as SP. Proc. 4o. ---))-5, (as filed by petitioners before the R 6. hey li3e(ise reiterated that the probate proceedings should ta3e precedence o$er SP. Proc. 4o. -7-,72, because testate proceedings ta3e precedence and en8oy priority o$er intestate proceedings. he document that petitioners refer to as Segundo9s holographic (ill is *uoted, as follo(s! :asulatan sa pag;aalis ng mana antunin ng sinuman /3o si Segundo Seangio <ilipino may asa(a naninirahan sa +5.;/ <lores St., Ermita, =anila at nagtatalay ng mai(anag na pag;iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan 3o ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay 3ong ana3 na si /lfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa a3in at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan 3o at mga 3apatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis 3ong 3inasama ng loob 3o at sasabe rin ni /lfredo sa a3in na a3o nasa ibaba( gayon gunit daratin ang ara( na a3o nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibaba(. >abis 3ong i3inasama ng loob 3o ang gamit ni /lfredo ng a3in pagalan para ma3apagutang na 3uarta siya at 3anya asa(a na si =erna de los Reyes sa 6hina Bang3ing 6orporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa a3ing ng mala3ing 3ahihiya sa mga may;ari at stoc3holders ng 6hina Ban3ing. /t i3inagalit 3o pa rin ang pag3uha ni /lfredo at ng 3anyang asa(a na mga custome?r@ ng ra$el 6enter of the Philippines na pinagasi(aan 3o at ng ana3 3o si Virginia. Dito a3o nagalit din 3aya gayon ayo3o na bilanin si /lfredo ng ana3 3o at hayanan 3ong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si /lfredo at si /lfredo Seangio ay hindi 3o siya ana3 at hindi siya ma3oha mana.

4ila?g@daan 3o ngayon i3a &, ng Setyembre "--. sa longsod ng =anila sa harap ng tatlong sa3si.

Asigned# Dy Yieng Seangio Asigned# Bnang Sa3si i3ala(ang sa3si Asigned# i3atlong sa3si I##ue1$ ?)N there was a %alid disinheritance. %e&'$ Ies Ratio: he purported holographic (ill of Segundo that (as presented by petitioners (as dated, signed and (ritten by him in his o(n hand(riting. E'cept on the ground of preterition, pri$ate respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document. he document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana , unmista3ably sho(ed Segundo9s intention of e'cluding his eldest son, /lfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. 0n effect, /lfredo (as disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 NCC requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 NCC. I##ue4$ ?)N the holo6raphic will is %alid. %e&'$ Ies Ra"(o$ # holo6raphic will, as pro%ided under #rticle G+3 NCC, must &e entirel' written, dated, and si6ned &' the hand of the testator himself. 4t is su&Bect to no other form, and ma' &e made in or out of the 1hilippines, and need not &e witnessed.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

!e6undoAs document, althou6h it ma' initiall' come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holo6raphic will prescri&ed &' law. 4t is written, dated and si6ned &' the hand of !e6undo himself. #n intent to dispose mortis causa can &e clearl' deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not ma:e an affirmati%e disposition of the latterAs propert', the disinheritance of #lfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. 4n other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the propert' of the testator !e6undo in fa%or of those who would succeed in the a&sence of #lfredo. *oreo%er, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, e=pressed in the form and within the limits prescri&ed &' law, must &e reco6nized as the supreme law in succession. #ll rules of construction are desi6ned to ascertain and 6i%e effect to that intention. 4t is onl' when the intention of the testator is contrar' to law, morals, or pu&lic polic' that it cannot &e 6i%en effect. Dolo6raphic wills, therefore, &ein6 usuall' prepared &' one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should &e construed more li&erall' than the ones drawn &' an e=pert, ta:in6 into account the circumstances surroundin6 the e=ecution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 4n this re6ard, the Court is con%inced that the document, e%en if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended &' !e6undo to &e his last testamentar' act and was e=ecuted &' him in accordance with law in the form of a holo6raphic will. Fnless the will is pro&ated, the disinheritance cannot &e 6i%en effect. I##ue5$ ?)N there was pretetition . %e&'$ No Ra"(o$ ?ith re6ard to the issue on preterition, the Court &elie%es that the compulsor' heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. 4t was, in the CourtAs opinion, !e6undoAs last e=pression to &e9ueath his estate to all his compulsor' heirs, with the sole e=ception of #lfredo. #lso, !e6undo did not institute an heir to the e=clusion of his other compulsor' heirs. "he mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Vir6inia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the uni%ersal heir. Der name was included plainl' as a witness to the altercation &etween !e6undo and his son, #lfredo.1wphi1 I##ue4$ ?)N the will should &e pro&ated. %e&'$ Ies Ra"(o$ Considerin6 that the 9uestioned document is !e6undoAs holo6raphic will, and that the law fa%ors testac' o%er intestac', the pro&ate of the will cannot &e dispensed with. #rticle G2G NCC pro%ides that no will shall pass either real or personal propert' unless it is pro%ed and allowed in accordance with the ules of Court. "hus, unless the will is pro&ated, the ri6ht of a person to dispose of his propert' ma' &e rendered nu6ator'. 4n %iew of the fore6oin6, the trial court, therefore, should ha%e allowed the holo6raphic will to &e pro&ated. 4t is settled that testate proceedin6s for the settlement of the estate of the decedent ta:e precedence o%er intestate proceedin6s for the same purpose. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. 3ELLIS%s. ED6ARD A. 3ELLIS, ET AL. G.R. No. L745*+8 /u,e *, 19*+ Fa!"#$ #mos .ellis was a F! citizen who e=ecuted a will in the 1hilippines. #t the time of his death, he was domiciled in "e=as, F!#. Dis heirs were his 2 e= wi%es and se%eral le6itimate and ille6itimate children.. #pparentl', #mos .ellis e=ecuted 2 wills, one in the F!# and one in the 1hilippines. Dis ille6itimate children opposed his will and alle6ed that the' were depri%ed of their le6itimes. "e=as law does not reco6nize le6itimes while 1hilippine laws do. I##ue$ ?hich law should appl'J

