Kesava Misra An Indian primer of philosophy

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

WILLIAM

H.

D0.\\l R

COLLECTION
purchased from
a gift by

HH DONNEK CANADIAN

FOUNDATION

Me moires

de P Academic Royale des Sciences et des Lettres de Danemark, Copenhague,

7 me serie,

Section des Lettres,

t. II,

3.

AN INDIAN PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY

OR

THE TARKARHASA OF KECAVAMICRA

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSCRIT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

POUL TUXEN,

PH.

i).

D. KGL.

DANSKE VIDENSK. SELSK. SKBIFTER,

7.

R. EKKE, HISTORISK

OG FILOSOFISK AFD.

II.

3.

K0BENHAVN
HOVEDKOMMISSION^R: ANDR, FRED. H0ST &
S0N, KGL.

HOF-BOGHANDEL

BIANCO LUNOS BOGTRYKKER1

1914

Det

Kg

l,

Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs

5 te Rsekke.
Historisk og filosofisk Afdeling.

Skrifter,

Kr.

Ore
"

I,
1.

1852

Peteraen, F. C.

Om

Epheterne og deres Dikasterier

Athen.

1847

2.
1.

2.
3.

Rosenvlnge, J. L. A. Kolderup-.
Scharling, C. E.

Om

Rigens Ret og Dele.

s

1847

35.

Mystikeren Michael Molinos

Laere og Skjaebne.
i

1852

4.

4.

Usslng, J. L.

Om

Italienernes Deelagtiggjerelse

den romerske Borgerret ved Bellum sociale.

1852

...

1.

65.

II, med 12 Tavler, 1857

1.

8.
i

50.
"

Ussing, J. L.

Graeske og latinske Indskrifter

Kj0benhavn.

1854
Kileskrift.
2.

I.

2. 3.

Westergaard, N. L.
Usslng, J.L.

Om

den anden
1.

eller

den sakiskc Art af Akhaemenidernes

s

1854

3.

35.

Attiske Studier.

Om

Sokrates
3 Tavler.

Hermes Propylaeos og Chariterne.

185G
Et Bidrag
til

Om

Planen og Ind~"

retningen af Parthenon.
4.

Med

Paludan-Muller, C.

Reformationshistorie.
5.

Herredagene i Odense 1526 og 1527. 1857

s

en kritisk

Behandling af den danske

2.
*

Muller, L.

Den thraciske Konge Lysimachus

5 Tavler,

Mynter.

Med

9 Tavler

1857

4.

>

III, med
1.

1869
tillagte

8-

Usslng, J.L.
Muller, L.
-

Om

de Kejscr Trajan

Breve

til

Plinius.

I860
1861

75.

2.

Oversigt over de puniske Gudebilleder.

Med

Traesnit.

65.

3.

Religiose
Traesnit.

Symboler af Stjerne-, Kors- og Cirkelform hos Oldtidens Kulturfolk.

1864
i

Med

Tavlc og
75.

4.

5.

- Undersegelse af et gammelt persisk Symbol, bcstaaende Med 1 Tavle. 1864 - Hermes-Stavens Med 1 Tavle. 1865 Oprindelse.
J.L.

en

Ring med

forskjellige Tilsaetninger.
i>0-

"

65.
75.

6.

llssing,

To

graeske Vaser

Antik-Kabinettet

Kjebenhavn.
geistlige
til

Med
eller

2 Tavler.

1866
1867

Allen, C. F.
8.

Om
L.

Christiern den

Andens saakaldte
fra del

Lov

Loven

for Landet.

50.

Westergaard, N.

De indiske Keiserhuse

4de

det lOde

Aarhundrede og nogle

aeldre Fyrsteslaegter
3.

efter samtidige Aktstykker.

Resume en

francais.

1867

69
S. 3.)

15.

(Fortsaettes

paa Omslagets

AX INDIAN PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY

THE TARKARHASA OE KECAVAMICRA

T1UNSLATK1) FROM TIIK OHKilXAL SANSCHT

WITH AN INTIUmrCTIOX AM) NOTKS

UY

pori. TrxKX.

PH.D.

I).

Kc,i..

DAXSKK VIOF.NSK.

SKI.SK.

SKIMKTKH.

7.

H.I:KKI:.

HISTOIUSK

nc,

n.nsoriSK AKIX

II.

.\.

K0BENHAVX
HOVKDKOMMISSIONVKH: ANDR.
I

FRED. H0ST & S0N. KC.L. IIOF-HOC.HANDKI.

.IANC.O i.rxos nor.TnyKKKiii

1914

"B

PREFACE
r

I his
interested

litlle

work has

twofold purpose. mailers

Its

first

aim

is

to

furnish

readers

in

philosophical
logicians

which
the
of

the

Indian

some specimens of the problems with were occupied. Its second aim is to make easier to
with

student of Sanscrit philosophy Hie entering into that most interesting branch
Indian

philosophy,

the
to

Nyaya-darcana,

Kecava

compendium being

in

my

opinion more adapted

this

purpose than the later ones,

among

other

things

because
I

its

polemical parts are less dogmatical in their formulation.

to

have endeavoured

make

this Iranslation as lileral as possible,

I

though, as
is

hope, without being illegible;

but as

had
could

to

translate into a language that

not

my

native,
to

must, in cases where

use
of

not

lind

anything better, conline

;

myself

make
the

some

technical

terms employed by COWKI.L and DYIYKDI

of course
siderably,

meaning of
I

the Sanscrit

and European lerms very often

differ

con
in

and therefore

should advise readers lo rely more on the definitions

the texl than

on the translated terms.

My
and
lo
it

best thanks are due to Professor Dr. DINKS

ANDKHSKN

for

valuable criticisms

the Directors of the

-CAKLSBKHG

FOND"

for the

pecuniary support that has

made

possible lo

me

lo

publish this treatise in English.

of

Regarding the
assistance of Miss

English

my

translation
A.

may acknowledge

the

useful

THOHA POULSKN, M.

Copenhagen, December 1913.

POL L TUXEN.

21

Introduction.
Kecavani era
i

Ihe
ent

treatise

which follows contains

in

translation of
.

cxccl-

compendium

the

philosophy of Nyaya

Tarkabhasa

is

an elementary

exposition of all the mainpoinls of Nyaya (and Vaicesika) intended for young people who have studied the common disciplines, such as grammar, poetics etc., but

ventured to grapple with philosophy, the three disciplines: poetics and philosophy forming to this day the basis of the education of every Pandit. Setting apart the absolute value which might eventually be ascribed to the work of Keeava, it must be supposed to be of some interest
not
yet

who have

Sanscrit

grammar,

showing us what was required (and is required) in India of the young man who wants a general basis in the way of philosophical method and phraseology corresponding to Philosophicum with us (The B. A. degree of philosophy). Nyaya
in

general basis of philosophical education through the fact that system, as DVIVKDI says with great truth (Tarkakaumud! 1880, p. 7), is the grammar of Indian philosophy; its phraseology, method and style have exercised a
is

able to give such

this

predominating influence on
interest,
in

all

other branches and schools.

Tarkabhasa has

for

everybody

interested

in

India

Apart from this historical no small importance

as mentioned, a general view of the systems of Nyaya and Vaicesika, which have not yet found any European exponent 1 two systems which form such
giving,
;

great part

in

the culture of both ancient and

to

modern India

that the

knowledge

of

them

is

absolutely necessary

everybody who

literature.

Of

the six so-called

"orthodox"

occupies himself with Sanscrit Indian systems. Nyaya and Vaicesika are
deals

the youngest and points of view in

logic

most

scientific

pair; they are

common, while Nyaya

complementary as having the main in a large measure with dialectics,

for

and the

art of disputation,

and Vaicesika has

treatment of the

phenomena
"

of the outer world on a

speciality a descriptive physical basis. The literature

its

M Immediately before the printing of this treatise, which was delivered to the "Kgl. danske Videnskabernes Selskab April 1913, I have noticed a Tarkabhasa-translation made by Pandit Gangamitlui
.Ilia

(from a different recension of the text

II.

j"Pandit"

19()1|)

and

published

in

the Quarterly

Indian

thought"

Allahabad 1911.
later
della

A very detailed and thorough-going survey of the two systems, as the} appear in the compendiums, Professor Suali has now given in his comprehensive work Introduzione allo studio
:

filosofia

Indiana. Pavia 1913.

1C)C)

main the grouping usually prevailing dealing with the two systems present in Hie The oldest source that \ve possess is the Uvo in a system of Indian philosophy. Sfilra works which, however, evidently does not form the beginning of a philo
sophical development but rather to a certain degree, up and fixing of the results gained in the schools;
S. XXXI, placed by .J.u.om (J.A.O. Buddhistic schools, between A. I).
1.

mark
in

their present

the preliminary windingform they are

on the basis of their polemics against The standard-works of the two 201) and 450. vi/. as to Vaicesika the systematic systems belong to the end of the same period, which must be separated from 1895 d Benares a sla (ed. of Praca pa representation a considerable Kanada. of the author Sutra, space of time, and as to Nyaya by ted. Calcutta 1865). s Sutras Vatsyayana s Vatsyayana s commentary on (iotama to defend who wished CM was commented on by I ddyotakara
191()\
,

Bhasya
it

U>th

against then was

the

attacks

of

the

commented on by Ya ca spa

Over against this thousand years and is closely attached to (iotama s Sutras, stands another group based on Gangeca s more systematic exposition of Nyaya, Tatlva-einlamani (12th c.) and elaborated by the so-called XavadvJpa school (Xuddea in Bengal) during the

Udayana.

Uddyolakara s Nyayavartika and this again by extensive bulk of literature which stretches over a
.I)ignaga>:
I
i

Buddhists

era

.)th

or Kith CM

the acuteness following centuries in works that bear testimony to a brain-excercise, same the at but which, time, by or subtlety of which is said to be almost unique, its sterility had a fatal inlluence on the school of Nyaya.

Nearly
century,
a

coincident
of

with

the

beginning of

this

period,
itself

that

is

about the 12th

new form

literature begins to

assert

in

Nyaya and Vaicesika,

growing

natural desire namely that of the shorter compendium*; they are probably due to a of the ever in consideration of doctrine, the to find one s bearing in the chief points bulk of commentaries. To the last representatives of this direction belong the

Tarkasa ingraha
zu Gottingen.
the oldest are

Phil.-Hist. Kl. 1907

with Dlpikfi. translated by HU.T/SUI (Abh. d. kgl. Ges. and Tarkakaumnd! (/. I). M. (i. 1907);
i

d.

Wiss.

among

We
tion
to

Civaditya s Saptapadarth! and K ec a va m c r a s Tarkabhasa. do not know anything about Kecavamiera Paranjape, in the introduc
;

his

edition

of

Tarkabhasa (Poona 1894\ places

s

his

lifetime

between 1200

namely written in the 14lh hand Kecava other on the quotes Udayana whom Paranjape and century, whilst llth is not correct, Udayana lived in the 10 others place in the 12th cent.; the latter cent. (See Venis in Preface to Tarkikaraksfi, Pandit 1899): Kecava must, however, have lived in the interval between Udayana and Chinnabhatta. The contents of
and 1400; Chinnabhatta

commentary on Tarkabhasf,

is

Tarkabhasa point

the book was probably written before Gangeca s been influenced, as far as style or subject-matter Tattvaeintamani, as it has scarcely are concerned, by this work, which has exercised a predominating inlluence on 12th cent.), we dis aflerages; if we compare Tarkabhasa with SaptapadarthI (1Kb
to the

same period;

cover that while ibis work acknowledges abhava (non-existence) as seventh category in Vaicesika Tarkabhasa mentions only the first six at the place where these categories

are introduced (see note

f>8

in tliis translation)

but adds,

it

is

true,

the seventh as a

probable that Tarkabhasa belongs to one of the lirsl centuries of the second millennium, for from the lime of Saptapadarth! the seventh category is Cully acknowledged together with the others.

supplement;

this incertitude,

too,

makes

it

The

great

number

of

commentaries and subcommenlaries which

the

book

has occasioned bear witness to the popularity of Tarkabhasa. Auf rechl s Cat. catalogornm mentions 26 different commentaries. Of these the publication of Chinnabhatta s above-mentioned commentary has long been announced, but, unfortunately, has never appeared. On the other hand have been able to make use of Go vardh ana s commentary in Paranjape s edition (1894) and that of Vicvakarman in Surendralala Gosvamin s edition (Pandit XXII XXIII, Benares 1901), besides the fragments of Ga url k a n la s and Madha vade va s commentaries, which Paranjape has published in the notes of his edition of Tarkabhasa. Vicvakarman lived in the Kith c. thus also Govardhana as proved by Paranjape; consequently he cannot be a pupil of Keeavamiera as Surendralfda maintains on the basis of an
I
;

expression (vivicya gurunirmitim) in the introductory verses of his commentary; nor is he, as Colebrooke believed (Essays I, 263), the oldest commentator on Tar kabhasa; his father Balabhadra, as well, has written a commentary on Tarka

which Paranjape has published together with Govardhana s Tarkabhasaprakaca, but Vicvakarman s commentary, too, has been a good help to the understanding of the text, which is not quite easy as far
bhasa.

This translation follows the

text

as several sections are regarded.

Tarkabhasa
yet

gives, as

without, like

later

mentioned, the doctrine of both Nyaya and Vaicesika, compendiums exhibiting any complete fusion of the two

systems; for the book professes to be pure Nyaya and on the points where the two systems diverge it follows the views of Nyaya and is founded on the first Nyayasutra;
but
in

mentioning the ninth Nyayasutra

(see note 58

it

goes through the

six (seven) categories

of Vaicesika

of the

translation)

work.
work,
.

Comparatively by
is

far the greater part

first

dedicated

to

the

of the

This category is treated of in ledge the Method which will be applied. Knowledge gives rise to a short
inherent,

non-inherent and effective.

its

up a great part of the more than one half of the 16 categories of Nyaya, e. g. Means of Know the beginning, after some remarks concerning The characterisation of Means of right mentioning of the three sorts of Causes, Then the four means of knowledge follow:
(ills

which

of this,

Perception and
practically, with a

different

forms;

Inference,

treated

of

theoretically

and

supplement on Fallacy;

Then

the establishment of

Comparison and finally Testimony. Other Means of Knowledge is rejected and the first

work ends in a contemplation on Validity of Knowledge and its substantiation. The second half begins with the second category of Nyaya, Objects of Know* ledge, which are considered in accordance with Nyayasutra 1,9 in the
half of the
1

To

tliis

edition the

numerals

in

he margin refer.

1B8
succession:
of
c

Soul, Body. Souses. Objects (including, as mentioned, the categories Vnicesika at length: Substance, Quality. Action, Generality, Parti1

x s Ie n ce Notion, Organ of T h ought. and Final Liberation. With Fruit. Pain, Activity, Defects, Future Life. these subdivisions of the two lirsl categories we have arrived at page 92 of the 11H

a r

n h

e r e n c e

and N o

pages of the book, the

the only exception of a
is:

last

14 categories are

consequently made short work of with

renewed treatment of Fallacy. The succession of the treatment

Doubt, Motive, Instance, Tenet. Members of Syllogism, Reduelio in absurdum. Ascertainment, Discussion, Wrangling, Cavilling; then the renewed, more detailed treatment of Fallacy, as mentioned above, with an
remark about
Criteria

additional

and their

faults;

finally

the last three,

treating

of Faults during Discussion. As this argument has shown, these categories are set fortunately this special point of up from the point of view: Art of disputation of the subject which, through the view is of small consequence in the treatment matters which are treated of in this connection, is of far greater interest than
;

mere sophistry might reckon upon. Of the very few modern works concerning Xvfiya [here JS;}? which of COLMUHOOKK S short review in Misc. Kssays
1

is is

mention composed just on the

reason for
a
:

basis of Tarkabhfisfi
,

i.

Abt. (1908

s
!

Bd. exposition in Allg. Geschiehte der Philosophic, I. on the basis of the first book of the Nyayasulras besides, concerning
;

Di.i

SSIA

Die indische Logik a single phase of the system, an excellent exposition by J.u.om of the The Kl. in Gott. gel. An/. Nachrichten 1901, phil.-hisl. system has been history of BODAS in the introduction of Athalye s edition Tarkasamgraha (1897 delineated
:

by

To

lliis

of Indian

lotfie

must now be added Suali 102. and dialectics p.

!5

above-mentioned

Introdti/ionc".

\vliieli

treats of the history

Tarkabhasa.
For him who wishes, though young to penetrate into the system of Nyiiya, but without great exertion and exlensive sludies, I elaborate the following Tarka
1

bhasa-,

concise, but

accompanied by (necessary) argumentation.

I.

Method.

Xyayasiilra runs as follows: "Final beatitude is attained through of the essence of the following categories: means of acquaintance right know
first

The

(of syllogism),

ledge, object of knowledge, doubt, motive, instance, tenet, member reductio in absurdum, ascertainment, discussion, wrang1

(2)

ling, cavilling, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke." The meaning hereof is that final liberation is attained by essential acquaintance
categories: means of right knowledge, etc. Essential knowledge, i. e. right knowledge, of the means of right knowledge etc., is, however, not possible, before these (categories) are made the object of statement, characterization, and 1 as the author of the Bhasya says: "The method of this doctrine investigation;

(3)

of the

1()

(6)

is

threefold: statement, characterization,

and
to

investigation."

Now stale me ui
that has been
1

(uddeca)

means

indicate the things only by

name, and

(7)

done

in Ihe

quoted Sutra.
"he

Hala means, properly, a hoy; Vicvakarman explains the word as who signifying does not know the l(i categories, means of knowledge, The word appears in the intro ductory verse, in order to indicate Ihe person for whom the work is composed; the fact is
etc."

that the introductory verse is to indicate the four factors (annbandha] necessary at the com position of such a hook: its subject matter (/>/,SY///\ its purpose (/>r(ii/ojcmci\ connexion (sanujati) and 111 reader (arf/ziVam /j); here respectively: the system of Nyaya with its categories; the easy acquirement and further the acknowledgment of truth as means of liberation; the rela tion between the text-book and its subject, that is what exhibits and what is exhibited; and,
finally, the
-

young seeker of

truth.

Tarkyante tarkasahakrtapramanajanyapramitivisayikriyanta iti larkiih padarthas te bhasyante uddecalaksanapariksadibhir nirupyanle nayeti tarkabhasa (iaurlkanta). It is strange that the Tarkabhasa is not introduced by a prayer as a good omen Yicvakarman takes comfort in the thought that Kecavaiuicra may have said the (mai/</(ila)prayer within himself, which we may infer from the fact that the work is finished (samaptya lingena tadanumanat). N. S. I, 1, 2; When of pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notions, by the disappearing of each ;member the preceding disappears, final liberation sets in.
v
;i

E.
I)

g.

Vatsyayana ad N.
7.
Ilii

S.

1,

1.

2.

(Calcutta
II

181)5,

p.

<).).

I).

K.

Viilcnsk. Sclsk. SUr.,

klu-,

hist, on lilos

AM.

3.

170

CJia ra cleri/a
the mailer in
<|iu

on
is

(lak.\an<i)

slion

means to indicate special attribute, as, oi the cow, dewlap, ele. possession
;>

when
>

When
means
or not.
(<S)

thing is charactcri/ed in a particular way, deliberation whether the characteristic in (piestion

a

investigation duksamn may be

7/f.sv7i
(/>/

applied

hi
o!

These two things, therefore, eharaeteri/alion and investigation, must needs undertaken in order to arrive at an essential knowledge of (the categories) means
right

knowledge

etc.

II.

Means

of Right
l/Ki

Knowledge.

is the category first staled, it is also knowledge .prdiii lirsl characleri/ed here: -means of right knowledge" is instrument of right knowledge; here means of right knowledge is what must hi characleri/ed. and instrument of

As

means

of right

right

knosvledge

is

the characteristic.

Now,

if

means

of right

knowledge

is

the instrument of right

knowledge,

its

accom effect (j)lidl(t> must be capable of being slated, as an instrument must needs be is is i.e. what just the produced, panied b\ an ctTect. This is also true: the efVecl, effect of an axe as instrument of cleaving. right knowledge: just as cleaving is the of which the means of knowledge is the what is this
Now,
right
(<))

10)

knowledge (tiinhlxiuit which is the a pprehcnsion knowledge its with term object processes of agrees By the agrees with its object yatli- rllta in a 1) surd urn knowledge as doubt :.sc//m;m/a), error />//;un/rn/rn and reductio apprehen15y the term (/(//AY/I which do not agree with their object, are excluded. is all excluded: is knowing jnnnu sion remembi-ance (smrli apprehension
instrument
.

Answer:

right
<

.>

,[>r(iiu<~:

>.

),

remembrance excepled.
111.

