Criterion V 2 No 4

CHlTEHlON
ouAnTznLY
OcT. - Dzc. 2DD7
voLumz 2 No. A
EoiToniAL
PoLiTicAL ONcznTAiNTY ANo ExTnzmisT VioLzNcz
THz PoLiTics or EcoNomic PoLicY Hzronms
KAsHmin DisuTz: ls THznz A ViAaLz SoLuTioN
THz HooTs or SzcTAniANism iN PAKisTAN
Nzzo ron A PAK-ArcHAN TnzATY oN
MANAczmzNT or JoiNT WATzn
DzriNiNc MomzNTs - THz PoLiTicAL lmLicATioNs
or STATz PoLicY
lnAN, THz ONiTzo STATzs ANo HzcioNAL STAaiLiTY
EssAY
Somz HzrLzcTioNs oN lsLAm ANo GovznNANcz
ooK Hzvizws
DAinizs or FizLo MAnsHAL MoHAmmAo AYua KHAN
(1966-1972I
SHAmzruL FLicHT aY STANLzY WoLznT
LzTTzns To THz EoiTon
2 CRITERION Jolume 2 No.4
Eaitorial
Publisher
S. IItikhar Murshed
Editor-in-Chief
S. Mushfq Murshed
Executive Adviser
Riaz Khokhar
Adviser
Aziz Ahmad Khan
S. Mashkoor Murshed
Editors
MuzaIIar Abbas (Executive)
Navid ZaIar (Research)
Cover Design by
Fariha Rashid
Printers
Lawyersown Press
28, alIalah Askaria Plaza,
Committee Chowk, Rawalpindi.
Contact
Editor The Criterion
House 225, Street 33, F-10/1, Islamabad
Tel: 92-51-2210531 Fax: 92-51-2297206
'Criterion` is a quarterly magazine which aims at producing well researched articles Ior a
discerning readership. The editorial board is neutral in its stance. The opinions expressed are
those oI the writers.
Contributions are edited Ior reasons oI style or clarity. Great care is taken that such editing
does not aIIect the theme oI the article or cramp its style.
Quotations Irom the magazine can be made by any publisher as long as they are properly
acknowledged. We would also appreciate iI we are inIormed.
Subscription:
Pakistan, Bangladesh & India Rs. 195 (Local Currency)
Overseas US $ 15
The Annual Subscription Price is Rs. 700 or US $ 50 plus postage
Price: Rs 195
US $ 15
Criterion
October/December 2007
Volume 2, Number 4
(GLWRULDO 3
Political Uncertainty and Extremist Violence
S. Mushhq Murshea
The Politics oI Economic Policy ReIorms Ishrat Husain 10

Kashmir Dispute: Is There a Viable Solution Zamir Akram 25
The Roots oI Sectarianism in Pakistan Khalea Ahmea 57
Need Ior a Pak-AIghan Treaty on Management oI Joint Water 86
Khala A:i:
Defning Moments The Political Implications oI State Policy 118
Shahwar Junaia
Iran, the United States and Regional Stability 137
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
(VVD\ 166
Some Refections on Islam and Governance
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa
%RRN 5HYLHZV 174
Dairies oI Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan(1966-1972)
ShameIul Flight by Stanley Wolpert
/HWWHUV WR WKH (GLWRU 181
3
Eaitorial
CRITERION October/December 2007
(GLWRULDO
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY
AND EXTREMIST VIOLENCE
As the fnal 2007 issue oI Criterion goes into print, increasing
extremist violence and election-year political uncertainties have exposed
the state`s inability to enIorce its writ and demonstrated that sixty years
aIter its independence, Pakistan has yet to establish a stable constitution-
based political system.
The Political Process
General MusharraI`s 6 October re-election as a military president
is an innovation that has no parallel in the history oI parliamentary
democracy. Earlier he had given frm assurances that iI elected he would
relinquish his position as ChieI oI Army StaII and had nominated Gen.
AshIaq Kiani as his successor. A precedent has, thereIore, been set
which does not augur well Ior the accident-prone democratic process oI
Pakistan.
The Supreme Court`s earlier rejection oI the writ petitions, submitted
among others by Qazi Hussain Ahmad oI the Jamaat-e-Islami, challenging
the president`s eligibility to contest the election while retaining his
army post was a 6-3 split decision. Among those who Ielt that there
was suIfcient legal justifcation to admit the petitions was Justice Rana
Bhagwan Das, the second senior most judge oI the Supreme Court.

According to a Iormer Supreme Court judge, the rejection oI
the petitions was on the technical ground that article 184 (3) oI the
Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to only admit non-appellate
cases when: (i) 'there is a question of public importance, (ii) such
a question involves enforcement of funaamental right, ana (iii) the
funaamental right sought to be enforcea is conferrea by Chapter 1, Part
Eaitorial
II of the Constitution. The opinion oI the judge was that there was
no inIringement oI Iundamental rights and, thereIore, the rejection was
legally correct.
This ruling did not deter presidential candidates Justice (retd)
Wajihuddin Ahmad and Amin Fahim Irom fling new petitions
challenging MusharraI`s eligibility and requesting a postponement oI
the polls till the Supreme Court`s decision. The latter however allowed
the election to continue but stayed the Iormal notifcation oI the results
till its ruling on the petitions.
The prevailing political uncertainty has been compounded by
speculation, aIter the Supreme Court`s rejection oI the earlier petitions,
whether the judiciary had really become independent. Its landmark
decision oI 20 July reinstating ChieI Justice IItikhar Choudhry resulted
in jubilation and spawned the hope that an assertive judiciary would
ensure constitutional rule.
Sceptics, however, believed that the 20 July decision was infuenced
by the massive popular outcry against the ChieI Justice`s removal. They
recalled the past and cited earlier decisions oI the judiciary such as the
1954 Maulvi Tamizuddin case in which the Federal Court under Justice
Munir upheld the dismissal oI Constituent Assembly and the Asma Jilani
case oI 1972 in which the Supreme Court declared Gen Yahya Khan a
usurper aIter his removal though it had validated his rule in 1969. Some
oI the same judges later endorsed General Zia-ul-Haq`s coup against the
Zulifkar Ali Bhutto government and subsequently condemned him to the
gallows. Several serving Supreme Court judges accorded legal sanction
to President MusharraI`s ouster oI Nawaz ShariI. They endorsed the
17
th
Amendment, confrmed MusharraI as president and approved his
continuation as ChieI oI Army StaII till the end oI the current year.
The en bloc resignation Irom the Iederal and provincial legislatures
oI the All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) plus fve members
oI the ruling PML (Q) and a Iew others made the presidential electoral
college, though technically intact, look unconvincing. With or without
the support oI the opposition, the ruling PML (Q) had the required
5
Eaitorial
numbers to ensure President MusharraI`s re-election.

What President MusharraI lost in the process was the moral high
ground because oI the split Supreme Court decision, the absence oI
almost all opposition parties and re-election by the same National
Assembly which was nearing the completion oI its term. In eIIect the
truncated legislatures imposed a president Ior the next fve years on the
post-general election assemblies.
The National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) oI 5 October is
controversial and, Iar Irom promoting harmony, has the potential oI
generating political instability. It indemnifes politicians and bureaucrats
accused but not convicted oI corruption Irom 1986 to 12 October 1999
i.e., till the coup that brought General MusharraI to power and, as such,
it does not apply to Iormer Prime Minister Nawaz ShariI. Twenty years
oI plunder oI the national wealth amounting to billions oI dollars have
been written oII by the stroke oI the pen. The main benefciaries are
Benazir Bhutto, the MQM and even some serving government ministers
oI the government. It provides protection to legislators inasmuch as
criminal charges cannot be brought against them without the approval
oI a parliamentary ethics committee consisting oI members Irom the
treasury benches as well as the opposition. Apologists Ior the Ordinance
claim that it protects members oI the National and Provincial Assemblies
Irom arbitrary political victimization while critics maintain that it gives
them a Iree hand to indulge in corrupt practices.
The NRO was promulgated aIter its fnal draIt had been approved
by Ms. Bhutto and it meets one oI her demands Ior cooperating with
the president namely, the withdrawal oI the corruption cases against her
and her husband. So much Ior the PPP claim that the NRO was not
tailor-made to beneft the party. Political expediency and not the loIty
ideal oI reconciliation inspired the promulgation oI the Ordinance. In
the past the President declared aa inhnitum that plundering politicians
such as Bhutto and Nawaz ShariI had no place in Pakistan. They were
accountable to the people and would not be allowed to evade justice.
The emptiness oI the rhetoric became selI-evident.
Eaitorial
Two oI Ms. Bhutto`s Iour demands Ior cooperating with President
MusharraI have thus been met. The corruption charges against her are
being dropped and the president will relinquish the post oI ChieI oI
Army StaII. General MusharraI also does not seem to be opposed to
a third term Ior Ms. Bhutto as prime minister but this will require an
amendment to the constitution Ior which a two-third majority vote in
the National Assembly is not available. The only sticking point is ex-
prime minister Bhutto`s insistence on removing article 58 (2) (b) oI the
Constitution which empowers the president to dismiss the prime minister.
An instructive study on the powers oI the president and prime minister
is available in A. G. Noorani`s article 'The Parliamentary System in
South Asia Ieaturing in the July-September 2007 issue oI Criterion.
President MusharraI`s confdence, which probably stems Irom
the disunity within the APDM, could well be misplaced. The Iuture
political setup will be determined by the general elections. Two Iactors
are oI importance. First, the president`s popularity is at its lowest and
the PML (Q) is seen as a military-created entity. Second, Ms. Benzair
Bhutto might have undermined her own political standing by her
apparent cooperation with President MusharraI Ior no higher motive
than to promote her own political and economic interests. Furthermore,
her recent statements that she would allow the IAEA access to Dr. A. Q.
Khan and her willingness to permit the US, under certain circumstances,
to strike Taliban and Al Qaida outfts in Pakistan is seen as a sell-out to
the Americans.
The country is poised Ior general elections in an atmosphere oI
political uncertainty. Till now there has been little electioneering. None oI
the parties have announced their maniIestoes. The political permutations
and combinations that will emerge in the coming weeks are unclear. The
country has more than its share oI political chameleons whose loyalties
change Ior no higher motive than the Iurtherance oI personal ambitions.
Despite its apparent disunity caused in large measure by the ambivalence
oI Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his JUI, the APDM leadership has
declared that the coming political battle will be Iought in the streets.
Under the circumstances this could lead to political polarization and
violence verging on chaos.
7
Eaitorial
The Spread of Extremism
Chaos provides a Iertile breeding ground Ior extremist violence.
II the state is unwilling or unable to enIorce its writ, then political
space is conceded to obscurantist Iorces and this is precisely what has
happened and continues to happen in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA). The promulgation and enIorcement oI draconian laws,
administration, the collection and disbursement oI revenues are in the
hands oI the Taliban and their Al Qaida mentors. The old system oI
administration through the political agents and tribal elders, which
worked so well and Ior so long, has been dismantled.
The cancer oI extremism has spread to the settled areas in the NWFP.
This is largely because an inept administration has taken at best only
halI-hearted measures to contain the violence. To cite just one example,
extremist elements had threatened measures against women attending
educational institutions in Swat. This warning went unheeded and girls
schools were bombed. The weak-kneed reaction oI the authorities and
their over emphasis on negotiations rather than use oI Iorce (when
required) has emboldened the obscurantist Iorces.
The government signed an agreement with Maulana Fazalullah, the
leader oI Tehreek NiIaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi, in May under which he
was not to use his illegal FM radio station. Yet in mid-July he resumed
transmissions and Iorbade girls Irom going to school. As a result, nearly
2000 girls in Imam Deri, Swat, were stopped Irom attending educational
institutions by their parents because the cleric said it was un-Islamic.
Similarly, earlier 25,000 children were deprived oI polio vaccination as
it was conveyed to their Iamilies through the radio that the vaccination
drive was an attempt by the Jews and Christians to stunt the population
growth oI Muslims.
Residents oI Islamabad and Rawalpindi were given a taste oI what
transpires on a daily basis in the tribal areas by the Abdul-Rashid duo
oI the Lal Masjid. Abductions, vandalism, oppression, threats oI suicide
bombings and the establishment oI a Shariah court resulted in Ieeble
negotiation attempts by the Government Ior 6 months. The eventual
military operation was inevitable, however, the delay was unnecessary as
Eaitorial
it emboldened extremist elements to be even more assertive. According
to an editorial in the Daily Times, there were 558 terrorist incidents in
Pakistan in the frst six months oI this year resulting in the loss oI 1,019
lives, 853 terrorists were arrested including 32 Al Qaida operatives.
The government needs to adopt a tougher stand in FATA to be taken
seriously. It has to be proactive and not wait till chaotic conditions
envelope our lives. Willingness to negotiate may remain an option,
but this should always be Irom a position oI strength. With over 1500
casualties and more than 200 soldiers captured, the militants in the tribal
areas believe that the government will eventually compromise. They
need to be disillusioned. The government has to craIt an iron-hand-
in-velvet-glove policy. A mix oI Iorce and economic inducements is
required. Development projects need to be accelerated in tandem with
frm military action when necessary.
The Political Parties Act oI 1962 does not apply in FATA. As a result,
no political party is allowed to Iunction in the tribal areas although there
are 12 seats reserved in the National Assembly and 8 in the Senate Ior
FATA. This provides an unopposed playing feld Ior religious parties
to gain control oI the area through the management oI mosques and
madrassahs. Khalid Aziz, a Iormer NWFP ChieI Secretary, in an
article carried in the April-June issue oI Criterion recommended: .the
Political Parties Act shoula be amenaea ana the tribal areas openea
to all political parties. This will generate internal tribal aynamics ana
bring into play balancing forces. Subsequently, a constitutional petition
was fled under Article 184(3) in the Supreme Court by the PPP Ior
introducing the Political Parties Act in the tribal areas.
One point made by President MusharraI has to be agreed upon. It is
necessary to have a strong and unifed Government to battle the Taliban/
Al Qaida elements in Pakistan. At the moment, uncertainty in the centre
and disjointed attempts nationwide are only strengthening the extremist
movement.
The next three months will be crucial Ior Pakistan. The army,
politicians, judiciary and people oI Pakistan all have their role to play.
9
Eaitorial
Will it be too optimistic to presume that each one realizes the severity
oI the situation and acts accordingly? Nothing is certain. Pace and
unpredictability oI events may make these comments outdated by the
time they are printed. The only point that we can mention with certainty
is that Pakistan is at crossroads, once again.
6 0XVKT 0XUVKHG
Editor-in-ChieI
Ishrat Husain
THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC
POLICY REFORMS
Ishrat Husain

*
Abstract
(The formulation ana implementation of economic reforms generate
winners ana losers. The former are normally silent, the latter critically
vociferous because the trickle-aown benehts of growth come too late.
The leaaer who ignores populist sentiments places himself in political
peril ana, at times, is temptea to aaopt statist policies built upon
nationalisation. The consequence is economic stagnation. To minimise
the :ero sum effect of economic reform a policy mix that ensures political
stability through growth ana social welfare has to be craftea. This
entails. (i) an effective communications strategy that informs the public
about the rationale ana possible fallout of the reform, (ii) eliminates
bureaucratic turf wars that impeae reform implementation, (iii) ensures
that policy obfectives are responsive to aomestic ana external changes
ana, (iv)avoias over centralisation which can be counterproauctive.
Eaitor).
Development economists were long under the illusion that their
elegant, technocratic, 'frst best solutions to the problems Iaced by
developing countries were so crystal clear that they would be readily
implemented by policy makers. AIter suIIering many retreats, reversals,
set-backs and slippages through the decades in several countries, they
have come to realize that economic reIorms are integral to the politics
oI a country and cannot be designed, implemented or sustained in the
absence oI political consensus and political will. The content, timing,
sequencing and phasing oI reIorms are critically dependent upon the
* Ishrat Husain is a Iormer governor oI the State Bank oI Pakistan.
11
The Politics of Economic Policy Reforms
quantum oI political support provided by the decision makers. AIter
all, iI the economy Ialters, the neck oI political leaders, will be on the
noose at the time oI elections, not that oI economists, policy advisors
and economic managers. The politicians have to Iace the consequences
oI the actions they may have taken on the advice oI technocrats.
The linkage between economic reIorms and politics is rooted in
the truism that each economic policy action has trade-oIIs in terms oI
benefts and costs and creates a set oI losers and winners. The losers
are usually vocal, identifable and homogeneous while the winners are
diIIused, diIIerentiated and silent. The grievances oI the Iormer resonate
in the inner sanctums oI the decision making coterie.
In the case oI Pakistan, the politics oI economic reIorms can be
better understood in the historical context.
1
In the decades oI the 1950s
and 1960s, the government played a proactive role controlling the
commanding heights in the economic space. The instruments used by the
government in promoting industrial growth, considered as the lynchpin
oI development strategy at that time, were import licensing, Ioreign
exchange allocations, approvals Ior industrial investment, subsidized
credit, tax holidays, accelerated capital depreciation, preIerred access
to public utilities, high tariIIs and quantitative restrictions to protect
domestic producers. In every single case, entry into the industrial or
commercial area was controlled by the government Iunctionaries. They
could either make or break an entrepreneur. The Pakistan Industrial
Development Corporation (PIDC) set up a number oI successIul
enterprises by using capital provided by the government and once these
enterprises became proftable, they were sold to private entrepreneurs
on non-competitive terms. Agricultural lands in new irrigated areas were
allotted to a chosen Iew at less than the market price. Plots oI urban land
developed by the public sector authorities in prime locations were also
disposed oI through the discretionary powers oI the political leaders.
In the 1970s, the nationalization oI industries, banks and the
proliIeration oI government-owned and managed development fnancial
institutions (DFIs) opened another major avenue oI patronage. Debt
capital was provided by the government-controlled fnancial institutions
Ishrat Husain
to the politically infuential borrowers who never repaid the loans.
Through over-invoicing, collusion with bank oIfcials and manipulation
oI accounts these statespawned industrialists fnanced their own equity
share oI the industry Irom these loans. Once the sponsors had recovered
their capital several times over, the enterprises were abandoned as 'sick
industries and leIt in the tender care oI the creditors. By the end oI
the 1990s, more than halI oI the non-perIorming loans advanced by the
Nationalized Commercial Banks (NCBs) and DFIs were blocked in these
sick industries. The losses incurred by the banks and DFIs were borne
by the tax payers through budgetary and extra-budgetary allocations.
The activities oI these 'private entrepreneurs were not limited
to borrowing capital and Iailing to repay it, but extended to large-
scale evasion oI taxes, duties, import tariIIs, utility charges etc. In the
absence oI any obligatory requirement Ior documentation or any Iear
oI penalty Ior non-compliance, the proportion oI declared income got
progressively smaller while the size oI the concealed income increased.
The tax revenues to the government became stagnant while the private
concealed incomes oI the tax payers and tax collectors kept swelling.
Fiscal defcits and resort to borrowing both domestic and external
were thus Iorced upon the government.
The other element in the moaus operanai employed by the privileged
private sector cabal oI Pakistan was the manipulation oI Ioreign
trade fows Ior obtaining windIalls. By restricting imports, imposing
diIIerential tariIIs and surcharges, securing specifc exemptions and
concessions through Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs), misclassiIying
goods and claiming reIunds and rebates Ior non-existent or Iraudulent
transactions in connivance with customs oIfcials, a large number oI
private businessmen and customs oIfcials became rich overnight at the
expense oI the consumers and the national exchequer.
The parasitic equation between the large private businesses,
government oIfcials and politicians propelled the country towards
fnancial crisis by the end oI the 1990s. A detailed Iactual analysis oI
this relationship can be Iound in an earlier work.
2
The situation was not
helped by the nuclear tests oI May 1998 or the sanctions imposed upon
13
Pakistan as a consequence. The international fnancial institutions and
bilateral western donors terminated all assistance while the Ireezing oI
Ioreign currency accounts eroded the confdence oI resident and non-
resident Pakistanis. Capital fight intensifed and the exchange rate was
almost in a Iree Iall. Consequently, in October 1999 Pakistan was at the
brink oI massive deIault and had already deIaulted on its Eurobonds.
It was at this stage that structural economic reIorms were vigorously
implemented in the country. An analysis oI the content, impact and
consequences oI these reIorms has been carried out elsewhere
3
and is
beyond the scope oI this paper. The historical narrative briefy summarized
above should, however, be kept in mind to understand why the politics
oI economic reIorms is so diIfcult. There are some simple explanations
oIIered to explain this phenomenon. The external donor agencies
believe it is lack oI 'political will that is the stumbling block between
sound policy prescriptions and their implementation. But it should be
remembered that in the last general elections the electorate oI Andhra
Pradesh threw out its able ChieI Minister a reIormer oI high calibre
and a darling oI the donor agencies although he had demonstrated
strong 'political will and implemented enormously sensible economic
reIorms. So iI it is not political will then what is it that drives the politics
oI economic policy changes? The Pakistan case needs to be examined in
a little more depth.

The economic policy agenda oI deregulation, privatization,
liberalization and market orientation was adopted in the early 1990s and
was Iollowed by successive governments. As these governments were
Irequently changed and were mainly preoccupied with their political
survival, the implementation track record was not impressive. The pace
picked up aIter 1999 when the continuity oI the political regime provided
a boost to the implementation oI these reIorms. The hrst observation
is, therefore, that political stability is an inaispensable prerequisite
for continuity ana consistency of economic policies ana sustainea
implementation of reforms.
The reIorms since 1999 have changed the economic landscape and
reduced the enormous discretionary powers enjoyed by the bureaucrats
Ishrat Husain
and the political leadership. A large number oI state-owned enterprises
have been or are in the process oI privatization depriving the politicians
the powers to conIer jobs. Except Ior two or three commercial banks all
the domestic banks are now owned by the private sector or by international
banks. Political loaning, import and export licensing, administered
pricing oI goods and state monopolies in trading have been abolished.
Foreign exchange controls have been removed and a unifed exchange
rate exists that is determined by market Iorces. The diIIerential between
open market and oIfcial rate oI exchange has almost disappeared.
TariII rates have been brought down signifcantly to the disadvantage
oI smugglers and tax evaders. Protection oI domestic manuIacturing
industries is no longer encouraged. Duty slabs have been simplifed and
issuing oI SROs to beneft individuals have been discontinued. A selI-
assessment system with random audit have been introduced Ior income
and corporate taxes. Sales tax reIunds and custom reIunds are no longer
a lucrative proposition. Petroleum and petroleum products are no longer
imported by the government and the price is fxed by an independent
regulatory agency. Competition among telecommunication companies
has lowered prices, expanded access and sifarish (infuence) or speed
money bribery are no longer required Ior obtaining a phone connection.
The liberal export and import oI agricultural commodities by the private
sector has reduced iI not eliminated market manipulation and collusive
practices. Loans are allocated by the banks and priced in accordance
with the credit worthiness oI the borrowers. No license is required to
set up an industry. Despite this, there are still market ineIfciencies,
inequities in the distribution oI income, privileged access to public
goods and services and misuse oI powers and authority. It is not being
suggested that corruption or political infuence have disappeared but the
relative picture looks diIIerent at least in some areas such as - taxation,
trade, banking, telecommunications, oil and gas, and agriculture. The
police, judiciary, civil service as well as the land revenue and registration
systems etc., are still badly in need oI reIorms.
Despite the structural reIorms that have been brought about in
the last several years, the perception about economic perIormance is
characterized by two opposite views. Those in the government along
with multilateral development banks, external rating agencies, Iund
15
managers, international investment banks, and research analysts believe
that the reIorms undertaken during the last seven years have turned
around and stabilized the economy and stimulated growth. Independent
economists, popular electronic and print media, politicians oI all
persuasions, large business organizations and many others, however,
argue that these reIorms have done nothing to improve the lives oI the
ordinary citizens and that the benefts have been concentrated upon the
well-to-do segments oI the population. The echoes oI the Decade oI
ReIorms oI the 1960s and the 22 Iamilies are being heard once again.
Why does such a polarization exist in the perceptions about
economic perIormance? How can these apparently paradoxical positions
be reconciled? The empirical evidence oI policy reIorms Irom Pakistan
and other developing countries indicates that: (i) there is considerable
variation in the economic impact oI policy reIorms and that each set
oI reIorms creates both winners and losers; (ii) there is a considerable
time lag in the distribution oI the benefts and initially the benefts are
accrued to those who already possess resource endowment and; (iii)
there is a disconnect between the expectations oI the politicians and the
objectives oI the economic policy makers.
Economic policy Iormulators have to make tough choices and
trade-oIIs and select ingredients oI diIIerent policy options to meet
the objectives they have set Ior the economy. These policies aIIect the
economy as a whole in a benefcial manner over time but hurt many
groups or individuals in the process. For example, the objective oI
aggregate GDP growth may be attained but the initial benefts oI this
growth may be captured by those who already own capital, land and
fnancial assets, those who run their own businesses or those who are
already employed. Thus the consequences oI this policy will aIIect
various segments and classes oI the population in an uneven manner.
It is the responsibility oI the decision makers to keep the political
leaders inIormed and to communicate to the general public as to what
particular mix oI instruments they are planning to use, with what
intensity, magnitude and duration they will be using this particular mix
and what the consequences oI these actions are likely to be. A neglect
to communicate creates its own momentum oI uncertainty that hardly
Ishrat Husain
helps the reIorm process.
Predicting the consequences oI various policy reIorms is also
Iraught with diIfculties. Economists are notorious Ior poor Iorecasting
oI outcomes as they usually build their models on historical trends oI the
variables and the underlying assumptions that these are also conditioned
by the past behavioural relationships. Despite this, policy makers must
not shy away Irom inIorming the public about their predictions Ior the
Iuture particularly in reIerence to who is going to gain or lose Irom these
reIorms.
The Annual Budget Statement, Annual Development Plan, Six
Monthly Monetary Policy Statement, Annual Trade Policy and Price
Support Policy Ior major crops are some oI the systematic attempts made
by policy makers in Pakistan to inIorm the general public about the likely
course oI fscal, monetary, trade and agricultural policies oI the country.
But these instruments should be supplemented by interactive dialogue
with the business community, civil society, think tanks, political leaders
and media. The secona observation is that an effective communication
strategy to inform the public about the rationale ana the consequences
of the policies aaoptea is absolutely essential.
Even iI an eIIective communication strategy is in place, it does
not necessarily guarantee that the impact oI apparently benign policy
reIorms will be Ielt, or even appreciated, by a substantial segment oI
the target population. The reason is that the implementation oI such
policies is oIten carried out ineIfciently and the results are Iar Irom
satisIactory. Internal consistency in various policies and coordination
in their implementation are absolutely essential iI the confdence oI the
private economic actors is to be generated. The turI battles, the silo-like
vertical decision making process, the concealing oI vital inIormation and
data Irom each other, one-upmanship, and Ieigned attempts to please the
bosses at the expense oI other competing ministries derail both policy
Iormulation as well as implementation. The subsequent blame game and
pass-the-buck syndrome Ior the Iailures due to this lack oI coordination
and these internal inconsistencies are neither acceptable to the public
nor to the political bosses. The ministry or organization responsible Ior
17
the policies shows up in a bad light and, in the process, the stakeholders
which include the government oI the day, the ruling party and the people
suIIer.
It is seldom realized by those engaged in these turI battles that it is the
policy mix rather than the stand-alone, isolated or uncoordinated policies
that will make the diIIerence. To strike the right mix requires cooperation
and collaboration among various ministries and agencies. Despite this
obvious prerequisite, it is disconcerting that bureaucratic turI wars and
personality clashes have become commonplace. This conIrontational
approach invariably results in poor policy Iormulation and even greater
disasters in policy implementation. The expected benefts oI reIorms
are thus dissipated creating nationwide disenchantment and disillusion.
The thira observation is that inter-ministerial turf battles ana negative
bureaucratic competition rather than cooraination unaermine the
efhcacy of policy reforms.
Well-thought-out and reasonable policies may still not produce the
desired results iI their sequencing, phasing and timing are oII the mark.
Just as a seasoned cheI skilIully administers ingredients to produce
gastronomic delights, so must the economic expert artIully Iormulate
a correct policy mix.
How should the right policy mix be chosen? The starting point is
the specifcation oI the objective that the government wishes to achieve.
As mentioned earlier, each economic policy action will create its own
set oI winners and losers in the short run while the long term impact
may turn out to be quite benign. The popular adage 'no gains without
pain seems to apply here. UnIortunately, the long term goal cannot
be attained without a segment oI the electorate undergoing the short
term pains. This is the root cause oI the continuing diIIerences between
politicians and economists worldwide. While politicians wish to please
everyone, the economists are unable to design policies without some
losers. Occasionally the latter are compensated and though this sounds
good in policy articulation, it is diIfcult to implement.
These dilemmas that conIront the policy makers can be illustrated
Ishrat Husain
with a Iew real world examples. In 2000-01 Pakistan, aIter almost a
decade oI stagnant per-capita incomes, low levels oI new investment
and rising unemployment and poverty, recorded a negative per capita
income growth. Infation was, however, quite low. The policy makers
were conIronted with a situation in which they could either live with a
low infation, low growth scenario and allow the status quo to prevail or
they could choose an option under which growth rate could be accelerated
and taken to a higher trajectory to push the economy out oI this low
equilibrium trap. The two main policy instruments at the disposal oI
the government Ior kick starting the economy are fscal and monetary
policies. The fscal policy lever could not be used at that time as the
country was already trapped under an unsustainable debt burden and
the assistance oI the IMF was sought to obtain long term re-profling oI
bilateral oIfcial debt. The only lever that could be relatively Ireely used
to provide a stimulus to the economy was monetary policy and that too
could only be used because oI the prevailing Iavourable low infationary
environment. An expansionary monetary policy was, thereIore, pursued
Ior the next three years with the result that GDP growth rate recovered
Irom 1.8 percent to 3.1 percent in FY 02, 4.8 percent in FY 03, 6.4 percent
in FY 04 and 8.4 percent in FY 05. Consequently, the unemployment
rate Iell Irom 8.3 percent in FY 02 to 6.2 percent in FY 05. Poverty
naturally declined under this set oI growth outcomes Irom 34 percent to
24 percent. What happened to infation during this period? The infation
rate remained subdued at 3.5 percent in FY 02, 3.6 percent in FY 03 and
4.6 percent in FY 04. But beginning FY 05 a price in Iorm oI higher
infation had to be paid as it reached 9.3 percent and then 8.4 percent in
FY 06. The unanticipated surge in the international prices oI petroleum
products Irom $ 25 per barrel to $ 75 per barrel did not help and actually
accentuated the infationary pressures.
Consequences of Policy Mix.
What were the consequences oI this chosen policy mix? BeIore
2000-01 declining per capita income had made lives miserable Ior most
segments oI society and the government. As incomes were declining
government revenues could not rise to provide basic inIrastructural
and social services to the citizens. Investors domestic and Ioreign
19
were reluctant to commit their Iunds in a situation where the rates oI
return were likely to be negative or only marginally positively. Stagnant
private consumption was not able to transmit any positive signals to the
manuIacturing sector which was Iorced to cut down on hiring people.
As services are directly and indirectly related to the volume oI economic
activity domestic production, consumption and imports the growth in
this sector was also marginal. Most employment expansion takes place
in services sector but the stagnant economy inhibited any signifcant
job creation in this sector too. Fixed income earners those on wages,
salaries, pensions etc., were not aIIected much as the infation rate was
quite low.
What has happened since FY 04 in terms oI the impact oI higher
growth and higher infation on various income classes and the segments
oI the society? The businesses and selI-employed services sectors were
better oII with this boom in aggregate demand as their earnings and
proftability improved signifcantly. Government revenues grew by 20
percent annually allowing the public sector development expenditure
to multiply Iour-Iold in less than three years but, in the process, Iurther
pressures on the supply oI goods and services in the economy were
added. Middle class consumers benefted Irom liquidity surge in the
banking sector and their enhanced purchasing power added to the
demand Ior goods and services in the economy. Foreign direct investors
saw such high income growth rate as the precursor Ior high corporate
profts in an environment where the currency remained stable Ior a
considerable period oI time. Naturally, Ioreign investors brought in
capital and consequently demand Ior labour rose and new employment
opportunities were created.
Who benefted and who lost out in this changed economic
environment? The benefciaries were the selI-employed, partnerships,
individuals and businesses accounting Ior 80 to 90 percent oI the work
Iorce oI the country. These segments Iound their incomes rising as a
result oI this higher demand. The unemployed Iound jobs aIter a long
period oI search and the government was able to raise the development
expenditure Iour Iold. The main losers were the fxed income earners
as their wages, salaries, savings, deposits and pensions did not keep
Ishrat Husain
up with rising infation. Negative real returns on bank deposits and
other saving instruments did not endear these policies to them. They
are the most vocal and articulate people and their sound bytes are heard
over all the TV channels and their written tirades adorn the pages oI
our newspapers. This infuential and articulate segment oI our society
has been badly hurt by the policy mix and is understandably angry and
justifably upset. Those belonging to this group extrapolate their own
experiences and oI their cohorts and colleagues and paint a negative
picture oI the economy with a broad dismissive brush. They cannot
be blamed Ior having any compunctions or pangs oI guilt Ior lack oI
objectivity as they are suIIering Irom the impact oI these policies.
The policy mix has been altered since April 2005 through tightening
oI monetary policy and is beginning to show some demonstrable results.
Infation has edged down to 7.5 percent and is expected to run out oI
steam by early next year. It will take another year oI monetary tightening
to bring infation down to 6 percent. But the losses this storm has leIt
behind in terms oI real income and purchasing power erosion during
the last couple oI years will be hard to compensate and the bitterness
it has leIt among the losers Irom these policies will not disappear. The
popular perception that the high growth rates have benefted the rich and
well-to-do segments oI the population is, thereIore, justifed Irom the
perspective oI those who have been losers Irom the policy mix adopted
between 2000-01 and 2005. The irony is that the benefciaries oI these
policies remain silent spectators. The disconnect between the voices oI
the losers and the silence oI the winners Irom economic reIorms makes
the task oI policy makers highly diIfcult. The voices oI the losers resonate
in the National Assembly and Senate halls, seminars and conIerences,
electronic and print media and are magnifed by those opposed to the
government oI the day. The clich oIt pronounced and repeated widely
that 'the common man has not benefted Irom these reIorms then
becomes the brazen truth. The risk is that the political leadership may
develop cold Ieet as they see their chances oI getting elected at the next
elections withering away. They may begin to adopt populist policies to
appease their electorate loose fscal and monetary policies, subsidies
oI all kinds and fnancing losses oI public utilities and enterprises, tax
exemptions and concessions etc. II this happens the benefcial eIIects
21
oI reIorms will be dissipated and the economy will be back to the crisis
situation Irom which it was extricated. The fourth observation is that
policy obfectives ao not remain static ana as aomestic ana external
conaitions change the policy obfectives have to be moaihea. The losers
unaer one set of policies can become the winners unaer a aifferent set.
So there are no permanent winners or losers unaer changing economic
policy environment.
Pakistan has also not lived up to Huntington`s
4
hypothesis that
'Centralization oI Power is an essential pre-requisite Ior policy
innovation and reIorm. Mr. Z.A Bhutto Iollowed this hypothesis and
nationalized industry, banks, insurance, education etc., by a stroke oI
his pen. But this policy innovation did not sit well with most oI the
infuential actors and the country went through a period oI economic
turmoil.
5
The Devolution ReIorms oI 2001 have also met a lot oI direct
and indirect resistance by the provincial government politicians and the
bureaucrats in general. The non-acceptance oI the reIorms imposed by
the centre has been a major constraint in the sustainability oI economic
policies however sound or sensible they may be. A more participatory
and consultative process in which the views oI the provinces and local
governments are assigned due weight would have a much better chance
oI success.

The hfth observation is that in the case of Pakistan a centrali:ea
approach to aesign ana then push the reforms to the provinces ana
lower tiers of governments for implementation aoes not always work or
is unlikely to proauce the aesirea results.
In a Federation with one Federating Unit dominating numerically,
politically and economically over all other units; iI most decision
makers civil servants, military oIfcers etc., also originate Irom that
dominant unit, the Iorces opposed to centralization oI power are likely
to be intense. The limited success in the reIorms on distribution oI
water and distribution oI tax revenues through the National Finance
Commission can be ascribed to this in-built tension and mistrust. Under
these circumstances it does not make much sense to have a centralized
authority pushing Ior reIorms. Consensus building among all aIIected
Ishrat Husain
stakeholders, striking compromises and saIeguarding the interests oI all
those adversely aIIected by the reIorms are better tools in countries like
Pakistan. But the reality is that Pakistani leaders whether elected or
military have demonstrated a patrimonial leadership style. To them
unIettered personal discretion rather than institutional checks and
balances has been the norm oI leadership. These leaders believed in
Iavouring and benefting those loyal to them personally and carried out
their command and wishes without raising any question. Those who
opposed them were severely punished in one way or the other. Heeger
6

described Bhutto`s leadership as patrimonial but this description is apt
Ior many others who held high oIfce in Pakistan. Under this style oI
leadership where patronage, discretionary Iavours and personal ambitions
dominate the political environment, resistance to rule-based transparent
policy reIorms that curtail discretion and create a level playing feld and
competition is natural.
Conclusion.

This brieI assessment attempts to identiIy the reasons why sensible
economic policy reIorms are not implemented in a linear, smooth and
uninterrupted manner. The fve key lessons drawn Irom the specifc case
study oI Pakistan show:
x There is tension between the politicians` instincts to remain
popular with the electorate and the economic managers` objective
to maintain fscal prudence, monetary discipline and stimulate
overall growth. Economic policies do create losers and winners
in the short term which is also the time horizon oI the politicians
Ior getting themselves elected. The politicians will thus resist
such reIorms that give rise to vocal losers.
x Political stability is a precondition Ior continuity and consistency
in economic policy implementation.
x An eIIective communication strategy to keep the politicians and
the public inIormed about the consequences oI the reIorms is
essential to build consensus and mobilize support.
x A centralized approach to the Iormulation oI reIorms in which the
provinces and the local tiers oI government do not play a signifcant
23
role is unlikely to succeed during actual implementation.
x Even well conceived policy reIorm packages do not always
produce the desired results because oI bureaucratic infghting
and turI battles between diIIerent government ministries and
agencies.
In democratic societies, regime changes at the time oI elections can
threaten the implementation oI economic reIorms that were originally
designed by the previous ruling party. As continuity and consistency
are the key ingredients Ior the success and subsequent sustainability oI
policy reIorms, the government and opposition parties should agree on
the broad direction and the contents oI the reIorm packages. The pace,
sequence and timing will, oI course, diIIer according to the preIerences
oI the political party in power. Losers Irom the reIorms in that event will
be unable to get the policies reversed when the opposition party displaces
the ruling party as both parties would have agreed on the substance oI the
reIorms although the modalities may diIIer. International and domestic
investors will then have confdence that the country`s economic policies
are immune Irom political changes.
Development policy economists are learning Irom the experiences
oI the past. They are beginning to take into account the political,
social and cultural Iactors in the design oI policy reIorms and
recognizing the capacity constraints and bureaucratic dynamics in their
implementation.
The paradox oI economic policies is that the politicians will not
allow the introduction oI the reIorms that create negative vibes in the
society. But iI these reIorms are not initiated on time and sustained, the
economy may get into serious trouble at some point in the Iuture. The
discredit Ior the fnancial and economic crisis will go to the politicians
in power at that time. It is, thereIore, in the larger interest oI the country
as well as the collective political interests oI the ruling and opposition
parties that they should swallow the bitter pill sooner than later to make
the economy healthy.
Ishrat Husain
Reference
1 For the history oI economic developments in Pakistan see Hasan, Parvez Pakistani
Economy at the Cross Roads (OxIord University Press 1998) Zaidi, Akbar Issues in
Pakistani economy (OxIord University Press 2006) Burki S.J. Pakistan: FiIty years oI
Nationhood Westview Press, 2001)
2 Husain Ishrat, Pakistan: The Economy oI an elitist state (OxIord University Press 1999)
3 Husain Ishrat, Economic Management in Pakistan 1999-2002 (OxIord University Press
2003)
4 Huntington, Samuel F. Political Order in changing Societies (Yale University Press,
1968)
5 For an excellent analysis oI Bhutto reIorms see Saeed, ShaIqat, Civil Military Relations
in Pakistan (Westview Press 1997)
6 Heeger, Gerald, 'Socialism in Pakistan in H. DesoIosses and J. Levesque (eds) Socialism
in the Third World (Praeger Publishers, 1975)
25
Kashmir Dispute. Is There a Jiable Solution
KASHMIR DISPU1E: IS THERE A
VIABLE SOLUTION
Zamir Akram

*
Abstract
(For the past sixty years the Kashmir dispute has resulted in wars
and incessant Pakistan-India tensions. As a consequence oI the 1998
nuclear tests conducted by the two countries, this core issue has become
a nuclear fash point. Courageous leadership and a paradigm shiIt in
thinking are required Ior a lasting settlement oI the dispute. Recent
developments, especially ideas advanced by President MusharraI, oIIer
a way out. Any just and durable solution must be acceptable to all three
parties namely, Pakistan, India and above all the Kashmiri people. This
paper examines various proposals Ior a solution and advocates 'joint
sovereignty as the most viable option. Author).
I. INTRODUCTION.
A realistic paradigm is desperately needed Ior a solution oI the
Kashmir dispute which has been a Iestering wound Ior Pakistan, India
and especially the Kashmiri people Ior six decades. The study attempts
to step away Irom the groove oI traditional thinking and, based on
prevailing realities coupled with a dispassionate analysis oI the positions
oI the three parties involved, advocates a paradigm shiIt on their part.
Only an innovative approach can Iacilitate the evolution oI a conceptual
Iramework to resolve this seemingly intractable dispute.

