A Pragmatic-Coherentist Approach to External World Skepticism

Caleb Castaneda

Philosophy 341 Professor A n!r "ecember 1#$ #%1#

Castaneda 1

ABSTRACT
In one form or another, the skeptical argument concludes that the data from our senses are insufficient to serve as justification for belief. o!ever, the skeptical argument relies on a conception of justification that demands more than is needed" it is presumed that our beliefs do not start out !ith some positive epistemic status, and then justification is e#pected to $ield such status. Contrar$ to this vie! of justification, this paper argues that, because the$ are formed !ithin a conte#t !here the$ serve an agent%s needs, beliefs alread$ possess some positive epistemic status before !e seek justification for them. The role of justification is to !eed out incompatible beliefs, not to suppl$ positive epistemic status to propositions. Because the role of justification is reduced to the role of e#plaining relationships bet!een beliefs that alread$ possess some measure of positive epistemic status, a coherentist justificator$ frame!ork can be adopted !ithout succumbing to a vicious form of circular reasoning. It is also argued that such a scheme is still truth&seeking, albeit through an inference that realit$ is under!riting our truth claims. If such an inference !ere to be sho!n false, ho!ever, !hat !ould be revealed is that !e care much less about truth than !e thought !e did, and that !e onl$ value truth to the e#tent that it allo!s us to survive and thrive.

&he skeptical arg!ment has resisted sol!tion for millennia' (t remains incredibly pers!asi e beca!se each of its premisses seems so int!iti ely correct' And yet$ the premisses lead to a co!nterint!iti e concl!sion) that one cannot rely on her experience as e idence abo!t her *orld' &his entails a position of complete external-*orld skepticism' &he diffic!lty for anyone *ho takes !p the challenge of the skeptical arg!ment$ pres!ming she *ishes to a oid s!ch a de astating concl!sion$ is finding some means of indicating kno*ledge gi en a sit!ation in *hich *e seem to ha e already conceded that o!r int!itions s!ggest the tr!th of the skeptical premisses' +efore beginning$ it might pro e !sef!l to briefly set do*n a placeholder skeptical arg!ment respecting ,!stification)i 1' #'
i

( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing that ( am not massi ely decei ed' (f ( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing that ( am not massi ely decei ed$ then ( cannot

be ,!stified in belie ing the representations of my senses' ( cannot be ,!stified in belie ing the representations of my senses'ii

ii

Altho!gh the content of this specific form!lation is my o*n$ ( ha e made !se of the template for the arg!ment from ignorance by -eith "e.ose) /Sol ing the Skeptical Problem$0 The Philosophical Review$ 1%4$ no 1 112234) 1' ( specifically take on ersions of the skeptical arg!ment *hich deal *ith ,!stified belief rather than kno*ledge' ( do this principally beca!se ( *ill be arg!ing that *e ha e a mis!nderstanding of ,!stification that has created the problem' 5i en the enormo!s diffic!lties of e en defining kno*ledge$ it seems like