Causality.
Av/n/mnV
ell
It

Now, what
(l-nrc.nin;

is

inslrumenl

is

the

most
is

e e

v e c a u s e

most

elVeclive

means more than

elVeclive

eclive: that

to

say the extraordinary

cause

and cause are synonyms; therefore we do not yet know what cause means! That is now explained: the cause of a product
Well, but
the

words

LaksdiHi is most often translated by delinition. wh;il is wrong. II means Hie quality which separates Hie thing from what is nol the tiling utullvaviuwmrhcilakn dlidrnio htksitiuun. Kecava explains laksana as state Yatsyayana ad I. 1,2 thus chief characteristic, etc. When ment of a special quality asadliaraiiadliarmavaeanam il is nol. consequently, quite correct; Concerning have been obliged to follow the inaccuracy in my translation vliaractcri/ation wide, or the Ihree faults with which a characteristic may be beset, as being too narrow, loo
:
.

impossible, see p. Panini I. 1,

"

lOi.

-12.

Kununi
to

is

in

Hie Tarkasam^ralia delined as

acting-

s]>ecial

cause;

acting

is

said

exclude inherent cause, special in order to exclude the common causes: these god: his knowledge, wisli and acts: former are. according to Vakyavrtli Nyavakoca p. 1)17
in

order

non-cxislence: lime: space: merit and guilt

((idrsltt)-

11

"

Hie existence of which before the product (punmbhavu) is ;il)solnlely (Hi and not formerly explained otherwise (ananyathrisiddha)*, as, for instance, necessary, threads and loom as opposed to cloth. Kven if, when cloth is produced, a donkey brought on by chance, for instance,
is

the

tiling

must be said
cloth),

to exist

has already been explained in another way, as (the colour of the threads) exhausts its powers in producing the colour of the cloth, loo complicated supposition to regard it as the cause of the its being a and
this pnv-existenee

necessary. but

And

the colour of the threads

before (the cloth in question), this pra>exislence is not absolutely must needs, it is true, exist before (the

by

cloth, too.

To be
not

cause,

therefore,

means

to

be

in

possession of a prse-existence which

is

is

(13i

absolutely necessary; already explained otherwise, an of to be in means necessary succession alter some absolutely possession product otherwise. thing which has not previously been explained that to be cause means to have maintained is it when it is Therefore wrong
l

and which

and

to

be

pr;rscnlia

and

lujdlirckituai:

as space, for

corresponding to that of the product (karyamikrtanvaijafor the result hereof would In- that eternal and infinite (substances; instance, could not be cause, as in their case absentia regarding lime
absentia

(IT)!

and place

is

out of question.

Now
Of
these

the

mentioned cause

is

threefold:

inherent,
is

non-inherent, and
in

ell eclive.
is

inherent cause (samauuyikarana) inherent when it comes into existence, as for

cause of the cloth, for
it

that

one

which

the

product

instance: the threads are the inherent

is inherent, when it comes there exists a connexion (16) as but into existence, not in the shuttle, etc. Well, just between the cloth :md the threads, thus it is also connected with the shuttle, etc.; is inherent why, then, is it only in the threads, not in the shuttle etc. that the cloth sorts of Iwo are there but so fan is V (This is true, it when objection
is

in the

threads that the cloth

produced is a con connexion: conjunction and inherence; of those inherence (s(tnuw nexion of two (things) which cannot be supposed to exist apart (ayutasiddha); between others only simple conjunction is found .s-a/m/or/ai. Now, what are two
ij<t)
<

of the

Because three forms of din/dlluisiddlii Hie following instances m;iy be iven. itself the colour of the thread is ainidtlidxiddlid as opposed to the cloth, even 2 Because of the notion to exist together witli the thread before the cloth is seen if it in his relation to the pot. even if is dtiudtluixiddhu father the the potters father, potters thus also before the pot. .\ A donkey brought it is evident thai lie exists before the potter, and
K

For

the-

thread

on by chance is (tniidthuxiddhd as opposed to the pot here, even if it appears together with stick and disc, which in other cases must be supposed necessarily to exist before the pot. Thus the cases look, summarily slated: both in the Tarkakaumud! and \vilh the commentators of the Tarkabhasa they give rise to elaborate researches, which, however, may be left out The meaning is that the here, as the phenomenon itself is only hinted at in Kecava s text. is factors of the as cause a already explained and thus concerning ling exhausted otherwise: if diii/dlluisiddhd is translated by unessential, etc., the meaning,
i-

in

itself perfectly clear, will

be vague.

172

12

things
tilings

which cannot he supposed of which the one as long as

is

l<>

exist

apart

Not

existing

apart

arc

two

it

suhsisls remains only reiving on the other.

As
as

it

said

know that two things are not existing apart when Hie one, as long remains only reiving on the other. Instances are: parts and whole, qualities and their possessor, motion and its and individual, particularity (incesa) and eternal possessor, characteristic of genus
Yon
shall
it

subsists,

substances; for whole,

relatively

etc.,
1
"

remain, as long as they subsist, only as

far as they rely

(17)

In the stale in which they are destroyed they remain, on parts, etc. on nothing, as, for instance, the cloth, when the threads are deshowever, relying To be destroyed is equal is destroyed. troyed, or a quality, when its substratum

to the

apart.
as,

destruction. presence of the totality of the causes of Now threads and cloth stand in the relation of parts and whole; therefore the connexion between them is inherence, as they cannot be imagined to exist Between the shuttle and the cloth, on the other hand, there is no inherence,

regarding them, not

to exist

apart

is

out of question.

For

shuttle does not

on the shuttle; only remain relying on the cloth, and not the cloth, either, relying therefore the connexion between them is simple conjunction.

The cloth, then, is inherent in the threads; and the thing inheres, when it comes into existence, is the inherent cause of
fore only the threads and not The cloth is, further, the

in

which

product

the product; there cause of the cloth. inherent the are the shuttle, etc.,

and, likewise, the

colour,
etc.

clay

is

the

inherent cause as opposed to its own colour, etc., inherent cause of the jar, and the jar that of its
a

produced, its colour etc. is also between a produced; therefore, because of the contemporaneity (samnnakdlinatua} and cause is out of question, quality and its possessor, a relation as between product as well as between the right and left horn of a cow. succession being precluded, and therefore the jar, etc., cannot be the inherent cause of its own colour, etc., for
Well, but

now when,

for instance,

jar

is

inherent cause

is

only
lint-

special

kind of cause.
the following consideration
into existence

Against this
a quality

of

argument

must be maintained:

substance

(18)

contemporaneously, but lirsl the and then the inherent qualities qualities" was simultaneous if a assumed, there would be no dif are produced; origination as the totality of causes would be its ference between the quality and possessor, the same (for both of them): and it is an established rule that the difference of

and

its

possessor do not

come

without

comes

into existence

See page
10

(,<S7).

must, consequently, be understood relatively; the parts of a independent of the concerning; whole, but ceases at the same time to be parts of the same whole; the threads may be imagined separated from the cloth, but then they are not parts hereof and. accordingly, not the inherent cause of the cloth. 11 This seams not to a.qree quite \vitb the assertion formerly alleged that a quality and its possessor cannot exist apart; cf.. however, the preceding note.

The terms

purls,

etc..

whole may, of course,

exist

products must he due

the
(irsl

to

difference of cause.

Thus

il

is

the case that the jar at

moment

is

without

and. qualities, consequently exists hel ore the qualities,

for the

therefore,
In

may he this way

the inherent cause of the qualities. difference of cause will also appear,

jar

is

not

its

own
it

cause,

as,

can can
the

exist
he
1

on the part of a single object, succession is out of question, hecause neither hel ore nor after itself. Hut as il can exist heibre its qualities,
if

il

their inherent cause.

this
is

Well, hut
lirsl

moment was

the fact, the consequence hereof would he that the jar at invisihle, as il, jusl like Ihe wind, would he a colourless
is

(19)

suhslance; for only the suhslance the same lime as il has a certain
Further,
slance, as
il

visihle

which possesses developed colour

at

si/e.

consequence hereof would he that (the jar) would he no suh would not he substratum of qualities, for the chief characteristic of a
the
a

substance

is:

substance
be true,

(druinjcf) is

substratum of qualities

(yiiua).

This
subtile

may

but now,

when

jar at

the

first

and not apprehended by the

that opinion thai the jar

adopted

came

eye, where is the into existence with qualities,

etc.

moment is extremely harm for us. For if we

il

might no

much is question. without existence therefore an established fact: first the jar comes into qualities, and in Ihe nexl and following moments il is apprehended by the eye. The con
more be apprehended when
(only) a

moment

was

in

So

sequence hereof

is

not that

it.

at the first

moment,

is

no substance,

for

we apply

Ihe following chief characteristic on a substance: substance is what is inherent cause, and it is substratum of qualities by ils being capable of (obtaining qualities); to be

substratum of qualities means not

to

be substratum (adhikarana) of the absolute

".

(20)

non-existence (atyantabhriud) of qualities 1

Now
cause
is

the

non-inherent cause
t

Ihe (cause

((isamavdyikurand) is staled: non-inherent the power of closely connected with the inherent cause and

which
the

(to

be cause
of of Ihe
il

in Ihe case

under consideration)
is

is

established.

Thus,
Ihe

for instance,

conjunction
fact

the

threads
is

the

non-inherent

cause

of

cloth,

for

the

(21

conjunction
the

threads
quality

closely connected with the inherent cause, through

in
il

that

as

inheres

its

inherent cause of the cloth; and

existence

acts

are the possessors, Ihe threads, which as cause in ils relation to the cloth, its

before (Ihe cloth)

In Ihe

explained. the colour of the cloth.

same way
is
1

being absolutely necessary and not already otherwise the colour of Ihe threads is the non-inherent cause of
the
,

Well, but
is

the cloth

inherent
it

cause of the colour of Ihe cloth,

thus

said thai every quality

when

is

only found with the cloth,

is

being non-inherent cause of the colour of Ihe cloth, as il, loo. is nected with the inherent cause; on the other hand, not the colour of the threads,
-

capable of closely con

Cf.

Vaicesikasutra IV,
|>.

1.

,"">.

1:1

See
I

13 b

Vicvakarman reads: read with Vicvakarman s text:

(SSj.

v<>L>\ata

ca

gunalyantabhavabhavah.

kasi/acid

171

C22)

as

il

cannot be applied on the

latter

lh;il

it

is

closely connected with

closely connected \vilb

the inberen!

cause

Do
cause
i

not sav that:

for

cause) which
is

is

Hie inlu

reiit

cause of a
in

things inherent cause

i.

indirectly closely connected with tbe inherent

question

Kffeclive cause (iiimiUakilrana^ the cause is termed which is neither inherent nor noil-inherent, and which nevertheless is cause; thus the loom etc. is the effective cause of the cloth. These three kinds of causes are only relevant lo positive cate
gories;
as this

when non-existence
category
(blinini).

(ablinini]

is

in

question, only elVcctive cause

is

relevant.

inheres

in

nothing:
that

for

inherence

is

quality with two existing

or other
is

things

Of
minent

these kinds of causes

is

one which

in

some way

most pro
is

what we

call

instrument.

Therefore the characteristic

alleged

right:

means

knowledge that it consequence wrong; acknowledges an object not formerly acknowledged, of knowledge (/O.-Tmn of the fol of this would be that a succession of processes same jar was concerned, lowing form, this is a jar; this is a jar when one and the would not be right knowledge, since Ibese (processes) would perceive something which
:

of right knowledge is instrument of right knowledge. On the olbcr hand, the characteristic 14 of means of right
is

lor the

was already perceived. And

it

cannot be maintained that

is

(in this case, tool

knowledge

of an object not (formerly) perceived ilhe object) is made tbe object (of the knowledge), as
ised
lo
(

at

hand, starling from the consideration that

it

is

more

precisely particular

by ever

new fragments
finest

grasp the
[he four

,r

(processes):
a

through perception it is impossible difference in time: if i! was possible, an illusory understanding motion, (disjunction, abolition of the former conjunction,
of a
lor

moment:

and entering of
Well,
perceiving

new) conjunction

as coexisting,

would be precluded.
knowledge, as for instance the are they instruments (of right
1

but there are so

the

many

causes of right
of

person and knowledge) or not?

object

knowledge;

Answer: As right knowledge needs not come into existence even if a perceiving are at hand, while, inversely, right knowledge person and the object of knowledge sense land object) will immediately arise- when the connexion between organ of has taken place, then only this connexion between organ of sense (and object) for by this eminence it rises over the etc. is the instrument (of right knowledge);
etc."

perceiving person
11 This view Kumarilabhatta.

etc.,

even

if

they are like one another

to Yic\

in

being elTeclive

all

of

is

maintained, according

akarman. by the famous teacher of MTmamsa

of
a

apprehend Paranjape uses as instance the falling lo Hie ground movement in the fruit arises, by that means process, while there are really four: lirst a is abolished, the fruit and Ihc tree are separated, thus the connexion between fruit and tree Yicvakarman Hie and fruit Hie ground. between filtered is connexion and finally a new
fruit:

we

its

lall

MS

one

leaves at once. illustrates by that process to pierce Kte. refers to inference, comparison and testimony.
!<>()
"

means more Ihan dice-live, and il was just thai which we Icnncd Therefore the perceiving person etc. is nol means of knowledge, bul only the connexion between organ of sense (and object) etc. because it is inslrumenl.
llu in;

most

clfeclive

inslrumenl.

IV.

Perception.

Now
the

there are four

17

means
are:

of

knowledge;
is

as the Xyfiya Sfitra

(I,

1,3) savs,

means
is

of

knowledge
.

perception,
is

inference,

comparison and

testimony".

What

perception

Perception

(pratyaksa)

the inslrumenl of intuitive, right

is

knowledge, and the knowledge by an organ of sense.

II is

termed intuitive (suksutkHrin) which

produced

Its

instrument

two-fold: differentiated (sauikalpaka) and undifferentiated (nirvikalpukd). is three-fold sometimes an organ of sense, sometimes the con
:

between organ of sense and object, sometimes notion jntiua). When is an organ of sense the instrument V An organ of sense is the inslru menl when the effect (phalli) is the right knowledge which has the form of undilTerenlialed; for the soul comes in contact with the organ of thought (manas), the
tact (saiiinikarsa)
(

organ of though with the organ of sense, the organ of sense with the object, il being an established rule that Ihe organs of sense produce the notion after having reached the tiling; then arises through the organ of sense connected with the object
I

an undifferentiated notion without connexion with name, genus, characteristic, etc., lh which only refers to the thing itself and has the following form: this is something: the organ of sense is the instrument of this notion, as Ihe axe is (the inslrumenl)
of cleaving; Ihe contact between organ of sense and object is the intervening operalion as the connexion of the tree and the axe as the instrument (wy<l]):lra)
1:I
{ai><lnlai

of cleaving; the effect of the axe.

is

an undifferenlialed notion,

just as the cleaving

is

(the effect)

When
after

is

contact between

the contact between organ of sense and object the instrument The of sense and is the instrument when organ object immediately
.

the undifferentiated notion a differentiated notion

arises consisting
this

in
is

con

nexion
Ibis
is
7

with
a

name, genus-characteristic, etc., which has Brahman, this is black and which refers to
,

form:

this

Dittha,

(the relation

between) the

Tarkikarnksa three verses indicating the point means of knowledge: The materialists Buddhists perception and inference; Samkhya these two together with testimony; some philosophers of Ny ay a the same, while others acknowledge in addition comparison; Prabliakarn (MImamsfl) acknowledges these four and, besides, implication; Kumarilabhatta s school of the Mlmamsfi and the Yedanta moreover non-existence as the sixth; linally Paurnnikas these Mentioned and, besides, possibility and tradition Kle. signifies quality, motion (Yiev.i. The genus-characteristic is the general notion
s

Yievakarman quotes from Varadarajn

of view of the diU erent schools as to the number of the ((tri ukd) acknowledge only perception: Vaicesika and

"

of things, for instance the notion of jar

injufjurd
is

</luilati>(i.

a thing and which at the same time produces that which is produced by the same thing: for instance Ihe contact between axe and tree is produced by the axe and produces the cleaving produced by the axe (If. Vicv.
is

what

produced by

170

object

and

-"

its

qualification

(mces(inai>ici>xija\:

Ihe unditVerentialed

notion

is

the

8)

intervening operation: elVecl is When is. further, a notion the instrument-?

the differentiated notion.

The undilVerentialed notion

is

Hie

instrument when

notions \hmltlhi)

immediately
In

after the

mentioned

of disgust, attraction or uninterestedness dillerenlialed notion; the differentiated notion

etc.,

arise
is

the intervening operation; the notions of disgust,

this

are the effect.

connexion
is

organ of sense

the

(however) il is maintained by somebody thai only the instrument also of the differentiated (notion), etc.; all the

thai case) Hie intervening operation. inUM-vening contacts, etc., form (in of sense and object which is the cause of intuitive The contact between organ

right

knowledge

is

six-fold

connexion,
inherence inherence
inherence,
in

in

something connected, something which inheres

in

something connected,

inherence

something which inheres, and finally relation between the object and its qualilicalion.
in

of the eye, a notion with a jar for its object arises, the of sense and the jar is object and their contact is a simple eye is (the acting! organ connexion, as il is out of question thai these two might not be found apart. the inner organ of sense, Likewise-, when, by means of the organ of thought, the organ of thought is of self, notion the a notion arises with the soul as objecl. contact is also simple their and the (acting) organ of sense and the soul the object,

When

thus, by

means

connexion.

When
of the eye of these
the jar

(on the other hand) the colour etc. of the jar

(so that

is

apprehended by means

with this jar black colour is found, then the eye is the objecl; and the contact the (acting) organ of sense, and the colour of the jar inheres in two is inherence in something connected, as the colour

we

slate.)

which is connected with the eye; the same kind when, by means of the organ of thought, we apprehend
etc.

of contact

is

forthcoming

the pleasurable sensation

a four-fold

inherent

in

the soul.
etc.

When

the dimension

of a jar

is

apprehended, we must adopt

it

(2U)

wanting, are incapable contact as further cause (of knowledge!, as we, when even if the mentioned of apprehending the dimension, etc., (of a thing) far away, is at hand; this four-fold contact looks thus:
is

inherence

something connected the parts of the object, connexion between Ihe parts of the organ of sense and a as the whole, between the parts object between the organ of sense as a whole and
in

or prakara the The object O/?.T.S-;/</) is lor instance a jar. the qualification (I iri snnd the relation between these two r. where of notion the jar >,hnlatva is. then, of a form thiim) we have the differentiated perception this is a jar. e. g. this thing is qualified is perceived undifferentiated Preceelin.u is always an indefinite, general, through the qualilication not is perceived. yet where the relation between object and qualification
"

<,lialuli>u.

perception

17

177

of the organ of SCMISC and the object as a whole, and (finally; between the ori an of sense as a whole and the parts of the object.

When

has,

then,

the

mentioned contact the form of inherence in

Hi ing

some

thing which inheres in some a knowledge of the general notion

inhering sense and
these two
in

connected?

When

by means

of the eve

(the genus-characteristic) of colour (rilpatna), etc., the colour of the jar is produced, then the eye is (the acting) organ of the general notion of colour etc., the object, and the contact between
,

is

inherence
of

in

something which inheres

inheres
in

in

something connected,
inheres
in

for the

general

notion

colour

the

colour which again

the

jar

connected with the eye.

When
prehended the sound

then, the mentioned contact inherence When the sound is ap by the organ of hearing, then this is the (acting) organ of sense and is the object; and the contact between these two is inherence; for the
is,
?
,

21 and the sound is a quality with the space, organ of hearing consists of the space relation and the between quality and the possessor of the quality is inherence. When is, then, the mentioned contact inherence in something which

by means of the organ of hearing the general notion (the genus-characteristic) of sound etc., inhering in the sound is apprehended, then the organ of hearing is the (acting) organ of sense and the general notion of sound etc., is the object; and the contact between these two is inherence in something
/
, ,

inheres

When

which inheres, the general notion of sound inhering in the sound which again inheres in the organ of hearing. When has, finally, the contact between organ of sense and object the form of
r e
1

on

ween
it

the object
is

and

its

qua
is

ca

on

vicesun twicesyabli
in

<~n>a

When

for instance the non-existence of a jar

is the non*existence of the jar, place connected with the eye. And when in the soul connected with the organ of thought (nmnas) the non-exist ence of joy, etc., is apprehended (and it is stated): I am without joy, etc., then the

with the eye (and

stated): in this place is etc., a qualification with the

apprehended found no jar, then

a place

connected

non-existence of joy, etc., is a qualification with the soul connected with the organ of thought. And when in the g-sound inhering in the organ of hearing the nonexistence of the general notion of the gh-sound is apprehended, (that is when it is then the nonstaled): the g-sound is without the general notion of the gh-sound
,

(30)

existence of the general notion of the gh-sound is a qualification with the g-sound inhering in the organ of hearing. Thus, in short, the non-existence (of a thing) is apprehended by means of an organ of sense, that is through a contact between

organ of sense and object, a contact which is characterized through the relation between object and qualification, connected with one of the live (mentioned) con-

See

p. (08).

but

is,

Here the text seems to he corrupted; Vievakarman s text inserts hhutalaiii viecsynni moreover, no more satisfactory as far as the symmetry is concerned. The sense, how
sufficiently clear.
Vidcnsk. Sclsk. Skr.
7.
I).

ever,
I).

is
K.

