People vs MArti

FACTS: August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the !anila "ac#ing and $%port &orwarders' carrying &our (4) wrapped pac#ages* +he appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the pac#ages to a friend in ,urich, Swit-erland* Anita Reyes as#ed if she could e%amine and inspect the pac#ages* She refused and assures her that the pac#ages simply contained boo#s, cigars, and glo.es* /efore the deli.ery of appellant0s bo% to the /ureau of 1ustoms and /ureau of "osts, !r* 2ob Reyes ("roprietor), following the standard operating procedure, opened the bo%es for final inspection* A peculiar odor emitted from the bo% and that the glo.es contain dried lea.es* 3e prepared a letter and reported to the 4/5 and re6uesting a laboratory e%aminations* +he dried mari7uana lea.es were found to ha.e contained inside the cellophane wrappers* +he accused 8 appellant assigns the following errors9 +he lower court erred in admitting in e.idence the illegality of search and sei-ed ob7ects contained in the four (4) parcels* ISSUE: :hether or not the sei-ing of illegal ob7ects is legal; HELD: <es, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt* RATIONALE: Article III, Sections 2 n! ", #$%& Constit'tionM pp vs O(io, e)cl'sion r* r'le Stone(ill vs Dio+no, declared as inadmissible any e.idence obtained by .irtue of a defecti.e search warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in !ercado .s "eople0s 1ourt* +he case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the e.idence sought to be e%cluded was primarily disco.ered and obtained by a pri.ate person, acting in a pri.ate capacity and without the inter.ention and participation of state authorities* =nder the circumstances, can accused > appellant .alidly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and sei-ure* +he contraband in this case at bar ha.ing come into possession of the go.ernment without the latter transgressing appellants rights against unreasonable search and sei-ure, the 1ourt sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted* FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS , Readily foreclose the proportion that 4/5 agents conducted an illegal search and sei-ure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the 4/5 agents made no search and sei-ure much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused > appellant* CHAD-IC. vs STATE , ha.ing obser.ed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof /ILL OF RI0HTS +he protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection against the S+A+$*

Monte1 *or v2 Ar net Universit*, && SCRA "2# 3#$&&4

?ac# of @ue "rocess in +ermination of $mployment Remedied by 3earing in the 4?R1* &9 "etitioner was a professor at the Araneta =ni.ersity &oundation* An 7>B>74, he was found guilty of ma#ing homose%ual ad.ances on one ?eonardo @e ?ara by a faculty in.estating committee* An 11>B>74, another committee was appointed to in.estigate another charge of a similar nature against petitioner* "etitioner, through cousel, as#ed for the postponement of the hearing set for 11>1B and 19, 1974, but the w>c motion was denied* +he committe then proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 1C>5>74, submitted its report recommending the separation of petitioner from the =ni.ersity* An 1C>1C>74, the =ni.ersity applied w> the 4?R1 for clearance to terminate petitionerDDDDs employment* !eanwhile, petitioner filed a complaint w> the 4?R1 for reinstatement and bac#wages* 2udgement was rendered in petitionerDDDDs fa.or, but on appeal to the Sec* of ?abor, the latter found petitionerDDDDs dismissal to be 7ustified* 3ence, this petition for certiorari* 3$?@9 +he 1onsti* assures to wor#ers security of tenure* 5n the case of petitioner, this guarantee is reinforced by the pro.ision on academic freedom* 5n denying petitionerDDDDs motion for postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the petitioner* +his was, howe.er, remedied at the mediation conference called at the @ept* of ?abor during w>c petitioner was heard on his e.idence* +here he was gi.en the fullest opportunity to present his case* "etition dismissed* "etitioner filed a !&R contending that the hearing in the 4?R1 did not conform to ther re6uirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not called so that petitioner could cross-e%amine them* 3$?@9 "ettioner did not ob7ect to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses at the school in.estigation and did not assert his right to cross-e%amine them* "etitioner wai.ed his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his e.idence* 4or was it incumbent on resp* to present the witnesses in the 4?R1* "etitionerDDDDs only right is to be heard* EE*