Castaneda # &he position of this paper is that the first premiss of the skeptical arg!ment fails beca!se it is hopelessly conf!sed abo!t *hat is meant by ,!stification'ix ( take this position *ithin an essentially coherentist frame*ork that *ill be s!pplemented by pragmatic considerations' (n essence$ ( am arg!ing that any form of ,!stification *orth caring abo!t is !naffected by the skeptical arg!ment' &his is so beca!se$ if ,!stification is !nderstood as simply a coherence relation bet*een beliefs$ then the belief /( am not massi ely decei ed0 *o!ld be ,!stified so long as it coheres to all the other beliefs that a person happens to hold' (n brief form$ my thesis is that the first premiss of the skeptical arg!ment fails !nder any interpretation of ,!stification that claims that a belief is ,!stified if and only if it is part of a coherent system of beliefs' S!ch an ans*er is$ of co!rse$ not *itho!t its dra*backs6 ob io!s diffic!lties *ith the theory remain' (t seems beyond the scope of this paper to *ork o!t e ery problem *ith coherentist theory' What ( hope can be done in this paper is to sketch o!t the problems *hich any !sef!l theory of coherentism *ill ha e to address and to sho* that s!ch sol!tions are *ithin the reso!rces a ailable to coherentists' &his task is made diffic!lt beca!se coherentism faces se eral rather da!nting ob,ections' 7ne of the most ob io!s ob,ections to the coherentist theory of ,!stification has been the problem called /the alternati e systems0 ob,ection'iii (f a coherentist makes the claim that beliefs are ,!stified ,!st if they happen to cohere *ith all the beliefs that a person holds$ then it *o!ld seem possible that there might be many s!ch systems' (ndeed$ an infinite n!mber of s!ch possible coherent systems might be tho!ght possible' Speaking abo!t the probability calc!l!s as the meas!re of coherence$ A n!r makes this point s!ccinctly) /7ne co!ld in that case be
taking on too m!ch to attempt to redefine ,!stification and kno*ledge *ithin the same small space' ( *ill note$ ho*e er$ that once ,!stification has been properly defended$ *e seem to be in a m!ch better position to attempt to reclaim the t!rf of kno*ledge'

iii

( ha e fo!nd the ob,ection in many locations$ for an example$ see http)88***'iep'!tm'ed!8coherent89S:3b

Castaneda 3 ,!stified in belie ing anything 1e'g'$ that s;!irrels r!le the !ni erse4$ so long as appropriate credences are assigned to logically related beliefs 1e'g'$ that it is not the case that s;!irrels do not r!le the !ni erse4' &his strikes most of !s as impla!sibly permissi e'0i 7f co!rse$ A n!r makes this statement *ithin the context of a specific type of coherence relation$ notably conformance to the probability calc!l!s' +!t it seems that some ersion of his criticism *ill apply to any form!lation of the idea of coherence' &o see *hy this is so$ is sho!ld be reali<ed that his criticism might be interpreted in one of t*o *ays) 114 &hat the S;!irrel-5ods belief co!ld arise *ithin the context of a belief system that is exactly like mine in e ery single *ay$ sa e the belief in the S;!irrel-5ods6 or 1#4 that the S;!irrel-5ods belief co!ld arise *ithin the context of a completely alternati e system$ *hich itself *o!ld be ,!st as ,!stified as my o*n' ( take it that 114 is an easier problem for coherentism to address than 1#4' +!t !ltimately$ they get at the same !nderlying fla*' Consider interpretation 114) if the probability calc!l!s is the sole means of determining coherence$ i'e'$ if a necessary and s!fficient condition for coherence is that it conform to the probability calc!l!s$ then the S;!irrel-5ods belief can be coherent *ithin a system exactly like mine so long as it has no other rele ant connections to any other belief *ithin the system' +!t if s!ch an arbitrary belief co!ld exist *ithin my belief system$ and be ,!stified by it$ it *o!ld seem that there is no connection bet*een the idea of ,!stification *ithin my system and reality' +!t that seems to be precisely the *ork *e *ant ,!stification to do' We *ant to say that if a belief is ,!stified$ it gi es !s some reason to think that it is tr!e' And if a belief can be ,!stified *itho!t relying on any other beliefs$ it is diffic!lt to see ho* the strength of the o erall system co!ld lend its *eight to s!ch a belief' 7f co!rse$ one co!ld block interpretation 114 by s!ggesting that more is in ol ed in coherence than ,!st the probability calc!l!s' &his$ ( take it$ is behind both - an ig and +on=o!r>s re,ection of the probability calc!l!s as the meas!re of
i ?! al A n!r$ /Clos!re .econsidered$0 Philosophers Imprint$ 1#$ no 2$ 1#%1#4) @