H;cKUc. hist.

0.4

iilus. Aftl.

II.

I!.

23

17S

nexions:

and

likewise

also

n h e

r e

n ce

is

apprehended
it

through the
ils

fact

thai

the inherence of Ihe cloth (in

tion

the threads)

is

apprehended by
is

being a qualifica

with the thread connected with the eye, (and

inheres.
is

staled):

herein these threads

Ihe cloth

Thus

described
is

the

here recorded)

summed

The
iated
six

right

knowledge depending and unditTerenlialed ils instrument

;

lakes place in six ways, and (what is up (in the following cloka): on an organ of sense is two-fold: different

contact which

is

three-fold,

and
is

its

contact

has

forms.
it

Well, be
has
a

admitted that the

nd

ITc

ren

ia

led (noiion)

different

(genns-characlerislici

real individual object (paramdrthasatsual(ikxan<tvisaya}\ noiion a led (notion) be perception, (Ihe notion! which has a general like testimony and inference on a for li it as
i

perception, as it hut how can (In

object,

depends
is

(objects), 2) and only be called perception, i) and tin- (notion) produced (immediately) by the objecl may individual Hut real is the thing, not only a real objecl is able to produce if. 3 for this one, the positive existence of which is refilled Ihe notion

form

(nknra)

vix.

general noiion

which

found

in

several

"

general

(lil)

in consisting only ol an through means of knowledge, is deprived of real existence is different which thai from (anyauynurtli). exclusion (of the objects concerned) does not hold true, as the Against Ibis we maintain that this argument)
(

of the things iixisluhhnta). general notion belongs to Ihe real essence have thus explained perception.

We

V.

Inference.
is

Then inference (anumrma)

syllogistic characteristic7
,

staled.

Inference
the

for

inference

signifies

means consideration of Ihe means of inferring, and you

therefore
is

infer through consideration of the syllogistic characteristic:

tion of Ihe syllogistic characteristic

The philosopln

;
(

m/a/u//v7/m//ra)

inference.

considera And

it

of Ihe Vaicesika denies, however, that inherence may be perceived p. :vi). by perception: it can only he perceived by inference (See Pracaslapadabhasya Vicvakarman s text contains one cloka more \\hich sums up what is perceived by of the colour, means of the six -contacts, vi/. f the jar. 2i its colour. :ij the general notion inherence. and non-existence and sound, of the notion the lithe sound. general the individual thing, hut not that of the
<)>
">.)

The Buddhists acknowledge only

is

the general noiion. that the general notion

reality See Sar\ adarcanasamgraha p. 10

>f

and Vicv.

p. :?1.

who

against the assertion

found with individual things, makes the Buddhist ask if it is found with other individual things; there totally or partially: in the first case it cannot be found notion is namely eternal, the second possibility is incompatible with its unity. The general one. and is found with several things; see below p. Like the horns of a hare (Vicv.). Vidhihhiira Vicv. explains by aslilixt. On the other hand it cannot be said, according to Vicv. in Cf. Xyayavartika p. 17.
(8(>).

the

is made words of U day a na, that logical inference is the syllogistic characteristic which a logical inference in reference the object of consideration, for the consequence would be that the syll. characteristic in these eases to something passed or future would be impossible, as

lias

no existence.

H
consists in

17

.)

knowledge of smoke,
((iniiniUi).

etc., !his

(knowledge) being the instrument of logical

of
lire,

knowledge
is

Logical knowledge

means knowledge

etc.,

and knowledge of smoke,

etc.,

the instrument hereof.

lion

the syllogistic characteristic / of this consist? Answer: the syllogistic

is
is

Now, what

makes us apprehend
instance,

the object by virtue the syll. characteristic of lire;

of the
for the

And wherein does the consideracharacteristic is that which concomitance. Thus smoke, for

(32)

concomitance

invariable companionship (of two things): where there is smoke, and only when (the concomitance) is perceived the smoke produces the knowledge
of lire;

(uyapti) is the! (33) there is lire, loo;

therefore

the

smoke

is

the

syll.

characteristic of the

lire,

as

it

makes

us

by knowledge (of the smoke) is termed consideration of the svll. characteristic. At first smoke and (in the same lime) lire is seen again and

infer (the existence of) the lire

virtue of the concomitance.

The

third

again, for instance, in the kitchen.

between smoke and

lire

is

stated:

Even
like

if

the repeated

sight

By this repeated sight an essential connexion b where there is smoke, there is (ire, too. takes place in the same way by an observation
-

(34)

this:
,

where we have the notion of

does not,

Maitri

son

we have

also the notion of

black
Maitri

there

however,
,

exist

any

essential

connexion

between

to

be

son

and

to

be black

but only a conditional (connexion),

1

because the

is required consisting, for instance, in the of For when to be black is in question, to be Maitri s son digestion vegetables. is not the effecting factor, but, for instance, a certain assimilation of vegetables, and the effecting factor is termed necessary condition.

fulfilment

of a

necessary

condition"

For the connexion between smoke and

dition (to be required fulfilled); or not; in the latter case there
for
is
if

fire
is

there

is

found no necessary con

its

there

any,

it

must

former case

it

is

(in

no reason for admitting the connexion in question) not seen.

existence,

either be perceptible and in the

a necessary condition is required, it will be seen, too; as, for instance, the presence of wet fuel, when the connexion of the fire with smoke is in question; or like the fact that the action concerned is prohibited when the connexion between
:!
"

Where

to commit slaughter and to entail guilt is in question; or (finally) as a certain assimilation of vegetables, for instance, when the connexion between to be Maitri s son and to be black is in question. fact that the smoke is constantly accompanied by fire is concerned, the fulfilment of no condition is required; if such a one had existed it must have been seen; therefore it does not exist, as it is not seen; by means
it is possible to apprehend the concomitance, as we cannot come and smoke, the answer will be that knowledge of all lire and smoke is possible by virtue of a special knowledge depending on the acquaintance of the general notions lire and smoke See Siddhantamuktavall ad Karika 03, Turkadipikn p. 91.
!

Hut here where the

II

you ask how

all

in

contact with

lire

-"

See

p. (43).
if

"

Thai means of course,

presence of smoke

is

inferred from

lire.

180
of

tliis

reduclio in
of

nbsurdum
I

(tarku),

which supports

non-observation
question.

the condition),

we

record that

a pi reeplion accompanied by no necessary condition is in

and (ire Now, when hat is the case, we record concomitance helween smoke is attended and their companionship by means of the perception which apprehends im sight, partly by an (sdnmknrd}
I

by repealed non-presence of this condition, apprehension pression suggested by no conTherefore between smoke and lire is found only an essential connexion, ditional one, and an essential connexion is termed concomitance. When by that way we get an understanding of the concomitance between smoke and (ire, the first knowledge of the smoke is that which lakes place The second knowledge of the smoke is that which lakes in the kitchen. Then the con of the syllogism (paksd). place on a mountain or another subject and the comitance formerly apprehended between smoke and lire is remembered on the here considered: is which is found there on the mountain again
suggested
of
the

partly by an impression

the

smoke
1

mountain smoke
e

is

found, invariably accompanied by

r.

lire.

This

is

the

third

know-

d ge o

mok

Thus
as follows:
(ire

the

mallei

must necessarily be regarded, otherwise

is

it

would only run

of
is

where there
be
attained"

smoke

there
a

is

lire;

but

how should an admission

there

here
,

Therefore

knowledge of the form:

smoke

here,

the must be required, and just this (knowledge) forms the consideration of the is Ibis consideration forms the inference, as it syllogistic characteristic; and instrument of logical knowledge; from this (third knowledge) the logical knowledge
loo
arises: lire
is

found here on the mountain.

Well, but
in

why

is

it

not the

lirst

knowledge of smoke,

that

the kitchen,

which
is

makes

us

infer the

far be true,

but
that

we have
us,

only
is

when

not yel (at recorded, the logical

then, infer Hie

(presence of) the thai moment) recorded the concomitance, and

.

which takes place This might so lire

Well, but
ascertained.

let

lire

Hie subject of inference

No, for here the lire is must be such as

knowledge may appear. in the kitchen as soon as the concomitance seen it, and beyond doubt, because we have
is

doubled, as the author of the Hlifisya

has said: Logical proof lakes place neither against an object which is not perceived, which is nor against a mailer which is settled, but only in reference lo a mailer doubted.
Well, but

\/
|

why
a

is

not, then,

an inference concerning

lire

of smoke which

man
is

has
in

who simply approaches

the

produced by.lhe knowledge mountain; here, to be sure,

doubt as

a basis of the logical argu question, as doubt becomes of means knowledge being at hand. mentation, neither a conclusive nor a refuting This is in so far true; but remembrance of the concomitance is also a (necessary) the for the man who has recorded but forgotten cause of the
to the
(ire

logical

knowledge,

concomitance

may no more draw

.5.
|>.

logical

conclusion than the person

who

has

Yatsyavana

21

181

not recorded

by Hie sight of the lire Hie latent impression (saiiiskdru) CM) has been aroused, then Hie concomitance is remembered What is in possession of
it.
:

When

smoke
of

also in possession of lire, as for instance the kitchen. Therefore the third knowledge of smoke is that \vhich arises
is

when

the sight

forthcoming and which has the following form: this (mountain) is in possession of smoke. Only this (knowledge) and no other makes us infer (the presence of) lire, and herein the
the

smoke and

recollection

of the

concomitance are

consideration of the syllogistic characteristic consists. Thus (the stated) characteri/alion is established: inference is the consideration of the syllogistic characteristic. Now inference is twofold: that which takes place for one s own sake, and
1

The lormer is thai that which takes place for the sake of another person. which is the cause of one s own understanding (pratipatti). The fact is that when
a

person

hended

has through a qualified the concomitance between smoke and lire, and then
in

the kitchen or elsewhere

:!

perception appre has approached a

which
then,

mountain, and doubts the existence of fire thereon, and then sees a streak of smoke is on the mountain and unbroken ascends from this towards the clouds,
a

latent impression being

aroused by the sight of the smoke, he remembers

is

the concomitance:
is

where there

smoke

there

is

lire,

realizes

now

that here, loo,

smoke, and attains to the comprehension: accordingly there is lire here on the mountain. This is an inference for one s own sake. The inference for the sake of another person arises, on the other hand, when, having himself inferred the lire from the smoke, a man applies the proposition with the live members (auayava) to make it obvious to another person. It has
the following form
:

This mountain has

lire.

Because

it

has smoke.
lire,

What
Thus

has smoke has

is

too, as

for instance the

kitchen.

also this (mountain).

it

Therefore

is

so.

Starting from the syllogistic characteristic staled in this proposition, and furnished with the live qualities", another person, too, understands the (existence of) lire.

Therefore Ibis

is

Mere
fact

what

is to

called an inference for the sake of another person. be proved (stldhya) is that the mountain has

(38)
lire,

and the

mountain) has smoke is the reason (hetu). The latter is in posses sion of both positive and negative (concomitance), the concomitance taking place both positively and negatively. The positive concomitance (anvayavijapti) runs namely as follows: where
thai (the

possession of smoke there is also possession of kitchen; for in the kitchen we find stated the connexion
there
is

lire,
;;1

as for instance in the

(anvaija) between

smoke

and

fire.
-

Qualified through

freedom
Yie;v.

of co n

<1

o n

;in<l

through

concomitance.

See
;u
i.

p. ill

NYilli

inusl be read pancariipopapannal.

e.

simultaneous presence.

182

In

like

manner
lire

the

negative concomitance

not smoke, either, as is lire. By negative con exclusion imintireka) of both smoke and pond we lind the which of that the is the by positivenegation following comitance the regular order here accompanying (ini<lpaka), and concomitance was (mjnpijd) becomes
there
is

not

there

(injatirekavydpti) runs: where for instance in a pond; for in a

accompanying positive concomitance) Il is expressed (in the following clokas) accompanied. found between the negations of two things Ihe negative concomitance) is
the negation of that
1
"

accompanied which (by

was

becomes

between accompanied and accompanying admitted between Iwo things (by positive concomitance) and what is is accompanied, By positive concomitance the reason (sildhaim) the negation of what is to be proved isHdluja) is accompanying: in the other case, reason is accompanying. to be proved is accompanied, and the negation of the the accompanying; thus examined First the accompanied is staled, and then
inverse
relation of the relation
.

(By

the true nature of the concomitance

becomes obvious. the concomitance lakes place both in Ihe propositions only the positive concomitance positively and negatively. When one alone, and is slated, this statement is done because Ihe result is attained by -- il being un two the of direct concomitance is the most because the

Thus with

reason like

to

have smoke

positive
a

reasonable,
il

when

result

may

be arrived but
il

by

roundabout way

is

found.
tive

Thus the reason lo have concomitance, and likewise other reasons, too. are found with both positive and negative concomitance, as for instance a reason like to be produced when is what is to be proved. to be transient has only negative concomitance, as lor (Another kind of) logical reason when Me) be animated is elc. instance the reason Mo be in possession of prfma
smoke"
1

by the straight way, to try to reach not because no negative concomitance is is in possession of both positive and nega
at
,

..

what must be proved. Accordingly:

The
As
it

living
is

body

is

animated.

in

What
Thus

is

etc. possession of prfma, not animated is not in possession of prfma, etc.,

like

for instance

the

jar here.

this

living
il

body
so.

is

not.

Therefore
In this

is

not

instance
in

and

to

be

concomitance,

positive of the following form is lo be found:

what is to be proved, has is the reason: exclusively negative possession of prfiua, etc. concomitance may be imagined: lor no instance (<//-.s//7/i/) as no
Ihe

animation of the living body

,

is

il

whal

is

in

possession of prfma,
f.

etc.,

is

ani-

The
"

iHenares 181)8- )!)). one is found in Rumania s <;iokavartika p. iiSl thetranslators see p. 8(5. (Copenhagen Yoga Breath, one of the live animal spirits;
lirsl
llu-

1!

etc.

si-Millies

other diaraelerislics of Ihe soul, mentioiu d

in

Yaicesikasutra

III. 2.

I.

mated, as

for

instance

*.

All

what

is

living

body

is,

namely,

(in

this case)

the

subject of the inference (pakxa).

Also the chief characteristic (of a tiling) is a reason which has only nega For instance the chief characteristic (laksana) of the substance (40) of earth is the possession of smell:
tive

concomitance.

The present
As
it

object of the discussion

is

to

be termed

earth

is
is

in

What
Or (another

possession of smell. not called earth is not in possession of smell, as for instance \valer.

instance): the chief characteristic of the

means

of knowledge

to

be

instrument of right knowledge.

etc.,

Accordingly:
.

must be termed means of knowledge Perception, As it is instrument of right knowledge. What is not termed means of knowledge is not instrument of

right

know

ledge, as for instance fallacious perception. Here no positive concomitance is forthcoming, for no instance of the following form is found: what is the instrument of right knowledge must be called means of

knowledge, as

for

instance such

or such,

all

that

is

means

of

knowledge being

the subject of the syllogism. In these instances the designation (i)yavahara) itself is what must be proved, and not the notion of means of knowledge ( pramanalmi); for as just this consists

made

being the instrument of right knowledge and, accordingly, is not different from the fault would occur which consists in (reason) being identic with what is to be proved (sudhydbhedadosa}. Thus the reasons are stated which have only concomitance. negative
in

reason,

Another kind of
instance:

logical reason

has only positive

concomitance,

as for

As

may be named. may be made the object What may be made the object
117

Sound
it

of right knowledge. of right knowledge

may

be named, as for

Thus

this

is,
it

too.
is

instance a jar.

Therefore

so.

Here the sound

that
it

This (reason) has exclusively may as no instance of positive concomitance, negative concomitance of the following form may be imagined what is not able of being named cannot be made the object of The fact is that an instance right knowledge, either, as for instance this or that. must always be slated which is aulhori/ed by a means of knowledge, and it must of course be capable of being perceived and named.
:

be

made

capability of being named is what the object of right knowledge.

must be proved

the reason

is

Of

these

three

kinds of)

inferences,

with both positive and negative con-

comitancc, only with positive, or only with negative concomitance, the reason which
117 I

read with Yicvakurman

text:

calxlo bhidhevali.

184

has

both

prove bul one of them.

(41)

concomitance is capable to prove \vbal positive and negative with live qualities (nlpa), but not if only as far as it is furnished
live qualities are:

it

it

must wants

The
to

concomitance, Hie subject of the syllogism, as it is namely, an attribute of the mountain, be found with analogous found with the mountain. Likewise (is here staled): to instances like the kitchen. instances, i.e. it (Ihe reason) is found with analogous the pond, to be excluded from contrary instances like (In like manner we have): an object has either, not, smoke have to (A reason like) is not found there.
i.

be an attribute with the subject of the syllogism (paksadharnmtva), to be found with analogous instances (sa/wiA .se saliva), to be excluded from contrary instances (vipakxtid vyavrtti), and not to have an object which is contradicted (abddhitavisayatud), not to be counterbalanced (by another reason, asatpralipaksatva). and negative Tliese (pialities are found with a reason which has both positive smoke is, have To smoke to have reason) the for instance (with
.

e.

il

smoke is Inequality which is contradicted; for the object of a reason like to have not contradicted, i. e. not which must be proved, namely to have lire and it is reason) to have overthrown by any means of knowledge whatever. Likewise (the reason; the e. il is not hit by any contradictory smoke is not counterbalanced, the which contrary ot proves fact is that another reason is called contradictory,
,

i.

what has
like
a
to

to

be proved, and such a one

,

is

have smoke as we cannot see it. smoke reason like to have smoke therefore this 4o have
,

not to be found as opposed to a reason 3 are found with Thus all live qualities
"

is

logically conclusive

with reference

have lire. an attribute with the subject of the syllogism is proved by The logical inference has, namely, the reason s being an attribute with the same. an attribute two constituents: the concomitance and the (reason s) being what with the subject of the syllogism; of these the concomitance proves connexion the while special must be proved, in its general form (sddluiasdmdmja), of what is to be proved with the subject of Ihe syllogism (paksasambandhitvamresa) an attribute with the latter. is proved by the fact that the reason is attribute with the mountain, we infer By the tact that to have smoke is an Otherwise we might quite do Ihe connexion of the tire with just this mountain. form Irom is proved in ils general without the inference, as what is to be proved the apprehending of Ihe concomitance alone. and negative concomitance loo, which have both positive All other
to
k

lo

Thai the

lire

is

reasons, with these five qualities, otherwise are only right reasons when they are furnished reasons. The reason which has no as as much i. e. they are fallacies (helvdbhdsa) on the contrary, what it must prove, when merely positive concomitance proves, as far as il is concerned, lo be excluded only fournished with four qualities, for,
"

Concerning the relation of the

live -qualities

to the live -fallacies

see p. (110).

25

185

from contrary instances is out of question, as such are not found. Also the reason which has negative concomitance only, is merely furnished \vith four characteristics, tor, as far as it is concerned, to he found with analogous instances is out of question, as such are not found.

Now, what
instances
?
It

are

subject of the syllogism

analogous instances
the

and contrary
(42)

is

explained:
(

Subject of the syllogism

which
is

[>aksa]

is

doubted, and which must be proved, inference from smoke.

thing which has an attribute for instance the mountain in an

Analogous instance
session

(sapakxa)

a thing

is

called,

which

is

in

of the attribute

same
sion

logical

which must be proved, inference from smoke.

(vijtaksa) a

for instance

the

decided pos kitchen in Ihe

Contrary instance
of the negation logical inference.
of

thing

is

called,

which

is

in

decided posses
in

what must be proved,

for instance the

pond

the

same

Thus

three (kinds of) reasons are staled: with both positive and negative con

comitance, with only positive concomitance, and with only negative concomitance. (Reasons) different from these are called fallacies. Fallacies (hetuablulsa) are reasons which want the characteristics (laksana)
of a
reason,

many

forms.

but which, nevertheless, look like (real) reasons; they appear under They are live the irreal, the contrary, the non-cogent, the counter

balanced, and the refuted.

the irreal one (asiddlw) is a such the existence of which with the of the subject syllogism is not an established fact. This irreal (fallacy) is divided into three kinds, according to its being irreal (1) as far as its substratum, (2) as far
as
it

Of them

itself,

or (3) as far as the concomitance

is

concerned.
is

That which, concerning the substratum,

(for instance the following):

irreal

(ricraijusiddha)

is

The

sky-lotus

is

fragrant.