Ru&(,2$ "e=as Ra"(o$ #rts +7/20 K #rt.+32, NCC, render applica&le the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentar' successions, with re6ard to 5 itemsE /a0 the order of succession$ /&0 the amount of successional ri6hts$ /e0 the intrinsic %alidit' of the pro%isions of the will$ K /d0 the capacit' to succeed. "he' pro%ide that L ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. ART. 1039. apacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. #ppellants would howe%er counter that #rt. +-, para6raph three, NCC, statin6 that L !rohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 1re%ails as the e=ception to #rt. +7/20 NCC afore-9uoted. "his is not correct. 1recisel', Con6ress deleted the phrase, ;notwithstandin6 the pro%isions of this and the ne=t precedin6 article< when the' incorporated #rt. ++ of the old Ci%il Code as #rt. +- of the new Ci%il Code, while reproducin6 without su&stantial chan6e the second para6raph of #rt. +3 of the old Ci%il Code as #rt. +7 in the new. 4t must ha%e &een their purpose to ma:e the second para6raph of #rt. +7 a specific pro%ision in itself which must &e applied in testate and intestate succession. #s further indication of this le6islati%e intent, Con6ress added a new pro%ision, under #rt. +32,, which decrees that capacit' to succeed is to &e 6o%erned &' the national law of the decedent. 0t is therefore e%ident that whate%er pu&lic polic' or 6ood customs ma' &e in%ol%ed in our !'stem of le6itimes, Con6ress has not intended to e=tend the same to the succession of forei6n nationals. Hor it has specificall' chosen to lea%e, inter alia, the amount of successional ri6hts, to the decedentAs national law. !pecific pro%isions must pre%ail o%er 6eneral ones. #ppellants would also point out that the decedent e=ecuted two wills L one to 6o%ern his "e=as estate and the other his 1hilippine estate L ar6uin6 from this that he intended 1hilippine law to 6o%ern his 1hilippine estate. #ssumin6 that such was the decedentAs intention in e=ecutin6 a separate 1hilippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in "iciano v. #rimo, 53 1hil. G7-, G-3, a pro%ision in a forei6nerAs will to the effect that his properties shall &e distri&uted in accordance with 1hilippine law and not with his national law, is ille6al and %oid, for his national law cannot &e i6nored in re6ard to those matters that #rticle +3 L now #rticle +7 L of the Ci%il Code states said national law should 6o%ern. "he parties admit that the decedent, #mos G. .ellis, was a citizen of the !tate of "e=as, F.!.#., and that under the laws of "e=as, there are no forced heirs or le6itimes. #ccordin6l', since the intrinsic %alidit' of the pro%ision of the will and the amount of successional ri6hts are to &e determined under "e=as law, the 1hilippine law on le6itimes cannot &e applied to the testac' of #mos G. .ellis. Re,.o( Do!"r(,e No" A88&(!ab&e %ere $Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-+7-5,, Januar' 2+, +,720 "his doctrine is usuall' pertinent where the decedent is a national of one countr', and a domicile of another. 4n the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was &oth a national of "e=as and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. !o that e%en assumin6 "e=as has a !o,0&(!" o0 &a9 ru&e pro%idin6 that the 'o:(!(&(ar # #"e: /&a9 o0 "-e 'o:(!(&e0 should 6o%ern, the same would not result in a reference &ac: /re,.o(0 to 1hilippine law, &ut would still refer to "e=as law. Nonetheless, if "e=as has a conflicts rule adoptin6 the #("u# "-eor /&e; re( #("ae0 callin6 for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, ren%oi would arise, since the properties here in%ol%ed are found in the 1hilippines. 4n the a&sence, howe%er, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of "e=as, it should not &e presumed different from ours. IN T%E MATTER OF T%E TESTATE ESTATE OF ED6ARD E. C%RISTENSEN %s. %ELEN C%RISTENSEN GARCIA G.R. No. L71*+49 /a,uar 51, 19*5 Fa!"#$ Edward Christensen was a F! citizen /California0 who, at the time of his death, was domiciled in the 1hilippines. De left se%eral properties to his 2 ille6itimate children, namel'E Luc' and Delen. Delen o&Bected to the pro&ate of the will &ecause she was alle6edl' depri%ed of her le6itime as an ac:nowled6ed natural child. C# law does not reco6nize le6itimes while 1hilippine laws do. #ccordin6 to C# conflict of laws rule, the domiciliar' law of the decedent should &e followed as to the disposition of his properties. ?hile under 1hilippine laws, it

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

should &e the national law of the decedent. I##ue$ ?hich law should appl'J Ru&(,2$ 1hilippine law, appl' the ren%oi doctrine Ra"(o$ "he law that 6o%erns the %alidit' of his testamentar' dispositions is defined in #rticle +7 NCC. "here is no sin6le #merican law 6o%ernin6 the %alidit' of testamentar' pro%isions in the F!, each state of the Fnion ha%in6 its own pri%ate law applica&le to its citizens onl' and in force onl' within the state. "he ;national law< indicated in #rticle +7 NCC refers to no other than the pri%ate law of the !tate of California. "he ne=t 9uestion isE ?hat is the law in California 6o%ernin6 the disposition of personal propert'J #rticle ,57 of the Ci%il Code of California, which is as followsE %f there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile. #rticle ,57 should &e applica&le, and in accordance therewith and followin6 the doctrine of the renvoi, the 9uestion of the %alidit' of the testamentar' pro%ision in 9uestion should &e referred &ac: to the law of the decedentAs domicile, which is the 1hilippines. "he national law mentioned in #rt+7 NCC is the law on conflict of laws in the C# CC, i.e., #rt ,57, which authorizes the reference or return of the 9uestion to the law of the testatorAs domicile. "he conflict of laws rule in C#, #rt,57, CC, precisel' refers &ac: the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in C#, to the law of his domicile, the 1hilippines in the case at &ar. "he court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case &ac: to C#$ such action would lea%e the issue incapa&le of determination &ecause the case will then &e li:e a foot&all, tossed &ac: and forth &etween the two states, &etween the countr' of which the decedent was a citizen and the countr' of his domicile. "he 1hilippine court must appl' its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the 9uestion has to &e decided, especiall' as the application of the internal law of C# pro%ides no le6itime for children while the 1hilippine law, #rts. GG-/50 K G,5 NCC, ma:es natural children le6all' ac:nowled6ed forced heirs of the parent reco6nizin6 them. Dence, the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of C#, is the 1hilippines, the %alidit' of the pro%isions of his will depri%in6 his ac:nowled6ed natural child, the appellant Delen, should &e 6o%erned &' the 1hilippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to #rt. ,57 CC of C#, not &' the internal law of C#. /.L.T. AGRO, INC., re8re#e,"e' b ("# Ma,a2er, /ULIAN L. TEVES, petiti ner! vs. ANTONIO 3ALANSAG a,' %ILARIA CADA1DA1, resp n"ents. G.R. No. 141884. Mar!- 11, 4))< Facts: Don Culian >. e$es ADon Culian# contracted t(o marriages, first (ith /ntonia Baena A/ntonia#, and after her death, (ith =ilagros Donio e$es A=ilagros Donio#. Don Culian had & children (ith /ntonia, namely! Cosefa e$es EscaDo ACosefa# and Emilio e$es AEmilio#. Ee had also + children (ith =ilagros Donio, namely! =aria E$elyn Donio e$es A=aria E$elyn#, Cose 6atalino Donio e$es ACose 6atalino#, =ilagros Reyes e$es A=ilagros Reyes# and Pedro Reyes e$es APedro#. he present contro$ersy in$ol$es a parcel of land co$ering nine hundred and fifty;four A-.+# s*uare meters, 3no(n as >ot 4o. 5) of the Bais 6adastre, (hich (as originally registered in the name of the con8ugal partnership of Don Culian and /ntonia under 1riginal 6ertificate of itle A16 # 4o. .&,) of the Registry of Deeds of Bais 6ity. Fhen /ntonia died, the land (as among the properties in$ol$ed in an action for partition and damages doc3eted as 6i$il 6ase 4o. )++) entitled Josefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves, Emilio B. Teves, et al. =ilagros Donio, the second (ife of Don Culian, participated as an inter$enor. hereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Comp omise Ag eement (hich embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Culian. 1n the basis of the compromise agreement and appro$ing the same, the 6<0# of 4egros 1riental, "&th Cudicial District, rendered a !ecision? dated )" Canuary "-5+. he 6<0 decision declared a tract of land 3no(n as Eacienda =edalla =ilagrosa as property o(ned in common by Don Culian and his t(o A&# children of the first marriage. he property (as to remain undi$ided during the lifetime of Don Culian. Cosefa and Emilio li3e(ise (ere gi$en other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the Gmo$ie property,H the commercial areas, and the house (here Don Culian (as li$ing. he remainder of the properties (as retained by Don Culian, including >ot 4o. 5). Paragraph ") of the Comp omise Ag eement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays do(n the effect of the e$entual death of Don Culian vis-"-vis his heirs!