Kashmir has rightly been called 'the most aangerous place on
earth.`
1
Pakistani and Indian troops Iace each other eyeball-to-eyeball in
* Zamir Akram is Additional Secretary (Foreign AIIairs) at the Prime Minister`s
Secretariat.
Zamir Akram
a conIrontational mode along the Line oI Control (LoC). Two wars have
been Iought between them over this territory, apart Irom several clashes
as in Siachen and Kargil. It has also spawned a continuing environment
oI hostility which has retarded Pakistan-India relations Ior more than 60
years. AIter the nuclear tests by India and, in response, by Pakistan in
May 1998, Kashmir has become a nuclear fash- point as well.
Accordingly, the Kashmir dispute remains a core issue on the Ioreign
and security policy agendas oI both Pakistan and India, exacting a heavy
toll in terms oI blood and treasure on them.
Even higher is the toll on the Kashmiri people who continue to be
disenIranchised and brutalized under Indian occupation and repression.
Though their spirit is undaunted, their suIIerings, both human and
material, are incalculable.
For the international community, Kashmir is the most likely arena
Ior a nuclear war. Given the danger that even an unintended or accidental
action by the troops oI either belligerent could trigger a confict, the
Iear is that this military exchange could quickly escalate and cross the
threshold to nuclear war. Hence, resort to war to settle the Kashmir
dispute is no longer an option Ior either Pakistan or India.
In view oI these interrelated Iactors, there is an urgent need to resolve
the Kashmir dispute on a durable and viable basis. However, this is easier
said than done because it entails reconciling the diametrically opposite
positions oI Pakistan and India. These time-entrenched positions have
acquired an added signifcance that equates Kashmir to the very raison
aetre oI both countries. Hence, the indispensable precondition Ior
evolving a practicable settlement is the development oI an innovative
mindset and shedding the baggage oI the past by the two sides. The trail
has to be blazed by a courageous and visionary leadership.
No objective study can aIIord to ignore the realities oI power politics.
The Iact is that it has been the asymmetry in the power capabilities oI
Pakistan and India which has enabled the latter to repeatedly fout its
international and bilateral commitments regarding Kashmir. It is due to
27
this continuing inequitable co-relation oI Iorces that India today occupies
Kashmir without any political, legal or moral justifcation. Why then, it
can be asked, should India change its policy and seek a compromise
solution with Pakistan and the Kashmiris. It is the answer to this central
question which will ultimately determine whether a viable solution to
this dispute can emerge.
II. BACKGROUND
Genesis of the Kashmir dispute - 1947-48
Perhaps the best description oI the Kashmir dispute was given by
the late President Ghulam Ishaque Khan oI Pakistan who termed it as
'the unhnishea business of Partition.`
2

The guiding principle by which the British-Indian empire was
partitioned was selI-determination through elections or reIerendum/
plebiscite. The Muslim majority states oI British-India thus became
Pakistan. The decision about accession by the Princely states such as
Jammu and Kashmir to either Pakistan or India was leIt by the British
to the rulers oI these states with the understanding that their choice
ought to take into account Iactors such as geographic contiguity and
demographic composition oI the state.
The Indian Congress Party, however, argued that the people, and not
the rulers oI the Princely states, were empowered to make the decision
about accession to either dominion and, on the basis oI this argument,
Iorcibly absorbed those states whose Muslim rulers either wanted
independence such as Hyderabad or to join Pakistan as in the case oI
Junagarh. The situation in Jummu and Kashmir was the reverse oI the
Junagarh case where the Muslim majority population was ruled by a
Hindu Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh. Hence, by their own yardstick,
the Congress leaders should have accepted the right oI the Kashmiris
to decide the matter oI accession and not manipulated a Iraudulent
accession by the Maharaja.
The duplicity oI the Congress leadership is Iurther exposed by a
Zamir Akram
development in Kashmir at the time which has hitherto received scant
attention. The Iact is that the Muslim ConIerence Party in Kashmir,
which gained a majority in the state elections oI January 1947, passed
a resolution on 19 July 1947 calling Ior the accession oI Kashmir to
Pakistan 'in view of the geographic, economic, linguistic, cultural ana
religious . relations` with Pakistan.
3
Despite this clear exercise oI selI-determination by the majority
party, the British Governor General oI India, Lord Mountbatten, as
well as the Congress government oI Jawaharlal Nehru manipulated
the situation to ensure Kashmir`s occupation by India. As disclosed by
British historian Alistair Lamb
4
and others such as Campbell-Johnson,
5

Mountbatten altered the RadcliIIe Award, giving the Muslim majority
Gurdaspur district to India, thereby ensuring the latter a land access to
Kashmir. Mountbatten also connived with Nehru to ensure that Maharaja
Hari Singh signed an instrument oI accession to India in return Ior Indian
military support to quell the popular uprising against him in various parts
oI Kashmir, especially in Poonch, Gilgit, Hunza, Skardu and Kargil.
This public outcry broke out as soon as the Kashmiris realized that the
Maharaja would not honour the Standstill Agreement with Pakistan.
Based on documentary evidence, Alistair Lamb has conclusively proved
that the Maharaja could not have signed the accession document on
26 October 1947 as claimed because on that day he was feeing Irom
Srinagar to the saIety oI Jammu by car.
6
By then Indian troops were
already in Srinagar and Hari Singh was actually conIronted by a fait
accompli. In eIIect, thereIore, the Maharaja signed the instrument oI
accession under duress oI Indian occupation oI Kashmir which made
this document null and void.
7

This Indian charade was so blatantly obvious, that both Mountbatten
and Nehru hastened to camoufage their machinations by promising the
Kashmiris the exercise oI their right to decide their Iuture and termed the
Maharaja`s instrument oI accession a 'provisional` document. This was
clearly stated in Mountbatten`s reply oI 27 October 1947 to Hari Singh`s
'instrument oI accession that this was conditional and Kashmir would
only be incorporated permanently into India aIter a reIerence had been
made to the Kashmiri people Ior their approval.
8
Nehru, Ior his part,
29
stated that 'it has been our policy all along that where there is a aispute
about the accession of a state to either aominion, the accession must
be maae by the people of that state.`
9
Later, Nehru also claimed 'we
have always right from the beginning acceptea the iaea of the Kashmiri
people aeciaing their fate by referenaum or plebiscite.
10

Still, the Kashmiri Ireedom fghters, aided by Pakistani volunteers
and tribesmen Irom the NWFP, held out against the Indian troops to
liberate a substantial part oI Kashmir.
11
Sporadic fghting continued Ior
14 months and ended only aIter intervention by the UN and acceptance
by Pakistan and India oI a ceasefre in Kashmir on 1 January 1949.
r12

The ceasefre line agreed to by the 2 sides continues to divide Kashmir
to this day.
International Mediation-1948 - 1965.
Nehru decided to reIer the Kashmir issue unilaterally to the UN on
15 January 1948 under chapter VI oI the Charter, in which India accused
Pakistan oI committing 'aggression` and demanded that Pakistan
stop assisting and deny access to 'invaaers` into Kashmir.
13
Pakistan
counter-charged India oI illegally annexing Kashmir and proposed that
the UN arrange Ior a ceasefre and withdrawal oI all outside Iorces Irom
Kashmir, ensure the rehabilitation oI reIugees who had fed the state,
establish an impartial administration and hold a plebiscite to determine
whether the Kashmiri people wanted to join Pakistan or India.
In the UN Security Council debates, Pakistan`s arguments carried
greater weight and the Indians soon discovered that despite having
brought the issue to the UN, they were being put in the dock. The Council
adopted its frst resolution on Kashmir on 17 January 1948, calling Ior
the end oI hostilities
14
and, in a subsequent resolution, decided to set up
a UN Commission Ior India and Pakistan (UNCIP)
15
to investigate the
Iacts and to play a mediatory rule, leading to a plebiscite.
On 14 August 1948, UNCIP presented its proposals, the essence oI
which was: (a) agreement on a ceasefre; (b) Pakistan to endeavour to
secure the withdrawal oI its nationals Irom Kashmir; (c) the administration
Zamir Akram
oI the evacuated area by local authorities under UNCIP`s supervision;
(d) the phased withdrawal oI Indian troops Irom Jammu and Kashmir;
(e) the holding oI a Iree and impartial plebiscite under UN supervision.
AIter due deliberations, both Pakistan and India accepted the
UNCIP resolution, including the principle oI plebiscite, which was also
endorsed by the Security Council.
Although the UN continued to be seized oI the Kashmir issue Ior
many years to come, adopting several resolutions, and enlisted the
services oI several prominent international personalities, the UNCIP`s
plebiscite plan could not be put into eIIect due to Indian obduracy.
Similar eIIorts by some oI the major powers, especially the US and UK,
which continued until 1962, also come to naught as did the eIIorts by
Pakistan to engage in bilateral negotiations. The crux oI all these eIIorts
was to secure India`s agreement to the demilitarization oI the area and
hold a UN supervised plebiscite.
But the Indians continued to vacillate and obIuscate. At frst it
raised technical and procedural objections to the enIorcement oI the
UN resolutions and then, fnally, in 1956 resorted to outright rejection.
Nehru Iormally stated that there was no need Ior a plebiscite in Kashmir
as it was legally a part oI India.
16
As justifcation, he claimed that since
the Kashmiri people had by then voted Ior a Constituent Assembly
which brought the (Indian puppet) Sheikh Abdullah to power as
'Prime Minister, they had thereby already exercised their right oI selI-
determination. The UN, however, rejected this claim and stated that any
action by the state assembly could not be a substitute Ior a plebiscite.
17

The UN`s Iailure to implement its decisions was largely due to
the indiIIerence oI the major powers. None oI the Security Council`s
permanent members had a direct interest in the Kashmir issue. Their
main concern was Ior peace between the two combatants and to a much
lesser degree to upholding international law. None oI these powers was,
thereIore, willing to expend its resources and incur the enmity oI India
Ior the sake oI the Kashmiris. Hence, without any political, legal or
31
moral justifcation, India has been able to claim ownership over stolen
property. As such, the principle oI selI-determination has been sacrifced
by the world community at the altar oI political expediency. The same
sordid replay oI realpolitik on the issue oI Kashmir is in evidence even
today.

Developments within Indian Occupied Kashmir - 1948-1965
In the build up to independence and partition, Nehru assiduously
cultivated Sheikh Abdullah who had set up the 'secular National
ConIerence which he saw as being more in tune with Congress policies,
especially regarding the creation oI Pakistan.
Nehru was hopeIul that Sheikh Abdullah would obtain the popular
mandate oI his people to join India. It was with this calculation that
the Indian leader took the Kashmir issue to the UN. However, he
soon discovered that the popular Ireedom movement in Kashmir belied
Abdullah`s claims oI enjoying the support oI his people. ThereIore, the
real reason Ior Nehru`s prevarication on the plebiscite issue aIter having
initially accepted it was the growing realization that India would lose
the reIerendum. Later his deIence minister, Krishna Menon, was more
Iorthright when he conceded in 1965, that in a plebiscite 'Kashmiris
woula vote to foin Pakistan ana we woula lose it.`
18

Not surprisingly then, the Indians immediately installed Sheikh
Abdullah as head oI an emergency administration. A 'special status`
was given to the state in the Indian Union and Hari Singh`s son, Karan
Singh, was made the 'Sadar-i-Riasat and not the Maharaja while
Abdullah became 'Prime Minister.
This special status embodied in the Indian Constitution as Article 370,
recognized the autonomy oI Kashmir, with the state having jurisdiction
over all matters except Foreign AIIairs, DeIence, and Communications.
By 1953 India did not need this Iaade and, Iurthermore, Abdullah
had out lived his utility. Consequently, on 8 August oI that year, he was
dismissed and placed under arrest and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was
Zamir Akram
appointed ChieI Minister with the instructions to 'fnalize Kashmir`s
accession to India. New Delhi also withdrew Article 370 and with it ended
whatever little autonomy, in real terms, that the state had enjoyed.
Through the help oI repeatedly rigged elections and repression oI
any political opposition, the Indians ensured Ghulam Mohammad`s
continuation in power Ior the next ten years. But, as others beIore
him, he too was expendable once his useIulness ended. Charged with
corruption and abuse oI power he was replaced by another puppet,
Khwaja Shamsuddin, in 1964.
War and Diplomacy 1965-1990.
The Iailure oI political and diplomatic initiatives to make any
headway towards a resolution oI the Kashmir dispute prompted Pakistan
to attempt changing the status quo by other means. In August-September
1965, it launched 'Operation Gibraltar which led to a Iull-fedged
confict on 6 September. Fighting continued Ior seventeen days and
ended with a ceasefre on 21 September. The war was a stalemate and
did not alter the ground realities.
It was leIt to India`s staunch ally, the Soviet Union, to broker a
peace agreement, the Tashkent Declaration, which was signed on 10
January 1966. This agreement contained little oI value Ior Pakistan as
it did not commit India to any negotiations, let alone resolution, oI the
Kashmir dispute.
Taking advantage oI Pakistan`s internal political crisis, to which
it had no doubt contributed, India invaded East Pakistan in December
1971. This resulted in the creation oI Bangladesh.
The most obvious lesson oI the 1971 war was that when Pakistan
could be divided in halI, what hope could there be Ior a just solution oI
the Kashmir dispute through bilateral or international eIIorts. Indeed,
several Indian oIfcials, such as the then Foreign Secretary, T.N. Kaul,
had pressed their government to use their military advantage to secure
a hnal settlement oI Kashmir by occupying Azad Kashmir and the
33
Northern Areas or at least Iorcing Pakistan to accept the status quo.
y19

Acceptance by Pakistan oI the status quo, thereIore, became the
primary objective oI Indian diplomacy during the negotiations which
led to the Simla Agreement signed on 2 July 1972. Since then New
Delhi`s eIIorts have been to stress articles oI the Simla agreement
regarding inviolability oI the ceasefre line, henceIorth called the Line
oI Control, as well as to renounce the international status oI the Kashmir
dispute and oppose Pakistan`s eIIorts to take this bilateral issue to
any international Iorum. More importantly, India repeatedly alleged
that in addition to the written text oI the Simla agreement there was an
unaerstanaing between the leaders oI the two countries, Z.A.Bhutto
and Indira Gandhi, that Pakistan would eventually accept the LoC as
an international border.
20
This sell out` was vehemently denied by
Z.A.Bhutto in subsequent parliamentary debates and press comments
and continues to be rejected by Pakistan. Irrespective oI the spin given
by the Indians, the Iact remains that the Simla agreement calls Ior a
'hnal settlement of Jammu ana Kashmir` apart Irom acknowledging
the supremacy oI the principles ana purposes of the UN Charter and
calls Ior respecting the LoC by both sides, without prefuaice to the
recogni:ea position of either siae- which clearly maintains, as Iar as
Pakistan is concerned, that the LoC is not an international border and
thereIore the status quo is unacceptable.
21
The people oI Indian occupied Kashmir were demoralized by the
outcome oI the 1971 war as they Ielt that a weakened Pakistan would
not be able to champion their right oI selI-determination. The Simla
Agreement was perceived as a Iurther blow, especially by those Kashmiris
who were opposed to their destiny being decided by Pakistan and India
and not by themselves, as envisaged in the UN resolutions. Most vocal
among these Kashmiris were the ones Iavouring independence Ior
their land which became the rallying cry oI the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), a new political Iorce that emerged on both
sides oI the LoC.
During the 1980s, Pakistan`s strategic environment deteriorated
dramatically when the Soviet Union invaded AIghanistan in December
Zamir Akram
1979, thereby destabilizing Pakistan`s western border at a time when
tensions were continuing with India on the eastern side, especially
due to growing Indian problems with Sikh separatists Ior which India
blamed Pakistan. Taking advantage oI Pakistan`s preoccupation with
the AIghan situation, India also began encroachments into the undefned
no-man`s land in the Siachen glacier, leading to yet another area oI
conIrontation between Pakistani and Indian troops. During a temporary
thaw in relations, the two sides did come to an agreement to 'reaeploy
their troops Irom Siachen in July 1989 but the Indians soon reneged
on this understanding. Consequently, the Siachen issue continuous to
plague Pakistan India relations to the present day, having become one
oI the spin-oIIs oI the Kashmir dispute.
The other related issue that emerged during this period was due to
Indian preparations to build a barrage on the Jehlum river in occupied
Kashmir at Wullar Lake, in violation oI the Indus Waters Treaty
concluded in the 1960s. The Wullar barrage dispute also continues to be
on the bilateral agenda.
The Kashmiri Uprising-- 1990-2007.
During the decades oI the 70s` and 80s,` the Kashmiri sense oI
betrayal and alienation Irom India continued to Iester. Sheikh Abdullah
and his son and successor, Farooq Abdullah, were viewed as traitors and
were blamed Ior corruption and abuse oI power. Political opposition
was not tolerated by them and several state elections were blatantly
rigged. Even worse, Delhi`s governor, Jagmohan, a Hindu Ianatic,
promoted communal tensions and increased economic deprivation oI
the Muslims.
The rigging oI the 1987 elections and heavy handed eIIorts to
stife political dissent led to violent public demonstrations and total
boycott oI the 1990 elections. In response, the Indians dismissed the
Farooq Abdullah government and imposed Governor`s rule along with
deployment oI the Indian Army and paramilitary Iorces who resorted
to indiscriminate repression.
22
The Kashmiri youth reacted by meeting
Iorce with Iorce in selI-deIence. Thus began the 'intifaaa` which still
35
continues in occupied Kashmir.
This indigenous uprising has qualitatively changed the Kashmir
situation. For the frst time in fve decades, the Kashmiri people have
taken the lead to demand the right oI selI-determination. They have
thus demonstrated in the most IorceIul manner that they are the central
party to the Kashmir dispute which cannot be resolved only by India and
Pakistan. This change also underscores the Iact that the status quo is not
a viable basis Ior a settlement even in the unlikely event that Pakistan
accepts such a solution. Consequently, the Kashmiris have made it clear
by shedding their blood and undergoing tremendous sacrifces that any
solution to the dispute must be acceptable to them.
The Kashmiri struggle has also undergone a metamorphosis
over the past Iourteen years. Initially it was mainly led by the JKLF
which continues to advocate an independent Kashmir and the Hisb-ul-
Mujahideen, the military wing oI the Jamaat-i-Islami which Iavours
accession to Pakistan. Despite their diIIerences, these groups cooperated
to set up the All Parties Hurriyat ConIerence (APHC) which also included
other pro-A:aai (independence) groups such as the Peoples ConIerence
and the Awami Action Committee besides other smaller outfts. While
the APHC perused the political campaign Ior A:aai, the JKLF, the Hisb-
ul-Mujahideen and other smaller groups such as Al Umar Mujahiddin
engaged in the military struggle.
By the mid 1990s, as the war in neighbouring AIghanistan against
Soviet occupation began to wind down, 'fehaai elements began to
gravitate towards the new 'fehaa in Kashmir against Indian repression.
Widespread Indian abuse oI human rights and violence against the
Kashmiris created Irustration and helplessness Iorcing the people to resort
to other means Ior survival. This phenomenon led to greater emphasis
on the fehaai aspect oI the struggle rather than on the political goal oI
selI-determination. It also brought to the IoreIront these Islamic militant
Iorces in place oI Kashmiri nationalists as groups such as Harkat-ul-
Ansar, the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammad and others began
to dominate the military struggle. UnIortunately, these groups began
resorting to hitting soIt targets such as non-combatants and civilians
Zamir Akram
instead oI exclusively targeting the Indian security Iorces. Attacks on
Hindu pilgrims, kidnapping oI civilians, including Ioreign tourists and
indiscriminate bomb blasts in crowded areas became common place. The
Indian themselves encouraged this trend by using 'Sarkari (oIfcial)
militants and conducted Iake encounters to project the Kashmiri struggle
as 'terrorism. The cumulative impact oI these developments was to
erode popular support Ior the Mujahideen within Kashmir and provide
an opportunity Ior the Indians to project the Kashmiri struggle as 'cross-
boraer terrorism sponsorea by Pakistan.` This also had repercussions
at the international level.
Another negative development was the marginalization oI the
Kashmiri political movement led by the APHC with the result that over
the years APHC unity Irayed and ultimately broke down. The Indians,
oI course, encouraged this trend through their propaganda. Despite these
developments, however, the momentum oI the Kashmiri movement
against Indian occupation has survived and an overwhelming number oI
Kashmiris, irrespective oI their political aIfnities, remain committed to
their opposition to Indian rule. New Delhi`s response has been to try and
bludgeon the Kashmiris into submission. Draconian laws and repressive
measures such as TADA, POTA and the Armed Forces Special Powers
Act have been used to unleash state-sponsored terrorism through the
security Iorces and the so called oIfcial or 'sarkari militants comprising
Kashmiri traitors and criminals. The number oI troops deployed,
including the army and the paramilitary Iorces, have steadily increased
over the years to levels over 700, 000. This is the highest concentration
oI military Iorces in such a small area in any part oI the world today.
These troops have resorted to a reign oI terror including murder, torture,
rape, arson and looting as instruments oI policy, leading to consistent
and massive violations oI human rights which have been highlighted
by independent human rights organizations such as Asia Watch and
Amnesty International as well as the US State Department.
23

The cost oI these repressive policies Ior the Indians has also
been high. Kashmir has become a bleeding wound Ior India. It is Ior
these reasons that successive Indian governments have tried to launch
peace eIIorts in Kashmir oIIering fnancial inducements and political
37
concessions as well as dialogue. However, all these initiatives have so
Iar Iailed as Delhi is unwilling to accept the central Kashmiri demand
Ior a transparent and impartial exercise oI selI-determination.

Pakistan-India Tensions and Dialogue--1990-2007
India has predictably blamed Pakistan Ior its endemic problems
in occupied Kashmir, accusing Islamabad Ior aiding and abetting
the Kashmiri 'militants and 'terrorists, despite the Iact that the
overwhelming majority oI the Ireedom fghters were and still remain
indigenous Kashmiris who are deIending themselves against continuing
Indian repression and waging a just struggle Ior selI-determination.
The high degree oI tensions in bilateral relations that began with the
Kashmiri uprising in January 1990 have continued in a cyclical trend,
with periods oI volatile conIrontation eased through de-escalation and
dialogue and back again to conIrontation. Over the last 14 years, thereIore,
tension levels have fuctuated, with signs oI hope and Iears oI war. The
period oI tensions in the early 1990s gave way to dialogue in the mid-
1990s leading to agreement on several 'Confdence Building Measures
(CBMs) such as renouncing use oI chemical weapons; identiIying a no
fy zone Ior military aircraIt near each other`s borders; prior intimation
about military exercises near the borders among others.
24
Tensions, however, fared up again when the Indians tested nuclear
weapons in May 1998 Iorcing Pakistan to respond in order to maintain
strategic deterrence. ConIronted with the spectre oI nuclear war triggered
by the Kashmir dispute, the international community compelled India to
re-open the dialogue process with Pakistan. As a result a 'Composite
Dialogue started in October 1998 in which, Ior the frst time, India
agreed to include the Kashmir issue as a separate item on the 8 point
agenda. This was Iollowed up by the Lahore Summit in February 1999
which adopted, apart Irom the Lahore Declaration, an MOU on nuclear/
security CBMs. Notably in the Lahore Declaration, both sides agreed to
'intensify their efforts to resolve all issues incluaing the issue of Jammu
ana Kahsmir.`
25
Zamir Akram
Relations again plunged with the Kargil episode in May-June 1999
and remained acrimonious till the Agra Summit on 15-16 July 2001
between President MusharraI and Prime Minister Vajpayee. While the
Indians twice reneged on agreed texts oI joint statements, the talks
marked a lowering oI the conIrontation.
However, the implicit understanding at Agra to resume talks did
not materialize since the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in
December 2001 provided the opportunity that India needed to jump on
the 'terrorism band-wagon in the post-9/11 global scenario dominated
by the American 'war on terrorism.
By December 2001 relations had deteriorated to the brink oI war,
with India deploying its troops on the Pakistan border and threatening
punitive action in its exercise oI 'coercive diplomacy. This phase
oI tensions lasted till January 2004 when, aIter growing international
opprobrium over its belligerent policies, India relented and agreed to
attend the SAARC Summit in Islamabad where Vajpayee met President
MusharraI Ior the second time on 6 January 2004. In their Joint Press
Statement the two sides agreed on the resumption oI the composite
dialogue to settle all issues 'incluaing Jammu ana Kashmir` to the
satisIaction oI both sides.
25

However, the dialogue process could not commence until holding
oI the Indian elections in May 2004. These elections produced a surprise
result with the deIeat oI Vajpayee`s BJP-led coalition and the victory oI
the Congress Party and its allies.
In her very frst public appearance aIter the election victory, Congress
President, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, aIfrmed her party`s commitment to
continue the dialogue with Pakistan which was Iollowed soon aIter
by another reiteration by the newly elected Indian Prime Minister,
Manmohan Singh.
The scheduled Foreign Secretary level talks which included Kashmir
were held in New Delhi on 27-28 June 2004. According to the Joint
Statement issued aIter the talks, the two sides 'hela aetailea exchange
39
of views on Kashmir ana agreea to continue the sustainea ana serious
aialogue to hna a peaceful negotiatea settlement` and 'reiteratea the
hope that the aialogue will leaa to peaceful settlement of all bilateral
issues, incluaing Jammu ana Kashmir.`
26
Pakistan also drew some
satisIaction Irom the Iact that while the Communiqu reIerred to the
'aetermination to implement the Simla agreement in letter ana spirit,` it
also, in the same paragraph 'reiteratea the commitment to the principles
ana purposes of the UN Charter,`
27
which is by implication Pakistan`s
reIerence to the UN resolutions on Kashmir.
While the composite dialogue process has continued between the
two sides on predictable lines that refect stated positions, the most
signifcant development has been the courageous and visionary policy
advocated by President MusharraI. He has promoted 'out oI the box
thinking to evolve a solution acceptable to all parties. The central theme
in the President`s proposal is Ior both sides to demonstrate fexibility
in order to evolve a 'win-win solution. His 4 step approach envisages
(i) identifcation oI regions in Kashmir taking into account nuances and
strategic implications; (ii) demilitarization oI the area with security
to be provided by the people themselves; (iii) maximum autonomy to
the Kashmiris; and (iv) joint management/institutional arrangement by
creating a super structure which gives comIort to both Pakistan and
India.
28
This proposal demonstrates remarkable fexibility on the Iorm oI the
solution but retains the principle oI selI-determination in that it requires
that the solution must be acceptable to the Kashmiris. It also requires
reciprocal fexibility Irom the Indians and challenges them to respond
to an eminently reasonable proposal iI they are indeed committed to a
settlement as they claim. Taking his initiative Iorward, the President
has succeeded in ensuring a durable ceasefre on the LoC, instituted a
back-channel dialogue process and ensured that direct contact between
Kashmiris on both sides oI the LoC are restored through reopening long
dormant road links Ior bus services.
At the same time the President`s initiative does not especially
spell out a Iormula Ior a solution and seeks to evolve one through
Zamir Akram
negotiations. This is also a positive Iactor as any 'pre-cooked solution
would have invited immediate Indian rejection. Now they have to
engage in a dialogue process to work towards a mutually acceptable
settlement. President Pervez MusharraI has also claimed that the time
has come to move Irom confict management to confict resolution and,
more importantly, that it should be resolved within a 'reasonable time
frame.`
Whether the Indians are willing to respond with equal fexibility
and demonstrate similarly courageous leadership is yet to be seen.
They are now, no doubt, under pressure to demonstrate by actions their
stated commitment to resolve the Kashmir issue and to show fexibility
towards this end. So Iar, however, statements Irom New Delhi remain
ambiguous Prime Minister Singh has stated that 'short of secession,
short of rearawing bounaaries, the Inaian establishment can live with
anything` regarding Kashmir.
29
This is just another way oI advocating
the status quo. Accordingly, no real change in the Indian position has
taken place.
III. THE COSTS OF CONFRONTATION AND
THE BENEFITS OF COMPROMISE
There is no doubt that the conIrontation over Kashmir has exacted
a heavy price on all three parties to the dispute. There have been both
direct costs and opportunity costs. No reliable computation oI the costs
is available in the public domain oI either country. These expenditures
are hidden in their respective budgets. While quantifcation in such
situations is diIfcult, a measure oI the magnitude involved is provided by
the Iact that in 1992, one 'roti (bread) Ior the Indian troops in Siachen
cost Rs. 500.
30
II we use this fgure as a base, the expenditures on both
sides oI the military conIrontation along the LoC alone is astronomical,
not to mention on the international border as well.
The opportunity costs oI the Kashmir confict are also obvious. Were
it not Ior this dispute, issues such as Siachen, Kargil and Wullar Barrage
may not have arisen, or could have been resolved amicably. Moreover,
Pakistan and India would have been able to engage in mutually benefcial
41
economic and commercial cooperation apart Irom diverting their scarce
resources towards desperately needed social sector projects.
In such a situation, it is particularly essential Ior the Indians to evaluate
the costs oI their intransigent Kashmir policy. Since 1990, more than
700,000 Indian Iorces have been bogged down in the Kashmir quagmire.
According to reliable estimates, Indian casualties (dead and wounded)
over the last 17 years have been about 800,000. According to the general
rule oI thumb, the actual number is usually 3 times higher. Morale is also
low. There have been growing desertions Irom the troops deployed in
the combat zones as well as several cases oI attacks on superior oIfcers
and reIusal to obey orders. The expenditure oI the occupation Ior India
is estimated to be around US dollars 4 billion annually.
31
Kashmir has,
thereIore, become a quagmire Ior the Indians but so Iar they seem to
remain prepared to pay this cost Ior their occupation.
The highest price, however, is being paid by the Kashmiri people.
Their struggle since 1990 has taken a toll oI over 91,000 Kashmiris
killed, including 6627 custodial killings by the Indians; 1000 have been
tortured;7554 are presently under detention; 9722 women have been
molested by the Indian Iorces as an instrument oI policy; 105,440 houses
and buildings have been deliberately burnt down
32
in an organized policy
oI 'ethnic cleansing .
The alternative to this tale oI horror is a just settlement oI the Kashmir
dispute which can open up vast areas oI mutually benefcial cooperation,
not only between Pakistan and India but Ior the entire South Asian
region. The benefts oI a compromise are, thereIore, obvious. Billions oI
rupees being spent on deIence by both sides could be devoted towards
desperately needed social sector projects to eradicate poverty, hunger and
disease as well as to provide housing, education and employment. Trade
and economic cooperation could also fourish including such projects as
oil and gas pipelines Irom Iran and Central Asia as well as sharing oI the
existing electrical power generation potential. Consumers on both sides
would also beneft Irom greater regional economic integration under
SAARC. Tourism travel would increase and above all mutual tensions
will dissipate, leading to peace and stability in the region as a whole.
33
Zamir Akram
IV. THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION
The nuclear tests by India and, in response, by Pakistan in May
1998 converted the already volatile Kashmir issue into a nuclear fash-
point. This had a proIound impact on the subsequent nature oI relations
between the two countries, especially in the context oI their policies
towards Kashmir. Reverberations oI the tests were also Ielt across the
world, in particular the West, which Ieared that fare up oI Pakistan - India
tensions, even by accident, could lead to nuclear war. The American
CIA in its assessment oI global fashpoints Ior the year 1999 described
South Asia as the most likely arena Ior a nuclear war.
34
In the India-Pakistan strategic context a 'balance oI terror through
'Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) came into operation. This
transIormation in eIIect negated the advantage oI conventional weapons
numerical superiority acquired by India over Pakistan. Consequently, an
eIIective and credible situation oI nuclear deterrence was established.
The implication oI this reality was that resort to war or use oI Iorce no
longer remained an option Ior either side.
It is important to note here that the major powers, while calling
Ior settlement oI Kashmir through dialogue, place greater emphasis on
maintaining peace and avoiding tensions. By implication, thereIore,
the primary interest oI these countries is that in an environment oI
deterrence, the spectre oI nuclear war has Irozen the Kashmir situation
Ior all times.
Such arguments have been made by Western and Indian nuclear
strategists, academics, journalists and privately even by government
oIfcials. These views are based essentially on the doctrine that nuclear
deterrence eventually leads to 'stability such as during the Cold War
between the US and the USSR. However, some experts recognize that
deterrence can also create the 'stabilityinstability paradox which
means that while deterrence would prevent Iull scale conventional war,
it can actually Iacilitate sub-nuclear threshold hostilities such as through
guerrilla tactics and/or limited clashes.
35
It is in this context, that India
continues to accuse Pakistan oI waging a 'proxy war in Kashmir and
43
itselI threatens a 'limited war against Pakistan.
V. TERRORISM--- THE IMPACT OF 9/11
As in the case oI the nuclear tests, there has been a tremendous
impact on the Kashmir issue by another extraneous development---the
terrorist attacks on the US on 9/11, 2001. The consequent US-led war on
terror has come as a vital opportunity Ior India to cover up its repression
in occupied Kashmir and, at the same time, demonize Pakistan.
From the beginning oI the Kashmiri uprising in 1990, India had
tried to project the Kashmiri Ireedom fghters as terrorists and accused
Pakistan oI sponsoring terrorism across the LoC. However, till the mid
1990s the West had tended to remain neutral about the armed clashes
between the Kashmiris and Indian Security Forces, maintaining that
neither side should target civilians or non-combatants, which it would
consider as terrorism. However, this approach changed in July 1995
when several western tourists, including two Americans, were taken
hostage and some subsequently executed by the so called 'Al-Faran
group which was accused by India oI connections with Pakistan.
Consequently, a greater receptivity grew in the West Ior the Indian
allegations against Pakistan. The Americans put several oI the 'fehaai
groups on the list oI terrorist groups and called upon Pakistan to
terminate 'infltration across the LoC and 'dismantle the so called
training camps in Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. Secretary oI State Colin
Powell said in Delhi on 16 March 2004 that 'cross border terrorism
against India Irom Pakistan should end.
36
This was repeated by US
Deputy Secretary oI State Richard Armitage on 16 July 2004.
37
The terrorism issue has thus been exploited by India to shiIt the Iocus
Irom the real issues in Kashmir which are Indian denial oI Kashmiri
selI-determination and massive violations oI human rights, to the charge
oI act oI terrorism by Pakistan and the Kashmiris.
Zamir Akram
VI. EXITING OPTIONS FOR A SOLUTION
Three basic options Ior a solution oI the Kashmir dispute exist in
keeping with the positions oI the three parties to the dispute. Several
other options have also been suggested by various experts over the
years. It would be instructive at this stage oI the discourse to examine
the major proposals and the reactions oI the parties concerned.
1. Plebiscite/Self determination
Pakistan advocates a plebiscite under UN resolutions which would
enable the Kashmiri people to choose between accession to either
Pakistan or India. Pakistan remains confdent that the majority oI the
Kashmiris would choose to join Pakistan. It rejects the contention that
the UN resolutions have become obsolete and argues that only another
UN resolution can amend or annul these resolutions.
The plebiscite option has remained completely unacceptable to
India since it realized that it would lose such a reIerendum.
The Kashmiri people support a UN-sponsored plebiscite but
some groups such as the JKLF want the inclusion oI the option oI
independence.
A proposal Ior 'joint control has also been put Iorward Ior
consideration by all these parties by President MusharraI.
2. Status Quo
While India maintains the maxamilist position that the whole oI
Jammu and Kashmir is its integral part, including Azad Kashmir and
the Northern Areas, it has indicated its willingness to accept the status
quo or the LoC as a 'compromise solution. This was India`s objective
at the Simla conIerence and continues to be its implied bottom line, as
we have established in the Ioregoing analysis.
Obviously, this option is unacceptable to Pakistan and the majority
45
oI Kashmiris on both sides oI the LoC.
The latest Indian position, as articulated by Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, is Ior 'any solution short of changing boraers`
which implies little more than the status quo.
3. The Third Option
Independence Ior Kashmir, usually called the 'third option,
is advocated by a section oI the Kashmiri people, mainly the urban
population who support the JKLF. Whether this group is in a majority
or not can only be determined iI and when the Kashmiris are able to
exercise their choice.
So Iar both Pakistan and India, Ior their own reasons, reject this
option.
4. Chenab Formula
According to this Iormula, the Muslim majority areas comprising
the Kashmir Valley and three Muslim dominated districts oI Jammu
(Poonch, Rajouri and Doda) Ialling on the right bank oI the Chenab
river would join Pakistan and the rest oI occupied Kashmir would go
to India. This solution was superfcially discussed during the 1962-63
Bhutto-Sawaran Singh talks but was not Iollowed through by the Indians.
Later, in 1999, it was also discussed between Iormer Foreign Secretary
Niaz Naik and his Indian interlocutor R.K. Mishra, both oI whom had
been authorized by their respective governments to unoIfcially explore
solutions Ior Kashmir.
38
However, nothing came oI their talks and this
could have been only an exploratory ploy by the Indians.
Pakistan and the Kashmiris could live with such a settlement but
it is highly unlikely that the Indians would accept it in the present
circumstances.
Zamir Akram
5. Owen Dixon Plan
Owen Dixon was an Australian Jurist who had been entrusted by
the UN in 1950 to explore ways to resolve the dispute. AIter extensively
visiting the region, Dixon proposed a regional approach Ior the areas
where the people`s preIerence Ior India or Pakistan was not clear i.e.,
the Kashmir valley; and present day Azad Kashmir, whose status would
be negotiated and resolved through reIerence to the people. As Ior the
other areas, Jammu and Ladakh would go to India while the Northern
Areas would become part oI Pakistan.
39
Pakistan could have gone along with such a regional approach
but India did not take a clear position initially and later rejected this
proposal.
6. Kashmir Study Group Proposal
In 1998 a US based Kashmiri tycoon, Farooq Kathwari, Iunded a think
tank called the Kashmir Study Group composed oI South Asian experts
Irom the region and the US. The group put Iorward several variations
based on the idea oI a 'United Sovereign Entity which envisages the
Kashmir valley to be reconstituted through an internationally supervised
ballot as a sovereign entity but without an international status, having
Iree access to and Irom both India and Pakistan. Later, this proposal was
enlarged to include Azad Kashmir in such an entity.
40
So Iar neither Pakistan nor India have endorsed this proposal.
7. UN Trusteeship Proposal
Under this proposal, made by Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a Pakistani
academic, the areas oI Jammu and Ladakh would join India while the
Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir would become a part oI Pakistan,
leaving the Kashmir valley to be put under UN Trusteeship Ior 10 years
Iollowing which a reIerendum would be held to determine whether the
people want to join Pakistan or India or become independent.
41
47
So Iar neither country has endorsed this approach and it is unlikely
that they will in the present conditions.
8. Yousaf Buch Formula
A Iormer Pakistani and UN oIfcial oI Kashmiri descent, YousaI
Buch, put Iorth a 2 phased approach in which the frst phase would
be devoted to ending the violence in Kashmir by declaring a ceasefre
within Kashmir and on the LoC; and in the second phase, the UN would
demarcate fve cantons or divisions along the lines oI the undivided state
oI Jammu and Kashmir where elections would be held to Provisional
Assemblies in the 5 cantons. Each Assembly would vote on whether it
wished to continue with the existing relationship with either Pakistan or
India or to negotiate a new relationship with either or both which would
then be put to a reIerendum in that canton.
42
This idea has not Iound Iavour with either Pakistan or India. In any
case, it is too complicated an approach.
9. The Trieste and Tyrol Models
These ideas have been put Iorward by an American academic, Selig
Harrison, who uses the model oI the autonomous region oI Trieste
between Italy and Iormer Yugoslavia where the people oI Slav origin live
under Italian sovereignty but enjoy Ireedom to protect their culture and
ethnicity as well as travel between the two sides. Harrison proposed that
India should give special status to the Kashmir valley as an autonomous
region while Pakistan would do the same in Azad Kashmir so that both
sides oI Kashmir would get equal autonomy. The LoC would become a
'soIt border allowing people on both sides to move Ireely across.
43
A similar arrangement that exists between Italy and Austria, in the
German speaking area oI Tryol, in Italy, allows maximum autonomy
and Iree movement across the border with Austria. This arrangement
has also been suggested by some experts.
Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris have not expressed any interest
Zamir Akram
in these ideas.
10. The Andorra Solution
Andorra, like Kashmir, is a small princely state situated on the
border oI Spain and France which had been claimed by both sides since
803. In 1993, the two countries agreed to give Andorra an independent
constitution with jointly guaranteed autonomy. According to this idea,
Kashmir should be similarly given a special autonomous status by
Pakistan and India.
44