Because it is a lotus. Like the lotus growing

in

the pond.

Here the sky-lotus is the substratum (of the reason), but such a one does not exist. A reason, irreal as to the reason itself (svarupasiddha), (is found in the
following syllogism):

Sound
As
it

is

is

transitory. the object of the organ of sight.

Like a

jar.
,

Here the reason is to be the object of the organ of sight but this (reason) is not found with sound, as sound is the object of the organ of hearing. The reason, irreal as to the concomitance (injapyatvusiddlia) is again divided into two subdivisions: on is due to want of a means of knowledge for
1)

(43)

K.

1)

VicliMisk.SrlsU. Ski-

186
the other to the existence of apprehending the concomitance, must he required fulfilled). The first (is found in the following syllogism):
a condition

(which

What

exists has only

momentary
.
. .

existence

(ksanikd)*"

like the clouds.

Now, sound

exists, etc.

us apprehend But there does not exist any means of knowledge which makes maintained it is If existence. the concomitance between existence and momentary because it is conditional, then that (the reason) here is irreal as to the concomitance, due to something else. is existence the momentary has to be admitted that it

The second (subdivision appears in The killing connected with

As
it

the following way):

sacrifices

produces

guilt.

is

killing.

Like killing outside

sacrifices.
itself

Here

it

is

not

namely the thing

it

to

he killing

which occasions
is

the pro

ducing of

guilt,

hut

is

the fact that (the particular act)

is

prohibited,
fulfilled).

which
a

is

the producing factor, i. e. the condition (that For the chief characteristic of a condition (upddhi)
tion
is

must be required

the following:

condi

proves.

but not what the thing which invariably accompanies what must be proved, for the notion is found with the notion prohibited

This (characteristic)

what must he proved, vi/. the production of guilt: where prohibited accompanies we have production of guilt, we have invariably also the notion prohibited On the other hand the notion prohibited does not accompany what proves,
.

(44)

vi/.

to

be killing
prohibited

notion

where we have the notion as we have not the notion

killing

we have prohibited when

,

not invariably the the killing of the

animal

for sacrifice is in question.

Ho
a

like to be prohibited is required, (a reason like) As, consequently, a condition is concerned, and dependent on be killing is irreal, as far as the concomitance

concomitance produced by something

else."

(virnddha) should be proved. For instance:

Contrary

is

the

reason

accompanied

by the opposite of what

Sound
As
it

is is

eternal.

produced. Like space.

is
,

accompanied by the notion transient consequently which was what should be proved; what is pro of the opposite of to be eternal reason to be produced duced is namely transient and not eternal; therefore the
For the notion produced
,

is

contrary.

The no n -cogent
!W

(fallacy

anaikantika

is

the reason)
logical

which allows another

inference with fallacy
is

What Kecava here

states as an instance of a

the
Cf.

famous doctrine of the Buddhists on the Sarvadarcanasamgraha p. 7 10.

40

wrong momentary

existence of everything existing.

Viz.

by the condition

in question.

27

187

inference
its

than the intended (savyabhicara).

It

lias

two subdivisions, according

is (a

to

being too general or loo particular.

Of

these

too general (sudharandnaikanlika)

reason) found both with the

subject For instance:

of the

syllogism, with analogous instances, and

with contrary

instances.

Sound
As
it

is

eternal.

is

the object of right knowledge.

Like space.

Here the reason

is

to

be the object of right knowledge

the (reason)

and
is

it

is

found with
excluded

both eternal and transient things.

Too particular

(asadharananaikantika}

which

is

from both analogous and contrary instances, and which For instance: subject of the syllogism.

is

only found with the

The element
Because
it

of earth

is

eternal.

has smell.

excluded from analogous instances, eternal things, and from contrary instances, perishable things, and is only found with the element of earth. The counterbalanced 41 reason (prakaranasama) is the reason opposed to
is

To have smell

which another reason For instance:

As
it

is

found, which proves the contrary of what should be proved.

lransienl

is

without eternal qualities.

And:

Sound is eternal. As it is without transient

This (fallacy)
is

qualities.

Refuted
the negation of

called the neutrali/ed (satpratipaksa). (kalatyayapadista)* the reason is called the object of
1

which

is

refuted,

what must be proved being another means of right knowledge. through

Fire
is

stated with the subject of the syllogism For instance:

cold.

As

is produced. Like water.

it

(45)

11 have used in the translation the terms by which they As to the two hist fallacies, are later on designated (satpratipaksa and bitdhita) (and which are found, too. with Kecava), in order to avoid the obscure terms borrowed from the Nvayasutra I, 2, 48 and applied with him, with the more reason as Keeava s explanation of these two fallacies agrees with the later conception, and not with the explanation which the Sutra and the Bhasya give of them. The terms of the Sutras are respectively pvakaranasama which according to Vatsyayana seems to mean what does not gel further than to assertion and counter-assertion and kalaI
.">(),

tyayapadista which musl mean the one staled after the lapse of the favourable moment or the like. It is evident thai none of these designations applies to Kecava s explanation, as. upon the whole, the fallacies mentioned in the Nyayasutra t, 2, 1(5 and the Yaicesikasutra III, foil, might hardly be reconciled with the system given in the compendiums later on. 1, With the exposition of the fallacies finished here may be compared the more detailed treatment which follows p. (101) (110).
f>0
lf>

24*

188

Here the reason is to be produced and what it must prove is the notion But the negation of this we have stated through perception, perceiving (that cold
.

lire

is)

hot through the perception which Thus inference is finished.

VI.

is

called touching.

Comparison.

knowledge of an object characleri/ed through (upamana) a knowledge accompanied by the remembrance likeness with (for instance) a cow, of a tending to the transfer (of qualities from one thing the

Comparison
object

is

of

proposition

to another, alidecavakya}.

some

As, for instance, inhabitant of a

when
forest

man who
has heard

does not
a

know

buffalo looks like a

buffalo (gavayd) but from cow goes into the

forest,

and remembering the object of this proposition, sees an object characterized is the knowledge which takes place through likeness with a cow, then comparison characterized through likeness with a cow and accom reference to an
with
object
object panied by the remembrance Knowledge through it is an instrument of knowledge through comparison (npamiti). characterized of an through object takes place immediately after the sight

of the

of the

above mentioned proposition;

for

comparison

likeness with (for instance) a cow,

and consists

between denomination and denominated: This is the result (phala, of the comparison). the word buffalo.

understanding of the relation this object must be denominated with

in

Thus comparison

is

finished.

VII.
(46)

Testimony.
man.
Trustworthy is collection of words

Testimony
the

(rabrfa]

is

the statement of a trustworthy

(47)

is a thing as it is. A statement (sentence) which are in possession of (reciprocal) dependence (strictly speaking: claim),

man who

stales a

com

patibility,

and juxtaposition. Therefore words like cow, horse, man, elephant

are

no sentence,

as they

want reciprocal dependence (akdnksa). is not No more is you shall besprinkle with tire a sentence, as compatibility no is there compatibility reciprocal found here, for between tire and sprinkling the inslrumentalis agnina fire is namely construction a By (aiwaya). for forming the of the act of sprinkling, and tire is not compatible (with given as instrument and fire therefore there exists between idea of) being the instrument of sprinkling: as there is no compatibility, and instrument, action no relation as between
sprinkling and therefore
shall besprinkle with fire is no sentence. words: bring the cow hither form no sentence Similarly/ for instance, the at intervals of three when they are not pronounced coherently but one by one, even if it is true hours, for there is no reciprocal juxtaposition (samnidhija) for forming a construction that reciprocal dependence and reciprocal compatibility

you

are found.

29

189

Only the words which arc in possession of (reciprocal) dependence, compati he wo desires heaven must bility, and juxtaposition form a sentence, as for instance
l

perform the Jyotistoma-sacriflce or at the river-hank are five fruits or the ahove mentioned words bring the cow hither pronounced without delay. Well, but here is it not the words which possess dependence, but the things (r//ia), as for instance the fruits, as far as they must abide somewhere (adheya), require a place as for instance the bank on which to abide (adhura}\ on a closer examination it is not the things, either, which possess dependence, for as dependence (here) has the character of a desire, it must be the attribute of something
,
, ,

(48)

conscious.
true; but the things are said to have dependence as they suggest with the person who hears the words which signifies them, the desire (dkanksa) of other objects, and thus the words, loo, which express the things in a figurative
is
,

This

sense are said to have

thing,

are

said

Or only the words, having espressed the dependence to have dependence in suggesting a desire the object figuratively
.

of

a
to

which is another thing. Thus the things, when they have dependence, become compatible for forming reciprocal construction, and thence the expression compatible is, loo, transferred
the words.

(49)

means the articulation of the words without delay by the same found immediately in the words, not (indirectly) through the things. By that we have arrived at the following definition: a sentence (vakijci) is a collection of words pronounced immediately one after the other, expressing things
Juxlaposition
il

man;

is

the

expressing

compatibility of which for reciprocal construction is obvious and which by the thing suggests with the listener the desire of another word or

another thing.
(pada) is a collection of sounds; collection (samilha) here means to of a be object single cognition. As we are incapable of apprehending several sounds simultaneously, the sounds in due succession being quickly destroyed, then, at the moment when we, after

A word

having apprehended the preceding sounds, hear the last sound, arises at once the comprehension of words depending on several existing or non-existing (no
longer existing) sounds, by
the

means
last

comprehension
is

of the conventional

of the organ of hearing, which is supported by meaning of the derivation of words, ami,
(finally) is

then,

connected ^wilh the

sound, and which

the

accompanied by the

(this

(saniskdra] suggested by apprehension preceding sounds; comprehension of words is produced) by virtue of subsidiaries (sahakarin}> like recognition; for by the perception where a recognition takes place, a former stale, though passed, appears. Then appears the comprehension of sentences, depending on several words, by means of the organ of hearing, which is supported by the notion of the thing that is expressed by the word, and has as its object the last word, and

impressions

of

the

190

which

is,

(finally,)

accompanied by the impressions suggested by the apprehension

forward by a trustworthy

of the preceding words. Such a sentence, pul

man
is

is

the

knowledge which

is

called

right testimony;

its

result

the

of right knowledge of the

means

object of the statement. This characterization of the

means

of knowledge:

testimony,
is

is

common

to

ordinary and Vedic tradition; as far exists that many a one maybe trustworthy, but not every one; therefore only some

as the ordinary one

concerned, the ditl erence

viz. such as originate from a ordinary statements are means of right knowledge, on the to As all. not Veda, contrary, any statement com (51) trustworthy person, but of right knowledge, as they means God is posed by the most trustworthy supreme are the statements of a trustworthy person, every one and all.

Thus

the four

means

of right

from these is no means of right knowledge, as far as it is means of right knowledge.

VIII.

knowledge are gone through; what is different here in so it is comprised under

Other Eventual Means of

that

right

Knowledge.

means of right knowledge; does not eat during the Devadalta for when we him who does not eat for the eat must night; during day, we comprehend that he therefore implication by day it is impossible to be fat without eating by night; the arisen through the impossibility of explaining the fatness in another way is means of right knowledge (which makes us comprehend) that (Devadatta) eats in etc., for eating in the night cannot And it is different from the
Well, but

implication

(artlulpatti) is a particular

have seen or heard

the fat

night.

perception

be the object of perception

etc.
is

for to eat by night (Against this we answer) no, of the following form:

the object of an inference

Devadatla eats by night. As he is fat without eating by day. He who does not eat by night is not
instance he

who

eating by day, as neither eats by day nor by night is not fat.

fat

without

for

Thus
(52)

person is not. is not so. he Therefore

this in

As we

this

way comprehend

that (Devadatla) eats

by night by means of
implication
called

an inference with only negative concomitance, particular (means of right knowledge)?

Well,
but
there
;

why
means

then regard
of

as a

is

another

particular
in

knowledge

non-

existence

(ablitiufi)

this

we must admit
for instance,

non-existence (of a thing);

order to be able to apprehend the the non-existence of a jar is apprehended

the
jar.

of by means of the non-apprehension (amipalabdhi) means the non-existence of apprehension, and through

Non-apprehension

this non-existence as

means

of right knowledge

we apprehend,

for instance, the non-existence of a jar.

31

191

This does not hold true; for what

non-existence,

is

the use of a

means

when

\ve

apprehend the non-existence (of a thing) only by

of right knowledge like means of

perception, accompanied by non-apprehension and supported hy a reductio in ah surd u in of, for instance, the following form: if there had been a jar here, il would have been seen just as well as the place (whereon it is not
seen).

having (the thing), both parties agree. But now no connexion takes place between an organ of sense and non-existence; 41 for we have two kinds of connexion: and none of conjunction and inherence them is found wilh the two factors in question. It is an established rule
,

Well, but the organs of sense make us only perceive an object connected wilh them; for the organs of sense suggest a notion (prakara) when they have reached the thing, because Ihey are instruments of knowledge, like light, or eye and ear suggest a notion when they have reached the thing, because they are exterior organs of sense, like the of for touch, organ instance, and that the organ of touch produces (notion) after reached is a fact on which

namely

that

conjunction only
is

takes place between

existence
factors)

no substance.
not

Neither
to

may inherence

are

known

not

be able to

two substances (drcwya), and nonbe in question as (the two exist apart. These (two connexions),
positive

(53)

moreover, are only

the
4;!

found as an attribute with

things

(bhava).

Finally

relation between object and qualification (vicexanamcesyabhava} is no connexion as (this relation is not different (from the two factors), does not sub sist in both, and is nol one thing; for a connexion is different from the two connected (factors), subsists in them and is one, as for instance the conjunction between drum and stick; il is namely different from drum and stick, subsists in them, and is one. Such is not, however, the relation between object and qualification; for the relation between object and qualification, as it is found between a man and a stick,
,

the fact that the stick acts as qualification not being a different thing (added to it) but even its character. And non-existence, too, appears as qualification, and in non-existence no category (padartha), substance etc.,
is

not different from

these two,

be imagined subsisting. 44 When, therefore, the character of non-existence is to occasion a notion (buddhi) coloured by itself, it is just that which makes it a qualification; and it is no different thing. Likewise the relation between accompanied

may

42
4:5

See

p. (16).

idea was that a connexion between organ of sense and object must lie found in order that a perception might be affected. The Mimamsaka, which is here supposed to deny the possibility of apprehending the non-existence of a thing through perception, asserts that a connexion between organ of sense and object is impossible when the non-existence of a thing as an object is in question. So far everything is clear. Hut when he at the same time proceeds asserting that the relation between an object and its qualification is not a sambandhu, he may be right; but it does not seem to concern the matter here, as this connexion by no means may be parallelized wilh a connexion between an organ of sense and its object and it is not either applied Ihuswise in the Nyaya.
14

The

Which would make

it

a different thing

192
"

32

and accompanier

(54)

and cause, and the like, must he accompany (the smoke) is just that character regarded; for with a notion depending on itself, and with the threads, (of the lire), which produces is in for instance, to he cause (of the cloth) is just that character of them which to that of the product, and no possession of pnesentia and absentia corresponding as And non-existence, too, appears accompanier and cause, and in different
(in

inference)

between

effect

fire, for instance, to

thing.

non-existence no generality (sdmdnya)

factors in question.

he imagined. Thus the relation between object and (nullification is not different from the character of the two
16
.

etc.,

may

(This relation)

does not any more subsist

he qualification
is is

in

both

(factors), as

with the

qualification only to the object only to be object

found, and not to be object, and as with not to be qualification. and found
either;
for

word bhmm which appears after the copulative compound thus dissolved: qualification and object, the being quali fication and object resp., must be combined with each (of the preceding words), two things, so that we gel: to be qualification and to he object: and they are and between relation object qualification while a connexion is one; therefore the
(This
relation)
is

not one

the

is

no connexion.

Such
panier
etc.

is

also

the

case

with the relation

between

accompanied and accom

on a figurative sense and is application of the word connexion depends real and connexion) are like one due to the fact that both relations (i.e. relation

The

another

in being produced through two factors. Therefore it is impossible to apprehend non-existence through with the latter. sense, as it is unable of being connected

an organ of
4

is This might so far seem correct; but (the above-mentioned) concomitance of a a notion which of sense gives only determined by positive things; an organ but it has reached, this notion only of a thing that positive thing gives, it is true, of sense this is not applicable when it gives a notion of non-existence; an organ of the means a so) non-existence (does by the of a notion (of thing) which

gives

(f>f>)

relation
school
that
1
"

between object and qualification;

is.

thus

the
the

doctrine
fault
is

of

our

And even through

this

theory of
a too

qualification

avoided
l!

wide application (atiprasanga), because (our conception) might we might also apprehend a non-existence not connected (with the organ of sense). The same might, by the way, occur, loo, at the admission of the opinion of our of faulty is the same with both parties, opponent; and when faulty and refutation
involve
lire is accom relation of concomitance, lor instance, between lire and smoke; fire. See without smoke (38). no have p. we panier and smoke accompanied, as Or an other from non-existence different category. 17 and connexion between organ of sense and object". See p. (52). Between
45

The

"

perception"

4* 4

See

p. (29).

"

We

apprehend, consequently, through

this
in

that qualilies an object, not the non-existence

process only the non-existence general of everything

of

a thin?*

the one ought

not
>()

to

be prosecuted further with questions

at

the consideration of

such a matter.

IX.

On

Validity of
1

Knowledge.
.

is Here Hie following consideration put forward When a knowledge (//mm/) of water, for instance, has arisen, a man approaches the water after having ascer

tained the validity of the knowledge; another man goes doubt and establishes the validity after having moved,

to vi/.

the place by reason of

when he has obtained

beforehand
I

the water; thus the matter may be regarded in two ways. Now here (a MImamsaka) says: the man moves after having ascertained the validity of the knowledge, this being ascertained from

he

know

ledge itself

(si>atas).

The idea is the following: the validity of a knowledge is apprehended through the same (process) by which the knowledge itself is gained, and Ihe (process) which makes us apprehend the validity of a knowledge, its attribute, is no other than that which makes us apprehend the knowledge itself; therefore the validity of a knowledge is apprehended from the knowledge itself, what means that il does not require any other (process) than that which makes us apprehend the knowledge. The knowledge itself is of course apprehended before the person moves. How
validity or non-validity be doubled, as no doubt may arise might has not been apprehended. which a thing concerning When therefore a person has apprehended Ihe knowledge before moving,

(57)

otherwise

its

by means of an
attribute)
to

impossible, Ihen the validity resting in and then the man moves. the knowledge is apprehended, too, through implication the is first so that But it is not knowledge apprehended alone, and that then
is
,

implication (arthapatti) be apprehended otherwise

which

arises

through

the fact

that (the

the validity of the knowledge

is

ascertained

by the sight of the

is

result,

after

Ihe

person has moved.

To

Ibis

we

say:

when

il

is

said that

knowledge
this,

an implication which

arises through the fact of (Ihe attribute)

being impossible otherwise,

we cannot admit

apprehended by means of to be apprehended we are also far from the and

a

apprehension of the validity of knowledge through implication. The following is, namely, the opinion of our opponent: when
has come
will be

knowledge
(58)

into existence, for instance with a jar as object, the result as to the jar to be apprehended expressed in Ihe following form: I apprehend this jar
infer that,

and hence we
r
>o

when

a
p.!)

knowledge has
II

arisen,

an attribute by

name

to

Kumarila, Clokavarlika

iv. 2.Y2,

cunyavada).

he easier understood il what the Mimamsa tenches is kept in mind, thai the validity of a knowledge is established through the apprehension of the knowledge itself, while Ihe Nyaya maintains that it is established independent of Ihe know
ri

The following exposition

will

ledge itself through inference.

"

Concerning

this
7.

means

of
C>K

knowledge not acknowledged

lilov

in

the

Nyaya

see
-

p.

(.">!)

1).

K.I). Vklensk. Selsk. Ski-.,

Ua-kUe, hisl.

d.

II.

:;.

