This document summarizes David Carrier's article "On the Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism: Philosophy and the Market in Art". The article explores the cynical view that people may stop believing artworks have aesthetic qualities. It does this in four stages: 1) It argues aesthetic judgements change over time, supporting aesthetic relativism. 2) This makes plausible the idea that aesthetic value equals market value. 3) This calls into question the role of critics in determining aesthetic value. 4) It suggests extending this position to question all beliefs about art's value. The aim is not to argue for or against these conclusions, but to explore the possibility of such skeptical arguments about aesthetic judgements and values.
This document summarizes David Carrier's article "On the Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism: Philosophy and the Market in Art". The article explores the cynical view that people may stop believing artworks have aesthetic qualities. It does this in four stages: 1) It argues aesthetic judgements change over time, supporting aesthetic relativism. 2) This makes plausible the idea that aesthetic value equals market value. 3) This calls into question the role of critics in determining aesthetic value. 4) It suggests extending this position to question all beliefs about art's value. The aim is not to argue for or against these conclusions, but to explore the possibility of such skeptical arguments about aesthetic judgements and values.
This document summarizes David Carrier's article "On the Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism: Philosophy and the Market in Art". The article explores the cynical view that people may stop believing artworks have aesthetic qualities. It does this in four stages: 1) It argues aesthetic judgements change over time, supporting aesthetic relativism. 2) This makes plausible the idea that aesthetic value equals market value. 3) This calls into question the role of critics in determining aesthetic value. 4) It suggests extending this position to question all beliefs about art's value. The aim is not to argue for or against these conclusions, but to explore the possibility of such skeptical arguments about aesthetic judgements and values.
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AulIov|s) Bavid Cavviev Bevieved vovI|s) Souvce Leonavdo, VoI. 18, No. 1 |1985), pp. 35-38 FuIIisIed I The MIT Press SlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1578092 . Accessed 25/10/2012 0055 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . The MIT Press and Leonardo are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Leonardo. http://www.jstor.org On the Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism: Philosophy and the Market in Art David Carrier Abstract-What can we learn about art by analyzing the art market? The author offers a skeptical argument. Judgements of aesthetic value change with time. Since those changes reflect market value, perhaps we can show that aesthetic value is market value. The critic, we would then believe, seeks to persuade us that art has aesthetic value, for our beliefs about art's value depend upon a consensus established in part by the critic. Recently some critics and philosophers have argued that the traditions of art are dead. The prospects for such an 'aesthetic atheism' in relation to this skeptical argument are discussed. I. ON BECOMING A CYNIC No other activity so closely combines snobbery and scholarship as the art market. Dependent for its existence upon the good will and dedication of many, mostly impecunious, artists, art dealers and art critics, this market effectively functions to provide masterpieces to be purchased by the very rich. Recently several philosophers have discussed how objects like Duchamp's readymades are accepted as art [1]. This paper explores the related cynical view raised by critics of contemporary art and society [2] that people might cease to believe that art- works possess the qualities traditionally called aesthetic. I term this view 'aesthetic atheism', drawing an analogy to the rejection of traditional religious beliefs. I concentrate upon contemporary painting in the art market and its rela- tionship to the theories of art discussed in commercial art journals. Much art- most of that considered in Leonardo, for example-falls outside that market, and many visual artists working with film, multiples or performance attempt to remain outside that commercial arena. If my analysis is found interesting, it would be worthwhile asking if it applies also to such non-commercial art. That is the task for another article. In a recent paper I describe the system of art production [3]. Two points from that account are relevant here. First, famous art is extremely expensive. Second, the art world suffers from ex- treme overproduction. Few art students can hope to make a living from their work. Observing a nineteenth-century exhibit, a Henry James character re- marked: "There are too many of them, David Carrier (philosopher), Department of History and Philosophy, Carnegie-Mellon University, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, U.S.A. Received 26 January 1984. poor devils; so many who must make their way ... Some of them ... stand on their heads ... to make people notice them" [4]. One way of attracting atten- tion is through a critic's review. However, the reviews published in commercial art journals are difficult to understand; few people could explain the theories used to validate the works they observe. Dis- course in any technical field is abstruse for outsiders, but there is something novel about this situation in which the influential literature of art is overly technical. An historical perspective is valuable. Few of the nouveau riche Americans who purchased Raphaels in the late nineteenth century knew about art. They desired prestige, and the role of the art historian was to guarantee that they purchased genuine works [5]. The modern museum director must be, in