VII. PARADIGM FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION
In the Iorgoing analysis an eIIort has been made to bring together
all the relevant Iactors that have a bearing on any possible solution to
the Kashmir dispute.
In this study we have established that while Kashmir has come to be
viewed as underscoring the very identities oI Pakistan and India, it has
also placed a very heavy burden on them and especially on the Kashmiris
themselves. Moreover, as we have seen, there is no military option open
to either party due to nuclear deterrence and they are, thereIore, limited
to seeking a political or negotiated settlement. This entails a compromise
which in turn requires a change in the mindset or the evolution oI a new
paradigm Ior reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.
An attempt is made here to synthesize ideas Irom various sources,
the most prominent among which are those oI Mushtaq-ur-Rehman
45

and the Kashmir Study Group
46
who have put Iorward suggestions on
'shared sovereignty, as well as on the idea put Iorward by President
MusharraI Ior 'joint management. It is hopeIully possible that such
a synthesized approach may provide a viable solution to the hitherto
intractable Kashmir dispute.
This proposal envisages absorption oI Azad Kashmir and the
Northern areas into Pakistan; and Hindu majority Jammu, (excluding the
Muslim majority districts oI Poonch, Rajouri and Doda), and Buddhist
49
majority Ladakh into India. The remaining area oI Kashmir proper and
the Muslim majority Jammu districts, would be unifed and become
autonomous with all powers with the exception oI DeIence and Foreign
AIIairs under joint Pakistan-India 'sovereignty or 'control. Both
countries would be jointly responsible Ior deIence and Ioreign aIIairs
oI Kashmir within pre-agreed limits. This arrangement would have to
be part oI an overall 'package deal or treaty among the three parties,
in which their respective powers, rights and responsibilities would be
clearly defned.
Outlined below are suggestions relating to the specifcs oI such an
arrangement.
Sovereignty
Kashmir would not be a sovereign entity but a highly autonomous
region as in the present case oI Hong Kong. Its degree oI autonomous
authority would have to be defned in an agreement between the
Kashmiris and India and Pakistan. A good basis could be the deIunct
article 370 oI the Indian constitution which allowed the Kashmir state
all powers except deIence, Ioreign aIIairs and communications. In this
case, communications could be retained by the autonomous state subject
to arrangements Ior communications with both Pakistan and India.
Kashmir would need to have the ability to act independently in its
internal government Iunctions including basic legislative, executive
and judicial activities. As such it would have the right oI 'internal self-
aetermination but not the right oI unilateral accession to either country
or independence.
Citizenship
Kashmiris, as defned by permanent residency and /or ethnicity,
and verifed by the state authority through issuance oI Identity Cards,
would have the right to vote, own property and live in Kashmir. They
would also need to pay taxes and other obligations placed on them by
the state government. Kashmiris living abroad since 1947 who wish
Zamir Akram
to return could do so provided they prove their ethnic origins and/or
relationships to persons living in Kashmir. For travel into Pakistan or
India, the Identity Card oI the Kashmiri citizen would suIfce as the
borders oI Pakistan and India would be open to them but not to the
citizens oI the other country who would require regular passports as
at present. For travel outside Pakistan or India, citizens Irom Kashmir
would have the choice oI obtaining a Pakistani or Indian passport, as is
the case oI people oI Northern Ireland who, in Iact, have both British
and Irish passports.
Legislative Powers
The powers delegated to autonomous Kashmir could be specifcally
listed in the Pakistan-India-Kashmir agreement on Kashmir`s status
or Kashmir could assume all powers not specifcally reserved Ior joint
exercise by Pakistan and India. As stated earlier, a guide in this regard
could be the Indian constitution`s provisions oI Article 370. As such,
deIence and Ioreign aIIairs could be the joint responsibility oI Pakistan
and India while all other powers could be exercised by Kashmir.
The Kashmir legislature would have powers to enact laws governing
the sectors oI health, social services, taxation, education, language policy,
transportation, adoption oI penal and civil laws, police, planning, local
administration, trade and economic policies among others.
The state would also engage with Pakistan and India to coordinate
on issues such as communications, transport, transit trade, tourism,
apprehension oI criminals etc.
The Kashmir legislature would be elected Ior a stated duration by
the Kashmiri people through adult Iranchise without any limitations or
interIerence by Pakistan or India.
Executive Powers
As in the case oI the provinces oI Pakistan and India, autonomous
Kashmir would have an elected ChieI Minister or Prime Minister (the
51
title is unimportant) along with a cabinet to administer the Iunctions oI
the state powers. Instead oI a governor, appointed by the Iederation or
union as in the case oI Pakistan and India, there would be a 3-member
Governing Council including one appointee each oI Pakistan, India
and the Kashmiris, to represent the interests oI Islamabad, New Delhi
and Srinagar as well as to reconcile any diIIerences that may arise in
implementing the joint sovereignty agreement in Kashmir. In case oI
any dispute which remains unresolved by the Governing Council, it
would be reIerred Ior resolution to the governments oI Pakistan and
India. In the event that the two governments are also unable to resolve
the issue, it would be reIerred to the Kashmiris themselves, frst at the
level oI their state Assembly and in case oI a deadlock to the Kashmiri
people to decide through reIerendum.
As per the joint agreement between Pakistan and India, the subjects
oI deIence and Ioreign aIIairs would not be within the jurisdiction oI
the Kashmir state, which will be bound not to enter into any deIence
or Ioreign relations with any third country. Neither Pakistan nor India
would maintain any troops within Kashmir or deploy any armed Iorces
near the provincial borders oI Kashmir. Law and order within the state
will be maintained by the state government itselI, through a police Iorce
composed oI Kashmiri citizens only.
1udicial Powers
The Kashmir judiciary would be independent with the lower courts
and the Kashmir High Court Iunctioning as at present. However, the
present system whereby the Kashmir High Court reIers matters on
appeal to the Supreme Court oI India would need to be discontinued.
A Supreme Court oI Kashmir would need to be set up to replace the
present judicial practice.
Economic, Trade and Financial Matters
The Kashmir autonomous state will have powers to raise Iunds
through levying local taxes and would be exempt Irom taxation by
the Pakistani and Indian governments. It will also retain Iull control
Zamir Akram
over its monetary matters. The state could also receive equal fnancial
awards Irom Pakistan and India. Customs duties would not be levied on
goods Irom either Pakistan or India but could be applied to goods Irom
third countries. Kashmiri trade would be given Iree access Irom and to
Pakistan and India as long as the goods are oI Kashmiri origin. Once
the SAFTA agreement is eIIectively in place there would be no need
Ior any controls on movement oI Pakistani and Indian goods in either
direction through Kashmir. Kashmir would also be granted access to
Ioreign markets through both countries.
Kashmir could have its own currency iI it wanted but it would be
simpler to have a Iree exchange system between the Pakistani and Indian
rupees, both oI which could be used as is done in Nepal, where both
Nepalese and Indian currencies are accepted. There are also precedents
oI Iederating units such as Scotland printing its own currency which is
interchangeable with the British pound. This could also be possible in
Kashmir.
Defence and Foreign Affairs
As noted above, these subjects would be retained by Pakistan and
India. First oI all it would be necessary Ior both powers to agree on
mutual and balanced steps with regard to Kashmir as part oI the overall
package oI agreements on promoting Iriendly relations between them.
In the context oI Kashmir, both would need to demilitarize and redeploy
their Iorces Irom within Kashmir and Irom the LOC. The cantonments
and air bases as well as other military and paramilitary installations would
need to be pulled back to an agreed minimum distance Irom Kashmir.
Perhaps it may be necessary to have international or mixed Pakistani-
Indian-Kashmiri teams as observers to monitor these redeployments.
The Kashmir state itselI would not enter into any deIence oI Ioreign
relationships with a third power nor be represented abroad or have a
representation oI another country assigned to Kashmir. Kashmiri
representatives, however, could be part oI Pakistani and Indian
delegations abroad, such as to the UN General Assembly sessions.
53
Implementing the Agreement on Kashmir
While Pakistan and India will be negotiating the agreement
on Kashmir, the initial question will be as to who will represent the
Kashmiris. This could be addressed by involving leaders oI the
APHC and some oI the other parties such as the National ConIerence.
Alternately, an impartial and transparent election in Kashmir could be
held under international supervision and these elected representatives
could send their delegates to the meetings with Pakistan and India. In
either case, once the agreement has been fnalized it will have to be put
to a reIerendum by the Kashmiri people - which would be their exercise
oI selI-determination.
As stated above, this Iormal agreement on an autonomous Kashmir
state under joint sovereignty would be part oI a broader treaty on
peace and security between Pakistan and India. Its operationalization
would also require appropriate amendments in the Pakistani and Indian
constitutions. A related agreement would also need to be fnalized
between the three parties on sharing oI the rivers waters which would,
in a sense, be a successor to the Pakistan-India Indus Waters Treaty. It
would be up to the 3 sides whether they would want to involve the UN in
this process, at least with regard to Iuture Iunctions oI UNMOGIP. Even
iI it is to be wound up, this would require interaction with the UN.
Also, it would be advisable to setup a dispute resolution mechanism, at
least in the initial stages, such as an international arbitration commission,
to ensure binding interpretations oI the agreements reached between the
three parties.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this imperIect world there are no perIect solutions. OI course the
paradigm put Iorward here Ior a Kashmir settlement has many pitIalls
and limitations. It is, Ior instance, rather complicated because it seeks
to resolve a complex problem. But at least it is an eIIort to provide a
Iramework Ior a possible settlement that has so Iar been intractable. It
can and should be improved upon through collective eIIorts, preIerably
Zamir Akram
by experts on all three sides.
The proposed settlement would obviously not be Iully in line with
the demands oI any one side but would entail a compromise by all the
parties conceding on their maximalist positions. This paradigm, thereIore,
provides the most practical means Ior reconciling the divergent interests
oI the three parties. Above all, this agreement would mean an end to a
long Iestering dispute and provide new opportunities Ior cooperation
rather than conIrontation. It should be seen as a win-win solution Ior all
sides.
For Pakistan it would mean Iormal accession oI Azad Kashmir and
the Northern Areas as well as partial Iulflment oI its policy to enable
the Kashmiris to exercise their right oI selI-determination. To that extent
Pakistan would not be abandoning its principled position. Some in
Pakistan would criticize the loss oI the Kashmir valley and with it control
over the rivers fowing through the area. However, the Iact is that today
Pakistan neither controls the valley nor the river waters which remain in
Indian hands. As a result oI the proposed agreement this control would
pass on to the Kashmiris which would be more preIerable Ior Pakistan.
For India, accepting Kashmiri autonomy under joint sovereignty
would be in line with Article 370 oI its constitution. It will also beneft
by ensuring the de jure incorporation oI Jammu and Ladakh into India.
Above all, India would be able to end its expensive misadventure in
Kashmir.
For the Kashmiris, the settlement will provide limited sovereignty
instead oI Iull independence or accession to Pakistan but at least will rid
them oI Indian occupation. Some Kashmiris would oppose ceding the
areas oI the state to Pakistan and India but as the existing realties are
they do not have any control over these areas anyway.
This paradigm also makes certain basic assumptions which were
alluded to in the introduction. The Iundamental assumption is that the
Indians will agree to a change in the status quo and that its leaders would
have the Ioresight and courage to change their mindset and break the
55
shackles oI the past. This is a critical prerequisite Ior any solution to be
possible in Kashmir.
Judging Irom current realities, however, it is unIortunate that no
real change in the Indian approach is discernable, despite the rhetoric
emanating Irom New Delhi. Their statements are positive but their
actions are not. ThereIore, there appears little hope Ior a breakthrough
in the Ioreseeable Iuture.
However, the improvement in atmospherics in the recent past has
raised expectations among the peoples oI Pakistan and India as well as the
Kashmiris. The solution oI this long standing dispute over Kashmir can
no longer be brushed aside or postponed. The rising costs oI conIrontation
and the growing benefts oI cooperation have become undeniable Iorces
that press Ior a durable settlement oI Kashmir. India can ill aIIord to
ignore this growing trend and must, thereIore, recognize the need Ior a
substantive change in its obdurate Kashmir policy. Pakistan, Ior its part,
needs to continue with its peace oIIensive, and maintain the momentum
Ior a lasting solution oI Kashmir. The Kashmiris themselves must play
the most proactive role intensiIying their political struggle while also
deIending themselves Irom Indian oppression. Ultimately, the truth that
no one can be subjugated against their will, will triumph.
Disclaimer: The views expressea in this paper are entirely my own ana
ao not in any way reect the views ana politics of the Government of
Pakistan or any of its functionaries.
References
1
Former US President Bill Clinton, Times oI India, 11
th
March, 2000.
2
President Ghulam Ishaque Khan, Dawn, 10 May 1992.
3
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, The Kashmir Case, 1992, pp43-44.
4
Alistair Lamb, Kashmir- A Disputed Legacy, 1991, pp. 105
5
Campbell- Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, 1951, pp. 145
6
Alistair Lamb, Myth oI Indian accession to Jummu and Kashmir, pp4-5.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Jawaharlal,Nehru, Broadcast to the Nation, All India Radio, 2 November 1947, Pakistan
Foreign OIfce Documents
Zamir Akram
10
Nehru, The Statesman, 18 January, 1951, Pakistan Foreign AIIairs Documents.
11
Rehman, Mushtaqur, Divided Kashmir, 1996, pp.78.
12
This was Iormalized by the UN supervised Karachi agreement between Pakistan and
India signed on 17

July 1949.
13
Rehman, op.cit, pp-87.
14
UN Security Council Resolution No. 38 Document number S/651, dated 17 January
1941.
15
UN Security Council Resolution No. 47 Document number S/726, dated 21 April 1948.
16
Rehman. Op cit. pp 98
17
UN Security Council Resolution No. S/2017/Rev. I, dated 30
th
March 1951.
18
Rehman, Op cit., pp. 103.
19
Claimed by T.N. Kaul in meeting with diplomats on 18 August 1990, New Delhi.
(author`s notes)
20
Attributed to P.N. Dhar, Iormer Secretary to Indian Prime Minister Indian Ghandi in his
article in The Times oI India in April 1995, mentioned by Victoria Schofeld, op. cit. pp.
118. Also claimed by T.N. Kaul to author, op cit.
21
Text oI Simla agreement.
22
Victoria Schofeld, op. cit, pp. 144
23
Amnesty International Report, 2003, and US State Department Report on Human
Rights, 2006.
24
CBM agreements signed between 1991 to 1992, Foreign OIfce Documents.
25
Joint Press Statement, 6
th
January, 2004.
26
Joint Press Statement, 28
th
June, 2004.
27
Ibid.
28
Interview by President MusharraI to Frontline Magazine, 25 August 2006
29
International Herald Tribune. 24
th
May 2004
30
Report in The Nation on Pakistan-India meeting on Siachen, 4 November, 1992.
31
Data estimated by Ministry oI Foreign AIIairs, Islamabad.
32
Data collected by APHC. SOS Irom occupied Kashmir, Vol. VII, No. 8, August, 2007
33
Shahid M. Amin, 'Prospects oI Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia: a Political
Perspective paper delivered at Institute oI Regional Studies, Islamabad on 8
th
June
2004.
34
CIA Report to the US Congress on Global Security Threats, 1999.
35
Feroz Hassan Khan, Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia, The Non
proliIeration Review, Spring 2003.
36
Time oI Inida 16
th
March 2004.
37
The News 16
th
July 2004.
38
Author`s interview with Mr. Niaz Naik, 22 July 2004.
39
Mushtaq-ur-Rehman, op. cit. pp 91-92.
40
Kashmir Study Group Kashmiri: A Way Forward, February 2000.
41
Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, 'A solution Ior Kashmir dispute in Regional Studies,
Islamabad. Autumn, 1986, P- 12.
42
Foreign OIfce Documents, 2004.
43
Selig Harrison, South Asia and the United States, 1992 P-102.
44
Faisal YousaI in 'Resolving the Kashmir dispute: an Array oI Options, Kashmir
Institute oI International Relations. April 2004. P-35.
45
Mushtaq-ur-Rehman, op. cit
46
Kashmir Study Group, op. cit.
57
The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan
THE ROOTS OF SECTARIANISM IN
PAKISTAN
Khalea Ahmea

*
Abstract
(The sectarian violence in Pakistan which has marrea the hnal
years of the last century continues in the present ana has cost thousanas
of lives. Shia-Sunni tensions were largely concealea through layers
of governance ana preventea from aegenerating into confrontation
auring the British Raf. Soon after the emergence of Pakistan, the
uneasy relationship between Shias ana Sunnis graaually aegeneratea
into open violence by the mia-1980s. The Iranian revolution with 'the
threat of export` as well as the aecaae-long struggle against the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan ana its aftermath also stokea the sectarian
ame in Pakistan which is home to the largest concentration of Shias after
Iran. Though apostatisation of Shias has not been allowea, successive
governments have, at best, been inaifferent to the sectarian fatwas
issuea by extremist organi:ations such as the Sipah Sahaba, Lashkar-e-
Tayba, Jaish-e-Muahammaa, Al Ikhwan ana Harkutul Mufahiaeen. The
violence these have ignitea has 'resultea in a tit-for-tat Shia response.`
Eaitor).
Introduction:
Tens oI thousands oI lives have been lost in Pakistan`s sectarian war
in the last two decades oI the 20
th
century. And the mayhem continues into
the 21
st
century. A tolerable level oI Sunni-Shia tension was inherited by
the country Irom the British Raj, but the two sects squared oII violently
only aIter 1980. Like all internecine conficts, the war oI the sects has
been characterised by extreme cruelty. It coincided with the onset oI the
* Khaled Ahmed is consulting editor oI the Friday Times, Lahore.
Khalea Ahmea
Islamic Revolution oI Imam Khomeini in Iran and the threat its 'export
posed to Saudi Arabia and other Arab states across the GulI.
Pakistanis invariably blame Saudi Arabia and Iran Ior the violence
since the two countries Iunded and trained the partisans oI this war. Both
are aware that Pakistan was subjected to someone else`s 'relocated
war. Much oI the internal dynamic oI this war remains hidden Irom
public view. A kind oI embarrassment over the phenomenon oI Muslim-
killing-Muslim has prevented Pakistanis Irom inquiring Irankly into
how the two mutually hostile states were able to transplant their confict
in Pakistan.

Sectarian violence has drawn its strength Irom the past too.
The schismatic past was concealed behind two important layers oI
governance. First, the Raj was able to almost completely uproot the
Sunni-Shia conIrontation during its tenure Irom 1857 to 1947. A reIusal
to recognise the jurisprudence oI takhr (apostatisation) and a competent
encoding oI the Muslim Family Law, separating the two sects, almost
buried the confict that had its seeds in the 7
th
century.
The Pakistan Movement in India that resulted in the creation oI
Pakistan against the wishes oI Great Britain and the secularists oI India
was spearheaded by the two sects together. The movement carried the
promise oI a fnally successIul coexistence and possible integration oI the
two sects. Early governance in Pakistan was in some ways an extension
oI the secular impartiality oI the Raj. However, aIter Independence in
1947, two developments took place that sowed the seeds oI sectarianism
that were to bear Iruit later on.

Pakistan began to look Ior its identity in the stance its representative
political party, the All-India Muslim League, had adopted during
its competition with the secular and much larger All-India National
Congress. Because oI the early military confict with India in 1947,
Pakistan`s nationalism began to coalesce positively around Islam
and negatively around India. Its textbooks sought their exemplary
personalities in historical Muslim 'utopias and imagined 'golden
ages that highlighted the particularism oI Muslim identity instead oI its
59
'liminal cross-Iertilisation with Hinduism at the cultural level.
Pakistani textbooks went back to pre-Raj days and selected periods
oI Muslim rule where pluralism was at its lowest, and highlighted
instead the separation oI Hinduism Irom Islam. (Liberal Mughal kings
who treated the Hindus well also accepted the Shia as Muslims.) Most
oI this selection turned out to be sectarian. While it set Muslims and
Hindus apart it also emphasised the confict between Sunni and Shia
communities. In the early period oI Pakistan`s history, ignorance oI the
schism or amnesia induced by the Raj interregnum allowed this bias
to go unnoticed.

During the Saudi-Iranian standoII in 1980, Pakistan was drawn to
the Saudi side Ior a number oI reasons. It had a large expatriate labour
Iorce stationed in the Arab Middle East, particularly in the region oI the
GulI where the GulI Cooperation Council (GCC) was Iormed in 1980 to
ward oII the Iranian threat. BeIore 9/11, almost 80 percent oI Pakistan`s
'Ioreign remittances were earned Irom this region. Saudi Arabia was
also the most important ally aIter the United States - in 'Irontline
Pakistan`s war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
Saudi Arabia Iunded the jihad, it bought Pakistan its frst instalment
oI the 40 F-16 warplanes Irom the United States, it gave Pakistan the
seed-money Ior its Zakat Fund which now stands at almost Rs 12 billion
annually to be distributed among the poor but which went predominantly
to the seminaries during the 1980s. Saudi Arabia allowed Pakistan to buy
Saudi oil on 'deIerred payment which meant Iree oil. The Islamisation
oI Pakistan under the military ruler General Ziaul Haq proceeded under
the tutelage oI Saudi Arabia.
It is not possible to examine the Saudi-Iranian confict exclusively
in a non-sectarian perspective. The schism was refected in the AIghan
jihad, but aIter the jihad ended, it was refected in the ouster, Irom the
frst government-in-exile, oI mujahideen belonging to the Shia militias.
The AIghan mujahideen government was set up in Peshawar in 1989,
but, under Saudi pressure, the Shia militias were not given representation
in it. The rise oI the Taliban in 1996, recognised by Saudi Arabia and
Khalea Ahmea
Pakistan in the early summer oI 1998, was in a way a reversal oI Iran
at Saudi hands in the fnal count. The Taliban were recruited Irom the
Deobandi and Wahhabi outfts, which were historically anti-Shia.
In 1986, the Deobandi seminaries oI Pakistan and India had issued
Iatwas oI apostatisation against the Shia population and thus upheld the
maniIesto oI the Sipah Sahaba, a party Iormed in 1985 in Pakistan on
the basis oI its demand that the Shia be declared non-Muslim by the
state oI Pakistan through an amendment to the Constitution. The state
had already set the precedence oI apostatising Muslim communities and
declaring them non-Muslims under the Second Amendment oI 1974.
The anti-Shia Iatwas were 'managed through a Deobandi scholar
oI India, Manzur Numani, who had earlier written a book against Imam
Khomeini and Iran. Funded by the Saudi charity Rabita Alam Islami
(World Islamic League), he wrote to the Deobandi seminaries oI India
and Pakistan, asking them to give their juristic opinion on the Shia
Iaith. In 1986 all oI them sent Iatwas to him declaring the Shia kafr or
non-Muslim. No attention was paid to the character oI the Shia Iaith in
Pakistan, a grave mistake made at the political level.
The Shia oI Pakistan had developed as a community tied to the
teachings oI NajaI. Their religious leaders Iollowed the school oI NajaI,
which meant non-acceptance oI the Iranian brand oI Iaith Iounded on
the concept oI Jelayat Faqih by Imam Khomeini, giving the Shia clergy
the right to rule under the divine charisma oI the ruling jurist. There
was a strong implication in this oI the sharing by the ruling jurist oI the
divinity oI the innocent Twelve Imams. The Shia community oI Pakistan
was not politically aligned to its clergy, it was even less connected with
the clerical hierarchy oI Iran. The Shia oI certain regions oI Pakistan
began going to Qum instead oI NajaI only aIter the state oI Pakistan
under General Zia decided to collaborate with Saudi Arabia.

Laws promulgated in Pakistan against the apostatisation oI the Shia
do not contain any provision banning the issuance oI Iatwas as 'private
edicts that violate the sovereignty oI the state. The state is reluctant to
bring the controversy oI the apostatising Iatwas into the courts oI law
61
because the courts themselves Iunction under the sharia and will fnd it
hard to disagree with the Iatwas as edicts. The state rightly reIuses to
recognise the Shia as a separate community and has not given them a
separate status in the census, meaning that the state does not 'oIfcially
discriminate on the basis oI sect
1
.
It is generally agreed that Shia are 15 to 20 percent oI the total
population, with signifcant concentrations in Quetta in Balochistan,
Kurram Agency in the Tribal Areas, and Gilgit in the Northern Areas. II
the Northern Areas is given the status oI a separate province, it will be a
Shia-majority province. Pakistan is second only to Iran in respect oI the
number Shias living in it.
The sectarian fatwas in Pakistan
It is oIten said that the people oI Pakistan are not sectarian. This is
meant to point to the lack oI a general anti-Shia animus at the popular
level. Yet, Pakistan has seen a lot oI sectarian violence in recent years.
The truth oI the above statement is substantiated by the pattern oI
killings: the Sunnis kill Shias at large, targeting congregations, and
the Shias target-kill with some exceptions the selI-proclaimed
anti-Shia clerics. This pattern tells us that the Shias are aware that the
Sunni majority does not hate them. It rather proves that Shia-baiting is
a specialised Iunction carried out in the tradition oI certain schools oI
thought among the Sunni-Hanaf conIession.
Is the state oI Pakistan involved in this sectarian war? The Brussels-
based International Crisis Group in its Asia Report No 95 titled The State
of Sectarianism in Pakistan says: 'In 1988, the last year oI Zia`s rule,
the longstanding sectarian peace in the Northern Areas was shattered
by bloody anti-Shia riots. When Shias in Gilgit celebrated Eidul Fitr,
Sunnis, still Iasting because their scholars had not sighted the moon,
attacked them. Since the initial clashes ended with a truce between local
community leaders, Shias were caught unprepared when they were
attacked by a Sunni lashkar.` The lashkar consisted oI thousands oI
people Irom Mansehra, Chilas, Kohistan and other areas in the NWFP.
They had travelled a long distance to reach Gilgit, but the government
Khalea Ahmea
did not stop them. No government Iorce intervened even as killings and
rapes were going on. Instead, the government put the blame on RAW
(Research and Analysis Wing, India`s intelligence agency), Iran and
CIA. In the rampage that Iollowed, more than 700 Shias were killed,
scores oI Shia villages were pillaged and burned, and even livestock
was slaughtered.
'It was on MusharraI`s watch as Army ChieI that Pakistan`s Kashmir
jihad policy increased the ranks oI Islamic extremists in the Northern
Areas. In 1999 the Kargil confict resulted in the infux oI Sunni jihadi
elements into the region. Extremist organisations like the SSP, Lashkar-
e-Tayba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Al-Ikhwan and Harkatul Mujahideen have
since opened oIfces there. Places like Chilas and Gilgit have become
the hub oI Sunni jihadi training and anti-Shia activism. And every Sunni
attack has resulted in a tit-Ior-tat Shia response.
The main reason Ior the 'hate specialisation is the secret nature oI
the Shia Iaith (taqiyya) especially in some aspects oI the historic quarrel
with Sunni Islam. The clerics who target the Shias dig into early Islamic
history to fnd evidence oI 'insult oIIered by the Shias to the Companions
oI the Prophet. The argument usually begins by the Sunni cleric positing
that the Shias have a covert tradition oI denouncing the Iundamentals
oI Sunni Islam. The verdict oI apostatisation is thereIore purported to
be 'reactive. AIter that, the Shia tradition oI oIIering taveel (secondary
meaning) oI the Quran is 'detected and a Iatwa oI apostatisation is
issued. Not all the Hanaf schools apostatise the Shias. The Barelvis are
seen to oIIer a 'liminal interIace with them Ior which they are oIten
denounced by the hardline schools like the dominant Deobandi school.
(Maulana Jhangvi, Iounder oI Sipah Sahaba, did that.
2
)
Islam has many sects. They are supposed to run into scores. Each
region however chooses its own primordial hate-object which is then
collectively apostatised. The Shias don`t qualiIy as the 'death wish
object oI hatred Ior Pakistan the same way as the Ahmedis. In Iran, it is
not the Sunnis so much as the Bahais who arouse primordial hatred. In
Pakistan, another sect with equally covert articles oI Iaith the Ismailis
don`t arouse the same vehemence oI Ieeling as the Ahmedis although
63
hate material against them has recently come to light. The hatred oI the
Shia has Iocused on the clerics oI Deoband and, aIter the AIghan war oI
the 1980s, on the Ahle Hadith. With the hardening oI Islam in Pakistan,
the sectarian trend has grown. It could be predicted even in 1949 when
the state oI Pakistan embarked on the path oI becoming an Islamic state
and tacitly said goodbye to the liminality or cultural coalescence oI the
majority Barelvi school with the Shias.
Attacking the Shia traditionists
Anti-Shia Iatwas reveal the mainsprings oI the sectarian dispute. The
'departure or heresy oI the Shias is seen in documents that don`t have
common currency in the country and only the orthodox practising Shias
know about them. It is only aIter the polarisation caused by the Deoband-
dominated AIghan jihad that some Shias have come to know about the
early Shia scholars like Kulayni and Majlisi
3
whose writings contain
the kernel oI the Shia-Sunni schism. Even the rise oI Imam Khomeini
in Iran did not bring about any considerable awareness among the Shias
about the 'Iacts oI their case in the dispute, although an underground
oI denunciatory and abusive literature had always existed in some small
cities away Irom the metropolises, usually a result oI personal rivalries
between local clerics on both sides oI the sectarian divide. Marriages
between Shia and Sunni spouses were quite common till the sectarian
killings tended to increase sect consciousness.
4
In some areas oI the
country cross-sect weddings have been disrupted by the local clerics
under pain oI violence.
The Iatwa oI apostatisation issued against the Shias by one the
Iounders oI Karachi`s Darul Ulum at the Banuri Town mosque complex
will make clear the basic Ieatures oI the sectarian quarrel.
5
MuIti Wali
Hassan Tonki issued the Iollowing judgement in 1986: 'The Shia believe
that the Quran is created and not eternal and is lying saIe with the Occult
Imam; that the Quran has been changed as claimed in the works oI
Kulayni, Mullah Baqar Majlisi and Muhammad Taqi al-Nuri al-Tabarsi;
that, like the Qadianis, the Shia accept Muhammad as the last Prophet
only literally and not in the real sense and have set up a parallel system to
his Prophethood in the concept oI Imamate, equating one with the other;
Khalea Ahmea
that the Shia reject the ifma (consensus) oI the Muslim community on
the caliphates oI Abu Bakr and Umar; the Shia are thereIore outside the
pale oI Islam.
6
It is important to understand here the status oI the Shia traditionists
that the Pakistani ulema attacked in the above Iatwa.
The author oI al-Kah was Abu JaIar Muhammad b. Ya`qub b.
Ishaq al-Kulayni al-Razi. He died in 940 AD. Very little is known oI
his liIe. He frst worked as a religious scholar and faqih (student oI hqh
or religious law) among the Imami-Shia scholars oI al-Raiy in Iran.
Then he moved to Baghdad and became head oI the religious and legal
scholars oI the Imamis during the time when al-Muqtadir was Caliph.
Al-Kulayni`s liIe`s work took place during the time oI the sufara oI
the Mahdi (the agents who acted on behalI oI the Hidden Imam during
the lesser occultation, al ghaiba al-sughra). Al-Kulayni is credited with
several works during this period. Among these are, as well as al-Kah,
a Kitab al-rifal, (a book in which men are assessed as authorities Ior
traditions), al-Raaa ala l-Qaramata (ReIutation oI the Carmatians),
Rasa il al-aimmata, Letters oI the Imams and an anthology oI poetry
about the Imams. Only al-Kah appears to have survived.
7
Mohammad Baqr Majlesi, son oI Molla Mohammad Taqi, was
born in 1628 and died circa 1700 and buried in Atiq Mosque oI IsIahan.
He was a religious leader oI the Muslims in IsIahan who, controlled
people`s aIIairs through his wisdom, and solved their problems. He was
enormously interested in teaching and the number oI his scholars in
Riadh was estimated at about one thousand. He travelled to Mecca and
Iraq several times. His eIIorts to propagate his Iaith were such that Shiism
could be called Majlesi`s religion, according to Shah Abdul Aziz`s book
Tohfeh. AIter Majlesi`s book Haqul Yaqin ('The Confrmed Truth) was
published, about 70,000 Sunnis oI Syria converted to Shiism. He passed
away at the age oI 73. Majlesi`s works number more than 60. Some oI
his important writings are: Bahar Al-Anvar h Akhbar Al-A emah Al-
Athar (26 volumes), Meshkatol Anvar, Eynol Hayat, Jala Al-Oyoun,
Helyatal Motaqin ana Hayat Al-Qollob.
8
65
There appear to be many Shia traditionists named Tabarsi but it is
Nuri Al Tabarsi (d.1902) who comes under attack Ior claiming that the
Quran was incomplete and would be revealed in its complete Iorm by
the occulted Imam Mahdi. But Tabarsi does not receive a consensual
acceptance among the Shia because oI his recent date. Yet, when the
polemic is joined, there is a deIence oI Nuri Al Tabarsi which must be
noted.
'There are three individuals with the title oI Tabarsi among the Shia.
The one accused oI writing a booklet on the incompleteness oI Quran,
is Husain Ibn Muhammad Taqi al-Nuri al-Tabarsi (c 1838-1902). Those
who call the Shia Kafr due to this booklet will be surprised to know that
many oI the Hadith reports that al-Nuri al-Tabarsi has quoted are, in Iact,
Irom the Sunni documents and were quoted Irom their most authentic
books! Actually his book has two parts. In one part he has gathered
the Sunni reports and in the other part he provided the Shia reports in
this regard. The Wahhabis, who have recently distributed copies oI this
book to attack the Shia, have intentionally omitted the part related to the
Sunni reports! Nonetheless, the Shia scholars oI his time disagreed with
his conclusion regarding the alteration oI Quran. This shows that the
Shia scholars strongly believed that nothing is missing Irom Quran. We
cannot call any person (Shia or Sunni) who claims Quran is incomplete,
as kafr. This is simply because believing in the completeness oI Quran
is not an article oI Iaith, nor do we have any tradition saying that anyone
who claims Quran is incomplete, is a kafr. Also, the verse oI Quran
that states that Allah is the protector oI the Reminder, can be interpreted
diIIerently. (Logically we cannot prove the lack oI alteration in Quran
by Quran!).
9
The problem oI the six accepted-as-true Sunni collections
oI hadith reports has cropped up in the past among the Sunnis too
because oI their objectionable content in the eyes oI some scholars like
Pakistan`s Ghulam Ahmad Parwez (1903-1985) who rejected the Sunni
hadith selectively because oI reports Iound in it about the changing or
withholding oI certain sections oI the Quran. There was intense reaction
against him Irom Saudi Arabia and the GulI. His works were banned in
Kuwait and in the NWFP province in Pakistan. In Lahore, where his trust
is located in Gulberg, there is always the threat oI attack Irom radical
militia-backed religious parties who don`t agree with his Quran-centred
Khalea Ahmea
and hadith-rejecting approach.
10
The irony oI Parwez`s work is that his
writings reject the Shia Iaith while his critical examination oI the Sunni
hadith strengthens the Shia deIence oI the belieI that the Quran had been
tampered with. Parwez oI course castigated the Sunni hadith Ior making
this view current among the Muslims. His eIIorts were paralleled in Iran
by Ali Shariati who objected to Shia hadith.
Manzur Numani and his anti-Iran campaign
A number oI clerical leaders oI Pakistan co-signed or confrmed
the Iatwa against the Shia in 1986. Among them were two well known
names: Muhammad YusuI Ludhianvi and MuIti Nizamuddin Shamzai.
Both were to die in the sectarian upheaval that overtook Pakistan during
the AIghan civil war oI the 1990s and the jihadi reaction to American
invasion oI AIghanistan in 2001. Fatwas oI apostatisation are on record
as having been issued Irom time to time Irom all the prominent madrassas
oI Pakistan. Darul Ulum Haqqaniya Akora Khattak oI Maulana Samiul
Haq issued its own Iatwa oI apostatisation oI the Shia in 1986 saying that
eating Iood cooked by them, attending their Iuneral and burying them
in Sunni graveyards stood banned. Another Iatwa Irom Jamia Ashrafa
Lahore, whose leader Maulana Muhammad Malik Kandhalwi known
to be a relative oI General Zia, declared the Shias kahr because 'they
held that the Quran had been tampered with and gave Hazrat Ali a status
equal to Prophet Muhammad, claiming that angel Jibreel had made a
mistake while taking wahi to the Prophet.
The above Iatwas were circulated in Quetta, Balochistan, in 2003
beIore the massacre oI the Hazara Shias there on two occasions. Since
no madrassa is required by the state to register all the Iatwas it gives out
to the people, the inIormation given by the Hazara leaders on TV Iell on
deaI ears. However, a compilation oI all the Shia-related Pakistani Iatwas
was made in Lucknow India in 1987, thus oIIering research workers
in Pakistan a glimpse into the activity oI the madrassas which mostly
disclaim that they are involved in anti-Shia crimes. Lack oI knowledge
oI the Deobandi-Shia confict oI the past is yet another prooI oI the
non-sectarian nature oI the general public in Pakistan. It is not generally
known that the Iounder oI the state Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali
67
Jinnah was an Ismaili who chose to become Shia in the 1920s to help
along his political career. (Shia Iaith was then more acceptable among
Sunni Muslims than Ismailism.) It is also not known that Maulana
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani who led the prayer oI his public Sunni Iuneral
(a secret Shia Iuneral having already taken place at night) had earlier
signed a Iatwa declaring all Shias as kahrs.
11
The Sunni-Shia confict as an Islamic schism died down in India
under British Raj simply because the British administrators dealt strictly
and Iairly with sectarian breaches oI law. In Lucknow, Ior example, where
the Shia community fourished, both the sects were Iorced to respect
the municipal law under pressure Irom oIfcers that had no religious
aIfliations. Had the local deputy commissioner not told a sectarian
crowd that it could not take the law in their own hands, Lucknow`s
controversial poet Yaas Yagana Changezi would have died as a lynched
apostate. The same can be said about Ghalib in Delhi under the British
Raj administration when he was accused oI being a rah:i (converted
Shia) by the Ahle Hadith who had dominance in the court oI the Mughal
King. Imam Khomeini`s own Iamily, Iearing persecution in Iran, had
migrated to India and lived in Lucknow Ior a time because it Iound
the city saIe.
12
Amir Taheri interestingly notes that Khomeini took the
pen-name (takhallus) Hinai (Indian) in his poems and that his youngest
brother Muhammad was named Syed Muhammad Hindi.
13
Why were the series oI Iatwas apostatising the Shias issued in Pakistan
in the year 1986? Why was there a simultaneity in the issuance oI these
Iatwas? A book was put together in 1993 titled Khomeini Aur Shia Kay
Barah Main Ulema Karaam Ka Mutahqqa Faisla (Consensual Verdict
oI the Ulema on Khomeini and the Shia) in Pakistan by someone called
Chishti Sabri and introduced by Khalilur Rehman Sajjad Nadvi. The
text belonged to an Indian cleric Maulana Manzur Numani (d.1994) who
claimed that 'it is a masterpiece oI research. Why should a collection
oI Iatwas be described as a masterpiece oI research? One comes to know
that in Iact these Iatwas were either never available Ireely in India and
Pakistan or had become unavailable aIter their issuance simply because
oI the lack oI habit oI record-keeping in the country and the latter-day
tendency oI the madrassas to hide their sectarian past.
Khalea Ahmea
Maulana Manzur Numani was a graduate oI Darul Ulum Deoband
in India and had already written against Imam Khomeini in 1984, but
in these writings he had not gone beyond accusing the Iranian Imam
oI heresy. But aIter that, he allegedly came across more solid evidence
proving the Shias non-Muslim. He himselI wonders that till the age oI
80 he had not cared to look into the writings oI the Sunni ulema down the
centuries on the question oI the real Iaith oI the Shia. The 'masterpiece
he achieved came in the shape oI a collection oI Iatwas printed serially
in the Lucknow-based journal Al Furqan Irom December 1987 to July
1988. The Iatwas were mostly issued in 1986 and their publication in Al
Furqan was undertaken the Iollowing year. What made him undertake
his anti-Shia readings? He explains it himselI. AIter the appearance oI
Imam Khomeini on the international scene in 1979, and aIter the 'anti-
monarchical inspiration oI the Iranian Revolution radiated in the Arab
world, many clerics in the United States began to worry about the Iuture
oI their proselytising enterprise.
Numani says some ulema wrote to him Irom the US saying the
American blacks were now being attracted to Shiism rather than Sunniism
as in the past. Since proselytisation in the US was mostly leveraged with
Arab/Saudi money, the Iundamental Arab-Iranian religious contest too
is visible in Numani presentation oI the case. He goes on to cite Imam
Abu HaniIa`s well-known edict that since the Shia were ahle-e-qibla
(those who bowed to Kaaba) they should not be apostatised. He says
Imam Abu HaniIa the Iounder oI the Hanaf school oI jurisprudence
never meant it as a ban on apostatisation oI the Shia who actually did
not accept the Last Prophet sincerely. Quite the opposite oI it, he points
to the concept oI the Hidden Imam in Shiism and says that the fnal
aim oI the Shias is to control the Kaaba and proclaim their ascendancy
Irom there. He then reIers to the 1987 clash between Saudi troops and
the Shias doing hajj in Mecca and warns that a campaign to depose
the Sunnis Irom the guardianship oI the Kaaba could actually be taking
shape.
There is an interesting precedent to Numani`s book oI Iatwas.
Numani had written an earlier book in 1984 titled Iranian Revolution,
Imam Khomeini ana Shiism (Irani Inqilab, Imam Khomeini aur Shi`yyat)
69
with a preIace written by the popular Indian religious leader, Abul Hasan
Ali Nadwi, whom one least expected to endorse a sectarian tract. Vali
Nasr met him in India in 1989 and this is what he writes:
'Nadwi or Ali Mian as he was popularly known was then one oI the
most senior religious leaders oI India. He was a scholar and the rector
oI an important seminary in Lucknow as well as a trustee oI OxIord
University`s Center Ior Islamic Studies. He was also a leader oI India`s
Muslim community, oIten interacting with politicians on behalI oI Indian
Muslims and travelling across the Muslim world to represent them.
Nadwi was an adviser to the Saudi Islamic World League. Although
moderate in his views and a critic oI Iundamentalism, he nevertheless
let himselI be prevailed upon to lend his authority to Numani`s attack
itselI an ominous sign.
'Numani saw Khomeini as the Iace oI Shiism and pointed to Iranian
excesses as prooI that Shiism was beyond the Islamic pale. The book
quickly made a stir. Numani and Nadwi were not marginal opportunists
but senior Sunni ulama. Their commentary had the quality oI a major
Iatwa. With Saudi fnancial support, the book was translated Irom Urdu
into English, Arabic and Turkish Ior wide circulation across the Muslim
world. A copy whether in English or Arabic was available to any interested
person who requested one at the Saudi embassy in Washington, DC. The
book made Deobandis central to the ongoing sectarian conIrontation in
Pakistan.
'When I visited Nadwi in 1989, I asked him about the book. I
expected him to go into outspoken anti-Shia mode, but to my surprise he
grew quiet. He preIerred not to talk about the book. When I pressed him
whether it was prudent to equate Shiism with Khomeini and to denounce
the Shia Iaith so strongly, he demurred it had all come down to the Iact
that Numani had been his Iriend, and that political circumstances had
dictated the book`s production. Moderate Sunnism was being pushed
to adopt an unbending position toward Shiism. Nadwi had always been
a pragmatic and temperate man. He had travelled to Iran during the
Shah`s days and until 1984 had not adopted an anti-Shia position. But,
as he hinted, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry was imposing its own radicalising
Khalea Ahmea
logic on sectarian relations.
14
The lending oI his name to Numani`s book by Ali Mian is an

extraordinary event. The profle oI this great Indian Islamic scholar,
provided by Yoginder Sikand, describes him as a very realistic man
despite his correctly appreciated great scholarship. Sikand does not
dwell on Ali Mian`s anti-Shia leanings because there were apparently
none, but he does list his deep contacts with the Arabs in general and
the Saudis in particular. He received the King Faisal Award Irom Saudi
Arabia in 1980 while serving as the rector oI the Muslim seminary oI
Nadwat al-Ulema, as member oI the standing committee oI the Darul
Ulum, Deoband, and participant in the working oI many European
institutions devoted to studying Islam. He was member oI the Standing
Committee oI Rabita al Alami al Islami (The World Muslim League),
Mecca; member oI the Consultative Committee oI the Islamic university,
Madina. Sikand is oI the view that his views were greatly moulded by
his contacts with the Arabs.
15
It is quite clear Irom the above that the 'inspiration to write the
books came Irom one source, Saudi Arabia, while a helping hand might
have been provided by others. In 1984, Pakistan`s General Zia had a bad
meeting with Khomeini, aIter which in 1985 the anti-Shia organisation
Sipah Sahaba was allowed to be Iormed; in 1986 General Zia allowed
the massacre oI the Shia in Parachinar in Kurram Agency, and the same
year the Deobandi Iatwas were issued Irom the three top seminaries oI
Pakistan. In 1984, Numani in India got worried about Iran and wrote his
book against Khomeini, which was picked up by the Saudis, translated
and distributed all over the Muslim world. Then in 1987 Numani was
prompted to put together all the Iatwas against the Shia and write another
book which has been noted above as the book published by a Pakistani
in 1993.
Arab scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl explains the widespread
puritanism among the Muslims oI today as based on a textualism that
leaves very little room Ior human agency in the interpretation oI religion.
He thinks that Saudi Arabia was able to guide the conservative salafst
trends among the Arabs towards a tough literalist Iaith aIter the collapse
71
oI Nasserism. Instead oI putting the Quran and Hadith at the top oI
all values in Islam, the puritans use them to empower themselves 'to
project their socio-political Irustrations and insecurities upon their text.
While the puritans seek to dominate and punish Iellow Muslims, puritan
militants like Al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, seek to punish the non-
Muslims too. About Saudi patronage oI this creed, he writes:

'Initially this process oI dissemination (oI Wahhabi ideology)
consisted oI lending fnancial support to Iundamentalist organisations,
but by the 1980s, this process became Iar more sophisticated. So, Ior
instance, Saudi Arabia created a number oI proxy organisations such as
Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (Muslim World League, a sister organisation
oI Mo`tamar al-Alam al-Islami or Muslim World Congress) that widely
distributed Wahhabi literature in all oI the major languages oI the world,
gave out grants and awards, and provided Iunding Ior a massive network
oI publishers, schools, mosques, organisations and individuals. The net
eIIect oI this campaign was that many Islamic movements across the
Muslim world became advocates oI Wahhabi theology.In many parts
oI the Muslim world, the wrong type oI speech or conduct (such as Iailing
to veil or advocate the veil) meant the denial oI Saudi largesse.
16

Senior Pakistani journalist MustaIa Sadiq once wrote in Lahore`s
daily Jang (21 November 2003) that when he was saying his prayer in
a mosque in Dipalpur, a small town in Punjab, he discovered pamphlets
there penned by the great late Saudi scholar Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz.
He was greatly impressed by the pamphlets and remembered that Bin
Baz was rector oI the Madina University and wielded a lot oI authority
with the Saudi royalty. The columnist went to Saudi Arabia in 1966 and
interviewed Bin Baz, which he published on one Iull page oI his paper
Wafaq. Bin Baz could actually undo the punishments given out by the
princes. He was so powerIul he could open the door oI the crown prince,
the most powerIul man in the kingdom, and enter at will. He wore his
usual long robe but kept a big pocket in it. In the pocket was always a
mohur (stamp). Whenever he wanted to give an order that the kingdom
had to obey he took it out oI his robe and aIfxed it on the paper carrying
his instructions.
Khalea Ahmea
A portrait of Maulana Manzur Numani
Qasim Zaman presents India`s Maulana Manzur Numani (d.1996)
as a populariser oI Islam together with YusuI Ludhianvi oI Pakistan.
Numani published his Islam kiya hai (What is Islam?) Ior the common
Muslim reader and sold 70,000 copies oI it in India and perhaps an equal
number in Pakistan. By the late 1990s the book had been reprinted 38
times and many times more in other languages. Zaman categorises this
kind oI popular writing as a Iunction oI the ulema away Irom the usually
specialised work not grasped by the masses. He reIers to MuIti YusuI
Ludhianwi`s similar contribution in a special column on Islam begun
in daily Jang oI Lahore in 1978.
17
The 'media muIti was not popular
among all the sects and was shot to death in 2000 in a market oI Karachi.
The Indian populariser Manzur Numani remained alive because he was in
India and not in Pakistan where his book oI Iatwas would certainly have
led to his death. It is quite possible that he was chosen to undertake the
collation oI anti-Shia Iatwas because oI his location outside Pakistan.
Zaman discusses Numani as a sectarian polemicist and mentions
Saudi patronage in this regard: 'What has been labelled Saudi
patronage` in this discussion comes not only Irom the state but also Irom
Saudi-sponsored international associations like the aIore-mentioned
Rabita al-Alam al-Islami or Irom wealthy private individuals.Saudi
patronage helped muster the support oI many Sunni ulama against the
Iranian revolution which the Saudis saw as a threat to the stability oI
their regime.
18
He goes on to mention the eIIorts made by the Deobandi
scholars to attract Saudi patronage in the Iorm oI money and training. He
makes reIerence to a Deobandi seminary in Kohat in the NWFP which
actually publicised the Iact that it had 'Iormulated its goals in accordance
with not only those oI the other Deobandi madrassas oI Pakistan and
India but also with those oI the Islamic University oI Madina and the
Islamic Institute oI Doha, Qatar. The Jamia Faruqiya oI Karachi, which
was to issue its most IorceIul Iatwa oI apostatisation oI the Shia under
MuIti Nizamuddin Shamzai (killed in 2004) was set up in 1967, but by
1991 it had 1,775 students. It was rated as the most successIul seminary
in terms oI attracting aid Irom Saudi Arabia and other international
sources. The curriculum oI its language-learning department was a
73
mix oI styles Iound in South Asia and the Arab Middle East: 'Most oI
the students here are Irom the Fiji Islands, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia, and the institute itselI is run by graduates oI the Islamic
University oI Madina.
19
The Deobandis began their campaign Ior Arab Iunds aIter the rise
oI Imam Khomeini. A cable published by Iran Irom the documents
(Vol 2, page 117) captured by Iranian youth aIter an assault on the US
embassy in Tehran, records in 1979 a conversation between the chieI oI
Pakistan`s JUI, Maulana MuIti Mahmud and an oIfcer oI the American
embassy in Islamabad. MuIti Mahmud asked, 'Why can the Arabs not
spread their wealth among a broader cross-section oI the rebels |in
AIghanistan|?
20
By 1986, only seven years later, the Deobandis were
the largest recipients oI Saudi Iunds.
Together with Hasan Ali Nadwi mentioned as Ali Mian by Vali
Nasr, Numani began his career in Tablighi Jamaat. While Numani was
also a member oI the advisory board oI the Deoband madrassa, Nadwi
was additionally a member oI the Saudi-sponsored Rabita al-Alam al-
Islami. Numani had engaged in polemics with the Barelvis early in his
career and was sectarian-minded in his approach. His next step in the
Iorm oI his The Iranian Revolution, Imam Khomeini ana Shiism was a
polemic against the Shia belieI and quickly became a bestseller in the
world, not a little assisted by Saudi Iunds and world-wide circulation
in many languages. Then in 1987 he put together the Iatwas oI takhr
(apostatisation) that he had elicited Irom a large number oI seminaries
Irom India and Pakistan. First to be listed oI course was the Jamia Banuri
Town which was to be headed by the late Shamzai whose connection
with AIghanistan`s Mullah Umar was later to become well known. AIter
2001, his Iatwa oI qital (death) against the Americans became Iamous as
he was known to be a moderate scholar.
Qasim is oI the opinion that the mainstream Deobandi ulema engage
in an academic polemic against the Shia but the killing is perIormed by
the 'peripheral ulema and their operatives. The leading ulema simply
state that the Shia are 'infdels because oI their vilifcation oI the great
personages oI Islam but do not directly prompt the Sunnis to kill the
Khalea Ahmea
Shia.
21
This can be accepted as true but in the context oI the Saudi-
Iranian campaign oI mutual contest, the issuance oI Iatwas in 1986 on
the request oI Numani has to be looked at diIIerently. The truth oI the
matter is that the 'peripheral ulema who carried out the killings were
Iunded by the Saudis in equal measure with the senior ulema. It is quite
possible that great scholars like Shamzai were persuaded to issue the
Iatwas without knowing that the prompting state had also organised
the peripheral clerics to carry out the killings aIter the issuance oI the
Iatwas. The creation oI the apostatising Sipah Sahaba in 1985, Iollowed
by the Iatwas in 1986 - which coincided with the massacre oI the Shia
in Parachinar - points to a programming that cannot be ignored. There
is a crescendo pattern in this Saudi campaign involving the clergy and
President Zia-ul-Haq oI Pakistan who ordered another massacre oI the
Shia in Gilgit in 1988 and was to die on the 17th oI August aIter someone
had killed the Shia leader AriIul Hussaini in Peshawar on 5
th
oI August.
In his preIatory remarks to his book oI Iatwas, Numani reIers to
all the great personalities that had gone into Pakistan`s nation-building
process. He reIers to the frst apostatiser oI the Shia, Sheikh Ahmad
oI Sirhind and his Iamous tract Raaa-e-Rafawi: (Repudiation oI the
rejectionists) and points out that Sheikh Ahmad was writing to apostatise
them when the Shia were infuential in India. The queen oI Emperor
Jahangir, Nur Jahan, was a ghali (extremist) Shia and her Iather was
prime minister while her brother was also highly placed in the Mughal
court. He however remains selective in his account oI Sheikh Ahmad
and doesn`t comment on Sheikh Ahmad`s spiritual claims purported
to elevate him to a status equal to that oI the Prophet and higher than
the Companions. He neglects to give the disapproving views oI Sheikh
Ahmad by the Sheikh`s contemporaries like Abdul Haq Muhhadis and
Manzur Numani`s own contemporary, Abul Ala Maududi.
22
He then reIers
to Shah Waliullah, the patron saint oI the Deobandi school, as another
objector to Shia dominance in the aItermath oI the long reign oI anti-
Shia emperor Aurangzeb when his weak successors were manipulated
at will by powerIul Shia persons in the court. Shah Waliullah wrote
his voluminous work Quratul Ainain against the Shia and in his letters
clearly placed them outside the pale oI Islam because oI their doctrine
oI imamat.
75
Numani proclaims that all Shia, whether clerical or not, have the
doctrine oI Imam Mahdi or the return oI the 12
th
Imam inscribed on their
hearts, and Imam Mahdi, aIter his arrival in Madina, will exhume the
corpses oI Umar and Abu Bakr and punish them repeatedly with death
each day Ior their transgressions oI the past. AIter that Imam Mahdi
will enIorce haaa (Quranic punishment oI death) on Ayesha too.
23
The
invasion oI Madina by Imam Mahdi will be motivated by the aim oI
converting all the population to Shiism on the pain oI death. Numani
mentions this because he wishes to create a tradition oI 'takeover oI
the cities oI Mecca and Madina among the Shias to explain the trouble
the Saudi government had with the Shia pilgrims Irom Iran in 1987.
24

He then quotes Irom Imam Khomeini`s works that it was a religious
obligation oI the Shia to attempt the 'reconquest oI Mecca and Madina
whenever circumstances became Iavourable.
He quotes Irom the 350-page Kashf al-Asrar oI Imam Khomeini that
Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman and Abu Ubayda, etc., never became Muslims
at heart but were munahq (pretending to be believers) who had embraced
Islam only to get close to the Prophet. These men went against the clear
edicts oI the Quran and ruled against the orders oI the Quran. Had they
Iound that they could not grab power without changing the Quran, they
would have done so. They could have also manuIactured new hadith
reports to prove that the Prophet had actually ordained selection oI
the caliph through council, not testament. In the end Numani quotes
Khomeini as saying that Umar had insulted the Prophet at his death bed
so grievously that the Prophet passed away nursing a wound in his heart.
Numani invites all Sunni clerics to read Khomeini`s book and let their
Sunni Iollowers know that all Shia were flled with the same poison
against the Companions oI the Prophet. He claims that Mullah Baqir
Majlisi whom Imam Khomeini recommends to all the Shia, and whose
works the Shia read with great relish at the popular level, had accused
Ayesha oI plotting with HaIza to poison the Prophet.
25
Manzur Numani was responsible Ior spreading sectarianism in India
too Ior which he used the Iamous Nadwatul Ulema seminary. Yoginder
Sikand, the noted Indian scholar oI Islam, laments:
Khalea Ahmea
'Even madrassas considered somehow more open` and modern`
are not Iree Irom the virus oI sectarianism. Consider the case oI the
Nadwatul Ulama in Lucknow, one oI the largest and most infuential
madrassas in India. Established in the late nineteenth century, the Nadwa
was intended as a bridge between the rigidly conservative Deoband
madrassa and the thoroughly westernised Aligarh College. Its Iounders
also envisaged it as broadly ecumenical, seeking to promote a sense
oI unity among the diIIerent Muslim sects. Among its early supporters
and Iounder-members were traditional Deobandi-type ulama, western
educated Muslims, and even Shias and ulama oI the Barelwi school.
The Barelvi association with Nadwa proved short-lived, and the leading
light oI the Barelvis, Ahmad Raza Khan, went so Iar as to issue Iatwas
oI kufr (infdelity) against the Iounders oI the Nadwa. One oI his main
grouses against the Nadwa was that it had included the Shias, whom
Khan considered to be heretics, in its programmes. The Nadwa did not
go on to Iulfl the hopes oI its Iounders. Its early Shia supporters soon
withdrew, and the Nadwa emerged as a centre Ior the promotion oI Sunni
orthodoxy, hardly diIIerent Irom Deoband. From the 1980s onwards,
Nadwa began receiving generous Saudi patronage as part oI the broader
Saudi strategy oI promoting conservative Sunni groups to counter anti-
monarchical and anti-imperialist tendencies emerging out oI Iran. One
oI the Nadwa`s leading teachers, Manzur Numani, penned numerous
diatribes against the Shias in the wake oI the Iranian Revolution,
branding them as infdels and insisting that Shiism had nothing to do
with authentic` Islam whatsoever.
26
Lucknow and the sectarian memory
As Indian scholars like Yoginder Sikand report a revival oI the
sectarian sentiment in Lucknow in the 2000s, sectarian publications
in Pakistan seek to discredit the Shia Iaith by describing the eclectic
culture oI the Shia-dominated Lucknow as heresy. To understand why
the anti-Shia fatwas were published by Manzur Numani Irom Lucknow,
it is important to look at the city`s sectarian past. Today the capital oI
India`s largest state, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow was once an annexed
district oI the Shia principality oI Awadh. The state oI Awadh itselI was
created in 1724 by an award Irom a declining Mughal king in Delhi. The
77
man Burhan al-Mulk, thus rewarded Ior military services to the king,
was a scion oI a Iamily oI Nishapur in Iran and was Shia by religion.
A sectarian tract printed in Karachi describes the actions oI the frst
ruler oI Awadh as traitorous. Burhan al-Mulk, made ruler oI Agra as
well, was supposed to come to the help oI the Mughal King when the
Shia king oI Iran, Nadir Shah, invaded Delhi and put it to the sword in
1739. The Awadh ruler advanced towards the army oI Nadir Shah on
his elephant but then allowed the animal to wander deep into the enemy
lines till he was recognised by his Nishapuri Iriends in the Iranian army
and accepted as an ally.
27

The book describes the rise oI the state oI Awadh during the decline
oI the Mughal rule, which lasted Ior 140 years. The downturn oI the
Mughal rule is dated Irom the conquest oI the Shia state oI Deccan by
the king, Aurangzeb, to highlight the Iact that the Lucknow-centred Shia
culture sprouted in the North aIter its frst maniIestation was destroyed
in the South. Like the Qutb Shahi state in Deccan, the Shia state oI
Awadh was established in the midst oI a majority Sunni population.
Author/translator Abbasi quotes Irom a literary fgure oI Lucknow,
Abdul Halim Sharar, to describe the 'heresies oI the Shia rulers.
28

The book quotes Sharar on Nawab oI Awadh Naseeruddin Haider
Shah (reg.1827-1838): 'Naseeruddin used to live among women and
had become Ieminine himselI, which aIIected Shiism in ways never
heard oI beIore. Wives oI the twelve imams,` selected out oI the pretty
girls oI the realm, were made to re-enact pregnancies in anticipation
oI the birth oI the occulted 12
th
Imam in rooms designated as special
delivery rooms. The eIIeminate Nawab himselI got pregnant` among
these girls and pretended to experience the labour pains oI the Mehdi,
aIter which a mythical birth actually took place Irom his womb. AIter
that, ceremonies oI birth, cutting oI hair and bath were also perIormed
Ior the reborn Mehdi. The Nawab had no time Ior the aIIairs oI the
state as he was busy in carrying out these puerile rituals surrounded by
women. Naseeruddin Shah had also started the innovation` oI taking
out the Iuneral processions oI the imams who were actually buried`
aIter a Iaked Iuneral prayer.
29

Khalea Ahmea
BeIore Lucknow was made the capital oI Awadh under Nawab AsaI
al-Daula (reg.1775-1797) Faizabad was the capital Ior nearly a halI
century. For the tract-writer in Karachi, however, it is important to note
that Lucknow was never a Shia city and that till the end, when it became
a Hindu-majority capital oI the India`s UP province, it was frmly a
Sunni city. It was chieI minister Hasan Raza Khan under Nawab AsaI
al-Daula who frst sent money to Iraq Ior the building oI the Hindiya
Canal that transIormed the desert cities oI NajaI and Karbala into Iertile
land and made it possible Ior the Iranian scholars living in the shrines
to convert Iraq`s exclusively Sunni Arabs to Shiism. It was Hasan Raza
Khan again who extended patronage to the Sunnis oI Lucknow willing
to become Shia. He is called 'ghali (extreme/abusive) Shia by the anti-
Shia writers oI later times and a lot oI detail is given about how Shia
mosques were built separately so that Shia could manage to stop saying
their prayers together with Sunnis. He also began to send Shia scholars
to NajaI to absorb the true, as opposed to the eclectic, Shiism oI India,
which is supposed to have led to the currency oI the ritual oI tabarra
(abuse) oI the Sunni caliphs and the modifcation oI the call to prayers
to include the name oI Ali. This was Iollowed by the frst incidence oI
violent Shia-Sunni encounters in the city.

The spread oI the Shia Iaith in Lucknow was Iacilitated by the
inclination oI the Mughal court to Iavour Shiism, in some cases Iollowing
the conversion oI the Mughal king to Shiism. The reaction oI the Sunni
ulema to this development was understandably intense. Indeed, verdicts
on the 'culture oI Lucknow were also intensely negative and were
applied to the poetry produced in the city by the great Urdu poets,
Mir Taqi Mir, Anis and Dabir. The poetry oI Lucknow was considered
lascivious and non-philosophical and totally given to hedonism.
30
The
anti-Shia publications oI the 1980s connected the 'literary decline oI
Urdu to the 'eIIete Shia rulers oI Lucknow. The textbooks in Pakistan
too looked down upon the highly cultured but militarily weak nawabs
oI Awadh as examples oI Muslim decadence in India that the new state
oI Pakistan would shun.

A more reliable and scientifc account oI Shiism in Lucknow by
David Pinault explains the character oI the Shia Iaith in Lucknow as
79
the religion oI a minority community endeavouring to live in harmony
with the dominant populations oI Sunnis and Hindus. OIfcial support to
the Shia minority kept it Irom being discriminated against. Shia rituals
were made compatible with Sunni and Hindu Iaith by toning down the
tabarra tradition and by taking on board the aarshanic tradition oI the
Hindu gods. Sunnis were thus enabled to grieve over the martyrdom
oI the Iamily oI the Prophet and the Hindus were enabled to see the
rituals oI martyrdom in the Iorm oI aarshan, that is, treating the martyrs
as deities in need oI being looked aIter and decorated. The nawabs oI
Awadh thereIore initiated a trans-communal sharing oI religion under
an akhbari Shia tradition in tune with local cultural accretions.
31

Three Iactors changed the nature oI Shia religion in Lucknow. First
was the arrival iI usuli Shia ulema Irom Iran, including the IoreIathers oI
Imam Khomeini, who made it obligatory Ior the Shia society in Awadh
to Iollow one supreme cleric (marja taqlid) and cleanse the Shia rituals
oI local Hindu accretions. The conversion to the usuli Shiism Iorced
the Shias to diIIerentiate the Shia Iaith Irom the Sunni belieI in 1803,
thus removing the Sunnis Irom the rituals oI Muharram. The second
transIormational event was the annexation oI Awadh by the East India
Company in 1856, removing the patronage oI the rulers Irom the Shia
minority population. The third event was the mutiny oI 1857 that saw the
Muslim community divided on sectarian lines. What Iollowed was the
sporadic sectarian violence in Lucknow, reaching its high-water mark
in 1977 when there were widespread riots, Iorcing the Shia community
oI India to frmly adopt the doctrine oI taqiyya (dissimulation) and
becoming a silent Iootnote to the religious politics oI India.
32
A party devoted to apostatisation
The three apostatising Iatwas Irom Darul Ulum Banuri Town, Jamiya
Ashrafya and Darul Ulum Haqqaniya Akora Khattak were issued in
1986. Why were these issued the same year? II Manzur Numani had
asked Ior them, who prompted him to make the request? Did someone
or some agency ask them to issue simultaneous Iatwas at the behest oI
the state? It is quite possible that in the mid-1980s, early contradictions
between Iran and Pakistan were coming to the Iore. (General Zia`s
Khalea Ahmea
intercessionary diplomacy in the Iran-Iraq war had Iailed because
Imam Khomeini did not acknowledge his credentials as an impartial
go-between. He was too aware oI the billions oI dollars Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait had given to Saddam Hussein to take care oI his Islamic
Revolution. He also knew about the special relationship General Zia
enjoyed with Saudi Arabia.) With this background the brazenly anti-
Shia organisation, Sipah Sahaba arose in the district oI Jhang in Punjab
in 1985. The Iatwas Iollowed soon aIter. In the years to Iollow, Pakistan
was to cope with the post-Geneva Accord (and post-1989) situation in
AIghanistan, Iacing an increasingly hostile Iran. Pakistan had already
succumbed to the Saudi persuasion by ousting the Iran-based Shia jihadi
outfts in the AIghan government-in-exile Iormed in Peshawar.
33
The ISI
Iormed and executed Pakistan`s jihad policy at this stage.
The Ioundation oI Sipah Sahaba the party that frst demanded
oIfcial apostatisation oI the Shia in Pakistan - in 1985 is another Iactor
that cannot be ignored. The Iounder became a rich man aIter coming
into contact with the Arab princes in Rahimyar Khan where they have
extraterritorial rights Ior hunting. The militia was set up in Jhang where
a strong Shia presence was to be targeted. Aggressive sectarianism in
Pakistan was born out oI the decade oI Islamic regimentation imposed
on the country by General Zia and his decade oI ideological control in the
name oI Islamisation. International aIIairs too played a signifcant role
in inclining the unwilling common man to the Ieeling oI the sect. The
rise oI Iran as a theocracy exacerbated the sectarian scene in Pakistan.
In the initial stages, Imam Khomeini was looked at in Pakistan as an
Islamic alternative and a messianic personality without any sectarian
underpinnings. This helped move the Iormerly quietist Shia community
to active approbation oI the Islamic Revolution. Imam Khomeini
himselI reshaped the thrust oI Iranian Islam to make it pan-Islamic
rather than Shiite. In the early phase, Iranian reIorms abolished some oI
the extreme rituals oI Shia Islam. To date, Shiism in some Sunni states
remains wedded to more extreme ritual behaviour (Ior instance, violent
selI-fagellation) than in Iran.

The Iran-Iraq war however pitted Iran against the oil-rich but
militarily weak Arab states in the region. Iran`s aggressive conduct in
81
the GulI threatened these states. Iraq`s Saddam Hussein exploited their
military weakness and promised them security against Iran in return
Ior liberal Saudi and Kuwait Iunding oI the war against Iran. Pakistan
tried to keep out oI the Iran-Arab confict Ior instance, it reIused to get
involved in the plans to set up a GulI Security Force but was not able
to sustain this posture Ior long. The biggest Iactor in this Iailure to keep
neutral was the confict in AIghanistan and its crucial fnancial hinge,
Saudi and American Iunding oI jihad.

A number oI other Iactors combined to complete the sectarian
developments in the region. The Shia clergy oI Pakistan became aware
oI the charisma oI Imam Khomeini and the purity oI the new theocracy
in Iran. In 1980, the Shia clergy had already reIused to accept the new
zakat laws promulgated by General Zia and was much strengthened
in its resolve to deIend its separate jurisprudence by the presence oI a
truly Shia-Islamic state in Iran. On the other hand, the mujahideen who
Iought the AIghan jihad against the Soviet Union had to be drawn Irom
the Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan since Barelvi Islam was considered
apostate in AIghanistan. In its very make-up, Deobandi Islam had a very
strong anti-Shia background. Three other Iactors also weighed in.

The United States, that supplied the Iunding and the weapons
to Pakistan Ior jihad in AIghanistan, had been greatly hurt by Imam
Khomeini when he allowed over a year long but legally dubious siege
oI the American embassy in Tehran. Washington Iroze the Iranian assets
in the United States then crucially needed by the new Islamic regime;
and US Congress imposed sanctions on Iran. Washington also Iavoured
a separation oI the jihad on sectarian lines as that would keep Iran Irom
exercising any infuence on the war and the Iuture political dispensation
in AIghanistan. The parallel provider oI Iunds, Saudi Arabia, actively
sought the isolation oI the AIghan Shia militias who relied on Iran Ior
their strategy and survival. Funding was also provided directly to the
Sunni militias in Pakistan through their seminaries.

With the Iunding came the Arab agenda. General Zia, and oIfcers
aIter him, Iavoured the 'downsizing oI the Shia Iactor because oI
the problems oI the 'ideological disagreement they Iaced with the
Khalea Ahmea
Shia clergy.
34
The United States did not oppose the anti-Iranian trend
and perhaps saw the increasingly anti-Shia pathology oI the religious
state in Pakistan as a positive Iactor in its regional strategy. Under the
umbrella oI the waiver oI internal sovereignty by Islamabad in Iavour
oI the Deobandi warriors, the mujahideen were encouraged to adopt an
aggressive sectarian posture. When the sectarian scene worsened in the
mid-1980s as a result oI these developments, the Shia Iound themselves
deIenceless. It is at this point that the Iranian Iunds reactive and
deIensive in nature - began to come in. Leveraged with money, the
sectarian war began in earnest in Pakistan, climaxing in the 1990s when
the state in Pakistan had been leached oI most oI its internal sovereignty
through covert wars in AIghanistan and Kashmir.

The third Iactor was the social impact oI Pakistan`s policy oI sending
workers to the Arab states. From Islamabad, there was no choosing where
the country`s surplus labour could be sent. They were absorbed by high-
income low-population states across the GulI and proved acceptable to
the Arabs because oI their apolitical identity in the intra-Arab Ierment oI
ideas. Economists say large scale migration oI Pakistani workers in the
two decades oI 1970s and the 1980s dramatically altered the character
oI development in Pakistan and contributed to Iundamental changes in
the country`s economy and society. In all, there are 3 million Pakistanis
working abroad sending home 4 billion dollars annually.
35
Out oI them
two-thirds are employed in the GulI region. While the people back
home in general did not nurse any sectarian prejudice, their contact with
a rising number oI returnees Irom the Arab states tended to wean them
Irom the more pluralist, low-church religion oI the past:
'Attitude towards religion are also suggestive oI some oI the more
complex conficts engendered by the migration experience and contact
with other Islamic societies, especially conservative societies such as
Saudi Arabia which represented the heartland oI Islam. Work in the
Middle East allowed some migrants to complete what Ior many had
been an impossible dream undertaking the hajj and visiting the holy
places in Mecca and Madina. There is evidence oI substantial divergence
in attitude on this point, suggesting that the greater choice brought about
by the Middle East migration resulted in greater complexity and, on
83
occasion, increased confict at a local level. According to one village
study, returnees disliked some oI the more traditional aspects oI rural
Pakistani Islam, particularly special prayers on Thursday evenings and
visits to the tombs oI dead saints or pirs. Such migrants were reIerred
to by villagers as Wahhabi because oI their tendency to introduce and
endorse new ideas stemming Irom Saudi Islam.
36
References
1 Census is a controversial institution although the state needs it Ior non-discriminatory
purposes. The Iundamental objection to census is its policy oI classifcation oI citizens.
In an ideal state census would simply be a head-count and not counting according to
classifcations. Modern states classiIy Ior purposes oI aIfrmative action but such action
can also attract discrimination against certain identities.
2 Mariam Zahab, The Sunni-Shia Conict in Jhang in Livea Islam in South Asia (2004:
Social Science Press Delhi) Founder oI Sipah Sahaba, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-1990),
a khofa graduate oI a Deobandi seminary in the city, was vice-president oI the JUI in
Punjab.
3 Colin Turner, Islam without Allah? The Rise of Religious Externalism in Safavia Iran;
Curzon Press (2000); P.40 Muhammad Al Kulayni (d.940 AD) was the greatest compiler
oI Shia tradition, Usul Arba, his masterpiece being known as Al-Kah; Muhammad Baqir
Majlisi (d.1110 AH/1679 AD?) arose as the most emphatic oI the Shiite traditionists.
4 LeiI Manger (ed), Muslim Diversity. Local Islam in Global Diversity; Curzon Press
London (1998). Tor H. Aase oI the Department oI Geography, University oI Bergen, has
taken a close look at what happened to the society oI Northern Areas aIter migration and
external conIessional infuences Irom Pakistan. The watershed event were the riots that
broke out in Gilgit over the sighting oI the moon and the observance oI Ramadan Iasting
in 1988. OIfcially 300 people died but unoIfcially the count was 700. At least three Shia
villages were wiped out in Gilgit as a result oI the conIrontation between the outside`
parties, Sipah Sahaba and Tehreek JaIaria. The oIfcial blame was put on CIA, RAW, and
MOSAD, while the people pointed to Hizb Allah and Wahhabi movement. Sunni clerics
routinely disrupted inter-sectarian marriages till the practice vanished.
5 Daily Jang (14 June 2003) wrote that the Iounder oI the Banuri Mosque complex was
Maulana YusuI Banuri (1908-1977) who was born in Basti Mahabatabad near Peshawar,
son oI Maulana Syed Muhammad Zakariya who was in turn the son oI a khaliIa oI
Mujaddid AlI-e-Sani. He was educated in Peshawar and Kabul beIore being sent to
Deoband where he was the pupil oI Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. He returned to join the
seminary oI Dabheel. In 1920 he passed the Maulvi Fazil exam Irom Punjab University.
In 1928, he went to attend the Islamic conIerence in Cairo. He migrated to Pakistan in
1951 and started teaching at Tando Allahyar. He Iounded the Jamia Arabiya Islamiya
in Karachi in 1953 while he led the attack against Pakistani Islamic scholar Dr Fazlur
Khalea Ahmea
Rehman. He was involved in the aggressive movement oI Khatm-e-Nabuwwat Irom 1973
onwards and was made member oI the Council oI Islamic Ideology (CII) by General Zia
on coming to power. Today, Darul Ulum Banuri Town is situated in SITE Karachi.
6 Muhammad Manzur Numani, Khumaini aur Shia kay barah mein Ulama Karam ka
Mutahqqa Faisala (Consensual Resolution oI the Clerical Leaders about Khomeini and
Shiism), Al-Furqan, 1988.
7 IKA Howard, Great Shii Works. Al-Kah of Al-Kulayni, Al Serat Vol 2 (1976), Published
by the Muhammadi Trust oI Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Reproduced with
permission by the Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project team.
8 Posted at http://www.irib.ir/Ouriran/mashahir/mazhabi/majlisi/html/en/page.htm , 12
October 2006.
9 Shia website: http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter8/5.html, accessed 13 Oct
2006.
10 Khaled Ahmed, The Genius of Ghulam Ahmaa Parwe:, The Friday Times, 11 December
1999.
11 Liaquat H. Merchant, Jinnah. a fuaicial veraict (East-West Publishing Company Karachi,
1990). The book is an account oI a case in which the Sindh High Court sought to know
the true religion oI Jinnah.
12 Baqer Moin, Khomeini. Life of the Ayatollah, IB Tauris London (1999). Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-1989) led the revolution against the Shah in Iran in 1979. The
ancestors oI Khomeini were Iranian settlers in the early 18
th
century in Kintur, a town oI
Oudh, not Iar Irom Lucknow in India.
13 Amir Taheri, The spirit of Allah. Khomeini ana the Islamic Revolution, p.315 (appendix)
and Index.
14 Vali Raza Nasr, The Shia Revival. How Conicts within Islam will Shape the Worla, WW
Norton & Company, 2006; p.165
15 Ibrahim Abu Rabi (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought,
Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Yoginder Sikand, Sayyea Abul Hasan Ali Naawi ana
Contemporary Islamic Thought in Inaia, p.90.
16 Khaled Abou El Fadl in his book The Great Theft. Wrestling Islam from the Extremists
(Harper/San Francisco, 2005) p.74
17 Jang later gave MuIti Ludhianwi a weekly Iull-page in its sister English daily The News.
This column was widely read by the more liberal section oI the readers whom it shocked
with its sectarian content. MuIti himselI Iell victim to sectarian violence in Karachi in
2000.
18 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Custoaians of Change,
Princeton University Press, 2002. p.176.
19 Ibid.175.
20 Mushahid Hussain, Among the Believers, monthly The Herald, Karachi, September 1992.
P.36.
21 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Custoaians of Change,
Princeton University Press, 2002. p.133.
22 Annemarie Schimmel, Islam in the Inaian Subcontinent, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003,
p.92: 'His dictum Muhammad has become Ahmad` points to his own name, Ahmad. He
also regarded himselI as qayyum upon whom the world rests.towards the end oI the
17
th
century Abdullah Khweshgi Irom Qasur accused the mufaaaia oI having arrogated
85
Prophetic qualities, thus lately Maulana Maududi was very critical oI Ahmad Sirhindi`s
claim to be the mufaaaia. And p.91: 'Ahmad`s Iame rests on his 534 letters which were
described by Jahangir as a bunch oI absurdities`.and had him imprisoned in the Iort oI
Gwalior Ior a year.
23 Manzur Numani, Khomeini aur Shia kay barah main Ulama Karam ka Mutahqqa Faisala
(Clerical consensual Verdict on Khomeini and the Shia), p.31.
24 Dilip Hiro, War without Ena. the Rise of Islamist Terrorism ana Global Response,
Routledge 2002: p.155. Iranian and non-Iranian pilgrims together took out a procession
oI nearly 100,000 which was stopped by the Saudi police amid violence that killed 402
people. AIter this Saudis brought the Iranian quota oI pilgrims down to 45,000 Irom
traditional 150,000, which resulted in a hajj boycott by Iran.
25 Manzur Numani, Ibid. p.90.
26 Yoginder Sikand, Qalandar.com, 4 March 2004.
27 Mahmud Ahmad Abbasi, Baashah Begum Awaah, Maktaba Mahmud, Liaquatabad,
Karachi. P.16. Typically undated, the book is a part oI the anti-Shia campaign and revives
an old publication written in criticism oI the Shia culture as evolved in Awadh in general
and Lucknow in particular. The central account concerns the lady rulers oI Awadh and
their religious practices, but it is the 166-page introduction to the old account that relates
the heresy oI Shiism to the situation in Pakistan aIter 1980.
28 Abdul Halim Sharar, Lucknow The Last Phase oI an Oriental Culture, OUP, 1994.
29 Mahmud Ahmad Abbasi, Ibid, p.10.
30 Mahmud Ahmad Abbasi, ibid, p.126. The author questions the details deployed by
Anis and Dabir in their poetic re-enactments oI the Battle oI Karbala and its dramatis
personae.
31 David Pinault, Horse of Karbala. Muslim Devotional Life in Inaia, Palgrave 2001, p.17.
32 Ibid, p.19.
33 Barnet Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan. from Buffer State to Failea State;
Yale University Press (1999). P.105, Rubin says the Iranian shura (oI mujahideen) was
kept out because Saudi Arabia was against it. Saudi intelligence spent 25 million dollars
per week during the discussions in Peshawar, and each delegate was paid 25,000 dollars
to keep the Shias out. The seven parties in Peshawar appointed all the 519 members oI
the assembly who were mostly Pushtun Irom eastern AIghanistan.
34 Chairman oI Council oI Islamic Ideology Justice (Retd) Tanzilur Rehman was the
spearhead oI extremist anti-Shia thinking under General Zia, writing two books on the
concept oI apostatisation (irtidad) in which he included reIusal to pay zakat.
35 Dawn, 24 July 2006, Sultan Ahmad, An outlook on home remittances. 'Having achieved
a record rise in remittances oI overseas Pakistanis to $4.6 billion in 2005, Pakistan now
Iaces a prospect oI Ialling infows because oI a big drop in the number oI workers going
abroad Ior employment.
36 Jonathan S Addleton, Unaermining the Centre. The Gulf Migration ana Pakistan, OUP
Karachi, 1992, p.158.
Khalia A:i:
NEED FOR A PAK - AFGHAN
TREATY ON MANAGEMENT
OF 1OINT WATER COURSES
Khalia A:i:
*
Abstract
(This paper examines the enaemic water scarcity in parts of
Pakistan, Afghanistan ana Central Asia since the early 1970s. The
aislocation causea in the agrarian economies has resultea in the loss of
livelihooas for millions, it has createa environmental refugees, some of
whom have resortea to political struggle to wrest control of the Afghan
state, others may have become the insurgents in Pakistans tribal areas.
Water scarcity may have been the ariving force that lea to the 1978
coup against Saraar Daua ana the rise of the Taliban in 1992, in both
cases the supporters of these changes were mainly the marginali:ea
Gil:ai pastoralists ana the Kare:e (unaergrouna springs) farmers from
southern Afghanistan.
Loss of livelihooas aue to water scarcity is examinea in terms of the
niche theory of ecology, if people ao not occupy niches, they are unable
to fulhl the evolutionary arives of fooa ana procreation. This failure has
aevastatea social ana political oraer in the region.
Since water is the essential ingreaient for generating livelihooas,
the paper examines water aata ana postulates that aue to awinaling
water resources a Pak-Afghan water treaty basea on the moael of the
Inaus Basin Treaty between Pakistan ana Inaia shoula be initiatea
for managing the basin of river Kabul. The paper also researches the
relevant international law ana case stuaies pertaining to the foint use
of waterways. Basea on this analysis it proposes the minimum aesign
features essential for constructing a treaty.
* Khalid Aziz is a Iormer ChieI Secretary oI the NWFP.
87
Neea for a Pak-Afghan treaty on Management of Joint Water Courses.
The stuay warns that failure to manage rivers will be catastrophic in
the backgrouna of global warming ana a 30 percent profectea aecline
in the ow of river Inaus ana other regional rivers, if that occurs it
will not be possible to feea the profectea 300 million population of
Pakistan in 2040. The stuay concluaes by recommenaing measures
which the Governments of Pakistan ana NWFP must take now, to face
the future shortage of water. In the absence of a water treaty, a Pakistan-
Afghanistan conict cannot be rulea out. - Author).
Introduction
Pakistan, AIghanistan and the countries oI Central Asia Iace severe
resource-driven problems related to rapid population growth, systemic
drought, economic growth demanding resources Iactors leading to
social unrest and destabilization. These issues constitute a Iormidable
challenge to the orderly progress oI these countries. Our primary Iocus
is on Pakistan and AIghanistan which are not only neighbours, but also
share a common history, a joint Pukhtun identity, and a shared interest
in some oI the region`s Iresh watercourses.

Despite these commonalities, the Pakistan-AIghanistan equation
has consistently been marked by tensions. AIghanistan`s initial objection
to Pakistan`s entry into the UN in 1947 and its support Ior Pukhtun
irredentist claims drove the two countries apart and led to Kabul`s tilt
towards Moscow, which culminated in the 1979 Soviet intervention in
that unIortunate nation.
1
Six million AIghans became reIugees and a
large number lost their lives.
2

Pakistan, Ior various reasons supported the cause oI AIghan
Ireedom, which was attained with generous US assistance. During this
war Ior AIghan liberation, Pakistan also hosted three million AIghan
reIugees. They were provided assistance by the Pakistan government and
the people oI NWFP and Baluchistan; two Pakistani border provinces
which have ethnic links to the Pukhtun reIugees, many oI whom have
remained behind.

Islamabad continued to play a pivotal but controversial role frst
Khalia A:i:
in supporting the Taliban government and later in its removal Irom
AIghanistan in 2002; subsequently Pakistan supported AIghanistan`s
transition towards democracy. Pakistan paid a heavy price Ior its
involvement in AIghanistan; it inherited the drug and gun culture
during the war against Soviet occupation and subsequently against
the Moscow-installed Najib regime Irom 1979 to 1992.
3
It severely
damaged Pakistani society and politics. Its later support in the removal
oI the Taliban government in AIghanistan has engulIed Islamabad in
a continuous counter-insurgency war against the Taliban in the tribal
areas and southern districts oI NWFP
4
Both these interventions retarded
Pakistan`s own transition towards real democracy.

Nature has now served notice inviting both AIghanistan and
Pakistan to cooperate in combating the persistent drought, which
is not only aIIecting AIghanistan but also large areas in the Central
Asian Republics. It is now apparent that the drought is not an isolated
phenomenon but is endemic and has blighted substantial expanses in
AIghanistan since the 1970s. The political and security implication oI
the drought is examined in the context oI climate change. The impact on
livelihoods oI the increasingly impoverished region is studied Irom the
perspective oI the niche theory borrowed Irom ecology. Convention and
rules on management oI joint waterways stress the need to concentrate
on the ecology oI these resources.

Data Irom various studies oI the region conclusively prove that the
drought has aIIected the lives oI millions belonging to AIghanistan,
and nearby Central Asia.
5
Pakistan`s water availability tables indicate
rising water scarcity, which will increase to dangerous proportions, aIter
the glaciers supplying water to the Indus basin melt and stabilize to
an annual fow oI about 65-70 MAF by 2040,
6
instead oI the existing
average annual canal-diverted fow oI 96-104 MAF.

