2nited 3ations

A45R64"4441
7istr.8 &eneral 11 August "#1$ 9riginal8 0nglish

eneral Assembly

Human Rights Council

Twenty-fourth session Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Councils attention

Report of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic
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Summary
The Syrian Arab Republic is a battlefield. Its cities and towns suffer relentless shelling and sieges. Massacres are perpetrated with impunity. An untold number of Syrians have disappeared. The present report covers investigations conducted from 1 May to 1 !uly "#1$. Its findings are based on " % interviews and other collected evidence. &overnment and pro'government forces have continued to conduct widespread attac(s on the civilian population) committing murder) torture) rape and enforced disappearance as crimes against humanity. They have laid siege to neighbourhoods and sub*ected them to indiscriminate shelling. &overnment forces have committed gross violations of human rights and the war crimes of torture) hostage'ta(ing) murder) e+ecution without due process) rape) attac(ing protected ob*ects and pillage. Anti'government armed groups have committed war crimes) including murder) e+ecution without due process) torture) hostage'ta(ing and attac(ing protected ob*ects. They have besieged and indiscriminately shelled civilian neighbourhoods. Anti'government and ,urdish armed groups have recruited and used child soldiers in hostilities. The perpetrators of these violations and crimes) on all sides) act in defiance of international law. They do not fear accountability. Referral to *ustice is imperative. There is no military solution to this conflict. Those who supply arms create but an illusion of victory. A political solution founded upon tenets of the &eneva communi-u. is the only path to peace.

/ The anne+es to the present report are circulated as received) in the language of submission only.

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6ontents
Paragraphs Page

I.

Introduction.............................................................................................................. A. ; 6hallenges........................................................................................................ Methodology.................................................................................................... ................................................................................................................. >olitical conte+t............................................................................................... Military conte+t................................................................................................ Socioeconomic and humanitarian conte+t....................................................... Massacres and other unlawful (illing.............................................................. Arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention........................................................... 5ostage'ta(ing................................................................................................. 0nforced disappearance................................................................................... Torture and ill'treatment.................................................................................. Se+ual violence................................................................................................ ?iolations of childrenAs rights......................................................................... 2nlawful attac(s.............................................................................................. Specifically protected persons and ob*ects...................................................... >illaging and destruction of property............................................................... Illegal weapons................................................................................................ Sieges and attac(s on food security.................................................................

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$ $ $ 4 4 < < < = 1# 11 11 1$ 14 14 14 1% "# "1 "1 "$ "$ "1 $# $4 41 4"

II.

6onte+t A. ;. 6.

III.

?iolations concerning the treatment of civilians and hors de combat fighters........ A. ;. 6. 7. 0 @. &.

I?.

?iolations concerning the conduct of hostilities...................................................... A. ;. 6. 7. 0.

?. ?I. Anne+es I. II. III. I?. ?.

Accountability.......................................................................................................... 6onclusions and recommendations..........................................................................

6orrespondence with the &overnment of the Syrian Arab Republic................................................ Massacres.......................................................................................................................................... In-uiry into events in Al Busayr........................................................................................................ >hotographs of Al'3ayrab CAleppoD) May and !uly "#1$................................................................. Map of the Syrian Arab Republic......................................................................................................

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%ntroduction

1. In the present report) the independent international commission of in-uiry on the Syrian Arab Republic1 sets out its findings based on investigations conducted from 1 May to 1 !uly "#1$. ". In its resolution ""4"4) the 5uman Rights 6ouncil e+tended the mandate originally established by the 6ouncil in its resolution S'1<41 for a period of one year. $. The present report should be read in con*unction with the previous commission."
reports

of the

4. 9n "1 !une "#1$) the commission was invited to brief the Security 6ouncil on the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. 9n "= !uly) pursuant to &eneral Assembly resolution 1<4"1") the 6hairperson of the commission briefed the Assembly on the situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic.

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Challenges

. The commissionAs ability to reach victims from all sides and to present a full picture of the conflict was significantly curtailed by the denial of access to the Syrian Arab Republic. A thorough investigation re-uires access to the location of incidents) to all available information and to all available witnesses. Recent missions to the country by the Special Representative of the Secretary'&eneral for 6hildren in Armed 6onflict and the 2nited 3ations investigation mission to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons give rise to hopes that the commission will be able to visit the country in the near future. 1. 9n " !uly) the commission addressed a re-uest to the >ermanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic in which it reiterated its re-uest to have access to the country and sought information on the events in Al Busayr in May and !une Csee anne+ ID. 9n 11 !uly) the commission addressed a re-uest to the Minister for @oreign Affairs that the members of the commission be granted access to the Syrian Arab Republic to e+amine the modalities for a future visit. 3o responses were received. 9n August) a note verbale was sent to the >ermanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the 2nited 3ations re-uesting information from the &overnment.

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(ethodology

<. The methodology employed for the present report was based on the standard practices of commissions of in-uiry and human rights investigations) adapted to the above challenge. The commission relied primarily on first'hand accounts to corroborate its findings. %. The information contained in the present report is based on " % interviews conducted in the region and from &eneva) including via S(ype and telephone. The total number of interviews conducted since the mandate began in September "#11 now stands at ")#=1.

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The commissioners are >aulo S.rgio >inheiro C6hairpersonD) ,aren ,oning AbuEayd) ?itit Muntarbhorn and 6arla 7el >onte. S'1<4"4Add.1) A45R641=41=) A45R64"14 #) A45R64""4 = and A45R64"$4 %. )

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=. >hotographs) video recordings) satellite imagery and forensic and medical records were collected and analysed. Reports from &overnments and non'governmental sources) academic analyses and 2nited 3ations reports formed part of the investigation. 1#. The standard of proof used in previous reports remains. This standard is met when incidents are corroborated to a level where the commission has reasonable grounds to believe that incidents occurred as described. 11. The commission investigated a number of incidents that may be labelled as Fterrorist attac(sG or FterrorismG. 9nce the threshold of non'international armed conflict has been met) and the suspected perpetrators are parties to the conflict) the commission renders its assessment of an attac(As legality under the rubric of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Any attac( the sole purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population is prohibited.

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Conte*t
+olitical conte*t

1". The situation in the Syrian Arab Republic was discussed in a !une meeting of the @riends of Syria group in 7oha and at the margins of the &roup of 0ight summit on 1< and 1% !une in 3orthern Ireland) with little apparent progress towards a solution to the conflict. As prospects for a political settlement stagnate) the warring partiesA willingness to negotiate has been affected by military developments on the ground. 1$. 7espite the efforts of the !oint Special Representative of the 2nited 3ations and the Heague of Arab States for Syria) agreement on a date for the proposed conference in &eneva remains elusive. The &overnment and the ,urdish Syrian forces have agreed) in principle) to send separate delegations to the conference. After ma(ing its participation conditional on a shift in military momentum) the Syrian 3ational 6oalition now appears to have agreed) in principle) to attend the conference. 14. ;oth the &overnment and anti'government armed groups believe that they can achieve a military victory. Their respective supporters afford them political coverage) financial assistance and military hardware) turning the Syrian conflict into a pro+y war of regional and international interests. ,& The parties

1 . The &overnment continues to struggle to provide security and basic services in areas under its control where living conditions have further deteriorated. 11. The Syrian opposition remains marred by internal strife. 9n 1 !uly "#1$) the Syrian 3ational 6oalition voted in a new >resident) Ahmad Asi Al'!arba) almost three months after the resignation of MoaI Al',hateeb. Two days later) >rime Minister &hassan 5itto resigned) citing the inability to form an interim &overnment to be entrusted with the administration of areas under opposition control. 9n the ground) the political vacuum has fed the ongoing fragmentation and disintegration of political authority) as signalled by recent infighting in Hata(ia governorate between some anti'government armed groups. 1<. In the north'east) friction over power'sharing emerged within the ,urdish political leadership) formally united under the ,urdish Supreme 6ouncil. 7espite tensions) recent statements made by representatives of the ,urdish parties indicate that parliamentary elections are being prepared in the areas under ,urdish control. 0lections will be preceded by a referendum on an interim constitution currently being drafted.

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Regional dimension

1%. The *oint call made by Tur(ey and the Islamic Republic of Iran for a truce to come into force during Ramadan) which reiterated an appeal by the Secretary'&eneral) was disregarded by all parties. 1=. Regional allies continued to provide military and financial support to the &overnment. 5iIbullah now fights alongside government forcesJ young Ira-i Shiites are travelling to the Syrian Arab Republic to fight for the &overnment. The &overnmentAs currency crisis has been temporarily stemmed by the e+tension of a K$.1 billion credit line from the Islamic Republic of Iran. A loan from the Russian @ederation is reportedly under discussion) while pre'conflict arms deals between Moscow and 7amascus continue to be honoured. "#. Influential Sunni clerics from several Arab States) including Saudi Arabia and 0gypt) called on Sunnis to *oin the *ihad against the &overnment of the Syrian Arab Republic and its supporters. Appeals) echoing an earlier call made by Al'Baida leader Eawahiri) urged that money and weapons be provided to anti'government armed groups. "1. The conflict continues to affect the internal political dynamics of neighbouring countries. 3owhere is this more evident than in Hebanon8 fierce clashes in Tripoli and SidonJ (idnappings) roadside bombs and cross'border shelling in the ;e-aa ?alleyJ roc(ets and a car bomb in ;eirut) where a protester was (illed during a sit'in in front of the 0mbassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran) were *ust a few instances of spreading violence. Hebanon hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees8 according to the 2nited 3ations 5igh 6ommission for Refugees) there were 11 )=<% as at 1 August. !ordan hosts more than ##)### refugees) a -uarter concentrated in Eaatari camp on the northern border with the Syrian Arab Republic) provo(ing growing concerns about the impact on the ,ingdomAs economy) security and stability. "". 9n !uly) Israel attac(ed a site near Hata(ia) apparently targeting Russian'made missiles. This) and previous attac(s inside the Syrian Arab Republic) could lead to a reassessment of the conflict in the legal framewor( of an international armed conflict.