+2. "hat in the e%ent of death of Julian L. "e%es, the properties hereinafter adBudicated to Josefa "e%es EscaMo and Emilio .. "e%es, /e=cludin6 the properties comprised as Dacienda *edalla *ila6rosa to6ether with all its accessories and accessions0 shall &e understood as includin6 not onl' their one-half share which the' inherited from their mother &ut also the le6itimes and other successional ri6hts which would correspond to them of the other half &elon6in6 to their father, Julian L. "e%es. 4n other words, the pr perties n # selecte" an" a"$u"icate" t %ulian &. Teves 'n t inclu"ing his share in the (acien"a Me"alla Milagr sa) shall e*clusivel+ ,e a"$u"icate" to the wife in second marria6e of Julian L. "e%es and his four minor children, namel', *ila6ros >onio "e%es, his two ac:nowled6ed natural children *ila6ros e'es "e%es and 1edro e'es "e%es and his two le6itimated children *aria E%el'n >onio "e%es and Jose Catalino >onio "e%es. 1n "5 4o$ember "-2&, Don Culian, Emilio and Cosefa e'ecuted a !ee# of Assignment of Assets $it% Assumption of &ia'ilities? in fa$or of C.>. . /gro, 0nc. Apetitioner#. >ess than a year later, Don Culian, Cosefa and Emilio also e'ecuted an instrument entitled (upplemental to t%e !ee# of Assignment of Assets $it% t%e Assumption of &ia'ilities )(upplemental !ee#* dated )" Culy "-2). his instrument (hich constitutes a supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred o(nership o$er >ot 4o. 5), among other properties, in fa$or of petitioner. 1n "+ /pril "-2+, Don Culian died intestate. 1n the strength of the (upplemental !ee# in its fa$or, petitioner sought the registration of the sub8ect lot in its name. / court, so it appeared, issued an order cancelling 16 4o. .&,) in the name of spouses Don Culian and /ntonia on "& 4o$ember "-2-, and on the same date 6 4o. ;)2. (as issued in the name of petitioner. Since then, petitioner has been paying ta'es assessed on the sub8ect lot. =ean(hile, =ilagros Donio and her children had immediately ta3en possession o$er the sub8ect lot after the e'ecution of the Comp omise Ag eement. 0n "-2+, they entered into a yearly lease agreement (ith spouses /ntonio Balansag and Eilaria 6adayday, respondents herein. 1n >ot 4o. 5), respondents temporarily established their home and constructed a lumber yard. Subse*uently, =ilagros Donio and her children e'ecuted a !ee# of E+t a,u#icial Pa tition of -eal Estate dated "7 =arch "-7,. 0n the deed of partition, >ot 4o. 5) (as allotted to =ilagros Donio and her t(o A&# children, =aria E$elyn and Cose 6atalino. Bna(are that the sub8ect lot (as already registered in the name of petitioner in "-2-, respondents bought >ot 4o. 5) from =ilagros Donio as e$idenced by the !ee# of A'solute (ale of -eal Estate dated - 4o$ember "-7). Respondents, as $endees of >ot 4o. 5), filed a complaint before the R 6 Branch +. of Bais 6ity, see3ing the declaration of nullity and cancellation of 6 4o. ;)2. in the name of petitioner and the transfer of the title to >ot 4o. 5) in their names, plus damages. he trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the interpretation of paragraph ") of the Comp omise Ag eement. 0t added that the direct ad8udication of the properties listed in the Comp omise Ag eement (as only in fa$or of Don Culian and his t(o children by the first marriage, Cosefa and Emilio. Paragraph ") ser$ed only as an amplification of the terms of the ad8udication in fa$or of Don Culian and his t(o children by the first marriage. /ccording to the trial court, the properties ad8udicated in fa$or of Cosefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother /ntonia, as (ell as their potential share in the estate of Don Culian upon the latter9s death. hus, upon Don Culian9s death, Cosefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, e'cept their proper share in the Eacienda =edalla =ilagrosa (hich (as ad8udicated in fa$or of Don Culian in theComp omise Ag eement. /s such, the properties ad8udicated in fa$or of Don Culian, e'cept Eacienda =edalla =ilagrosa, (ere free from the forced legitimary rights of Cosefa and Emilio, and Don Culian (as under no impediment to allocate the sub8ect lot, among his other properties, to =ilagros Donio and her + children. he trial court further stressed that (ith the use of the (ords Ishall be,I the ad8udication in fa$or of =ilagros Donio and her + children (as not final and operati$e, as the lot (as still sub8ect to future disposition by Don Culian during his lifetime. 0t cited paragraph "+of the Comp omise Ag eement in support of his conclusion.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