The extent oI the diIfculties Iacing this part oI the world calls Ior
immediate decisions in a host oI areas; especially in the joint management
oI Iresh-watercourses shared by Pakistan and AIghanistan. It calls Ior
the signing oI a bilateral treaty on the use oI waters oI the Kabul river on
the pattern oI the Indus Basin Treaty, signed with India in 1960; the new
89
proposed treaty is not oI the same magnitude but equally important in the
context oI the NWFP and the dwindling supplies oI water in the Indus.
It will also reduce the chance oI Iuture confict on water. AIghanistan`s
deputy irrigation minister has unambiguously demanded assistance in
better and sustainable management oI their rivers.
7
Extent of water scarcity
Map 1 indicates a part oI the region which is severely aIIect by
drought resulting in large scale poverty, deprivation and mass migration
oI humans who number more than 100 million spread over parts oI
Pakistan, AIghanistan and Central Asia.
8
Map 1: Drought regions of Asia
9
Water scarcity as cause of Afghan unrest
An ecological interpretation oI upheavals in AIghanistan since the
1970s would have us believe that owing to persistent droughts, the
nomadic Ghilzais, and Durrani Iarmers who number about 15 million
10

were severely marginalized, when their grazing lands and underground
water sources became dry. They were Iorced to sell their livestock
and their livelihood was threatened.
11
It led to a 75 percent reduction
oI livestock composed mostly oI sheep and camels.
12
It Iorced some
middle class and educated Ghilzai & Durrani to mount a coup against
Sardar Daud in 1978. It is believed, that once the communist leaning
Khalia A:i:
elite elements Irom these tribes were deIeated in 1992, the rustic Ghilzai
and Durrani took their turn to mount a second revolution, this time
under the Islamists garb oI the Taliban. This ecological hypothesis may
also explain the presence oI so many Uzbeks and others in Pakistan`s
tribal areas. They are the environmental reIugees feeing the extremely
water-stressed regions oI Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkmenistan and seeking a new liIe. Map 2 shows the distressed region
oI Central Asia, which is generating the reIugees; this dislocation has
security implications Ior all the countries oI the region.
Map 2: Drought impact & management in Central Asia
II Iurther research leads to a confrmation oI this hypothesis, then
the Ioundation oI received wisdom regarding the resurgence oI Islamic
Iundamentalism as the primary cause oI disturbance oI the international
order, will be challenged; we will return latter to this theme to note
briefy why history happens as conceived by the ecologist.
13

The discussion so Iar has at the minimum indicated that owing
to scarcity oI water, there has been widespread impoverishment oI
Iamilies in AIghanistan. II water can be provided, the problem could
be mitigated. However, the fip side is that iI water is a rare commodity
Ior AIghanistan, could it not Iorce it to use more oI the waters which
fow to Pakistan Irom AIghanistan and are used by its irrigation system?
91
Taking this line oI reasoning Iurther would not such an extraction oI
water by AIghanistan threaten the water 'rights oI Pakistan? Juxtapose
shrinking water availability in river basins due to global warming and
one sees a high degree oI probability that such an eventuality could lead
to confict. Yet another question is that can we not take steps now to pre-
empt Iuture confict is avoided and ensure that water Irom joint common
sources is used under institutional arrangements? This would guarantee
that the resource is protected and used in a mutually benefcial manner
in the best interest oI all stakeholders.

This paper examines these and other related questions in the
context oI global experience and international law governing the
non-navigational use oI Iresh waterways, the reason behind having
institutional arrangements and how the presence oI such organizations
can lead to peace. The paper will highlight some relevant fndings oI the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contained in their report oI
6 April 2007. II Iurther persuasion to act is required, the fndings leave
no choice but to immediately undertake joint management oI common
waterways.
14
By Iocusing on the hydrological diIfculties oI the region,
we may transcend the security driven compulsions which dominate the
discourse in this part oI the world and shiIt the paradigm oI analysis to
Iocus on the root cause oI discontent in South and Central Asia, which
is water shortage and poverty. Pre-emptive confict reduction through a
water treaty with AIghanistan will help in mitigating Iuture suIIering.
Hydrological situation of Afghanistan
According to 2004 fgures, AIghanistan has a population oI 22.2
million, oI which 85 percent are directly dependent on agriculture.
15

This population is expected to increase to 53 million by 2030. It has 19
million acres oI arable land. Out oI this, 12.7 million acres are suitable
Ior Iarming. BeIore 1978, 10.8 million acres were cultivated.
16
Even aIter
the war against Soviet occupation, when a major portion oI the irrigation
inIrastructure was damaged, irrigated land totalled 7.7 million acres. By
2002, it was reduced to only 4.6 million acres due to drought and Taliban
incompetence in rebuilding the irrigation system. In comparison, beIore
1978 AIghanistan was selI-suIfcient in Iood production and an exporter
Khalia A:i:
oI agricultural produce.
17

AIghanistan is suIIering Irom serious social dislocation caused by
a shortage oI rainIall with a consequential reduction in the quantity oI
fows in its aquiIers and rivers. It is this drought more than anything else
that is giving birth to social unrest. Regional long-term data indicates
a country-wide reduction in precipitation in AIghanistan. The peaks oI
such droughts were in 1898-1905, 1944-45, 1970-72, and 1998-2004
without a continuous downward trend.
18

As a result oI the decline in water availability, irrigation water has
dropped by 70 percent in canals, and in turn has led to the reduction oI
irrigated land by 60 percent. More than 36 percent oI the underground
springs (Kareze) have dried up and the discharge in the remaining reduced
by 83 percent. It has decreased Kareze watered land by 84 percent;
300,000 Iamilies who were dependent on Karezes had to leave their
villages or are struggling to eke out an existence. 800,000 other Iamilies
are receiving some Kareze water but are reduced to impoverishment.
19
II
the average household size is projected at a conservative 6.3 members per
household, then about 7 million people are Iacing economic dislocation
and possibly extinction.

Another research fnds that all 30 AIghan provinces have water
shortage problems. Out oI these, 28 provinces are suIIering Irom
drought.
20
FAO comparative data Ior 1998 and 2003 shows a drastic
decline in the absolute number oI livestock and the availability oI water
Ior them.
21
II the data concerning decline in agriculture due to drought
and water shortage is extrapolated, then one gets a horrifc fgure oI
approximately 20 million people aIIected economically by water
shortage.

Certain plausible deductions can be arrived at Irom the above Iacts.
First, the shortage oI water in AIghanistan has assumed the shape oI a
calamity Ior more than 20 million people. Second, both the Iarmers and
herders have been seriously aIIected. These assumptions indicate that
the herders and Iarmers, mostly composed oI Pukhtun tribes, have been
badly hurt and their niche oI economic survival obliterated. According
93
to ecological historians, under such circumstances, people will resort to
radical solutions.
22
Water audit of Afghanistan
AIghanistan, according to a report had a total potential oI 58.7
MAF oI water in 2003.
23
SurIace water fows in the rivers and main
streams accounted Ior 46.19 MAF and ground and spring water accounted
Ior 12.5 MAF. Table 1 below gives the fgures:
Table 1: Estimated surIace and groundwater potential
& consumption in AIghanistan 2003
Type of water
resources
Potential
Present used in MAF
Total Balance
Agriculture
Live
stock
Water
supply
Industry
MAF MAF MAF MAF MAF MAF MAF
SurIace Water/canals 46.19 15.89
0.04
0.12
0
16.01 30.18
Ground
water
Kanats
12.55
1.45 0.02
2.53 9.98 Springs 0.77 0.01
Wells** 0.14 0.14
Total
58.74 18.25 0.04 0.29
0
18.54 40.16
Agriculture used about 16 MAF oI water leaving a balance oI
approximately 30.18 MAF Ior development. This is a considerable
amount and needs to be rationalized and thought through by the AIghan
authorities. Obviously, in the Iace oI the existing circumstances,
development oI this sector will pay dividends. However, the ground
water/spring/wells potential and its usage does not appear to be
correct.
Table 2 below shows the decline in the discharge in the 5 main
AIghan rivers basins as compared with the previous years. However,
there is disagreement regarding the decline oI 72 percent shown Ior
river Kabul, which is jointly shared with Pakistan.
24
It is not clear how
the decline oI 72 percent has occurred in the fow oI river Kabul because
it should have a normal fow oI about 17.2 MAF below Jalalabad.
Data Irom Pakistani sources shows in Table 3 that the fow oI river
Khalia A:i:
Kabul beIore it receives the waters oI river Chitral and river Kunar is
14.6 MAF, because at Warsak, which is the frst water measuring point
oI river Kabul in Pakistan, the fow is recorded at 17 MAF. ThereIore,
this paper places the discharge oI river Kabul in AIghanistan at 17 MAF.
One reason Ior the AIghan conIusion about river fow data is that the
country lost all its167 hydrological measurement stations during the
wars.
25

Table 2: Water available in AIghan canals and command area
in 2002-03 and decline as compared with the past
26
River basins
Accumulated
Discharge in 2002
(MAF)
decline
of discharge
(2004)
Command area
of discharge
(h/a)
decline of
irrigated area
(2004)
River basin I-Kabul 10.04 72 328,434 48
River basin II-
Helmand
19.04 62 734,088 61
River basin III-
Western
2.31 69 69,148 69
River basin IV-
Northern
4.82 69 241,891 61
River basin V-
North-eastern
9.97 60 266,425 49
Total all basins 46.19 66 1,638,986 58
Table 3: Volume oI Kabul River
S. No Subject MAF
1 Flow at Jalalabad 14.60
2 (Addition Irom R. Chitral/Kunar) 02.40
3 Flow at Warsak 17.00
4 (Addition oI R. Swat / Kalpani) 05.30
5 (Total) Flow at Khairabad 22.30
Data provided in 2002 by the AIghan Deputy Minister oI Irrigation,
estimated total availability oI surIace and sub-surIace water to be 58.74
MAF.
27
This confrms the surIace fow availability fgure in Table 1
amounting to 30.18 MAF, aIter existing usage. It confrms the earlier
assertion that enough additional water is available in AIghanistan to battle
the drought in certain areas. Its problem is the absence oI management
capacity and damage to the existing irrigation inIrastructure.

95
How much water is available in river Kabul Ior use by Pakistan
aIter deducting its usage in AIghanistan? To answer this question we
have the existing and projected usage oI river Kabul water. There are
reports oI two new storages coming up on this river.
28
One oI the projects
being developed by AIghanistan is the multi-purpose Kama hydel and
irrigation project which aims to provide water to 14,000 acres oI new
land; it will use about 0.1 MAF oI water Irom river Kabul.
29
The AIghan
irrigation strategy as reported by the Asian Development Bank, projects
a trebling oI its existing water storage Irom 10 percent to 30 percent in
the next Iew years.
30
This will reduce the fows into the Indus Basin and
more specifcally into NWFP`s civil and liIt canals based on river Kabul
fows. No data oI additional water usage Irom new project is available.
However, whatever the additional usage oI water oI river Kabul by
AIghanistan, it will reduce the water Ior Pakistan storages. We look at
water availability in the context oI Pakistan next.
Pakistan`s irrigation water situation
Pakistan has the world`s largest contiguous irrigation system catering
to 45.2 million acres.
31
Its population will be 209 millions in 2015 and
approximately 300 million by 2030. Agriculture accounts Ior 23 percent
oI its GDP and provides jobs to 55 percent oI the labour Iorce. It also
provides 90 percent oI the country`s wheat needs and 100 percent oI
cotton, sugar cane, rice, Iruits and vegetable. It plays a major role in the
nation`s industry by providing commodities Ior processing.
32

However, this secure picture is beset with threats and worries. The
irrigation marvel oI Pakistan is organized around a single river basin
oI the Indus and its water regulation through storages and regulators,
controlling an annual average water fow oI about 104 MAF. The
construction oI its irrigation inIrastructure enabled Pakistan to double
its irrigated acreage Irom 1947 to 2005, to 45.2 million acres.

Currently, Pakistan is classifed as water short, but by 2016 it is
projected to become water scarce.
33
The water management expert,
Zaigam Habib has Iound that river infows decreased by 20 percent
aIter 1947. This shortage is Iurther compounded by Iaster glacial melt
Khalia A:i:
while rainIall has become unpredictable. The aquatic and environmental
assets like wetlands, rangelands and Iorests are receding. At the same
time water mismanagement shows losses oI 50 MAF annually in canal-
diverted water and 10-30 MAF loss oI foodwaters in the absence oI
storages. Salinity and water logging add to Pakistan`s growing woes oI
irrigation problems.
34

NWFP`s use of river Kabul waters
A study done by the NWFP Irrigation Department states that the
limited irrigated agriculture in the northern part oI the province is heavily
dependent on the waters oI river Kabul as shown in Table 4 below:
35
Table 2: Irrigation in NWFP Irom Kabul river waters *
S. No Project irrigation Department Water utilization NWFP]
1 Warsak canal system 0.40
2 Kabul river canal 0.32
3 Joe Sheikh Mian Gujjar canals 0.28
4 Kheshki liIt irrigation scheme 0.03
5 Private canals / kathas 0.08
Total 1.11
* Irrigation department NWFP
In the south oI the province 157,000 acres are food irrigated by the
Gomal River. This river has its headwaters in Ghazni in AIghanistan. Its
chieI tributary is the Zhob river in Baluchistan. Pakistan is building the
Gomal dam on this waterway which is likely to use about 0.75 MAF oI
water annually.

Pakistan is likely to increase the capacity oI irrigation works on river
Kurram which rises in the AIghan province oI Paktia. It is planned to
build the Kurram Tangi dam in Bannu. Rivers Kurram and Kaitu which
have a combined average fow oI about 1.1 MAF annually will provide
additional water Ior the new storage. It will provide water to the existing
Bannu canal system as well as irrigate new lands in N. Waziristan spread
over 16,000 acres oI new land in Tall plain, Bannu.

97
The precipitation in NWFP and the adjacent tribal areas is also Ialling
rapidly as in AIghanistan. In the tribal areas oI Pakistan water scarcity
has reached dangerous levels with a rapidly declining water table. Water
scarcity will increase problems here also. Thus new irrigation water
supplies will be essential Ior providing security to livelihoods in this
arid region.

The NWFP and tribal areas, with a combined population oI 24
million, depend on Iour AIghan rivers which fow into the Indus; namely,
the Kabul, Kurram, Kaitu and the Gomal. Furthermore, it may be noted
that the water oI the Kabul river includes that oI the river Chitral, which
joins it near Jalalabad, and provides about 2.5 MAF oI water annually
- this is the contribution by Pakistan to the river Kabul`s fow.

AIter river Kabul enters Pakistan, it fows through a diversion dam at
Warsak near Peshawar, which though silted, still produces power besides
diverting water Ior irrigation into the Kabul river canal system. The Swat
river and other small tributaries join river Kabul near Khairabad with a
fow oI 5.30 MAF; it increases its volume to about 22 MAF annually.
AIghanistan should, thereIore, recognize that it receives water Irom the
Pakistani Chitral river basin and hence there is a need to develop the use
oI river Kabul jointly.

II the fow in river Kabul is reduced it could have the Iollowing
adverse eIIects:
a. II AIghanistan unilaterally decides to build upstream storages, it
would have serious repercussions on the present usage oI these
waters as the entire fow oI the Kabul river that enters Pakistan,
is being utilized by its irrigation system. One does not Ioresee
construction oI AIghan diversions on the Kurram, Kaitu or Gomal
rivers; thereIore Pakistani projects on these rivers are currently
saIe Irom threat oI water reduction.
b. The adverse aIIect on incomes and livelihoods in Pakistan will
be large in the context oI net reduction in river Kabul fows
and this will become more serious with global warming. In a
Khalia A:i:
calculation conducted by the author during the negotiations oI
the Indus Water Accord in 1991, where the waters oI the Indus
were apportioned amongst the Iour provinces oI Pakistan, it was
Iound that 1 MAF oI water generated more than Rs.1 billion in
incomes aIter the land was developed.
c. But what will happen iI there is gradual global warming? In
this scenario the present trend oI dislocation oI populations will
continue to occur and social disturbance and chaos will recur at
a Iaster rate. As the weather warms, disease and pestilence will
increase. There will be pressure to move to Ireshly available land
becoming aIter the glaciers recede. This will happen gradually
but will generate pressure on the Iragile livelihoods already
threatened by scarcity oI water.
d. The report on global warming states that the Himalayas and
its westernmost extension, the Hindu Kush, will warm up. It is
projected that Himalayan glaciers will reduce by 35-40 percent.
36

This will reduce the fows in the Indus and diversion into canals
will be approximately 65-70 MAF or less. Agriculture in the
Indus will be reduced to about 28 million acres Irom the existing
45 million acres. This is likely to happen by 2040; however the
process has already started. And to compound the diIfculties
Iurther, Pakistan by 2030 is expected to have a population oI 300
million. The negative trend oI this projection is obvious.
Impact of Water Scarcity
Environmentalists, policy makers and systems experts are unanimous
in reaching the Iollowing conclusions related to shortage oI water and
the likely eIIect on state and society:
a. Scarcity oI water contributes to violent confict, more so in
societies where the population is growing rapidly. Scarcity can
be an important Iorce behind changes in politics and economics
relating to resource use and can lead to clashes between ethnic
groups or to civil striIe and insurgency.
37
In societies where
99
livelihoods are based on availability oI water, as in agricultural
or livestock rearing, shortage oI water can be the cause oI
unemployment in countries like Pakistan and AIghanistan, where
a majority oI the population is dependent on agriculture. Water
scarcity can, thereIore, endanger national security. It is thus
posited that water security is as important as national security.
38
b. McPherson, the US AID administrator, recognized in 1987, that
the development oI water resources is a crucial Ioreign policy
issue Ior the US. Multilateral organizations such as UNICEF,
Iound that in 1990, 40,000 children died worldwide a majority
in AIrica due to hunger or disease caused by lack oI water or
use oI contaminated water. Water resource management is thus
integral to security and international stability.
39
Evidently it is not as much bin Laden or the Taliban who are behind
the present unrest in AIghanistan, but a major contributory Iactor is
shortage oI water which is driving the inhabitants to extreme solutions
to create livelihoods. Shortage oI water and reduction oI livelihood
has Iorced the dispossessed, who number in thousands, to seek violent
change; al-Qaida and the Taliban are the instruments supported by them.
We now examine the ecological perspective because, in countries like
Pakistan and AIghanistan, water is the crucial resource in the economy.
An ecological perspective on water scarcity.
Water scarcity in South and Central Asia will unleash Iorces oI
historic proportions in the decades to come. The human mind responds
to attention-arresting events. II you look at the average human response
to dangers, we are quick to react when the threat is imminent and clear.
There is a policy defcit in instances involving a long gap between cause
and eIIect, this is the reason Ior our Iailure to react to global warming
and pollution threats to the planet.

In the present instance too we are relaxed in our appreciation and
policy responses to impending water Iamine. What will be the long
term historical impact on society oI this coming change? Global events
have occurred in the past too, Ior instance, the large scale movement
Khalia A:i:
oI people aIter the ice age, when the Aryans peopled Central Asia and
the subcontinent or the advent oI agriculture, which replaced the hunter
societies and similar long term historical movements.

All these were epochal events with a very long generational gap
between cause and eIIect; these events occurred over a period oI many
generations; the gradualness permitted societies and individuals to
adjust and fnd 'niches under the new organizing principle ushered by
ecological change. 'Niche, in this context, is defned as a sphere with its
own rules and social norms in which individuals participate to provide
some Iorm oI service or utility to society. In exchange Ior this service,
society and individuals pay a premium which could be in cash or kind.
It creates a livelihood. The closest parallel to a niche is a proIession.
40

The advantage oI occupying a niche is that it permits the Iulflment
oI two major evolutionary drives oI the human species; Iood and
procreation. Niche occupiers tend to engineer the introduction oI their
oII-springs into the niche occupied by their parents or other sub-niches
connected to the main niche. Another attribute oI the niche is that it is
conservative and selI-replicating; it is, in the larger societal sense, a
closed system with barriers against new entrants.

These barriers are mostly rule-based and laws and regulations are
eIIected to enIorce them. The largest niche space is, Ior example, a
country; you cannot occupy a niche space within a defned boundary oI
a country unless you are born there; the rules Ior preventing others to
share the niche are contained in the immigration or citizenship laws.

At the bottom end there are qualiIying rules Ior entering a trade or
proIession, Ior instance iI you wish to be a doctor you must abide by the
rules oI the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council. Niche guardians at
the apex always support claims oI Iellow niche members by providing
a Iavourable edge to the selection oI new entrants into niches oI those
whose parents are already niche members.

Amongst all the main theories oI historicism, the ecological one
is perhaps the most compelling since it is built on the recognition that
101
humans are basically a species within the larger complex oI what is
defned as animals;` we are driven by evolutionary drivers and society
is a collective construct showing how the drives are to be collectively
Iulflled without damaging or killing one another.

The march oI society in achieving the desired results is what history
is all about. Hobbes thought that history was nothing more than the
progress oI the supra-state or king Ior domination, and the state was
called the Leviathan; Rousseau measured it in terms oI society oI humans
progressing because oI the social contract refected in the General Will,
Locke witnessed history as the march oI law by keeping the state power
balanced amongst its various organs. Hegel thought history as the
development oI ideas through the process oI competing dialecticism.
Marx saw history as the progress oI capital to its ultimate goal oI a
classless society. Schopenhauer considered it the story oI domination
by the Will. And Toynbee saw history as the narration oI the struggle oI
civilization against challenges.

Water scarcity in South and Central Asia has removed the old niches
oI Iarming and connected trades. It has prevented millions Irom obtaining
their livelihood; due to water stress large groups oI people have seen
their niches disappear. Hopelessness under such circumstances creates
conficts and upheavals. Resolving the distribution oI water issues with
AIghanistan will avoid Iuture confict and lead to better management oI
water.
1oint management of international rivers
Water is necessary Ior human existence and thus Ior civilization.
Since water is such a crucial element, mankind has been constantly
involved in evolving ways Ior its cooperative use. Water treaties are the
preIerred option and are thus as old as civilization. The earliest water
treaty on record dates back to 2500 BC between the two Sumerian
cities oI Lagash and Umma relating to the Tigris River. The FAO has
documented 3600 international water treaties Irom AD 805 to 1984.
41
There are 263 international basins which are common to two or more
Khalia A:i:
nations. These 263 basins generate 60 percent oI the global Iresh water
and are home to 40 percent oI the world`s population. International river
basin management operates within a complex physical, political and
human set oI circumstances. It involves issues such as water scarcity,
degrading water quality, pressure Irom rising population, unilateral
water development and comparisons oI development levels between
two negotiating states.
Evidence since 1948, documents only 37 incidents oI confict over
water where Iorce was used. 30 oI these involved Israel and one or
another oI its neighbours. During the same period 295 water agreements
or treaties were signed. Many regional groups such as OECD and SADC
have accords regarding the use oI joint river basins.
42

Map 3 shows the population density oI river basins. The AIghanistan
and Pakistan region has the 2
nd
highest population density amongst the
world`s river basins; 151-300 persons p/sq km, which is next only to India
and the densely populated parts oI Europe. Where population density is
high, there will be stress on water resources. The second axiom is that
where there is water stress, the chances oI confict are high.
43
Map 3: Population density per international river basin
` www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu
103
On 9 September 2003 the government oI Pakistan Iormed a nine
member technical committee under the chairmanship oI the Federal
Flood Commissioner to Iormulate a draIt water treaty with AIghanistan;
the committee Iailed because, according to it, the AIghan authorities did
not provide the river fow data.
44

Later in 2005, a technical committee Iormed by Pakistan
recommended to the government to enter into a water treaty with
AIghanistan, so that the rights oI Pakistan as the lower riparian are
protected.
45
There has been no progress on this issue. This needs to be
addressed at the technical and bilateral level under the auspices oI a 3
rd

party like the World Bank or the UN. II leIt unresolved, the issue will
exacerbate bilateral tensions and Iurther compound the problems oI the
people oI both nations.
Growth of international law on joint waterways
As elaborated earlier, a lot oI work extending over centuries, has
been conducted in codiIying law to establish principles oI sharing
international Iresh waters Ior non-navigational use.

In the previous century, the frst landmark was the Madrid Declaration
oI 1911, on International Regulation Regarding the Use oI International
Water Courses. It:

a. discouraged unilateral basin alteration where the rights oI a lower
riparian were involved;
b. proposed the creation oI joint water commissions to settle issues
oI usage between two states amicably.
The International Law Association, an NGO Iormed in 1873,
completed in 1966 the Helsinki Rules, which is the best study oI
customary international law on transboundary water resources.
Khalia A:i:
Key concepts under Helsinki Rules
River basins extending over two or more states were considered an
indivisible hydrological unit to be managed as a single unit to ensure
maximization oI use. It included all tributaries including tributary
ground water within the defnition oI 'drainage basin.

It Iormulated the phrase, 'equitable utilization, to express the rule
oI restricted sovereignty as applied to Iresh waters. It stated that each
basin state is entitled within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable
share in the benefcial uses oI waters oI an international drainage basin.
This principle has been supported by the American Law Institute which
maintains that states should take measures to avoid injury to neighbouring
countries.
46

The biggest lacuna, however, remained the Iailure to work out the
relationship between the no 'harm rule and the 'equitable utilization
rule.
47

Dellapena fnds that customary international law is too weak an
instrument by itselI to modiIy behaviour oI states, 'relying alone upon
an inIormal legal system to legitimate and limit claims to use shared
water resources is inherently unstable. It becomes unstable when..
one or more states consider that it is so militarily dominant that it can
disregard the interest oI its neighbour...
48

Cooperative management will occur iI states, through treaties, agree
to create regional institutions Ior making and enIorcing their decisions
jointly.
49
Otherwise confict is inevitable.

When the Helsinki Rules reached the UN General Assembly, it
requested the International Law Commission to prepare draIt articles.
The Commission, aIter working Ior 23 years, produced the fnal draIt in
1994.
50
The UN General Assembly fnally adopted the Convention on
the Law oI the Non-Navigational Uses oI International Watercourses,
in 1997 by a vote oI 104-3.
51
There were 27 abstentions including
Pakistan.
52
105
Approval oI a convention in the General Assembly does not mean
that a country has accepted it. This happens when a country has ratifed,
accepted, approved or acceded to the Convention. To date Pakistan,
AIghanistan, India, China, US, UK, and France are amongst the 21
states that have not ratifed the UN Convention.
53
Important principles contained in the UN Convention of 1997
Article 3 states that the Convention can only be implemented iI
states have agreements or treaties covering arrangements on the use oI
waters oI joint water courses. The Convention provides the principles to
be contained in such treaties.
54
Article 5 read with Article 6 is the heart oI the convention. Article
5 recommends to states to use joint waterways in an equitable and
reasonable manner so that watercourses are developed on the basis oI
sustainable development. It exhorts the adequate protection oI the water
course.
Article 6 clarifes issues concerning defnition oI equitable and
reasonable utilization. Its main principles are:
a. Equitable and reasonable utilization includes the geographic,
hydro-graphic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other
Iactors oI a natural character.
b. The social and economic needs oI the water course states.
c. The population dependent upon such water courses.
d. Usage impact oI one state upon another.
e. Rationalizing existing and potential uses.
I. The availability oI comparable alternatives to a planned or
existing usage Ior optimisation.
Khalia A:i:
Article 7 enjoins users oI transboundary water to take all measures
to prevent signifcant harm to other users oI a watercourse. Where such
harm is caused in the absence oI any agreement; the harm causing state
must take steps to mitigate such harm and to discuss the question oI
compensation.
Article 8 enjoins water sharing states to cooperate on the basis oI
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, mutual beneft and good Iaith
Ior achieving the objectives oI the Convention. In order to implement
its provisions, states may establish joint commissions or other joint
mechanisms.
Article 9 is important because even when there is no agreement
or treaty between joint users, the states sharing the water courses will
exchange hydrological, meteorological, hydro-geological and ecological
data related to water quality. This article also permits a joint watercourse
using state to request river data Irom another state. The request receiving
state is obliged to do its best to comply and could demand reasonable
costs, iI such data is not readily available.
Article 10 (1) stipulates that in the absence oI any specifc treaty,
no user oI an international water course enjoys inherent priority over
other users. This article also says that in any dispute over the usage oI
waters, the principles contained in Articles 5 to 7 will prevail. It also
prioritizes human use oI water thus drinking water has a higher priority
than irrigation or industrial use.
Articles 11 and 12 stipulate that adequate inIormation and notifcation
regarding new projects and additional usage oI water Irom a joint water
course must be conveyed to users oI the same water. Both AIghanistan
and Pakistan have not inIormed each other about new usage oI waters
Irom river Kabul and other rivers.
Under Article 35, regional economic organizations like SAARC
or ECO can ratiIy the convention aIter which its principles will be
applicable to all members oI that regional group.
107
The Berlin Conference Rules 2004
A positive development is that the International Law Association
(ILA) has been working on improving the water law and to also help in
dealing with emerging challenges. It has tried to fll the gap and streamline
the 1997 UN Convention. It recognized that the chances oI confict
arising out oI water shortages will increase in view oI global warming.
55

The ILA exhorts states using joint waterways to reach agreements Ior
cooperative management beIore conficts on waters become inevitable.
It lamented the slow progress by states in ratiIying the UN International
Waterways Convention oI 1997. It recognized the slow progress oI new
water treaties amongst joint users. All these and additional problems
that needed to be addressed were included the Berlin Water ConIerence
Rules, 2004. The attempt is to make relevant changes Ior addressing
international water management issues better.
Some oI the main Ieatures oI the Berlin ConIerence Rules are:
x It clarifed defnitions concerning ecological integrity,
environment, sustainable use and vital human needs.
x It recognized that persons had human rights and could become a
party to deliberations concerning water usage (Article 1)
x States were enjoined to manage waters comprehensively and in
an integrated manner (Articles :2-6)
x It stressed that water must be used sustainably |Article:7)
x It stated that basin states have the right to participate in
management oI water (Article10)
x Basin states were also enjoined to cooperative Ior their natural
beneft (Article 11)
x Article 12 defned equitable utilization more clearly than the
earlier Iormulation.
x Article 13 read with Article 12 lists the variables to be considered
Khalia A:i:
while concluding equitable utilisation. This has made comparative
analysis much easier.
x Article 16 laid down the principles oI not undertaking development
oI a river basin which could cause transboundary harm.
x Article 17 provided an individual the right oI access to water as
a human right and allows him to challenge state acts which may
be in confict with the principles oI these rules.
x Article 18 provided the right oI inIormation to an individual.
ThereIore all water data must be readily available.
x Article 19 enjoined states to undertake public advocacy to educate
the people so that they know their rights under these rules.
The Berlin ConIerence Rules are Iuturistic, human rights oriented
and address issues oI development oI water resources in the context oI
dwindling water assets. Article 35, Ior example, lays down elaborate
rules on dealing with drought in the context oI river basins.
Essential principles of a water treaty
The dynamics oI international river basin management like the Kabul
river, includes complex physical, political and human aspects which can
make such management problematic. To address such multiple problems,
the international experience oI water treaties indicates the necessity oI
including the Iollowing principles within the treaty:

First, the institution created Ior management must be fexible. It
must permit public participation and be open to changing basin needs.

Second, a treaty must contain clear and fexible criteria Ior water
allocation and quality. It must indicate a priority oI use principle in case
oI basin shortages. Additionally, the treaty must include catchments-
wide environmental and ecological standards Ior protection oI water
quality.
109
Map 4: Environmental Degradation
The two satellite images in Map 4 compare the unchecked logging
oI Iorests in Nuristan Irom 1977 and 2002 leading to degradation
oI water qualiIy oI river Kabul basin. Pir Aziz, the AIghan Deputy
Minister Ior Irrigation, reported illegal deIorestation over 72,000 acres
annually. He thought that demand to use wood Ior Iuel was the main
cause. However, loss oI livelihoods based on deteriorating pastures due
to drought is a better explanation.
56
It may be the catalyst driving people
to seek alternate livelihoods by selling trees. II there was a management
structure Ior protecting river Kabul`s watershed such damage could be
mitigated.
Third, a treaty must shiIt Iocus to total water use in a basin. There
should be an equitable distribution oI benefts Irom diIIerent uses oI a
river like hydropower, agriculture, economic development, tourism or
protection oI aquatic ecosystems.

Fourth, the treaty must include a detailed confict management
mechanism. This will insure the eIIectiveness oI treaty.
57
Khalia A:i:
Lessons from the 1960 Indus Basin Treaty:
The ongoing pre-independence water dispute between the British
Indian provinces oI Sindh and Punjab became internationalized in 1947,
with the independence oI Pakistan and India. Since no agreement could
be reached on sharing shortages, the governments oI India and Pakistan
signed a 'Stand Still agreement until 31 March 1948, which allowed
river discharges Irom head works in India to fow into Pakistan, in
accordance with previous quantities.

When the agreement expired on 1 April 1948 and in the absence oI
a new agreement, India stopped delivery oI water to the Dipalpur canal
and the main branches oI the upper Bari Doab Canal.

Regardless oI the motives and politics oI this decision, the two
states were ready Ior a war. Elaborate discussions were started by the
World Bank based on David Lilienthal`s technical solution to water
sharing in August 1957, the World Bank organized a consortium to Iund
replacement works in lieu oI the loss oI irrigation waters oI the eastern
rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India, Pakistan got all the fows oI the
western rivers. The total cost oI the replacement and development works
which included the construction oI the Tarbella and Mangla dams was
$ 1.74 billion.
58

The Indus Basin Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on
19 September 1960. Besides obtaining the irrigation advantage, both
countries benefted Irom the Treaty and it Iostered remarkable bilateral
cooperation between them despite two wars. The Treaty established a
Pakistan-India mechanism to oversee the Indus Basin and played a vital
role in confict mitigation.

Some oI the other lessons learnt are:
x Power inequities may delay the pace oI negotiations. India
had both a stronger upper riparian position and relatively more
military strength thus it delayed an early resolution.
x Positive and active 3
rd
party involvement is vital to reach a
111
settlement, which in this case had active World Bank support.
x Provision oI fnancial assistance to undertake physical works can
help reach an agreement.
x Sensitivity to hydrological concerns can speed up an agreement.
x As water stress increases the chances oI reaching agreements
between riparians lessens.
59
x Historical evidence points towards a confict outcome in
basins lacking institutions, which can accommodate political,
hydrological and other basin stressors.
x The creation oI joint water institutions plays a vital role in
confict mitigation. Water management by defnition is confict
management.
60
Designing a treaty for river Kabul
As Iar as designing a treaty Ior the joint management oI river
Kabul based on optimal and equitable use is concerned, it can be
easily accomplished, given the Ioresight and the will to solve problems
concerning the waterways.

The Iollowing recommendations are made Ior accelerating the
Iormulation oI a water treaty with AIghanistan and dealing with the
challenges oI global warning and water scarcity.

The frst inhibiting and dangerous Iactor standing in the way oI a
treaty with AIghanistan is power asymmetry. Pakistan, despite its current
problems, has more military and institutional strength. However, there
is a danger Ior it to become blinkered and use other levers, rather than
dealing with AIghanistan as an equal partner. Pakistan must exhibit
statesmanship in this matter iI progress is to be achieved.

Second, AIghanistan unIortunately raises the issue oI the Durand
Line whenever any substantive matter is discussed. II Pakistan and India
could sign the Indus Basin Treaty despite so much hostility between them
in 1960, why can`t Pakistan and AIghanistan undertake the designing oI
a water treaty despite the AIghan fxation with the Durand Line?
Khalia A:i:
Third, given the situation oI less than Iriendly inter-government
relationship other interlocutors like the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank or / and the bilateral Iriends oI both could intervene
to get a water treaty on the anvil.

Fourth, pending the draIting oI a treaty, Pakistan and AIghanistan
should exchange data on river Kabul and the additional water needed Ior
the proposed new projects.

Lastly, Pakistan should recommend that SAARC or ECO ratiIy the
UN Convention oI 1997 on Joint Waterways. At the SAARC Ioreign
ministers meeting in April 2007, it was decided to seek World Bank
assistance to help draIt a SAARC-wide joint waterways treaty. This is
an excellent move and should be vigorously pursued.
61
Conclusion
This report has provided grounds to believe that endemic water
shortage in AIghanistan is one oI the main reasons Ior its long term
instability. Water scarcity, which is also aIIecting Central Asia and
AIghanistan, has caused misery Ior millions in this water-stressed
region. Pakistan too is aIIected but has withstood the pressure better
because oI a robust irrigation base.
Water shortage is a principal contributory cause oI the political
upheaval which is engulfng the region. Because oI the instability
emanating Irom diminishing niches; thousands have become
environmental reIugees with dwindling livelihoods. Unless this problem
is addressed in depth we will be producing partial solutions because oI
incomplete analysis.
II we superimpose the fndings oI the IPCC regarding global
warming, the equation becomes more worrisome. It is not without
reason that global warming has recently been placed in the ambit oI the
UN Security Council.
62
This report Iorecasts that by 2040 global warming and water scarcity
113
in the Indus Basin will reduce irrigated land by halI. This will have
disastrous consequences Ior a population which would have reached
the 300 million mark; any reduction in the fows oI river Kabul will
aggravate a bad situation.
Pakistan needs to undertake an immediate review oI its water
management strategies to avoid these dismal projections; it will require
investment in new storages and introduction oI water saving demand
base irrigation.
63
Both the Iederal and the NWFP governments are advised to create
two essential organizations to deal with problems arising out oI global
warming and water scarcity. One organization should monitor global
climatic change and the Pakistan Metrological Department is best placed
to handle it; it should begin the modelling oI the global weather as it will
aIIect the country.
The other new organization should combine the government`s
hydrological related departments and the Ministry oI Food and
Agriculture. The latter should have the lead role in this combined
institution which will prepare contingency plans to manage both global
warming and water scarcity. It will also initiate crop and pest research
when the weather cycle shiIts or we have rising temperatures with
enhanced glacier melting. The main objective oI the organization will
be to fnd ways to Ieed the increasing population despite reduced water
supplies Irom the Indus basin.
The Peshawar University should create a centre oI excellence to
deal with the emerging global trends related to water law in the context
oI confict mitigation.
Failure to reach an agreement with AIghanistan on joint management
will Iorce it to continue developing additional uses on river Kabul. This
will reduce the availability oI water in the NWFP. Since the province
has no alternatives to replace river Kabul water shortages, its limited
agriculture will be damaged and will cause economic and social
dislocation.
Khalia A:i:
The water scarcity issue is the most serious potential problem
Ior Pakistan. Reaching either a bilateral or multilateral solution via
regional organizations, culminating in a water treaty with our neighbour
AIghanistan, could avoid confict and suIIering in the Iuture. Let us deal
sanely with the situation and grasp the opportunity while there is still
time. The more the delay the harder it will be to reach a settlement with
AIghanistan.
Annex 1: Mean average annual ows in Indus basin
before and after global warming.
S. No Item
(MAF)
(2007)
After global
warming (MAF)
(2040)
1 Total average annual surIace fow in Indus Basin 142 80 85
2
Average annual perennial diversion to canal
system
104 65 70
3 Average annual water losses in the Indus bed 23 15
4
Average annual perennial diversion into canal
system oI surIace water aIter the silting oI Tarbila,
Mangla & Chashma reservoir.
97 50
5 Average food water fow to sea 15 4 5
6
Average annual water available Ior diversion into
canal system
100 65 70
* Data obtained Irom two papers written by Khan, Fatehullah, 'Water Problem, its Causes
and solutions, written Ior the National Seminar on Problems and Politics oI Water Sharing
and Water Management in Pakistan, Nov 7-8, 2006, Islamabad, organized by International
Policy Research Institute, Islamabad, and an unpublished paper, 'Global warming to
transIorm Pakistan into a desert, (2006), Peshawar.
References
1 Aziz, Khalid, Causes of the Rebellion in Wa:iristan, Regional Institute oI Policy Research,
Peshawar, 2007, p.10,
2 'ReIugees Irom AIghanistan: the world`s largest single reIugee group. http://web.
amnesty.org/library/index/engASA110161999, 16 April 2007.
3 Marwat, F.R. Dr., From Mahafir to Mufahia, Pakistan Study Centre, Peshawar University,
2005, pp.142-146, 169-171.
115
4 Ibia., p.29.
5 Fuchinove, H., Tsukatani, T., and Toderich, K.N., Afghanistan Revival. Irrigation on
the right ana left banks of Amu Darya, Kyoto Institute oI Economic Research, Kyoto
University, 2002, p.2.
6 UNEP & WMO Working Group II contribution to Inter-government Panel on Climate
Change Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007. Climate Change Impacts,
Aaoption ana Julnerability Summary for Policy Makers, Available at http://www.ipcc.
ch/spm 6 avr 07 p.7.
7 Azizi, M. Pir, 'Special Lecture on Water Resources in AIghanistan, delivered at the
University oI Tsukuba 2002, Available at http://www.nourin.tsukuba.ac.jp/-tasae/2002/
Azizi -2002.pdI.
8 Ibia., (5)
9 Map oI drought regions oI Asia available at www.un.org/depts/cartographic/map/profle/
centralasia.pdI.
10 Population fgures obtained Irom http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durraini and www.khyber.
org/passhtotrabes/gighilzai-a-shtml.
11 FAO/WFO. 'Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to AIghanistan, Special Alert
315, 8 June 2001, available at www.Iao.org/docrep/004/y1259e00.html read particularly
the irrigation and livestock assessment pp.2-3.
12 FAO and WHO. Shobar, Sayed ShariI and Alim, Abdul Kabir. 'The eIIects oI calamities
on water resources and consumption in AIghanistan, 2004, available at http://www.
nourin.tsuruba.ac.jp/tasac/2004/AIthanistan.pdI.
13 Colinvaux, Paul, The Fates of Nations, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1980. ReIer to
chapters 3 & 4 Ior understanding the ecological drivers oI such movements.
14 Ibia (6).
15 Ibia., (12) p.1
16 Zonn, I.S., 'Water Resources oI Northern AIghanistan and their Future Use,
Soyuzvodproject, Moscow, pp.2-3, available at rrr.ccb.ucar.edu/centralasia/zonn.pdI.
17 Ibia.(12)p.2
18 Ibia., (12)p.1
19 Ibia., (12) p.1
20 Ibia., (11) pp 3-4
21 Ibia. (12) p.9
22 Ibia. (13) pp.50-67.
23 Ibia., (12), p.5
24 Ibia.. (12) p.7
25 Ibia., (12) p.3
26 Ibia., (12) p.5
27 Ibia., (7) p.5
28 Ibia., (7) p.6
29 Habib, Zaigham, 'Depletion oI Water Resources and Environmental Impacts in the Indus
Basin. Paper presented at the National Seminar on Problems ana Politics of Water
Sharing ana Water Management in Pakistan organized by the International Policy &
Reserarch Institute, Islamabad, 7-8 November 2005, p.3.
30 Asian Development Bank, 'Securing AIghanistan, available at www.adb.org/documents/
reports/aIghanistan/ecuring -aIghanistan-Iuture-fnal.pdI, p.1 MustaIa.
31 Khan, Fatehullah, 'Water Problem, its Causes and Solutions, paper presented at National
Seminar on Problems ana Politics of Water Sharing ana Water Management in Pakistan,
Khalia A:i:
organized by the International Policy Planning & Research Institute, Islamabad, 7-8
November 2005, p.3.
32 Ahmad, Shahid, 'Innovative Technologies Ior Integrated Water Resources Management
in Pakistan, paper presented at the National Seminar on Problems ana Politics of Water
Sharing ana Water Management in Pakistan organized by the International Policy
Planning and Research Institute, Islamabad, 7-8 November 2005, p.1.
33 Ibia., (29), p.2.
34 Ibia., (28) p.3.
35 Figures collated Irom various publications oI Pakistan`s Water and Power Development
Authority`s studies and those studies undertaken by the NWFP Irrigation Department.
36 Ibia., (6) p.10.
37 Homer-Dixon T.F., Boutwell, H., and Rathgens W., 'Environment Change and Violent
Change, Scientihc American, Feburary 1993, npd, p.1.
38 Starr, J.R., 'Water Wars, Foreign Policy, Number 82, Spring 1991, p.2
39 Ibia., (34) pp. 1 & 9.
40 Ibia., (11) p.23.
41 A very good and inIormative data base oI all issues on management oI joint waterways
Ior non-navigational use is maintained by the Oregan State University oI the US and the
data is available at www.transboundarywaters.orst/dec15206.html.12
42 Ibia., (41)
43 Ibia., (41)
44 MustaIa, Khalid, 'WB ready to Iacilitate Pak-AIghan water treaty, The News. Lahore,
12 December 2006.
45 Ibia., (44)
46 Dellapena, Joseph W.. 'The customary international law oI trans boundary Iresh waters,
Int. J. Global Environmental Issues, Vol. 1 Nos. 3 &4 , 2001. P. 247, is an excellent
critique by one oI the world`s leading exponents on the subject. It presents a critique oI
the existing water rules and conventions. He was later the rapporteur Ior the International
Law Association Ior Iormulating , 'The Berlin Rules on Water Resources, at its Berlin
ConIerence in 2004.
47 Ibia., (46) p.274
48 Ibia., (46) p. 276
49 Ibia., (46) p. 277.
50 Ibia., (46) p. 277.
51 International Water Law, 'Status oI Watercourse Convention, as on 18 October 2006,
available at www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Watercoursestatus.hm
52 Ibia., (51) p.1
53 Ibia., (51) p.1
54 The 'United Nations Convention on the law oI the Non-Navigational Uses oI International
Watercourses, May 1997, is available at, www.Internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/
Watercoursestatus.hm p.1
55 International Water Law. 'Berlin ConIerence (2004), Water Resources Law, the rules
are available at www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Watercoursestatus.hm p.1
56 Ibia., (12)pp. 6 & 9
57 UNDP. Landovsky, Jakub, 'Institutional Assessment oI Transboundary Water Resources
Managaement, npd, 2006, p.9
58 Ibia., (41)
59 Ibia., (41)
117
60 Ibia., (57) pp. 1-3
61 Personal interview with senior oIfcers oI the Pakistan Foreign AIIairs Ministry on 15
April 2006.
62 Jabbar, Javed, 'Climate Change in the Security Council, Dawn, Karachi, 19 April
2007.
63 Ibia., (31).
Shahwar Junaia
DEFINING MOMENTS:
The Political Implications of State Policy
Shahwar Junaia
*
Abstract
(There are aehning moments in the history of nations that set
their course for aecaaes to come. Dehning moments in the national
history of a state can have a lasting impact on its allies as well as its
aaversaries. the foreign policies of Britain ana the Unitea States haa
a profouna impact in the post-Worla War II era. Their activities in the
pursuit of strategic goals were not always in consonance with their
political aoctrine. Britain was in a position to moula events through the
aisposition of territories ana assets auring the aecoloni:ation process.
Many countries, such as Pakistan that were affectea, neea to move out
of the shaaow of post-Worla War II manipulation, reaehne their goals
ana reafhrm their national iaentity. Author).

