THE JORDAN EVENT OF PARTIAL BLACKOUT ON 19/10/2008 ENG.

MUWAFAQ HUMAIDAT NEPCO JORDN

Abstract :
This paper describes one of the serious events, which took place on the 19th of October 2008 and caused a severe partial blackout of the Jordanian grid. During a periodical live-washing of insulators at 132 kV B.B. of Amman South 400/132/33 kV S/S, a flash over was occurred. The direct cause of this event is the miss coordination among technicians responsible for the washing process on both sides of the insulator to be washed. The problem was aggravated because this substation exists in the Jordan load center. The fault was cleared by the protective relays of main B.B protection. However, the trip signal was passed from the main1 B.B protection relay (the faulty zone) to the backup B.B protection relay through an auxiliary contact of the isolator which connects the main1 B.B and the reserve B.B. This has caused tripping for the most of transmission lines in Amman South S/S and the two 400MVA main transformers 400/132/33 kV. The tripping sequence throughout the network has caused a partial blackout and isolated both, middle and north of Jordan, from the main grid. Keywords: tripping, cascade, relay, fault Introduction:With the exception of HTPS, which uses fuel oil to produce electricity, the rest of plants in Jordan are gasfired ones. The system contains 6 main substations to transform EHV (400 kV) to HV 132/33 kV. Figure 1 below illustrates S.L.D of the Jordanian network

Two of these substations feed the load center in Amman area, the Capital of Jordan. This area consumes 70% of the total load of Jordan (The Peak load in the year 2009 was 2300 MW). The two main S/Ss (400/132/33 kV) in Amman contain 2 x 400 MVA transformers each. If one of these transformers is tripped, an overload occurs on the healthy transformer. This phenomenon is clearly noticed in Amman south S/S which has a defense plan scheme to protect the two transformers from tripping. After the occurrence of several faults on the 400 kV transmission system, connecting Aqaba in the south to Amman south in the center of the load, and after year 2000, NEPCO had changed their method of cleaning the insulators. The dead-line cleaning was changed into automatic live washing for each S/S and O.H.L. It is worth noting that, before the incident on 19 th of October 2008 an UNDEFINE alarm signal was received in the National Control Center (NCC) from the Amman south S/S 132 kV side as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Configuration and status of the nearby S/Ss at the time of fault occurrence as depicted by the NCC. The received signal had indicated that a problem was occurred on the isolator connecting the circuit under washing with the reserve B.B. The isolator status was not clear whether it was in closed or open position. Unfortunately, the operators in the NCC, and the site maintenance substation Engineer didnt pay attention to that signal. Therefore, the washing process started in the morning of that day, which was the reason for flash over initiation.

NEPCO

Figure 1: S.L.D. of Jordan Transmission network

The B.B protection Main1 has detected the fault and consequently sent a trip signal to the C.B. associated with B.B main1 protection relays. The trip signal of the B.B protection main1 passed through the isolator (auxiliary contact) to trip the reserve B.B in Amman south S/S 400/132/33 kV, which causes the trip of the two 400 MVA transformers and the circuits connected to main1 & reserve B.B. However, the circuits which were connected to Main 2 of the B.B 132 kV were still in service with a heavy S/S load in Abdoun and Amman south. These S/S was Feeding from the north zone of the power system through Amman north 400/132/33 kV S/S, an over load and low voltage was appeared on 132 kV, O.H.L in the north zone connected with middle zone in Zarqa and Amman south S.L.D. attached. Moreover ,the incident has been started by a flash over on the main bus-bar in Amman South 132 kVS/S, during live washing operations and has been transferred to the severe condition worsened by the failure of one of reserve bus bars ,isolator (auxiliary contact). This contingency can be classified as an extreme contingency, that is at very low probability of occurrence. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to include it in the list of the contingencies that the system should sustain without severe consequences. In fact, due to the particular system structure, such occurrence is one of the most critical along with the loss of 400 kV corridor,(AqabaQatranah,Qatarnah-Amman-South) for which a dedicated control action has been designed.The study and analysis were done by NEPCO and CESI team to prohibit similar future faults. figure 2 the S.L.D of Amman south substation.

The goals of the study are summarized in the following points: 1. Explanation of the incident through the identification of both the sequence of the events and the dynamic evolution of the system based on experimental information and time domain simulations 2. Identification of the critical devices (control or protections) and analysis of their interaction with the dynamic phenomena that have affected the system during the incident evolution. 3. Issuing of recommendations aimed to avoid similar incidents or/and, more in general, improve the system security. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY The methodology applied for the reconstruction is summarized in the following points: 1. Reconstruction of the pre-fault operating conditions 2. Analysis of the incident evolution, based on experimental data (SCADA Measurements/Log and DFR trends) In particular to identify: a. The correct sequence of events causing the system degradation b. The critical phenomena causing (and determined by) the events 3. Data collection and tuning of the dynamic simulation environment, and in particular: a. Reconstruction of the pre-fault load-flow (topology and operating conditions).Table 1 is the s/s load and table 2 is the power stations load.

Figure 2 The study has been based on a preliminary analysis of the experimental data followed by an accurate study based on comparisons between available experimental information and the results of the dynamic simulations. Table 1

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Table 2 Building up and tuning of an accurate dynamic model capable of reproducing the various transients through a set of dynamic simulations needed to interpret phenomena and understand the causes of the events. Reconstruction of the incident based on time domain simulations Analysis of the behavior of: Protections Generating units Defense plan Monitoring system Assessment of: Operation rules System security versus severe contingencies Development of recommendations aimed to reduce the possibility of future incidents.