T n ! v2 P(il2 Ato1ic Ener5* Co11ission, #6# SCRA "7& 3#$%84

/ias as @is6ualification in Administrati.e 5n.estigations &9 "etition for prohibition brought by ta%payers, 6uestioning the competence of members of the "A$1 to pass 7udgment on the safety of the /ataan "ower "lant and charging them w> bias and pre7udgment, based on their publications stating that the plant was safe* 3$?@9 (1) :here the .alidity of an appointment is not challenged in an appropriate proceeding, the 6uestion of competence is not w>in the filed of 7udicial in6uiry* +he 6uestion of competence is a matter addressed to the appointing power* (C) 5n these publications, "A$1 clearly indicated its pre7udgement that the nuclear plant is safe* +he first was published in 19B5* +he other C were issued earlier, but as the ma7ority of the "A$1 commissioners e.en then were already occupying responsible positions in the "A$1, they cannot escape responsibility for these publications* "etition granted and "A$1 restrained from acting in the proceedings for issuance of license*

T n ! v T'ver #"8 SCRA 2&

FACTS: "etitioners see# a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and> or cause the publication in the Afficial Fa-ette of .arious presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, e%ecuti.e orders, letter of implementation and administrati.e orders* +he general rule in see#ing writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a pri.ate indi.idual only in those cases where he has some pri.ate or particular interest to be subser.ed, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,G and Git is for the public officers e%clusi.ely to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subser.ed'* +he legal capacity of a pri.ate citi-en was recogni-ed by court to ma#e the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recogni-ed by no less than the fundamental law of the land* ISSUE: :hether publication in the Afficial Fa-ette is still re6uired considering the clause in Article C unless otherwise pro.ided'* HELD: =nless it is otherwise pro.ided' refers to the date of effecti.ity and not with the publication re6uirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effecti.e* +he necessity for the publication in the Afficial Fa-ette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April C4, 19B5* +his is necessary to pro.ide the general public ade6uate notice of the .arious laws which regulate actions and conduct as citi-ens* :ithout this, there would be no basis for Art H of the 1i.il 1ode 5gnorance of the law e%cuses no one from compliance therewith'* :3$R$&AR$, the 1ourt hereby orders respondents to publish in the Afficial Fa-ette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ha.e no binding force and effect*

:3$R$AS, it was li#ewise obser.ed that GNuOndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily a.ailable, ha.e a wider readership, and come out regularlyGK and :3$R$AS, in .iew of the foregoing premises Article C of the 1i.il 1ode should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effecti.e must be published either in the Afficial Fa-ette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the countryK 4A:, +3$R$&AR$, 5, 1ARA,A4 1* AP=54A, "resident of the "hilippines, by .irtue of the powers .ested in me by the 1onstitution, do hereby order9 Sec* 1* ?aws shall ta#e effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Afficial Fa-ette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the "hilippines, unless it is otherwise pro.ided*

<not v IAC 3#$%&4 #6% SCRA 8=$

&acts9 "etitioner transported M caracbaos from !asbate to 5loilo in 19B4 and these wer confiscated by the station commander in /arotac, 5loilo for .iolating $*A* MCM A which prohibits transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one pro.ince to another* 1onfiscation will be a result of this* +he petitioner sued for reco.ery, and the Regional +rial 1ourt of 5loilo 1ity issued a writ of reple.in upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of "1C,JJJ*JJ* After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer beproduced, ordered the confiscation of the bond* +he court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the e%ecuti.e order, as raise by the petitioner, for lac# of authority and also for its presumed .alidity* +he same result was decided in the trial court* 5n the Supreme 1ourt, he then petitioned against the constitutionality of the $*A* due to the outright confiscation without gi.ing the owner the right to heard before an impartial court as guaranteed by !'e process2 He also challenged the improper e%ercise of legislati.e power by the former president under Amendment M of the 197H constitution wherein !arcos was gi.en emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that had the force of law* 5ssue9 5s the $*A* constitutional; 3olding9 +he $A is unconstitutional* "etition granted*