194

34

be apprehended

through positive and negative concomitance thai it arises through the knowledge, as it has not arisen before the has come knowledge, but (on the other hand) has arisen as soon as the knowledge to be name attribute this Likewise originated existence. apprehended, into by with the knowledge, cannot be possible without knowledge, as a product does nol
has arisen, too, and

we

establish

arise

when no cause
implication
is

is

present,

and Ihus (the attribute)

to

be apprehended proves

through

;V.))

own cause, the knowledge. however, correct, as no attribute to be apprehended is found of the knowledge. beyond the character of being object when for instance a jar is in question, to be but (The Mlmainsaka): Well, to be is the same as to be the substratum of (the attribute) object of knowledge the know the knowledge. For Ho be object (of apprehended which is produced by does nol arise through consubstanlialily (tadatinya), as we do nol admit
its

(All) this

not,

ledge)

consubstantiality between the jar and the knowledge.

that to be object (of a

If

we

further

would admit

knowledge) depends on

consequence would be that for instance the knowledge originates also from the organs of sense. object (of the knowledge), as the Therefore we draw the following inference: through knowledge something (vi/. and this means which the in nothing arises just attribute to be apprehended jar by to be appre else becomes the object of the particular knowledge; (the attribute) be possible cannot hended is thus proved by the fad, that the being an object a perception alone. (otherwise), but nol through is not relevant, however, because the being an object may This consideration character the (svabliava) (of the particular factor) alone. be possible starting from such a natural particularity (viresa) that the Object and knowledge have, namely, and the vehicle of the latter (visayauisayibluiva) thus becomes relation between
)

relation of origin (tadutpatti), the the organs of sense, loo, would become
a

object Otherwise past and future (things) could not be an object, possible between them. know be to as (the attribute) apprehended in such cases could nol arise through itself the when arise (ilharmin) cannot a thing) thing ledge; for the attributes (of does not exist. Furthermore a new attribute to be apprehended must be required, we are led to as this attribute itself may be the object of a knowledge, and by this to be If it is maintained that (the attribute) a regressus in inlinilum (aiuwnstlnl). of its character virtue (snabhdim) a of an knowledge by object apprehended may be what is then the use of this attribute new

alone without any

being apprehended

question? admitted that (such an attribute) as to be apprehended exists, we that only the knowledge, [not its validity. If it be main (60) understand, after all, by tained that all knowledge is perceived through the attribute to be apprehended and its validity through a particular kind of being apprehended, then the know(the

when

knowledge
it

of) the jar, etc., is in

Or be

Tadnlnu/d

in

the

MTniamsa corresponds

to the relation of

inherence

in the Yaiccsika

.Yicvakarman

35

195
itself
is

consequently apprehended through Ho he apprehended 4 and its which is infallible in the know validity through a particular being apprehended ledge of a means of right knowledge, but how do we then get (the result) that (In
ledge
]"

by e. might be apprehended by other means, by other means than that which makes us apprehend knowledge itself. Knowledge itself is, namely, apprehended by a perception through the organ of thought (munasapralijakxa), but its validity by inference. After the know ledge of water the activity (pravrtli) with the person who wishes water may, namely, be of two kinds: successful or not successful. Of these the is successful
(fjaratas)

non-validity of the knowledge, so that a knowledge and its non-validity would be apprehended together by means of a special being apprehended which is infallible in the know ledge of what is not a means of right knowledge, and thus, too, the non-validity of a knowledge would be apprehended starting from the knowledge itself. If therefore the non-validity of a knowledge is apprehended other means
,

validity of Ihe knowledge is apprehended by the same factor which makes us apprehend the knowledge itself? If it is maintained that knowledge and its validity are apprehended together a by particular being apprehended which is infallible in the knowledge of a means of right knowledge, the same thing may be asserted over against the
,

then

its

validity,

too,

i.

activity

which

is

fit

(samartha), and

by means of that we infer the validity of a

is

know
a

ledge (ydtharthya).

The syllogism runs:

of water in question
valid (pramana), as
it

The knowledge
fit

produces

(61

activity.
is

What
Thus
Subject

not valid

knowledge produces no
right.

(it

activity,

like a

knowledge

only apparently
of the
;

the concomitance runs,

which
is

is

negative only.
a
its
e.

syllogism

is

here (he

knowledge of water which produces

its

successful activity what is to be proved not its object, being the instrument of right

validity
"

i.

its

agreeing with
is

knowledge"
".

as the consequence thereof

to

would be
a
fit

a fallacious
,

inference as

to

recollection"

Logical reason

produce

activity

i.

e.

a successful one.

When we

by such an inference with negative concomitance only have com

prehended the validity of a knowledge the first time it occurs (anabhyasada<jupanna), we infer, even before the production of activity, the validity of a later knowledge, a such (the like of which, accordingly,) has taken place formerly, by an inference

which has both

characteristic
(first

to

positive and negative concomitance, be of the same kind as the first one

and which has as syllogistic and which (finally) has this

knowledge) as an instance.
M The words
6

in

the brackets are not found in

a

Yicvakarman
a successful

text.

Read pramakaranatvam.

The

fact

is

that

recollection
Yicv.j

may

occasion

activity,

hut

it

is

not an

instrument of right knowledge.

25*

196

(62)

Therefore the validity of

other means and not by the

the
has

knowledge is only apprehended by an same (process) which makes us apprehend

a

knowledge
The means
thus
stated

itself.

of right knowledge, which are only four in number, Kecava for the understanding of young people, according to the doctrine
little

of the school and accompanied by a

argumentation/
the

With

this

(ends

the

exposition of)

category

called

means

of

right

knowledge.

X.

Objects of Knowledge.

organ
final

The (Nyaya)-sutra (1,9) the objects of knowledge (prameiia) are staled. of sense, objects, notion, runs, "Object of kowledge is soul, body, organs and of activity, defects, future life, fruit, pain,
Then

thought,
I

be ra

io

n."

1.

Soul.

>H)

(64)

is thai which is in possession of the germs-characteristic one to each body, from is distinct It soul body and senses, etc., is distributed, the direct of the is It perception through object omnipresent (mhhu), and eternal. are notion etc., the syll then qualities organ of thought; if this is not admitted, characteristics (which make us infer its existence). are For notion, etc., are qualities, as they, al the same lime as being transient, like colour; a quality must depend on a subapprehended by one organ of sense, the elements, as they stratum (gunin)\ now notion, etc., cannot be qualities with are found the qualities which are perceived by means of the organ of thought; for as example with the elements are not perceived through the organ of thought, time or organ of cardinal with (///r), be points qualities colour; neither they

Of

these

soul (atman)

7 the qualities in cardinal points, etc., as thought, as they are particular qualities common for instance number, are not peculiar qualities: they are, namely, qualities as they to all substances; notion, etc., on the contrary, are particular qualities,
;

may

one single organ of sense, like colour. together with being qualities are perceived by Therefore they are not qualities in cardinal points, etc. the eight must accordingly admit a substratum of notion, etc., distinct from runs: The syllogism (substances at hand), and that is even the soul.

We

,Kf>)

Notion,

etc.,

must

rest

with

substance distinct from the eight substances:

with
the
eight

earth, etc.

Because they are qualities without

earth, etc.

resting

substances:

desire, aversion, exertion, colour, particular qualities are: notion, pleasure, pain, and demerit, merit together with impression taste, smell, touch, viscidity, original fluidity, Karikavall 90 IT. Bomhay HMKV. and sound.
"

The

:M

197

That which does no!

etc.,
is

rest

will)

not a quality without resting with the etc., like, for instance, colour.

substance distinct from the eight: earth, eight substances: earth,

Thus with negative concomitance

With both
positive

only.

and negative concomitance:

Notion,

etc.,

must

rest

with a substance distinct from the eight substances:

earth, etc.

Because they are

earth, etc.

qualities

without

resting

with

the

eight

substances:

That which without resting with (a substance) is a quality, must rest with one distinct from this, as for instance sound, which does not rest with earth, etc., rests with the space (dktli-a) distinct from earth, etc.

Thus we have proved

from the eight: earth,
etc.

(the existence of)

a soul as a

ninth substance distinct

s are found omnipresent, as its effects, the it is in of as it is omni i.e. dimension; very largest possession everywhere, of like Because the of it is eternal, pleasure, etc., (it space. present, multiplicity to each one must be) distributed body.

This (soul)

is

2.

Uody.

Body
(of the soul)

(t-anrd)

is

that

which

is

the basis (dyatana) of the enjoying

*.

compound (antyavayauin) sensation of either pleasure or pain; basis of enjoying or suffering is that by which enjoying and suffering are determined, when they appear in the soul, and that is the body.
is

and

ultimate

and suffering and suffering Enjoying

(66)

(bhoga)

is

for
(

motion attainment or prevention of (respectively) good and

Or

the

body

is

substralion of motions;

means (here) action not motion in general evil,

(cesla)

(67)

spandanamatra).
3.

Organs of sense.

of sense (indriya) is that which is imperceptible, instrument of know and in ledge, conjunction with the body. If there was only said organ of sense the consequence would be that lime, etc., were an is that which is imperceptible This added, the organ of sense, too; therefore we said instrument of knowledge characterisation would, moreover, be loo wide, still, (being applicable also) on the

Organ

contact between organ of sense and object;

the body. the body said
If
,

we had only

light

therefore we said in conjunction with instrument of knowledge and in conjunction with for instance might also be called an organ of sense; therefore we
said

imperceptible.

The organs

of sense

are

six

organs of smell,

taste,

sight,

hearing, touch, and thought.

"

With

this
is

"

What

is meant notion, pleasure, etc. (Vicv.i not itself a part of a further unity.

198

38

Of
it

these

organ of smell
it

(ghrana}

is

the organ
is in

perceptions, and

has

its site

in the lip of the nose.

it

which As it

is is

the

means

of olfactory

in possession of smell,

(68)

consists of the element of earth, and us apprehend smell; an organ of sense

colour,

etc.,

us apprehend smell; therefore

possession of smell because it makes connected with that of the five qualities: which it apprehends, as, for instance, the organ of sight, which makes colour, has colour: now the organ of smell makes us apprehend
is
it

is

in

possession of smell.
in

Organ
taste,

of taste (rasaiia)
has
its

and

it

site

the organ which the lip of the tongue.

is

is
It

the

means

of perception of

consists of the element of

water, being in possession of taste, and it is in possession of taste because it of the five (qualities): colour, etc., manifests just taste, like for instance saliva. of (aiksns) is the organ which is the means of perceptions of

Organ
and
it

sight

colours, fire, as

it

has

its

site

in

the tip of

the pupil.

It

consists

of the

element of
light.

of the live (qualities): colour, etc., manifests just colour, like a

Organ
touch, and
it

of touch
is

(ti>uo

is

the organ

which

is

the

found

in

the
it

whole body, having

a

its

of perceptions of It site in the skin. consists

etc.,

means

of the element of wind, as

of the live (qualities): colour,

fan,

manifests just (the

the cool

perception of) touch, like touch of the water on the body

the wind arising from

which manifests

Organ
sound, and

of hearing
it

(rrotra)

is
1

only space
",

(akfira),

other substance

(69)

having the apprehend the sound; an organ of sense is conjoined with even that of the live the organ of sight, which qualities: colour, etc., which it apprehends, as for instance makes us apprehend colour, has colour; now the organ of hearing makes us ap prehend the sound, therefore it has sound as a quality.

the organ which is the means of perceptions of limited by the auditory passage, but no i. e. sound as a quality; and that it has, making us
is

Organ

of

bought
It

of pleasure, etc.

(manas) is the organ which is the means of perceptions has the dimension of an atom (anil).
is

Well, but what

now
?

the

proof
etc.,

(i>rainana)

of the existence of the organs of

vi/.:

sense, organ of sight, etc.

(The proof

is)

an inference,

Perceptions of colour,

must be produced by an instrument (karana).

to cleave.

As they are actions

like the action

4.

Objects.
11
:

substance, quality, action, is generality, particularity, and inherence. Even if right knowledge, etc.,

Objects

(artha) are the six categories

definite aim. comprised under here, they are yet mentioned apart vdth
f>0

See

]>.

(75).

of the system of Yaicesika, sika; some repetitions hence

his exposition of the system of Xyaya the six categories consequently here quite a small compendium of the Vaiceresulting could not he helped, matters being here mentioned which partly have been spoken of, partly will be spoken of in its due place in the survey
"

Here Kecava introduces

in

i>ives

199
a.

Substances.

that

Of ((he categories) substance (dravya) isl hat which is an inherent cause or which is the substratum of a quality. The substances are nine, viz. the ele
(<7/r),

ments of earth, water, fire, and wind, space dlkilra), time, cardinal points soul, and organ of thought. Of these element of earth (prthwi) is that which has the genus-characteristic
of

earth

It

is

connected with
its

combination of

parts.
is

It

stones, trees, etc.,

and

in

hardness, softness, etc., according to the special has the form of organ of smell, body, lumps of clay, of possession colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimen

sion, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, fluidity and impression. It is twofold: eternal and transient; eternal as an atom, transient as a product. In either colour, smell, and touch are and
taste,

(70)

through heating; heating (pfika) means connexion with the former colour, etc., of the earth are destroyed, and
they are

transitory fire; by that

produced

means only
therefore

new ones

arise,

produced through heating. Element of water (fipas) has the genus-characteristic water it has the form of organ of taste, body, rivers, oceans, snow, and hail, etc., and is in possession of the above mentioned qualities except smell, and with the addition of viscidity. It is eternal and transient: according to its being eternal or transient its
,

colour,

etc.,

is

eternal or transient.

has the genus-characteristic fire and is divided into and lightning, etc. It has colour, touch, number, -, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, fluidity, and It is divided into four impression. It is eternal and transient as above. groups. 1) with developed colour and touch, 2) with undeveloped colour and touch, 3) with developed colour and undeveloped touch, 4) with undeveloped colour and developed touch. Of these developed colour and touch are found in the densified (pintlita) element of fire, as for instance common fire. Gold, on the contrary, has developed colour and touch, which, however, are suppressed; if it had not developed colour, it would not be visible, and if it had not developed touch, it could not be appre hended by the organ of touch; the suppression is produced by something prevalent of the same kind, viz. of the colour and touch of the element of earth. Undeve- (71) loped colour and touch has the organ of sight. Developed colour and undeveloped touch has the halo round a light. The fire (finally) which is in water has
(tejas)

Element

of fire

organ of

sight,

body, sun, gold

boiling

undeveloped colour and developed touch.

of the Xyaya; any essential contradiction we (to not lind, however. Here only the six categories are stated which are found in the old writings of the Vaieesika (Vaie. Sutra I, 1,4 and racastapada p. 6), and which, moreover, are known by Vatsyayana (ad I, 1,9. p. 1(5). As a supplement is, indeed, mentioned the seventh category non-existence (see p. (88)), which in later Vaicesika-literature (from Civaditya) has its place In along with the six original ones. the Nyayasiitra I, 1,13- 14 the objects, on the contrary, are the four elements and space together with their qualities.
1

62

Tbe proof

that gold

is lire

may

be seen in the Tarka-DIpika

p. 35.

20(1

4()

Klein on

of

wind

(ixlyu)

is

and divided into organ of touch,

connected with (the genus-characteristic) wind breath, wind, etc. It has touch, number, body
, t!:! ,

and velocity. dimension, separaleness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, the For touch, neither hot We infer the existence of this (element) from touch. with nor cold, which is felt when the wind blows, is, being a quality, impossible this substratum out a substratum, and makes us consequently infer a substratum; as the touch, and of element of the see earth, we the wind, as is even nothing
is twofold: eternal neither hot nor cold, takes place with earth and wind only. II and transient; eternal as an atom, transient as a product. Now is set forth the order in which the four (elements) earth, etc., as products

arise and perish

is

produced;

its

by action two atoms are inherent cause are the two atoms;
1 1

When

in
its

conjunction, a double-atom non-inherent cause is their

conjunction; effective cause

72)

is

fate uif/r.s/ai, etc.

is

When

by action three double-atoms

are in conjunction, a triple-atom atoms, the other two as above.

the three doubleproduced; its inherent cause are Likewise a quadruple-atom (is produced) by four By so on from the latter the grossest (composition of atoms). triple-atoms, and are wind and water, of produced; earth, tire, that means the perceptible elements which is found in the colour, etc., found in a product arises from the colour, etc.,
the inherent cause of
its

substratum, according

to

the rule that the qualities of the

cause produce the qualities of the product. thus brought into In the parts of a product-substance, for instance a jar, a disjunction (is hence and or blows, existence, an action arises through thrusts cause and com non-inherent is destroyed which is produced); then the conjunction instance the for then the product-substance, i. e. the whole, poses the whole, and Thus we have showed the destruction of a substance through the jar, is destroyed. Sometimes a substance is destroyed through destruction of its non-inherent cause. of the above the destruction of the inherent cause. At the lime for the withdrawal

draw in (the mentioned element of earth, etc., with Mahecvara (God) who is to in the atoms arises, and world), the wish of drawing in arises; then an action
then the because of the disjunction thus produced the conjunction is destroyed; the double-atoms perish, and next, because of the destruction of their substralums, the instance for Or are the element of earth, etc., destroyed. triple-atoms, etc., up to is destroyed by cloth is destroyed by the destruction of the threads. Its colour, etc., while the substratum the destruction of the substratum; in other cases they perish,
subsists, at the

(?;*)

forthcoming of contrary qualities, as

for

instance the destruction

ol

the colour of a jar, etc., through healing. Now what is the proof of the existence of a loins the finest (particle) seen in a

sunbeam

falling

(paramdnun It is explained: through a lattice, must be composed

When
in
i>od

the world of
(lire),
114

and

as In the four elements to appear as body is in question, it means respectively m;m (earth in the world of Varuna (water), in the world of Aditya, the sun2 in the world ol Vayn the C.od ol the winds (wind) (Tarkasamgraha p.
i.

Compare

to this

racastapiula

description

p.

18

IV.

41

201

by
a

like a

substance of very small dimension, being a substance which is a product, Also this (productive) substance must be a jar. product, as what composes perceptible (nmhat)* substance must of necessity be a product (itself). Thus we
a
to

have attained
too
is

the establishing
a

composed by
jar.

product, like a
it

of a new substance, termed double-atom. This small inherent a substance which is cause, being a very That which composes the double-atom is even the atom, and
else).
,

is

not

composed (by something

help""

as that which composes a productWell, but how can it be not composed substance cannot a being product-substance (itself) To be sure, otherwise we should have the fault consisting in an infinite series
.

would he thai the mountain Sumeru and a grain of have the same dimension, as in that case both would have been composed by an endless number of product-substances; therefore the atom is not composed. The double-atom, on the other hand, is composed of two, and onlv two, atoms, a single one not being able to compose anything, and no proof existing for the admission of three or still more. The triple-atom is composed of three double-atoms, a single one not being able to compose anything, and because it would
the
result

of products and

mustard-seed would

(74)

be impossible to account for the magnitude (mahattva) of the product, supposed to be composed of two only; for in a product the
7

if

it

were
arises

magnitude

through the magnitude of the cause, or through the multiplicity of the cause, and the iormer not being found" we must admit the latter; there is no proof for the admission of four or still more, magnitude being produced by three only. * Space (akara) is that which has sound as a quality. It is in possession of
,

sound, number, dimension, separaleness, conjunction, and disjunction; omnipresent, eternal, and has sound as syllogistic characteristic.

it

is

one,

How
For sound

is

sound
is

its syllogistic characteristic Through elimination (pari^e.vya). a special quality, as it together with having a genus-characteristic is
.

apprehended by quality must be

people by one external organ of sense, like colour. A (75) in a substratum; now neither one of the four elements beginning with earth nor soul may be a substratum of the sound, as it is the apprehended

common

by

organ of hearing; the qualities with the elements of earth, etc., are not apprehended by the organ of hearing, as for instance colour, etc., but sound is apprehended by the organ of hearing; neither may it be a quality of cardinal points (die), time, and

organ of thought, being a particular quality. Therefore we must infer a substratum of the sound different from these, and that is even the space.
one, no proof existing of its division (blicda}, and all requirements being the admission of its unity. Because of its unity there is not in space e. which may he made the object of Literally great", perception. I read with Yicv.: karyadravyatvavyabhicarat tasya. For the double-atom is not great com]), note K Must not be mistaken for the cardinal points (see p. (77)); akaea is a construction with Hie aim of attaining an element corresponding to sound, just as the four elements correspond cacti to its particular quality; it is not like Hie others composed of atoms.
It

is

fullilled
i:

at

i.

ll7

<),">.

I).

K.

1).

VhliMisk.

Si-lsli. Ski-., 7.

K:rliko, hist.

01;

lilos.

A IV I.

11.

;!.

2(1

12

round

termed any generality (genus-characteristic)

-with

nkn.-alva,

as generality niusl

be

found
7C,,

more than
is

one.

its elTeel being appre omnipresent, i. e. of the very largest dimension, Space is eternal. it of its because omnipresence hended everywhere: Time (knia) we infer from a distance and a proximity contrary to thai relating con It is in to cardinal points. possession of number, dimension, separaleness, and disjunction; it is one, omnipresent and eternal.

junction,

How may we
to

infer
.

it

from

cardinal

points

In

the following

distance and a proximity contrary to that relating us way: as to an old man who is near to
,

(a notion of a) and who, because of his proximity, ought to be called near to cardinal points): and as to remoteness arises contrary to (the proximity relating to be called a young man, far from us, and who, because of his remoteness, ought to remote (a notion arises of a) proximity contrary to (the remoteness relating to that cardinal points); being a product, this remoteness and proximity, contrary

(77)

occasioned by cardinal points, makes us infer a cause, vi/. lime, cardinal points, not being able of being cause. and future past Kven if time is one, it gets the designation present
, ,

etc.,

by

virtue of conditional

man
like

gets the designation

factors u//n7J/;M like present, past or future actions, just as a factor begging etc., by virtue of a conditional cooking
,
, ,

the action

etc. to cook and omnipresence are due Klernily

to

time as above.