Figure 2

5. a. b. c. d. 6. a. b. 7.

The stages of the fault development depend on the system analysis study and recontruction. After the fault was occurred and trip the two main transformers in Amman south the load of Amman area transfer to the Amman North S/S 400/132/33 KV Figure 2, the load in Amman area was feeding through the 400 MVA transformers in Amman North through the two circuits of Rehab-Zarqa, Zarq(HTPS)-Sabha-Amman south and Abdoun to the load in Sahab, Amman south and Abdoon S/S 132/33 kV Figure 3,4,the relay setting Figure 5,6.

Figure 2, 3

Figure 5,6

power system and load shed about new 300 MW which also made an extra Generation, increase the flow to Egypt & Syria through the tie lines Aqaba Taba and Amman North Dir Ali 400 kV Figure 8,9 and figure 10,11 the relay setting the Tie lines with Egypt and Syria.

Figure 7 The Directional over current relays D.O/C on the two circuits of Rehab-Zarqa figure 5,6 at 132 kV trip, and isolated the Amman Area load (450 MW) from the main system, and still feeding from one steam unit in HTPS produced 30MW&Reshah power plant with 60 MW, the frequency droop in HTPS and Amman area trip the units in HTPS&Reshah and cutoff the current on about (450 MW) of power system from the total load (1450 MW) on that day. The following stages of the partial blackout was because we have an extra Generation on the power system of (NEPCO) sent to Egypt power system through the Tie line Aqaba-Taba 400 kV figure 8,9,10,11 the power flow toward Egypt&Syria.

Figure 10,11 The Directional Over Current (D.O/C) relay in Aqaba and Amman north figure 10,11 has been detected the over current and trip the tie lines, the power system of Jordan remain isolated with an extra generation with definite load in the south (from Aqaba to QAIA) S/S . The frequency on the Generation units at Samra and Amman east was exceed the limit of over frequency O/F relay setting reach to 51.5 HZ and trip the five units in Samra & two GT. Units in Amman east which is connected to 400 KV O.H.L side through step up transformers,15/400kVfigure,12

Figure 8,9

Figure12 The 400 kV lines remain in service with low load due to exceeding the voltages to the level of the over voltage relay in Amman north , Amman South & Qatranah S/S's figure 13. The O/V relays had tripped the line Amman north Samra from Amman north side and the Circuit Amman south- Qatranah circuit no.1 from Amman south and Qatranh Amman South circuit no. 2 from Qatrana/Side.

Figure 10,11 the S.P.S relays (defense protection relays ) on the tie line Aqaba-Taba which has a setting is 550 MVA with delay time 600 msec, detect an over current and send trip signal to eight (8) S/S's in the North and middle of

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Trip some of Generators by the O/F relay when the frequency goes up .Table below clarify the new setting.

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Figure 13 Only one unit about 150 MW in Rehab power plant remain in service till the U/F relay on the unit operates and trip the unit after the fault binning of about 20 mints because it was still feeding Tareq & Bayader s/s load with about 200 mw, so the north & middle are of power system had been blackout and the operators had been started to restoration the power system. The last problems on the power system restoration ,mainly related to the scheme of the over voltage relays. The hand reset scheme of the over voltage relay delayed the restoration about one hour to be repeat the power system elements in service which started from small diesel units in Marka power plant.

Change the scheme of over voltage relay on the O.H.L 400 kV from hand reset to self or electrical reset to faster the restoration form the black out conditions. Concerning the increase of generation (and number of units in service) in HTPS, so as to avoid the tripping of the corridor 132 kV Rehab HTPS, it has to be pursued a trade off between generation re-dispatch and probability of the occurrence causing the partial BO. Three alternatives are to be taken into account. Increasing the units in service in HTPS (3 units with about 180 MW generation are needed to avoid the loss of Rehab HTPS corridor). Implementing a dedicated control action disconnecting feeders or lines immediately after the fault (for example the line Sahab Amman South). Studying a dedicated restoration procedure. In fact, if the low probability of similar incidents and economic aspects are taken into account, it is possible to give up saving the Rehab HTPS corridor and preparing a fast and reliable restoration procedure.

Conclusion and General recommendations 1 lock of interest in the undefined signal of the isolator in Amman south S/S caused the trip of main1 and reserve kV B.B.C 132 and their connected circuits especially the two 400 MVA transformers . The master plan should consider the maximum amount of power that can be transfered between 400 & 132 kV in Amman area. The operator should take care during the maintenance of the main S/S as Amman south S/S the limited power transfer. The operators should change the configuration circuits in Amman south S/S to decrease the probability of trip the 400 MVA transformers. The operators can increase the power produced in HTPS power plant to about 200 MW during similar maintenance which decreases the probability of such a blackout in a similar conditions. 9. The installation of some (at least in 3-4 points) digital recorders dedicated to the vision and registration of electromechanical dynamic phenomena are recommended. Such devices allow the analysts to understand the transient behaviour and reconstruct the disturbances affecting the system It is recommended to coordinate unit protections and emergency control devices, with particular reference to the coordination of the overfrequency relays of the units. The question that if we have a measurement can be taken to prohibit similar faults? The answer is that the easiest and cheapest solution is to change the configuration circuits in Amman south 400/132 kV S/S during the maintenance as in the S.L.D figure 14 -

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Figure 14

References:1-NEPCo records 2-CESI fault analysis report