Kyle Crockett HIS 310 Book Review Whatever is Necessary President John F.

Kennedy took office on January 20, 1961, following a long congressional career and a presidential campaign characterized by a renewed effort to assert the United States dominance over her communist enemy, the Soviet Union. Kennedy promoted the notion that America could improve its military and economy while using those ideas to contain communism and progress other areas of the world. This idealistic pursuit took shape, at least in word, with Kennedys Alliance for Progress, a list of economic, academic, and reformative goals for increasing the standard of living in the Americas. His project would complete the revolution of the Americas,1 laying responsibility for smaller countries in Latin America upon the far more economically and governmentally stable United States. Interestingly enough, one could argue that Kennedys plan to complete Americas own revolution failed directly because of revolution. It was quickly evident that Kennedys grandiose plan would come to a standstill due to his tout anti-communist mentality, paired with Kennedy and his administrations perception of Latin America as a volatile and explosive region, susceptible to the ideologies of communism at every turn. Just before leaving office President Dwight D. Eisenhower advised his young successor to do whatever is necessary to insure the success of the army of Cuban exiles that

John F. Kennedy, On the Alliance for Progress, March 13, 1961, Fordham University. http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1961kennedy-afp1.html
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the CIA was training in Guatemala.2 This advice could have been much more farreaching than solely for Cuban counterinsurgency. With such a tone of mandatory action in the face of impending peril, Eisenhowers suggestion might have been the guiding principle behind Kennedys entire management of communism in Latin America, as well as his subsequent mismanagement of the Alliance for Progress. In a different light, perhaps the Alliance itself was part of this whatever is necessary outlook. By outlining such lofty and optimistic goals, Kennedy curried heavy favor and cooperation from many Latin American diplomats, but perhaps the entire goal was to shine a more positive light on the United States for Latin America, as opposed to the rhetoric of Soviet Union communism. If one accepts this notion, it is not difficult to see Kennedys Alliance for Progress simply as a means to his anticommunist end. Stephen Rabes work on Kennedy in Latin America, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confront Communist Revolution in Latin America , postulates that while Kennedy had a sincere desire to increase the welfare and success of smaller Latin American countries, his efforts went down as a casualty of his unflinching fight against Cold War communism. Rabe makes it very clear that Latin America was a completely different political and cultural climate than any with which the United States had dealt before. The Kennedy administration turned foreign policy on its head. Departing from classical modernization theory, characterized by economic development as a catalyst for national stability, Kennedy Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1988, p. 171-173, quoted in Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1999, p. 34.
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embraced modern militarization and national stability as a catalyst for economic development. There is an obvious disparity here between Kennedys outlooks and intentions in comparison to the rhetoric of his Alliance for Progressa document entrenched in classical economic modernization language. Rabe notes in his first chapter that these military goals took precedence over Kennedys Alliance. He notes, Even before completing work on the Alliance plan, the Kennedy administration had initiated a series of extraordinary measures to contain political turmoil and win the Cold War in the Caribbean region.3 In February 1961, only a month before Kennedys presentation of the Alliance for Progress, Rabe observes that the United States had provided arms and sabotage equipment for rebels in the Dominican Republic who sought to overthrow the oppressive Trujillo familys control. Trujillo had always aired on the side of communism, and his position seemingly grew more sinister by the minute, as Dominican radios praised Cubas revolution and denounced Kennedy as an imperialist.4 With Eisenhowers advice glaringly present, Consul General Henry Dearborn expressed the administrations fears: our theme has been that the longer Trujillo continues to dominate the D.R., the more susceptible the country is becoming to leftist extremists.5 An obvious allusion to Trujillos close relationship with Castro, this agreed with Kennedys decision to send arms to Trujillo opponents, yet it still contradicted the rhetoric of his Alliance, which promoted the Good Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 33. Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 37. 5 Cuban Task Force of NSC to Bundy, 15 May 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:629-30; Dearborn to State Department, 22 March 1961, ibid., 621-23, quoted in Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 37.
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Neighbor Policy almost to a romanticized extent. On May 30, 1961, dissidents assassinated Trujillo and the United States had, at the least, inadvertently set the act in motion.6 Dearborn later defended the administrations involvement: Political assassination is ugly and repulsive, but everything must be judged in its own terms.7 While Kennedy and his team publically sought to increase their popularity as a helping hand to Latin America, they privately took extreme measures to prevent the spread of communism, taking advantage of the increased attention and American presence in Latin American countriesunder the guise of the Alliance for Progressto bring about their own goals of squashing future communist revolutions. Another such instance occurred in British Guiana, when the United States sought to unseat Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan. Jagan was an educated leader, who Churchill accused of Communism as early as 1953, and his reputation followed him all the way to his campaign for Prime Minister, a seat he took in August 1961. The British were willing to allow a free election in the name of the countrys decolonization, but Kennedy was not so inclined to the idea. In this situation, Kennedy went even further against the principles of the Alliance, promoting economic development and democracy, doing everything he could to prevent Jagans rise to power over British Guiana. First, he bought time from the British by encouraging them to stall the election. Even during this time, Rabe notes, The

Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 39. Dearborn to State Department, 22 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:621-623, quoted in Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 38.
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president wanted to use covert measures to influence the election.8 Vice President Johnson warned that Jagan might be a Communist-controlled sleeper who would establish a Castro-style regime upon independence.9 Nonetheless, Jagan won the seat. By February 1962, almost a year since Kennedys announcement of the Alliance, Rabe observes, the Kennedy administration had already launched its campaign to overthrow Jagan.10 CIA presence was extreme, and they funded many protests and strikes against the Prime Minister. William Howard McCabe, a CIA representative based in London, financed the Trade Union Council under one Richard Ishmael, who carried out bombings and arson attacks against government buildings in Georgetown,11 the capitol of British Guiana. The administration used extreme measures in their attempts to hinder Jagans rise to power, as they saw much of Fidel Castros leadership skills, rhetoric, and potential in the Prime Minister. Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented that the United State was not inclined to give Jagan the same benefit of the doubt which was given two or three years ago to Castro himself.12 In an instance of Communist paranoia, the Kennedy administration forsook its lofty goals of development and globalizationor perhaps they took advantage of the position in which those goals placed themin the name of containing and preventing the spread of Communism through Latin America. Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 83. Ibid., p. 86. 10 Ibid., p. 88. 11 Ibid., p. 89. 12 Johnson quoted in memorandum of conversation between U.S. and Colonial Office officials, 17 March 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, 12:558-64; Rusk to Embassy in United Kingdom, 11 August 1961, ibid., 519-20, quoted in Rabe, Most Dangerous Area, p. 83.
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Generally poor criticism followed Kennedys Alliance for Progress throughout its life, and still today. The United States had spent far too much money on a project that accomplished far too little given the Kennedy administrations gigantic investment in it. However, if one challenges the true motives behind the Alliance and seeks a correlation between the money and manpower the Alliance poured into Latin America and the intense anti-communist efforts employed by Kennedys presidency, a more favorablehowever more secretive and backhandedoutcome can accompany Kennedys Alliance. Kennedy knew the importance of Latin America in the Cold War as well as its significance in relation to the future of the Western Hemisphere, and his Alliance spending did indeed accomplish Kennedys goals of containing Communism and asserting the United States identity as the authoritative power in the Western world. Through President Kennedys management of Latin America and his use of the tool that was his Alliance for Progress, it is no far stretch to argue that Kennedy did indeed listen to President Eisenhower, carrying out whatever was necessary to prevent his perceived notion of impending doom from spreading throughout the West, and onto his own countrys soil.