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VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE) BLAST DAMAGE FAR BEYOND THE COMPANY PROPERTY LINE

Dr. Erdem A. Ural Loss Prevention Science and Technologies, Inc. 659 Pearl Street Stoughton, MA 02072, USA Erdem.Ural@LPSTI.com Tel. 1-781-818-4114 Copyright 2013 by Loss Prevention Science and Technologies, Inc., All rights reserved.

Prepared for Presentation at American Institute of Chemical Engineers 2013 Spring Meeting 9th Global Congress on Process Safety San Antonio, Texas April 28 May 1, 2013 UNPUBLISHED AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained in papers or printed in its publications

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VAPOR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE) BLAST DAMAGE FAR BEYOND THE COMPANY PROPERTY LINE
Dr. Erdem A. Ural Loss Prevention Science and Technologies, Inc. 659 Pearl Street Stoughton, MA 02072, USA Erdem.Ural@LPSTI.com Tel. 1-781-818-4114

Abstract
A massive hydrocarbon leak in 2008 led to a Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE) in a Texas refinery. This accident inflicted serious injuries, and significant property damage both inside the plant boundaries and far beyond. The explosion was heard at distances as far as 40 miles from the plant. The explosion produced ground motion recorded by seismic stations located approximately 120 to 440 miles away. A large number of houses, located several miles away from the plant, suffered damage. Yet, the analysis shows that the methodologies promulgated by CCPS are incapable of predicting the far field property damage caused by this accident. This presentation will review the accident, and the observed far field property damage. Simplified analysis including blast propagation, atmospheric inversion, terrain effects, and appropriate damage criteria produces a more accurate representation of the consequences.

1. Introduction
A massive hydrocarbon leak developed in a refinery in Big Spring, TX operated by Alon USA on February 18, 2008. Available information indicates that Propylene splitter system in Alon USA refinery held 162,300 to 198,200 kg of propylene/propane mixture prior to the massive leak. Released vapor cloud was ignited after a delay and resulted in a powerful Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE), and fire following. It caused catastrophic damage within the plant boundaries, and took the 70,000 barrel-per-day refinery offline for the immediate future. The explosion ripped through Big Spring, the Howard County seat along I-20 with a population of 25,000. This accident inflicted serious injuries and significant property damage both inside the plant boundaries and outside. The explosion was heard at distances as far as 40 miles from the plant, and produced ground motion recorded by seismic stations located approximately 120 to 440

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miles away. Analysis of seismic data from eight stations pinpointed the epicenter to the ALON Yard, Time: 8:15 AM, Magnitude: 2.1, and Depth: 0 km. The newspapers covered the aftermath in detail and published numerous witness statements such as: The shock waves from Monday's oil-refinery explosion in Big Spring rolled as far as San Angelo, 90 miles to the southeast. The massive 8:15 a.m. blast injured at least five people - including a woman driving on nearby Interstate 20 - forced the closure of the highway, shattered windows in nearby neighborhoods It knocked pictures off walls 45 miles away in Sterling City and led Kat Morgan, an ex-California resident who was playing cards with her husband in Bronte, to wonder whether West Texas had experienced an earthquake. Bronte is about 80 miles by air from Big Spring. "As it rumbled, my house started squeaking," Morgan said. "I could tell that it was moving. The dog, she said, was whining and shaking. The blast shattered windows in a nearby school, blew doors open, and cracked and collapsed ceilings. It left Debbie Battle, whose home sits just a quartermile from the refinery, wondering whether her attic remains structurally sound. "I thought a plane had crashed into my house," she said via phone. "I've never heard anything that loud." It felt like a bus hit the side of my house said Howard County Judge Mark Barr. I thank God nobody was killed. Mayor Russ McEwen said he couldn't recall an explosion as big as this one at the refinery. I was at home at the time and I thought it was thunder he said. The windows rattled and all that. It was extremely scary. You shook you were so scared, Laura McEwen, the wife of Mayor Russ McEwen, who lives about two miles from the refinery, told the Associated Press. Our walls shook. It jolted your bed. It was like an earthquake. John Moseley, managing editor of the Big Spring Herald whose downtown office is also about two miles from the refinery, said, "I thought it would knock the walls down." The explosion forced open the doors of the school district's administration building about four miles from the plant, Dunnam said. "Literally pieces of my ceiling came on top of my head," she said. Bonnie Duncan, a jailer for the Mitchell County sheriff's office, said the building shook in Colorado City and the office has received reports of the ground shaking in Loraine. Duncan said her sister-in-law in Andrews, 64 miles west of Big Spring, felt the explosion. There was widespread property damage in Big Spring and beyond. Hundreds of properties sustained damage. ALON contractors quickly replaced many broken windows in exchange for general release of liability. Later, approximately 400 property owners sued ALON. Figure 1 shows a map of the property locations in relation to the Alon USA refinery. The rings centered at the address 200 Refinery Road (Latitude: 32.270N, Longitude: 101.419W) show radii in 1 mile

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increments. A large number of houses, located several miles away from the refinery, suffered damage.