Castaneda 4 coherence' (t is open to the coherentist to s!ggest that the probability calc!l!s itself forms only part of the idea of coherence$ and that there are other considerations in ol ing coherence$ one of *hich might be that beliefs m!st be$ not only not incompatible *ith$ b!t in some sense deri e their s!pport from the rest of the belief system in order to be ,!stified' i +!t *hile this is !ndo!btedly a fr!itf!l line of in;!iry$ it does not really mitigate the force of the ob,ection' &he reason for this is that it *o!ld al*ays be open to an indi id!al *ho *as s!fficiently moti ated to keep the S;!irrel-5ods belief to change his or her other beliefs to make them conform to the belief that the S;!irrel-5ods r!le the !ni erse' While a mo e s!ch as the coherentist might be tempted to make might block interpretation 114$ it really only does so by t!rning interpretation 114 into interpretation 1#4' +!t either *ay$ the force of the ob,ection is that the coherentist approach seems to separate tr!th from ,!stification in a *ay that se erely !ndermines the concept of ,!stification' And the alternati e systems ob,ection$ interpretation 1#4$ arg!ably makes this point more forcef!lly than does interpretation 114' Closely related to this idea is the problem of explaining sense experience *ithin coherentism' ii What *e really *ant is to be able to attach o!r belief system to the *orld$ *hich incl!des the ob,ects of experience' What coherentism *ants to incorporate are beliefs6 b!t it is not ob io!s that sensory experiences are beliefs at all' At the ery least$ they are not
=onathan - an ig$ /Coherentism$0 3$4' do*nloaded from his site at +aylor) https)88bearspace'baylor'ed!8=onathanA- an ig8***8tex8coherentismc!llison ol!me'pdf - an ig s!mmari<es +on=o!r>s acco!nting of the coherence relation as being different than the probability calc!l!s' And$ *hile he takes no definite stance himself on the iss!e$ it is to be inferred that he is against the probability calc!l!s as the meas!re of coherence beca!se he says that it *o!ld in ol e the cost of re,ecting his incorporation of sense data' i Compare$ for example$ the entry at Stanford>s Encyclopedia) 7lsson$ Erik$ /Coherentist &heories of Epistemic =!stification0$ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1Winter #%1# Edition4$ Ed*ard B' Calta 1ed'4$ forthcoming D.E F Ghttp)88plato'stanford'ed!8archi es8*in#%1#8entries8,!step-coherence8Hgt6' &his reso!rce gi es many differing *ays of !nderstanding a coherence relation' =onathan - an ig$ /Coherentism$0 #-4 also specifically resorts to explanations of the coherence relation *hich *o!ld re;!ire beliefs to deri e s!pport from other beliefs in order to cohere' (n fact$ these t*o ob,ections are so closely related that henceforth ( shall consider them as a single ob,ection$ beca!se they are both predicated on coherentism>s problem *ith the tr!th connection'

ii

Castaneda 3 propositional' iii +!t if they are not beliefs in the same *ay that other beliefs are$ then it seems that any *ay of doing coherence *o!ld lea e them !nacco!nted for' And if sense experience cannot be incorporated$ then it seems that o!r beliefs *ill al*ays be isolated from a partic!larly important part of the ery *orld that *e *ant to explain by o!r beliefs' &his problem co!ld$ of co!rse$ be dealt *ith by saying that coherence is a necessary albeit ins!fficient condition of ,!stification$ and that o!r sense experience is incorporated in some other *ay'ix &he problem *ith doing that is that it renders coherentism impotent in addressing the skeptical problem' .emember$ the coherentist>s ans*er to the skeptic is that ,!stification is possible beca!se ,!stification ,!st is coherence and it is possible to make a non-skeptical belief cohere to a belief system' +!t if all the coherentist has done is identify a necessary condition of ,!stification$ he has not done eno!gh *ork to sho* that ,!stification does obtain for the statement that ( am not massi ely decei ed' (n essence$ the skeptic *ill be able to respond$ /?es$ that is all *ell and good$ b!t yo! ha e only sho*n that yo!r belief meets a necessary condition for ,!stification6 yo! ha e not done f!rther *ork to sho* that ,!stification act!ally obtains$ only that it has met one of the conditions'0x (t seems$ then$ that the coherentist is faced *ith a se ere diffic!lty) he m!st maintain that the coherence of a system ,!st is ,!stification in order to defeat the skeptic$ b!t in so doing he commits himself to a path that at the ery least creates a se ere diffic!lty in incorporating the data from o!r senses into his belief system' Iinally$ coherentism faces a sta!nch challenge from the ob,ection that it really seems to be only a circ!lar form of reasoning' Consider a small belief system *ith only three beliefs' &he coherentist might be asked *hat reason ,!stifies belief AJ :e might ans*er that belief + ,!stifies
iii ix x - an ig explicitly makes the point that sensory data is not propositional' See =onathan - an ig$ /Coherentism$0 #' ( am indebted to the skepticism class for making this point d!ring in-class comments d!ring my presentation period' (bid'$ partic!larly Professor A n!r *ho helped me clarify in my mind ,!st *hy$ if coherentism is to be a s!itable ans*er to skepticism$ coherence m!st be both a necessary and s!fficient condition for ,!stification'