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(ilitary conte*t

"$. The conflict is deadloc(ed) with both warring parties convinced that a military victory is possible. This has led to an intensification of hostilities along distinct) though fluid) battle lines. @ighting continued) with both sides consolidating forces in their primary strongholds. &overnment forces continued to control ma*or cities and lines of communications) while anti'government armed groups reinforced their presence in large swathes of the northern and eastern governorates) and areas along the !ordanian border. More regional actors were sponsoring flows of fighters and e-uipment) increasingly along sectarian lines) leading to a rise in corresponding violence. Meanwhile) the conflict has e+panded beyond the countryAs borders) re'igniting tensions in fragile neighbouring countries and threatening regional peace and security. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

"4. &overnment forces have seiIed the momentum in the past three months) recapturing some of the areas lost previously to the armed groups and consolidating their control over contested regions) particularly in 5oms and 7amascus countryside. " . Lith the e+ception of Aleppo city) government forces reinforced their hold over ma*or cities and economically important areas. 7espite the efforts of armed groups) government forces successfully held most strategic military positions) air force bases and
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main lines of communication in Aleppo and Idlib. They disrupted supply lines lin(ing armed groups to their networ(s across the borders. "1. &overnment forces continued to rely on heavy and often indiscriminate firepower to target areas they were unwilling or unable to recapture through ground operations. A variety of fire assets) including missiles) *et fighters and artillery) were systematically employed against restive localities to prevent a return to normality under armed group control and to sanction the local population. "<. ;attle'hardened and growing accustomed to fighting an insurgency) government forces benefited from wide logistical support and personnel provided by allies) including the deployment of military advisers. The army was invigorated by the increased support of the 3ational 7efence @orces $ and by the involvement of foreign irregular forces) in particular 5iIbullah. These regenerated combat power) replacing losses through deaths) defections and the increasingly difficult recruitment of new troops. "%. 7efections continued to spare the core of military and security forces and steadily declined) even among the less'trusted units. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

"=. Anti'government armed groups reinforced their control over large swathes of the northern and eastern governorates) but failed to hold (ey positions in 5oms and 7amascus. >ersistent divisions and lac( of logistical support seriously limited their operational capacity to face the latest offensives of government forces. $#. A number of diverse and initially profoundly divided insurgent groups have evolved into a more organiIed force. Alliances operated across several fronts) with increasing collaboration among groups. They failed) however) to unify their structures under a coherent command owing to their divergent ob*ectives and resources. The efforts of the Supreme !oint Military 6ommand 6ouncil were undermined by its inability to centraliIe logistical support and to integrate e+isting command networ(s. More recently) discord grew among groups with different loyalties) occasionally leading to confrontation over areas and resources. $1. The fluctuating and erratic support provided by a number of countries and wealthy individuals to the armed groups was sufficient to escalate hostilities) but is unli(ely to fundamentally determine the course of the conflict. Support mainly benefited the armed groups operating along the borders. Those positioned in central areas recently lost control of their supply lines. $". Anti'government armed groups were e-uipped mainly with small arms and light weapons) although they occasionally increased their use of anti'tan( and anti'aircraft systems. They also employed mortars and artillery guns to target military and security positions) including those within residential areas. $$. 7espite efforts to limit the e+tremistsA influence in opposition circles) the radicaliIation of anti'government fighters continued. Alongside a growing number of foreign fighters) the discipline and operational abilities of radical fighters) combined with better access to reliable sponsors) allowed them to outmatch the fractious moderate groups. The most radical) such as !abhat Al'3usra and the Islamic State of Ira- and Al'Sham CISISD) developed their own strongholds in the north. ISIS subsumed the Islamic State of Ira-) a group which) with Al'3usra) is on the sanctions list maintained by the Security 6ouncil 6ommittee pursuant to resolution 1"1< C1===D.

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/urdish armed groups

$4. Armed violence flared in ,urdish areas in the north'east) where the role of local militias in the conflict grew. >rioritiIing their neutrality and the protection of ,urdish localities) the >eopleAs >rotection 2nits CM>&D clashed with both government forces and anti'government armed groups. There was a spi(e in tensions with radical anti'government armed groups. Intra',urdish disputes also arose.

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Socioeconomic and humanitarian conte*t

$ . Since !anuary "#1$) the number of refugees has grown from appro+imately 1##)### to more than 1.% million. $1. The influ+ fuelled tensions between refugees and their host communities. In refugee camps) women and girls are vulnerable to se+ual e+ploitation) forced marriage and traffic(ing. There are increasing incidents of domestic violence. 5ardships compelled some refugees to return to the Syrian Arab Republic. $<. 9il e+ports decreased) partly owing to sanctions. Some oil fields are now controlled by opposition forces) including those affiliated with Al'Baida) which benefit from sales. 4 The manufacturing sector contracted owing to both the destruction of factories and sanctions. The burning of crops and the disruption of agriculture raised prices of goods) including flour. $%. 3otwithstanding the ever'growing number of people in need of urgent assistance) the &overnment and some anti'government armed groups obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance. 7espite security constraints) some cross'line deliveries of aid were made) but were insufficient to meet the ever'growing needs of the affected population. Some locations remained inaccessible. Some ".% million people are in need inside the country. The situation is particularly dire in besieged areas of Aleppo) 5oms and 7amascus. $=. 2nited 3ations aid agencies have estimated that K$.1 billion is needed to aid the affected population) in the Syrian Arab Republic and in neighbouring countries) until the end of "#1$. 9nly half the pledges made at the international donorsA conference held in ,uwait in !anuary "#1$ have been fulfilled.

%%%& 0iolations concerning the treatment of ci-ilians and hors de combat fighters
A& (assacres and other unlawful 1illing.

4#. Individuals were regularly (illed in contravention of international law) which criminaliIes both murder and e+ecution without due process. International human rights law prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. 6ommon article $ of the &eneva 6onventions prohibits e+ecution without previous *udgement pronounced by regularly constituted courts affording *udicial guarantees.

In May "#1$) the 0uropean 2nion voted to lift sanctions to allow other opposition groups to sell the oil they control. See also anne+ II. 2

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o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

41. 7eaths in custody rose mar(edly. 7eaths from torture were recorded in centres controlled by the Air @orce) >olitical and &eneral Intelligence and Military Security. Many cases were recorded in &eneral Intelligence ;ranch "= ) "# (m east of 7amascus) and ;ranch " 1) in 7amascus. 9ne former detainee held in the Al'@ehar ;ranch of >olitical Security in Al'MeIIeh C7amascusD barely survived. 5e detailed the deaths of others. 7etainees were tortured to death in Military Security ;ranch "1 C7amascusD. 4". 9ther unlawful (illings included chec(point shootings C7amascus) !uneD) snipers (illing civilians C7amascus countryside) !uneD and unlawful (illing of civilians during ground operations C5oms) @ebruary) March) April and !uneJ 5amah) @ebruaryJ 7amascus countryside) !uneD. 4$. A Fterrorism courtG was established in Al'MeIIeh to hear cases that violate the "#1" Anti'Terrorism Haw. Accused were not informed of the allegation) nor were they afforded timely access to counsel. The &overnment also established military field courts. 3o legal representation) family visits or appeals were allowed) yet *udges may confer capital sentences. 44. 2nlawful (illing was perpetrated by government forces as part of widespread attac(s directed against the civilian population. The attac(s included widespread shelling of villages) the burning of civilian ob*ects) sniper attac(s and systematic e+ecutions Csee anne+ IID. The coordination and active participation of &overnment institutions indicated the attac(s were institutionaliIed and conducted as a matter of policy. 2nlawful (illing occurring during such attac(s were crimes against humanity. &overnment forces also committed the war crime of murder) carried out e+ecutions without affording due process and arbitrarily deprived the right to life. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

4 . 9n % !une) ISIS fighters e+ecuted a 1 'year'old boy) Mohamed Batta) accused of blasphemy. 41. In !une) an anti'government armed group (illed a 6atholic priest) @ather @ranNois Murad) in Idlib. The priest was one of the only remaining 6hristians in the town of &hassaniya. !abhat Al'3usra was active in &hassaniya at the time. 4<. Buasi'*udicial mechanisms established by anti'government armed groups varied considerably across areas under their control. The lac( of codified law led to an inconsistent administration of *ustice. 0ssential *udicial and procedural guarantees were rarely accorded) and most *udicial mechanisms did not reach the necessary level of independence and impartiality. 4%. The punitive mechanisms established by some armed groups deny the right to counsel and the opportunity for appeal) given that e+ecutions were carried out immediately after sentencing. The close functional relationship between armed groups and courts compromised the independence and impartiality of the latter. 4=. In 5amah) persons arrested or captured by armed brigades are transferred to one of two parallel -uasi'*udicial mechanisms) following military interrogation. The local security committee has *urisdiction over disputes between armed groups and minor criminal and civil offences. Serious cases) such as murder) are referred to the sharia committee in ;ab Al'5awa) Idlib. Those found guilty can be e+ecuted. A captured soldier or pro'government fighter who FconfessesG faces immediate e+ecution) without referral to the sharia committee. 9n "# May) a captured soldier was e+ecuted in Balat Al'Madi- after confessing to (illing a fighter for the @ree Syrian Army C@SAD.

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#. Military councils in 7araAa set up sharia courts to investigate allegations) operate detention facilities and conduct trials. In practice) court *udges operate under the authority and instruction of the councils. 6aptured government soldiers or those that defected in 7araAa are reportedly not e+ecuted) but may be imprisoned for such crimes as spying. Those accused are not permitted defence counsel. 1. In 7ayr aI Eawr) armed groups accepted the *urisdiction of a local court. !udicial authority was e+ercised by legal scholars) religious scholars and legal professionals that had defected from the &overnment and applied a hybrid of Islamic and Syrian civil law. ". The war crime of murder and the crime of e+ecuting without due process were perpetrated by anti'government armed groups. )& /urdish armed groups

$. In !une) in the town of Amudah CAl 5asa(ahD) several protestors were shot and (illed by M>& forces. A 1"'year'old girl and a 1 'year'old boy were among the deceased. Roc(s and bottles had been thrown at M>& fighters) and they claimed that one of their ran(s had been shot. The M>& committed an abuse of human rights associated with the disproportionate use of force.

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Arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention

4. Thousands of people have been apprehended since the conflict began. Most face a string of interwoven human rights violations) often culminating in their torture or death. Some bribe their way outJ a relatively small number were FamnestiedG. 9thers eventually appeared before a *udge and were sentenced. Most languished in overcrowded cells with no access to *udicial oversight) legal counsel or their families. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

. Since "#11) government forces have conducted arbitrary arrests on an enormous scale. Males over the age of 1 years were routinely arrested during raids. Arrests are increasingly made by entities with no or dubious arresting authority) such as the 3ational 7efence @orces. In !une) 5iIbullah arrested Syrians in 7ayr Atiyah. 7etainees were typically held for days outside the law and sub*ected to severe maltreatment before being transferred to security services. 1. A presidential decree promulgated in March re-uired all 1%'year'olds to report for military duty) or face arrest. ;oys appearing to be 1% were detained at chec(points. At Al' Mada(ah chec(point C7araAaD) soldiers routinely arrested and ill'treated young men on the prete+t that they had not enlisted. <. Internally displaced persons are especially vulnerable to arbitrary arrest as they fled conflict'affected areas) often without documents. Arrests appeared to be predicated on the personAs originating from a restive area or being a family member of wanted persons) such as defectors. 6ases of internally displaced persons arrested at chec(points were recorded in Al'3aba( C7amascus countrysideD) Al'Mada(ah C7araAaD) Busayr) Al'5oulah C5omsD) Al' ;ayda CTartusD and Masharah CAl'BunaytirahD. In May and !une) in !ob Al'!arrah C5omsD) 3ational 7efence @orces raided the area) arresting displaced Sunnis in what was viewed as an attempt to evict them. %. In some cases) family members were arrested if the person wanted could not be found. In one case) a girl) released from detention in April in 7amascus) was arrested to gain information on her brotherAs activities. In ,arnaI C5amahD in March) soldiers detained the wife and children of a wanted man.
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=. Medical staff were arrested on the prete+t of Fhaving supported terroristsG when they provided medicine or medical aid to fighters. Many Red 6rescent volunteers were detained for Fassisting terroristsG. 1#. The arrest or detention of persons on discriminatory grounds violated the StateAs human rights obligations. Medical staff are protected under international law irrespective of the party to which their patients belong. 7epriving detainees of such fundamental rights as the presumption of innocence) being informed of the charges against them to having their detention reviewed by an independent authority violates international human rights law and international humanitarian law. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

11. The number of people detained by anti'government armed groups is rising) as are instances of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention. In April) a doctor in Aleppo was detained for refusing to allow !abhat Al'3usra to hoist its flag over a field hospital. More than 1 # people were detained in the same location) and none had access to counsel. @amily visits were also prohibited. In Ar Ra--ah) ISIS is holding several hundred prisoners) including community activists and women. The legal basis for anti'government groups detaining individuals is unclear. There is no indication that detainees are being granted their fundamental rights. )& /urdish armed groups

1". In areas under ,urdish control) arbitrary arrest is also on the rise. In March) a woman protesting in Afrin against M>& was arrested. In May) M>& forces detained opposition activists. M>& was involved in Ftit'for'tatG abductions with other opposition groups. Lhile an ad hoc *udicial mechanism e+ists) its efforts to e+ercise authority over detainees appear limited.