Fith >ot 4o. 5) being the con8ugal property of Don Culian and /ntonia, the trial court also declared that =ilagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto e'cept as to the con8ugal share of Don Culian, (hich they could claim only upon the death of the latter. he trial court ruled that at the time of Don Culian9s death on "+ /pril "-2+, >ot 4o. 5) (as no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on )" Culy "-2). 6onse*uently, the lot could not be a proper sub8ect of e'tra8udicial partition by =ilagros Donio and her children, and not being the o(ners they could not ha$e sold it. Ead respondents e'ercised prudence before buying the sub8ect lot by in$estigating the registration of the same (ith the Registry of Deeds, they (ould ha$e disco$ered that fi$e A.# years earlier, 16 4o. .&,) had already been cancelled and replaced by 6 4o. ;)2. in the name of petitioner

/R . ",7,. Should a person ma3e a partition of his estate by an act inte vivos, or by (ill, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not pre8udice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. 0n interpreting this pro$ision, Custice Edgardo Paras ad$anced the opinion that if the partition is made by an actinte vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the /rticle. The partition will of course be effective only after death. 0t does not necessarily re*uire the formalities of a (ill for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of ac*uiring o(nership. 4either (ill the formalities of a donation be re*uired since donation (ill not be the mode of ac*uiring the o(nership here after death% since no (ill has been made it follo(s that the mode (ill be succession Aintestate succession#. Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be gi$en to each heir.)he historical antecedent of /rticle ",7, of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode is /rticle ",.5 +, of the old 6i$il 6ode. he only change in the pro$ision is that /rticle ",7, no( permits any pe son Anot a testator, as under the old la(# to partition his estate by act inte vivos. his (as intended to abrogate the then pre$ailing doctrine that for a testator to partition his estate by an act inte vivos, he must first ma3e a (ill (ith all the formalities pro$ided by la(. +" /rticle ",.5 of the old 6i$il 6ode Ano( /rticle ",7,# authoriJes a testator to partition inte vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui gene is, which is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a conveyance of title until his death. 0t deri$es its binding force on the heirs from the respect due to the (ill of the o(ner of the property, limited only by his creditors and the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs. he partition inte vivos of the properties of Don Culian is undoubtedly $alid pursuant to /rticle ")+2. Eo(e$er, considering that it (ould become legally operati$e only upon the death of Don Culian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties ad8udicated to him under the compromise agreement (as but a mere e'pectancy. 0t (as a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future ac*uisition, the interest by its nature (as inchoate. 0t had no attribute of property, and the interest to (hich it related (as at the time none'istent and might ne$er e'ist.+) E$idently, at the time of the e'ecution of the deed of assignment co$ering >ot 4o. 5) in fa$or of petitioner, Don Culian remained the o(ner of the property since o(nership o$er the sub8ect lot (ould only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his death. hus, as the o(ner of the sub8ect lot, Don Culian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime. Eis right cannot be challenged by =ilagros Donio and her children on the ground that it had already been ad8udicated to them by $irtue of the compromise agreement. Emerging as the crucial *uestion in this case is (hether Don Culian had $alidly transferred o(nership of the sub8ect lot during his lifetime. he lo(er court ruled that he had done so through the (upplemental !ee#. he appellate court disagreed, holding that the (upplemental !ee# is not $alid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition of Don Culian9s heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of the 6ourt of /ppeals is erroneous. he contention is (ell;founded. /rticle 7.+ pro$ides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, (hether li$ing at the time of the e'ecution of the (ill or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir% but the de$ises and legacies shall be $alid insofar as they are not inofficious. =anresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, (hile mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir (ithout disinheriting him e'pressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. 0t is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. 0t consists in the silence of the testator (ith regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not gi$ing him anything in the hereditary property but (ithout e'pressly disinheriting him, e$en if

I##ue$ %e&'$

Ratio: Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be determined, ad8udicated and reser$ed prior to the death of Don Culian. he 6ourt agrees. 1ur declaration in Blas v. (antos)+ is rele$ant, (here (e defined future inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract , that a person may in the future ac*uire by succession. /rticle ")+2 of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode e'plicitly pro$ides! /R . ")+2. /ll things (hich are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the ob8ect of a contract. /ll rights (hich are not intransmissible may also be the ob8ect of contracts. No contract ma !" "nt"r"d #nto $%on &$t$r" #n'"r#tanc" "(c"%t #n ca)") "(%r"))* a$t'or#+"d ! *a,. /ll ser$ices (hich are not contrary to la(, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may li3e(ise be the ob8ect of a contract. Fell;entrenched is the rule that all things, e$en future ones, (hich are not outside the commerce of man may be the ob8ect of a contract. he e'ception is that no contract may be entered into (ith respect to future inheritance, and the e'ception to the e'ception is the partition inte vivos referred to in /rticle ",7,. <or the inheritance to be considered Ifuture,I the succession must not ha$e been opened at the time of the contract. / contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of /rticle ")+2, (here the follo(ing re*uisites concur! A"# hat the succession has not yet been opened% A&# hat the ob8ect of the contract forms part of the inheritance% and A)# hat the promissor has, (ith respect to the ob8ect, an e'pectancy of a right (hich is purely hereditary in nature. he first paragraph of /rticle ",7,, (hich pro$ides the e'ception to the e'ception and therefore aligns (ith the general rule on future things, reads!