part, the agent of those collectors he must satisfy in order to attract donations for the museum's collection. When Richard Wollheim speaks of the devices "by which art has been segregated from those for whom it was made and turned into a preserve of the rich and arrogant" [6], we must recognize that he is a utopian. When has art been made for anyone but the wealthy? It would be naive to see museums as anything but the natural products of contemporary capitalism. Raphael's works have always been treasured, and genuine Raphaels are rare. Today a few younger artists, unknown 5 years ago, achieve substantial prices, while the work of some senior figures is as valuable as lesser-known old masters. The value of these works is not established by the test of time that validates Raphael, but by the con- troversial claims of critics. Many commodities are expensive because they are rare and highly desired; no theory is needed to explain their worth. For example, barbed wire, decoy ducks and stamps can be collector's items. Detached from their original use, as when an antique car ceases to be used for transport, they become valued for their rarity [7]. In contrast, the value of contemporary artworks depends upon beliefs about their aesthetic significance. And one function of criticism is to support such beliefs. II. IS CYNICISM JUSTIFIED? My philosophical question is whether the cynic's argument outlined above is justified. I will proceed in four stages. The acceptance of my earlier stages need not imply agreement with the later ones, and only in the last stage will I sketch an argument for aesthetic atheism. Like Descartes in his Meditations, I want to see how far a skeptical argument can be taken. I begin by arguing that aesthetic relativism is true; that is, judgements of aesthetic value, of the artistic worth of an artwork, do change with time. Second, I suggest that this makes plausible a reductionist theory of aesthetic value. Aesthetic value, that theory claims, is market value. Third, I argue that there is then reason to critically question the belief that critics identify aesthetic value. Finally, I move from contemporary art to a more sweeping application of this position. My aim is not to argue polemically for or against these conclusions, but to see what kind of argument is possible. This account might be introduced by noting parallels in philosophical discussions of knowledge and ethics. Do we possess any knowledge? Are our actions ever morally justified? These are the parallel questions of the skeptic. The aim is not to doubt the existence of the external world or the validity of moral obligations, but to explore how such beliefs are justified. Skepticism about aesthetic value has been discussed less frequently. A society genuinely skeptical about its knowledge or morality is hard to imagine, for a social Pergamon Press Ltd. Printed in Great Britain. 0024-094X/85 $3.00+0.00 LEONARDO, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 35-38, 1985 35 system requires some such stability to function. A society similarly skeptical about the value of art is easier to imagine. Many traditional religious groups-Jews, Muslims, Christian iconoclasts-have been hostile to representational art. My conclusion will suggest that we may for various reasons become hostile to art. If neither sensory errors, nor the possibility that I am dreaming, nor the existence of an evil demon can deprive me of knowledge, then, Descartes argues, my knowledge is secure. Perhaps this analysis can similarly justify our belief in art's value. III. CYNICISM AND AESTHETIC RELATIVISM Aesthetic relativism has been borne out by history. For a long time the most admired artworks in Europe were Roman copies of Greek sculpture; a century ago, salon painting was generally preferred to work of the impressionists; in his lifetime, Jackson Pollock was not widely ap- preciated. Today all thesejudgements are rejected by most authorities [8]. The usual explanation is that new art is difficult to evaluate; time is needed to judge its true value. For reasons I have given elsewhere, that theory is question- able [9]. How long does the test of time take? Interest in some early Renaissance painting has only recently revived, while Pollock's work quickly became widely appreciated. Why should time allow us to better judge an artwork? Raphael aimed to satisfy his contemporaries, so why does the test of time show that his painting is great? Today we need the aid of art historians to understand his work and therefore it is unclear why we are better judges of it than Raphael's contemporary audience. The belief that a work's excellence is a property of that object, like its shape and color, seems implausible. In societies where changes in beliefs about aesthetic quality occur slowly, aesthetic relativism seems a fantastic notion. But our judgments about contemporary art are volatile. The critic's claim to perceive the work's actual value is impossible to verify. By the time I see a painting, I have often read or heard many accounts of it. Even if I reject these views, my judgment is socially conditioned. The reason that judgments about contemporary art are more debatable than those about older work has little to do with the test of time. Rather, since Raphael's works are in the museum and he is an established figure, nothing could be more quixotic than an attack on him. By contrast, praise or criticism of a contemporary artist can have real impact. In part, changes in taste reflect facts about the art market. In 1910, Cezanne was little known and so not collected; today he has almost the status of Raphael, and so his work is very valuable. Most collectors today cannot afford a Cezanne, and therefore turn to other artists. Everyone knows that Pollock's work was inexpensive 30 years ago, so now collectors of contemporary art seek his successor. The art market depends in part upon the belief that major new work is being created; looking for Pollock's successors seems more exciting than seeking out his minor contemporaries. But