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Hostage-ta1ing

1$. 5ostage'ta(ing and (idnapping have risen sharply. Armed men) motivated by financial gain or to e+change prisoners held by opposing forces) abduct and hold individuals under threat of death. Scores remain captiveJ others have been released after negotiation. In the period under review) doIens were (illed. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

14. >ro'government militia were involved in (idnappings in volatile areas across the Syrian Arab Republic. Multiple cases of (idnappings occurred among groups inside) and those laying siege to) 3ubl CAleppoD. 9ne interviewee described these abductions as F-uite commonG. In @ebruary) in Al'5a*ar Al'Aswad C7amascusD) two older men in a car were seiIed while passing through a chec(point manned by 3ational 7efence @orces. Their families were later approached and ransom was sought for their release. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

1 . ,idnapping and hostage'ta(ing by armed groups also revolved around ransoms and prisoner e+change. 9n " March) following the arrest of a fighterAs wife and children by pro'government forces Csee paragraphs 4 to 1"D) a group of fighters abducted three women from Al'Su-aylabiyah C5amahD. The (idnappers contacted a religious leader) and informed him of the abduction and the conditions for release. Abductees from both sides were allowed a phone call to their families. An e+change was negotiated and all women were released unharmed.
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11. ;oth pro'government forces and anti'government armed groups engaged in hostage' ta(ing) in violation of international humanitarian and criminal law.

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7nforced disappearance
o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

1<. Instances of enforced disappearance have risen e+ponentially since the conflict began. ;y placing victims outside the protection of the law) government forces sewed terror among the civilian population. 1%. 0nforced disappearance infringes on a personAs fundamental human rights) including the rights to liberty) to personal security and to a fair trial. A crime under international law) it is a violation which persists for years after the initial arrest or abduction. It is a gateway to other offences) such as torture. 1=. 0nforced disappearance was carried out by government forces) including Air @orce and Military Intelligence) and by 3ational 7efence @orces. In Aleppo) 7amascus) 7araAa) 7ayr aI Eawr) 5amah and 5oms) civilians were arrested following army raids. Individuals were abducted in their homes) at chec(points) in mos-ues and in hospitals. ?ictims were ta(en to un(nown locations) their whereabouts undisclosed. <#. Across the country) families wait : sometimes for e+tended periods : to (now the fate and whereabouts of their relatives. 9ne intervieweeAs brother was arrested in 7araAa in March "#1" by members of Security ;ranch "1 ) and has not yet reappeared. <1. @amilies have *ustified fears that searching for their relatives may lead to reprisals. Some who reported a disappearance were themselves detained. Authorities also refused to provide information or to ac(nowledge arrests. 9ne defector) who wor(ed in Air @orce Intelligence in a central governorate until late "#1") cited orders that information about detainees was not to be provided to their relatives. The desperation of families has left them vulnerable to e+tortion. Some families pay bribes to those who : often falsely : claimed they could provide information. <". In most cases) the only way to obtain information is when a detainee is released. 9ne interviewee) held for over a year by an intelligence agency) was confronted upon his release by doIens of women thrusting photographs of their male relatives towards him) hoping he might have seen them during his detention. <$. Most fre-uently targeted are males over the age of 1 . In some cases) however) elderly women and children have been FdisappearedG. 9ne interviewee reported that) following the armyAs counter'offensive in ;ab Amr in March) soldiers abducted his neighbours) including women and children. These families were not seen again. Medical personnel) internally displaced persons and individuals fleeing the violence have also vanished. 9n % !une) a family fleeing fighting in Al'Laar neighbourhood) 5oms city) was stopped by soldiers. The husband was arrested and ta(en to an un(nown location. <4. 0nforced disappearance is used by government and pro'government forces as a strategy of war) to stifle dissent and to spread terror within society. It is committed as part of a widespread attac( against a civilian population) with (nowledge of the attac() and constitutes a crime against humanity.

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Torture and ill-treatment

< . Torture remains widespread. Severe physical and mental pain and suffering is deliberately inflicted to obtain information or confessions) as punishment) to intimidate or
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coerce. The prohibition of torture under international human rights law and humanitarian law is absolute) triggering both State and individual responsibility. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

<1. The &overnment) including its intelligence agencies) employed widespread) systematic torture to interrogate) intimidate and punish its perceived opponents. Torture was used in detention centres) security branches) prisons and hospitals. <<. >reviously reported torture methods remained in use across the country. Many of the victims interviewed carried visible scars consistent with their accounts and e+hibited symptoms of psychological trauma. <%. Interviewees consistently identified Air @orce Intelligence CA@ID as one of the worst perpetrators. In 5amah) A@I detainees were beaten upon arrest and tortured during interrogations. According to an A@I defector in 5amah) personnel who used torture faced no disciplinary measures. <=. Military Security interrogated those apprehended by the army and routinely used torture. 9ne detainee) arrested in 7araAa city in mid'May) was released from Military Security three wee(s later with a bro(en leg and multiple cigarette burns on his bac(. Another former detainee described being tortured in Military Security ;ranch "$ . %#. ?ictims in these centres were sub*ected to previously undocumented torture methods. Military Intelligence officers used water torture) such as simulated drowning) at ;ranch ""<. 7etainees in the Al'@ehar ;ranch in 7amascus were held in solitary confinement Fs-uatting cellsG) in which it was impossible to stand upright or lie down. 9ne detainee was held in such conditions for 1# months) beaten daily) suspended by his wrists for 1< days) burned with cigarettes and sub*ected to electric shoc(s. %1. Lhere detainees were brought before &overnment courts in Aleppo city) they bore evident mar(s of torture) which were ignored by the *udiciary. %". Medical professionals at some military hospitals were co'opted into the maltreatment of hospitaliIed detainees. %$. Security and intelligence services operated detention centres within Abdul &adir Al' Shagafi Military 5ospital in Al'Laar) 5oms) and at Al'MeIIeh Military 5ospital in 7amascus. 7etainees were brought in bound and blindfolded. They were registered according to the number of the detaining authority. Security personnel guarded the detainees and acted as intermediaries between patient and doctor. %4. 6ases were recorded of patients being tortured in these hospitals in coordination with various security branches. >atients were reportedly beaten in the guarded 14'bed ward of Al'MeIIeh Military 5ospital. % . The bodies of those tortured to death in Abdul &adir Al'Shagafi Military 5ospital and in State Security in 7amascus were transferred to hospital morgues. Most bodies were not returned to their families. Some were returned to their family in e+change for a signed statement confirming that the victim had been (illed by FterroristsG. %1. Multiple reports were received of beatings and ill'treatment at chec(points and other points of arrest. Most victims were men accused of assisting the opposition) and they were often transferred to Military Security and tortured during interrogations. A man was arrested in !anuary at a chec(point in ,halidiyeh C5omsD. 5e was detained until his death in !une. 5is body was covered with in*uries consistent with e+tensive beating and whipping.

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%<. ;eatings were documented at the chec(point at the entry of 7araAa) operated by Military Security) the chec(point in 7eir ;aalbah operated by >olitical Security and at chec(points along the 5oms'7amascus highway) which contained short'term detention facilities where detainees were beaten prior to their transfer to the Military Intelligence) outside Masharah CAl'BunaytirahD and in Al'Ashrafiyah CAleppoD. %%. Torture and other forms of cruel) inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment were perpetrated by government forces as part of a widespread and systematic attac( directed against a civilian population) pursuant to or in furtherance of an organiIational policy. The involvement and active participation of government institutions indicated that torture was institutionaliIed and employed as a matter of policy. The crime against humanity of torture and cruel treatment was perpetrated with impunity by Syrian intelligence agencies) in particular Military and Air @orce Intelligence) as well as the Military Security services. Such conduct is also prosecutable as a war crime. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

%=. Some anti'government armed groups mistreated and tortured persons in their custody. Lhile such violations were committed in isolated instances) there are strong indications that such practices are on the rise. =#. In mid'May) members of a sharia committee in northern Aleppo city arrested and detained several activists following a peaceful demonstration) and sub*ected them to physical violence) including beating them on the soles of their feet. =1. Hiwa Asifat Al'Shamal operated a $##'person capacity prison in AIaI CAleppoD where) as a method of interrogation) detainees were put in a 1. m deep hole in the ground and covered with sheet metal for 4% hours. =". 9n 1= !uly) the Saddam 5ussein ;attalion) part of the Hiwa Al'Tawheed military police) beat and tortured a man using the dulab method.1 =$. Some ant'government armed groups perpetrated the war crime of torture. The infliction of cruel) inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is also a violation of international human rights law and humanitarian law. )& /urdish armed groups

=4. In @ebruary) M>& forces in Afrin beat anti'government protesters and detained persons affiliated with the @SA. Accounts were received of the setting up of ma(eshift prisons near Afrin) where detainees were beaten. The M>& has inflicted cruel) inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) a violation of international human rights law and humanitarian law.

8&

Se*ual -iolence

= . Se+ual violence has played a prominent role in the conflict) owing to the fear and threat of rape and by the violence committed. It occurs during raids) at chec(points and in detention centres and prisons across the country. The threat of rape is used as a tool to terroriIe and punish women) men and children perceived as being associated with the opposition. 2nderreporting and delayed reported of se+ual violence is endemic) ma(ing an assessment of its magnitude difficult.