$I$1=+5E$ AR@$R 4o CJJ PRO9IDIN0 FOR THE PU/LICATION OF LA-S EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL 0A:ETTE OR IN A NE-SPAPER OF 0ENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A RE;UIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTI9IT< :3$R$AS, Article C of the 1i.il 1ode partly pro.ides that Glaws shall ta#e effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Afficial Fa-ette, unless it is otherwise pro.ided * * *KG :3$R$AS, the re6uirement that for laws to be effecti.e only a publication thereof in the Afficial Fa-ette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recogni-ed by the Supreme 1ourt in +aLada* et al* .s* +u.era, et al* (F*R* 4o* MH915, @ecember C9, 19BM) when it obser.ed that GNtOhere is much to be said of the .iew that the publication need not be made in the Afficial Fa-ette, considering its erratic release and limited readershipGK

Ratio9 +he lower courts are not pre.ented from e%amining the constitutionality of a law* 1onstitutional grant to the supreme court to re.iew* 2ustice ?aurelDs said, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is 6uestioned* An the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relie.e the abscess, and so heal the wound or e%cise the affliction*' +he challenged measure is denominated an e%ecuti.e order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an e%isting law due to the grant of legislati.e authority o.er the president under Amendment number M* "ro.isions of the constitution should be cast in precise language to a.oid contro.ery* 5n the due process clause, howe.er, the wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient* +his was due to the a.oidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff command for all circumstances* +here was fle%ibility to allow it to

adapt to e.ery situation with .arying degrees at protection for the changing conditions* 1ourts ha.e also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due processlest they be confined to its interpretation li#e a strait7ac#et* +here must be re6uirements of notice and hearing as a safeguard against arbitrariness* +here are e%ceptions such as conclusi.e presumption which bars omission of contrary e.idence as long as such presumption is based on human e%perience or rational connection between facts pro.ed and fact presumed* An e%amples is a passport of a person with a criminal offensecancelled without hearing* +he protection of the general welfare is the particular function of police power which both restrains and is restrained by dure process* +his power was in.o#ed in MCM-A, in addition to MCM which prohibits slaughter of carabos with an e%ception* :hile MCM-A has the same lawful sub7ectas the original e%ecuti.e order, it can0t be said that it complies with the e%istence of a lawful method* +he transport prohibition and the purpose sought has a gap* Summary action may be ta#en in .alid admin proceedings as procedural due process is not 7uridical only due to the urgency needed to correct it* +here was no reason why the offense in the $*A* would not ha.e been pro.ed in a court of 7ustice with the accused ac6uired the rights in the constitution* +he challenged measure was an in.alid e%ercise of police power because the method toconfiscate carabos was oppressi.e* @ue process was .iolated because the owener was denied the right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately* +his was a clear encroachment on 7udicial functions and against the separataion of powers* +he policeman wasn0t liable for damages since the law during that time was .alid

protection clause only if they can show that the go.ernmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the .ery least, discrimination that finds no support in reason* 5t suffices then that the laws operate e6ually and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the pri.ileges conferred and the liabilities imposed* &a.oritism and undue preference cannot be allowed* &or the principle is that e6ual protection and security shall be gi.en to e.ery person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous* 5f law be loo#ed upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whate.er restrictions cast on some in the group e6ually binding on the rest*

An5lo? Fil tr !in5 Corp vs L @ ro

Property Ri hts !re "u#$ect to the Exercise o% Police Power& '( )he petitioners were a*on +, stevedorin and arrastre operators at the -la "outh Har#or& )heir licenses had expired #ut they were allowed to continue to operate on the stren th o% te*porary per*its& On -ay ./ 0123/ the resp Phil Ports !uthority decided to allow only one or & to operate the arrastre and stevedorin services& On !pril +4/ 0145/ #ased on the report and reco**endation o% an evaluation co**ittee/ the PP! awarded the exclusive contract %or stevedorin services to the Ocean )er*inal "ervices 6nc 7O)"68& )he petitioners #rou ht suit in the C'6 to annul the contract %or exclusive service& On *otion/ Ct issued a )RO en$oinin PP! and O)"6 %ro* i*ple*entin the exclusive contract& 9ater/ the ct li%ted the )RO pro*ptin the petitioners to %ile an action %or certiorari with the "C contendin that( 708 ex parte li%tin o% )RO constituted rave a#use o% discretion: 7+8 the award would i*pair the petitioners;; contracts with %orei n custo*ers& HE9D( 708 Considerin that the previous rant o% )RO in %avor o% pets& was *ade ex parte and w>o bond, notice and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory* (C) Ste.edoring ser.ices are sub7ect to regulation and control for the public good and in the interest of the general welfare* A single contractor furnishing the ste.edoring re6uirements of a port has in its fa.or the economy of scale and the ma%imum utili-ation of e6uipment and manpower* 5n return, effecti.e super.ision and control as well as collection and accounting of the go.t share of re.enues are rendered easier than where there are CH contractors to o.ersee* As resp ct found from the e.idence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat competitions in the port * =nderstandably, most contractors had been unable to ac6uire sufficient modern facilities , obser.e labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay ""A dues* +he contention of pets* that due process was .iolated resulting in a confiscation of pri.ate property is li#ewise without merit* 5n the first place, the pets were operating merely on Ghold o.erGpermits* 5n the second place, the award of A+S5 was the result of a e.aluation of performance of e%isting contractors made by a special committee created by the ""A

