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FACEBOOK VIDEO GET INVOLVED Home / Country Profiles / Syria / Chemical Syria flagSyria PrintShareEmailTwitterFacebookLinkedInSelect Another CountrySyria OVERVIEWANALYSISTREATIESOFFICIAL DOCUMENTSFACILITIES NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL MISSILE CHEMICAL Chemical Last updated: November, 2013 Since the early 1980s, Syria has made efforts to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical weapons. Regional security concerns, and most notably Syria's adversarial relationship with Israel, represent the most likely present-day motivation behind Syria's chemical weapons program. Specifically, a series of disastrous military defeats to Israel in 1967, 1973, and 1982, followed by the weakening of Arab unity against Israel following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Israel's presumed acquisition of nuclear weapons, provided impetus for Syria to pursue a strategic deterrent against the conventional and nuclear Israeli threats. [1] Historically, Syria elected not to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), stating that while it supports a region-wide ban on WMD, it could not unilaterally renounce chemical weapons as long as Israel continued to pose a threat to its security. [2] Damascus has continued its pursuit of chemical weapons despite the damage to its international reputation and the rising costs of evading international export controls on chemical weapons materials. Since embarking on a CW program in the 1970's, Syria has obtained both chemical agents and CW-capable missiles from foreign suppliers. [3] Currently, Syria's ability to produce CW agents and delivery systems appears to remain heavily dependent on foreign support for materials and expertise. Since 2005, Jane's Defense has reported on alleged Iranian assistance to Syria in upgrading and enhancing its CW production infrastructure. [4] On 12 September 2013 Syria submitted an instrument of accession to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and on 14 September deposited the instrument of accession to the UN Secretary General, requesting to join the Chemical Weapons Convention. [5] The reversal came amid speculation that the Assad regime used chemical weapons in the ongoing Syrian conflict, and calls by the United States for limited air strikes. The CWC has entered into force for Syria on 14 October 2013. [6] On 16 September 2013 the United Nations released a report confirming the use of chemical weapons outside of Damascus on 21 August 2013. [7] While the report did not apportion responsibility to either party in the Syrian civil war, the U.S. and other western nations have

stated that the details of the report clearly confirm that the Assad regime is responsible. [8] The UN is conducting additional investigations into the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict. [9] On 27 September, the OPCW approved a disarmament plan for Syria's chemical weapons and related infrastructure. [10] The UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution to secure and destroy Syria's chemical weapons. [11] The joint resolution called for the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons production capability by 1 November 2013, and the elimination of all chemical weapons by mid-2014. [12] On 11 October, the UN and the OPCW approved a Joint Mission to oversee the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons and related infrastructure. [13] While the Joint Mission has oversight, the Syrian government is responsible for carrying out the destruction process. [14] On 31 October the Joint Mission announced that Syria met the 1 November deadline of eliminating all weapons production and mixing capabilities. [15] The UN has concluded that it is impossible to destroy all of Syrias chemical weapons on Syrian territory. [16] The UN and US are currently exploring options for destroying Syrias arsenal in other countries. History 1972 to 1986: The Israeli Threat and Initial CW Imports Although the majority of open source information focuses on Syrian offensive, rather than defensive capabilities, defensive CW equipment were among the first CW-related imports purchased by Syria. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles from the Soviet Union that were usually fitted with chemical protection systems as standard equipment. According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree, the Soviet Union provided Syria with a full range of decontamination equipment in the 1970s and 1980s. [17] Allegedly, personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. Syria is known to have purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11 protective masks; whether this represented a single purchase or a portion of a broader acquisition effort to replace all existing masks remains unknown. [18] Numerous press and U.S. government sources indicate that Syria first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt on the eve of the attack on Israel in October 1973. [19] Reports that Israeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that Syrian combat troops received these weapons during the Yom Kippur war. [20] Notably, although Syrian forces suffered severe defeat, at no point did they deploy chemical weapons. Although the lack of access to Syrian personnel or records renders all explanations for this restraint speculative, Syrian-born security analyst M. Zuhair Diab and Israeli military analysts both suggest that Syria may have planned to use its chemical arsenal only in the event of a total military collapse, which never occurred. [21] Suboptimal military coordination among Syria, Egypt, and Iraq during the 1973 Yom Kippur War revealed fissures in Arab unity against Israel. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty deprived Syria of an important military ally against the Israeli threat, and according to M. Zuhair Diab, motivated a pursuit of greater military self-sufficiency. [22] Further, Diab notes that the near-disastrous clashes with Israeli forces during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 exposed Syria's land and air vulnerabilities and further motivated Syria's military to acquire chemical weapons.