Castaneda K belief A' (n t!rn$ he might be asked abo!t *hat ,!stifies belief +$ and he might respond that belief C is ,!stifying belief +' +!t *hen asked *hat ,!stifies belief C$ if he *ishes to a oid circ!larity he better not ans*er that either belief A or belief + ,!stifies belief C' +!t if only beliefs can ,!stify other beliefs$ it seems that that is precisely the ans*er he m!st gi e'xi Enlarging the set of beliefs might make the problem of circ!larity far less ob io!s to a less than diligent obser er$ if only for the reason that a ;!estioner might get lost in the details$ b!t it no less ass!redly seems to lead to circ!larity' 7f co!rse$ s!ch an ob io!s ob,ection has not gone !nnoticed by coherentists$ *ho ha e de eloped ario!s *ays of attempting to make coherentismLs circ!larity non- icio!s' Apart from my o*n proposal that *e can appeal to the !tility of belief for some sort of positi e epistemic stat!s$ thereby discarding the icio!sness of the circ!larity$ there are se eral other methods *hereby an indi id!al might claim that the circ!larity problem is not an iss!e' 7ne might propose$ for instance$ that the entire system of coherent beliefs need to be e al!ated as a *hole rather than seeking ,!stification for each partic!lar belief'xii &he problem *ith this *ay o!t is the ;!estion is immediately raised) by irt!e of *hat$ then$ is the entire system ,!stifiedJ &his is a ;!estion for *hich no immediate ans*er presents itself' Another$ perhaps more ambitio!s$ *ay o!t of the problem *o!ld be to s!ggest that it is the nat!re of coherence to tend to*ard tr!th$ th!s coherence gi es !s prima facie ,!stification' &his *o!ld sol e both the circ!larity problem and the connection-to-tr!th problem$ b!t at the sacrifice of making a claim *hich co!ld be easily pro en false' &he fact that it is easy to assert f!lly coherent propositions that are seemingly false perhaps goes a long *ay to*ard explaining *hy this seemingly tantali<ing a en!e ne er finds
xi xii 7lsson$ Erik$ /Coherentist &heories of Epistemic =!stification0$ &he Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1Winter #%1# Edition4$ Ed*ard B' Calta 1ed'4$ forthcoming D.E F Ghttp)88plato'stanford'ed!8archi es8*in#%1#8entries8,!step-coherence8Hgt6M Cf Peter N!rphy$ /Coherentism in Epistemology$0 at) http)88***'iep'!tm'ed!8coherent8 ( ha e fo!nd this partic!lar arg!ment in many places'

