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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Professor F. Gregory Gause III

Date: November 21,2003
Classification: Unclassified
Prepared by: Dan Byman
Reviewed by: Tom Dowling
Team numbers: 1 and 3
Location: Phone interview
Participants - Commission: Dan Byman & Tom Dowling

Background
Professor Gause, a professor at the University of Vermont, is a leading expert on Saudi
Arabia.

Extremism in Saudi Arabia before and after September 11

The Saudi government was confronted (in Saudi terms) with a surge of political activism
after the 1991 Gulf War. The religious critique of the ruling elite was far more troubling
to the regime than were previous challenges from Iranian-inspired Shi'a or Arab
nationalists. The regime stopped the demonstrations and jailed activists, but it did not
take on the ideas. The Saudi government was happy to avoid a political fight.

By the late 1990s, the Saudi regime was confident. Asserting that it had arrested and
executed the key accused in the OPMlSANG bombing, the regime then largely ignored
the incident. By the end of the decade, the regime felt comfortable enough to let many
leading Islamists out of jail. Before 9/11, religious extremism was seen as a security
issue rather than something that needed to be confronted intellectually. The regime
thought that, far from causing internal problems, supporting the "good" causes of jihad
in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir would allow it to ride the wave of growing domestic
support for Islamic causes.

Although September 11 led to a limited rethinking, it took the May 2003 attacks for the
Saudis to really recognize the interconnectedness of these causes. Once viewed as a
messy problem, Bin Ladin now is seen as a major albeit manageable threat.

Many Wahhabist clerics in Saudi Arabia have condemned "Bin Ladinism." Gause noted
that even though we do not like many of the ideas of these clerics, we want them on our
side. Establishment clerics also discouraged jihad when the U.S. went to war with Iraq,
even though almost all Sunni Muslim clerics saw the fight against the United States as
legitimate.

Gause challenged that idea that Wahhabism equated with violence. Although it had a
violent past, Wahhabism became more conservative (though not necessarily tolerant) as it
evolved into a state ideology. He also noted that Bin Ladin was not really a Wahhabist.
For example, Bin Ladin's key concept ofmodernjahiliyya- which views all Muslim

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regimes and most living Muslims as non-Islamic- is an Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

idea. In addition, the Afghanjihad was a key factor in Bin Ladin's thinking.

The spread ofWahhabism, however, still is bad for U.S. foreign policy. It is intolerant of
other religions and bad on gender issues. Moreover, the structures that the Saudis set up
made it easy for jihadism to flourish.

The Ulema and Support for Bin Ladin

Gause argued that the Saudi ulema fall into two major groups. There are the muftis, the
High Committee of Ulema, and many others all with jobs paid by the regime. Then there
are the regime critics (like al-Auda and Hawali in the past), who lack official positions
but have much more popular credibility. Save for Saad al-Faqih in London, the Bin
Ladinists lack a public voice in either group.

Some Saudis see Bin Ladin as "Robin Hood". Most will say he has good ideas but that
the violence is bad. Most back the Al Saud over Bin Ladin but, few seem willing to do
much to aid the regime should it come to an open struggle. The regime probably could
mobilize additional support from the elite business community and some tribes but
neither the regime nor the Bin Ladinists have a truly broad support network. Political
support for Bin Ladin cuts across Saudi Arabia. The network of recruitment appears to
be along clan and tribal lines (many from the Asir area), as these lines facilitate trust.
Tribes in general are more settled and work for the government, leading to a loss of tribal
autonomy.

The Saudi Response to Opposition

The first Saudi response is always to buy off opposition. However, once you threaten the
regime's security, it will go after you. For example, they accommodated Nasser and
Saddam until they openly rejected the regime. Since, by 1994, Bin Ladin was openly
calling for the Al Saud's overthrow, Gause doubts any top officials tried to accommodate
him after 1994. However, some of the outer rings of the royal family may have worked
with Bin Ladin. Some may share the jihadist ideology, and others may want to curry
favor with the Islamists. Gause noted that without a strong King it is hard to control the
family.

Education
Few Saudis have gained appropriate skills from the education system. In the past, only
the elite got an education. In recent years, everyone can go to college- enabling everyone
to receive a worthless BA. However, Gause noted that regimes do not get overthrown
due to unemployment alone. He also noted that the state religious educational institutions
produce fewer radicals than secular universities in Saudi Arabia.

Regime Anger at the United States

The Saudis have several grievances against the United States. First, there is U.S. support
for Israel. Second, they see mixed messages by reading the U.S. press (e.g. calls for
reform and calls to crack down) - confusion that is often echoed in government. Third,
they are not clear about U.S. priorities.

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Future Steps
The Saudi regime could do more to use their transnational religious network to go after
the jihadists. They do this to some degree, but we can ask more.

The regime could largely stop the flow of money to Bin Ladin since all wealthy Saudi
families are vulnerable to regime pressure. A grey area is "nice jihads" such as Palestine,
Chechnya, and so on. However, in Gause's view, cutting financial support for these
causes would not risk regime legitimacy, and the Al Saud could gain the backing of the
clergy for a cutoff if necessary. Palestine would be the hardest, as many non- Islamists
support this.

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