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

he is mentioned in the (ill in the latter case. But there is no preterition (here the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there (as no total omission of a forced heir. 0n the case at bar, Don Culian did not e'ecute a (ill since (hat he resorted to (as a partition inte vivos of his properties, as e$idenced by the court appro$ed Comp omise Ag eement. hus, it is premature if not irrele$ant to spea3 of preterition prior to the death of Don Culian in the absence of a (ill depri$ing a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties (hich the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Culian upon his death. / couple of pro$isions in the Comp omise Ag eement are indicati$e of Don Culian9s desire along this line. Eence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Culian9s heirs from the second marriage, a re*uirement for preterition to e'ist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded. Despite the debun3ing of respondents9 argument on preterition, still the petition (ould ultimately rise or fall on (hether there (as a $alid transfer effected by Don Culian to petitioner. 4otably, Don Culian (as also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Cosefa, (as the treasurer thereof. here is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer (ould remo$e >ot 4o. 5) from the estate from (hich =ilagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer deed and the title (hich necessarily must ha$e emanated from it ha$e to be sub8ected to incisi$e and detailed e'amination. Fell;settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title ser$es as e$idence of an indefeasible title to the property in fa$or of the person (hose name appears therein. / certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the e'act status of the fee held by its o(ner. he certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the e$idence of title and sho(s e'actly the real interest of its o(ner. o successfully assail the 8uristic $alue of (hat a orrens title establishes, a sufficient and con$incing *uantum of e$idence on the defect of the title must be adduced to o$ercome the predisposition in la( in fa$or of a holder of a orrens title. hus, contrary to the appellate court9s ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmar3 of Don Culian instead of his signature in the (upplemental !ee# (ould not affect the $alidity of petitioner9s title for this 6ourt has ruled that a thumbmar3 is a recogniJed mode of signature. he truth, ho(e$er, is that the replacement of 16 4o. .&,) in the name of Culian by .6. . 4o. ;)2. is marred by a gra$e irregularity (hich is also an illegality, as it contra$enes the orthodo', con$entional and normal process established by la(. /nd, (orse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Fhere, as in this case, the transferee relies on a $oluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a ne( title in his name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. Koing by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since (hat (as lost is the o(ner9s copy of 16 4o. .&,), only that o(ner9s copy could be ordered replaced. hus, the Register of Deeds e'ceeded his authority in issuing not 8ust a reconstituted o(ner9s copy of the original certificate of title but a ne( transfer certificate of title in place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates, directed the issuance of a ne( transfer certificate of titleLe$en designating the $ery number of the ne( transfer certificate of title itselfLthe order (ould be patently unla(ful. / court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original of the 1.6. . (hich has not been lost, as the petition for reconstitution is premised on the loss merely of the o(ner9s duplicate of the 16 / plain reading of the pertinent pro$isions of the (upplemental !ee# discloses that the assignment is not supported by any consideration. and assignment shall become absolute upon signing. he amount of P7+,,,,.,, ad$erted to in the dispositi$e portion of the instrument does not represent

the consideration for the assignment made by Don Culian. Rather, it is a mere statement of the fair mar3et $alue of a**the nineteen A"-# properties enumerated in the instrument, of (hich >ot 4o. 5) is 8ust one, that (ere transferred by Don Culian in fa$or of petitioner. 6onse*uently, the testimony of petitioner9s accountant that the assignment is supported by consideration cannot pre$ail o$er the clear pro$ision to the contrary in the (upplemental !ee#. /rticle ")"7 466 enumerates the re*uisites of a $alid contract, namely! A"# consent of the contracting parties% A&# ob8ect certain (hich is the sub8ect matter of the contract% and A)# Cause of the obligation (hich is established. hus, /rticle ").& declares that contracts (ithout cause, or (ith unla(ful cause produce no effect (hatsoe$er. hose contracts lac3 an essential element and they are not only $oidable but $oid or ine'istent pursuant to /rticle "+,-, paragraph A&#. he absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction (hich normally should be supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Culian of all nineteen A"-# lots he still had at the time, coupled (ith the fact that the assignee is a corporation of (hich Don Culian himself (as also the President and Director, forecloses the application of the presumption of e'istence of consideration established by la(. 4either could the (upplemental !ee# $alidly operate as a donation. /rticle 2+- 466 is clear on the point, thus! /rt. 2+-. 0n order that the donation of the immo$able may be $alid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the $alue of the charges (hich the donee must satisfy. he acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not ta3e effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. 0f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. 0n (umipat, et al v. Banga, et al., this 6ourt declared that title to immo$able property does not pass from the donor to the donee by $irtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. he acceptance may be made in the $ery same instrument of donation. 0f the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Fhere the deed of donation fails to sho( the acceptance, or (here the formal notice of the acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not gi$en to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and $oid. 0n the case at bar, although the (upplemental !ee# appears in a public document, the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or e$en in a separate document is a glaring $iolation of the re*uirement. 1ne final note. <rom the substanti$e and procedural standpoints, the cardinal ob8ecti$es to (rite finis to a protracted litigation and a$oid multiplicity of suits are (orth pursuing at all times. hus, this 6ourt has ruled that appellate courts ha$e ample authority to rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or other(ise not raised in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the 8ust resolution of the pleaded issues. Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of (hich are necessary in arri$ing at a 8ust decision and complete resolution of the case, or to ser$e the interest of 8ustice or to a$oid dispensing piecemeal 8ustice.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

0n the instant case, the correct characteriJation of the (upplemental !ee#, i.e., (hether it is $alid or $oid, is unmista3ably determinati$e of the underlying contro$ersy. 0n other (ords, the issue of $alidity or nullity of the instrument (hich is at the core of the contro$ersy is inter(o$en (ith the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the trial court and the appellate court. hus, this 6ourt is also resolute in stri3ing do(n the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

died. / separate petition for the probate of his last (ill and testament (as filed. 4elson Cimena (as named e'ecutor and substituted Pedrosa in the partition proceedings. Due to disagreement of the parties on the characteriJation of the properties, the court in the partition proceedings ordered A), =arch "--,# the submission of comments, ob8ections and manifestations on the pro8ect of partition submitted by the parties. During a lull in the proceedings, the presiding 8udge also passed a(ay. 1n &+ Canuary "--" the follo(ing no(;*uestioned order (as issued by the herein respondent presiding;8udge designate (ho too3 o$er! .it% all t%ese info mations, an# consi#e ing t%e natu e of t%e action, t%e Cou t fin#s t%e su'stitution of t%e o iginal plaintiff imp ope , as t%e #efen#ant %e ein can pu sue %e claim ove t%e p ope ties 'efo e t%e intestate p ocee#ings 'eing institute#. Action fo inte vention in o #e t%at t%e ,u#gment in t%is pa ticula p ocee#ing can 'e implemente#, can 'e aise# in t%e intestate Cou t. &i/e$ise, t%e appointment of t%e eceive conflicts $it% t%at of t%e ,u#icial a#minist ato consi#e ing t%at $it% t%e filing of t%e intestate case, t%e p ope ties of t%e #ecease# plaintiff a e in custo#ia legis an# t%is Cou t losses ,u is#iction in #ete mining fu t%e t%e #ist i'ution of t%e p ope ties. I##ue$ ?hat is the remed' of LedesmaJ %e&'$ Ratio: he case of Maca#ang#ang vs. Cou t of Appeals, (here a similar issue (as in$ol$ed L the husband ha$ing died after the legal separation of the spouses had been finally decreed but before the actual li*uidation of their community of properties L is on point. he 6ourt therein said! FE do not find merit in petitionerMs submission that the *uestioned decision had not become final and e'ecutory since the la( e'plicitly and clearly pro$ides for the dissolution and li*uidation of the con8ugal partnership of gains or the absolute community of property as among the effects of the final decree of legal separation. /rticle ",5 of the 6i$il 6ode thus reads! /rt. ",5. he decree of legal separation shall ha$e the follo(ing effects! "# he spouses shall be entitled to li$e separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be se$ered% &# he con8ugal partnership of gains or the absolute con8ugal community of property shall be dissol$ed and li*uidated, but the offending spouse shall ha$e no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, (ithout pre8udice to the pro$isions of /rticle "25 he afore*uoted pro$ision mandates the dissolution and li*uidation of the property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution and li*uidation are necessary conse*uences of the final decree. his legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or automatically follo(s, as an ine$itable incident of, the 8udgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the con8ugal assets. the decision of the trial court dated Canuary +, "-2) decreeing the legal separation bet(een then spouses /ntonio =acadangdang and <ilomena Ka$iana =acadangdang had long become final and e'ecutory and the di$ision of the con8ugal property in a Isupplemental decisionI is a mere incident of the decree of legal separation.

Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL April 29, 9!" G.R. No. L#!$2%

Fa!"#$ "he will was si6ned &' the testator and was attested &' three instrumental witnesses, not onl' at the &ottom, &ut also on the left-hand mar6in. "he witnesses testified not onl' that the will was si6ned &' the testator in their presence and in the presence of each other &ut also that when the' did so, the attestation clause was alread' written thereon. "heir testimon' has not &een contradicted. "he onl' o&Bection set up &' the oppositors to the %alidit' of the will is the fact that the si6natures of the instrumental witnesses do not appear immediatel' after the attestation clause. I##ue$ ?)N the will should &e admitted to pro&ate. %e&'$ Ies Ra"(o$ "his o&Bection is too technical to &e entertained. 4n the case of A,angan vs. A,angan, /53 1hil. 5-70, this court said that when the testamentar' dispositions ;are wholl' written on onl' one sheet si6ned at the &ottom &' the testator and three witnesses /as the instant case0,their si6natures on the left mar6in of said sheet would &e completel' purposeless.< 4n such a case, the court said, the re9uirement of the si6natures on the left hand mar6in was not necessar' &ecause the purpose of the law N which is to a%oid the su&stitution of an' of the sheets of the will, there&' chan6in6 the testatorAs dispositions N has alread' &een accomplished. ?e ma' sa' the same thin6 in connection with the will under consideration &ecause while the three instrumental witnesses did not si6n immediatel' &' the maBorit' that it ma' ha%e &een onl' added on a su&se9uent occasion and not at the uncontradicted testimon' of said witnesses to the effect that such attestation clause was alread' written in the will when the same was si6ned. "he followin6 o&ser%ation made &' this court in the A,angan case is %er' fittin6E "he o&Bect of the solemnities surroundin6 the e=ecution of wills is to close the door a6ainst &ad faith and fraud to a%oid su&stitution of wills and testaments and to 6uarant' their truth and authenticit'. "herefore the laws on this su&Bect should &e interpreted in such a wa' as to attain these primordial ends. .ut, on the other hand, also one must not lose si6ht of the fact that it i not the o&Bect of the law to restrain and curtail the e=ercise of the ri6ht to ma:e a will. !o when an interpretation alread' 6i%en assures such ends, an' other interpretation alread' 6i%en assures such ends, an' other interpretation whatsoe%er, that adds nothin6 &ut demands more re9uisites entirel' unnecessar' useless and frustrati%e of the testatorAs last will, must &e disre6arded. ?e should not also o%erloo: the li&eral trend of the NCC in the matter of interpretation of wills, the purpose of which, in case of dou&t, is to 6i%e such interpretation that would ha%e the effect of pre%entin6 intestac' /article -GG and -,+NCC0 ANGELICA LEDESMA %s. INTESTATE ESTATE OF CI=RIANO =EDROSA re8re#e,"e' b Ne&#o, /(:e,a, %o,orab&e /u'2e 3e"-e& >a"a&ba#7Mo#!ar'o, G.R. No. 1)414* Mar!- 14, 1995

Facts: /ngelica >edesmaMs marriage to 6ipriano Pedrosa (as declared a nullity. Surprisingly it too3 some time before the ne't order implementing it. Pending receipt by the court of the ordered in$entory, 6ipriano Pedrosa

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

Since Fe ha$e ruled on the finality of the 8udgment decreeing the spousesM legal separation as of Canuary +, "-2), the remaining issue for 1ur resolution is the final disposition of their con8ugal partnership of gains (hich partnership, by reason of the final decree, had been automatically dissol$ed. he la( A/rticle ",5, ",2 of the 6i$il 6ode# clearly spells out the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the con8ugal property. he death on 4o$ember ),, "-2- of herein petitioner (ho (as declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the li*uidation of the con8ugal property is effected, poses a ne( problem (hich can be resol$ed simply by the application of the rules on intestate succession (ith respect to the properties of the deceased petitioner. hus, the rules on dissolution and li*uidation of the con8ugal partnership of gains under the aforecited pro$isions of the 6i$il 6ode (ould be applied effecti$e Canuary +, "-2) (hen the decree of legal separation became final. Bpon the li*uidation and distribution conformably (ith the la( go$erning the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the la( on intestate succession should ta3e o$er in the disposition of (hate$er remaining properties hea$e been allocated to petitioner. his procedure in$ol$es details (hich properly pertain to the lo(er court. he properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by $irtue of the li*uidation of the con8ugal assets, shall be distributed in accordance (ith the la(s of intestate succession in Special Proceedings 4o. ")+. he Maca#ang#ang decision in$ol$ed legal separation but, (ith e*ual reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment (hich is the situation at bar. he respondent presiding 8udge is directed to decide the partition Ali*uidation# case A6i$il 6ase 4o. "++5# (ithin thirty A),# days from receipt of notice of this decision to determine (hich of the properties of the con8ugal partnership should be ad8udicated to the husband and the (ife. his is but a conse*uence or incident of its decision rendered in the same case annulling the marriage. PetitionerMs letters to the 6ourt indicate that she is se$enty A2,# years of age and the prolonged action for partition Ali*uidation# has ta3en a toll on her resources. Custice and e*uity demand the disposition of her case (ith dispatch. /ny properties that may be ad8udicated to the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance (ith his last (ill and testament in the special proceedings in$ol$ing his estate ANGELA RODRIG-E., MARIA RODRIG-E., ET AL. $s. HON. J-AN DE BORJA, ANATOLIA /ANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN G.R. No. L-01223 J$n" 01, 1244 Facts: <r. 6elestino RodrigueJ died on <ebruary "&, "-5) in the 6ity of =anila% that on =arch +, "-5), /polonia Pangilinan and /delaida Cacalan deli$ered to the 6ler3 of 6ourt of Bulacan a purported last (ill and testament of <r. RodrigueJ% that on =arch 7, "-5), =aria RodrigueJ and /ngela RodrigueJ, through counsel filed a petition for lea$e of court to allo( them to e'amine the alleged (ill% that on =arch "", "-5) before the 6ourt could act on the petition, the same (as (ithdra(n% that on =arch "&, "-5), aforementioned petitioners filed before the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of RiJal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of <r. RodrigueJ alleging, among other things, that <r. RodrigueJ (as a resident of ParaDa*ue, RiJal, and died (ithout lea$ing a (ill and praying that =aria RodrigueJ be appointed as Special /dministratri' of the estate% and that on =arch "&, "-5) /polonia Pangilinan and /delaida Cacalan filed a petition in this 6ourt for the probation of the (ill deli$ered by them on =arch +, "-5). 0t (as stipulated by the parties that <r. RodrigueJ (as born in ParaDa*ue, RiJal% that he (as Parish priest of the 6atholic 6hurch of Eagonoy, Bulacan, from the year "-), up to the time of his death in "-5)% that he (as buried in ParaDa*ue, and that he left real properties in RiJal, 6a$ite, NueJon 6ity and Bulacan.