Castaneda O anyone *illing to p!rs!e it' (t seems$ then$ that at minim!m a *orkable ie* of coherentism *ill ha e to address t*o ma,or concerns) (t m!st stri e to be tr!th-seeking$ and it m!st find a *ay to a oid the problem of circ!larity' &hese are tall orders to be s!re' +!t the coherentist has another task) once he has sho*n that the ob,ections are not ins!rmo!ntable$ he also needs to find a *ay to tell !s ,!st *hat it means *hen *e say that something coheres$ other*ise the idea *ill not be able to be !sef!lly applied' (t is good to be a*are of that f!rther challenge6 other*ise$ the coherentist might think that his *ork is done if he is able to sho* that there are no ins!rmo!ntable obstacles to the theory' Ior the p!rposes of this paper$ that task *ill ha e to be left !ndone' ( merely s!ggest it as a f!rther area of in;!iry' (t seems to me that$ *hile *e may not kno* exactly *hat coherence consists in$ there m!st be a good ans*er to that ;!estion *hich *e *ill disco er thro!gh f!rther in;!iry' &his is s!ggested beca!se there seems to be a !ni ersal concept of coherence' While *e cannot$ perhaps$ define it precisely$ *hen *e !se the term it seems that it is at least !nderstood that *e are speaking abo!t something' While this is certainly not concl!si e$ the presence of a !ni ersal concept seems s!ggesti e of the tho!ght that there is something to *hich this concept refers' .et!rning to the task at hand$ ( *ant to briefly sketch o!t my proposed sol!tion to the problems of attaching coherence to tr!th and making the system non-circ!lar' &he task is made m!ch more diffic!lt if ,!stification is defined in s!ch a *ay as to make it do all the epistemic *ork' What ( mean by this is that it seems to me that$ *hen *e speak of ,!stified belief$ *e often expect that all of the acti e epistemic *ork *ill be done by the ,!stification component of kno*ledge$ *hile belief is tho!ght to be merely passi e' &o ill!strate this point$ *e might imagine a table of beliefs that has been marked$ /to be belie ed'0 7n the floor$ in a h!ge

Castaneda @ concept!al pile$ is e ery concei able proposition' &he indi id!al picks !p these propositions one at a time and seeks to find if the proposition is independently ,!stifiable' (f she determines that the proposition is ,!stified$ then the indi id!al p!ts the proposition on the /to be belie ed0 table6 other*ise$ she ret!rns the proposition to the pile$ to perhaps be re-examined if e idence later s!rfaces *hich might make it ,!stified' (n this conception$ the sole role of o!r fac!lty of belief is to passi ely accept e ery proposition *hich ,!stification places on the metaphorical table' While this imagery no do!bt o ersimplifies the !lgar attit!des abo!t ,!stified belief$ it is my belief that it only does so slightly' &hat is to say$ *hate er *e officially recogni<e as being the case abo!t the *ay that h!man beings act!ally form beliefs$ o!r philosophical position is !s!ally that belief is epistemically posterior to ,!stification' &o the extent$ then$ that some beliefs are formed prior to ,!stification *e think they are formed illegitimately' (n brief$ according to this ie*$ ,!stification is ,!stification to belie e something$ s!ch that if ,!stification is lacking$ the indi id!al lacks any positi e epistemic stat!s for her belief' &his frame*ork for ,!stification is s!rely *rong from a coherentist standpoint' 7r a better *ay of saying it is that a coherentist better not affirm this frame*ork for the relationship bet*een belief and ,!stification$ for if he does so he *ill be affirming the circ!larity problem' &he problem *ith this conception is that it asks too m!ch of ,!stification' (t asks that ,!stification carry o!t t*o tasks' 14 (t asks ,!stification to pro ide some independent stat!s in fa or of belie ing a proposition$ and #4 it asks ,!stification to tell !s the *ay that ideas relate to each other' +!t this *ork can be concept!ally separated$ *ith some of this *ork placed on belief' (n this ie*$ o!r fac!lties of belief can be likened to a garden f!ll of plants gro*n from seeds that are kno*n to ha e a propensity to gro* desired crops' =!stification in this scenario is a gardener *ho *eeds o!t any !ndesirable plants that happen to gro*' &his ie* anticipates a m!ch more acti e role for o!r belief fac!lties$ *hile sim!ltaneo!sly demanding less *ork of ,!stification'