There are defning moments in the history oI nations and communities
that set their course Ior decades to come. Such moments can also change
the character oI nations. It may not be as easy as it initially appears
to be, to identiIy defning moments in national history. There can be
a time lag between the actual moment oI change, when policies are
Iormulated, and the outward maniIestations and impact oI that change
on the environment that nations create through their policies at home
and abroad. By recognizing the defning moment we are better placed to
cope with its consequences at the national and global levels.
*
Shahwar Junaid, a Iormer Communications Media Consultant to the Pakistan
Government, is an eminent writer and intellectual. Her latest book is titled Terrorism
ana Global Power Systems, OxIord University Press, 2006.
119
Dehning Moments. The Political Implications of State Policy
It is relevant to the Iormation oI state policy to review and discuss
at the national level defning moments in the national history oI infuential
countries and consider the implications Ior bilateral and multilateral
relations. Defning moments in the history oI a state can have a lasting
impact on its allies as well as its adversaries. Just as the Ioreign policy
oI a number oI nation states has been critical to the political, economic
and social development oI Pakistan, the Ioreign policy oI other nation
states has been infuential in other parts oI the world.
The Ioreign policies oI both Britain and the United States have
infuenced the course oI history in the South Asian subcontinent, West
Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere.
1
It is necessary to determine which
political, economic and social developments in these areas have been
the result oI decisions taken by national/local leadership and how much
has been a direct result oI the continuation oI the policy oI colonial
powers aIter independence, because the institutions and systems
Ior the perpetuation oI that policy were in place. It is relevant to this
study to determine how new Ioreign policy imperatives, international
arrangements, economic institutions such as GATT,
2
and other initiatives
oI the global powers reinIorced such patterns.
Well aIter Iormal decolonization, the states that emerged in the
subcontinent, West Asia and the Middle East continued to be economic
dependents oI the developed world.
3
,
4
Large multinationals corporations
controlled economic resources within their borders and enjoyed
enormous infuence over national aIIairs. The newly independent states
were also controlled through cleverly arranged territorial dispensations
that limited their political potential. For such states the defning moment
in their respective national history came beIore they even existed. For
instance, unlike the inevitability that characterized the independence oI
the subcontinent and the establishment oI an independent state Ior the
Hindu nation, the creation oI Pakistan was not a certainty. As a result
oI this, several aspects oI its relations with India and the rest oI the
world, at the bilateral and multilateral levels, were predetermined Ior
Pakistan.
Several challenges that Pakistan Iaced immediately aIter
Shahwar Junaia
independence were the result oI a territorial dispensation that now
appears to have been capricious at best. The land mass oI Pakistan was
not contiguous: Pakistan`s Eastern Wing was about a thousand miles
away Irom its Western Wing. The Western Wing consisted oI some oI the
least developed areas oI the subcontinent and was home to some oI the
most fercely independent people oI the region. Pakistan also contained
a kingdom: Hyderabad Deccan, had its own economy, taxation system
and postal service. It posed unique problems Ior national integration.
This territory was also separated Irom the Eastern and Western Wings
oI the country by Indian land mass and there were no arrangements Ior
overland travel. Meanwhile, Pakistan did not contain Kashmir, the area
Irom which its waters fowed. At the time oI Partition, the Muslims oI
India were told that this was the best that could be done Ior them under
the circumstances. Such territorial dispensations have inbuilt limitations
Ior independent action and development as a nation. It is a comment on
the robustness oI Islamic culture as a uniIying Iactor that the Pakistani
nation has survived the defning moments oI its inception.
There is a haunting similarity between maps dating Irom the Partition
oI the subcontinent and the present day maps oI the Palestinian territory:
the pattern oI territorial dispensation is similar. Small areas oI land
denoted Palestinian territory are surrounded by Israeli land - in order to
move Irom one part oI Palestinian territory to another part the people
must travel through hostile country.
5
It is diIfcult to create national
identity, not to mention national institutions, under the circumstances.
6
A strategic task accomplished by the British Ior European powers
in 1948 was the carving out oI the state oI Israel Irom Palestinian land
by Iorcibly expelling the indigenous population.
7
There are harrowing
accounts oI what was done. Between 30 March and 15 May 1948 Israeli
Iorces had seized 200 villages and expelled 250,000 people living under
the British Mandate which expired on 14 May. The British had 75,000
troops in Palestine to enIorce the Mandate and were legally obliged to
uphold law and order as the occupier (UN resolution 181).
8
In breach
oI the terms oI settlement, the Labour government withdrew all British
policemen and Iorbade the presence oI any UN personnel there. The
government ordered British Iorces to disarm the Iew Palestinians
121
with weapons and promised to protect them Irom Israeli attacks but
immediately went back on its word. By the time Israeli operation ended
in autumn 1948 halI oI Palestine`s population, over 800,000 people
had been expelled, 531 villages had been destroyed and eleven urban
areas had been emptied oI their original inhabitants. The exercise was
undertaken in order to achieve the strategic policy goals oI the world
powers that emerged aIter World War II. It was the precursor oI similar
ethnic cleansing exercises that were to take place in Europe (Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo) decades later.
The ferce Cold War battles between the United States, Britain and
their allies on the one hand and the USSR and its satellite states on the
other hand, redefned concepts oI diplomacy and warIare as the struggle
to infuence world aIIairs encompassed every sphere oI human activity.
9

A defning moment in the history oI the United States occurred aIter
World War II, when some oI its security and intelligence agencies were
reorganized and new ones were created. This was also a defning moment
in world aIIairs. Not only states within the sphere oI infuence oI the US
were aIIected by this activity but the other major world power at the time,
the USSR, its satellite states and those states that were within its sphere
oI infuence were also aIIected. As a result, countries like Pakistan, with
an elite that draws sustenance and support Irom the nation`s alliance
with world powers, were drawn into other people`s wars.
In his book on the subject Martin Walker states, 'The history oI the
Cold War has been the history oI the world aIter 1945. Communications
and missile technology required the Cold War`s proxy battles zone to
girdle the entire earth and its satellites to orbit above. The Cold War
was truly a global confict, more so than either oI the century`s two
World Wars. South America and sub-Saharan AIrica continents which
had been largely spared the earlier struggles, were sucked into its maw.
Turks Iought in Korea, Algerians Iought in Vietnam, Cubans Iought
in Angola, and American and Russian school children, whose lessons
had been interrupted by nuclear air-raid drills grew up to die in Saigon
and Kabul.
10
The Cold War never really ended, it metamorphosed
into new wars with new combatants: Today, NATO is fghting the 'new
Russians, the Taliban, in AIghanistan.
11
Shahwar Junaia
The agencies that were charged with securing US Ioreign policy
objectives aIter World War II worked in a number oI felds. The methods
used to secure objectives were refned during two decades oI activity in
post-World War II Europe and South America. Subsequently the same
modus operandi was used in other parts oI the world including, Asia and
the Middle East.
12
By mid-1950 the United States National Security Council (Document
68) was calling Ior a military build-up to meet the communist threat
worldwide and, in particular, in Asia. The invasion oI South Korea by
the communist North led President Truman to mobilize and place US
troops on the Korean peninsula without Congressional approval. By
late 1950 US troops had moved into North Korea and by 21 November
they had reached the Yalu River and the Chinese border. US military
assistance was provided to the French in Indochina. The Philippine
government which was Iacing an internal rebellion by the Huks was
also provided US military assistance. The Seventh Fleet was ordered to
prevent a Chinese attack on Taiwan.
Containment was no longer limited to Western Europe. It now
included East Asia. A massive build up oI resources was thereIore
required in order to achieve Ioreign policy goals. US deIence spending
nearly tripled that year. However, this build up oI resources was not
enough when new actors entered the scene: China`s entered the Korean
War on 26 November 1950. This led to a retreat by US troops below the
thirty-eighth parallel and resulted in a stalemate. A ceasefre agreement
was negotiated between North and South Korea at the thirty-eighth
parallel on 27 July 1953. ThereaIter US President Eisenhower adjusted
commitments Ior the French eIIort in Indochina. The Diem government
in South Vietnam was given economic, not military assistance.
Washington was not interested in committing additional resources
Ior containment in Europe either. Recognizing that the United States
did not have the military resources to challenge the Soviet Union in its
sphere oI infuence, President Eisenhower did not support the Hungarian
uprising. This was considered a betrayal oI commitments made to the
leaders oI the uprising and discouraged movements Ior democracy in the
123
socialist states Ior more than thirty years. The United States acquired
the reputation Ior being an unreliable ally.
By December oI 1952 it was clear that the United States was not going
to commit the level oI resources required to engage in a conventional
war in Asia. It began to redefne and limit the goals oI containment
worldwide. It also began to consider new means oI achieving these
goals. A pattern oI overseas intervention evolved and the United States
became the most active Western player in international aIIairs.
The idea was to draw upon the resources oI other countries to counter
the communist threat through alliances, such as the Baghdad Pact and the
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. Low-cost CIA-engineered coups
were used to achieve Ioreign policy goals in Guatemala and Iran. The
size oI the armed Iorces was reduced in Iavour oI covert intervention
through local partners and the strategic doctrine oI massive retaliation.
This policy continues to be in Iorce today.
In order to limit the sphere oI infuence oI the USSR the United
States undermined socialist political movements and governments with
socialist pretensions, regardless oI the public support they enjoyed
within their borders. This was done through intelligence agencies
aIter World War II. AIter public criticism oI the extra-judicial methods
used by some US agencies, other means were employed to secure the
same objectives.
13
According to reports the CIA used known American
Ioundations, as well as other custom-made entities that existed only on
paper to Iund trade unions, cultural organizations, media and prominent
intellectuals to fght communism overseas.
In the aItermath oI World War II the United States was without any
mechanism to channel political assistance to its allies, US policy makers
resorted to covert means, secretly sending advisors, equipment and
Iunds to support newspapers and political parties in socialist Europe.
Mechanisms and organizations were put in place to achieve Ioreign
policy goals. Among others, the United States InIormation Agency was
created (1953) with the idea oI using American culture, flm, music
and theatre to counter the appeal oI communism. These agencies had
Shahwar Junaia
enormous resources at their disposal and became infuential in decision
making in countries like Pakistan.
In 1975 the Pike Committee oI the US Congress investigated the
covert side oI US Ioreign policy. A summary oI its fndings included
a list oI extra-judicial activities Washington had either endorsed or
been engaged in Irom the end oI World War II to 1975. These included
attempting to overthrow more than 40 Ioreign governments and the
unprovoked military invasion oI 20 sovereign nations. According to
the fndings oI the Committee, by 1975 US agencies had worked to
crush more than 30 populist movements which were fghting against
dictatorial regimes. Over the years US agencies had provided support to
brutal dictatorships thereby destroying the potential political progress oI
entire nations, Ior generations to come. The United States government
cooperated with oppressive, brutal national regimes in Nicaragua,
Guatemala and Korea among others.
14
In such countries the need Ior
social and economic reIorm and public support Ior political entities
promising such reIorm were not considerations in the pursuit oI Ioreign
policy goals: during the Cold War period oI the 1970s, South America
became the nightmare oI development workers. These revelations
damaged the democratic credentials oI the US and its allies and, as a
result, nationalist lobbies emerged in many countries.
A case in point is that oI Chile. The United States intervened in Chile`s
politics continuously between 1963 and 1973. This was done in order to
keep socialist Salvador Allende out oI oIfce and then, to destabilize his
government. AIter a coup during which the presidential palace in Chile
was bombed, President Allende, who had introduced socialist policies
in the country, was reported to have committed suicide. On 9 November
1970, Henry Kissinger had written decision memorandum No. 93. It was
addressed to heads oI diplomatic, deIence and intelligence departments
and stated that '...pressure should be placed on the Allende government
to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies
contrary to US and hemispheric interests. This statement represents
the mindset that gave rise to sanctions regimes that the United States has
used, both bilaterally and through the United Nations, in recent times.
125
When revolutionary movements continued to emerge in AIrica and
South America despite the US strategy oI infltrating social and political
organizations a new strategic initiative was introduced. A public-private
mechanism to Iund overseas activities was established on the lines oI West
German Ioundations
15
that had been created by major political parties in
Germany. The American Political Foundation (APF) was established in
1979. It was a coalition oI the Democratic and Republican parties, union
leaders, employers, conservative academics and institutions working on
Ioreign policy issues. Generous Iunding gave the United States, Britain
and West Germany control over academia at home and abroad. The
Iunding establishments set the boundaries oI academic Ireedom in
Western democracies. Real academic Ireedom remained a myth.
The National Endowment Ior Democracy (NED) was created in
1983. It was supposed to be a non-proft-making organization to promote
human rights and democracy. However in 1991 its frst President,
historian Allen Weinstein, admitted to the Washington Post '.A lot
oI what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.
16

Elsewhere William Blum observed that '.what was done was to shiIt
many oI the awIul things (done by the CIA) to a new organization, with
a nice sounding name. These observations indicate that a shiIt in US
policy did not take place and the post-World War II systems oI global
intervention to achieve Ioreign policy goals were in place.
The NED was managed by Iour core organizations including the Free
Trade Union Institute, a branch oI the AFL-CIO trade union Iederation
later incorporated into the American Centre Ior International Labour
Solidarity. The other core organizations were the Centre Ior International
Private Enterprise, an aIfliate oI the US Chamber oI Commerce, the
National Republican Institute Ior International AIIairs and the National
Democratic Institute Ior International AIIairs.
In Nicaragua, Cuba and Poland NED gave money, established NGOs,
manipulated the electoral process and gave direct aid to its preIerred
candidates in national elections. AIter the collapse oI the Soviet Union
the organization expanded rapidly. It intervened in the social, economic
and political process in 90 countries in AIrica, South America, Asia and
Shahwar Junaia
Eastern Europe.
17
Electoral interventions were oI critical importance to
US global policy and made it possible to support handpicked leadership
through direct aid.
During the frst 10 years oI its existence NED distributed $200
million amongst 1500 projects. Subsequently its network spread
and it was coordinating 6000 projects worldwide. Some oI the more
spectacular Iailures oI intervention through organizations such as NED
and its branches include Haiti, Cuba and Iran. In Pakistan, NDI has been
conducting training programs about democracy Ior new entrants into
politics who were handpicked by the military regime aIter constitutional
reIorms - an incongruous alliance to say the least.
Initiatives to promote US Ioreign policy goals through electoral
interventions have Iailed on a number oI occasions. The moral in these
Iailures is obvious. In 1990 NED is reported to have spent $36 million
on the candidacy oI Marc Bazin, a Iormer World Bank oIfcial. Despite
this, Jean Bertrand-Aristide was elected. He was ousted the Iollowing
year aIter a media campaign reportedly Iunded by NED and USAID
(United States Agency Ior International Development). NED spent $20
million over a period oI 20 years to promote a so-called democratic
transition in Cuba. Since 1996 USAID has contributed another $65
million to this eIIort without success. In Pakistan the training oI civil
servants, public representatives and legislators has been placed in the
hands oI these organizations. AIter the revolution oI 1979 Iran resisted
external intervention in its society, its politics and the electoral process.
When AIghanistan came under the infuence oI the Taliban, the West
Asian region moved out oI the sphere oI infuence oI the United States
and Britain.
18
Since it would not bend to their will, Iran also became
one oI the most vilifed countries in the world, alongside North Korea,
AIghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussain.
The patterns oI strategic intervention in global aIIairs that evolved
during the post-World War II period endured, with some mutations,
Ior fIty years. However, the response to such interventions changed
Irom time to time. The Islamic Revolution oI Iran is a case in point: it
established that the possibility oI indigenous political change existed,
127
despite limited resources and opposition Irom world powers. This was
the revolutionary thought that Castro`s Cuba also represented. Pakistan`s
nuclear tests (May 1998) took place in the teeth oI intense international
opposition. With each such response to international pressure the
dynamics oI global power systems changed. India and Pakistan became
unoIfcial members oI the club oI nuclear nations by conducting ten
nuclear explosions during a period oI twenty days.

In the aItermath oI the Cold War, when the nature oI global confict
was changing, nuclear power assumed ideological value.
19
AIter the
dissolution oI the Soviet Union a number oI Western countries were
winding down their nuclear weapons programs. Pakistan was under
intense international pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and reIrain Irom pursuing its nuclear goals. The UN ConIerence
on Disarmament also called on India and Pakistan 'to accede without
delay to the Non-ProliIeration Treaty. Nevertheless, in 1998, frst India
and then Pakistan conducted a series oI nuclear test explosions and
became unoIfcial members oI the club oI nuclear nations. As Iar as
Pakistan was concerned the decision to go nuclear was a response that
secured the strategic Iuture oI the country. Without nuclear capability
Pakistan would not have survived 9/11 even though it had nothing to do
with it.
Global power systems operate within given parameters with a
view to maintaining a balance oI power and containing the disruptive
potential oI states and other entities through all available means: among
other things, bilateral, multilateral and international economic sanctions
penalize states Ior stepping out oI line, by isolating them Irom the global
economy. It is well known that the weakest sections oI society suIIer
the most under economic sanctions. While the economic impact oI
international sanctions can be calculated in fscal terms, the response
oI the people to the hardship imposed on them through such sanctions
is not so easy to calculate.
20
AIter the GulI War, economic sanctions
were imposed on Iraq. Contrary to the expectations oI the Coalition, the
hardship oI economic sanctions led to a surge oI nationalism and anger
against the international Iorces that had imposed them on Iraq.
Shahwar Junaia
The ability to withstand international pressure and respond to
challenges to national sovereignty has always been critical to national
development, and vice versa. It is even more important now that
globalization and inIormation technology have exposed entire nations
and their economic, social and cultural systems to external infuences.
International fnancial systems keep track oI the economic potential
oI nations, as well as the ability oI their leadership to exploit that
potential. Countries with natural resources as well as the expertise and
inIrastructure to exploit them can demand reasonable prices Ior value
added products. Those without expertise and capital have to sell non-
renewable resources cheaply. Alongside commodity deals, nationalists in
developing countries have always demanded the transIer oI technology
that will help them exploit their resources more eIIectively.
21
In order to
ensure the supply oI commodities at advantageous rates multinationals
work with industrialized countries to control political events and,
thereby, the demands regarding economic arrangements that might fow
Irom political events. This happened in both Iraq and Iran aIter World
War II.
22
It is happening there, and in Central Asia, today.
The term 'economic development has a history and means many
things to many people. Prior to World War II it was seldom used in the
sense oI a process that societies undergo. However, the term had been
used to describe oIfcial activity to develop land and natural resources.
23

The political implications oI economic policy, that is, policy Ior the
pursuit oI economic development, are selI-evident: post World War II
states moved into the capitalist camp or the socialist camp. The politics
underlying economic activity and patterns oI wealth distribution divided
the world and created the Iron Curtain. There were developed, less
developed and newly developed states within the capitalist camp as well
as the socialist camp. Other sub-categories oI economic development
were identifed later. Sixty years aIter they were frst introduced these
categories still exist. None oI the existing political systems, in their pure
Iorm, have been able to produce the ideal base Ior successIul economic
development.
24
Economic policy is a product oI political philosophy: its success,
or Iailure to satisIy the aspirations oI the people, has proIound political
129
implications and consequences. In developing countries that are without
democratic institutions the margin Ior error in providing Ior the masses
may be substantial in political terms because there is no outlet Ior public
discontent. However, there are limits to public tolerance. The acceptance
oI a direction in fnance, commerce, agriculture or social welIare marks
a defning moment in the history oI a nation.
In Pakistan a clear defnition oI the responsibilities oI the state towards
its citizens was given in the address oI Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammed Ali
Jinnah to the constituent assembly on 11 August 1947. With regard to the
welIare oI the people he said, '...II we want to make this great state oI
Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate
on the well being oI the people, and especially oI the masses and the
poor. ThereaIter, on a number oI occasions he spoke on the subject:
on 11 October 1947 in an address to Civil, Naval, Military and Air Force
oIfcers oI the Government oI Pakistan he said, 'We should have a state
in which we could live and breathe as Iree men and which we could
develop according to our own lights and culture and where principles oI
Islamic social justice could fnd Iree play. .. On 21 February 1948, in an
address to the oIfcers and men oI the 5th Heavy Ack Ack and 6th Light
Ack Ack Regiments in Malir, Karachi, he said, 'You have to stand guard
over the development and maintenance oI Islamic democracy, Islamic
social justice and the equality oI manhood in your own native soil. With
Iaith, discipline and selfess devotion to duty, there is nothing worthwhile
that you cannot achieve. Besides defning the responsibilities oI the
state towards its citizens the Quaid also defned the responsibilities oI
citizens towards society and the state.
A re-defnition oI economic philosophy took place in Pakistan during
the 1970s when nationalization oI industries was supposed to embody
the socialist bent oI the political party in power. The Pakistan People`s
Party had translated the slogan oI the well known 'Basic Human Needs
program oI the World Bank under Robert S. McNamara
25
into an election
slogan, promising the masses ' Roti, Kapra, Makaan.
26
In order to gain
control oI the private sector broad-based nationalization was undertaken.
Since government Iunctionaries and the political workers entrusted with
the job did not have the expertise to manage nationalized industries,
Shahwar Junaia
thousands oI units closed down within a year. Wealthy industrialists
and their allies within the bureaucracy believed nationalization was
only a method oI seizing the wealth oI private citizens and handing its
control to political workers. Nationalization had been oI no use to the
general public or the state. Subsequent land reIorms were seen in the
same light because they were selective and did not beneft the masses.
Meanwhile, the state continued to accept responsibility Ior providing
relieI to the masses: where they were available, utilities, health services
and education Iacilities were subsidized. Pakistan was neither a socialist
state nor a Iree market economy, it had become a hybrid. This did not ft
into global scheme oI things and was considered suspiciously socialist.
In Pakistan the breakdown oI the social contract between state and
citizen began with the installation oI the military government oI Gen.
Ziaul Haq (5 July 1977 17 August 1988). Field Marshal Ayub Khan
(1958-1969) had worked through the existing civil administration aIter
he seized power. Martial law means no law, but during the 1950s the
civil administration was able to temper the severity oI the situation aIter
a while. The coup d`etat oI 1977 put the armed Iorces in total control
oI state resources.
27
The military had had little contact with the general
public thus Iar, and had no idea how to deal with them. They used
draconian methods to subdue any hint oI political opposition. The initial
oIfcial statement was that the army had seized power due to the political
turmoil in the country, it expected to hold elections within 90 days and
hand over power to a civilian government. Instead they prosecuted and
hung the Iormer Prime Minister and stayed Ior eleven years.
During this period the public welIare orientation oI state policy was
replaced by a national security orientation. This change oI direction and
the subsequent diversion oI an unusual proportion oI national resources
to deIence were justifed on the grounds that the Soviet presence in
AIghanistan posed a threat to Pakistan. Collaboration with the United
States in cross-border military action to destabilize the government in
AIghanistan was rationalized on the same grounds.
28
No thought was
given to the Iallout oI these policies and the likely impact oI this on the
civilian population.
131
At the time a quota oI 20 percent was established Ior armed
Iorces personnel in the civil administration. During the ten years that
Iollowed the induction oI armed Iorces personnel through this system
oI employment created a substantial military presence in the civil
administration oI the country. However, this Iact was not publicized.
Aggressive military intervention in civil administration became the
hallmark oI the MusharraI regime which appointed serving and retired
military personnel throughout the Iederal and provincial administration,
in every administrative grade, including tenure positions.
The mandate given to these personnel was not people-Iriendly: they
were not appointed to serve, as public servants are expected to. They
expected to oversee and monitor the activities oI the civil administration
and secure the interest oI the military regime in every way. The creation oI
a tier oI overseers, who were not subject to the same laws and discipline
as those they were monitoring had grave implications Ior the integrity oI
the state and its institutions: the gulI between state and citizen widened.
No thought was given to the likely Iallout oI these policies and its impact
on the civilian population.
Another development was a wave oI privatization oI state
corporations and assets. Well run, proftable enterprises were put up
Ior sale. Many were sold to Ioreign buyers Ior a very small premium.
OIIered 100 percent ownership, Ioreign investors entered the market in
pursuit oI higher profts and a captive market: this led to a rise in the
price oI essential commodities and utilities. The price hike had a direct
impact on the personal economy oI consumers, but the state did not
appear to be very concerned about this. This disregard Ior the hardship
Iaced by the weakest economic groups in society marked a proIound
change in the economic management oI the country. The priorities oI
the state had been redefned and, in Iuture, the country was to be run like
a proft making corporation. The socio-political impact oI running the
state Ior proft, like a corporation, had an impact on the social contract,
written or unwritten, between citizen and state. It led to a weakening oI
allegiance to the state, distancing the common man Irom the state entity.
This was a dangerous development.
Shahwar Junaia
InIormation technology has created new dynamics in the global
economic environment: now elite economic groups in developing
countries tend to ally their interests and identiIy with similar economic
groups in other countries.
29
On the other hand, underprivileged and
marginalized economic groups tend to identiIy with people in similar
circumstances in other parts oI the world. This phenomenon has
created unique challenges Ior national leadership, Ior allegiance to the
brotherhood beyond national borders may be as strong as allegiance to
the state. The concept oI nationhood will be redefned iI the leadership
in developing countries cannot provide some measure oI economic and
social opportunity and to all citizens.
The state as a corporation and transnationals as states without borders
have created a new range oI imperatives and unique tensions within the
tradition-based socio-political Iabric oI nation states. In most cases the
terms have changed yet the traditional contract between citizen and state
has not been re-written. The state demands the same level oI allegiance
it has always received Irom its citizens although it may have passed on
many responsibilities Ior the well being oI their citizens, to the private
sector. These days the private sector may consist oI national, regional as
well as transnational organizations, each with its own culture, economic
environment and unique demands. In return Ior jobs and social benefts
these unique corporate cultures demand loyalty and the maximum
utilization oI human potential. The private sector does not commit to the
Iurtherance oI traditional national goals. Capital does not have national
loyalties or a conscience: it is only strictly enIorced legislation in the
interest oI labour that secures social benefts Ior industrial workers in
developed countries. This has created an environment in which the role
oI the state in the liIe oI citizens has diminished, thereIore the social
contract between state and citizen needs to be re-examined. This needs
to be done in the national context and not according to a concept oI
political change that has evolved elsewhere in the world.
The present regime in Pakistan (2007) did not come to power as the
result oI a legally sanctioned political process or a political movement. The
regime appeared to have a Iair idea oI the results it wanted in the political
and administrative spheres but obviously had very little knowledge
133
about how to go about achieving those results. The administrative
measures it wanted to introduce in order to reorganize government were
a throwback to the 1960s as were the political underpinnings oI those
measures. The primary purpose oI its initial endeavours, as it appeared,
was to distance the Iederal and provincial governments Irom the general
public by introducing new layers oI intermediaries and institutions into
the administrative setup. These included contractors, non-governmental
organizations and a tier oI nominated political elements. Meanwhile the
new regime began to divest itselI oI state enterprises in order to raise
capital Ior new ventures. EIIorts were made to privatize basic services
and utilities on the principle that governments should not be running
businesses. Earlier, these services and utilities had been provided to the
general public at subsidized rates.
The masses were told to turn to the private sector Ior the kind oI
services they had hitherto received Irom the government. In order to
provide services, the private sector charged a premium that the general
public was not in a position to pay since wages had not kept pace with
infation. The private sector was not the largest employer in the country
and any relieI it could provide would go to those employed by it. This
leIt the majority oI the population out in the cold. It resulted in the
political alienation oI marginalized groups that were not integrated in
the national economy. This policy was bound to carry a penalty.
The socio-political contract between the state and citizen is a
world apart Irom the contract between a corporation and its employees.
Individuals surrender a predetermined measure oI Ireedom and personal
wealth, by accepting civil laws and taxes, to the state in return Ior
welIare, protection and security. Governments are responsible Ior the
welIare oI their citizens. That is what makes them diIIerent Irom private
enterprise, which keeps its eye on the bottom line and will get rid oI any
employee not delivering a given measure Ior the money paid.
In a number oI cases the budgets oI transnational corporations
are larger than those oI many small nation states and they behave like
selI-governing entities. In order to secure the kind oI loyalty that is
generally associated with citizenship and relations between state and
Shahwar Junaia
citizen, transnational corporations provide the kind oI security umbrella
and social protection that states provide to citizens. They do this through
arrangements with private sector organizations. In return, transnationals/
corporations expect the kind oI loyalty that states demand Irom their
citizens. This has created a dilemma: could loyalty to an employer
transcend loyalty to the state, especially in countries like Pakistan that
are taking measures to run the state like a corporation? In the event that
it does, the consequences Ior national security and the integrity oI the
body politic are bound to be disastrous. The answer to these and many
similar questions will lead to new thinking on the subject only iI policy
planners can move out oI the shadow oI global power systems and into
the real world.
Goodwill between the state and marginalized groups can be restored
by Iorging a new policy and acknowledging the Iailure oI the previous
one that sought to distance itselI Irom the public. The state has to
acknowledge that it is responsible Ior the welIare oI all its citizens not
just a Iew institutions and activities. The resources oI the state are a
public trust Irom which benefts must be seen to fow to the public, the
masses. This will require a reaIfrmation oI the guiding principles oI the
social contract between citizen and state that were broadly defned by
the Quaid, Mohammed Ali Jinnah
30
in his speeches aIter the creation
oI Pakistan. He oIten spoke oI the importance oI Iair play and justice.
He asked the public to saIeguard their rights and to guard against
corruption.
During the past Iew years Pakistan has Iaced unprecedented
natural disasters (earthquake, drought and foods), inIrastructure
Iailures (destruction oI bridges and highways) and political upheaval
(the March/07 lawyers movement, May 12/07 riots in Karachi, the
Lal Masjid tragedy, suicide bombings, confict in Balochistan and
Waziristan). Given political will, national character and perceptions oI
nationhood crystallize in times oI crisis and during their aItermath, when
reconstruction takes place. Pakistan needs to shake oII the constraints oI
the meaningless Ioreign pressure it has accepted as its destiny and create
its own defning moment in history.
135
References
1 Choudhry, G.W., Inaia, Pakistan, Banglaaesh ana the Mafor Power Politics of a Diviaea
Subcontinent. The Free Press, New York, 1975.
2 General Agreement on TariIIs and Trade (1947). Originally created by the Brettton Woods
ConIerence as part oI a larger plan Ior economic recovery aIter World War II.
3 Alnaswari, Abbas, 'The Economy oI Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction oI Development and
Prospects,1950-2010, Article in Economics ana Economic History, Greenwood Press,
1994.
4 Springborg, Robert; Henry, Clement; Karshenas, Massoud, 'Oil and Democracy in Iraq,
Miaale East Issues, Saqi Books, 2007, published in association with London Middle
East Institute at the School Ior Oriental and AIrican Studies.
5 Said, Edward, The Question of Palestine, Vintage, 1992.
6 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage. the Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehooa,
Beacon Press, 2006.,
7 Pappe, Ilan, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications, 2006.
8 The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine recommended that Palestine be
divided into an Arab state and a Jewish state. The Commission called Ior Jerusalem to
be put under international administration. The UN General Assembly adopted this plan
on 29 November 1947 as UN Resolution (GA 181). The plan Ior the 'partition with
economic union divided the land into several cantons.This jigsaw puzzle would have
been diIfcult to implement Ior Iriendly populations, and was impossible to implement
given the hostility between Arabs and Jews.
9 Sherry, Michael S., In the Shaaow of War The US since 1939, Yale University Press, 1997.
The author states.War and national security became consuming anxieties providing
metaphors and models that shaped major areas oI civil liIe and public policy.
10 Walker, Martin, The Cola War. A History, Owl Books, 1995.
11 Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars, Penguin (Non-Classics), 2004.
12 Staten, CliII, US Foreign Policy Since Worla War II, 'An Essay on Reality`s Corrective
Qualities, American Diplomacy.org updated 8.28.07 (Foreign Service Dispatches and
Periodic Reports on United States Foreign Policy Est. 1996).
13 In a 2005 interview Phillip Agee reportedly told Hernando Calvo Ospina, quoted in
'CIA`s Successors and Collaborators Le Monae Diplomatique, August 2007.
14 On 9 October 2003 a debate was held at Trinity College in Dublin. It was organized
by the University Philosophical Society, the proposition to be debated was: 'America`s
Ioreign policy does more harm than good. Supporting the proposition were: William
Blum, American author; David Barsamian, American radio journalist and author; and
Tom Hanahoe, Irish author.
15 For example, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation created by the Christian Democratic
Union in West Germany,
16 Blum, William, Killing Hope. US Military ana CIA Interventions Since Worla War ii,
Common Courage Press Monroe, Maine: Updated edition October 2003.
17 Sussman, Gerald, Communication Technology ana Politics in the Information Age, Sage
Publications Inc.,1997.
18 Wright, Robin, The Last Great Revolution. Turmoil ana Transformation in Iran, Vintage,
2001.
19 Nizamani, Haider, K, The Roots of Rhetoric. Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Inaia ana
Shahwar Junaia
Pakistan, Praegar Publishers, 2000.
20 Blanchard J, Power ana the Purse. Economic Statecraft, Inaepenaence ana National
Security, (Case Series on National Security), Routledge, 2000.
21 Fatemi, Nasrollah, S., Oil Diplomacy. powaer keg in Iran, Whittier Books, 1954.
22 Ahrari, Mohammed E., and Bruckey, Stuart, Dynamics of Oil Diplomacy. Conict ana
Consensus, (Multinational Corporation Series), Ayer Co. Publications, 1980.
23 Arndt, H.W., Economic Development. The History of an Iaea, University oI Chicago
Press, 1989.
24 Schneider, GeoIIrey; Knoedler, Janet; Sackrey, Charles, Introauction to Political
Economy. Dollars ana Sense, Economic AIIairs Bureau Inc., 2005.
25 President, World Bank, 1968-1981. Robert McNamara was responsible Ior the institution
oI systems analysis in public policy, which developed into the discipline known today as
'political analysis.
26 'Food, Clothing, Shelter,
27 Root, Hilton, R., Capital ana Collusion. the Political Logic of Global Economic
Development, Princeton University Press, 2005.
28 Rothstein, Hy S., Afghanistan ana the Troublea Future of Unconventional Warfare, US
Naval Institute Press, 2006.
29 Stiglitz, Joseph E., Making Globali:ation Work, W.W. Norton (reprint 2006).
30 Jinnah. Speeches ana Statements1047-1948, OxIord University Press, 2000.
137
Iran, the Unitea States ana Regional Stability
IRAN, THE UNITED STATES AND
REGIONAL STABILITY
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
*
Abstract
(Irans si:e, energy resources ana strategic location combine to
make it a mafor player in the peace ana stability of the Gulf region
ana beyona. The current stanaoff between Washington ana Tehran on
the latters nuclear programme is fraught with serious consequences.
Military action against Iran woula ignite a long arawn conict which
woula be aevastating. Oil prices woula soar ana 'the whole Gulf woula
become an inferno of exploaing fuel tanks ana shut-up facilities.` Yet
the US ana Iran have common perceptions on mafor contemporary
issues. The mistrust ana tensions of the past three aecaaes can be
replacea with cooperation. For its part Washington neeas to rethink its
attituae towaras Iran while Tehran must come forwara with sincere ana
pragmatic policies that are matchea by action. Eaitor).
Iran is indisputably the most powerIul and strategically important
country in the region comprising the Persian GulI, Central and South-
west Asia. Spread over 1.6 million sq. km. with a population oI nearly
70 million and a US $190 billion GDP, Iran lying at the nexus oI the
Persian GulI, Central Asia and South Asia has one oI the most strategic
locations in the world. It holds 10 percent oI the world`s proven oil
reserves. It is OPEC`s second largest exporter and the world`s Iourth
biggest oil producer. It also has the world`s second largest reserves oI
natural gas (15 percent oI the global total).
The other major player, the United States, while geographically not
a part oI the region, has extensive interests to protect. It has elaborate
*
Iqbal Ahmad Khan is a Iormer Pakistan ambassador to Iran.
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
deIence and security arrangements with regional countries, vital
economic interests and a Iormidable military presence. The 1979 Iranian
revolution not only toppled the staunchly pro-US Shah but established
an Islamic republic whose initial rhetoric about the 'export oI its
revolution generated regional tensions and put Iran-US relations on the
groove oI hostility. The standoII between Washington and Tehran has
skewed political, economic and social development oI the neighbouring
states and impacted adversely on regional security and stability.
US-Iran tensions revolve around or have a bearing on a number
oI issues ranging Irom Iran`s nuclear programme, the invasion oI Iraq
and the consequent turmoil, the US-led war on terror, the decades old
unresolved Palestinian question coupled with Washington`s blind support
oI Israel and, increasing Iranian infuence in the region, in particular the
Persian GulI - a 600-mile-long body oI water which separates Iran Irom
the Arabian Peninsula. The Persian GulI is considered to be one oI the
world`s most strategic waterways due to its importance in global oil
transportation. At the Strait oI Hormuz, the Persian GulI narrows to only
34 miles. The Persian GulI countries account Ior roughly 27 percent oI
the global oil production while holding 57 percent oI the world`s proven
crude oil reserves. Besides oil, the GulI region has huge reserves (2,462
trillion cubic Ieet-TcI) oI natural gas, accounting Ior 45 percent oI total
proven world gas reserves.
1
Added to this is the assessment oI experts
that the Persian GulI oil is extremely economical to produce.
In the near three decades since the Iranian revolution, Washington`s
perception oI Tehran, its policies and practices, has remained
Iundamentally unaltered, namely that Iran poses a serious threat to the
interests oI the US and that oI its allies, both in the region and beyond.
The priority that the US assigns to the Iran Iactor in its Ioreign policy was
emphasized by Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary Ior Political AIIairs, in
an address on 11 May 2006 at The Washington Institute. He asserted:
'.(there) is no greater challenge to the Unitea States than to
confront the unique threat from the Iranian government, ana
particularly from the new ana raaical regime of Presiaent
Ahmaainefaa..There is the challenge that Iran is aeveloping,
139
without any question, a nuclear weapons capability that if it
succeeas in that venture will be a airect challenge to all that
we neea to accomplish in the Miaale East, to our security ana
the security of our frienas ana allies in the greater Miaale East
region...
'There is the challenge of terrorism, ana a lot of us who have
servea in the U.S. government since the late 70s ana early 80s
remember that it was Iran that unleashea this wave of terrorism
against the Unitea States beginning in the early 1980s in
Lebanon.
'Ana hnally, there is the challenge of aemocracy or the lack
of aemocracy ana freeaom in Iran itself, ana the neea for the
Unitea States ana our European allies ana other countries to be
engagea as best we can in a very aifhcult environment to help
support those in Iran who believe that the future of Iran shoula
be a aemocratic future.
'Iran is a strong state. If you look at the speeches of Presiaent
Ahmaainefaa or of Ali Larifani, the secretary of the Iranian
national security council, this particular Iranian government
aspires to be the most powerful state in the Miaale East, the most
inuential, ana it is certainly trying to expana its inuence as we
speak throughout the Miaale East. Ana we talkea to our gooa
frienas in the Gulf, ana neighbours beyona ana there is a great
aeal of concern about this latest trena in Iranian foreign policy.
Ana we are as aeterminea to resist an expansion of Iranian
inuence on a regional basis as we are absolutely aeterminea
to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, ana
aeterminea to confront it as it poses this terrorist threat to the
Unitea States.`
2