See A45R64"$4 %) para. %$. ,)

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,&

o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

=1. Se+ual violence was committed against women during raids by pro'government forces in 7araAa) 5amah and Tartus. A woman was raped by a security officer during a raid in 7araAa in 7ecember "#1". A 3ational 7efence @orce fighter attempted to rape a woman in her home in Tartus during a raid in May. =<. 7etention centres and prisons were the locations most often cited for se+ual violence. In late April) a woman released from the >olitical Intelligence branch in 7amascus described how she had been forced to orally copulate with her interrogators. A woman detained at Al'MeIIeh in 7amascus in 7ecember "#1" described the rape of cellmates. In late !anuary) @SA fighters captured a detention centre in 7ayr aI Eawr and found a family among the prisoners. 2nder threat that her children would be (illed) the mother was raped and forced to clean and coo( for her captors. =%. The threat of rape was used as a tool to coerce confessions. Two women) held at Al' MeIIeh and ;ranch "$ in 7amascus respectively) were told by their interrogators that their daughters would be raped if they did not confess. A nurse held at a police station in 7amascus was threatened with gang rape if she failed to reveal whom she was treating. ==. Lomen were harassed) insulted and) in some instances) beaten at chec(points in 7amascus) 7araAa) 5oms and Al'Bunaytirah. A university student was raped at a chec(point in 7araAa in early "#1$ because her brother was wanted by the &overnment. Afterwards) the @SA arranged for her to marry someone in order to Fprotect her honourG. 1##. Rape and other inhumane acts) as crimes against humanity) were committed by government forces and the 3ational 7efence @orces. Rape and inhuman treatment are also prosecutable as war crimes.

&
,&

0iolation of childrens rights

o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

1#1. Most child deaths and in*uries were caused by shelling and aerial bombardments. 9n 4 !une) a missile stri(e on ,afr 5amrah CAleppoD (illed 1$ people) including 1# young children. There were no military targets nearby. 9n 1" !une) during the shelling of Tell Al' Shay(h C7araAaD) a 1$'year'old girl was severely wounded when a shell struc( her house. 5er mother died and her two sisters were seriously in*ured in the attac(. 1#". 6hildren were the victims of e+ecutions. Lhen pro'government forces raided Al' ;ayda CTartusD on " May) boys aged around 1$ to 1 years were (illed alongside adult men. 9n 1# April) in ,hirbet Al'Teen C5omsD) a ;edouin family was (illed. The adults were shot) while the four children had their throat cut Csee also anne+ IID. 1#$. Moung men *oin : sometimes voluntarily) sometimes forcibly : the army and the 3ational 7efence @orces. Three 1<'year'old boys were forcibly recruited at chec(points in AleppoJ one was (illed within two wee(s. Moung recruits were reportedly mistreated and pushed towards frontlines by older soldiers. Si+teen' and 1<'year'olds have been observed in the 3ational 7efence @orces. 1#4. In !une) 1# boys aged 14 to 1< years) who were with a group of around # civilians displaced from 5oms) were ta(en from a bus) forced to strip na(ed and were beaten at a chec(point run by >olitical Security in 7eir ;aalbah C5omsD. They were later released. 1# . Adult detainees regularly reported the detention and torture of children as young as 1$ in detention facilities.

,#

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"&

Anti-go-ernment armed groups

1#1. 6hildren were (illed when armed groups indiscriminately shell civilian areas. 9n 1 !une) a 1#'year'old boy in Al'@ouAa CIdlibD was (illed by indiscriminate shelling from positions in neighbouring ;innish. 1#<. 9n % !une) three armed men e+ecuted 1 'year'old Mohamed Batta in Aleppo. Two children were among "< people (illed in 5atla C7ayr aI EawrD on 1# !une Csee anne+ IID. 1#%. Some armed groups recruited children under the age of 1%. The ran(s of both Hiwa Al'Tawheed and !abhat Al'3usra included fighters between the ages of 14 and 1%. Mounger fighters were not armed with heavy weaponry) but underwent a training programme and participated in hostilities on the front. 9ne fighter e+plained that children were recruited because Fthey fight with enthusiasmJ they are fearlessG. 1#=. A 1$'year'old boy enlisted with an @SA brigade in 7araAa after his school ceased to operate. 5e was not allowed to carry weapons or ammunition but used as a porter) whose duties included carrying the wounded and medicines) and preparing ammunition. 5e was seriously wounded in May. Another boy) who provided support services to an @SA' affiliated group) *oined when he was 1$ years old after seeing his father humiliated at a chec(point. )& /urdish armed groups

11#. In Afrin CAleppoD and Al 5asa(ah) the M>& recruited boys and girls from the age of 1". In late "#1") large numbers were recruited to counter an attempt by !abhat Al'3usra to enter Al 5asa(ah from Tur(ey.

%0& 0iolations concerning the conduct of hostilities

A& 9nlawful attac1s

111. Most civilian deaths result from indiscriminate or disproportionate shelling. These unlawful attac(s are a primary reason for the movement of people inside the Syrian Arab Republic and over its borders. 11". 2nlawful attac(s by government forces were documented in almost every governorate. In particular) towns and villages hosting internally displaced persons from restive areas) such as 5oms) were relentlessly assaulted. 11$. Some anti'government armed groups : notably in northern Aleppo and in Idlib countryside : also shelled indiscriminately. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

114. Across the country) the &overnment shelled civilian areas with artillery) mortars and roc(ets. Aerial bombardment by helicopters and *et fighters was common and) in some areas) a daily occurrence. Imprecise weaponry) such as surface'to'surface missiles and cluster munitions) was regularly used. 7efectors indicated that there was a retributive element to some attac(s) to FpunishG civilians for the presence of armed groups. 11 . &overnment forces continued to fiercely shell and bombard contested areas of strategic importance Csee anne+ III for a description of the attac( on Al Busayr and the surrounding villages by government forces and 5iIbullahD. 111. Across 5oms) shelling and bombardments have intensified since April. 6ivilian populations residing in !ob Al'!arrah) 5oulaia) Al'5oulah) Al'Talif) Ain Tamora)
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Tal(ala(h) 7ar Al',abirah) Al'&hantu) Teir Maalah and opposition'controlled neighbourhoods in 5oms city came under attac(. In Al'Baryatayn) shelling increased in April and became near'continuous in the days leading up to the ground attac( of "4 !une. 9n 1% May) in Al'Talif) a roc(et landed in the house of a displaced family from Al'5oulah) (illing a woman and her three children. ;etween < and = !une) "" civilians who had been internally displaced from other areas of 5oms were (illed by shells. In April) in eastern 5oms) more than a doIen civilians attempting to flee towards !ordan were (illed when a chec(point shelled a truc(. 11<. Accounts received from those who fled western 5oms countryside) particularly the Al Busayr region) emphasiIed that the attac(s had displaced the Sunni population. Most believed this to be a deliberate policy. The fact that some attac(s were launched by 5iIbullah and that many of the &overnmentAs artillery positions were located within Shia villages led to a strong undercurrent of sectarianism in the interpretation of events by those who lived through them. 11%. As civilians fled 5oms into north'eastern 7amascus) the shelling and bombardment of localities hosting internally displaced persons intensified. This occurred in Al'3aba() Al'Barah) Mabrud and 7ayr Atiyah. Soldiers e+torted money from civilians in these areas in e+change for a temporary cessation of the attac(s. &overnment forces continued to shell and bombard areas south of 7amascus city) including 7arayya) !beb) Ramadan and Adra. 11=. ;etween April and !uly) civilians in northern rural 5amah C,afr Eita) 5owi*a) Balat Al'Madi-) Al'5awash) 5alfaya and TremsehD came under sustained attac(. Artillery shells were launched from army chec(points and from within pro'government towns) such as Al' Su-aylabiyah. In 5alfaya) the shelling presaged the ground attac( by pro'&overnment forces of 1= May. &overnment forces also fired cluster munitions into 5alfaya between 1" and 11 May. 1"#. Shelling and aerial bombardment) including the dropping of barrel bombs) continued in towns across northern Aleppo. Indiscriminate attac(s were recorded in MareAa) AIan) Anadan) 5reitan) ,afr 5amrah) Al'Atarib and Tal Rifat. Surface'to'surface missiles were widely used) resulting in many civilian casualties.< 1"1. In Idlib towns where civilians remain) such as TaftanaI) Sal-in and !isr'Ash' Shughur) indiscriminate shelling by government forces caused e+cessive civilian casualties. 6luster munitions were used e+tensively in these areas. 1"". In 7araAa) planes continued to bomb 7araAa city) notably the Tari- Asad area. Also shelled were Tafas) In(hel) Al'Musayfrah) 3awa) ,hirbet &haIalah and Maarbeh. 1"$. The shelling and aerial bombardment of opposition'controlled areas of 7ayr aI Eawr city and Muhassan continued. Surface'to'surface missiles were fired on these locations) where civilians still resided. Similarly) in Ar Ra--ah governorate) Ar Ra--ah city and Al'Tab-ah came under artillery and mortar fire) as well as barrel bombing. Attac(s intensified in early !une) with a corresponding increase in civilian casualties. In Al 5asa(ah governorate) &overnment forces shelled Al'5amis and Eahiriya villages in March after they fell under opposition control. 1"4. Indiscriminate sniper fire resulted in civilian casualties) including children) in Aleppo and 7araAa cities. 1" . &overnment forces conducted their military operations in flagrant disregard of the distinction between civilians and persons directly participating in hostilities. The &overnment should ta(e greater precautions to protect civilians inside areas where military
<

The photographs contained in anne+ I? show the impact site of a missile stri(e in Al' 3ayrab) southern Aleppo city) which destroyed appro+imately 1" buildings.

,$

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operations are conducted. >recautions include the use of more targeted weaponry and the cessation of use of barrel bombs) poorly'guided missiles and cluster munitions. 1"1. &overnment forces continued to position military ob*ectives inside towns and villages) including 3ubl and Eahra CAleppoD) @ouAa CIdlibD and Shia villages in south' western 5oms) thus endangering the civilian population and violating international legal obligations. As the residents of these localities tend to be predominantly Shia) Alawite and 6hristian) such positioning contributed to rising sectarian tensions. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

1"<. Armed groups continue to operate within civilian areas) violating international legal obligations to avoid positioning military ob*ectives within or near densely populated areas. In several locations) including ,afr Eita C5amahD) Al'Baryatayn C5omsD and Al'3aba( C7amascusD) armed groups too( care to base themselves away from the civilian population. Some fighters) however) including those in Aleppo city) live among civilians) e+posing them to attac(. 1"%. Anti'government armed groups) led by Hiwa Al'Tawheed) continued to shell 3ubl and Eahra in northern Aleppo using artillery and home'made roc(ets. @orces positioned inside the villages shelled nearby opposition'controlled villages. 1"=. @rom March to !uly) a coalition of armed groups) including Ahrar Al Sham) Hiwa Al'Tawheed and !abhat Al'3usra) shelled Aleppo central prison. In Aleppo city) armed groups fired roc(ets and shells indiscriminately into &overnment'controlled neighbourhoods. 1$#. Armed groups based in ;innish) Idlib) continued to launch home'made roc(ets and artillery shells on @ouAa villages. Lhile there were &overnment shelling positions Ctargeting TaftanaI and ;innishD in @ouAa) armed groups made no distinction between civilian and military ob*ectives for shelling) causing several civilian deaths. 1$1. @or information on the shelling of villages in south'west 5oms countryside by anti' government armed groups) see anne+ III. 1$". Reports were received of snipers from armed groups shooting indiscriminately into &overnment'controlled neighbourhoods of Aleppo city) causing civilian casualties. 1$$. Anti'government armed groups used mortars) roc(ets and snipers in a manner that made no distinction civilian and military ob*ectives) thereby committing unlawful attac(s. )& 9ndetermined perpetrators

1$4. Two bombings) both in 7amascus) were reported during the period under review. 9n 11 !une) there was a double suicide bombing in Mar*eh S-uare) (illing 14 people and in*uring $# others. The target appeared to be a nearby police station. 9n "< !une) a suicide bombing occurred in a 6hristian neighbourhood) (illing four people. The li(ely target was a nearby Shia charity. 3o party claimed responsibility. These bombings demonstrated no clear military ob*ective and spread terror among the civilian population. 1$ . Lhile the above'mentioned acts constitute crimes under domestic law) they may) if it is determined that the perpetrators are parties to the conflict) also amount to war crimes.