Other regional developments may also have motivated Syria's pursuit of a CW capability. Water-sharing conflicts with Turkey over the Euphrates River contributed to tense SyrianTurkish relations during this period, as did Turkish allegations of Syrian support for the Kurdish independence movement. Syria may also have sought CW as a deterrent against a show of force or as a form of leverage. [23] Perhaps more directly troublesome to Syrian leadership, the Soviet Union chose to support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, weakening Syria's partnership with the USSR and further isolating Syria. [24] The combination of increasing political isolation and observed military deficiencies vis--vis Israel together provided incentives for Syria to develop a self-sufficient CW capability. 1986 to 1997: Building CW Self-Sufficiency According to Israeli media, Syria began developing an indigenous chemical production capability in 1971 at the Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS) a facility in Damascus that today administers Syria's CW program while also contributing directly to research and development efforts. [25] According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree, however, most reports indicate that Syria's CW production capability came online sometime in the mid-1980's. [26] In 1989, CIA Director William Webster testified that Syria had begun producing CW agents in the early 1980's. [27] In 1983, a U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate first identified a Syrian CW production facility. By 1986, Seth Carus wrote that in just five years, Syria had obtained CW production technology from Western Europe and had focused its attention on producing nerve agents. [28] Reportedly, unidentified U.S. officials also indicated that Syria could produce sarin, a charge repeated by Shimon Peres. [29] By the end of 1986, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had all openly stated that Syria was producing nerve agents and delivery systems. [30] By 1990, both media and statements by U.S. officials indicated that Syria had converted several agrochemical factories into sarin production facilities. [31] Reports then appeared alleging that Syria had begun researching the more toxic V-series nerve agents. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success. [32] While the CIA never publicly committed to the view that Syria possessed VX, 721 reports in the 1990s claimed either that Syria "may be trying to develop more potent nerve agents," or that it "apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents." [33] Signaling growing official concern over Syria's burgeoning CW production capability, in June of 1986 the Reagan Administration banned the sale of sarin and mustard precursors to Syria. [34] However, by the early 1990's numerous reports of illicit trade began to emerge. In 1996 Russian authorities charged retired Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich with shipping 800-kilograms of precursor chemicals to Syria. [35] Although these charges were eventually dropped, Israeli press reported that Kuntsevich later admitted to the transfer of nerve agent precursors. [36] It later emerged that Kuntsevich and Syria first agreed to collaborate on the transfer of equipment and materials to Syria in 1992. [37] By 1997, both U.S. and Israeli sources claimed that Syria's CW program, under the administration of CERS, included production facilities in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo and could produce sarin, mustard, and potentially VX. [38]

Despite Syria's ongoing development of its chemical weapons capability, there have been no confirmed incidences of combat use. [39] In 1982, Amnesty International charged that the Syrian government had used cyanide gas against a Moslem Brotherhood uprising in Hama. [40] The report, which could not be further substantiated, alleges that Syrian troops connected rubber piping to chemical gas tanks and pumped these substances into buildings. The regional security trends that drove Syria's CW program namely, counter-balancing Israel's growing conventional warfare capabilities amid increasing military isolation continued throughout the next decade. During the 1980s and 1990s, Israel's military superiority over Syria increased, leaving Syria increasingly vulnerable. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980scombined with the all too apparent inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipmentrequired Syria to seek an equalizer. While the overall objective of projecting a capability to inflict unacceptable losses on Israel's military and civilian population remained, Syria also likely recognized the careful balancing act of maintaining a credible threat without provoking an Israeli attack. In this regard, Syria likely found it advantageous to adopt an opaque chemical weapons policy, not unlike Israel's nuclear policy, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of chemical weapons even as it continues to deploy and improve them. Syria built its CW program off foreign support and has been a voracious importer of CW materials, technologies, and expertise. Due to Syria's relative isolation from the international community the capacity of Syria's indigenous capability built during this period remains unknown. Open source reports generally do not include sufficient details about Syrian CW imports to further characterize any changes or trends in Syria's import activities. However, the overall scale of Syrian CW imports in this era declined when compared to that of the early 1980s. [41] 1997 to the Present: Silence and Reinvigoration Reporting on the Syrian CW arsenal remained relatively stable throughout the next decade. Since the initial reports alleging sarin production and potential VX research and production, few new developments have emerged in public reporting. From 2002 to 2006, reports from the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence repeated that "Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents." [42] The 2009 and 2010 versions of this report repeated a similar line, that Syria "has had a CW program for many years and already has a stockpile of CW agents" and that "Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals." [43] Relatively few open source reports of Syrian tests on CW agents or delivery systems emerged during this decade. [44] The most recent publicly described test, a Syrian missile test in July 2001, probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead. [45] Since that time, Syria's CW program has maintained a very low profile, although Jane's Defense has continued to report on foreign support for the development of chemical warheads for Scud missiles and other delivery systems. [46] In 2005, Jane's began publishing claims that Syria was engaged in efforts, assisted by the Iranian government, to expand its capability to produce precursors. [47] In early 2009, Jane's published assertions to the effect that Syria