In the US perception Iran`s nuclear program, despite the latter`s
repeated assertions that it is meant exclusively Ior civilian purposes, is
unquestionably weapons oriented and is the most obvious maniIestation
oI Tehran`s desire to achieve great power status. It poses a serious threat
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
to Israel and is meant to empower Iran in dominating the region. In an
interview on Israeli TV, President Bush made no bones oI how the US
viewed Iran`s nuclear program. He categorically stated:
'.(it was)secretly aesignea to proauce nuclear weapons ana
that Israel ana the Unitea States were unitea in their obfective
in ensuring that Iran aoes not acquire nuclear weapons ...
aiplomacy shoula be usea to persuaae Iran to suspena its nuclear
program ana if it failea the Unitea Nations Security Council
shoula impose sanctions. But in the event that aiplomatic efforts
aia not bear fruit then all options were on the table..The use of
force is the last option for any presiaent. You know we have usea
force in the recent past to secure our country.`
3
The other country which is keeping a close watch on Iran`s nuclear
activity is Israel. Israel, whose bid to acquire nuclear weapons goes back
several decades, has successIully stockpiled a daunting nuclear arsenal
and is the sole nuclear power in the volatile Middle Eastern region. It
is determined to maintain its monopoly come what may, an objective in
which it has the Iull backing oI the United States, which is committed
to support Israel in maintaining a clear strategic edge over its rivals in
the region.
The Israeli concerns and likely course oI action have been lucidly
spelt out by Yossi Mekelberg, Associate Fellow, Middle East Program
at Chatham House. In an article titled 'From War of Woras to Woras
of War` he claims that Iran`s nuclear programme is widely seen by
the international community as aimed at developing a nuclear military
capacity, rather than Ior civilian purposes alone. It represents a very
dangerous dimension oI the already strained and rapidly deteriorating
relations between Tehran on the one hand and Washington and
Jerusalem on the other. Concerns about the programme, combined
with the infammatory rhetoric Irom Iran`s President Ahmadinejad and
other Iranian leaders, meant that the likelihood oI military action by
Israel against Iran`s nuclear installations was increasing every day the
international community did not act, although this was not Israel`s or
the United States` preIerred option. Both preIerred that Iran dismantle
141
its nuclear programme altogether, but Israel might be satisfed iI
Iran accepted tight international supervision to ensure that it stopped
enriching uranium to weapons grade and that its nuclear programme did
not develop nuclear weapons.
According to Yossi Meckelberg, in January 2005 the head oI
Israel`s intelligence agency Mossad, Meir Dagan, warned the Knesset
Foreign AIIairs and DeIence Committee that Iran`s nuclear programme
was close to the point of no return, where Tehran would no longer
need outside or international help to enrich uranium Ior use in atomic
weapons. Meanwhile, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Shimon Peres,
concluded that Iran is single-hanaealy the worlas most serious security
threat.
Israel, Yossi Mekelberg goes on to assert, had genuine concerns
about Iran developing weapons oI mass destruction and its intentions, but
has always had an interest in internationalizing the problem, rather than
addressing the issue on its own. Mobilizing the international community
to address this, whether through peaceIul diplomacy, sanctions or even
military action would spare Israel Irom conIronting Iran directly.
4
There is a great dilemma on the part oI the Arab states oI the Persian
GulI vis-a-vis Iran`s nuclear programme. They are extremely concerned
that proliIeration oI weapons oI mass destruction in a volatile region like
the Middle East could prove catastrophic. Yet, when compared to the
heavy weights - Iran, Israel and the United States - they simply do not
possess the clout necessary to shape Iuture developments in their Iavour.
Individually each, barring Saudi Arabia, and that too only recently, has
maintained an uneasy silence and remained on the sidelines. Collectively
too they have not been able to pack a punch which would Iorce the
principal players to Ieel their impact. It was only in December 2006
at the Riyadh summit that the six-member GulI Cooperation Council
announced in the fnal communiqu plans to seek nuclear energy Ior
peaceIul purposes while repeating its demand to make the Middle East
a nuclear weapons Iree zone. The GCC leaders ordered that a 'GCC-
wiae stuay be conauctea to formulate a foint programme in the hela of
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in keeping with international
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
stanaaras ana regulations.` They called Ior a peaceIul settlement oI the
confict over Iran`s nuclear programme, and demanded that Israel, the
only country in the Middle East believed to have nuclear weapons, join
the nuclear Non-ProliIeration Treaty. 'We want no bombs... Our policy
is to have a region free of weapons of mass aestruction,` the Saudi
Ioreign minister said. 'This is why we call on Israel to renounce (nuclear
weapons). The original sin was from Israel as it establishea a nuclear
reactor with the only purpose of proaucing nuclear weapons.`
5
The strategy oI the Arab states oI the Persian GulI has been
accurately encapsulated by Emile el-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi in
an article titled 'The Arab Gulf States in the Shaaow of the Iranian
Nuclear Challenge.` The authors contend:
'the Arab Gulf concern has not translatea into an integratea
campaign to obtain Iranian cooperation with European
negotiators. Essentially, their strategy seeks to keep the aiscussion
away from the public arena, placate Iran to avoia antagoni:ing
a powerful neighbour ana rely on EU aiplomacy ana American
military forces to constrain ana aeter Iran. This two-level strategy,
critici:ea by many as auplicitous, characteri:es relations between
Iran ana its Arab Gulf neighbours. It is arguably a cost-effective
way of conaucting their relations with the foremost regional
power, a more pragmatic approach than both the many iaealistic
collective security schemes put forwara by solicitous acaaemics
ana the policy of confrontation suggestea by more hawkish
American analysts.`
6
An indirect and creative way through which Arab GulI states are
tackling the Iranian nuclear challenge is by emphasizing the environmental
hazards linked to Iran`s nuclear programme. The legitimate and genuine
concerns Arab GulI states have about nuclear saIety are grounded in two
widely-shared assessments: frst, that the nuclear technology acquired
and developed by Iran presents a high degree oI risk and unreliability,
second, that the populations and basic inIrastructure oI the GulI
monarchies are, with the exception oI Saudi Arabia, concentrated on
the coastal region and would be highly vulnerable to a nuclear accident.
143
UAE Ioreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan expressed
the Iear oI the GulI states when he said that a 'raaioactive leak from
an Iranian nuclear power plant coula cause an enormous ecological
catastrophe by polluting the waters of the Gulf.` The Arab countries oI
the Persian GulI suIIering Irom insuIfcient natural water supplies rely
heavily on desalination plants to make up the shortIall.
7
Earlier, a Saudi
journalist had complained that 'the Bushehr nuclear reactor is closer to
Manama or Doha than to the Iranian capital.`
8
The asymmetry oI power between the Arab states oI the Persian
GulI and Iran explains, but only partially, the role oI the Iormer as mere
spectators in the ongoing negotiations on the nuclear issue. The apparent
unwillingness on the part oI the leadership in these states to resolutely
engage Iran in order to ensure that its programme remains peaceIul
is explained by the sympathy that it evokes among their own people.
The mastery over nuclear technology by a Muslim country is popularly
viewed as challenging the Western (read United States) monopoly
oI nuclear weapons as well as that oI Israel in the Middle East. This
sentiment is Irequently refected in a cross-section oI the Arab media.
In her weekly column in the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Syrian
Minister oI Expatriate AIIairs Buthayna Sha`ban wrote:
'Those in the know unaerstana (that) all this fuss is because
this time it is a Muslim state that has obtainea nuclear know-
how ana technology...One of the wars being wagea by the
West against the Muslims is the war on the front of thought,
science, ana technology, its aim is to prevent the Muslims from
possessing the tools of knowleage ana aavancea technology...
The backwaraness of the Muslims, ana among them the Arabs,
in science ana technology is the funaamental cause of the Wests
aisaain for them, of the insult to the places holy to them, ana
of the occupation of their lanas. The saving of the honor of
Islam... [aepenas on the Muslims{ acceptance of the scientihc
ana cultural challenge, using thought, logic, ana vigorous goal-
orientea efforts. The U.S. has aescribea Iran as [a country{ on
the path of provocation, [inaeea{, there is no aoubt that this
is the path that the Arab ana Islamic nations must take...`
9

Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
An editorial in the Saudi daily Al-Watan advised:
'it woula be htting for the international community to look for
the reason that lea Iran to strive to attain nuclear capability...
before it begins to take harsher stances. The U.S. ana the
international community, in accoraance with the principle of non-
aiscrimination, shoula set Israel at the top of the agenaa, so as to
expose its nuclear capability. This is because ignoring [Israels
nuclear capabilities{ will leaa Iran to become more stubborn ana
this is not gooa for the region or for its peoples.`
10
Ali Al-SaIadi, columnist Ior the Jordanian government daily
Al-Dustour, echoed the Al-Watan editorial in a column titled 'The
International Lack oI Balance Regarding Iran and Israel:
'What the international [arena{ aemanas from Iran is
not aemanaea from other countries, particularly from
Israel. The West, which is keenly opposea to Irans nuclear
programme... helpea Israel buila its nuclear artillery, which
is the greatest threat to the peace ana security of the region.
Why is Israel permittea to ao what is forbiaaen to Iran?
11
Mazen Hamed, columnist Ior the Qatari daily Al-Watan, argued that
it was US provocation that had led Iran to develop missiles and nuclear
weapons:
'How shoula [Iran{ act when American cannons overlook it
from the long boraer with Iraq ana Afghanistan? How shoula it
act when it is surrounaea by the American navy ana threatenea
by air, sea, ana lana? How shoula it act when its allies in Syria
ana Lebanon are besiegea at home ana abroaa? What shoula
the Iranians ao, now that their country has become the main
party in the axis of evil? What shoula they ao, in face of [a
prospective{ attack on their military ana nuclear facilities, about
which they reaa every aay? What shoula they ao in light of the
plans to incite against [the Iranian{ revolution [i.e. regime{,
which are aimea at [bringing about{ regime change, which
145
they reaa about every aay? In light of all this, it is natural for
Iran to turn to aefenaing itself ana creating the means that will
enable it to block or prevent such invasions, if they occur...`
12
Ureib Al-Rintawi, columnist Ior the Jordanian government daily Al-
Dustour, congratulated Iran on its nuclear achievements, and criticized
the Arabs Ior 'marching in place` and not even coming close to
obtaining nuclear capability:
'...Congratulations to Iran on its accomplishments unaer
very aifhcult regional ana international circumstances, ana
congratulations to its leaaers ana its sources of [religious{
authority... To hell with our failea initiatives to turn the Miaale
East into a WMD-free :one. These initiatives convince no one
not even the initiators ana promoters themselves.
13
The nuclear stand-oII in the region is compounded by the spectacular
developments, virtually all negative, Iollowing the US invasion oI Iraq.
The US attack was meant to overthrow Saddam Hussein`s authoritarian
and despotic regime and put in its place a secular, democratic dispensation
underpinned by a vibrant Iraqi nationalism. The new Iraq was to be a
bastion oI democracy and a beacon Ior other countries oI the region,
including its Arab neighbours seeking to evolve a more open society and
a participatory government. This obviously has not happened. Instead,
one is witnessing the Iracturing oI Iraq on ethnic and sectarian lines.
In this chaotic situation non-state actors and Ioreign states have moved
in to pursue their respective agendas by creating proxies and networks
designed to promote their interests. According to a survey conducted by
PEW despite concerns over Iran`s nuclear ambitions, the United States
presence in Iraq is cited at least, as oIten as Iran, and in many countries
more oIten, as a danger to stability in the Middle East and to world
peace.
14

Washington cites massive Iranian interIerence in Iraqi domestic
aIIairs as one oI the main reasons Ior its inability to achieve its original
objectives in Iraq. With the passage oI time US allegations have become
incrementally shrill. It claims that Iran is training and equipping Iraqi
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
militants increasingly with sophisticated weapons, who then attack the
United States and other coalition troops engaged in restoring order and
stability in Iraq. In the process they undermine the nascent democracy
in Iraq. In a testimony beIore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on 29 March 2007 Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary Ior Political AIIairs
claimed:
'beyona its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Iran has enaeavourea
to sow chaos ana instability throughout the region, particularly
in the precarious aemocracies of Iraq ana Lebanon, where Iran
funaea militants seek to thwart the aemocratic will of the Iraqi
ana Lebanese people...In Iraq, Iran continues to proviae lethal
support to select groups of Shia militants who target ana kill
Unitea States ana coalition troops, as well as innocent Iraqis. We
have maae clear to Tehran that this is absolutely unacceptable,
ana our troops on the grouna in Iraq are acting to aisrupt Irans
networks in Iraq that proviae aeaaly weapons to Iraqi groups.`

As evidence oI an Iranian policy aimed at countering the US military
presence in the region, Washington also alleges that Tehran is supplying
weapons to the insurgents in AIghanistan, even though they have good
relations with the government oI President Hamid Karzai. On a visit to
Germany in June 2007, US DeIense Secretary Robert Gates revealed that
he had seen recent intelligence reports which made it 'pretty clear that
theres a fairly substantial ow of weapons into Afghanistan. Given the
quantities that were seeing, it is aifhcult to believe that its associatea
with smuggling or the arug business or that its taking place without
the knowleage of the Iranian government.` The DeIense Secretary said
that this was ironic, because Iran had good relations with the AIghan
leadership, adding that it was anybody`s guess what Iran`s motives might
be beyond causing trouble Ior the United States. Under-Secretary oI
State Nicholas Burns was more direct, when he told CNN that there was
'irrefutable eviaence` that Iran was supplying the Taliban with arms.
'Its coming from the Iranian Revolutionary Guara Corps commana,
which is a basic unit of the Iranian government.`
15
Iran`s national security objective in Iraq is to ensure that at no
147
time in the Iuture should Iraq emerge as a military power which could
threaten and wage war on Iran as happened under Saddam Hussein in
the 1980s. In addition to a diminution in Iraq`s power, Iran also desires
that the government in Baghdad be Iriendly to Tehran and supportive
oI its political, economic and national security objectives in the region.
Iran would also like an early withdrawal oI US Iorces Irom Iraq and a
distancing oI the Iraqi government Irom the United States.

Iran`s oIfcial policy towards Iraq was clearly enunciated by the
Supreme Leader oI the country, Sayyed Ali Khamenei, when he received
the visiting Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri Al-Maliki, in August 2007 in
Tehran. Iran, he said, Iully supported the popular government oI Iraq.
Underscoring the importance oI unity among various Iraqi Iactions, he
said that solidarity among Sunnis and Shias, Arabs and Kurds, and other
Iraqi groups was a religious necessity which should be realized through
cooperation with the al-Maliki government. Khamenie described the
presence oI occupying Iorces in Iraq as a catastrophe. 'The occupiers
are trying to convince the worla that Iraq woula be aestroyea if they left
the country while their witharawal woula in fact open the way for Iraqi
ofhcials to solve their problems... The blooashea ana other problems
in Iraq are aue to the presence of the occupying forces or their failure to
perform their auty,` Khamenei observed. He praised Iraqi clergymen,
notably Ayatollah Sistani in NajaI, Ior being vigilant and attentive in the
service oI the Iraqi nation.

Irrespective oI whether Iran is playing a positive or a negative role,
or bits oI both, in Iraq, the United States invasion and the overthrow
oI Saddam Hussein has plunged the country and the entire region, into
an ever deepening crisis. The disintegration oI Iraq could have serious
implications Ior the stability and territorial integrity oI adjoining
states. Those with restive Kurd populations are apprehensive about
the emergence oI an independent Kurdish state Irom the ashes oI Iraq;
those with sizeable Shia populations are equally concerned about
sectarian harmony within their borders, particularly when they recall the
revolutionary messages beamed to their Shia populations in the 1980s
Iollowing the success oI Imam Khomeini`s revolution.

Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
Iran`s policies and practices concerning the Shia populations oI the
countries oI the region have bred Iear, suspicion and unease among its
neighbours in the Middle East including the Arab states oI the Persian
GulI. King Abdullah bin Al Hussein oI Jordan in the now Iamous 'Shiite
Crescent interview with the Washington Post in December 2004 on the
eve oI the Iraqi elections warned that:
(i) Iran was trying to infuence the Iraqi elections in a bid to
create an Islamic government that would dramatically shiIt
the geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslims
in the Middle East.
(ii) More than 1 million Iranians had crossed the 910-mile
border into Iraq, many to vote in the election -- with the
encouragement oI the Iranian government.
(iii) Iran was paying salaries and providing welIare to unemployed
Iraqis to build pro-Iranian public sentiment. Some Iranians,
trained by Iran`s Revolutionary Guards, are members oI
militias that could Iuel trouble in Iraq aIter the election.
(iv) II pro-Iran parties or politicians came to dominate the new
Iraqi government, a new 'crescent oI dominant Shiite
movements or governments stretching Irom Iran into Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon would emerge and alter the traditional
balance oI power between the two main Islamic sects.
(v) The creation oI a new Shiite crescent would particularly
destabilize GulI countries with Shiite populations. 'Even
Sauai Arabia is not immune from this. It woula be a mafor
problem. Ana then that woula propel the possibility of a
Shiite-Sunni conict even more, as youre taking it out of the
boraers of Iraq,` the king said.
16
The Shia Iactor in Middle Eastern politics was also highlighted,
much to the chagrin oI Iraqi leaders oI all denominations, when in an
interview to Al-Arabiya television president Hosni Mubarak claimed
149
that the majority oI the Iraqi Shias were loyal to Iran and not to the
countries they were living in.
17
In yet another maniIestation oI alarm at the Shia revival, Abdullah
bin Jabrain, a key member oI Saudi Arabia`s clerical establishment
declared Shiites around the world to be heretics and urged Sunni Muslims
to expel them Irom their land. The International Herala Tribune also
reported that in December 2006 another top Saudi cleric Abdul Rahman
al-Barak considered close to the kingdom`s royal Iamily, urged Sunnis
worldwide to oppose reconciliation with Shiites.
18
The nature and implications oI a rejuvenated Shia community rising
Irom the turmoil in Iraq have been spelt out in a brilliant article in the
journal, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006 by Vali Nasr, an adjunct
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York and
author oI 'The Shia Revival. How conicts within Islam will shape the
Future.` According to Vali Nasr:
(i) By liberating and empowering Iraq`s Shiite majority, the Bush
administration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will
upset the sectarian balance in Iraq and the Middle East Ior
years to come
(ii) The sheer size oI their population today makes them a
potentially powerIul constituency. Shiites account Ior about
90 percent oI Iranians, some 70 percent oI the people living
in the Persian GulI region, and approximately 50 percent oI
those in the arc Irom Lebanon to Pakistan -- some 140 million
people in all. Many, long marginalized Irom power, are now
clamoring Ior greater rights and more political infuence.
Recent events in Iraq have already mobilized the Shiites
oI Saudi Arabia (about 10 percent oI the population) and
during the 2005 Saudi municipal elections, turnout in Shiite-
dominated regions was twice as high as it was elsewhere.
Hassan al-SaIIar, the leader oI the Saudi Shiites, encouraged
them to vote by comparing Saudi Arabia to Iraq and implying
that Saudi Shiites too stood to beneft Irom participating. The
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
mantra 'one man, one vote, which galvanized Shiites in Iraq,
is resonating elsewhere. The Shiites oI Lebanon (who amount
to about 45 percent oI the country`s population) have touted
the Iormula, as have the Shiites in Bahrain (who represent
about 75 percent oI the population there).
(iii) Iraq`s liberation has also generated new cultural, economic
and political ties among Shiite communities across the Middle
East. Since 2003, hundreds oI thousands oI pilgrims, coming
Irom countries ranging Irom Lebanon to Pakistan, have visited
NajaI and other holy Shiite cities in Iraq, creating transnational
networks oI seminaries, mosques, and clerics that tie Iraq to
every other Shiite community, including, most important, that
oI Iran. Pictures oI Iran`s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, and the Lebanese cleric Muhammad Hussein
Fadlallah (oIten reIerred to as Hezbollah`s spiritual leader)
are ubiquitous in Bahrain.
(iv) It may also be more Iractious. Just as the Iraqi Shiites` rise
to power has brought hope to Shiites throughout the Middle
East, so has it bred anxiety among the region`s Sunnis. De-
Baathifcation, which removed signifcant obstacles to the
Shiites` assumption oI power in Iraq, is maligned as an
important cause oI the ongoing Sunni insurgency.
(v) Stemming adversarial sectarian politics will require satisIying
Shiite demands while placating Sunni anger and alleviating
Sunni anxiety, in Iraq and throughout the region. This delicate
balancing act will be central to Middle Eastern politics Ior the
next decade. It will also redefne the region`s relations with
the United States. What the US government sows in Iraq, it
will reap in Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere
in the Persian GulI.
(vi) The emerging Shiite revival need not be a source oI concern
Ior the United States, even though it has rattled some US allies
in the Middle East. In Iact, it presents Washington with new
151
opportunities to pursue its interests in the region. Building
bridges with the region`s Shiites could become the one clear
achievement oI Washington`s tortured involvement in Iraq.
Succeeding at that task, however, would mean engaging
Iran, the country with the world`s largest Shiite population
and a growing regional power, which has a vast and intricate
network oI infuence among the Shiites across the Middle
East, most notably in Iraq. US-Iranian relations today tend
to centre on nuclear issues and the militant rhetoric oI Iran`s
leadership. But set against the backdrop oI the war in Iraq,
they also have direct implications Ior the political Iuture oI
the Shiites and that oI the Middle East itselI.
19
The tension and instability spawned by the nuclear and Iraqi issues
is Iurther exacerbated by the continuous Iallout Irom the Iestering
Palestinian dispute, where the United States is simply not prepared
to brook any opposition to Israeli occupation oI Palestinian land and
repression oI the Palestinians. Iran`s view oI the issue, which President
Ahmadinejad presented in his September 2006 address to the United
Nations General Assembly runs counter to the United States` unhindered
support oI Israel. An anguished Iranian president told the world body:
'.a government was establishea in the territory of others with
a population collectea from across the worla at the expense
of ariving millions of rightful inhabitants of the lana into a
aiaspora ana homelessness. This is a great trageay with haraly
a preceaent in history. Refugees continue to live in temporary
refugee camps ana many have aiea still hoping to one aay return
to their homelana. Can any logic, law or legal reasoning fustify
this trageay? Can any member of the Unitea Nations accept such
a trageay occurring in their own homelana? The pretexts for the
creation of the regime occupying Al-Qoas Al-Sharif are so weak
that its proponents want to silence any voice trying to merely
speak about them as they fear that the sheaaing of light on the
facts woula unaermine the raison aetre of this regime.
'The trageay aoes not ena with the establishment of a regime in
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
the territory of others. Regrettably, from its inception, the regime
has been a constant source of threat ana insecurity in the Miaale
East region, waging war ana spilling blooa ana impeaing the
progress of regional countries, ana has also been usea by some
powers as an instrument of aivision, coercion, ana pressure on
the people of the region.. Just watch what is happening in
Palestinian lanas. People are being bombaraea in their own
homes ana their chilaren muraerea in their own streets ana alleys.
But no authority, not even the Security Council, can affora them
any support or protection.`
20
What is oI great concern to the United States and Israel is that
Iran`s support to Palestine is not confned to mere rhetoric. Its practical
maniIestation is witnessed in signifcant Iranian fnancial and material
assistance to Syria, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Hizbollah oI Lebanon,
which in 2006 was successIul, much to the discomIort oI the United
States, in thwarting an Israeli attempt to deIang and eliminate it. Iran`s
pro-Palestinian stance and Hizbollah`s sterling perIormance have
touched a sympathetic cord within the Arab Middle East. This growing
Iranian infuence has alarmed the United States as it has the autocratic
Middle Eastern regimes whose own perIormance on Palestine leIt much
to be desired.
It is disconcerting Ior the United States to fnd Iran looming large
on the Iraqi landscape evoking strong sympathies within the majority
Shia community; it is equally a matter oI concern that the Iran-backed
Hamas is the democratic choice oI the majority Palestinians and, in
neighboring Lebanon the Hizballah are admired Ior deIending Lebanon
against Israel`s wanton aggression; in AIghanistan, Iran is considered
a Iriend and a generous donor and generally the Arab street regards the
United States and its surrogate Israel a Iar greater threat to Middle East
peace and security than Iran or its nuclear ambitions.
In an eIIort to contain the growing Iranian infuence in the region
and as part oI counter-terrorism measures, the United States has Iorged
deIense relationships with some oI Iran`s neighbours and established a
military presence in the region tantamount to a virtual encirclement oI
153
Iran. The United States maintains nearly 40,000 troops on bases in allied
Arab countries that Iace Iran across the Persian GulI, including about
25,000 in Kuwait, 6,500 in Qatar, 3,000 in Bahrain, 1,300 in the United
Arab Emirates and a Iew hundred in Oman and Saudi Arabia, according
to fgures Irom the Dubai-based GulI Research Centre. To the north,
Turkey is a member oI the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a
US ally; the United States also has a military presence in the Caucasus
and certain Central Asian states, which allow NATO aircraIt to over-fy
their airspace Ior crucial access to Central Asia as well as AIghanistan;
in Iraq the presence oI more than 150,000 US troops has only served to
exacerbate tensions; the island kingdom oI Bahrain is home to the US
Navy`s 5th Fleet and Qatar to the enormous Al-Udeid air base, Irom
where the US Air Force commands all American air operations over
the Middle East. In order to demonstrate its strength the US conducts
military exercises regularly. In March 2007 the US Navy demonstrated
its largest show oI Iorce in the GulI since the 2003 invasion oI Iraq, with
15 ships, 125 aircraIt and 13,000 sailors taking part in an exercise that
veered within a Iew dozen miles oI Iran`s coast.
21
In the latest move the US government has reportedly decided to
provide its allies in the Middle East advanced weaponry in order to,
amongst other things, counter the growing infuence oI Iran in the
volatile region. According to an Observer report the centrepiece oI
the deal is an agreement between the US and a group oI Persian GulI
nations, including Saudi Arabia worth at least $20bn. At the same time,
10-year military aid packages will be renewed with Israel and Egypt. Its
main thrust is the supply oI advanced American weapons to long-term
Arab allies in the GulI - Saudi Arabia and fve other GulI states: the
UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. All these countries have been
jittery over the growing power oI Iran and the possibility that Tehran is
seeking to build a nuclear bomb. The supply oI American arms to the
countries not only gives them greater military power to counter Iran but
also cements them Iurther as American allies.
In Iact, so great is the White House`s Iear over Iran`s intentions,
comments The Observer, that the deal appears to ride roughshod over
other American strategic concerns - such as Israeli Iears over arming
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
Arab countries and concern that Saudi Arabia has been supporting Sunni
militants in Iraq. A senior Pentagon oIfcial said the deals were being
made to cope with what has been a changing strategic threat Irom Iran
and other Iorces.
The deal will Iocus on improvements to the countries` air and
missile deIence systems. It will also upgrade their navies and air Iorces,
giving them a greater strike capability. Some oI the sales will also cover
technology that can turn standard bombs into so-called precision-
guided` bombs oI the type that have become common with US Iorces.
22

Parallel to its military encirclement oI Iran, the United States
has adopted a host oI measures designed to hurt Iran fnancially and
economically. The Iran Sanctions Act (Iormerly Iran-Libya Sanctions
Act) constitutes a warning to Ioreign entities against investing in Iran`s
oil and gas sectors. The United States also constantly pressurizes
Ioreign governments especially in Europe and Asia to reduce oIfcial
export credits they provide to Iran. It has played a key role in the
unanimous adoption by the Security Council oI resolutions calling
upon Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
and warning that Iurther sanctions would be imposed in the event oI
non-compliance. At the time oI writing this paper the United States is
reportedly contemplating declaring the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) a terrorist organization, a move that some believe could
unleash a backlash in Iraq, AIghanistan and Palestine.
The United States government has also been generously Iunding
programmes designed to promote democracy and human rights in
Iran as well as VOA Farsi TV service and Radio Farda which call Ior
democratic and open government in Iran. For the fnancial year 2008, the
government has requested over $100 million in Iran Iunding, including
roughly $20 million Ior VOA`s Persian service and $8.1 million Ior
Radio Farda and $75 million in economic support Iunds to civil society
and human rights projects in Iran.
23
The irony oI Iran-US conIrontation is that in some oI the important
theatres oI confict namely Iraq and AIghanistan and on the pre-eminent
155
question oI oil, Iran and United States` goals coincide. In Iraq, both desire
a united, stable and democratic country; in AIghanistan they are Iriends
to and supportive oI president Karzai`s government; and it is in their
common interest that there continue to be a smooth, uninterrupted fow
oI oil, which is critical to Iran`s economy and security as it is to global
prosperity. Iran realizes that a Iragmented Iraq on its borders would be
a source oI multiple problems, including providing a magnet Ior its own
Kurdish people trying to unite with their brethren in an independent
Kurdish state. Similarly, Ior the United States a dismembered Iraq would
signal a colossal Iailure oI its determination to establish a secular and
democratic Iraq. In AIghanistan too the alternative to president Karzai
in the shape oI the Taliban and Al-Qaeda is neither acceptable to Iran
nor the United States.
The real dilemma Ior Iran is whether the removal oI the Sunni
Iundamentalist Taliban regime Irom AIghanistan and that oI the dreaded
Saddam Hussein Irom Iraq represented a plus Irom the national security
viewpoint or in Iact impacted negatively on its security. In AIghanistan,
the Ianatical Taliban dispensation has been replaced by a nascent liberal
democracy which owed its birth and sustenance to the United States
and other western powers and was clearly supportive oI a major US and
allied military presence in the country. In Iraq, the departure oI Saddam
Hussein was indeed hailed by Iranians oI all persuasion but the political
chaos and unimaginable violence that has Iollowed in the wake oI the
American invasion has perhaps irretrievably Iractured Iraqi society
and the political and economic structure, with dangerous consequences
Ior all neighbouring countries including Iran. To boot, it has brought
150,000 US troops to the western border oI Iran. The prospect oI being
hemmed in by a major US military presence in Iraq and AIghanistan
as well as the Persian GulI poses a clear and present danger Irom the
standpoint oI the Iranian leadership. Iran would like to see a stable and
secure Iraq and an AIghanistan united under president Karzai but sans
the United States, because on balance it perceives the intimidating US
presence a greater threat.
As Ior oil, Iran`s economy is in the fnal analysis its security and
stability and the Iate oI the regime is inextricably linked to its production,
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
a stable market and uninterrupted oil exports. Sales oI oil and natural gas
account Ior the bulk, between two-thirds and three-quarters, oI Iran`s
governmental income and make up roughly 80 percent oI its exports.
Spurred on by artifcially low energy prices, Iranians are among the
world`s largest consumers oI gasoline.
The government oI President Ahmadinejad relies heavily on high
global energy prices to underwrite his vast social programmes and
populist-minded subsidies (gasoline, bread, heating oil). His latest
budget which boosts government spending by 20 percent contains
over 300 such social programmes including aIIordable housing and
job retraining initiatives. Tehran spends between $20 billion and $30
billion per year, or 15 percent oI Iran`s GDP, on heating oil and energy
subsidies, according to Market Oracle, a UK-based frm that analyzes
fnancial markets.
24
Oil is perhaps the most important natural resource, not just Ior those
who own it, but Ior all the countries oI the world. In a globalized and
interconnected world it is inextricably tied to the world`s political stability
and economic development. In the event oI a serious and prolonged
disruption in oil supplies Irom the Persian GulI, the global economy
and, as a corollary, global security would be gravely threatened. The
security and stability oI the Persian GulI is, thereIore, oI vital interest
to the United States, Europe and Japan, as it is to emerging powers like
China and India.
The ownership oI a vital natural resource such as oil can prove to be
both an asset and a liability. Oil is a tangible source oI national power
and lends clout and prestige to a state. It mitigates the disadvantages a
country might Iace on account oI its territorial size and population. But
it can also be a liability as Kuwait learnt in 1990 when it was invaded
by its giant neighbour Iraq, which had exhausted its human and material
resources in the 8-year war with Iran and coveted the oil laden felds oI
Kuwait. Ironically, Kuwait during the war had provided Iraq billions oI
dollars to help it ward oII the Iranian counter-oIIensive.
The critical importance oI this precious natural resource is not lost
157
upon the United States. In 2003 US gross oil imports Irom the Persian
GulI were recorded at 2.5 million bbl/d, which accounted Ior about 22
percent oI US net oil imports and 12 percent oI US oil demand. Its
allies in Western Europe (defned as European countries belonging to
the Organization Ior Economic Cooperation and Development-OECD)
averaged 2.6 million bbl/d and Japan with imports oI 4.2 million bbl/d
sharply increased its dependence on the Persian GulI Irom 57 percent oI
total oil imports in 1988 to a high oI 78 percent in 2003.
The US Ioreign policy objective in the region is to secure
uninterrupted fow oI Persian GulI oil to the US and its allies as well as
to ensure that control over the major oil production Iacilities remains in
the hands oI countries and governments which are Iriendly to the United
States. The overthrow in 1979 oI the Shah oI Iran and the establishment
in Tehran oI a revolutionary Islamic regime whose policies ran counter
to US interests and some aspects oI which were perceived by pro-US
monarchies and sheikhdoms oI the Persian GulI with trepidation, caused
the US to view the new regime as hostile to its vital interests in the
region.
It is indeed most unIortunate that even though there is a confuence
oI Iranian and American interests in Iraq, AIghanistan, Iree fow oI oil
and combating Al-Qaeda, the conIrontation between the two countries
continues to escalate. It appears that Iran`s nuclear programme, its
opposition to Israel and the accumulated distrust and acrimony oI nearly
three decades cancel out the potential Ior a Iran-US rapprochement that
lies in overlapping interests in other key areas. The United States is
virulently opposed to Iran`s nuclear programme, which it believes is
aimed at regional dominance and threatens Israel. Thus Iar, the United
States has Iollowed the diplomatic route in addressing the issue. Initially,
it was leIt to the US` European allies to negotiate an acceptable resolution
oI the problem. When the EU3-Iran talks came to a dead-end, the United
Nations nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, was activated and thereaIter the
UNSC which has unanimously adopted two resolutions calling upon
Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and seriously negotiate or Iace
Iurther sanctions.
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
Dangerously, both Ior the region and Ior global prosperity, neither
the United States nor its regional protg Israel have ruled out the use
oI Iorce in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. At a briefng with Radio
Free Liberty on 21 August 2007, the US Under-Secretary oI State Ior
Political AIIairs Nicholas Burns stated:
'We have some time to make aiplomacy successful. We know
that aiplomacy is a combination of offering -- as we have -- to
help Iran to help cope with its electricity shortages by helping
to buila a civil nuclear power system. But also being willing to
sanction. Ana to increase economic pressure on Iran, shoula that
be necessary, ana it is aehnitely necessary. Frankly I think the
Unitea States has maae a gooa faith effort. I believe we shoula
continue that effort. I think we shoula stay focusea on aiplomacy,
ana as I saia before, exhaust aiplomacy. But Presiaent Bush has
been very clear, ana many senior members of both parties of the
Congress have also been very clear. the Unitea States ultimately
has a variety of options, incluaing, of course weve never taken
the military option off the table, but we certainly prefer ana are
aeaicatea to a peaceful aiplomatic solution ana I think that will
be the focus of the international efforts -- aiplomacy -- over the
coming months as we try to get the Iranians to accept our offer
to negotiate.`
As Ior Israel, Yossi Mekelberg, Associate Fellow, Middle East
Program at Chatham House believes that in the absence oI diplomatic
leverage on Iran and the Iact that Israel cannot hurt it economically, the
decision-makers in Jerusalem might come to believe that their only option,
iI international eIIorts Iailed to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, was
a military strike, probably by air. Former ChieI oI StaII, Dan Halutz,
when asked how Iar Israel was willing to go to stop the Iranian program,
replied Two thousana kilometres roughly the distance between Israel
and Iran`s nuclear Iacilities at Natanz and EsIahan. To improve its
intelligence-gathering capabilities, Israel launched a satellite which can
take clear photographs oI locations around the world, including in Iran.
Yet, Israel is well aware that a military strike on Iran would be very
complex and did not guarantee success; that it had no capacity to destroy
159
the entire Iranian nuclear inIrastructure; and that the response in the
wider Middle East and Islamic world, especially in the short term, might
be severe. While the international community might not be sorry to see
the Iranian nuclear programme suIIer a serious setback, most would be
quick to condemn Israel Ior acting unilaterally, Ior risking an Iranian
reaction and endangering international stability. Various countries,
either individually or collectively, might look Ior ways to retaliate and
punish Israel.
Israel`s policy, as expressed by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,
was to present the threat oI a nuclear Iran as a challenge to the whole
international system. Olmert said in an interview in April 2006 that
Israel should not be at the IoreIront oI this confict, and emphasized the
danger posed by Iran to the 'well-being of Europe ana America fust as
much as to the state of Israel.` He even declared that: 'To assume that
Israel woula be the hrst to go into a military confrontation with Iran
representea a misunaerstanaing of the issue.` In a speech on 24 January
2007 to the Herzliya ConIerence, regarded as setting the Israeli agenda
Ior the year to come, the Prime Minister put the Iranian issue at the top
oI the country`s priorities. He made it clear that Ior the state oI Israel,
Iran posed a real threat, and that 'there is not one among us who aoes
not sense the aangers inherent in this threat, not only to Israel, but also
to the future of the region ana the stability of the worla oraer.` Although
Olmert was still at pains to emphasize the need Ior international action,
his speech was laced with intimations that iI the international community
Iailed to stop Iran, Israel would take the necessary steps to do so. 'We
have the right to full freeaom of action to act in aefence of our vital
interests. We will not hesitate to use it. I ao not suggest that anyone
mistakes our restraint ana responsibility, or presumes that it will harm
our aetermination ana capability to act when necessary."
25
US or Israeli attack on Iran would spell disaster Ior the United
States and the region. I do not believe that anybody in his right senses in
the United States would be contemplating an invasion and occupation
oI Iran with a view to eliminate their nuclear programme and install a
government in Tehran oI their choice. II at all such a hair-brained scheme
does fnd Iavour with the United States it could meet a Iate worse than
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
Vietnam. Unlike neighbouring Iraq where the United States Ior the past
Iour years has been battling an assorted pack oI militias which are also
fghting each other, in Iran they would be met with Ierocious resistance
by a proud, united and a highly motivated nation which would rally
behind the regime oI president Ahmadinejad.

Even an attack limited to targeting Iran`s nuclear installations would
at best delay Iran`s nuclear programme. On the other hand, it would
serve to strengthen the present Iranian government as the people shore
up the Islamic Republic in the Iace oI US/Israel aggression. The current
anti-American trend in the region would gain Iurther momentum, as it
would among Muslims worldwide, where the strike would be seen as yet
another evidence oI the US anti-Muslim campaign. The worst aIIected
would be the autocratic governments oI the Persian GulI and the Middle
East. Already their close military and economic embrace oI the United
States and perceived impotency on the Palestinian question has given
rise to unease and Irustration among their peoples. Even though there
is concern among the governments and peoples oI the Arab states oI
the Persian GulI regarding Iran`s nuclear programme, the real threat to
the Middle East is believed to be Irom Israel with its massive nuclear
arsenal.
A confict with Iran would not only reinIorce the anti-American
trend in the region and beyond but would contribute tangibly to the
lowering oI US power and prestige. In April 2006 Zbigniew Brzezinski,
president Jimmy Carter`s National Security Advisor during the Iranian
Revolution and the subsequent US embassy crisis (1979-81) told David
Ignatius oI the Washington Post, 'I think of war with Iran as the enaing
of Americas present role in the worla.Iraq may have been a preview
of that, but it is still reaeemable if we get out fast. In a war with Iran,
well get araggea aown for 20 or 30 years. The worla will conaemn us.
We will lose our position in the worla.`
26

As Ior the regional or even global economy, the price oI oil
would skyrocket undermining global growth. It would seriously aIIect
countries like Pakistan whose limited Ioreign exchange earnings would
be increasingly diverted towards paying the energy bill rather than Ior
161
development, lack oI which has been a signifcant Iactor in spreading
Irustration and extremism within their populace. Prince Turki Al-Faisal,
the Iormer Saudi Ambassador in Washington graphically described the
impact on oil prices in the event that diplomacy Iailed and war broke
out over Iran`s nuclear programme. He told a Brookings Institution
gathering in June 2006 that iI 'there is military conict, if bombs are
aroppea, ships are blown up, oil facilities on our siae of the Gulf are
targetea..fust the iaea of someboay hring a missile at an installation
somewhere woula shoot up the price of oil astronomically..Not fust our
installations but the whole Gulf woula become an inferno of exploaing
fuel tanks ana shut-up facilities.`
27
In short, a US or Israeli attack on
Iran would violate international law, engender regional instability,
undermine political stability, retard economic development, Iurther the
West-Muslim divide and make the ground more Iertile Ior extremism
and terrorism.