while it took a long time to see Cezanne's importance, now that process is speeded up. For everyone has read the stories of how Cezanne and then Pollock became famous and their work valuable. The result is that ultimately aesthetic value is reflected in market value. I may admire the work of someone obscure; once she or he is widely written about, I anticipate that that person's art will be marketable. It is unnecessary to moralize about this situation. What is more natural than that the works most highly regarded should become the most valuable? These observations become philosophically interesting only when they prompt a reductionist theory of aesthetic value. IV. A REDUCTIVE THEORY OF AESTHETIC VALUE The theory is easy to state: aesthetic value is market value. That Pollock was once thought minor means that once his works were cheap; that Pollock is called great means that now his art is expensive. Few people admired him in 1950, and so then the statement "Pollock's work is excellent" was only a good prediction. How can aesthetic value be just market value? Consider a parallel, the materialist's claim that mental states are brain states [10]. That conclusion is not established by showing that every mental state coincides with some brain state; the materialist wants to show that mental states are nothing over and above brain states. So he makes two moves. He shows that mental states, when scientifically analyzed, are simply brain states. And he explain why people once thought that there was something more to mental states. The cynic follows the same procedure, showing that aesthetic value is market value and then explaining why people have believed otherwise. This parallel is doubly problematic. First, much recent discussion questions materialism's interpretation. Second, we might think that materialism involves a scientific discovery, while the reductionist theory of aesthetic value is merely a sociological hypothesis. Because he states his case against such claims in detail, Gombrich's account is worth study. He makes two key points [11]. Standards are defined by the canon of achievements "handed down in tradition as a touch- stone of excellence." So the artist believes in "values which will always transcend his skill" as an individual. The concept of a canon is complex, for the modern museum brings together objects from many cultures, taking work out of context to make it art. For Gombrich our canon ends with cubism. For some critics it includes Pollock but excludes Duchamp. For others, Duchamp is important. So, when there are such serious disagreements it is misleading to speak of 'the canon' as if everyone were talking about the same thing. Certainly Gombrich is correct to say that relativism is difficult to imagine. "If all our reactions are equally subjective ... the idea of a canon would collapse... I confess that whenever I get involved in this argument I have a curious feeling of unreality." Were I a contemporary of Pollock, I might be more critical of his work; were I a Muslim, Persian calli- graphy would be easier to understand. Equally, if I accepted the reductionist theory of aesthetic value, I would disagree with Gombrich. That point can be made in an uninteresting way. That I can imagine myself a sincere terrorist doesn't undermine my present beliefs; as a terrorist, I would be a different person. The interesting question is how my beliefs might change. Showing how belief in the canon could collapse may undermine Gombrich's claims. The relationship between my ex- perience and beliefs is complex. A vegetarian cannot enjoy Beef Wellington, nor an admirer of Ruskin, Palladiar churches. They do not think of these as attractive things that are also morally reprehensible. Such people cannot reconcile the evils of animal suffering or Renaissance society against the pleasures they obtain from such evils. Gombrich thinks that we could admire an artist's skill even while disliking his work. That may be true, but only up to a point. Raphael is admired by non-Christians, but a real iconoclast would not care for his work. I might understand an artist's goals and dislike her or him all the more for promoting what were for me unacceptable practices. So the case against relativism remains incomplete. Carrier, Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism 36 V. ON THE ROLE OF ART CRITICS These arguments show only that the reductionist position is possible. That alone is of some interest, for the trouble with many relativistic positions is that they are self-refuting. No statements are true; All moralities are equally good: these appear self-contradictory claims. To explain why anyone would be motivated to become a relativist, I must return to my discussion of the critic's role. Were aesthetic relativism false, then we might think of the critic as someone who helps us to see the artwork as it is. Once we give up that view of aesthetic value, it is more natural to think of criticism as an exercise in persuasion. The critic offers arguments for his or her judgments, and if we are convinced, we accept those judgments, which today typically involve appeal to some complex theory of art. This does not imply that critics 'create' aesthetic value. Many, perhaps all, artworks may have some inherent aesthetic value; they can be enjoyed for their color, drawing or spatial relation- ships. But I am interested in how today a few artists' works are singled out as being of major importance. In our society there is a sharp distinction between expensive works whose importance is validated by critical consensus and those many other artworks known and enjoyed only by friends of the artist. The philistine, too ignorant to under- stand the art he detests, may agree with all of this, but I am interested in how such beliefs arise from within the art world. As is true for most institutions, people in the art world may question some but not all of the accepted beliefs before they cease to be members of that community. A Catholic may question some papal judgments, but does