was modernizing and expanding its Al-Safira facility, basing these claims in part on satellite photography, and in part on information from confidential sources. [48] In early 2008, Seymour Hersh reported that a Syrian official had commented that "Syria had concluded...that chemical warfare had little deterrent value against Israel, given its nuclear capability" following an Israeli raid on an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor being constructed. [49] While the comments of this Syrian official could provide some insight into Syria's overall CW calculus, Syria during this period made no official statements regarding chemical weapons doctrine, nor has it publically acknowledged possessing such weapons. Whether Syria views its CW arsenal as a realistic component of a potential battle in the Golan Heights or as a strategic deterrent to threaten the Israeli civilian population remains a topic of debate. [50] For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD while also supporting the right of any state to secure itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that until Israel abandons its presumed nuclear weapons program, Syria will neither renounce the right to possess chemical weapons nor destroy any arsenal it may possess. Whether Syrian leadership would in fact consider bargaining away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program remains unknown. What is more concretely known is that Syria remains adamantly opposed to CWC membership, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and discourages other Arab nations from joining. Recent Developments and Current Status The outbreak of civil unrest in late 2011 raised questions about both the security of Syria's chemical weapons sites and the potential use or transfer of such weapons. On 23 July 2012 Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi stated that Syria would never use "any chemical and biological weapons . . . .inside Syria," that the Syrian army was storing "all stocks of these weapons" securely, and that such weapons would only be used in the event of "external aggression." [51] In subsequent Twitter exchanges, he tried to walk back this apparent acknowledgement of Syria's possession of chemical and biological weapons, something Syria had previously denied. [52] As the conflict intensified, the international community became increasingly concerned that Syrian President Assad might use chemical weapons amid Syria's deteriorating situation and rebel gains. On 20 August 2012, President Obama warned, "a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized." [53] Several days later UK Prime Minister David Cameron underscored President Obama's remark that the threat or use of chemical weapons by President Assad's regime would warrant a revised approach, alluding to military intervention. [54] The newly elected President of France, Franois Hollande, took the podium at the United Nations 67th General Assembly to let the Assad government know, "that the international community will not stand aside if they were to use chemical weapons." [55] Between late November and early December 2012, Western intelligence agencies obtained clear evidence that Syrian government units were preparing chemical weapons for potential