It is most unlikely that a clear winner would emerge iI the Iran-
US cold war turned hot. What is certain is that once again the region
and its peoples would be subjected to the horrors oI confict with all its
attendant misery, the damaging oI their environment and a dissipation oI
their resources. In all the major problems - Iraq, AIghanistan, Palestine,
Nuclear, Terrorism and Oil - that the United States Iaces in the region,
Iran is in a position to play a constructive role. It is unrealistic to expect
that Iran can be beaten into submission. It is too strong Ior that. The most
reasonable and sensible course is to engage Iran as an equal interlocutor
and without setting preconditions. The recent talks between Iranian
and US diplomats on Iraq is a good beginning, but the scope oI the
interaction needs to be expanded to cover other subjects, in particular
the nuclear issue. The last thing that Iran desires is tension and confict.
It has had more than its Iair share oI turmoil. Yet, it would be but logical
Ior a country subjected to aggression and now to encirclement to adopt
measures that would give it security and peace oI mind. This explains to
a great extent the rationale behind the country`s nuclear programme. In
the context oI its historical experience Iran has always Ielt vulnerable to
Ioreign interests and intervention. What deputy Ioreign minister Larijani
pointed out in a major Ioreign policy address is as relevant today as it
was in August 1989 when he pointed out:
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
'.our region is a region of controls. Its geography is very
simple. Some of the countries are unaer the control of Britain,
some are unaer US control..First of all these [powers{ want
to keep their inuence, ana secona they want to expana their
inuence. From this geography we grasp the aynamics of control
in the region...The aialectic of our relations with the worla is
very clear. We cannot overlook the possibility of someone wanting
to gain control over us. ..The US is one of those countries which
has always meant to control each time it has triea to contact us.
So we have tola them a big No ana they have left after losing
their aignity.`
28

A confict with Iran would spell catastrophe Ior the Persian GulI
and beyond. It is defnitely not in the interest oI Iran, whose economic
backbone is oil. Tehran`s record oI the past nearly 30 years shows that
it has not been a destabilizing Iactor in the region. The Soviet Union`s
invasion oI AIghanistan, the decade-long US-backed mujahideen
resistance to the Soviet presence, Iraq`s eight-year 'imposea war`
on Iran, the dismemberment oI the Soviet Union and the rise oI
independent states on Iran`s northern borders in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, Saddam Hussein`s invasion oI Kuwait and the US-led war
on Iraq produced shock waves that swept across the region. None oI
these cataclysmic events were oI Tehran`s making. In Iact, Iran was a
victim (Saddam Hussein`s invasion oI Iran in September 1980), a healer
(succour to 2 million AIghan reIugees and calling Ior the withdrawal oI
Soviet troops), and a bystander (collapse oI the Soviet Union).

A secure and stable Persian GulI is in the vital interest oI Iran as it is
in the vital interest oI the Arab countries oI the Persian GulI and oI the
United States. It is in this context that Tehran`s blueprint Ior the security
and stability oI the Persian GulI should be seen. The 10-point proposal
was unveiled by Dr. Hassan Rowhani, representative oI the Iranian
Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at the World Economic
Forum meeting in Doha in April 2007. Its salient Ieatures were:
(i) Establishment oI the Persian GulI Security and Cooperation
Organization that would include the six members oI the n
163
GulI Cooperation Council (GCC) plus Iran and Iraq, based
on Article 8 oI UN Security Council Resolution 598.
(ii) Organizing a collective security system Ior fghting terrorism,
extremism, sectarianism, organized crime, drug smuggling
and dealing with other common security concerns.
(iii) Gradual removal oI various limitations Ior political, security,
economic, and cultural cooperation as a fnal goal.
(iv) Development oI commercial cooperation with regard to
existing trade capacities and joint investments in economic
plans Ior establishing a Iree trade bloc between regional
countries.
(v) Devising a plan Ior guaranteeing the production and export
oI energy in the region in order to saIeguard the interests oI
regional states and stabilize the international energy market.
(vi) Building trust between the regional countries concerning
nuclear issues, including monitoring and verifcation oI each
others` nuclear programmes in a voluntary and non-intrusive
manner.
(vii) Establishment oI a joint (nuclear) enrichment consortium
between the regional countries Ior producing (nuclear) Iuel and
other peaceIul uses oI nuclear energy under the supervision
oI the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(viii) Serious cooperation among regional countries Ior the
establishment oI a WMD-Iree Middle East.
(ix) Terminating the regional arms race in order to release Iunds
Ior economic development and fghting poverty.
(x) Withdrawal oI Ioreign military Iorces Irom the region and the
establishment oI a system in which regional countries would
Iqbal Ahmaa Khan
provide Iull security in the Persian GulI region.
29
Dr. Rowhani`s proposal covers vital contemporary issues - oil,
terrorism, nuclear, arms race, Ioreign military presence and regional Iree
trade. The proposed organization brings within its Iold, in addition to the
six GCC countries, both Iran and Iraq. The dilemma Ior the militarily
weak and predominantly Sunni (with the exception oI Bahrain) GCC
countries is whether they should step out oI the US security umbrella
and engage with the region`s heavyweights, the Shiite states oI Iran and
Iraq in a new security set-up. The answer is that they need to break new
ground iI they want to unhitch the client relationship that has characterized
their ties with the West, in particular the United States. Iran, on the other
hand, must come out with sincere and pragmatic policies matched with
action and eschew infammatory rhetoric in order to instil confdence
among its neighbours that it neither intends to interIere in their internal
aIIairs nor wishes to assume the role oI a regional hegemon. An end
to the arms race, withdrawal oI Ioreign military Iorces and mutually
reinIorcing confdence measures would promote stability and security
in this sensitive region, provide a fllip to economic development and
remove an important cause oI radicalism and extremism within the
states oI the region. It is in this manner that the Persian GulI region can
contribute signifcantly to international peace and prosperity.
References
1 Department oI Energy, United States Government.
2 Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary Ior Political AIIairs, Michael Stein Address on 'US
Middle Policy, at The Washington Institute , Washington, DC, 11 May 2006.
3 USA Today, 13 August 2005.
4 Yossi Mekelberg, Associate Fellow, Middle East Program at Chatham House. 'From
War of Woras to Woras of War, March 2007.
5 Arab News, 11 December 2006.
6 Emile el-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, 'The Arab Gulf States in the .Shaaow of the
Iranian Nuclear Challenge,` 26 May 2006.
7 Arab Times, 13 May 2007.
8 Tariq Al-Homayed, 'I Cry Out in the GulI, ' Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 13 April 2006.
9 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, (London), 17 April 2006.
165
10 Al- Watan, (Saudi Arabia), 14 April 2006.
11 Al-Dustour, (Jordan), 16 April 2006.
12 Al-Watan, Qatar), 14 April 2006.
13 Al-Dustour, (Jordan), 13 April 2006.
14 PEW Global Attitudes Project, 2006.
15 BBC World, 13 June 2007.
16 Robin Wright and Peter Blake, Washington Post, 8 December 2004.
17 Salah Nasrawi, Associated Press, 9 April 2006.
18 International Herala Tribune, 22 January 2007.
19 Vali Nasr, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006.
20 President Ahmadinejad`s address to the United Nations General Assembly on 20
September 2006.
21 Associated Press, 29 March 2007.
22 The Observer, 29 July 2007.
23 Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary oI State Ior Political AIIairs` testimony beIore the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 29 March 2007.
24 Council oI Foreign Relations 'Backgrounder prepared by Lionel Beehner, 16 February
2007.
25 Yossi Mekelberg, Associate Fellow, Middle East Programme at Chatham House, 'From
War of Woras to Woras of War,` March 2007.
26 Cited by Joseph A. Kechichiea in his article 'Can Conservative Arab Monarchies Endure
a Fourth War in the Persian GulI? Miaale East Journal, Spring 2007.
27 Oil prices could triple upon a US invasion oI Iraq, Arab New, 21 June 2006 as quoted in
Joseph A. Kechichian`s article 'Can Conservative Arab Monarchies Endure a Fourth
War in the Persian GulI? Miaale East Journal, Spring 2007.
28 Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani`s interview in Resalat, Tehran 7 August 1989, as quoted
in The Centre of the Universe, by Graham E. Fuller.
29 Mehr News Agency, 10 April 2007.
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa
(VVD\
Some Reections on
Islam and Governance
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa

*
Tolerance level Ior a rational discussion on any topic relating
to Islam has never been as minimal as it is today. Muslim history
shows certain rulers punishing divergences Irom the oIfcial
doctrine. The punishments, however, were accorded by the state,
as opposed to today`s groups oI selI righteous religious zealots
who consider it their sacred duty to take law in their own hands and
enIorce punishments on those they consider to be erring Muslims.
Some views expressed in this brieI essay may not be in accord
with the platitudes purported to be selI evident truths. These views
are shared, however, not only by many Muslim scholars living in
the West who want to reinterpret Islam to make it a workable system
in the 21
st
century, but also by some classical Islamic scholars.
UnIortunately, almost all attempts oI modernity - to understand
Islamic religion as a social phenomenon with the intention oI
entering into a dialogical discourse with Western academia is
looked upon with disdain by Muslim clergy. Western Muslims`
main motivation is to retain their religion as something valuable
to their existence and provide a bedrock Ior keeping their identity
intact. Contrary to some westernized perceptions they do not want
to discard their religion but want to readdress the paradigmatic
basis oI Islam Ior developing an authentic Islamic identity. The
madarassah ulema look at their attempts with contempt; branding
*
Dr. Manzoor Ahmad is the Rector oI International Islamic University, Islamabad
167
Some Reections on Islam ana Governance
them as westernized deviants bordering on apostasy. When they
themselves are desirous oI looking modern they use modern
terminology and concepts and assume that they have subsumed all
oI modernity within the classical Islamic doctrine or Islam per se.
One prevalent attempt oI pseudo-modernism is to proclaim
Islam to an ideological system` rather than a religion. Phrases like
Islamic Economic System or Islamic Political System are used
in the same Iashion as the socialists used the terms oI democracy
or socialist economy. Following suit, though unsupported by the
necessary philosophical underpinnings, Islamic pseudo-modernists
want to make us believe that Islam has a well defned economic
system; a political system and a pervasive social philosophy ;
that Islamic state` is a well defned concept in the modern sense
oI constitutional democracies etc. This characterization oI Islam
gained currency during the struggle Ior independence (in India),
under the infuence oI the nineteenth and early twentieth century
ideologies and philosophical doctrines. The systemizing thought oI
Maulana Maudoodi, as well as the language and party structure oI
Jamat Islami, conIorms to Marxist ideologism. In their eagerness
to prove that Islam has a systematic theory oI state, they articulated
Islamic concepts in modern terminology, without giving much
thought as to the nature oI such concepts. For instance, the
platitude that 'sovereignty belongs to Allah was sneaked into
Muslim constitutionalism without critical insights oI the concepts
oI political and legal sovereignty as against cosmic and ontological
sovereignty. Political sovereignity in a modern state, in addition
to its legal responsibility, has to Iulfl the day to day requirements
oI the state as an eIfcacious agent; the Imamiyyah theory is much
closer to this concept oI religious sovereignty.
It is plausible to assume that the pretext oI God`s political
sovereignty was required to make room Ior theocracy in Islam;
a concept which is otherwise derided by religious scholars as a
characteristic oI Jewish or Christian religions. The claim that only
an alim can decipher God`s intentions, as given in the Quran and
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa
Sunna, in order to implement the politico-legal sovereignty oI God
provides a privileged status to a certain class oI people against
others. The same muddle headedness can be seen in describing
the higera oI the Prophet to Medina as iI its sole purpose was to
establish an Islamic state` with a constitution necessitated by the
new political theory.
Indeed, Medina eventually became a state, but to say that the
mithaq was a constitution` oI the state is to stretch the point beyond
reasonable limits. Medina was a supra tribal society put together
under the patronage oI the Prophet. Had Medina been a state` in the
modern sense oI the word, as we are required to believe, it would
be unexplainable as to why all the essential components oI the state
were leIt undefned, making it possible Ior all types oI states to be
termed as Islamic. The procedures and methods oI establishing a
khilafah also remained undetermined and eventually brute Iorce or
power became the deciding element Ior establishing the Caliphal
authority. The election` oI the frst Iour caliphs leIt the so-called
concept oI an Islamic state` very equivocal. Later theorizing by
Muslim political thinkers was more oIten than not an attempt to
justiIy the status-quo without propounding a clear, cogent and
workable constitutional theory.
The migration oI the Prophet to Medina should be read in the
total context oI a tribal society, its trade, its system oI arbitration,
its pacts and alliances. It was basically to transIorm the tribal social
structures which were impediments to social development and to
evolve a supra tribal structure, i.e., umma or Pax Islamica` where
all members, even those who should not accept the new religion
would belong to one organization on equal Iooting. The Prophet
did not establish a state`, nor did he unite the Arabs; he took over
the existing established regime and modifed it, introducing as
Iew changes as possible. He never lost sight oI his ultimate goal,
i.e. ensuring justice and salvation oI his Iollowers, and promoting
peace and prosperity. Seen in this perspective the aim oI a modern
Muslim state can also be summed up around these eternal values.
169
The Iorm that a state would adopt may be relative to the spatio
temporal situation.
Modern apologists are only trained in classical hermeneutics
which normally operates through a deductive method, converting
oral or written statements into propositional structures and drawing
conclusions syllogistically. The meanings oI the major premises
are normally determined through sentences similar in syntax in a
Iormal structure oI subjects and predicates. The new hermeneutical
understanding oI the nature oI language and its structure has yet to
seep into the minds oI contemporary clergy as did Greek logic into
the minds oI their predecessors. One reason Ior a quick absorptions
oI Greek philosophy by the early Muslim scholars could have been
the availability oI a scholastic paradigm oI Christianity or Judaism.
Contemporary hermeneutics has not made such an impact even in
Western religious thinking probably because they are not conIronted
with problems similar to those Iaced by Copernicus or Galileo. But
in the Muslim world religious edicts become problematic when they
deal with contemporaneous socio-legal issues, which the modern
west has solved by a two pronged strategy. They classifed language
into various categories and developed criteria Ior their validity
separately. Two syntactically similar statements may belong to two
diIIerent logical categories and the nature oI predicate in one may
not be the same as in the other, making their rules oI verifcation
diIIerent. Secondly, they separated religious belieIs Irom political
structures. The legal issues no more rest on edicts Irom God or
clergy, but are Iormulated on the basis oI their utility, practicality
and their moral value.
The Islamic polity, as it developed later, perIormed three
distinct Iunctions. One oI these was to maintain law and order
within the jurisdiction oI the state. This was done by the rulers
who, more oIten than not, perIormed the Iunction oI making laws
and enIorcing their authority with, or without reIerence to any
religious edict, especially in cases where certain groups` posed
a threat to the authority oI the ruler. The tort cases were normally
decided by the qa:i courts according to the hqh commonly accepted
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa
in the reign oI the ruler. Matters regarding international conficts
were decided by the rulers Ior which purpose they normally had a
hand picked council. Support Irom the ulema class was normally
available in such cases. A centrally codifed law Ior the state was
rigorously rejected by the Muslim rulers, and a central legislature
was never constituted Ior their realms.
No doubt the polity remained within the legal parameters oI the
decisions taken by the Prophet during his days and later by the Iour
pious caliphs, but contemporary terms like constitutionalism and
legalism were never a Iorte oI Muslim society. It may be noted that
during the time oI the Prophet and the Iour caliphs there was much
more creativeness in legal matters, so much so, that certain decisions
oI the Prophet himselI were apparently not in conIormity with the
Quran and later, during the regime oI caliphs, with the Quran and
sunnah. This creativity, due to historical and psychological reasons,
came to an end during the 2
nd
& 3
rd
centuries oI hijera, when a very
useIul tool in the Iorm oI Greek logic became available to Muslim
ulema. From then onwards this creativity was circumscribed within
a deductive system oI logical reasoning, on the basis oI which civil
society evolved sets oI laws, along with a number oI sub-sets to be
known as sharia. The term sharia in the sense oI a system oI legal
propositions is oI a later origin; earlier it was used in a general non
legal sense.
In a modern state like Pakistan, iI one wants to replicate the
classical sharia then a Iunctional demarcation oI the various
authorities oI the state has to be replicated also. In other words
the ruler`s authenticity would rest on the Iorce and power they
possess, an implicit justifcation oI which is available within the
sharia parameters. The responsibility oI the ruler then would be to
maintain law and order in the society Ior which use oI coercive Iorce
would be justifable. The same rulers, along with their Council,
would be responsible to take decisions in international matters as
long as they do not violate any explicit legal edict (like breaking
a promise or waging war without justifcation or committing war
171
crimes as explicated by Islamic Sharia). Even iI they transgress,
organizations oI the civil society, like courts, or a group oI ulema,
would hardly have any power to stop them. In so Iar as tort cases
are concerned, they would be decided by courts established by the
rulers and supported by its executive authority. In a sense such
a state would be a peculiar combination oI secular and religious
strands working together and be a replica oI classical Muslim
states. II this is not what we mean by a modern Islamic state, with
a constitution, a legislative assembly, an executive system oI civil
services, a standing army and at the same time a just, normal and
value oriented democracy then the Iunctional parameters oI each
authority have to be redefned and understood very clearly.
For any state to be termed Islamic (in the modern sense) it has
to Iunction within the universal moral parameters which are also
shared by Islam. II a state`s behavior is immoral then it can not be
termed Islamic. These moral values are expressed in the Iorm oI
spatio-temporal systems which guarantee social justice, equality
and basic human rights. The state authorities should have the
Ireedom to make, amend or repeal laws as long as they saIeguard
the value system. Laws are made to attain certain purposes. II, due
to changed social structures, a particular law becomes ineIfcacious
in achieving the goal Ior which it was made then it can be amended,
repealed or kept in abeyance by the legislative assembly. No
person or group oI persons should possess veto rights to declare
any law Islamic or unIslamic. Law making is a process, which
starts as a civil society activity, through expression oI opinion and
measures suggested by knowledgeable persons oI the society which
eventually permeate into legislative assemblies which may then
legislate as deemed appropriate. Contrary to theocracy, in which
authority rests only with a class oI people who could declare any
law valid or invalid, in an Islamic state this authority rests with the
people. The Islamic ethical system demands that laws be universal
and egalitarian, irrespective oI their personal belieIs.
In Islam the raison-aetre oI establishing a state, as has been
Dr. Man:oor Ahmaa
enunciated by Islamic political thinkers, is to maintain law and
order; to Iacilitate the persons living within the state to perIorm
their religious rites and duties ; to establish a system which could do
justice to each and every section oI the society. It is indeed true that
the spirit oI Islamic system is democratic rather than authoritarian.
During the early days this democratic spirit was imbibed by the
system through tribal structures which were replaced later by
monarchies. In modern times the Islamic moral ethos can best
be expressed in terms oI elections, limited terms oI oIfces, and
universal Iranchise.
One oI the Iunctions oI the state is to provide the basic
necessities oI liIe. In order to do so it may levy taxes and iI necessary
promulgate ceilings to land holdings and wealth. It is a moot point
whether Islamic state should control religious education and places
oI worship specially mosque and madarsas. Nevertheless, the
curricula taught in educational institutions should have the sanction
either oI the government or oI autonomous bodies created Ior this
purpose by the government. The government should also have the
duty and control oI the construction oI all types oI buildings in
the sense that they Iulfl the requirements oI a civilized society
and should be in the larger interest oI the public. The building
oI religious institutions including mosques, temples, churches
and madarssahs should also be approved by relevant authorities,
keeping in view public interests. The operative part oI a modern
state should be strictly governed by explicit laws and it is the duty
oI the authorities to see to it that these laws are not to be violated.
The Head oI state in the classical period combined in him all
executive powers: civil, military and religious. In practice Muslim
rulers operated through a practical biIurcation between religious
and state Iunctions. Religion did not play any part in waging
wars, signing peace treaties, laying down the modalities oI the
selection oI the Head oI the state, determining and collecting oI
taxes, bestowing honours or money on individuals, etc. These
depended on the fat oI the ruler. Such a modality would not work
173
under present circumstances. State aIIairs were dealt with mostly
in consultation with selected individuals; an improvement oI the
old Arab system oI naai (Assembly) where the elders oI the tribe
or city ran the aIIairs by mutual consultation. The Islamic concept
oI shura was a developed Iorm oI the Arab naai system, likewise,
a new system can be evolved where all such Iunctions can be
perIormed by an elected parliament, drawing its powers Irom the
people who are the real sovereign. The cosmic sovereignty oI Allah
thus is not disputed but is enshrined in an eternal contract whereby
sovereignty is delegated to the people Ior running their own aIIairs
in whatever way they like.
Book Reviews
1itle: Diaries of Fiela Marshal
Mohammaa Ayub Khan (1966 -
1972).
Edited and Annotated by: Craig
Baxter.
Pages: 599 (incluaing 55 pages of
Appenaix, Notes ana Inaex).
First Published: 2007
Price (Paperback). Rs. 795/-
Publishers: Oxfora University Press,
Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub
Khan, president oI Pakistan Ior
eleven years Irom October 1958 to
March 1969, believed he was shaping
history. His book, Frienas Not
Masters, published in 1967 spells out
his policies and perceptions mainly
Irom the time oI his 1958 coup till
his election as president on 2 January
1965. Ayub`s Dairies, edited and
annotated by Craig Baxter, have now
been published i.e., thirty-fve years
aIter the last entry was recorded.
The Diaries provide a rare
glimpse into the mind oI a leader
whose rule spanned more than a
sixth oI Pakistan`s 60-year existence
as an independent state. The dairies
oI a ruler can never be entirely
personal and must necessarily record
consequential national, regional and
global events. They are oI incalculable
value Ior the historian and the scholar
and, at the very least, provide a useIul
chronology. UnIortunately, the entries
are confned to only six years starting
Irom 2 September 1966 and ending
abruptly on 30 November 1972. The
fnal entry is Iollowed by the Editor`s
note stating that
the Field Marshal had stopped
recording his diary because oI Iailing
health to which he succumbed on
20 April 1974. He was buried the
Iollowing day at his ancestral village,
Rehana, near Abbottabad.
OI the little more than the six-
year period recorded in the Dairies
only three pertain to the time when
Ayub was president the remaining
portion was written aIter his Iorced
resignation in March 1969. The
author attempts to be introspective
and, at times, even philosophical.
Frienas Not Masters combined
with the Dairies span the entire period
oI Ayub Khan`s rule minus the twenty
crucial months Irom the beginning oI
1965 to the autumn oI 1966. Thus no
insight is provided on the IateIul 17-
day September 1965 war with India
which initially raised nationalistic
impulses to unprecedented heights
only to be dampened by the UN
Security Council-brokered ceasefre
oI 23 September and the subsequent
Tashkent Declaration oI 10 January
1966 Iacilitated by Soviet premier
Alexei Kosygin. It was in this period
%RRN 5HYLHZV
175
Book Reviews
that Ayub`s decline began. His critics,
who Ielt that the war was going in
Pakistan`s Iavour, accused him oI a
sell-out to India by agreeing to the
ceasefre. It is, thereIore, interesting
that the Dairies begin at a time when
Ayub`s aura was Iading and the
initial rumblings oI a political storm,
howsoever Iaint, could be heard.
Or is this yet another example oI
the blinkered vision absolute rulers
acquire because oI their reIusal to
accept emerging realities?
The events recorded in the Dairies
occurred during the bipolar Cold War
era. Pakistan became the US`s 'most
allied ally but this was to change to
the 'most sanctioned ally as the Cold
War ended. Although the Iree market
economic policies pursued by the
Ayub regime resulted in spectacular
growth, the gap between the haves
and have-nots widened adding to
the poplar resentment against Ayub
and his ruling coterie. Policy makers
seemed to Iorget that an island oI
prosperity cannot not sustain itselI in
an ocean oI poverty.
The Diaries are undoubtedly
interesting inasmuch as they reveal
aspects oI the author`s complex
personality even though they
were written with the intention oI
publication albeit more than three
days later. The frst entry, on 2
September 1966, is a draIt letter to
the Governor oI West Pakistan, Malik
Amir Muhammad Khan, in which the
latter is allowed to proceed abroad
ostensibly Ior medial check-up but six
days later Ayub expresses his views
about the governor and politics: A
betrayal is unforgivable ana I was
forcea to let him to go. The lesson
is that in politics, hunarea percent
reliability is unattainable ana thus
keeping a man in one place for too
long is not a souna policy.
The same day the President
expresses his views about the US
policy towards South Asia: It is very
obvious that Americans are very
reluctant to ao anything that will
annoy Inaia. Our argument that we
have a much smaller force than Inaia
ana are no threat to it cuts no ice with
them. It looks that they even expect
us to aeny ourselves the right of self-
aefence.
On 4 September, the President
records his six-point programme
Ior the Muslim League, through
which he Iought the presidential
elections in January 1965. The fIth
point is particularly interesting as it
demonstrates his pragmatic approach
to situations and people:
a. Unity of nation basea on a
strong Centre with a consiaerable
measure of provincial autonomy.
b. Security of country through
unity of the nation, strong ana
prosperous Pakistan ana purposeful
foreign policy.
c. Development in eaucation,
inaustry ana agriculture. Parity
between the two wings.
a. Iaeology of Islam. Inculcate
it ana make it play a positive role in
Book Reviews
attaining unity ana higher spiritual
ana moral values.
e. Approach problems of life
with maturity, pragmatism ana
realism. Emotions ana passions have
a place but they must be temperea
with reason. The way to progress
ana salvation lies through critical
inquiry ana rational approach. When
emotions take charge reason goes
out ana when reason goes out, all
hopes of attaining worthwhile results
evaporate. In other woras be kina, but
be hara-heaaea ana have your feet
hrmly on the grouna. Avoia talking in
the air.
f. Eliminate extravagan:a ana
the un-Islamic customs.
Two days later on 6 September
1966, the President quotes Irom
ConIucius:
Confucius true name Kung Fu-
T:u likea aavising politicians as
follows.
a. Common hera shoula be lea
with kinaness, fustice ana paternalism
Golaen Rule.
b. The cautious selaom err.
c. Not more easily aoes the grass
bena before the wina than the masses
yiela to the will of above them.
a. Exalt the straight, set asiae
the crookea, the people will be loyal.

On 23 September, the President
records:
I have always been fascinatea
by Professor Parkinsons writings.
His book on the future history of
mankina is most revealing. His latest
publication is Parkinsons Law of
Delay.
In every Organi:ation there
is Abominable No Man. Says No
to everything, because to say Yes
requires an obligation to carry out
something. No gooa arguing with No
Man.
Raise the level ana get to Yes
Man, which every Organi:ation has.
On 22 January 1967, the Field
Marshal gives his perception about
the nation:
The people living in the areas
of Pakistan have always been rulea
by outsiaers. They have never been
masters of their own aestiny. The
result is that they are instinctively
suspicious of their rulers ana this
tenaency subsists even toaay. But
one must ao whatever gooa one can
ana help people aevelop healthy ana
constructive outlook.
Two days later, on 24 January,
the President records his meeting
with the Finance Minister:
The Finance Minister Mr. Uqaili
came to see me to aiscuss certain
problems. We are going through a
aifhcult economic situation, so these
consultations are necessary. I askea
him how he was liking his fob. He saia
it was thrilling. It buckea me up no
ena. I tola him that there were three
fobs I woula never like to ao. To be
a bearer, cook or a Finance Minister,
because whatever you ao, you can
never satisfy your master.
177
Book Reviews
On 25 March 1969 Ayub recorded
his speech to the nation explaining
why it had become necessary Ior
him to step asiae. The Iollowing
day he explained the rationale oI his
resignation to members oI the cabinet
and writes in his dairy: It was quite
obvious that the politicians are hell
bent on aisrupting the country..I
cant see any politician of national
outlook or stature rise for a long time
to come. Besiaes aemocratic methoas
are foreign to our people.
1itle: Shameful Flight

Author: Stanley Wolpert
Pages: 238 (incluaing 44 pages of
Notes, Bibliography ana Inaex).
First Published: 2006
Price: Rs. 495/-
Publishers: Oxfora University Press.
The University oI CaliIornia`s
Stanley Wolpert is recognized as an
expert on South Asia and particularly
the Ireedom struggle against British
colonialism. His biographies on
Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru and Zulfkar
Ali Bhutto are scholarly works as is his
A New History of Inaia. All writings
must reveal the author`s perspective
oI events and personalities and, to this
extent, are subjective. The alternative
is that they are reduced to drab
chronological narrations oI events.
Wolpert`s views, never cynical, are
well-argued and Iact-based and,
thereIore, have not been challenged.
Shameful Flight, an unusual
title Ior a book on the South Asian
Ireedom movement, is taken Iorm
an expression frst used by Winston
Churchill when he was the leader oI
the opposition in the British
parliament. Wolpert
acknowledges his debt to the Indian
author, Khushwant Singh, whose
searing novel, Mano Mafra, ('Train
to Pakistan, New York, 1956),
vividly portrayed the dimensions oI
the catastrophe that the partition oI
the Punjab brought to the population
living on either side oI that state: I
became more acutely conscious of
the historic aimensions of Britains
irresponsibly hasty witharawal from
Inaia ana the economic ana political
consequences of partition, when I
workea on my 1innah of Pakistan,
twenty years later.
Shameful Flight is accordingly
dedicated: To the memory of the
millions of aefenceless Hinau, Muslim
ana Sikh victims of British Inaias
partition and the opening page reads:
In mia-August of 1947, the
worlas mightiest moaern empire,
on which 'the sun never set,`
abanaonea its vow to protect one-
hfth of humankina. Britains shameful
ight from its Inaian empire came only
ten weeks after its last viceroy, Lora
Louis ('Dickie`) Mountbatten took it
upon himself to cut ten months from
the brief time allottea by the Labour
Governments Cabinet to witharaw
its air ana eet cover, as well as the
shiela of British troops ana arms,
from South Asias 400 million Hinaus,
Book Reviews
Muslims ana Sikhs.
The author then elaborates this
curtain-raiser to his work in the
second paragraph:
The hastily ana ineptly arawn
lines of partition of North Inaias
two greatest provinces, Punfab
ana Bengal, slashea through their
multicultural heartlanas. They were
arawn by an English furist, who haa
never set foot on the soil of either
province. Following Britains ight,
a tsunami of more than ten million
aesperate refugees swept over North
Inaia. Hinaus ana Sikhs rushea
to leave ancestral homes in newly
createa Pakistan, Muslims ea in
panic out of Inaia. Each sought shelter
in next aoors aominion. Estimates
vary as to the number who expirea
or were muraerea before reaching
their promisea lana. A conservative
statistic is 200,000, a more realistic
total, at least one million.
With such enormous casualties,
it was but natural Ior the atrocities
to be recounted in graphic detail
in thousands oI publications that
appeared in the two newly independent
countries. The mayhem was depicted
in flms and later, with the advent oI
the electronic media, became a theme
Ior television serials. Thus the painIul
memories oI the past did not Iade
into oblivion and the bitterness was
exacerbated. This cycle oI accusation
and counter-accusation leIt indelible
scars on Pakistan-India relations. The
common heritage oI the two countries
stretching back thousands oI years
was Iorgotten to be replaced by a
conIrontational equation that has only
a Iew parallels in recent history.
Shameful Flight represents a rare
attempt by an author oI international
stature to objectively portray 'the
indecent haste with which the British
leIt India. The book thus flls a missing
page in the last days oI the raj, which
was conspicuous by the insatiable
ambition oI the last Viceroy oI British
India to become the Governor General
oI both emergent nations.
It is with a touch oI amusement that
Wolpert writes about Mounbatten`s
disappointment on Jinnah`s reIusal
to accept him as the frst Governor
General oI Pakistan:
Mountbatten was so upset by
Jinnahs refusal to allow him to
govern the aominion of Pakistan
that he haa Ismay y to Lonaon, the
aay after he met Jinnah, carrying
his TOP SECRET report to the
Cabinet ana King.. So angerea by
Jinnahs stubborn refusal to ao what
he wantea, he hnally got up ana
left the room, after warning Jinnah,
somewhat acialy It may cost you the
whole of your assets ana the future of
Pakistan. Sheer vanity or prophetic
warning? 'I have always felt ana saia
that I consiaerea it morally wrong
to stay on with only one of the two
siaes,` Mountbatten confessea in the
last paragraph of the personal report
to Atlee ana the King. Yet he aeciaea,
after Jinnahs refection, to ao fust
that, fearing that otherwise, 'Nehru
woula never forgive me, for allowing
179
Book Reviews
Jinnah once more to have his way.`
So Mountbatten convincea himself
that he was aoing the right thing by
becoming the Governor General of
Inaias Dominion alone, although
he haa 'always felt` it was morally
wrong. (page 163-164)
Nehru and Mountbatten were
hand-in-glove and went the extra
mile to ensure that the Partition Plan
was implemented to the detriment
oI Pakistan. On page 167, Wolpert
narrates:
Raacliffe triea his best to be fair
in tackling what became an impossible
fob. He coula not unaerstana why
Nehrus ana Mountbattens greatest
concern over the new Punfab boraer
line was to make sure that neither of
the Muslim mafority 'sub-aistricts`
(tehsils) of Fero:epur ana Zira,
nor the Muslim mafority aistrict of
Guraaspur shoula go to Pakistan,
since that woula have aeprivea Inaia
of airect roaa access to Kashmir.
Independence oI two countries,
India and Pakistan that in normal
circumstances would have brought
happiness and tranquillity to 400
million people let all hell lose on
them, because two men at the helm
oI aIIairs, reIused to be guided
by principles. On page 189, the
author highlights the conIession to
Mountbatten oI India`s own High
Commissioner to Pakistan:
Yet as Nehru spoke of the battle
raging in Kashmir, his own high
commissioner (Ambassaaor) to
Pakistan, Sri Prakasa aamittea to
Mountbatten that 'for the sake of
peace all arouna` the 'best thing`
Inaia coula ao was to hana over
Kashmir to Pakistan. 'I was ama:ea,`
Nehru wrote Sri Prakasa, as soon as
Mountbatten reportea what he haa
saia.
That you hintea at Kashmir being
hanaea over to Pakistan.if we aia
anything of the kina our government
woula not last many aays ana there
woula be no peace.It woula leaa to
war with Pakistan because of public
opinion here ana of war-like elements
coming in control of our policy. We
cannot ana we will not leave Kashmir
to its fate. We have to see this through
to the ena.Kashmir is going to be a
arain on our resources, but it is going
to be a greater arain on Pakistan.
How unIortunate is the unIolding
oI events that Mountbatten, who until
15 August, was the supreme authority
in India, was now reporting to Nehru,
because he chose to stay back in India
as the Governor General and the
Prime Minister oI India was taking
a decision to retain Kashmir, iI that
would drain Pakistan`s resources
more than India`s!
The author identifes Gandhi as
a sole voice oI sanity that was trying
to bring tranquillity in the region, by
ending the impasse on Kashmir. On
page 190 the book narrates:
Movea by the spirit of Christmas,
Ganahi offerea a simple solution to
ena the Kashmir War on December
25. Can we not settle the issue between
ourselves? One shoula always aamit
Book Reviews
ones mistakes. I shall aavise Pakistan
ana Inaia to sit together ana aeciae
the matter. The Maharafa can step
asiae. If they want an arbitrator for
peace they can appoint one.` It was
Mahatama Ganahis last offer to
serve Inaia in the way he knew best.
as an impartial arbitrator for peace.
Insteaa of thanks from his former
aisciples ana an immeaiate invitation
to serve as he so generously offerea,
'I have been severely reprimanaea
for what I saia concerning Kashmir,`
Ganahi reportea a few aays later.
The book concludes on page
192:
But for Inaia, as for all of South
Asia, the rainbow of feaeratea peace
woula remain more than half a century
away, on a aistant hori:on, obscurea
by wars ana a potential atomic cloua
hovering aarkly over Kashmirs
Himalayan valley bitter legacies of
Great Britains hasty, shameful ight.

1DYLG =DIDU
181
Letters to the Eaitor
Sir,
I write with reIerence to the
reportage by Ms. Anjum Niaz oI
the Seminar on Extremism Law &
Order in Pakistan held in May 2007.
While otherwise it is an excellent and
judicious piece oI reporting, I would
like to make one point clear about my
speech on the occasion. When I was
talking about revisiting the corpus oI
laws known as Sharia I did not mean
to diIIerentiate between the laws
given in sacred scriptures and the
laws eventually derived Irom the text
through a syllogistic process readily
available to Muslim jurists through
the philosophical discourse prevalent
at that time. I am not diIIerentiating
between what Ms. Niaz terms as the
Quranic injunctions` and others`.
The validity oI others` is also derived
Irom the Quranic injunctions per-se.
I maintain the sanctity oI the text,
but I do want to revisit it through
a new hermeneutics to understand
and reinterpret it to refect new
levels oI understanding necessitated
by a qualitative change in social
structures.

The injunctions relating to socio-
legal maters including those given
in the Quran and the Hadith are
unchangeable only in the sense that
you cannot substitute any line oI the
Quran with a new line oI your own. The
Quran then would no more remain a
book authored by God. But I do mean
that the criminal and civil laws given
in the Quran are relative to socio-
temporal situations though they are
defnitely based on certain universal
value principles. One should discern
the principles underlying each legal
Iormulation and iI it is Iound that the
moral objectives are not achievable
through the particular Iorm given in
the Quran it can be amended in such
a way which is more likely to achieve
the moral objectives. This was the
basic principle oI the temporality oI
Shariah which Shah Waliullah reIers
to in his book Hufatul Baligah (ch.
56-57).. The diIfculty arises when
we start assuming that societies have
not changed substantively since 1400
years. It hardly needs any argument
to prove that modes oI production,
economic organizations, political
structures and associations, human
rights Iormulations, the concept oI
nation states, outreach oI corporate
sector and globalization have
substantively changed our social
structures and in certain cases old
laws are no more eIfcacious to
saIeguard the moral Ioundation oI
our societies. We should retain the
moral substantivity but may change
/HWWHUV WR WKH (GLWRU
the saliencies iI necessary.
I have never considered legal
structures as ends in themselves
and iI these structures have become
incapable oI sustaining the values
given by the Quran and which Shah
Waliullah calls Din, they can be
changed. It requires a long rational
argument and inIormed discussion
hardly suitable Ior a halI day
seminar.
Dr. Manzoor Ahmad
Rector,
International Islamic University,
Islamabad
Sir,
Ever since the Criterion` began
its liIe which I had the opportunity to
read Irom the beginning is a Iantastic
contribution in the current magazines
and journals being published in
Pakistan with regard to its contents` as
well as very objective comments and
observations given by the reputable
scholars. It, thereIore, leaves a very
good impact and its own impression
on the minds oI the readers. All the
articles in this magazine are oI very
high standard which we generally
do not fnd in Pakistan. I may quote
my own example. The Founder oI
Criterion` Quarterly, Syed IItikhar
Murshed requested me to contribute
an article on Central Asia and
Pakistan - Propsects and Challenges`
some months back. I could not do so
as I could not fnd out adequate time
to research and write an article oI
the high standard oI the Criterion`
which I shall Inshallah do some time
in Iuture. This peaks oI volumes oI
the high standard which Criterion`
has set ever since it began publishing.
Likewise, a seminar organized by the
management oI Criterion` on the Law
and Order situation in Pakistan` in
Marriott Hotel, Islamabad some time
back and which was presided over by
Mr. Justice Khalil Ramdey who had
later pronounced the landmark and
historic verdict` as head oI the Iull
bench oI Supreme Court in the case oI
ChieI Justice oI Pakistan, Mr. IItikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry was oI such an
objective one, projecting both sides
oI the issue that I have never ever
encountered in my entire liIe during
my 40 years oI associaiton with
Pakistan Television and otherwise.
II there would be any suggestion Ior
any improvement in your magazine,
I would be too happy to put Iorward
but at the moment I have none.
With best regards.
Prof. Dr. Z. A. Qurehsi,
Head, Deptt. of International
Relations, NUML, Islamabad,
President, Society of Asian
Civilizations Pakistan.
Sir
Heartiest Congratulations to
you and your colleagues Ior starting
a magazine basically meant Ior the
intelligentsia oI Islamabad. The
city will no longer be called an
intellectual desert. With its addition,
Islamabad will compete with Lahore
and Karachi .
183
The contents oI your magazine
are oI a high standard.

I oIIer my best wishes to your
magazine with my earnest prayers to
keep it up.
Yours truly
Mahfooz ur Rahman
Islamabad,
Sir,
Your repertory oI writings is
interesting. In the intellectually drab
and pretentious Islamabad it is a much-
needed vehicle oI communication.
Much will depend on the policy oI
Criterions editorial board. I hope
your journal will not degenerate into
childish libertarianism disguising
itselI as intellectualism, serving other
nations` interests. Our people deserve
to be saved Irom cynicism and
negativism. Likewise, it is important
that scholarly journalism must come
to respect certain Ioundational values
or even assumptions holding them
sacrosanct not to be questioned. You
have whetted my appetite.
Tariq 1an
Author and Critic
Institute of Policy Studies
Islamabad.
Sir,
The 'Criterion quarterly
contains a mix oI good as well as
mediocre articles. A.G. Noorani`s
pieces, 'Bilateral Negotiations
on Kashmir: Unlearnt Lessons
(October-December 2006) and 'The
Parliamentary System in South
Asia (July-September 2007) though
controversial are, nevertheless,
scholarly. However some oI the
articles notably those by retired
bureaucrats are unreadable.
Wakil Khan,
Peshawar.
Sir,
The October-December 2006
issue oI 'Criterion contained an
interview oI the Amir oI the Jamat-
e-Islami, Qazi Hussain Ahmad.
Many oI your readers had hoped
that this would be Iollowed by other
interviews. It would be a good idea
to restart interviewing our leadership
particularly now because oI the
coming general elections.
Ahmad Nawaz,
Karachi.
Criterion QUARTERLY
I would like to Subscribe to the Criterion Quarterly
Name: ________________________________________________
Address: ______________________________________________
______________________________________________________
Telephone: ____________________________________________
E-mail: _______________________________________________
No of copies required: ___________________________________
Bank Draft/Pay Order No. ________________________________
For amount: ___________________________________________
Please make your payment available to the Criterion Quarterly and send
this card to:
EDITOR Criterion
C/o Mr. Books
Supermarket, F-6/2
Islamabad - Pakistan
#PPWCN 5WDUETKRVKQP
Inland: Rs. 700/-
(If you make payment by cheque/payorder add Rs. 10 as bank collection charges)
Overseas: US $ 30
(If you make payment by cheque/payorder add US $ 4 as bank collection charges)

Criterion V 2 No 4

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Criterion V 2 No 4

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CHlTEHlON

The lending oI his name to Numani`s book by Ali Mian is an

1itle: Shameful Flight

You might also like