not suggest that Mohammed was a true prophet. Similarly, someone may disagree about the signifi- cance of individual artists, but asserting that Raphael was the last great painter prevents one from being a member of the art community. One difference between a religious community and an artistic community is that religious beliefs aim to be true to the facts, while beliefs about aesthetic value are merely shared judg- ments. These distinctions must be developed in more detail. What is important here is to understand the relationship between the art world consensus and the role of critics. Once we give up the claim that aesthetic judgments are statements of fact, then the role of rhetoric in art criticism is worth considering. If the art community is bound together by accept- ing judgments of quality, and if those judgments are a product of critics' rhetoric, then the art world consensus is the product of a general agreement to accept the arguments put forward by critics. So described, that agreement seems frail. Today almost everyone can see Pollock's greatness; it is not as if we have just all agreed to admire his art. But that belief, which I share, is in one sense less a fact about the work than a statement of how we all judge it. Certainly many do not admire his art, but they are typically marked as outsiders to the art world. A critique of Pollock might change our consensus, but such an account would be taken seriously only if presented from within the art world [12]. When three decades ago a few critics admired Pollock, their claims were considered eccentric. Now their judg- ments are generally accepted as true in the only sense of 'truth' possible here, truth relative to the beliefs of the community. If we think of aesthetic judgments as statements about the private experiences of individuals, then it may seem almost miraculous that we achieve so much agreement. But there is another way to look at this situation. Were such agreement-including, often, the agree- ment to accept disagreement-lacking, then the art world could not exist. Were there no general belief that a few contemporary artists are significant, then our art market could not exist. This analysis may treat the relationship between rhetoric and truth too simply. Rhetoric may serve the interests of truth, as when St Augustine urged the preacher to master pagan rhetoric [13]. And there need be no logical connection between how I come to hold my beliefs and the truth of those beliefs. Even when we recognize the connection between art criticism and the art market, it doesn't follow that the claims of critics are untrue. The claims of the critic, I am urging, are true relative to the art community; the search for some further sense in which those claims are true in relation to the artwork itself may be futile. I am discussing only contemporary works and only those relatively few discussed by critics. Much can be learned by examining the cases closer at hand. As my parallels with epistemological and moral skepticism indicate, studies of the foundations of our knowledge typically begin with a few selected cases. The close link between art making and the art market; the introduction of complex theories of critics: these are new phenomena. Raphael did not paint to exhibit in galleries, nor were his works validated by discussion in art journals of the time. Let us envisage a more sweeping presentation of these claims. VI. AESTHETIC ATHEISM Imagine someone who has come to question not just the claims made about some contemporary artists, but the way artworks are handled in our society. Just as someone who lost faith might still enjoy visiting churches, so this person might still aesthetically appreciate many things outside the museum. But this aesthetic atheist would be unwilling and unable to enjoy art as we have institu- tionalized it. How could we describe the inner life of this person? My account draws on Nietzsche's analysis of morality in On the Genealogy of Morals, for he is concerned with the interests served by religious beliefs, and I with those served by belief in art. Just as Nietzsche wants to undermine those foundations of morality by describing their genesis, so I am interested in understanding how a genealogy of aesthetic value might lead to aesthetic atheism. But my account is in one way more modest in its goals than his, and this difference may make aesthetic atheism more acceptable. Nietzsche's challenging claim is that such a genealogy undermines itself, the search for truth leading to skepticism about the existence of truth [14]. After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself... it poses the question "what is the meaning of all will to truth?" Unlike the critic of traditional morality, who perhaps will produce some equivalent for the beliefs he rejects, the aesthetic atheist seeks no substitute for art. The trouble with revolutionary kinds of art is that they become absorbed into the art market; by now, nothing is more traditional than such would-be attacks on the art world. But the aesthetic atheist wants us to stop making art. In this situation, my analysis may seem close to the criticism I discuss. Critics use rhetoric to sustain belief in aesthetic value, and my criticism of their role is only a similar exercise. Aesthetic atheism would become true for the relativist only if such beliefs were widely accepted. Since belief in aesthetic value depends upon consensus, if that agreement ceases to hold, then aesthetic value (in the special way I describe it) will cease to exist. The aesthetic atheist is interested not in stepping outside contemporary practice, Carrier, Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism 37 but in pointing to how that practice itself may break down. Just as Marxists are interested in working out what they call contradictions of capitalism and not in moralizing about that system, so here we may point to a growing awareness within the art world of the claims I describe. A group of recent critics, identified as 'postmodernists', argue