he mo$ants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of RiJal (as filed at 7!,, /.=. on =arch "&, "-5) (hile the petition for probate (as filed in the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of Bulacan at ""!,, /.=. on the same date, the latter 6ourt has no 8urisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of 0ngsingco 1#a. #e Bo ,a vs. Tan an# !e Bo ,a, K.R. 4o. 22-&, Culy &2, "-... he petitioners Pangilinan and Cacalan, on the other hand, ta3e the stand that the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of Bulacan ac*uired 8urisdiction o$er the case upon deli$ery by them of the (ill to the 6ler3 of 6ourt on =arch +, "-5), and that the case in this 6ourt therefore has precedence o$er the case filed in RiJal on =arch "&, "-5).

I##ue$ %e&'$

Ratio: he 6ourt of <irst 0nstance, as pre$iously stated denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a fe( hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference o$er the other% that, as early as =arch 2, mo$ants (ere a(are of the e'istence of the purported (ill of <ather RodrigueJ, deposited in the 6ourt of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to e'amine the same, and that mo$ants clearly filed the intestate proceedings in RiJal Ifor no other purpose than to pre$ent this 6ourt Aof Bulacan# from e'ercising 8urisdiction o$er the probate proceedingsI. Reconsideration ha$ing been denied, mo$ants, no( petitioners, came to this 6ourt, relying principally on Rule 2), section " of the Rules of 6ourt, and in$o3ing our ruling in 0ngsingco vs. Tan an# !e Bo ,a, >;22-&, Culy &2, "-... SE6 014 ". .%e e estate of #ecease# pe sons settle# . L 0f the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, (hether a citiJen or an alien, his (ill shall be pro$ed, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance in the pro$ince in (hich he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of any pro$ince (hich he had estate. he court first ta3ing cogniJance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall e'ercise 8urisdiction to the e'clusion of all other courts. he 8urisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, e'cept in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or (hen the (ant of 8urisdiction appears on the record. Fe find this recourse to be untenable. he 8urisdiction of the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of Bulacan became $ested upon the deli$ery thereto of the (ill of the late <ather RodrigueJ on =arch +, "-5), e$en if no petition for its allo(ance (as filed until later, because upon the (ill being deposited the court could, motu p op io, ha$e ta3en steps to fi' the time and place for pro$ing the (ill, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to (hat is prescribed by section ), Rule 25, of the Re$ised Rules of 6ourt ASection ), Rule 22, of the old Rules#! SE6. ). Cou t to appoint time fo p oving $ill . 2otice t%e eof to 'e pu'lis%e#. L Fhen a (ill is deli$ered to, or a petition for the allo(ance of a (ill is filed in, the 6ourt ha$ing 8urisdiction, such 6ourt shall fi' a time and place for pro$ing the (ill (hen all concerned may appear to contest the allo(ance thereof, and shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three A)# (ee3s successi$ely, pre$ious to the time appointed, in a ne(spaper of general circulation in the pro$ince. But no ne(spaper publication shall be made (here the petition for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

he use of the dis8uncti$e in the (ords I(hen a (ill is deli$ered to 1R a petition for the allo(ance of a (ill is filedI plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedentMs testament, e$en if no petition for its allo(ance is as yet filed. Fhere the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the (ill, the petition is deemed to relate bac3 to the time (hen the (ill (as deli$ered. Since the testament of <r. RodrigueJ (as submitted and deli$ered to the 6ourt of Bulacan on =arch +, (hile petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the 6ourt of <irst 0nstance of RiJal only on =arch "&, eight days later, the precedence and e'clusi$e 8urisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.34$p%53.6t But, petitioners ob8ect, section ) of re$ised Rule 25 Aold Rule 22# spea3s of a (ill being deli$ered to Ithe 6ourt ha$ing 8urisdiction,I and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not ha$e it because the decedent (as domiciled in RiJal pro$ince. Fe can not disregard <r. RodrigueJMs )) years of residence as parish priest in Eagonoy, Bulacan A"-),;"-5)#% but e$en if (e do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus eve ten#i to the place of his birth in ParaDa*ue, RiJal, that detail (ould not imply that the Bulacan court lac3ed 8urisdiction. /s ruled in pre$ious decisions, the po(er to settle decedentsM estates is conferred by la( upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the $enue but not the 8urisdiction of the 6ourt A 7n e :a( Singco, 2+ Phil. &)-% Reyes $s. DiaJ, 2) Phil. +7+% Bernabe $s. Vergara, 2) Phil. 525#. 4either party denies that the late <r. RodrigueJ is deceased, or that he left personal property in Eagonoy, pro$ince of Bulacan

such case, legal succession shall ta3e place only (ith respect to the property in (hich the testator has not disposed% A)# 0f the suspensi$e condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion ta3es place% A+# Fhen the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, e'cept in cases pro$ided in this 6ode. herefore, as ruled in Cast o, et al. vs. Ma tine8, ", Phil. ),2, Ionly after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre;established actionI. he institution of intestacy proceedings in RiJal may not thus proceed (hile the probate of the purported (ill of <ather RodrigueJ is pending. Fe rule that the Bulacan 6ourt of <irst 0nstance (as entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in *uestion, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. 0t is the proceedings in the RiJal 6ourt that should be discontinued. ANSELMA DIA., 5$ard#an o& VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIG-EL, a** )$rnam"d SANTERO, %"t#t#on"r), and FELI6BERTA /AC-RSA 5$ard#an o& FEDERICO SANTERO, "t a*., $s. INTERMEDIATE A//ELLATE CO-RT and FELISA /AM-TI JARDIN