,2

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'&
,&

Specifically protected persons and ob:ects

Hospitals and health-care personnel

1$1. Across the country) hospitals were destroyed and medical personnel targeted. Sic( and wounded civilians and hors de combat fighters were left to languish without treatment. 1$<. 2nder common article $ of the &eneva 6onventions) parties to the conflict must ensure that the wounded and sic( are cared for. 5ospitals and medical personnel must be respected and protected at all times and must not be the ob*ect of attac(. "& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

1$%. Attac(s on hospitals and health'care facilities were documented in 5amah) 5oms) Idlib) 7araAa) Ar Ra--ah and 7amascus. 1$=. In mid'May) during the ground operation on 5alfaya C5amahD) government forces deliberately shelled a field hospital) resulting in death and in*ury of medical personnel and the destruction of the facility. 14#. In the course of attac(s on opposition'controlled areas in 5oms) on 11 May) government forces destroyed a childrenAs hospital in 7ar Al',abirah and) in late May) shelled a field hospital in Al'5oulah. 141. 9n "4 May) two roc(ets hit a field hospital in TaftanaI) Idlib. They were fired in close succession) indicating that the hospital had been targeted. 14". @ield hospitals in 7araAa were systematically targeted and shelled) (illing medical staff and patients. &iven that the hospitals were forced to close) the wounded were left unattended. Although some hospitals remain operational in basements of civilian homes) there is a severe shortage in medicine and -ualified staff. 14$. In early !une) a field hospital in the Al'Balamoun region was shelled) leading to the wounding and death of patients. @irst responders were (illed in a second shelling attac(. 144. 9n "# !une) government forces bombarded the national hospital in Ar Ra--ah. Three medical staff members were in*ured and the intensive care unit was destroyed. 14 . Medical personnel were targeted and (illed while performing their duties. A pattern of arrests) harassment and intimidation of health'care professionals was observed Csee paragraphs 4 to 1" aboveD. 141. &overnment forces misused health'care facilities for military purposes) compromising their neutral status. Abdul &adir Al'Shagafi Military 5ospital in Al'Laar C5omsD was used as a military base to launch attac(s on Al'Laar and !uret Al'Sheyah. Snipers were positioned on the roof of the hospital) with tan(s and artillery around its perimeter. In late May) prior to the Al'Busayr offensive) government forces deployed inside its hospitals. 14<. There was a significant presence of security services in State hospitals in Bamishli CAl 5asa(ahD and 7amascus. 3urses wor(ing in 7amascus hospitals received instructions to deny medical aid to members of the opposition) any of whom elected not to see( medical assistance in hospitals based on a well'founded fear of arrest) detention) torture or death. 14%. The &overnment has violated its obligations under international humanitarian law) deliberately obstructing the efforts of the sic( and wounded to receive help. &overnment forces deliberately targeted field hospitals to gain military advantage by depriving the opposition and those perceived to support them of medical assistance for in*uries sustained)

,3

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committing the war crime of attac(ing protected ob*ects. Such attac(s spread terror among the civilian population. )& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

14=. 9n "% May) Hiwa Shuhada Al'5uran attac(ed the national hospital in 7araAa. 3o warning was given prior to the attac(. The attac( violated international humanitarian law and amounts to the war crime of attac(ing protected ob*ects. #& (a) Cultural property Government and pro-government forces

1 #. &overnment forces attac(ed cultural property as military targets. 9n 1$ !uly) government forces aerially bombarded ,ra( des 6hevaliers) a 230S69 Lorld 5eritage site in 5oms) causing severe damage to a fortress tower. The commission was unable to confirm allegations that anti'government groups were stationed there at the time. (b) Anti-government armed groups

1 1. In the two days following the attac( on 5atla C7ayr aI EawrD on 11 !une) !abhat Al' 3usra fighters looted and detonated e+plosives placed within the Shia hussainiat of Imam Al'5ussein and Imam Murtada and the Shia Al'Rasoul Al'Muaddam mos-ue. These places of worship were targeted deliberately as part of an attac( on a Shia locality. 1 ". >rior to April) a church in &hassaniya CIdlibD was vandaliIed) its statues dismembered and icons painted over. According to the remaining priest) e+tremist anti' government fighters carried out the attac(. .& ;ournalists

1 $. The Syrian Arab Republic has become the worldAs most dangerous Cand) in "#1") the deadliestD country for media wor(ers. Syrian and international *ournalists have been (illed) arbitrarily arrested) detained) tortured and disappeared in the line of duty. Several Syrian *ournalists have gone into voluntary e+ile. 1 4. As many as %4 *ournalists have been (illed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March "#11. The figure comprises citiIen *ournalists and netizens Cpeople who reported on the ongoing violence through social mediaD. 1 . To date) more than a doIen local and international *ournalists on assignment in the Syrian Arab Republic remain missing. $& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

1 1. 9n !uly) @ida Al';aali) also (nown as Mohammed MoaI) a reporter with Orient e!s and a citiIen *ournalist) died of in*uries sustained the month before while covering government shelling of Babun) north of 7amascus. 1 <. The &overnment arbitrarily arrested) detained and tortured *ournalists. 9n 11 @ebruary "#1") 1$ *ournalists from the 7amascus'based Syrian 6entre for Media and @reedom of 0+pression were arrested by Air @orce Intelligence and detained at Al'MeIIeh. Some of the men were severely tortured. To date) three of them : MaIen 7arwish) the 6entre 7irector) 5ussein &hrer and 5ani Al'Eeitani : remain in detention at 7amascus 6entral >rison and face charges of Fpromoting terrorist actsG. Their ne+t hearing at the terrorism court in 7amascus was set for "1 August.

,4

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2&

Anti-go-ernment armed groups

1 %. Al'I(hbariya correspondent Mara Abbas was (illed on "< May when her crewAs vehicle came under fire from anti'government armed groups in Al Busayr. 1 =. Some armed groups detained *ournalists for e+tended periods. Their subse-uent release without trial) and the confiscation in some cases of their e-uipment) indicates an intent to prevent *ournalists from performing their professional wor(. In two separate incidents) !abhat Al'3usra Muha*ireen ;rigade was involved.

C&

+illaging and destruction of property

11#. Appropriating property for private or personal use CpillagingD in the conte+t of an armed conflict is a war crime. 7eliberately destroying the property of an adversary in the absence of military necessity is illegal under international humanitarian law. Instances of both violations were recorded. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

111. &overnment forces intentionally destroyed the homes) farms and businesses of defectors) suspected anti'government members and supporters during raids. >roperties were searched and then looted before being destroyed. This occurred during raids in ;aniyas CTartusD on " and $ MayJ Musayfrah C7araAaD) on 11 @ebruaryJ 7ahadil C7amascusD) in @ebruaryJ ,arnaI C5amahD) on " MarchJ 5alfaya C5amahD) on 11 MayJ and Ramadan C7amascusD) on = !une. 11". Soldiers transported loot in military vehicles. 9ne interviewee reported that looted ob*ects were available at mar(ets in 7amascus) and that government forces returning from operations in 7arayya Fsold the stolen goods along the street in AtharG. 11$. 6hec(points have also been a point of unlawful appropriation. In May) internally displaced persons from anti'government areas were targeted at chec(points in the Al' Balamoun region C7amascusD and in In(hel C7araAaD. 114. Through bulldoIing and detonations) neighbourhoods were raIed to clear areas near military ob*ectives) such as bases and airports. 11 . Residential areas in 7amascus) 7araAa and the neighbourhoods of Mosha Arbeen and Ladi Al'!awI C5amahD were also raIed. 111. 9n !une) government forces demolished civilian houses in eastern In(hel) located around the perimeter of the 1 th ;rigade. According to a former resident) the demolitions were aimed at increasing visibility of the town and targeted houses that could be used) by virtue of their location) by anti'government armed group fighters. 11<. 7emolitions in Mosha Arbeen) Ladi Al'!awI and In(hel targeted civilian ob*ects whose destruction could yield military advantage. The destruction of neighbourhoods caused a level of harm to civilian property that is e+cessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Such disproportionate attac(s violate international humanitarian law. 11%. &overnment forces committed the war crime of pillage. They also violated international human rights law pertaining to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy) family and home.

"5

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"&

Anti-go-ernment armed groups

11=. In 5atla C7ayr aI EawrD) Shia homes and religions sites were deliberately destroyed after clashes on 1# and 11 May Csee anne+ IID. &roups affiliated with !abhat Al'3usra committed the crimes.

6&

%llegal weapons

1<#. Allegations were received regarding the use of chemical weapons) predominantly by government forces. 9n the evidence currently available) it was not possible to reach a finding about the chemical agents used) their delivery systems or the perpetrators. Investigations are ongoing.

7&

Sieges and attac1s on food security

1<1. Sieges continued to be imposed across the country) with harrowing conse-uences for civilians. The use of starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited under the laws of war. >arties to the conflict must allow the unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief. ,& (a) o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces Sieges

1<". &overnment and pro'government forces laid siege to towns and villages in 5oms) 7amascus) 7araAa) Al'Bunaytirah and 7ayr aI Eawr. Such sieges appeared to be calculated to render the conditions of life unbearable) forcing civilians to flee. 1<$. Most recorded sieges were in 5oms) where supplies of food) water) fuel) medicine and electricity have been bloc(ed or drastically curtailed since late "#1". &overnment forces) supported by 5iIbullah) intensified sieges and imposed new ones in the wee(s leading up to ground attac(s. This strategy was particularly visible in relation to the May attac( on Al Busayr Csee anne+ IIID. 1<4. In May) as military operations in the Al Busayr area commenced) sieges intensified in Al'Talif and Al';uweydah. In Al'Talif) supplies of food were bloc(ed by soldiers stationed at !ibreen chec(point. In May) government forces seiIed Abel village and a siege was imposed on Al';uweydah. 9pposition'controlled areas of 5oms city remain under siege. 1< . In May) soldiers and pro'government forces imposed sieges in areas north'east of 7amascus city) where displaced persons from Al Busayr had fled. In the Al'Balamoun area) government'controlled chec(points prevented the flow of food and medicine. 5iIbullah fighters reinforced the siege of 5arasta and 7umah in eastern 7amascus countryside. Areas of southern 7amascus) including Marmu( and Al'Asali) as well as Muadamiyah) in western 7amascus countryside) remained besieged. 1<1. In 7araAa) government chec(points enforced a siege on 7araAa city and on Al'Hi*ah villages. In 7amascus and 7araAa governorates) armed groups were periodically able to smuggle food to civilians. 1<<. In Al'Bunaytirah) a siege was imposed on Masharah. &overnment forces prevented incoming supplies of food) water) fuel and medicine. In addition) the village water tower and electricity generator were shelled.