Figure 1. Location of damaged houses in relation to Alon USA II. Damage Observed Outside the Plant: Some foundations and floors sustained damage such as pier & beam foundations brought unlevel, plumbing lines under pier & beam structures broken due to movement of structure, fasteners securing floor sheathing above pier & beam foundations caused to recede causing unlevel. Some windows and doors were hard to open and close, or leaky because of the deformation of the frames. There were cases of exterior doors blown inwards, windows shattered, double pane windows depressurized, garage door knocked off the railing, railing deformed. Interior damage included buckling of light weight wall paneling, cracks formed on wall and ceiling drywall, wall hangings fell down, wall cabinetry or other objects mounted on the walls dislodged or tilted, and tile damage.

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On the exterior walls, there were cases of brick veneer siding cracked, buckling of wood siding, cracks in bricks, mortar damage, external conduit detached from the bracing, CMU (Concrete Masonry Unit) fence (walls) cracked, and wooden fence becoming loose Roof damage included cases of roof sheathing separated from rafters, damage to metal roofing and siding, localized damage to roof, separation of exterior soffit, separation of exterior fascia board, chimney damage, and ceiling separated from the roof. III. Known Damage Thresholds: Vapor Cloud Explosions are rare events. The damage patterns are often well documented within the plant boundaries and in the near vicinity where the mostly industrial structures have experienced moderate and heavy damage. However, this author is unaware of any publicly available damage studies that focused on light damage observed in residential type construction situated in the far field of a VCE. On the other hand, blasting is a commonly used method in construction and mining. Its effect on residential properties is well documented by many, including the US Government. According to US Bureau of Mines report RI-8485 (1980)1 entitled Structure Response and Damage Produced by Airblast from Surface Mining, There is a consensus that damage becomes improbable below approximately 0.03 psi. This is equivalent to 4.3 psf (lb/ft2). However, the experimental study described in RI-8485 concludes that 0.014 psi (134 dB, 2 psf) is a more appropriate number for the maximum safe blast pressure to preclude damage. The 2 psf threshold is also equivalent to the Federal limit (30 CFR 816.67) of 134 dB required to prevent injury to persons, damage to public or private property outside a blasting permit area. US Army Blast Claims Evaluation Procedures (1994) provides some specific criteria used to judge the legitimacy of public damage claims near firing ranges. A summary of threshold levels for specific kinds of damage are presented in Table 5. The data provided in Table 5 serve as a basis for evaluating claims, but many times the residential component cited is not listed. In those cases, the Army recommends that the item must be compared with a similar item in the table and a subjective judgment made. It should also be kept in mind that overpressure pulses caused by Army firing activities are always concluded in time periods in the order of 0.001 second, whereas, the overpressure pulse caused by the ALON explosion was estimated to last approximately 0.5 second, hence capable of inflicting much more damage at the same overpressure level.

RI-8485, Bureau of Mines Report of Investigations, Siskind et al. Structure Response and Damage Produced by Airblast From Surface Mining 1980

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Table 5. Overpressure Threshold Criteria for Structural Damage

Interior Plaster on wood lath Plaster on Gyplath Plaster on expanded metal lath Plaster on concrete block Plaster, new Plaster, cured Nail popping Gypsum board (old-cracks) Gypsum board (old-loose paint flaking) Gypsum board, 1/2-in (nail popping) Gypsum board (new-cracks) Bathroom tile (old) Suspended ceiling (new) PSF 3.3 7.5 16.0 16.0 5.4 10.4 5.2 4.6 9.6 10.7 16.0 4.4 3.9 Exterior Brick (cracks) Glass door (loosened) Mullions (twisted) Molding (popped) Stucco (new) Light-weight superstructure Concrete Wood frame wall (fatigue, 80 min.) Roof (fatigue, 20 min.) Concrete wall, 8-in thick (fatigue, 10 min.) PSF 18.7 18.7 8.9 18.7 4.9 209 710 6.0 7.5 18.8