/ 'tist vs2 >'inio

Equal Protection Distinction Between Heavy and Extra Heavy Cars and Others /autista is assailing the constitutionality of ?A5 BM9 issued in 1979 which classified .ehicles into 3ea.y and $%tra 3ea.y* +he ?A5 further banned these .ehicles during wee#ends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am !onday* "urpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more oil* /autista claimed the ?A5 to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that 3 and $3 cars are hea.y on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil consumption* &urther, the law restricts their freedom to en7oy their car while others who ha.e smaller cars may en7oy theirs* /autista a.ers that there is no rational 7ustification for the ban being imposed on .ehicles classified as hea.y (3) and e%trahea.y ($3), for precisely those owned by them fall within such category* ISSUE: :hether or not the ?A5 .iolates e6ual protection* HELD: +he S1 held that /autista was not able to ma#e merit out of her contention* +he classification on cars on its face cannot be characteri-ed as an affront to reason* +he ideal situation is for the law0s benefits to be a.ailable to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its co.erage* Anly thus could chance and fa.or be e%cluded and the affairs of men go.erned by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the .ery essence of the idea of law* +he actual, gi.en things as they are and li#ely to continue to be, cannot appro%imate the ideal* 4or is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not ta#e into account the realities of the situation* * * * +o assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property* +hose ad.ersely affected may under such circumstances in.o#e the e6ual

9el sco vs 9ille5 s

F cts: +he petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ardinance 4o*49M4 of the 1ity of !anila, the contention being that it amounts to a depri.ation of property of their meansof li.elihood without due process of law*+he assailed ordinance is worded thus9 G5t shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any ad7acent room or

rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person*G+he lower court ruled in fa.or of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance* 3ence, the appeal* Iss'e: :hether or not Ardinance 4o* 49M4 is unconstitutional Hel!: 4A R tio: 5t is a police power measure* +he ob7ecti.es behind its enactment are9 G(1) +o be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ardinance 4o* HM59 asamended by Ardinance 47M7, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (C) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers*G+he 1ourt has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clausebecause it Gdelegates in statutory form the police power to a municipalityK this clause has been gi.en wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts* Such, it is well to really is the progressi.e .iew of "hilippine 7urisprudence*G+he 7udgment of the lower court is affirmed