Cardinal points

u/iV

are

(as

substance, means
them from notions
a

for

locali/ing)

one,

of eternal, and omnipresent; they are in possession

number, dimension, separaleness,

like

conjunction, and disjunction. can have no other cause, and

in

We

infer

east

etc.,
it

as they

because

thing

is

the same,

whether

is

located

east or west.

"

Though
Soul
it

the designation (as substance) one, cardinal points get

vi/..

eastern

etc.,

by
;

virtue of a conditional factor,

(ninmn)

is

that

which

the connexion of the sun with different regions. with the genus-characteristic soul is

conjoined

manifold because of the multiplicity of pleasure, with number, and the nine which tioned; its qualities are the live which begin due to it) as above. Kternity and omnipresence (are begin with notion. is which that is conjoined with the genusOrgan of thought (mantis) an atom and is in posses of dimension the has it characteristic organ of thought is the instrument of the and sion of conjunction; it is the interior organ of sense, has the live qualities: number, etc. it is eternal, apprehension of pleasure, etc.; of sense make us apprehend Through conjunction with this the external organs
it

is

pain, etc.:

has been

men

(7S)

the things; therefore

69
7
"

it

is

means

of every apprehension.

I.

e.

like space.

The

(inference relating to cardinal points cannot consequently

list

depend on the thing

it

self.
71

See the

of

lie

qualities

p. i7Si.

II

cannot

he

apprehended
Ihe following:

directly

through
he,
1

perception,

hut

is

allaiiu d

by

inference.

Namely

produced by an instrument distinct from the organ of sight, etc. As they arise without any organ of sense, etc., being present. It is of an infinitesimal dimension. This instrument is even uuinas.
Pleasurable sensations,
etc.,
7 -

must

Thus

the substances are treated.

h.

Qualities.

Then qualities
characteristic,
sist

which
7

is

((juna) shall he spoken of. Quality is that \vhich has genusnot inherent cause, and Ihe nature of which does not con
in

vix. colour, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, sound,

in

motion.

It

abides

a substance.

There are twenty-four,

s e

lasle, smell, touch,

number, dimension,

pa ra

te n ess,

notion, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, exertion, merit, demerit, and

imp r ess ion.

Of these colour (nlpa) is a particular quality, to be apprehended onlv by It is found with earth and the two following elements. In the organ of sight. earth it is of various kinds: while, etc., and arises here through healing; in lire il
white and bright and does not arise through healing; without brightness.
is

in

water

il

is

while, bul

is a particular quality, to be apprehended by the organ of taste. earth and water; in earth il is of six kinds: sweel, etc., and arises through healing; in water il is sweel, does not arise through heating, and may he eternal or transient; it is eternal in water-atoms, transient in aqueous products.

Taste

(rasa)

1 1

is

found

in

(aamllid) is a particular quality, to be apprehended by the organ of found only in earth, and is fragrant or ill-smelling. Smell apparently found in water and other things must be regarded las depending on) inherence in 71 with waler, etc. something connected

Smell
il

smell;

is

Touch
of feeling;
il

(sparra)
is

is

a
in

found

particular quality, lo be apprehended only by the organ Three sorts are earth and the three following elements.

distinguished:

cold,

hot,

and temperate; touch

colour,
etc.,
1

is

cold

in

waler, hot in

fire,

and
they

lemperate

in earth

and wind.
are called developed (mlbhutd)

These four
inhere in the

(qualities):

when

same Ihing
7
.

as

magnitude (mahaltva), and may then be apprehended

s

by perception.
7 -

According
j).

to

Yicvakarman

te\t intuuis lias its silo in the he;irt: see his

former men-

lion of annuls
7:

IOC).

Of these three definitions the iirsl excludes the categories: generality, parti cularity, and inherence which have no genus-characteristic; the next excludes substance which is inherent cause, and the third action which consists in motion. 7t 1. e. earth mixed up with waler. ?n e. Accordingly not in an atom which, indeed, is not in possession of magnitude",
i.

perceptibility;

cf.

note

<>.">.

II

Number
(NO)

(saiiilJujtl)

is

general quality,

UK- cause

ol

k-rins like

unity

etc.

these unity It begins with unity and ends in in trans transient in eternal things, is of two kinds: eternal and transient; eternal on the unity of the inherent cause of its substratum. itory things; it depends a distinguishing on the contrary, is transient only it is produced by Duality, of Iwo and that is one is this form: one, notion (apcksnlmddln) of llu following
;

100,000,000,000,000,000 (parnrdlm). Of

cause,

objects seen; here the two and the distinguishing

unities are non-inherent objects are inherent cause, their notion is ell eclive cause, as duality disappears at its

destruction.

Likewise

triad, etc., arises.

is

Dimension

(pariinand)

the special cause of the term

measure

it

is

fourfold:

small, large, long and short. the dimension of a product;

Number, dimension or aggregation (practiija) produce the dimension of a double-atom thus is produced by
it

(81)

number as a produced by number, i.e. it has the dimension of a triple-atom, loo, is cause, arising from the duality of atoms; cause of its substratum; the e. by multiplicity in the inherent produced by number, of the inherent dimension the the dimension of a quadruple-atom, etc., arises by is produced by the cause of its substratum; the dimension of a piece of cotton
God
s

distinguishing notion;

is

i.

auareualion o
I~^

t*

of the particles of

its

cause;

the aggregation of the particles

means

The dimension the loose accumulation of the inherent cause of their substratum. with found is it as extension, space (<7Av7m), etc., of the atom, and the very largest
are always eternal.

Separaleness
eternal or transient;

jtrlhaklna
a

is

the special cause of the term

separate".

It

is

results transitory product separaleness does. guishing notion as duality, etc., Conjunction (sanujoya) is the cause of the term conjoint

with

from

distin

It
7

has two sub-

It is three and is found in them without pervading them altogether. of both, fold: arising from the action of one (substratum), arising from the action action the from arises which of that instance an As or arising from conjunction. immovable an of the mentioned post and junction of one (substratum) may be That cause. its non-inherent is arising a moving falcon; for the motion of the falcon of two from the actions of both (substratum*) is for instance the collision

stratums,

lighting

rams or

of

two wrestlers, both being

is

in

motion.

The conjunction

resulting

the conjunction of product and that which is not product, from a conjunction because of the conjunction of cause and what is not cause; for instance the junc
tion of

and tree. by means of the junction of hand the It requires Disjunction (vibhtiya) is the cause of the notion disjoint It is threefold: existence of a conjunction beforehand, and has two substratum*. of both, or the action from one from the action of (substratum), arising

body and

tree

arising
li

Hie Tarka-dTpika (p. 55; defined as to have the same substratum falcon perching on the post conjunction is found ;is its own absolute non-existence: with at the foot of the post. in the lop of the post, its absolute non-existence, on the contrary, 77 as ol the part of it. body The fact is that the hand is the cause

mnminjavviniva

is

in

;i

arising from a disjunction. Tin- lirsl of these is, for instance. Hit- disiunclion of a rock and a falcon through the motion of the alcon standing on Hie rock. The second
I

is, disjunction of two wrestlers or rams. The third is, for instance, the disjunction of body and tree through the disjunction of hand and tree.

for instance,

lie

Distance and proximity

distant

and
it

near\

They

are

(paratunparalue] are the causes of the terms of two kinds: occasioned hy cardinal points U//V),

and occasioned hy lime.

First shall be told
arise;
in

dinal points
proximity arises

how the (distance and proximity) occasioned by car two things being found in the same direction, the (quality) of
1

(<S2)

the nearer (sanmikrsla) through conjunction of the cardinal points and the thing, supported by the notion this is nearer than that in the farther, the (quality) of distance arises through the notion of its being farther (uiprakrxla}; near ness means the smaller (number) of conjunctions of conjoined things between the
;

thing and the

body of
shall

the beholder; remoteness

Then
is

it

be told

how

the remoteness

means the greater (number) hereof. and nearness occasioned by time

constituted; when a young and an old person slay at fortuitous places, then (the this is connected with a quality) of proximity arises in the young at the notion lower degree of time than the oilier and in the old man the (quality) of distance arises at the notion this is connected with a higher degree of time than the other.
,

Gravity (yurulva) is the non-inherent cause of Ihe first falling; it is found in earth and water; as it is said "Where conjunction, velocity, and exertion are nol
":

at

hand,
earth,

falling (arises)

through

gravity."
it

Fluidity
in
fire,

(dravatva} is the non-inherent cause of the lirsl flowing; and water. In earth and lire as (respectively) butler, etc.,

is

found
is

and gold

the fluidity occasioned, being produced through, connexion with lire;

fluidity
is

in

water the

original (naisargika).

Viscidity

(sneha)

is

fsame) previous quality substance (it belongs to).

in

smoothness and is found only in water. It requires the its cause and like gravity, etc., it lasts as long as the
is

Sound

(rabdd)

which

apprehended by the organ of hearing

is

a particular

quality with space. Well, bul how

arises
in

may

the

drum
true,
in

be apprehended by the organ of hearing, as the sound for instance, while the organ of hearing is found with (the
it

(83)

hearing)

manV
is

This
Ihe

but the sound originating from the

the

bouring sound,

same way
7
";

as

Kadambalree come out

at

Ibis

drum produces a new neigh one wave produces a new, or as the buds of sound produces another and so on, until the

organ of hearing, is apprehended by the latter, bul, neither the first sound, nor the intermediate. Likewise when a reed acccordingly,
the
7
"

last sound, arisen

Ct.

Vaicesikasutra
said to

V.

1,

7:

saniskarabhave
directions

ijiinilval pataiiiini.
at

They are

expand

in all

one time. See Jacob

Laukikanyavafijali

i.l

JOOj p. 10

and the quotations there given.

sound originating from the place where the wo parts separate, new sounds, the last sound at the organ of hearing, produces. Ihrough and this last sound, hut, accordingly, neither the first, nor the intermediate, is The notion that I have heard the sound apprehended by the organ of hearing. of the drum is, consequently, always illusory. When the sound of the drum is produced, the conjunction of drum and space non-inherent cause: the conjunction of drum and stick is ell ective cause, and is
is

cleft.

Then

the

a series of

space

cracking sound of the cleaving of a reed is two parts of the reed and (parts of) space is nonproduced, the disjunction of the Thus the first inherenl cause: the disjunction of the two parts is effective cause. sound arises Ihrough conjunction or through disjunction: the intermediate sounds and the last one, on the contrary, have the sound as non-inherent cause, and favour able wind as effective (cause), as il lias been said Yaicesika-sfitra 11,2, of), "Sound
is

inherent cause.

When

the

and by sound originates by conjunction, by disjunction, cause of all sounds, the first one as well as the others,
(8-4)

itself."

The only inherent

Like action and notion

the intermediate

sounds now one perishes by the last but one. and tin- last but one by the this is not correct, for the last but one cannot last like Sunda and I pasunda lasi one, as it only lasts for three moments, possibly produce the destruction of the one to the second moment of the latter, but last the accordingly only accompanies
tained
that) the last
"

is space. the sounds) last only for three moments; the first and it now he main perish by the sound they produce: (if

does not

exist

in

arises only

by the

moment; therefore the destruction destruction of the last but one.

its

third

of

the last (sound)

We

infer the destruction of

sound; the
a

fact

is

thai:

an gcnus-characienstic is apprehended by a like an jar. external organ of sense with ordinary man, perishableness Here the perishahleness of sound is that which must be proved: means that the nature lot a thing) is determined by destruction, but not that it is

Sound must be transient. As it together with having

connected with

being which
)

is

determined by destruction,
-

for the result

would

the negation of transitoriness, as he that we in prior non-existence the logical reason (in the syllogism above) rprior non-existence is without being: man together with is to be perceived by the external organ of sense of an ordinary as it is perceived by the senses if we had only said having a genus-characteristic we would have drawn a conclusion encumbered with exceptions (uyabhicdra), vi/.

would

find

(8f>)

as to soul; therefore

we

said

external organ of sense

to

as such an erroneous infer

be apprehended by .an external ence might nevertheless be forthcoming, because said in order to exclude the Yogi organ of sense might imply that of a Yogi, we

an ordinary
su

man".

Two

giants
p. (XX
i.

who

lilitinii
foe. cil.

for a
If

woman
p.
IS.

sent

by

Brahma

for their destruction

killed

one another.
M See

See .Jacob,

(15)021

proof of the existence of Yogis V It follows here: be perceived by somebody, being objects of right knowledge, like a jar; the person by whom they may be perceived is even Yogi. The mentioned inference might after all be erroneous because of generality etc.; therefore we said together with having a genus-characteristic generality and the two following categories are namely without genus-characteristic. Notion (bnddlii) is the manifestation of a thing.
is,

What

by

Ihe way. the

atoms

iniisl

he

al)le to

Pleasure
everybody.

(sukli(i)

is

joy,

that

is

what makes

favourable

impression

on

Pain

(diihklw]

is

suffering,

that

is

what makes an unfavourable impression

on everybody.

Desire
A
v e
r s
i

(iccha)

is

attachment.
is

o n (dncsa)

anger.
is

Exertion

(prayalna}

energy.

Notion and the following five (qualities) are the objects of perception through the organ of thought. Merit (dharma) and demerit (ndharma) are the special causes of pleasure and pain. They cannot be perceived through the senses, but are attained by inference: Devadatla
s

body,

etc.,

must be produced by

a particular quality in Devadalta.

is the cause of Devadatta s enjoying (and suffering), like the things produced by Devadalla s exertion. The particular quality in soul which produces body, etc., is even merit and demerit, exertion, etc., not producing body, etc. Disposition (saiiiskara) is the special cause of the term disposition. It is
it

Because

together with being a product

threefold:
in earth

Of these velocity (vega) found velocity, impression and elasticity. and the three following (elements), and with the organ of thought, is the
,

(80)

cause of motion.
in soul,

The (form

of) disposition called

impression
is

(bhrivana)

is

found

arises

through an apprehension (amibhanci), and

it

the

cause of

remem

brance.

Only when awaked

produces remembrance. Awaking means

of co-operative factors (sahakdrin). the sight of similar things, etc., as

"Similar

The
it

its obtaining co-operative factors of the disposition means

is

said:

things, fate (adrsla), or a

1

thought,

etc.,

awaken

the

germ

of re

membrance.

Elasticity
possess touch;
it

(sthitisthapaka) is found in some particular things (uiresa) which restores its substratum, for instance a how, the slate of which had

been altered,

to

its

former condition.
notion,
etc..

The

qualities:

merit and demerit, together with

impression, are

the particular qualities of the soul.

Thus
c.

the qualities are treated.

Action.

Now action
in

(kdrnuin)
it

is

staled.

Action

is

that

the nature of

motion.

Like quality

abides in substances alone,

and

il

inheres

which consists in the same

208
tiling in

48
the substance, also called
(of a

which

also the limited

dimension

ol

bodily form

the conjunction It is the cause of inheres. thing) with a later place, when Five sorts are has ceased. by disjunction the conjunction with the former place enumerated: to cast upward, to cast downward, to contract, to extend, and going;

by the expression

going

is

also

meant roving about,

d.

etc.

Generality.

Generality
found
in in

I.sv7/ji/7m/ai

is

the cause of the notion

conformity

(<inunrtti).

It

is

substance and the following two (categories). It is eternal, one, and found several things. Il is twofold: wider and narrower; of these the wider is being
the
latter

(.S7////7),

having]
notion

many
of

objects;

and
the

it

is

generality

only,

the

cause of
,

the

conformity;

narrower (generality)

is

being merely the notion

substance etc., the latter having (comparatively) few objects; it is both generality and particularity, being also the cause of an exclusion (v\]avrtti). Here someone objects-generality exists different from the individual di lie re ill objects with different things (t Udkth; to this we answer: on what depends, the notion of oneness, if not on one thing that is in characteristics
"No

being
this

found

in

all

ol

them;

Well,

but

question, there is such a thing, it is even generality. notion of oneness may be occasioned by an exclusion
if

from

what is not the particular thing: exclusion from what is not cow, for instance horses;
is

lor thus

there

found

in

all

objects of

cow an
several

and

lluis is

found

in

which as its object has an exclusion Irom objects this notion of onenes, a notion what is not cow, but which, on the other hand, has not as its object a positive
generality: the notion

cow
not

This, however,

is

correct,

as

we only by

positive way apprehend

the

oneness.

"

:;

e.

Particularity.

Particularity

(inresa)

is

eternal

and found

in

eternal substances;

it

is

the

Internal substances are space and cause of the notion of exclusion only. and the following three (elements), earth following; moreover (elements of)

the tour

when

they have the form of atoms.

f.

Inherence.

to

connexion of two things which cannot be imagined Inherence (fi(umw-~ exist apart; it has been mentioned above."
is

y<i)

"-

to Hie point, by -generality or -general notion is not quite means is. M<//m//i// what really but perhaps it nuiy pass when it is only understood to the same kind; individual belonging all in things found the common characterislie that which makes a substance a substance; Uhatalixi is that which makes a jar a jar. ilnwijatim has the of a thing, for instance soul, as that which compare above the frequent definition found (ieneralil.v is consequently a reality -soul atma). (atmasamanyavau genus-characteristic translation correct more a been have would in itself in the tilings, why -enus-eharaeteristic the worst of it. if the abstract point of the notion had not thus got M See 1(5).

(loinp. note

2.").

The

tninshilion of

.s<mmm/r/

.S<//IK//J//

p.

49

209

Well, but parts and whole cannot be imagined to exist apart, therefore the connexion between them is inherence; but Ibis is wrong, no whole being found different from the parts; for it is the many atoms which, combined in different ways,
are apprehended as, for instance, jar or cloth. object to this: the notion of a jar being one and gross (sllulla) depends on perception, and the latter would not be possible in that way before many,

We

not gross
to

the jar)

is

imperceptible atoms; if it be asserted that this notion (with reference illusory, we say: no, because no (means of knowledge) refutes it.
sfl

Thus substance, etc., is described; these (categories) have being attained through positive notions.
Non-existence.
i

positive character,

g.

Now the seventh category si: is staled, \\7.. n on - e x s I e n c e (abhmni) arrived at by means of knowledge through negative notions. Non-existence of two kinds: non-existence by connexion and mutual non-existence.

which
is

is

(88)

shortly

Non-existence by connexion (samsargabhavd) is three-fold: Prior non-existence, non-existence by destruction, and absolute non-existence. Prior non-existence (prdyabhdva] is the non-existence of a product in the cause before it is produced, for instance the non-existence of the cloth in the threads;
it

has no beginning as

it

does not come into existence; but

its

it

has an end, the product

itself

having the form of

destruction.

Non-existence by destruction (pradhvamsabhaua] is the non-existence, e. destruction, of the product which has come into existence, in its cause, for instance when a jar has gone to pieces, the non-existence of the jar in the heap
i.

of shards;

produced beginning, but no end, as

it

is

for instance
a

by blows of

hammer, has consequently

all

Absolute

thing destroyed does not arise anew. non-existence (atiiant<lbhui>a) is non-existence in

three times,
as a counter-

for instance the non-existence of colour in

wind.
is

Mutual non-existence

(anyonydbhdva)

a non-existence
a jar

which
is

enlity has a consubstanliality (t(lddtnu}(i), as for instance Thus the objects are explained.

not cloth/

87 Well, but no objects are found outside (our) notions or outside Brahman. Do not say so, for (the external existence) of objects cannot be denied, being proved through perception and other (means of right knowledge).

*"

parts which
sr>

The Nvaya and the compose it.

See note
01.

Yaicesika maintain that the whole

is

something different from the

of these two notions is maintained by the Buddhistic vijftanavada which leaches that things have existence only as notions in us, but no outward reality; the other is maintained by the Vedanta, which teaches thai all is Brahman. The Nyaya and the Yai cesika on the other hand teach that the external world lias reality.
"~

The

first

I).

K.

I).

Viilensk. SelsU. SKr

7.

K;rUUi

hist, otf lilos.

AW.

21
11.
:i.

210

f)0

5.

