200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 Leibniz may have had good philosophical arguments for

relationism that Newton could not respond to, but in the end Newtons physical arguments carried the day. Assess this claim.

Newton believed, due to his physics, that there was more to space than the relations between objects and events. While he is not clear of what he believes the nature of space is, at points likening it to a substance and at others to some kind of property or attribute, his position is distinctly anti-relationist. Newton argues for space having some kind of actual existence based on absolute acceleration (Newton, 1687), and while Newton may not have a sufficient response to the problem Leibniz poses about his account of the ontology of space (Leibniz, 1715-1716), I believe that neither this problem nor the problem Leibniz puts forward based on absolute velocity (Leibniz, 1715-1716), which I believe can be demonstrated to be false, serve to refute Newtons argument for space based on absolute acceleration.

In Newtons mechanics there is a definite distinction between inertial and non-inertial motions, inertial motions being those of bodies at constant velocity and non-inertial motions being those of bodies that are accelerating. So if a body is in inertial motion then it is moving at a constant speed and moving in a fixed direction, and the relationist can make sense of these notions with something merely moving in a fixed direction and at a constant speed with respect to the reference that the relationist chooses (Sklar, 1992: 22). Contrasting to this however Newton argues that non-inertial motion cannot be understood as some kind of motion relative to something else but rather must be understood as a kind of motion that is absolute (Sklar, 1992: 22).

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 There is empirical evidence for the forces generated by non-inertial motions, for example the passengers on a train lurch forward when a train comes to a stop. However if we consider a case with two trains where the first train is accelerating out of a station while the second train is at rest in the station it seems fairly obvious that the passengers aboard the first train will feel some effect of accelerating while the passengers of the second train will not. However both of these trains are in fact accelerating relative to each other (Sklar, 1992: 22). The only explanation there is for the difference between the two is that there is acceleration which is absolute and not only relative to an arbitrary reference frame (Newton, 1687).

These effects of acceleration will be observable throughout the Universe according to Newton, and indeed they are. If we consider the motions of the planets for example, we find that it is the effects of acceleration that keep the planets in orbit around the Sun (Newton, 1687). So while absolute acceleration is not acceleration relative to any material body all acceleration is relative to something (Sklar, 1992: 22), and Newton says that absolute acceleration is to be understood as relative to space itself. Space itself here is not just a container for the material objects but enters into the causal picture with material objects (Sklar, 1992: 22). So just as the relative motion of my foot to a ball causes the ball to move, the relative acceleration of our train passengers to space itself is revealed by the inertial forces generated by that relative motion (Sklar, 1992: 22). It is important to note here that absolute space is a theoretical postulate for the Newtonian which must be presupposed to make sense of the empirical data (Sklar, 1992: 23). This provides us with no description of the ontology of space, indeed Newton himself does not seem to provide a clear account of the nature of space itself (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.2). This, however, is the source of the second problem that Leibniz posed for Newton

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 that I will deal with after I have discussed Leibnizs criticism based on the undetectability of differences in absolute velocity.

As for the Newtonian space itself genuinely exists, so to are the position of any object in space or an objects constant velocity compared to space genuine features of reality (Sklar, 1992: 23). The case with absolute velocity is very different to the case with absolute acceleration however, as absolute velocity can be shown to be undemonstrable due to the Galilean relativity of Newtons mechanics (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.1). Due to this feature of Newtons mechanics unless a closed system is accelerating there will be no differences in the evolution of the system regardless of velocity, so any mechanical experiments that I do at rest will give me the same as those done in a car moving smoothly at sixty miles an hour. The important feature of this is that there is no way of empirically determining absolute velocity (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.1), and it is using this feature that Leibniz poses his first criticism.

Leibniz argued that as any differences of absolute velocities are completely unobservable that such differences were not in fact genuine differences at all (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.1, Leibniz, 1715-16). He concluded from this that absolute space, which entails the reality of the differences between absolute velocities, is also false. There are two parts of this argument that I will disagree with, the first part being the assumption that If a difference is genuine, then it will be observable. and the second being the conditional statement that the argument seems to hinge upon, something like If absolute space is real, then the differences in absolute velocity will be genuine differences., or potentially its contrapositive. Taken together Leibniz can then say by Modus Tollens from the assumption that these differences are not genuine and then from this and the second

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 statement conclude either by Modus Tollens, or Modus Ponens if we are considering its contrapositive, that absolute space is not real.

This is a perfectly valid argument, but both the assumption and the conditional that it rests on seem unsound to me. The assumption seems to be something akin to verificationism, demanding that something be empirically observable for it to be counted as meaningful and this seems like a fairly unattractive position to hold as much of our inquiry and speculation would be rendered meaningless were we to accept this. If we were to accept the assumption then any considerations that are made about the theoretical differences between two theories with no empirical differences become meaningless, so there would be no point in debating which quantum mechanical interpretation to prefer for example, and indeed as the differences between them are unobservable it would follow from the assumption that they are not real differences. This seems ridiculous however, as we would want to say that the differences between, for example, the many worlds interpretation and the copenhagen interpretation are genuine, but according to Leibnizs assumption we would not be entitled to do so. For this reason I do not accept the assumption, as it is far too restrictive over quantities that we may well wish to consider genuine.