Castaneda 2 Dnder this ie*$ ,!stification is not ,!stification to belie e anything at all' .ather$ it is ,!stification of beliefs already held. (t can flag a belief as failing to cohere$ as either lacking a rele antly important connection to any other belief or contradicting another belief$ b!t !ltimately it does not pro ide the positi e epistemic stat!s alidating o!r decision to belie e the proposition' (t *orks to make propositions more likely$ not by s!ggesting tr!e propositions$ b!t rather by flagging beliefs *hich$ gi en the likely tr!th of other beliefs$ are likely to be false'xiii &ogether$ these t*o 1,!stification and belief4 pro ide !s *ith e erything that *e pre io!sly *anted of ,!stification) belief pro ides !s *ith the positi e epistemic stat!s for o!r beliefs$ and ,!stification tells the story of ho* these ideas are interrelated' +!t does this conception ask !s to belie e something odd abo!t beliefJ Dnder this conception$ the ery act of belie ing pro ides some positi e epistemic stat!s for beliefs' Can this possibly be correctJ Can the mere act of belief someho* pro ide its o*n positi e epistemic stat!sJ (n order to !nderstand ho* belief can pro ide its o*n positi e epistemic stat!s$ it is necessary to reali<e that beliefs are not simply propositions' 5ranted$ *e can express beliefs propositionally' +!t the fact that they can be expressed propositionally does not mean that they are nothing more than affirmed propositions' +elief is not a passi e process' .ather$ belief is an acti e process that in ol es an agent *ho has a stake in the o!tcome of his beliefs' (t is significant that beliefs impact !s' We are not imm!ne to their effects' So belief is not merely an academic process6 rather$ it is an act *here the agent takes on risk$ *herein the o!tcome of the agent>s beliefs *ill determine his or her *ell-being' &o p!t it simply$ e ery agent has skin in the game$ and that skin infl!ences *hether or not she *ill gi e credence to propositions' &o belie e
xiii +y /likely tr!th0$ ( only refer to the inference of tr!th that the agent is bo!nd to assign her beliefs$ and make no ,!dgment yet as to *hether that appearance is likely to be ob,ecti ely tr!e'

Castaneda 1% is an act of tr!st6 the agent gambles that her belief *ill make things go *ell for her' +eliefs *hich do not promote *ell-being simply cannot earn their keep for ery long' 7r more precisely$ it is impossible to fare *ell for ery long if the agent has a system *hich is *holly lacking in !tility' &he agent *ill fare better in direct proportion to the n!mber and significance of her beliefs *hich tend to promote *ell-being' Either directly or indirectly$ the system of beliefs m!st s!pport the agent>s *ell-being6 if they do not$ the agent *ill s!ffer'xi &his explains *hy it is that *e ha e s!ch little control o er o!r beliefs' &ry as *e might$ *e !s!ally find o!rsel es to be !nable to belie e that .ome is located in (daho$ or that =!li!s Caesar *as a giraffe' (t seems to me that belief is largely a s!bconscio!s process' ( do not *ant to make the stronger claim that *e can do nothing to infl!ence o!r beliefs' We certainly seem to ha e the ability to choose *hat to read and *ho to listen to$ and these factors are largely in ol ed in *hat *e *ill !ltimately belie e' +!t the physical action of s!bscribing to a belief is largely beyond o!r control' And this makes entire sense from the perspecti e that beliefs are gambles taken in a game 1life4 in *hich *e ha e tremendo!s stakes' We simply find o!r minds !n*illing to take gambles *hen the stakes are so high' &his propensity of o!r minds to belie e only that *hich it finds al!able is *hat con eys some sort of positi e epistemic stat!s' (t is the belief>s !tility$ and not its tr!th$ that gi es it this stat!s' &he standard$ then$ for a belief to ha e positi e epistemic stat!s is not directly tr!th' .ather$ *e ha e a sort of proto-*arrant to belie e things beca!se they *ork for !s$ beca!se they allo* !s to s!r i e and thri e' +!t from this$ it o!ght not be concl!ded that this system is blind xi
( !se the *ord /directly0 to refer to beliefs that the agent forms on her o*n *hich lead inescapably to *ellbeing' +eliefs of this sort might incl!de the belief that one>s is!al data is correctly sho*ing *here the road ends and *here the cliff begins' +!t many of o!r beliefs only indirectly promote *ell-being' Appeal to a!thority is one s!ch case' Nost of *hat *e belie e is belie ed beca!se *e appeal to a!thority' &he indi id!al beliefs may or may not act!ally promote *ell-being$ b!t as a he!ristic more often than not relying on experts pro es efficacio!s' Dltimately$ *e do this beca!se it *orks for !s as a *hole$ e en if it may fail !s in indi id!al cases'