IV. Estimation of the Peak Pressure Field: In this accident, as well as in certain other accidents that will be discussed during the presentation, methodologies promulgated by CCPS underpredict the severity of the Vapor Cloud Explosion and damage criteria. In some cases, the actual cloud burning rate or the extent of combustion is larger. In the case of Alon VCE, two additional factors caused the preferential focusing of the blast wave created by the Vapor Cloud Explosion. 1) Temperature inversion: The shape of the cloud seen in the photographs taken soon after the explosion seen Figure 2 demonstrates that that temperature inversion indeed existed in Big Spring. Figure 3 shows the temperature profile measured during an atmospheric sounding in nearby Midland, TX, approximately 2 hours before the Alon USA vapor cloud release. Figure 3 shows, in fact, there existed two temperature inversion layers, one near the ground, and another at around 2500 m elevation. The adverse effect of temperature inversion is widely recognized. Strehlow and Baker (1976)2 wrote The more significant atmospheric effects which induce non-ideal blast wave behavior are unusual weather conditions which can cause blast focusing at some distance from the source. A low-level temperature inversion can cause an initially hemispherical blast front to refract and focus on the ground in an annular region about the source (Grant et al., 1967). Severe wind shear can cause focusing in the downwind direction. This effect is discussed by Baker (1973) and Reed (1973). Structural damage from accidental explosions has been correlated with these atmospheric inhomogeneities (Siskind, 1973; Siskind and Summers, 1974; Reed, 1968), and complaints of damage from explosive testing were reduced when firings were limited to days when no focusing was predicted (Perkins et al., 1960).

Strehlow and Baker The Characterization And Evaluation Of Accidental Explosions, Prog. Energy Combust. Sci., Vol. 2, pp. 27-60, 1976

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Section 21.5.2 of NFPA 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations states: Blast Pressure Front Modification by Refraction and Blast Focusing. Atmospheric inhomogeneities can cause nonideal blast pressure front behavior at times. When a blast pressure front encounters a layer of air at a significantly different temperature, it may cause it to bend, or refract. This occurs because the speed of sound is proportional to the square root of temperature in air. A low-level temperature inversion can cause an initially hemispherical blast front to refract and to focus on the ground around the center of the explosion. The above-mentioned Bureau of Mines report RI-8485 states: Air temperatures normally decrease with increasing altitude, with the reverse of this called a "temperature inversion," or warm air layer. The index of refraction of air changes with temperature, so that the normal condition of cooler air at higher altitudes refracts sound away from the ground. Conversely, temperature inversions refract sound downward, leading to higher than normal sound pressure levels at points of focus. Much work had been done on theoretical calculations of airblast focusing from temperature inversions (36-37, 39). Perkins (36) predicted that a single inversion could cause airblast to be 3 to 6 times more intense. Poulter (36) concluded that within a distance of two times the height of the inversion no intensification would occur. Taylor (64) stated that up to a 10-dB increase can occur from inversion-produced refraction. Schomer (50) discussed both low-altitude inversions and jet stream focusing, for propagation distances of 2 to 40 miles and 30 to 300 miles, respectively. The short range case is applicable to mine blasts; a 3times intensification was the maximum measured and the average was 1.8 times (5.1 dB). 2) Terrain Effects The valleys around the Alon USA site, seen in Figure 4, can also cause the blast wave to strengthen or focus preferentially. The terrain effects are also widely recognized. Baker et al (1983)3 states A ground surface which is irregular can significantly affect the blast wave properties. Gentle upward slopes can cause enhancement, while steep upward slopes will cause formation of Mach waves and consequent strong enhancement. Downward slopes or back surfaces of crests cause expansion and weakening of shocks. These effects are quite localized, however, and smooth out quite rapidly behind the irregularities. Section 21.5.1 of NFPA 921 states: Blast Pressure Front Modification by Reflection. As a blast pressure front encounters objects in its path, the blast pressure front may amplify due to its reflection. This reflection in some cases will cause the overpressure to increase and will sometimes amplify it as much as eight times at the surface of reflection, depending on the angle of incidence. The above-mentioned Bureau of Mines report RI-8485 states: Terrain is another possibly critical factor for airblast propagation. The effect of the bench and blast face on levels and character was treated in the section on airblast characteristics. Wilton (81) discusses experiments of "air bursts" over valleys and the resulting 50-pct increase of intensity compared to flat terrain. He and Wiggins (80) both state that a 300-pct increase is possible. Topographic effects may be responsible for high airblast levels reported in the valleys of the Appalachian Mountain during strip mining.
3

Baker et al (1983), Explosion Hazards and Evaluation, p. 128

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Figure 2. Photographs taken soon after the explosion

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Midland, TX 6 AM Feb 18, 2008

36 34

Temperature (oF)

32 30 28 26 24 22 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500

Elevation (m)

Figure 3. Atmospheric temperature profile approximately 2 hours before the explosion

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Figure 4. Features of the terrain around Alon USA and damaged houses