he estate proceedings ha$ing been initiated in the Bulacan 6ourt of <irst 0nstance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume 8urisdiction to the e'clusion of all other courts, e$en if it (ere a case of (rong $enue by e'press pro$isions of Rule 2) Aold Rule 2.# of the Rules of 6ourt, since the same en8oins that! he 6ourt first ta3ing cogniJance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall e'ercise 8urisdiction to the e'clusion of all other courts. ASec. "# his disposition presupposes that t(o or more courts ha$e been as3ed to ta3e cogniJance of the settlement of the estate. 1f them only one could be of proper $enue, yet the rule grants precedence to that 6ourt (hose 8urisdiction is first in$o3ed, (ithout ta3ing $enue into account. here are t(o other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. 1ne is that their commencing intestate proceedings in RiJal, after they learned of the deli$ery of the decedentMs (ill to the 6ourt of Bulacan, (as in bad faith, patently done (ith a $ie( to di$esting the latter court of the precedence a(arded it by the Rules. 6ertainly the order of priority established in Rule 2) Aold Rule 2.# (as not designed to con$ert the settlement of decedentMs estates into a race bet(een applicants, (ith the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest. he other reason is that, in our system of ci$il la(, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only ta3es place in the absence of a $alid operati$e (ill. Says /rticle -5, of the 6i$il 6ode of the Philippines! /R . -5,. >egal or intestate succession ta3es place! A"# 0f a person dies (ithout a (ill, or (ith a $oid (ill, or one (hich has subse*uently lost its $alidity% A&# Fhen the (ill does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. 0n

G.R. No. L-44789 J$n" 18, 12:8 Facts: PR filed a Petition dated Canuary &), "-25 (ith the 6<0, I0n he =atter of the 0ntestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero,I praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of /dministration be issued in her fa$or and that she be appointed as special /dministratri' of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. 0t is undisputed! "# that <elisa Pamuti Cardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (ho together (ith <elisaMs mother Culiana (ere the only legitimate children of the spouses <elipe Pamuti and Petronila /suncion% &# that Culiana married Simon Cardin and out of their union (ere born <elisa Pamuti and another child (ho died during infancy% )# that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the (ido( of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero% +# that Pablo Santero (as the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero% .# that Pascual Santero died in "-2,% Pablo Santero in "-2) and Simona Santero in "-25% 5# that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death (as sur$i$ed by his mother Simona Santero and his si' minor natural children to (it! four minor children (ith /nselma DiaJ and t(o minor children (ith <eli'berta Pacursa. I##ue$ ?ho are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero L her niece <elisa Pamuti Cardin or her grandchildren Athe natural children of Pablo Santero#O %e&'$

Ratio: he dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here is (hether oppositors;appellees Apetitioners herein# as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero (ho is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda, de Santero. 4o( then (hat is the appropriate la( on the matterO Petitioners contend in their pleadings that /rt. --, of the

+3

Hannah Cris A. Echavez

gorgeous hannah

succession

4e( 6i$il 6ode is the applicable la( on the case. hey contend that said pro$ision of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode modifies the rule in /rticle -+" A1ld 6i$il 6ode# and recogniJes the right of representation A/rt. -2,# to descendants, (hether legitimate or illegitimate and that /rt. -+", Spanish 6i$il 6ode denied illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased grandparents, but that Rule (as e'pressly changed andPor amended by /rt. --, 4e( 6i$il 6ode (hich e'pressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father APablo Santero# in the estate of their grandmother Simona Pamuti#.I 7 PetitionersM contention holds no (ater. Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, (ho is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable la( is the pro$ision of /rt. --& of the 6i$il 6ode (hich reads as follo(s! /R . --&. /n illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relati$es of his father or mother% nor shall such children or relati$es inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. A-+)a# Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. 1n the other hand, the oppositors Apetitioners herein# are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. /rticle --& of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode pro$ides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession a' intestato bet(een the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and elatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. hey may ha$e a natural tie of blood, but this is not recogniJed by la( for the purposes of /rt. --&, Bet(een the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an inter$ening antagonism and incompatibility. he illegitimate child is disgracefully loo3ed do(n upon by the legitimate family% the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child% the latter considers the pri$ileged condition of the former, and the resources of (hich it is thereby depri$ed% the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable e$idence of a blemish bro3en in life% the la( does no more than recogniJe this truth, by a$oiding further grounds of resentment. 4 hus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier pro$ided for under /rt. --& of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode. 0n ans(er to the erroneous contention of petitioners that /rticle -+" of the Spanish 6i$il 6ode is changed by /rticle --, of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode, Fe are reproducing here(ith the Reflections of the 0llustrious Eon. Custice Cose B.>. Reyes (hich also finds full support from other ci$ilists, to (it! 0n the Spanish 6i$il 6ode of "77- the right of representation (as admitted only (ithin the legitimate family% so much so that /rticle -+) of that 6ode prescribed that an illegitimate child can riot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relati$es of his father and mother. he 6i$il 6ode of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced /rticle -+) of the Spanish 6ode in its o(n /rt. --&, but (ith fine inconsistency, in subse*uent articles A--,, --. and --7# our 6ode allo(s the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his o(n descendants, (hether legitimate or illegitimate. So that (hile /rt. --& pre$ents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can no( do so. his difference being indefensible and un(arranted, in the future re$ision of the 6i$il 6ode (e shall ha$e to ma3e a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue en8oys in all cases the right of representation, in (hich case /rt. --& must be suppressed% or contrari(ise maintain said article and modify /rticles --. and --7. he first solution (ould be more in accord (ith an enlightened attitude $is;a;$is illegitimate children.

0t is therefore clear from /rticle --& of the 4e( 6i$il 6ode that the phrase Ilegitimate children and relati$es of his father or motherI includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the (ord Irelati$eI includes all the 3indred of the person spo3en of. he record sho(s that from the commencement of this case the only parties (ho claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are <elisa Pamuti Cardin and the si' minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the pro$isions of /rticle --&, the respondent 0ntermediate /ppellate 6ourt did not commit any error in holding <elisa Pamuti;Cardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

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