Notion.
is

(89)

Notion
notion
is

(Imddhi)"

is

thai

which

signified

by the synonyms: notion, apper

idea ception (upalabdlih, knowledge (jmlnu) and

[pratijuya].
It

Or
is

(it

may

the

manifestation

of a

thing (arlhaprakaca).

shortly of

he said that) two kinds:

apprehension and remembrance.

the

Apprehension (aniibhaixi) is also of two kinds: right one (yathtlrtha) is that the object of which

right

and wrong. Of these cannot be disputed; it is

of right knowledge, for instance the produced through perception and other means knowledge of a jar by means of indel ective eyes, etc., or the knowledge of fire by means of smoke as a syllogistic characteristic, or the knowledge that (an object) at the sight of its likeness to a cow, or the knowledge must be termed buffalo
,

that

the .Ivotistoma-sacriiice

is

means

of attaining heaven,

through the sentence,

through what
is

he who desires heaven must perform the Jyotistoma-sacrifice. The (ayatharlha} apprehension is that which arises

wrong

not a
fold:

means
doubt,

is It three of right knowledge and does not agree with the object. Doubt and reduclio in absurdum reduclio in absurdum, and error.

will

be mentioned later on.

Krror (mpanjaya}
thai
is

is
e.

not that Ihing,

silver
:

i.

the apprehension of a thing with reference to an object an illusory knowledge, for instance the transfer of (the

notion)
(3ii

this

is

silver

on
h ra

thing

al

hand which

is

not silver, for instance

mother of Also two

through

pearl. sorts of

rem e m

nee

(smaraijd) are distinguished: right and wrong;

"

both
as

occur while awaking;

some

sleep every knowledge is remembrance and wrong^ delect (the notion) of Mhis arises where that rightly ought lo
in

be apprehended. Kvery notion

is

without form

(ninlkara).
for

form

on the notion (of the object).

No,

we dismiss

Well, but the object impresses the doctrine that notion

its
is

encumbered with form. For the same reason we dismiss means of the form transferred on the
of a jar
is

(the doctrine that)

we

infer

notion, as for instance (the

the objects by outward existence)

the object, proved through perception. Kvery notion is determined by of the it is for only when connected with the object thought, organ apprehended by have a notion of a jar, not only (under the and it appears (under the form):
l

form

have

notion.

Oriran of thought.
the inner organ of sense,

Organ of thought
tioned.

(nutnas)

is

and

it

has been

men

ts Here we follow again the enumeration of the Nyayasutra finished the review of the (i (7) categories of the Yaicesika. s the things are in dream apprehended as present. i. e.
"

I.

1.9 (see p.

((i2o.

after

having

51

211

7.

Activity.

Activity
the speech, etc.;

(prtwrtti)
it

consists

of

merit

and demerit, and

of
all

is

action

through

is

namely accomplishing
S.

worldly proceedings.

Defects.

is

desire;

Defects (dosa) aversion

i.

are

attachment, aversion, and delusion.

is

Attachment
is

(rdya)

(<1uesa)

resentment,

i.e.

anger; delusion (moha)

wrong

knowledge,

e.

error.
<).

Future
rebirth;
etc.

life.
it

Future

life

(pretyabhava)
in

is

consists in the soul

obtaining the

aggregation consisting

new body,

10.

Fruit.
suffering,

Fruit (phala) means enjoying sion of pleasure or pain.

and

and

it

consists in the apprehen-

(1)1

11.

Pain.

Pain (duhkha)

is

suffering,

and

it

has been mentioned.

12.

Final liberation.
the
are,

Final liberation (apavarga) is release, and that means cessation of the pain comprised under 21 heads. The 21 heads
secondary and essential: the body, the six organs of sense, six notions (based on the objects), pleasure and pain.
Also pleasure
to
is

absolute
comprising
the

(their) six objects,

means not

way

pain, as being encumbered with pain; to be encumbered with this transfer of sense (npacara] (appears) in the same without; appear as when, honey being mixed with poison, honey too is reckoned as poison. Now, how is final liberation attained? In the following way when by studies
:

knowledge of the categories has been gained, \vhen by the sight of the defects of the objects a person has become indifferent and wants release, when meditation is carried on, and soul is directly perceived by virtue of the ripening of the meditation, when a person is relieved from afflictions (kleca) and does not acquire new merit and demerit, only uninterested actions being made, when by exercise of Yoga the formerly earned sum of merit and demerit has been then, acknowledged and (the fruit thereof) is being enjoyed in compressed time
of the text-books
essential
: 1

Yogasutra and adherence to

M1
I

"

II,

>

life.

mentions the live A /m/.s: nescience, subjectivism, attachment, aversion, (Particulars in my book "Yoga". 112 121.)
|>.

suppose
in

time and thus

("Yoga"

Yo^in s being able to procure several bodies at one extraordinary shortness of lime pass through the expiation of their deeds.
thai Uiis refers lo the
>7*

p. litti.

212

(92)

previous actions being annulled, body is accruing, no connexion

hereof.

when
is

the present body, etc., departs, as no future found with the 21 pains, since there is no cause
21 sorts

This,

the

cessation

of the

of

pain

is

release,

and

this

is

final

liberation.
XI.

Doubt.
Doubt is the consideration of diverse same thing. It is of three sorts.
the particularity
a

Then he explains doubt (sam^aya).

contrary objects in regard
to
a

one and the

The

first

depends on
a

common
is

quality,
trunk or

(of the thing)

not being noticed.

For instance:

this a

man? When concerning

which
settles

the
it

same present thing

is

man

does not perceive the particularity

that

trunk,
it

that

is

crookedness, hollowness, etc., and not that, either, man, vi/. head, hands, etc., but only perceives the quality
\\v..

which

settles
to

common

a man, which consists in being erect, it becomes a question to him whether it is a trunk or a man. The next (sort on doubt depends on a difference of opinion, the parti For instance: Is sound eternal or transient (of the thing) being unnoticed.

trunk and

cularity

Because is eternal, another, on the contrary: it is transient. to a neutral a it becomes two these of of question of the difference persons, opinion is eternal sound whether sound), man, who does not perceive the particularity (of

For one says: sound

or transient.

(A third kind of) doubt

depends on
\\/..

a (too)
(its)
is

special quality.

For instance

doubt whether earth

is

eternal or transient,
to

the special quality of earth,

(93)
k

have smell,

as particularity being unnoticed, excluded from (other) eternal or

Doubt then gets the following form: is earth transient, being uneternal (things). connected with to have smell which is excluded from all (other) eternal (things), which is excluded from all or is it eternal, being connected with to have smell
, k

(other) transient

things

?
)

XII.

Motive.

which a person is incited when acting. It con (prayojann) is that by for the activity sists in attainment and prevention of (respectively) pleasure and pain, view. in that with takes man of every normal place

Motive

XIII.

Instance.
topic on

Instance
consent.
It

(drslanta)

is,

in

discussion, a

which both disputants

is

twofold.
to

the kitchen,

when

an instance of similarity (sndharmya), for instance have smoke is a logical reason; the other is an instance of

One

is

dissimilarity
v-

(uaidlwrmya), for instance a pond, as

particular, non-cogent fallacy p.

to

the

same

reason.

Compare: the loo

(44).

XIV.
(siddhanta) lend admitted by all

Tenet.
:

Tend

is

matter regarded as aiilhori/ed.

the tenet

:i

It

is

fourfold:

(1)

(he

admitted by related systems systems, (2) the tenet from (the admission of another) matter only, (3) following in question, and (4) the tenet appearing as merely a preliminary a
<i

ss o
i

n.

A
kind
is

tenet admitted
for instance: a

by

all

systems

is

for instance:

something

exists.

The second
(94)

Xaiyayika regards the organ of thought as an organ of sense, for that has been established in the Vaicesika-syslem consistent (with the Xyfiya). The third kind is for instance, it being proved that earth, etc., must have a creator,
that
this creator

then must be

omniscient."
,

The
it

fourth kind

is

for instance that

of a

Mlmamsaka:

Let sound be a quality

being considered whether

sound

is

eternal or transient.

XV.

Members
1

of Syllogism.

Members
for

the

sake of

(1,1,32) runs:
elusion.

component parts of the syllogism in an inference another person. They are proposition, etc., as the Nyaya-sfilra Members are proposition, reason, example, application, and cona statement setting forth the thing qualified be proved, for instance The mountain has fire.
(pratijfia}
is

(aimijtiua] are the

(95)

Of
by

these

proposition
which must
(hetu)

the quality

is a statement setting forth in the ablative or the instrumenlalis the syllogistic characteristic, for instance As it lias smoke.

Reason

Example

(udaharana]
instance

is

statement of the instance accompanied

concomitance, instance the kitchen.

for

That which has smoke, has

by the fire, too, as for

(n/;m/;/a) consists in establishing by the statement: "Thus is (the presence) of the syllogistic characteristic in the subject of the syllo for gism, example This, too, has smoke or, Thus is this, too.

Application
,

this,

loo

Conclusion (nigamand)
be proved
in

the subject,

for

consists in establishing (the presence of) what must instance Therefore it has smoke There or,
,

fore

it

is so.
five

These
1:1

(members), proposition,
;

etc.,

are called

members, being

like parts

if it really should -be authori/ed. Notice the expression "regarded as it might at an extreme estimate he applied on the two lirst sorts only. The commentaries of the Nyava31 are, moreover, mutually contradictory as to the three last sorts of siddhdnta. sutra I, 1, My translation of the terms autrwihinlni-. pratitantra-, udhikdnuui-. and (ibhijnpayamasiddhanta} considers Kecava s explanation of the matter itself. This form is clearly illustrated by the instance in the a III, N, 37: a r a k a sa m h When the following is under discussion: .The released makes no action which entails de merit and merit, being without desire then both actions, their fruit, linal liberation, the souls, and future life are thence given.
2(>
"

"

See

p. (37).

214
of the

syllogism
;
"

but they are not

its

inherent cause, as sound only inheres

in

space (akaqa).

XVI.
(<)n)

Reductio
(farka]
is

in

absurdum.

the indirect consequence of an eventuality 7 not wished not \vished for. It consists in (the demonstration) of an accompanied at the admission of an accompanied (factor), when two things are

Reductio

in

absurdum

for,

occurring

concomitance of which is established; for instance: if there had been a jar here, it had been seen as well as the ground. This reductio in absurdum supports the means of right knowledge; for if a here has lire or is without person, when a doubt has arisen whether the mountain to him that il is demonstrated then without it is thai the has fire, fire, opinion
in

question

the

had not smoke, either If (the mountain) for that reason have been without smoke. This (demonstration of) the indirect consequence (of what would occur) (prasanyd) Of the staled reductio in absurdum the object is is called reductio in adsurdum. the mailer which is to be proved, as il refutes (the thought that Ihe mountain) has
the indirect consequence

would be that here had been without fire, il would

it

not fire; therefore

In Ibis

it

supports the inference.

(97)

connexion someone objects thai reduclio in absurdum belongs to (the one alternative (koli) as ils category) doubt; but this is not correct, as il has only
sphere.

XVII.

Ascertainment.
il

is

(nirnaya) is a knowledge which establishes (something); the result of the means of right knowledge.

Ascertainment

XVIII.

Discussion.

Discussion (nfida) is the talk of a person"* who wishes to apprehend truth. rebukes are too little these eight Il may comprise eight rebukes too much (udhikn), renouncing of position (apasiddhanta), and the five (ni/ilmi),
(niyrahd)""
;

fallacies.

XIX.
(100)

Wrangling.

an interlocution between those merely contending for on both sides. It may, according to circum victory, but which contains arguments ends the all rebukes contain and, stances, position of the opponent being overthrown, own one s for of argument in Ihe position. establishing

Wrangling

(jalpd)

is

application

"

"

Otherwise the parts of a thing are ils inherent cause. Of course in a logical sense. See note 15. Would it not be better to read tattvabubhutsvoh: an interlocution between two?
See
p. (112).

""

55

215

XX.
is

Cavilling.
oi

eslablishmenl of a person s own position, Cavilling (vitanda) deprived and ends in the mere refutation of that of the opponents; the cavilling person has no position of his own which must be proved. An interlocution (kathn) is a collection of statements which put forward objection and position, and which are carried on by different, speakers.

XXI.

Fallacies.
1
""

Non-reasons want one or other of the (above) mentioned to be qualities an attribute with the subject of the syllogism etc.; but, being connected with some of the qualities of a reason and (therefore) looking like reasons (hetuvad abhasa:

(1(11)

are called fallacies (hetiwbhasa}. They are five, vi/. the irreal, contrary, the non-cogent, the counterbalanced, and the refuted. As to (the first) the irreality (asiddhi) consists, according to

manahj they

the (102)

Udayana,

in

the

negation
of

of the

reality

and
to

reality

means

the

notoriety of the
of
the
irreal

(reason)
(fallacy)

accompanied
subject
is

(by what
syllogism.

is

be

proved),
chief

being an attribute with the

the

Thus

the

characteristic

stated.

sion takes place,

be applied also on the contrary etc., it is evident that a confu in order to escape that the following is stated: the defect in which a reason is first manifested and which is able to (make us) apprehend its defectiveness (dusti), that and no other is the cause of the knowledge of its
this

As

may

and

defeetiveness,

i.

e.

it

appears as refutation (dilxana), as there

is

any other secondary (defect), the defectiveness being apprehended tested alone and the discussion thus being discontinued.

no application for at the first maul- (103)

When that is the case, we have the contrary fallacy, where it is a contra diction (virodha), vi/. that (the reason) is accompanied by the contrary of that which was to be proved, which occasions the knowledge of the defectiveness; and in the same way we have the non-cogent, etc., where the fact that other con clusions than the intended are possible (vyabhicara}, etc., occasions the know
ledge of the defectiveness.

The above mentioned

(three) irreal (fallacies) occasion also the

knowledge of

the defecliveness (of the reason) through the absence of the knowledge of the essence of the reason qualified by concomitance and by its being an attribute of the subject. The irreal (asiddha] fallacy thus conditioned comprises three kinds, according to
its

being

irreal, (1) as to its

substratum,

(2)

as to

itself,

and
is

(3)

as to the concomitance.
is

Of

these the reason the substratum of which

;

not

known

irreal as to

the substratum

for instance:
is

The

sky-lotus
it

fragrant.

Because

is

a lotus, like the lotus

growing

in

the pond.

Here the sky-lotus

1011

is

the substratum, but a such does not exist.

See

p. (41).

216

The following is also irreal The jar is transitory.

As
(104)
it

as to the substratum:

is

a product like the cloth.

a

Hut as here proved which

substratum

is

really found,

the

reason

as

it

is

a product

is

but (it may be admitted) that (here) something is established (siddlwsudliuim), it being proved that the jar (already) is transitory, what is established (beforehand). This, however, cannot be taken for an objection, for anything whatever cannot in itself be a substratum of a logical inference, but only that which is the object that Logical to the of (nyaya) takes place neither
not irreal as to the substratum;
is

doubt, according

rule""

proof

not perceived, nor against a matter which is settled, but and there is no doubt as lo the onlv in reference to a mailer, which is doubted Iransiloriness of the jar, as the latter has been established; therefore even if the as far as il itself is concerned (.s/>uri//H /mi, is found, it cannot be a substratum,

against an object which

is

jar,

as

its

transitoriness

is

beyond doubt, and

therefore (the reason in question!

called

is

no

(real)

The reason
instance
:

reason, being not found in the substratum

transient.

irreal

as to the substratum.
is

unreal as

to itself; for

Generality

is

Being produced.

The reason to be produced is not found in the substratum The partly irreal reason (blidgasiddha) also is only
instance
:

irreal

generality. as to itself; for

eternal.

The atoms

of earth

and the other three elements are

As they have smell.

To have
ject

smell

is

not

(howeven found

in

the

atoms which are here made the sub

of the syllogism, being only found in earth; therefore the irreality as to itself" appears in a part (of the reason). Subdivisions of that fallacy which is irreal as lo itself the reasons are, loo,

which are

irreal as to qualification
.

as lo object

as to unfit qualification

and

as to unfit object

Of

these the reason irreal as to

qualification

(viqesanasiddha]

is

for instance

the following:

Sound
As
it

is

eternal.

touch. being a substance is not in possession of to be a is of touch qualified through Here the reason not to be in possession a sub be to sound in and not not to be in possession of touch alone; substance as to irreal is stance is not, however, found, as it is aquality; therefore (this reason) to be a substance is not found, the notion For when the
,

qualification.

qualification

not lo have touch

qualified thereby,
is
1.

not being found, the qualified

1111

not found either, because, a qualification not found either, as for instance a man qualified
is
:\.

Yatsyayana ad N.

S.

I,

1.

p.

57
a slick
is

217
is

by

when merely the stick is not found, as well as when the Therefore even if not to have touch is in hand, no qualified reason is found, and therefore (this is) irreal as lo itself. Irreal as to the object is (the following reason):
not found

man

not found.

(uigesyusiddha)

Sound is eternal. As it is a substance without having touch. Here too we have a qualified reason, and when the object not in hand we cannot have something qualified in itself;
reason
is

(of the qualification)

is

therefore the qualified (105)

in the

not found in this case either.

(A reason with)
following case:

an unfit qualification (asamarthavifesana) we have

Sound
As
able to
it

is

eternal.

has no cause together with being a quality.

is

Here the qualification

prove the
is

quite unfit,

its

object,

vix.

to

have no cause
the

alone being
of

which

unfit,
is

is

eternity (of sound); (a reason) therefore, irreal as to itself, a qualified (reason) not

qualification

existing

when

the

qualification

not found.
,

but the qualification was here to be a quality and that is found in sound; how can it be said that qualification is not found? That is true; to be a quality is in hand, but not a qualification by means hereof; for the qualification of a reason is that which has as ils aim lo distinguish

Well,

it

from others;

but

to

be a quality

is

(here) purposeless,

and

is

therefore called

unfit (asamartha).

(A reason with) unfit object (asamarthavifesya) exemplification with transposition (of the members):

is

the following:

i.

e.

the

same

Sound
As
it

is
is

eternal.

a quality together with being without cause. Here the qualified object is namely unfit, the qualification alone being able to prove eternity (of sound). (This reason) is irreal as to itself, as there cannot be

something qualified when the qualified object does not

exist,

and as the reason

was

stated as qualified.

The

rest as

above.
(the reason)
is

Irreal as to the

concomitance
the
is

with

which

no con-

comitance is found. II has Iwo subdivisions;

one

is

not

accompanied by
a

that

which
thai

must be proved;

the other

only through
(in the

condition connected with

which must be proved. Of these the first is found

following instance):
as for instance Ihe clouds.

What exists has only momentary existence, Now sound or what else is discussed exists.
is

Here sound, for instance, is the subject of the syllogism, and ils momentary existence that which is to be proved; existence is the reason, bul there is no proof of the concomitance of Ihe reason with momentary existence.
1).

K.

1).

Vidensli. SelsU. Slr.,

7. Ili. Ulir,

hi-l.

OK

lih.s.

AM.

II.

3.

28

218

58

(106)
is

Now

the (reason) irreal as to the

10 concomitance accompanied by a condition

put forward.

For instance:
all

This son of Maitrl is black. As he is a son of Mailri like

the sons of MailrT

we

see.
;

Here
black

to
is

he black
in

but when Ho be Mailrl proved by means of Mo be a son of that is the effective factor, but, question it is not lo be a son of MailrT
is

on the contrary,

for instance the assimilation of vegetables;

and

the effective factor

therefore the assimilation of vegetables or the like is a condi is called condition; and to be black as the con to be a son of MailrT tion of the connexion between
,

nexion with wet

and smoke. A reason like to be a son of MailrT is thus irreal as to the concomitance for no concomitance is in band, the (necessary) connexion (of reason and what must be proved) depending on a condition. Also the following (reason) is irreal as to the concomitance
fuel
is

thai of the

connexion between

lire

The
As
it

killing
is

connected with sacrifices produces

be killing

guilt.

killing, like
to

killing outside the sacrifice.

The

does not produce guill, but to be prohibited as thus, just as above, a condition is in hand, (which is a (necessary) condition; must be required fulfilled), this reason to be killing is irreal as to the con
fact
is

that here

comitance.

Well, but the chief characteristic of a (necessary) condition is thai it invariably and Ibis that which proves accompanies thai which must be proved, but not how then can to be prohibited be a (neces to be prohibited is not relevant to
1
"

sary) condition V Do not ask thus;

for the chief characteristic of

;

the

condition

is

found also

with

to be prohibited
\\/..

for

the notion

prohibited

accompanies

that

which

is

to

be proved,

and (on the other hand) we have not necessarily the notion prohibited everywhere where we have the notion killing as an exception takes place as to the killing which is a part of the sacrifice; for here with the killing which is a purl of the sacrifice we have the notion killing Thus the (fallacy) irreal as to the concomitance but not Ihe notion

where where we have

the production of guilt, as we lie production of guilt;

I

have the notion

prohibited

every

prohibited

is

described.