",

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1<%. Areas of 7ayr aI Eawr city under armed group control had their supplies of food) potable water) electricity and fuel cut. The use of untreated water from the river resulted in health problems in the civilian population. 1<=. &overnment forces and 5iIbullah imposed sieges) violating their obligations under international humanitarian law. (b) Attac"s on food security

1%#. In the agricultural areas of northern 5amah governorate) the burning of harvests around ,afr Eita) ,afr 3abudah) 5alfaya) Balat Al'Madi-) Al'5owi*a and Tremseh were recorded in late May "#1$. 1%1. In 5oms governorate) harvests were burned in Al'5oulah) Al'Talif) Teir Maalah and !ob Al'!arrah in !une. 1%". Lheat and barley harvests were set alight around TaftanaI) Idlib) in late May. The blaIe followed the shelling from artillery positions located in @ouAa villages. 1%$. ;etween April and !une) government forces fired shells and mortars into fields in Anadan) 5reitan and MareAa) burning crops. 1%4. In 5amah and 5oms governorates) farmers trying to e+tinguish fires were shot at by soldiers at nearby chec(points. 1% . 7uring ground attac(s in Ramadan C7amascusD on = !une) and in Al'Baraytayn C5omsD on "4 !une) security forces (illed and burned cattle and other livestoc(. In a ground attac( on 5alfaya C5amahD on 11 May) government forces burned crops and looted farm e-uipment. 1%1. That the attac(s on the crops too( placed immediately prior to the harvesting period suggests that they were carried out with the deliberate aim of limiting the availability of food. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups Sieges 1%<. Since !uly "#1") armed groups in northern Aleppo have surrounded 3ubl and Eahra) bloc(ing food) fuel and medical supplies to its residents and government forces inside. The siege is enforced by multiple groups) including Hiwa Al'Tawheed) Hiwa Ahrar Sourya) Hiwa Al'@atih and !abhat Al'3usra. The &overnment has periodically brought supplies by helicopter. 1%%. Since April) armed groups : including Hiwa Al'Tawheed) !abhat Al'3usra and &horaba Al'Sham : have besieged the predominantly ,urdish town of Afrin. Armed groups believed that supplies of food and other necessities were flowing to 3ubl through M>& chec(points. 6lashes bro(e out as armed groups sought to seiIe these chec(points. Shortly thereafter) supplies of food and electricity were cut to Afrin. Lith no clean water entering the town) there has been a rise in infectious diseases. 1%=. In April) armed groups imposed a siege on the Aleppo central prison following the movement of soldiers and 3ational 7efence @orce fighters into the prison. Armed groups bloc(ed supplies of food and medicine. In late !uly) the siege was temporarily lifted after %# political prisoners were released. 1=#. In laying siege) anti'government armed groups in Aleppo violated their obligations under international law.

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0&

Accountability

1=1. In conferring its mandate to the commission) the 5uman Rights 6ouncil) sought to hold to account those responsible for violations and abuses of international law. % The commission continues to (eep record of those it reasonably believes to be responsible for the crimes and violations noted in its reports. ,& o-ernment and pro-go-ernment forces

1=". The &overnment retains the primary role in protecting the rights of its citiIens. As documented above and in previous reports) government forces have committed crimes against humanity) war crimes and violations of international human rights law. 1=$. The &overnment has yet to demonstrate the willingness or ability to reign in its security and intelligence apparatus. Similarly) it has condoned pro'government forces perpetrating crimes. 2ntil the &overnment enforces discipline within these entities) violations will continue. "& Anti-go-ernment armed groups

1=4. Some anti'government armed groups have committed war crimes. 6ommanders of groups have consistently failed to ta(e appropriate disciplinary steps.

0%& Conclusions and recommendations

1= . Relentless shelling has 1illed thousands of ci-ilians and displaced the populations of entire towns& (assacres and other unlawful 1illings are perpetrated with impunity& An untold number of men< children and women ha-e disappeared& (any are 1illed in detention= sur-i-ors li-e with physical and mental scars of torture& Hospitals and schools ha-e been bombarded& 1=1. The porous borders of the Syrian Arab Republic ha-e facilitated the in-ol-ement of regional armed actors< increasingly along sectarian lines& The dynamics of the conflict are e*tremely comple* and e*tend well beyond its borders& The o-ertones of sectarianism present in many of the -iolations find their roots in politics& %t is politics that pushes sectarianism< engenders -iolence and empowers its perpetrators& 1=<& These -iolations ha-e been the focus of ,5 reports and updates& The perpetrators are not deterred and do not fear future accountability& 1=%. There is no military solution to this conflict& Those who supply arms create but an illusion of -ictory& A political solution founded on the tenets of the final communiqu> of the Action roup for Syria ?the ene-a communiqu>@ 4 is the only path to peace& 1==. The commission renews the recommendations made in pre-ious reports and emphasiAes those below& "##. The commission of inquiry recommends that all partiesB ?a@ Halt indiscriminate shelling in areas with ci-ilian populations< including areas with concentrations of internally displaced persons=

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5uman Rights 6ouncil resolution "14"1) para. 1#. A4114%1 'S4"#1"4 "". ")

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?b@ Ta1e all feasible precautions to minimiAe the impact of attac1s on ci-ilians and ci-ilian ob:ects= ?c@ ?d@ ?e@ ?f@ ?g@ Cease e*ecuting ci-ilians and hors de combat fighters= Stop torturing detainees< and treat all detainees humanely= Stop 1idnapping and ta1ing hostages= Re:ect the use of weaponiAed chemical agents= Stop recruiting child soldiers=

?h@ Ta1e specific steps to ensure those in their ran1s who commit -iolations are held accountable= ?i@ Re:ect sectarian rhetoric= ?:@ Commit to a cessation in the fighting to allow humanitarian relief to mo-e unhindered through the country< and to pro-ide a space for the first steps towards dialogue to be ta1en= ?1@ %nform detainees immediately of the reason for their arrest and pro-ide them with access to independent :udicial re-iew< to their families and to legal counsel= ?l@ %nform families of the whereabouts of detainees< and allow -isitations= ?m@ 7nsure the preser-ation of material e-idence of -iolations and international crimes= "#1. The commission recommends that the RepublicB o-ernment of the Syrian Arab

?a@ Cease using imprecise weaponry< such as thermobaric bombs< cluster munitions< barrel bombs and others that are unguided or poorly guided< on ci-ilian areas= ?b@ 7nsure that those ma1ing arrests are trained and respect the detainees fundamental right to the presumption of innocence= ?c@ rant access to the commission to allow it to in-estigate alleged crimes more thoroughly and from all angles& "#"& The commission recommends that anti-go-ernment armed groups re:ect e*tremist elements& "#$. The commission recommends that the international communityB ?a@ Support the peace process based on the ene-a communiqu> and the wor1 of the ;oint Special Representati-e of the 9nited Cations and the Deague of Arab States for Syria= ?b@ 7nsure that any peace negotiation is conducted within the framewor1 of international law< cogniAant of the urgent need for a referral to :ustice at the national and international le-els= ?c@ Stop weapons transfers in -iew of the clear ris1 that they will be used to commit serious -iolations of international law= ?d@ "#4. Ta1e tangible steps to curb the increasing influence of e*tremists& The commission recommends that the Human Rights CouncilB

?a@ Support the recommendations of the commission and its access to the Security Council=
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?b@ Transmit the present report to the Security Council through the Secretary- eneral& "# . The commission recommends that the eneral AssemblyB ?a@ updates= Support the wor1 of the commission< in-iting it to pro-ide regular

?b@ 9phold the recommendations of the commission and e*ert influence towards a peaceful solution for the country& "#1. The commission recommends that the Security CouncilB ?a@ Ta1e specific steps to ensure that all parties meet their responsibilities in the protection of ci-ilians in armed conflict= ?b@ Support the wor1 of the commission and gi-e it access to the Council to pro-ide periodic briefings on de-elopments= ?c@ 8acilitate and underpin a comprehensi-e peace process for the country< with the full participation of all sta1eholders= ?d@ Commit to ensure the accountability of those responsible for -iolations< including possible referral to international :ustice&

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Anne* %
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Correspondence with the Arab Republic

o-ernment of the Syrian

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Anne+ II
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(assacres
1. The commission continued to carry out its specific mandate to investigate all massacres.1# In the incidents described) the intentional mass (illing and identity of the perpetrator were confirmed to the commissionAs evidentiary standards. o-ernment and pro- o-ernment forces &eir 'aalbeh( )oms( *-++ April ,-+, ". In the 7eir ;aalbeh) near 5oms city) between "# and 4# men were (illed in circumstances amounting to mass e+ecution. 0vidence indicated that the men) found in groups of two to 1$) had been blindfolded and had their hands tied behind their bac(s) before being shot at close -uarters. Reasonable grounds e+ist to believe that &overnment forces committed the massacre. Al-)amamiat( )amah( +. /arch ,-+. $. &overnment forces stationed in Al'5amamiat) a village located four (ilometres east of ,arnaI) 5amah) unlawfully e+ecuted si+ male farmers) residents of Al'5amamiat. The men were internally displaced to ,afr 3abudah but had returned to Al'5amamiat on 1$ March. They approached troops stationed at a chec(point) apparently see(ing access to their farms. The commission has reasonable grounds to believe that &overnment forces stationed in Al'5amamiat unlawfully (illed the men in violation of international law. 'ab Amr( ,* /arch ,-+. 4. &overnment forces regained control over ;ab Amr neighbourhood) 5oms city) for 1# days during the second half of March. As per observed patterns) after heavy shelling) &overnment troops entered the neighbourhood as @SA fighters withdrew. Save for a number of elderly) most civilians had fled. . 9n "< March) pro'&overnment forces) including the 3ational 7efence @orces) gathered several people) including seven elderly members of the ;IaIi family. The seven were e+ecuted and their bodies burnt at the family house. The deceased were between the ages of # and %% years old and included four women and three men. The 6ommission found reasonable grounds to believe that pro'&overnment forces unlawfully (illed the ;IaIi family members. 0hirbet Al-1een( )oms( +- April ,-+. 1. The Badrou family) part of a community of ;edouins was e+ecuted in the area of ,hirbet Al'Teen) in 5oms countryside. The family included eight children Caged between two and 1% years oldD. ?ideos of the victims clearly show that they had been shot at close range and three of the child victimAs throats were slit. The village) along the Tartus'5oms highway) where the victims were found is surrounded by villages that support &overnment forces.
1#

See A45R64""4 =) para 4".