use. At one base, soldiers were observed to be mixing precursor chemicals and taking other steps to make the chemical weapons battlefield ready. Surveillance photos further confirmed another army unit loading chemical weapons onto special military transport vehicles. [56] These actions prompted President Obama to warn Syria again on 3 December 2012 that "the use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable [and] there will be consequences and you will be held accountable." [57] Shortly afterwards Syrian forces appeared to have ceased chemical weapons preparations, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta attributed the halt of Syrian chemical weapons activities to President Obama's warning. [58] On 19 March 2013, allegations arose concerning a chemical weapons attack in the village of Khan al-Assal in the Aleppo province. According to the Assad regime, a rocket spewing a toxic gas in Khan al-Assal caused 26 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. Both the Assad regime and Syrian rebels denied responsibility for the alleged attack. [59] At the request of the Syrian Government, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed ke Sellstrm on 27 March 2013 to head a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. Sellstrm said that following mission preparation, the team would spend three to four days for inspection, and two to three weeks to write its report and conduct chemical analysis. [60] Despite the inspection team's preparations, the Assad Government denied the team entrance into Syria. The denial of access came amid calls by the United Kingdom, France, Luxembourg, South Korea, and Japan to increase the scope of the inspections to include allegations of chemical weapons use in Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. [61] On 19 April 2013, the United Kingdom and France announced they had "hard evidence" of chemical weapons use in at least one case. [62] On 23 April 2013 Israeli Brigadier General Itai Brun asserted sarin had been used "in a number of incidents" in Syria, based on photographs of victims foaming at the mouth and with constricted pupils and other unspecified symptoms. [63] Then, on 25 April 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that the "U.S. intelligence community assesses with some degree of varying confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically, the chemical agent sarin." The basis for Western governments' assessments remains unclear, as it would presumably be very challenging to maintain chain of custody over collection and handling of any soil or other physiological evidence. [64] However, on 13 June 2013, Benjamin J. Rhodes, President Obama's deputy national security adviser, announced that the White House will extend military support to the Syrian opposition because there was a "high certainty" Assad's forces used chemical weapons. The White House did not clarify what the military support would encompass, but such an operation would be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency due to the legal restraints of supplying arms without UN approval to groups attacking another government. [65] [66] As for humanitarian assistance, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman confirmed U.S. aid included protective equipment, medical treatment, and training for medical personnel as a means of protection and response to the use of chemical weapons. [67] Countering the West's assertions on 9 July 2013, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to the United Nations, said Russian inspectors visited the Khan al-Assal site, gathered samples for testing in an OPCW certified lab, and discerned the "Bashair-3 unguided projectile" was fired by the Bashair al-Nasr Brigade, an affiliate of the Free Syrian Army. [68] Churkin's claims

reinforced the West's allegations that chemical weapons were used in Syria, but only added speculation as to who was responsible. On 31 July 2013, UN Spokesman Martin Nesirky confirmed that the Assad government had agreed to allow the UN chemical weapons inspector team into the country for the first time to examine three sites of alleged chemical weapons use, including Khan al-Assal. [69] It is hoped that despite the elapsed time between the alleged chemical weapons use and the team's arrival, Sellstrm's team can gather evidence and present an unbiased report. The morning of 21 August 2013, during the UN chemical weapons inspection team's visit, new video footage emerged of an apparent chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, just outside of Damascus. According to initial reports and video footage, the attack involved an organized strike over a large area that utilized rockets as the dispersal mechanism. Hospitals and make-shift medical centers reported patients suffering from convulsions, immobilization, breathing difficulties, dilated pupils, cold limbs, and foaming from the mouth. Estimates of the death toll vary greatly, but various groups and video footage place the numbers of dead in the hundreds to over a thousand. [70] Doctors Without Borders reported that three hospitals within its network confirmed 355 people died and approximately 3,600 displayed symptoms of neurotoxic symptoms, while a U.S. government assessment placed the number of dead at 1,429. [71] The Syrian government eventually granted the UN inspection team access to areas of Ghouta (after stalling for five days), in lieu of the team visiting the originally planned three sites. [72] In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the United States, citing Syrian chemical weapons brigades' actions and communications, tried to rally support to conduct limited military strikes against Assad's forces. However, the international coalition supporting military action was reduced to the United States and France after the British House of Commons rejected a proposal by Prime Minister Cameron to authorize military operations. At the G-20 Summit, President Obama tried to rally the other economic powers of the world to take action against Syria. On 6 September 2013, 11 countries released a joint statement calling "for a strong international response to this grave violation of the world's rules and conscience that will send a clear message that this kind of atrocity can never be repeated." [73] However, President Obama was unable to convince President Putin to commit Russia to taking action against Syria, maintaining the ongoing deadlock among the UN Security Council members. As the U.S. Congress prepared to vote on whether to attack Syria, on 10 September 2013 Syria agreed, following Russian urging, to put its chemical weapons stockpile under international control for eventual destruction, and committed to joining the Chemical Weapons Convention. On 14 September, Russia and the United States reached a deal on a framework to eliminate Syria's chemical weapons. [74] [75] The framework called for Syria to submit a comprehensive list of its chemical weapons within one week; for inspectors to return to Syria by November; and for the destruction of all chemical weapons by mid-2014. [76] On 21-22 September, Syria met its obligation by providing two lists of its chemical weapons. [77] The United States responded that the list was "more comprehensive than anticipated," and Russia and the United States began negotiating text to provide a framework for a UN resolution. [78] [79] [80]