So, having rejected Leibnizs assumption we can see that his argument can no longer conclude that absolute space is not real. However there are those who would accept his assumption, so I will now demonstrate why I believe the argument based on the conditional I outlined above is incorrect. For this purpose we will accept Leibnizs assumption, as we are demonstrating why Leibnizs conclusion is incorrect even for those who accept both his assumption If a difference is genuine, it will be observable. and the

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 statement If absolute space is real, then differences in absolute velocity will be genuine differences.. From these we can infer by transitivity the statement If absolute space is real, then differences in absolute velocity will be observable.. Now this is not a statement the Newtonian would accept (while I do not think they would accept the earlier conditional either I believe that this would be due to the lacking the notion of a genuine difference as the Leibnizian is using it and that the earlier conditional would collapse to the later one upon explanation of this notion), as it is contradictory with Newtonian mechanics. If we consider Corollary V of the laws in the Principia (Newton, 1687), Newton demonstrates his own awareness of the Galilean relativity of his mechanics where he demonstrates that differences in absolute velocity will indeed be unobservable. So the statement that the Leibnizian argument rests on can then seen to be false, as nothing in Newtonian mechanics would imply the statement If absolute space is real, then differences in absolute velocity will be observable., indeed it seems that the Newtonian would actually assert to the negation of that statement. So then we can see that Leibnizs first argument is only successful for those who both accept his assumption and already reject Newtonian mechanics.

The second problem posed by Leibniz, and in my opinion the much stronger of the two, concerns the ontology of absolute space. In distinguishing his account of space from Descartes, Newton established that his absolute space was definitely non-material (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.1, 4.2.2, Newton, 1687, 2004), as evidenced by his belief that a vacuum could exist within absolute space. While space itself may indeed be non-material, intuitively it seems as though it should still be counted as part of the physical rather than the mental realm (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006 :4.2.2). In addition to this Newton also rejects both substance and attribute as being the class to which absolute space belongs (Newton,

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 2004). Newton argues that absolute space is not a substance as it does not possess causal powers, though it does enter into the causal picture as Sklar notes (Sklar, 1992: 22), and as it lacks entirely independent existence which Newton takes to be a property of all substances. The reason it lacks fully independent existence is due to Newtons acceptance of the principle that everything that exists, exists somewhere, which resulted in him viewing absolute space as a necessary consequence of the existence of anything (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.2). Newtons belief that there can be a vacuum in space illustrates why he believed that space could not be a property of bodies, for space still exists when there are no bodies. Rather than either a property or a substance, Newton posits that space itself is what we may call a pseudo-substance (Hugget & Hoefer, 2006: 4.2.2), much more similar to a substance than a property, but lacking certain features of true substances, such as their direct causal powers and fully independent existence. It is worth noting here that existence Newton is saying that absolute space has may simply be existence simpliciter, where he asserts the existence of absolute space but does not make any assertions to its ontology. If Newton is using exists in this manner however he would still be open to Leibnizs criticism based on his insufficient account of the nature of space as this still does not serve to give us any information about what absolute space is like itself.

It is easy to understand why someone might oppose Newtons notion of a non-material but physical entity. It seems intuitively obvious that being part of the physical realm requires being material, but I believe that under examination this can be shown to not necessarily be the case. If we consider any set of material objects that we see, we make sense of each discrete material object as having certain boundaries and being in a certain position and having various other properties that pertain specifically to each object. In making

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 sense of the specific boundaries of a material object we consider the object essentially against a certain nothingness it seems. When I consider the lamp on my desk for example I can see it as clear and distinct from the wall behind it, the lamp and its edges being defined as distinct from the wall seemingly by this nothingness. While there is a potential response in the fact that this nothingness which I am referring to is in fact all the air which is between the objects, the lamp and the wall in this case, when we then consider the air, which is itself made up of discrete particles, we once again find this idea of nothingness between the individual particles. In all of our conceptions of objects we seem to have this notion of nothingness that is distinctly non-material but it is also undoubtedly a part of the physical realm (Watts, 2008: On Nothingness).

While I believe that I have demonstrated that the first problem, that of the undetectability of absolute velocity, which Leibniz presented for Newtons account of absolute space does not work it seems as though Newtons lack of an account of the nature of absolute space is still problematic. While I believe I have shown his notion of a non-material but physical entity at work in our everyday conception of objects, the ontological question that Leibniz posed about the nature of space and Newtons imprecise account of it still present a serious philosophical problem, however this philosophical problem does not serve to refute the arguments the Newton made based on absolute acceleration for absolute space.

Bibliography Hugget, N. & Hoefer, C. (2006). Absolute and Relational Theories of Space and Motion. Available: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/spacetime-theories/>. Last accessed 2nd December 2013.

200621436 PHIL3852 Philosophy of Modern Physics December 2013 Leibniz, G. W. (1956). Correspondence (1715-1716). In: Alexander, H. G. The LeibnizClarke Correspondence, Together with Extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Newton, I. and Cohen, I. B. (1999). The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Cohen I. B. and Whitman A. M. (trans.) Berkeley, London: University of California Press.

Newton, I (2004). Newton: Philosophical Writings. A. Janiak (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sklar, L. (1992). Space, Time and Motion. In: Daniels, N. and Lehrer (eds), Philosophy of Physics. New York: Oxford University Press. 11-91.

Alan Watts: On Nothingness 2008, video, May 5th. Available: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLrMVous0Ac>. Last accessed on 2nd December 2013. Word Count: 2078