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<. There are reasonable grounds to believe that pro'&overnment forces have unlawfully (illed the Badrou family. 2deidat Al-3adel( !estern &amascus countryside( ,+ April ,-+. %. Accounts collected confirmed that thousands of internally displaced persons were in the area of !deidet Al'@adel when &overnment forces launched a military operation on 1 April. Lith the participation of the 1## th Regiment and 4th ;rigade) all access points to the area were bloc(ed by &overnment forces whereas heavy shelling from army bases west of the town targeted residential areas inside) causing a number of casualties. Some accounts state that the @SA had successfully overta(en a chec(point outside !deidet ArtouI which prompted the &overnmentAs response. As fighting intensified) particularly between 1 and "1 April) thousands of civilians along with a number of anti'&overnment fighters were bloc(ed inside the town. 5undreds of &overnment snipers were positioned on the townAs e+it points. Snipers and soldiers positioned at the town e+its (illed many civilians trying to flee the hostilities. Anti'&overnment forces attempted to accompany thousands of civilians out of the area of combat but the bloc(ade and the military operation made this impossible. =. 6ollected evidence gave reasonable grounds to believe that &overnment forces e+ecuted a number of inhabitants once they too( control of the town) including the Imam of the Mos-ue and his family. Al-'ayda( 'anias( 1artus( , /ay ,-+. 1#. 9n the morning of " May) the army surrounded Al';ayda and bloc(ed the main e+it points. 0+tensive shelling preceded the operation leading many civilians) especially those living at the edge of the village) to flee to surrounding agricultural areas. At appro+imately <am &overnment forces entered with a force of 1#'<# soldiers) establishing sniper positions around the main village s-uare. &overnment forces proceeded to raid various streets in the village as members of the 3ational 7efence @orces *oined the operation. 5undreds of civilians were arrested while some were e+ecuted in various locations. 0vidence indicates that between 4#'1# bodies were laid out in one room) a mobile phone shop) near the s-uare. The bodies appear to have been burned. The victims appeared to have been first arrested and then e+ecuted in the s-uare area. Some of the victims also appeared to have been hit in the head with blunt) heavy ob*ects. ;odies of $# women) also apparently e+ecuted) were found in a house not far from the centre while tens of bodies were strewn in the streets. ;etween1 #'" # civilians were allegedly (illed. Testimonies were consistent that members of the 3ational 7efence @orces were actively involved in the raids and in many cases leading them. 11. @indings indicate that armed opposition was not present or actively engaged in hostilities in the village of Al';ayda or its vicinity in the lead'up or during the alleged massacre. Some of the accounts suggest that &overnment forces were chasing a small activistsA cell in the village which it accused of facilitating the defection of regular soldiers from the army. It is evident) however) that the type of military operation and the alleged massacre that ensued were not in the conte+t of an armed confrontation. &overnment forces with the support of the 3ational 7efence @orces operated freely throughout the day on " May in and around the village. There were no reported deceased pro'&overnment forces. The area where the village is located was under the full control of government forces. Accordingly) there are reasonable grounds to believe that government forces and affiliated militia including the 3ational 7efence @orces are the perpetrators of the Al';ayda massacre

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4as Al- abe5( 'anias( 1artus( . /ay ,-+. 1". The incidents at Ras Al'3abeO are closely connected to the events of Al';ayda the preceding day. 3ews spread that the 3ational 7efence @orces) with the support of the army) were moving towards the village as part of the same operation. 5undreds of civilians attempted to leave the village through the regular chec(points but were pushed bac(. Some of the inhabitants managed to flee through dirt roads as main access roads to the village were bloc(ed. &overnment forces proceeded to shell the village from various locations) including from a bridge connecting the village to other areas including Al';ayda. Shelling lasted for appro+imately an hour before pro'&overnment forces moved in. 1$. As they raided the village) civilians were captured and e+ecuted. The commission reviewed evidence of families that had been e+ecuted) including children) as part of the operation. Testimonies of those who witnessed the aftermath described bodies lying in the streets for days before the inhabitants could safely return to collect them. Some of the bodies appeared to have been hit with heavy or sharp ob*ects) especially in the face and head area. According to reports the numbers (illed is between1 #'"##. As in Al';ayda) there is no indication that the armed opposition was active in the village. The operation did not occur in the conte+t of a military confrontation. &overnment forces were in full control of the area. 14. ;ased on an analysis of the evidence) there are reasonable grounds to believe that pro'&overnment forces perpetrated the $ May (illings in Ras Al'3abeO. 0hirbat Al-Souda( )oms( +6 /ay ,-+. 1 . 9n 1 May) anti'&overnment armed groups attac(ed a chec(point at the railway lin(ing 5oms and Tartus. In retaliation for this incident) &overnment forces from the chec(point shelled and raided ,hirbat Al'Souda) a small village five (ilometres north of 5oms city) (illing 11 people) including two women and a three'year'old child) and burned their bodies. 11. In eight incidents detailed above) reasonable grounds e+ist to believe that the war crime of murder was committed by &overnment and pro'&overnment forces) including the 3ational 7efence @orces. Anti- o-ernment armed groups )atla( &ayr Az-7a!r( ++ 2une ,-+. 1<. 9n !une 11 at appro+imately 84 am) several anti'&overnment armed groups) including members of !abhat Al'3usra) attac(ed the ShiOite areas of 5atla) a mi+ed) but Sunni'ma*ority) village located in eastern 7ayr AI'Eawr. In the ensuing fight) anti' &overnment armed groups defeated the outnumbered and outgunned ShiAite fighters. More than "# were (illed and some were captured. Ten anti'&overnment fighters were (illed during the attac(. 1%. 7uring the ta(eover) anti'&overnment armed group fighters conducted home invasions) (illing and summarily e+ecuting Cby shooting at close rangeD many Shia including at least $# civilians) among them children) women and elderly. @ighters also set civilian houses and a Shia mos-ue on fire as they shouted sectarian slogans. 1=. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the anti'&overnment fighters who attac(ed 5atla unlawfully (illed at least "# civilians in violation of international law. In relation to the 11 !une (illings in 5atla) anti'&overnment armed groups involved have committed the war crime of murder.

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%ncidents remaining under in-estigation "#. In some incidents that remain under investigation) the fact of the illegal (illing was confirmedJ however the perpetrator could not be identified. In other cases the circumstances of the (illing is not sufficiently clear to ma(e a determination as to its legality. Abel village( )oms( ,6 /arch ,-+. Al-'ur8( 1al"ala"h( )oms( .- /arch ,-+. 2ib 0hasara( )amah( ,, /ay ,-+. Saroaf 9hec"point( a!a( &ara:a( + 2une ,-+. /azra( Aleppo( ,; 2une ,-+. Al-)as!iyah( )oms( +; 2uly ,-+. %ncidents to be in-estigated during ne*t reporting period as of ), ;uly "5,) Al-'ayda( 1artus( ,+ 2uly ,-+. 0han Al-Assal( Aleppo( ,, 2uly ,-+. 1il Aran( Aleppo .+ 2uly ,-+.

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Anne* %%%
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%nquiry into e-ents in Al Eusayr

1. >ro'&overnment forces) including 5eIbollah) launched a ma*or offensive against the region of Al'Busayr) 5oms governorate) from 4 April to % !une "#1$) forcing the withdrawal of anti'&overnment armed groups from the town and the surrounding countryside. ". In its Resolution A45R64"$41) the 5uman Rights 6ouncil re-uested the 6ommission of In-uiry to Furgently conduct a comprehensive) independent and unfettered in-uiry into the events in Al BusayrG and re-uested the findings of the in-uiry be included in its report to the 6ouncil at its "4th session. $. This Anne+ details the offensive according to information collected during the investigations) ta(en together with documentary material such as photographs) satellite imagery and video recordings.

'ac1ground
4. Al'Busayr is located in 5oms province at a strategic *uncture for the warring partiesA forces operating in the central governorates. The town is located close to the Hebanese borders along the main line of communication between 7amascus and both northern and coastal governorates. . Since early "#1") anti'&overnment armed groups have controlled parts of the locality and e+tended their presence to its countryside) reducing the presence of &overnment forces to the eastern neighbourhood of Al'Busayr city around the security s-uare. 6ontrol of the town enabled the armed groups to ensure cross'border movement of arms and logistics while also disrupting the &overnmentAs supply lines from HebanonAs ;e(aa ?alley. 1. &overnment forces responded by imposing a siege on Al'Busayr towns and surrounding villages. The Syrian army prevented the flow of food and water into the areas from the northern and eastern access points) while 5eIbollah did the same following the assumption of control of access points to the south and west. @or over a year) Al'Busayr and nearby villages came under heavy shelling and aerial bombardment by &overnment forces. ;oth the &overnment siege and shelling of the area intensified in the wee(s prior to the ground attac(s. <. @rom April to mid'!une) anti'&overnment armed groups fired homemade roc(ets and artillery shells into villages) such as 5ermel) under &overnment and 5eIbollah control. Some roc(ets fell on Al'Basr) a village inside Hebanon) causing civilian casualties. %. In the Al'Busayr western countryside) tensions increased between anti'&overnment armed groups and pro'&overnment armed elements in the Shia villages. This led to 5eIbollahAs incremental involvement. As a result of clashes between the warring parties) local inhabitants from the predominantly Sunni villages around Al'Busayr were internally displaced to safer areas in Al'Balamoun) northeastern 7amascus countryside) with thousands fleeing to the town of 0rsal in Hebanon.

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=. Inside the town of Al'Busayr) various anti'&overnment armed groups collaborated during operations under the supervision of Al'Busayr Military 6ouncil. The main groups included Al'@arou- ;attalions) Al'Laleed ;attalions) @a*r Al'Islam ;rigade) ;ashair Al' 3asr ;attalions) Al'5a- ;rigade and a group of !abhat Al'3usra fighters. Immediately prior to the &overnment offensive) there were appro+imately ")### : ") ## anti' &overnment armed group fighters inside Al'Busayr. 1#. In March "#1$) the siege around Al'Busayr town and the surrounding countryside tightened. ?illages west of the Al'Assi River) predominantly populated by Sunni Muslims) were particularly affected. These included Al';urhaniya) Al' Radwaniyeh) Sa-ra*a) Ayn Al'Tannur) Ar*oun and Al'5amidiyah. 11. In the wee(s prior to the May "#1$ offensive) there were severe shortages of food) water and medicine inside the town of Al'Busayr. ;y early May) 5eIbollah had ta(en control of the Ain Tanour and 5amah water stations) four (ilometres west and two (ilometres north of Al'Busayr town respectively. Later to the town) already limited) was cut entirely. Sanitation levels declined rapidly) resulting in a corresponding increase in infectious diseases. As medical supplies ran low) the ability of hospitals and clinics to treat civilians in*ured by shelling and by crossfire was severely compromised. >ro'&overnment forces refused to allow Red 6rescent ambulances to enter Al'Busayr to evacuate the wounded.