Now

the

contrary

(fallacy)

is

staled.

The reason
to

accompanied Sound is eternal. As it is produced.

Here
eternity
is

by the opposite of that

which was

is contrary which be proved; for instance:

is

which must be proved, and -to be produced is accomwhat is produced is only Iransiloriness vi/. by (107)panied by the opposite hereof,
thai
:

1M Cf. p. (34).
"

1:i

Cf. p. (43).

transitory; there Core the reason lo he produced hy the opposite of thai which \vas lo he proved.

is

contrary,

being accompanied

Non-cogent Hie reason is which is encumhered \vithdonhl concerning that which must he proved, or which allows an oilier inference than the intended, ll has wo suhdivisions, as to ils heing loo general or loo particular. Of these the first is thai which is found holh with the suhjecl of Ihe syllogism, with analogous instances, and with contrary instances; for instance:
I

Sound
As
it

is is

eternal.

the object of right knowledge.

Now here the reason to he the ohject of right knowledge is found hoth with Hie suhject of the syllogism and wilh analogous instances, i. e. eternal things, and with contrary instances, i. e. transient things; for everything may he made the
object of right knowledge.

Too particular

that reason

is

which

is

excluded from analogous and con

trary instances; for instance:

Earth is eternal. As it has smell. Here the reason

i.

is

lo

have smell

and

it

is

excluded from analogous instances,

i.

eternal things, for instance space, and from contrary instances, things, for instance water, as to have smell is only found in earth.
e.

e.

transient

Now the possibility of exceptions

(vijabhicara)

is

characterized.

When

a reason has holh analogous and contrary instances"", the facl that il must he (108) excluded from contrary instances together with heing found with analogous instances,

a necessary rule (niyama), as il is that which makes us draw the conclusion. possihility of exceptions is the negation of this established rule wilh such a reason which is not accompanied by the opposite of that which was lo be proved. I0
is

The
It

takes place in two ways, (the reason) being found either wilh holh analogous and contrary instances, or heing excluded from holh of them. The counterbalanced (reason) 10 is thai opposed to which another reason, is found as opponent (pratipaksa); il is called the neutralized. For instance:
1

Sound As we
or

is

transient.
il)

(in
is

do not iind eternal

qualities,

Sound
As we

eternal.
il)

(in

do not
is

Iind Iransienl qualities.

The

here called another logical inference of the same strength which proves the contrary case; but that which has nol the same strength is nol an opponent.
fact
is

that

opponent

I read will) Yicv. sambhavalsapaksavipaksasya hetoh. This definition is necessary, as otherwise the contrary fallacy must he comprised under here (under the non-cogent). Concerning the designation of this and the Following fallacy see note 41.

101

105

1(

"

27*

220

60

which proves Hie contrary may he threefold 1) that on which the 2) other (on olher) dependent (upajwaka), or (the inference) depends (iipajiinja),

An

inference

{)

neither.

Of
instance
:

these the

lirsl

kind

is

refuting

hecause of

its

strength;

let

it

he said for

An atom
As
109)
it

is

transient.

lias

bodily form, like a jar.

is

going to prove transitoriness, is not possible with reference to a thing, for instance an atom which is not apprehended by a means of right knowledge, as (in that case) irreality as to substratum would be the result; by this inference the validity of that which makes us apprehend the

This logical inference, which

atom is (namely) admitted, as it otherwise could not arise; therefore (an inference) 107 on which the other depends, is always refuting. The dependent on the olher hand, is refuted because of its deficiency; as for instance the above mentioned logical in lemur which will prove transitoriness. The third kind is the counterbalanced, (the two reasons here) having the same strength. The refuted (reason) is that in the subject of which the negation of what was to be proved is slated by perception or another means of right knowledge; it For instance: is called (a reason) whose object is precluded.
,

Fire

is
is

cold.

produced, like water. and the negation of what was Here the reason is to be prodcued

As

il

vi/.

coldness,
lire
is

is

be proved, stated through perception, as we established by the organ of touch

,

to

that

hot.
,

Likewise also the following (reason) is refuted reason existence when what must be proved is that
,

vi/.

the

above mentioned
has only

(for instance) a jar

prove was momentary existence, and momentary existence; that which it had the negation hereof, consequently not-momentary existence, is established through as we establish the permanence (sthayitua) of perception supported by recognition, have of the a the jar by following form: this is the same jar which recognition of sense an is which accompanied organ seen formerly, a recognition produced by extends over the which and former the by apprehension, produced impression by
to
I

former and the later moment of lime. These live fallacies, the irreal, etc., do not prove that which they had to prove (110) I(1S vi/. respect and are not (real) reasons, as they \vanl one of (the live) qualities etc. of the the to be an attribute with syllogism subject ively
,
,

7 The inference as to the transitoriness of the atom is deficient, being dependent on an inference which proves the existence of the atom allto^ether, and this last inference proves and the basis of involuntarily at the same time that it is eternal, is consequently ujmjwya the first dependent inference, which therefore is wrong; in about this way the train of ideas
"

may

be
1011

summed
See

up.

p. (41).

til

221

The
regarded

(three

faults)

which

characteristic

10

Idksaiid

),

which
viz.

must
to

hi:

as a

reason

with

negative concomitance only,

may

have,

he too

narrow (avyapti), loo wide (ativyapti), or impossihle (asambhava), are also comprised here, and are not something different from the five (fallacies). A too wide (characteristic) is (a reason) which is irreal as to the concomit ance, not heing excluded from all contrary instances, or requiring a condition; for instance the notion animal as the chief characteristic of a cow, for to have dew and lap, etc., is the effecting (determining) factor ( prayojakci) of the notion cow not to he an animal. Likewise a loo narrow (characteristic) is (a reason) which is partly irreal; for instance lo originate from (the cow) Caball as characteristic of a cow.
,

(characteristic) is (a reason), irreal as lo itself; for instance \vhole-hoofedness as a chief characteristic of a cow.

An impossihle

(HI)

XXII.

Perversion.

Perversion
in

(chala)

is

(the proceeding)
is

one sense, another sense then

is

when, a word having been applied substituted and the refutation (of the opponent)
this hoy has a new garment on (the and then a person takes it for granted from this point of view) raises the following
,

thus

attained.
for instance in the proposition:
is

When
word nava)
that
it

applied has another sense, and (starling objection: He has not nine (nava) garments, heing poor; he can hardly be supposed to have two, lo say nothing of nine. He who discusses in this way is overthrown by the fact that he makes use
1

in

the sense

new

of

perversion.

XXIII.
is

Futility.

etc.;

wrong answer. It appears under many forms, utkarsasama, (112) Futility (jcili} but will not be fully set forlh here from fear of difl useness. The
futility called

consists in the transfer of a quality to the the same of a because quality is found in the instance, but without syllogism, subject of concomitance relation taking place; for instance when a person after the any argumentation: Sound is transient, as it is produced, like a jar, raises (the following
"

utkarsasama

objection): If sound it must also for the

is

lo

same reason and

be transient for the reason of being produced, like a jar, like the jar, too, consist of parts.
n(}

The

futility called

apakarxasama

consists in the transfer of the negation of

a quality (lo the subject of a syllogism) because of a quality in the instance, with as for instance when someone lo out any relation of concomitance taking place
;

"-

Cf. p. (7)

and note

5.

The designations of the subdivisions of respectively a plus or a minus are brought on a

110

jati are

thing, starting

untranslatable; they indicate that from false analogy.

222

62

the above mentioned logical inference says the following: If sound must be transient for the reason of being produced, like a jar. il must also for the same reason and
like the jar, too, not be audible; for a jar
is

not audible.

XXIV. Occasion for Rebuke.

Occasion
it

for

rebuke
liltle
,

has

many

forms:
,

too

1 is the cause of overthrow. Though (nigrahasthana.) a new object too much renouncing of position
1
,

(113) bewilderment

here for fear

in a case

will not be fully exposed it contradiction approval of opinion Too little (injund) consists in the fact that there of diffuseness.
, ,

to

be exposed

in

some way are

too

few

11 -

(members).

Too much
some way are

(ddhikd) consists in the fact thai there in the case to be exposed in

too
11:1

Renouncing of position (apasiddhanid) consists in the many new object (arthuntara) consists in the staling of an tenet. A of a abandoning Bewilderment (apralibhd) con that taken in hand. with not connected object sists in not to understand how to answer (the opponent). Approval of opinion
(members).
(niatriinijria)

consists in a person s approval, i. e. admission of a case which is main Contradic tained by the opponent and which is at variance with his own." tion consists in being guilty of a rejection of the case approved." That only the most useful different forms are treated here, and that those
1

which
stated

are
is

not

most serviceable
for the

is

not characteri/ed
11

is
"

no
c ra

fault,

as

that

so far

sufficient

education of young people.

a s a

Thus
111

the

Ta rka

bh

composed by K
designates a

e c a v a

is

finished.
in

The
I.

lerin

iii</r<ih(istli(uxi

case

where overthrow

the discussion

is

certain.

one or several members are wanting in the form in which the logical in see Vatsyayana ad N. S. V. _ 12. and Carakasamhita III, 8, I.e. not only members of the syllogism, but particularly superfluous secondary are irreal as to quali qualifications, as for instance in the fallacies mentioned p. (KM) which II I, these; Carakasamhita classed are too amonjj; fication, etc. Superfluous repetitions 111 According to Vatsvayana ad V. 2. 21 the fault aimed at here seems to be thai of a lo point out with the opponent a defect demonstrated in his own argument person lryin without clearin," himself of the delect in question. 111 the question here is incompatibility of proposition According to Vatsyayana ad V, 2, and reason. and note 1. Cf. p.
"

e.

that

ference

is

arranged

>.(

<T.

.">(>.

.)">));

11:1

<S,

~>1.

"

CONTENTS
Introduction .......................................
5
<)

Tarkabhasa ..............................................................................
I.

II.

Method ............................................................... Means of right knowledge (pramdna) ...........................................

10

III.
I

Causality ........................................................................ 10

V.

V. VI.

Perception (pmluaksa) ......................................................... 15 Inference (anumuna) ........................................................... 18

(Comparison (iifxtmdiid) .......................................................... 28

VII.
VIII.

Testimony (cabda) .............................................................. 28

Oilier eventual
1.

means of

right

knowledge ........... ........................... 30

.

2.

Implication (arthupatti) ................................................... JO Non-existence (ahhaixi) ................................................... 30

IX.

On

Validity of

knowledge ...................................

...

33

X.

Objects of knowledge ....................................... ..................... 36

1.

Soul (dlmaii) ............................................................. 36

2.

Body

(carira) ............................................................. 37
(indrii/d) ................................................ 37

3.
-I.

Organs of sense
a.

Objects (art ha) .................

.38

Substances
Qualities

(di

ai>i/a)

................................................ 39

b.
c.

(aiiiid)

.................................................... 43

Action (k(irnian) ................................................... 47

(ienerality (sdmdiuia) ............................................. 48

d.
e.
f.

Particularity (viresa) ............................................... 48

Inherence

(tfarndi difa).

............................................ 48
4i

g.
5.
(i.

Non-existence (abhaixi) ...........................................

(HHIIKIS) ...............................................

Notion (buddhi) ........................................................... 50

Organ of thought
I

50

7. 8.
9.

Activity (pravrlli) ................. ........................................ 51

)efects (dosci ......
)

.......................... 51

Future

life

(prelyabhiwa) ................................................. 51
........ 51
....... 51

10.

Fruit tphula) ..............

11.
12.

Pain (duhkhti) ...............................

Final liberation ((ipdixtrua)
...

....................

51

224

64
Page 52

XI.
XII.
XIII.

Doubt (saninnjd)
Motive
(i>ri/ojdiid)

52
.

Instance

(drsldiitti)
.
.

52

XIV. Tenet (siddlumla)

58
.

XV. Meni))ers of Syllogism (avaijavu) XVI. Heduclio in absurduni (lurka)

XVII. Ascertainment (ninnn/a)
XVIII.

58
5-1

51
51

Discussion

(ixida)
(jaljxi}

XIX.

Wran^lin^

54

XX. Cavilling XXI. Fallacies

XXII.
XXIII.

(vilaiidd)

55
.

(lictwihlntsu)
.
. . .

55
(51
(51

Perversion (diald)
Futility (jati)
...

XXIV. Occasion for rebuke (niurahasthuna)

(52

(Forts, fra OmslagetH S. 2.)

Kr.

Mre
50.

IV, med
1.

12 Tavler, 1874
til

12.

Ussing, J.L.

Kritiske Bidrag

Grackenlands gamle Geographi.

Mcd

et

Kaart over Thessalicn.

Resume;
75.

en francais.
2.

18GS
Polilik

Holm,
I

E.

Danmarks
C.

under den svensk-russiske Krig 1788-90.

Resume

en francais.

1868

...
ll

1.

15.

3.

aludan-Muller,

Studier

til

Danmarks

Historie

det 13de Aarh.

I.

Underhandlingerne
1869
til

om Valdcmar

Fangeuskah.
i.

Grevskabel iNerrehalland.

Resume

en franniis,

85.

Uoiirichsen,

II.

J.F.

Om
1869

den palatinske Anthologies Oprindelse, Alder og Forhold

Maximos Planudcs

Anthologie.
5--G.

50.
til

Paludan-Miiller, C.
HI.

Studier

Danmarks
i

Historie

det 13de Aarh.

II.

Om

Kong Valdemars Jordebog.

2.

Nordlydske Fyrster faa Del

Nogle Bemaerkninger
Studier
til

den danske Kongefamilies Arvegods.

1871

50. 75.

7.

Gislason, Konr.

om

Skjaldedigtenes
i

Beskall enhed
IV.

funnel Henseende.

1872

8.

Paludan-Muller, C.

Danmarks

Historie

det 13de Aarh.

Kong Erik Glipping og den romerske

1.
til

Kurie
9.

Kongens

Strid

med yKrkebiskop Jacob

Erlandscn.

1872

50.

Rordam, H. F.

ved nogle kriliske Bidrag Bemaerkninger Med 8 Tavler (Prover af aeldre danske Historikeres Haandskrifter). 1873

om

den historiske

Krilik, oplyst

dausk

Historie.
2.
1.

65. 35.
75.

10.

Ussing,

J.L

Kong

Attalos

Stoa

Athen.

Med

Tavler.

Resume en

francais.

1873

11.

Gislason, Eonr.

Om

Navnet Ymir.

1874
16.
i

V, med
1.

6 Tavler,

187792
s

50.
25. 80.

Miiller, L.

Det saakaldte Hagekors

Anvendelse og Belydning

Oldtiden.

Resume en

francais.

1877

3.
1.

2.
3.

Lange, Jul.
Ussing,
J. L.

Det ioniske Kapitaels Oprindelse og Forhistorie.

Med

3 Tavler.

Resume en

Nye Erhvervelser

til

Antiksamlingen

Kjobenhavn.

Med

3 Tavler.

francais. 1877. 9j Resume en francais.

1884
4.

2.
i

Lange, Jul.

Billedkunstens Fremstilling af Menneskeskikkelsen af den greeske Kunst. Resume en francais. 1892

. .

dens

eeldste Periode iudtil

Hwjdepunktet
9.

Det Kgi, Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter,

6 te Rsekke.
Historisk og filosofisk Afdeling.
Kr.

Ore

I,
1.

189093, med

7 Tavler

14.

2.

En sproghistorisk Beroringer mellem de finske og de baltiske (litauisk-lettiske) Sprog. 1890 Undersogelse. Yak-Lungta -Bracteaternc, Archaeologernes nordlske Gruppe af Guldbracteater Steenslrup, J. Japrtus S. fra den aeldre Jernalder, betragtede som saaregne Minder om en Kulturfoibindelse imellem HojAsiens og det Skandinaviske Nordcns Folkefuerd tidlige Aarhnndreder af vor Tidsregning, naermcst Folkevandringstiden. Med 4 Dobbelt-Tavler, 3 Enkelt-Tavler og mange Texten indtrykte Figurer. 1893
Thoinsen, Vllh.
i

9.

65.

7.

II,
1.

188889

12.
5.

2.

3. 4.

1888 den oprindelige Ordning af nogle af den islandske Fristats Institutioner. Genkendelse. Forsog paa en experimental Verilikation af Forestillings-Associalionernes Teori. 1888 Om Scholierne til Euklids Elernenter. Resume en francais. 1888 flclberg, J.L.
Finsen, V.

Om

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Lehmann,

Alfr.

Om

1.

50.
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2.

Ussing, J.L.

Phratri -Beslutninger fra Dekeleia.

Resume

en francais.

1889
2.

65. 80.

5.
6.

Starckc, C. N.
LcliiHaiiii.

1889 Etikens teoretiskc Grundlag. En Korrektion af Webers Lov Skelueloven. Grundlag af psykometriske Undersogelser. 1889
Alfr.

og

den

Ebbinghaus ske

Kontrastlov

paa
2.

(Fortseettes

paa Oiuslagets

S. 4.)

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CANC2LLSL

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lloffdlng,

H.

2. 3.

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Psykologiske Undersegelser. Erctriske Gravskrifter.

1889

3.

Resume

en francais.

1891
i

1.

Om

Sanskrits Stilling

Steenslriip, Japetus.

den almiridelige Sprogudvikling Det store Selvfund ved Gundestnip Jylland 1891.
i i

hidien.

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1891

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Orieiiterende Betraglninger over do

Figurer.

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Med 8 Udslagstavler og mange

1895

....

G.

50
50. 80.
50.

IV,
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H.

2. 3.

ftslrup, J.

Kort og 1 Tavle 1 1893 Hants (ilosofiske Udviklingsgang. til Kendskabel til den syriske Orkcn. liidrag Historisk-lopografiske
.
.

1893-99, med
i

10.
1. 1.

Kontinuiteten

Usslng, J. L.

Betragtninger over Vitrnvii de architectura libri Resume en francais. hvilken delte^Skrift kan viurc alfattet.
Studier

Med el Oversigtskort 1895 decem med saerligt Hensvn til den Tid, paa
1896
i

2.

15.

4.

Liinge, Julius.
i

5.

Usslng,

J.

den gracske Kunsts forste Storhedstid. Billedkunstens Fremstilling af Menneskeskikkelsen Resume en francais. 1898 de fra Perioden efterladte Kunslvaerker. Om Phidias Athenestatuer sirrlig Kliduchos. Med en fototypcret Tavle og Billeder i
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G.

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Det psykologiske Grundlag

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2.

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G5.

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S.

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Flitnur.

Knytlingasaga, dens Kilder og historiske Vaerd.

Carl

1900

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Bjorubo, Axel Aiithon og aeldste Kartograf.

Pelersen.

Kn Monografi.

Fyenboen Claudius Clausson Swart (Claudius Clavus), Nordens 1904 Avec un resume en francais.
1

8.

15

3.

de Pedrrsen, Holger. Les pronoms demonstratifs 1905 vocaliques indo-europeennes.

Kuliiml, Kr.

ancien armenien.

Avec un appendice sur

12

les

altcrnances
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60.
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4.

Den tslandske Laegebog Codex Arnamagnaeanus 434

a,

mo.

Med

2 Tavler.

1907.

...

2.

Dansk Ordbog.
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Tome

IV,

M-0. 1826. 6 Kr.

VIII,

V,

PR.

VII, 2, D.

1863. 2 Kr.

V-Z.

1905

1829. 6 Kr. 8 Kr.

VI, S.

1848. 12 Kr.

VII,

1,

T.

1853. 4 Kr.

Bornholmsk Ordbog. Med Indledning og Tiling. 1908 andre BrevChronologisk Fortegnelse over hidtil trykte Diplomer og Hegesta Diplomatica Historic Danicse. 1847 1536). skaber til Oplysning af den danske Historic. T.I. (822 * N Pars 2. 1870. (16321660). 1870 T. 11, Pars 1. (1536-1631).
. . .

10.

Series secunda.

T.I.
T.
II

(789-1536). 1880-89 Fasc 1 (1537 1558). 1892.

1895.
Fasc.
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30
Fasc.
2.

4.

(1608

1628).

1898.

(1558-1574). 1894. Fasc. 5. (1628-1644).

fotolith.

Fasc. 1901

3.

(1574-1607).
a
5.
6.

T.
llet
i

II.

Fasc.

(1644-1660).

1907

50
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Molbech, C.

Angers fundne Brudstykke Del Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Historic

af et Haandskrift af

Saxo Grammaticus,
i

Facsimile.
1843.

1879
8 VO
-

2.

dels ferste Aarhundrede.

Snorre Sturlassons Hislorieskrivning. Storm, Gustaf. Fortegnelse over de af del Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes
skabclige Arbejder.

Med

et

Kort.
i

1873.

8 VO

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35.

Selskab

Tidsrummet 1742-1891

udgivne viden-

1802

Kes"ava

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