CRU: .s PARAS
?egislati.e "rocess Re6uirements as to +itles of /illsK Sub7ect shall be e%pressed in the title &acts of the 1ase91* Eicente @e ?a 1ru-, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in /ulacan*C* 2ointly, de la 1ru- and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Ardinance 4o* B4 (series of 1975) #nown as a prohibition and closure ordinance which was based on Republic Act 4o* 9HB as amended (but was originally enacted on 2une CJ, 195H)*H* +he said RA is entitled9 GA4 A1+ FRA4+54F!=4515"A? AR 15+< /AAR@S A4@ 1A=415?S+3$ "A:$R +A R$F=?A+$ +3$$S+A/?5S3!$4+, !A54+$4A41$ A4@A"$RA+5A4 A& 1$R+A54 "?A1$S A& A!=S$!$4+ :5+354 +3$5R R$S"$1+5E$+$RR5+AR5A? 2=R5S@51+5A4S*G4* 5ts first section reads9 G+he municipal or city boardor council of each chartered city shall ha.e thepower to regulate by ordinance the establishment,maintenance and operation of night clubs,cabarets and other similar places of amusement within its territorial 7urisdiction *' 5* +hen on !ay C1, 1954, the first section wasamended to include not merely the power toregulate, but li#ewise Gprohibit*GM* +he title, howe.er, remained the same* 5t isworded e%actly as Republic Act 4o* 9HB*7* An 4o.ember 5, 1975, two cases for prohibitionwith preliminary in7unction were filed on thegrounds that (1) Ardinance 4o* B4 is null and .oidas a municipality has no authority to prohibit alawful business, occupation or callingK (C)Ardinance 4o* B4 is .iolati.e of the petitionersDright to due process and the e6ual protection of the law, as the license pre.iously gi.en topetitioners was in effect withdrawn without 7udicialhearingK and (H)+hat under "residential @ecree4o* 1B9 (as amended, by "residential @ecree 4o*C59 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, hasbeen transferred to the @epartment of +ourism*B* +he respondent 2udge issued a restrainingorder on 4o.ember 7, 1975* +hen came on2anuary 15, 197M the decision upholding theconstitutionality and .alidity of Ardinance 4o*B4 and dismissing the cases* 3ence, thispetition for certiorari by way of appeal* ISSUE :hether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibitthe e%ercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses HELD +he S1 held that municipal corporations cannotprohibit the operation of night clubs* +hey may beregulated, but not pre.ented from carrying on their business*

+he writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated 2anuary 15, 197M re.ersed,set aside, and nullified* Ardinance 4o* B4, Series of 1975 of the!unicipality of /ocaue is declared .oid andunconstitutional*/* Rationale Since there is no dispute as the title limits thepower to regulating, not prohibiting, it would resultin the statute being in.alid if, as was done by the!unicipality of /ocaue, the operation of a nightclub was prohibited* A refusal to grant licenses, because no suchbusinesses could legally open, would be sub7ectto 7udicial correction* +hat is to comply with thelegislati.e will to allow the operation andcontinued e%istence of night clubs sub7ect toappropriate regulations* Q 5t is to be admitted that as thus amended, if onlythe abo.e portion of the Act were considered, amunicipal council may go as far as to prohibit theoperation of night clubs* 5f that were all, then theappealed decision is not de.oid of support in law* Additionally, the title was not in any way altered,as the e%act wording was followed* +he power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition* Q +here is thus support for the .iew ad.anced bypetitioners that to construe Republic Act 4o* 9HBas allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would gi.e rise to a constitutional6uestion* +he 1onstitution mandates9 G$.ery billshall embrace only one sub7ect which shall be e%pressed in the title thereof*

Ermita- malate hotel vs Mayor of manila

Police Power Due Process Clause An 1H 2une 19MH, the !anila !unicipal /oard enacted Ard 47MJ and the same was appro.ed by then acting mayor Astorga* Ard 47MJ sought to regulate hotels and motels* 5t classified them into 1st class (ta%ed at M#>yr) and Cnd class (ta%ed at 4*5#>yr)* 5t also compelled hotels>motels to get the demographics of anyone who chec#s in to their rooms* 5t compelled hotels>motels to ha.e wide open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons* $rmita-!alate impugned the .alidity of the law a.erring that such is oppressi.e, arbitrary and against due process* +he lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in fa.or of $rmita-!alate* ISSUE: :hether or not Ard 47MJ is against the due process clause* HELD: +he S1 ruled in fa.or of Astorga* +here is a presumption that the laws enacted by 1ongress (in this case !un /oard) is .alid* :>o a showing or a strong foundation of in.alidity, the presumption stays* As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot pre.ail o.er the presumption* &urther, the ordinance is a .alid e%ercise of "olice "ower* +here is no 6uestion but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimi-e certain practices hurtful to public morals* +his is to minimi-e prostitution* +he increase in ta%es not only discourages hotels>motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the re.enue of the lgu concerned* And ta%ation is a .alid e%ercise of police power as well* +he due process contention is li#ewise untenable, due process has no e%act definition but has reason as a standard* 5n this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the pro.isions of the said ordinance alleged to be .ague*