Castaneda 11 to tr!th' Sooner or later$ an indi id!al *ill form the concept that his *orld ,!st is a certain *ay$ and that if he *ants to be s!ccessf!l$ he does *ell to try to fig!re o!t the *ay that the *orld is' &his a*areness forms the broad o!tline of o!r concept of tr!th$ *hich is to say that *e tend to think something tr!e if *e think it conforms to reality as it act!ally is'x (t seems likely that s!ch a concept$ at least in ag!e form$ is a prere;!isite to the learning of any lang!age' After all$ in order to !nderstand a lang!age$ one m!st ha e a reference' At minim!m$ the learner m!st !nderstand that *ords refer to certain things and that the reference point for e ery *ord holds constant$ s!ch that *hen he ocali<es that *ord$ it corresponds to some concept that he holds or some thing that he desires' &h!s$ *hile tr!th does not directly pro ide the *arrant for the agent to belie e$ it *o!ld be a mistake to think that the agent does not assign a tr!th- al!e to his beliefs' (n some sense$ the beliefs of e ery ling!istic creat!re ha e at the ery least an appearance of tr!th to him' &o belie e something$ then$ is e;!i alent to saying /in my ie*$ this proposition seems likely tr!e'0 (t seeks tr!th$ tho!gh the system of belief cannot g!arantee tr!th and tho!gh tr!th is not the !ltimate consideration *hich confers *arrant' (t seems appropriate to clarify *hat is meant by proto-*arrant' (t seems that$ if *e did not possess any concept of ,!stification$ then o!r beliefs *o!ld form all the *arrant *e need' Altho!gh the idea that animals ha e beliefs is$ ( take it$ some*hat contro ersial$ if *e accept that animals ha e some basic beliefs$ then it seems clear that they are *arranted in acting !pon those beliefs e en absent ,!stification' What makes h!mans different is that ery early on in life *e de elop the concept of ,!stification and rationality' 7nce that threshold has been crossed$ then belief itself is not solely *arrant-conferring beca!se *e *ill not take take belief to be$ in itself$ s!fficient' Bot*ithstanding this$ o!r belief *ill still con ey *hat ( am calling proto-*arrant P
x :ere$ ( am !sing a correspondence theory of tr!th' &his sho!ld be tho!ght of as a placeholder position$ as it is beyond the scope of this paper to disc!ss the !ltimate nat!re of tr!th'