On 16 September, the United Nations released its much-anticipated report, stating that the UN had "clear and convincing," evidence that sarin gas was used in the 21 August attacks outside of Damascus. [81] Subsequently, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that the evidence was "overwhelming and indisputable," that sarin was used. [82] While the report did not attribute responsibility to either party in the civil war, report details, such as the use of M-14 and 330m rocket artillery, and the estimated trajectories, suggest that the Assad regime was responsible for the attacks, as the rebels do not possess the rockets used. [83] While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France accepted the UN report as confirmation of the Assad regime's role in the attacks, Russia stated that the report was "distorted" and "one-sided," and maintains that the Assad regime did not conduct the attacks. [84] On 25 September, UN weapons inspectors returned to Syria to continue to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the civil war. [85] The UN team expanded the investigation to include additional sites where chemical weapons were allegedly used. [86] On 27 September, the OPCW adopted a decision on the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. [87] The decision, recognizing the joint Russia-US framework, calls for the destruction of all chemical weapons production and mixing facilities by 1 November 2013, and the destruction of all chemical weapons by mid2014. [88] As part of the decision, a team of 20 experts arrived in Damascus on 30 September to "initiate inspections pursuant to [the] decision." [89] Following the OPCW decision, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on Syria. Resolution 2118 calls for consequences should Syria fail to fulfill its obligations; however, the resolution was not written under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and any use of force against Syria would require an additional resolution. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that the United Nations "will stand ready to take action under Chapter VII of the charter," should Syria renege on its obligations. [90] On 12 October, the UN and the OPCW approved a Joint Mission to oversee the dismantling and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal and infrastructure. [91] The Joint Mission serves to monitor and verify Syria's compliance with UNSC Resolution 2118; however, its mandate does not include participation in the destruction process for which the Syrian government is responsible. [92] On 14 October the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force for Syria. [93] On 31 October, the OPCW announced that Syria had met the Phase I deadline of eliminating all production and mixing capabilities. [94] Phase II, the elimination of all chemical weapons, began on 1 November. As of 11 November the OPCW had completed verification activities at 22 of 23 sites. [95] Inspectors have been unable to visit the remaining site due to security reasons. According to the OPCW's initial findings, the Syrian arsenal includes 1,000 metric tons of Category I chemical weapons, 290 tons of Category II chemicals, and 1,230 Category III unfilled delivery systems such as rockets. [96] The OPCW's findings are in line with Syria's chemical weapons declaration.

The OPCW has stated that it is not possible to destroy Syria's entire arsenal on Syrian territory. [97] Currently, the UN and the United States are exploring options for the destruction of Syria's weapons. Russia, Jordan, Turkey, Norway and Albania have all rejected requests to destroy weapons on their territory. [98] [99] [100] Denmark and Norway announced that they would aid in the transportation by sea of chemical weapons out of Syria to a destruction location. [101] [102]According to Reuters the United States and Russia submitted a draft document to the OPCW outlining a timetable calling for the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria by the end of the year, and the destruction of all weapons by 30 December 2014, six months later than the initial deadline of June 2014. [103] On 15 November, the OPCW released a detailed timetable for the destruction process. The OPCW plan maintains a June 2014 deadline for the destruction of all chemical weapons, and states that all chemicals except for isopropanol will be destroyed outside of Syria. [104] Syria is to destroy all isopropanol, one of two precursors for sarin, on-site by 1 March 2014. [105]

The international community remains optimistic that Syria will live up to the Russia-U.S. framework. While recent developments are encouraging, experts warn that Assad may manipulate the CWC process to maintain some parts of his chemical weapons program. For example, Amy Smithson of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) writes that, "Syria could keep inspectors away from certain areas of production facilities if it declares to the OPCW that those sites have nothing to do with chemical weapons." [106] Zachary Kallenborn and Raymond Zilinskas of CNS add that, lessons from the Iraq and Libyan cases suggest that while verifying the correctness of a state's declarations is feasible, it is only possible for inspectors to have a limited degree of certainty in assessing the completeness of state declarations. As such, there is some risk, as occurred in the Libyan case, that the regime could successfully retain a secret CW capability. [107] Although the United States initially applauded the comprehensiveness of Syria's declaration of its arsenal, it too remains skeptical of its accuracy and the Assad regime's intentions. [108] Citing U.S. intelligence suggesting Syria may try to hide some of its chemical weapons, U.S. envoy to the United Nations Samantha Powers stated, "We are still reviewing [the declaration] we obviously bring skepticism born of years of dealing with this regime, years of obfuscation in other contexts, and of course a lot of broken promises in the context of this current war." [109]