+reparatory operations and bombardment

1". In reaction to the coordinated attac( by anti'&overnment armed groups on southern districts of 5oms city in March "#1$) a &overnment offensive on Al'Busayr was initiated in early April. This offensive formed a (ey part of the &overnmentAs strategy to secure 5oms governorate. 1$. &overnment forces) supported by foreign combatants including thousands of 5eIbollah fighters) captured the ma*ority of villages in the countryside in order to cut the armed groupsA supply lines and prevent their withdrawal. @rom 11 April to 1$ May) 5eIbollah fighters controlled the Sunni villages located in the southwest of Al'Busayr Cwest of Al'Assi RiverD) while the &overnment regained territory in 5oms city and challenged the armed groupsA positions from the northeast. These tactics ultimately bloc(aded the armed groups in a triangle formed by the towns of Al'Busayr) ;uwaydah Al' Shar-iyah and Ar*oun. The tight siege imposed on the town of Al'Busayr prevented the transfer of reinforcements and weapons to the armed groups. 14. Shelling and airstri(es on Al'Busayr town and surrounding villages also escalated in the wee(s prior to the ground attac(s. The villages to the southwest of Al'Busayr were shelled with mortars and came under aerial bombardment from *et fighters and helicopters. Al'Busayr also came under sustained attac() from shelling) surface'to'surface missiles and aerial bombardment. In the ten days prior to the ground attac(s) shelling and bombardments on the area were near continuous.

Attac1 on Al-Eusayr city

1 . 9n 1= May) 5eIbollah fighters along with &overnment troops and 3ational 7efence @orces launched a final attac( on Al'Busayr from several directions) reportedly forcing a negotiated withdrawal of anti'&overnment fighters. Litnesses stated that the armed groups withdrew in e+change for the lifting of the siege and the evacuation of civilians and in*ured persons.

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11. The ground attac( by the pro'&overnment forces was accompanied by an e+tensive campaign of shelling and bombardment involving the use of artillery and airpower. 6orroborated interviews indicated the use by 5eIbollah fighters of a highly e+plosive shoulder fired missile) li(ely to have been thermobaric in nature. This weaponry caused a significant number of casualties among anti'&overnment fighters and civilians) as well as e+tensive destruction of buildings. 1<. Lithin "4 hours) on "# May) &overnment forces and 5eIbollah fighters managed to ta(e control of Al'Busayr town) with the e+ception of its northern neighbourhood where anti'&overnment armed groups redeployed. @ighting continued throughout May) with both sides reinforcing their positions in and around the town. @urther &overnment reinforcements were redeployed from 7amascus and 7araAa) including from the Syrian Republican &uard. 1%. Appro+imately $## anti'&overnment fighters) including elements from the Al' Tawheed ;rigade from Aleppo and the Al'2sra Army from 7ayr Al'Eawr) arrived to support the armed groups inside Al'Busayr. 7espite those reinforcements) anti'&overnment armed groups began to lose ground to &overnment forces and 5eIbollah. &overnment forces benefitted not only of their superior weaponry and their ability to sever the armed groupsA supply lines into Al'Busayr but also from 5eIbollahAs e+pertise in street'to'street insurgency fighting. Appro+imately ## armed group fighters were (illed by shelling and by gunfire during the ground operations. An estimated %## to 1### fighters were in*ured) rendering them hors de combat. The &overnment later indicated that appro+imately 1)### anti'&overnment fighters were captured. It has not been able to confirm these numbers. The whereabouts and treatment of many captured fighters is currently un(nown. 1=. The remaining fighters were unable to hold ground in the face of the pro' &overnment onslaught. S-ueeIed between northern Al'Busayr and ;uwaydah Al' Shar-iyah) the fighters) together with civilians and hors de combat fighters) were forced : or allowed : to withdraw from Al'Busayr on !une along a narrow corridor still under opposition control to reach the villages of 7abaa) Salhiyah and ;uwaydah Al'Shar-iyah. "#. 2ntil the last day of the offensive) scores of women) children and elderly had been able to e+it Al'Busayr through military chec(points in 7omaynah Al'Shar(iyah and Shamseen. 5owever) those at ris( of arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention : themselves a gateway to a range of other violations : had little choice but to remain inside the town. This included civilian men) boys over 1" years old and women related to wanted persons) such as defectors. They formed part of the convoy leaving Al'Busayr in the last days of the battle.

The fall of Al-Eusayr

"1. It has been difficult to estimates the siIe of the convoy that e+ited Al'Busayr on !une) primarily because of the sheer number of people moving in a narrow formation out of Al'Busayr towards ;uwaydah Al'Shar-iyah. 5owever) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the total number was between 1$)### and 1 )### people. 6orroborated accounts indicate that at least 1#)### civilians) mostly males over 1" years and over) were part of this convoy. This large group moved along dirt roads to avoid army positions. "". @rom 1 to % !une) the convoy of internally displaced moved towards the 5oms' 7amascus 5ighway through 7omaynah Al'Shar(iyah) 5amra and Al'5ussayniyah. The few persons remaining in these villages *oined the convoy. "$. After ta(ing control of the town of Al'Busayr) pro'&overnment forces successively recaptured the remaining villages including 7abaa C1 !uneD and ;uwaydah Al'Shar-iyah C%

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!uneD. The displacement of thousands of civilians and fighters) including hundreds of in*ured) followed. "4. At dawn on < !une) the first group of civilians and fighters) numbering appro+imately ## people) arrived at the 5oms'7amascus highway. The ma*ority of the group was able to cross) in spite of shelling from nearby army chec(points) which caused a number of casualties. 6ontinued shelling and the resulting deaths led the remaining thousands still waiting to cross to retreat a few (ilometres to a farming area ne+t to Al' 5ussayniyah where they stayed until the following night. " . At around =pm on % !une) the group of displaced tried once again to cross the highway but were targeted by shelling from army positions in nearby Shamseen and Shinshar. In an effort to facilitate the crossing of the highway by waiting civilians) anti' &overnment fighters reportedly attac(ed the Shamseen chec(point. ;y dawn) more groups of civilians and in*ured fighters were still unable to reach east of the highway. They returned to the area of the farms) where they spent two more days suffering from lac( of water) food and medication. In one instance on % !une) army tan(s and troops from chec(points in the area attac(ed the civilians and fighters hiding in the farms) but they were pushed bac( by anti'&overnment fighters. "1. 9n or around % !une) following a negotiation) armed groups returned the bodies of two 5eIbollah fighters in e+change for the safe passage of $4 seriously in*ured armed group fighters to the Hebanese Red 6rescent. The in*ured fighters suffered beatings while under 5eIbollahAs control but were ta(en alive to the border and handed over to the Red 6rescent for medical treatment. "<. It was not until on or about 11 !une that the groups of fighters and civilians were able to cross the highway and entered the localities of Shamseen) 5issiyah and Al'7ibah. They settled there for a few days before leaving to other areas across the country and towards 0rsal in Hebanon.

Casualties
"%. The commission has) to date) been able to verify the (illing of 4 # people during the offensive on Al'Busayr town. Appro+imately half were civilian casualties) (illed primarily in the shelling and aerial bombardment of the town in the early days of the offensive. "=. Lhile civilians were (illed by gunfire) it has not been possible to determine who fired the shots or the circumstances under which the shooting too( place. These civilians may have been (illed in crossfire during the intense street'to'street battles.

8indings
9nlawful attac1s Pro-Government forces $#. In its shelling and aerial bombardment of both Al'Busayr and the Al'Busayr region in the months and wee(s preceding the military offensive : and in particular during the intense shelling which occurred in the ten days prior to the ground attac( : &overnment forces conducted themselves in flagrant disregard of the distinction between civilians and persons directly participating in hostilities. $1. 9n 1< April) the aerial bombardment of ;uwaydah Al'Shar-iyah (illed at least 1" people) including two women and two children. 9n !une <) at least a doIen civilians

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displaced from Al'Busayr were (illed when the army shelled orchards on the outs(irts of the town. ;etween and 1" !une) &overnment shelling targeted internally displaced persons fleeing Al'Busayr) the vast ma*ority of whom were civilians and hors de combat fighters. 6ivilians were (illed in the shelling as they attempted to cross the 7amascus' 5oms highway in search of a safe haven. $". 7uring the attac( on Al'Busayr and the villages around it) the &overnment deployed e+tensive aerial and artillery capabilities. This included imprecise weaponry such as surface'to'surface missiles which destroyed not only individual targets but also bloc(s of buildings. That the ma*ority of civilians were (illed in the shelling and aerial bombardment underlines the failure to ta(e ade-uate precautions to protect civilians. $$. As set out in the chapter on 2nlawful Attac(s) &overnment forces consistently transgressed the fundamental principle of the laws of war that they must at all times distinguish between civilian and military ob*ectives. $4. &overnment forces and 5eIbollah also positioned military ob*ectives inside the villages to the south'west of Al'Busayr) endangering the civilian population and violating international legal obligations. Anti-Government armed groups $ . Anti'&overnment armed groups shelled villages west of Al'Busayr) home predominantly to a Shia community) without ta(ing precautions to protect civilians living inside. 9n "< May) a Hebanese girl aged 1< was (illed in a rebel mortar attac( on the 5eIbollah stronghold of 5ermel. 9n 11 !une) one man was (illed and several people were in*ured during a roc(et attac( also on 5ermel. $1. Anti'&overnment armed groups used mortars) roc(ets and snipers in a manner that failed to distinguish civilian and military ob*ectives) thereby committing unlawful attac(s. $<. Armed groups also operated within civilian areas) including in the town of Al' Busayr itself) violating international legal obligations to avoid positioning military ob*ectives within or near densely populated areas. <mposition of sieges >ro'&overnment forces $%. &overnment forces and 5eIbollah had imposed a siege on the Al'Busayr area since late "#1". In the wee(s prior to the military offensive) the siege tightened considerably with harrowing conse-uences for the civilians remaining inside Al'Busayr town and the surrounding villages. The cutting off of medical supplies into Al'Busayr town) in particular) had dire conse-uences for the ability of the hospitals and clinics to treat those in*ured by shelling and gunfire. $=. As detailed in the section on Sieges and Attac(s on @ood Security) pro'&overnment forces have a legal obligation to allow and facilitate the unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief. The use of starvation as a method of warfare is clearly prohibited under the laws of war. There is strong evidence to suggest the siege was imposed for the specific reason to render the conditions of life unbearable) wea(ening the armed groups and forcing civilians) who were so able) to flee. 4#. &overnment forces and 5eIbollah have imposed sieges and bloc(ades in the Al' Busayr region) without complying with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

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Torture and other forms of ill-treatment Pro-Government forces 41. @ollowing a negotiated e+change of $4 seriously in*ured armed group fighters for the bodies of two 5eIbollah fighters on or around % !une) the in*ured hors de combat fighters were beaten by 5eIbollah members prior to their transfer to the Hebanese Red 6rescent for medical treatment. Such conduct is in flagrant disregard for the protections accorded to the sic() wounded and hors de combat fighters from ill'treatment. (assacres and other unlawful 1illings 4". 6ivilians were (illed in the indiscriminate shelling of Al'Busayr and its surroundings. It has not been possible to determine) beyond the re-uisite standard of proof) the circumstances in which those (illed by gunfire died. &iven the fierce fighting that too( place in Al'Busayr) there is a strong possibility that those (illed may have been caught in crossfire between the warring factions. There is no evidence) as yet) to indicate that fighters on either side were (illed in circumstances that would have deemed those (illings unlawful. Investigations are continuing.

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