that the end of painting has come [15]. This new presentation of a claim made by Hegel in the early nineteenth century has recently been made in another context by the philosopher Arthur Danto [16]. As the name 'postmodernists' indicates, these critics believe that the great tradition of twentieth century innovation in painting -the time of 'modernism'-is now closed. Some of these critics are interested in photography, multiples or performance, and they offer varied positive recom- mendations about what an artist working in these media today may constructively do. These challenging claims are worth further study. Here I focus just on what the postmodernists have to say about the end of painting, for only that portion of their claims is directly relevant to my discussion of aesthetic atheism. Though these authors disagree about much, they agree that the ability of today's artists to continue the traditions of art is in doubt. They dispute not only judgments about the importance of individual artists- every critic does that-but the whole system within which such judgments are made. Like skeptics about knowledge or morality, they ask us to consider whether our collective beliefs are justified. These postmodernists are only a small group, relatively isolated from much artmaking that proceeds without knowledge of or interest in such theorizing. But the history of art should teach us that sometimes movements that start in small ways can have large effects. If, as the postmodernists suggest, aesthetic experience itself has been rendered doubtful, then it is hard to imagine that such an end to the tradition would not affect how we view established art. Placing a Pollock in the museum along with a Raphael is justified by the belief that both artists are engaged in a common concern. In this respect they are somewhat like two scientists working at different times. But, just as the discovery that scientific laws were impossible to formulate would affect how we judge the achievements of older science, so be- coming aesthetic atheists would influence our view of the whole artistic tradition. Consider, too, the parallel my title "On the Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism" is intended to invoke, the history of attacks on religion. From the Enlightenment onward, most important philosophers have been highly critical to the claims of Christianity. As one result such esoteric debates have influenced many people who know nothing of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche or Freud. Almost without exception, these critics of moral and religious institutions exempted art from their criticism. Perhaps they came too early to see how art as much as religion might be attacked. Meanwhile, art has become, for many people, a substitute for religion. Such an activity, my analysis suggests, is possible only within a larger society which supports beliefs in its general goals. This account aims neither to promote aesthetic atheism nor to attack it, but to begin a discussion toward understanding the very interesting and novel situation in which that position can be articulated. Acknowledgements-For helpful discussion I thank artists Sharon Gold, Thomas Nozkowski, Joyce Robins and Sean Scully; the critic Joseph Masheck; and Arthur Danto, Alexander Nehamas, Marianne'Novy and Mark Roskill. Perhaps my largest debt is to Clement Greenberg, for everything I say argues with his work. REFERENCES 1. G. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1974); A. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981). 2. T. Wolfe, The Painted Word (New York: Bantam, 1976) is an unpleasant and deeply ignorant, but influential, account. C. Ratcliffs "Critical Thought, Magical Language", Art in America, p. 184 (Summer 1980) offers the perspective of a working critic. 3. D. Carrier, "Art and Its Market", in R. Hertz, ed., Theories of Contemporary Art (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall, 1984). 4. H. James, The Tragic Muse (Harmonds- worth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982) p. 14. 5. D. A. Brown, Raphael and America (Washington, D.C.: U.S. National Gallery, 1983). 6. R. Wollheim, Introduction to The Image in Form: Selected Writings of Adrian Stokes (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1972) p. 31. 7. J. Alsop, The Rare Art Traditions (New York: Harper & Row, 1982) is a long and thorough account. See the review by E. H. Gombrich in The New York Review 39 (2 December 1982); also, K. Clark, "The Ideal Museum", Artnews, p. 29 (January 1954). 8. F. Haskell, Rediscoveries in Art (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976). See the review reprinted in C. Rosen and H. Zerner, Romanticism and Realism (New York: Viking, 1984). 9. D. Carrier, review of Anthony Savile's The Test of Time in The Journal of Philosophy, p. 116 (April 1984). 10. J. O'Connor, ed., Modern Materialism: Readings on Mind-Body Identity (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969). 11. E. Gombrich, Ideals and Idols (Oxford: Phaidon, 1979) pp. 156, 128, 157. 12. See, for example, R. Hennessy, "The Man Who Forgot How to Paint", Art in America, p. 13 (Summer 1984). 13. See St Augustine, De doctrina christianna, liber quartvs, Tr. with commentary by Sister Therese Sullivan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1972). 14. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, W. Kaufman, trans. (New York: Random House, 1967) p. 161. 15. H. Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic (Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press, 1983) and T. Lawson, "Last Exit: Painting", Artforum, p. 40 (October 1981). 16. A. Danto, The End of Art (forthcoming); E. Wind, Art and Anarchy (New York: Vintage, 1969) offers a defense of Hegel's views. 17. D. Carrier, "Art Fashion", Journal: A Contemporary Art Magazine, p. 32 (Summer 1982) discusses these issues from a related point of view. Carrier, Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism 38
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