Castaneda 1# that positi e epistemic stat!s *hich all animals en,oy *hich permits them to act on their beliefs simply beca!se those beliefs permit them to s!r i e and thri e' :ere$ *e begin to see the role of ,!stification as a tr!th-seeking method' Each agent has a set of beliefs that she s!pposes to be tr!e6 she assigns some positi e tr!th al!e to these beliefs' +!t e en if *e *ere to grant the premiss that !tility is likely to make something tr!e$ it is also near certain that at the ery least some !ntr!e beliefs are likely to sneak thro!gh' &his is beca!se$ e en if !tility happens to be correlated *ith tr!th$ there is no reason to think that *hene er one enco!nters a belief$ that belief is likely to be tr!e' &o claim this *o!ld be to commit a logical fallacy$ to affirm the conse;!ent) (f A Qtr!thR$ then + Q!tilityR' + Q!tilityR$ therefore A Qtr!thR' E en if tr!th ine itably leads to !tility$ *e cannot affirm that e ery time *e see !tility$ tr!th m!st be present' And the sit!ation for the correlation bet*een tr!th and !tility is e en more strained$ beca!se *e cannot e en reasonably claim that there is an ine itable connection s!ch that tr!th *ill al*ays be efficacio!s'x i At best$ *e *ill be able to arg!e that tr!th tends to*ard !tility' 5i en the fact that$ no matter the correlation bet*een tr!th and !tility$ *e *ill not be able to pres!me tr!th e ery time *e see !tility$ it is clear that *e *ill need some f!rther tool to *eed o!t false beliefs' Enter ,!stification' =!stification starts *here beliefs lea e off' Ior the agent to belie e that she o!ght to rationally ,!stify her beliefs$ she seems already to ha e formed a partic!lar belief$ namely$ that /gi en a set of efficacio!s beliefs that promote *ell-being$ most of these beliefs are likely to be tr!e'0 (t is this belief that the skeptical arg!ment challenges' =!stification does not e en begin !ntil the indi id!al has this belief$ for if one did not think that tr!th *as the aim of belief$ *hy

x i

Ior an example$ see Adam Elga>s piece /7n 7 errating ?o!rself S And -no*ing (t0$ Philosophical Studies$ 1#3) 1$# *herein Elga arg!es that modern science has demonstrated that *e are !s!ally better off *hen *e o erestimate o!r o*n abilities' &his *o!ld be a concrete example of the fact that tr!th is not al*ays efficacio!s'

Castaneda 13 *o!ld one s!b,ect one>s beliefs to a system designed to *eed o!t false beliefsJ +y eliminating those beliefs that do not cohere to the rest of o!r beliefs$ *e thereby grad!ally red!ce the n!mber of false beliefs in o!r belief system' As ne* beliefs are formed thro!gh life experience$ *e are able to f!rther refine o!r belief set' &his premiss$ of co!rse$ is likely to be contentio!s' We might tend to notice ,!st ho* often h!man beliefs are apt to be incorrect' +!t this *o!ld be a mistake$ beca!se it *o!ld o erlook the sheer n!mber of times that h!man belief is apt to be correct' :!mans are$ indeed$ capable of belie ing the greatest abs!rdities' :o*e er$ e en the most fancif!l h!man has a set of beliefs that are taken to be !nproblematic) that his shoe is loose beca!se his shoelace came !ntied$ that *hen he says /apple0 his listener !nderstands *hich fr!it he *ants$ that *hen he reaches for a glass of *ater on the table$ his hands *ill clasp a solid ob,ect *hich *ill be filled *ith something that ;!enches his thirst' &he m!ndane nat!re of these beliefs may ca!se !s to o erlook their sheer ;!antity' (f *e foc!s on the n!mber of times people tend to belie e abs!rd things$ *hile forgetting the many m!ndane examples *here they get it right$ *e may tend to !nderestimate ,!st ho* good o!r fac!lties of belief really are' 5ranted$ the process is not perfect' At times$ perhaps$ incoherence may force !s to choose bet*een t*o beliefs$ and *e may choose incorrectly' We may contin!e to belie e the thing that does not$ in fact$ correspond to reality *hile abandoning the belief that does correspond to reality' +!t if o!r beliefs are more likely to be tr!e than not$ and if they are strongly interconnected$ this sit!ation o!ght not predominate' I!rther$ as ne* beliefs are formed thro!gh the process of learning$ this o!ght to be self-correcting' 5ranted$ these /if0 statements are highly conditional) they depend on the idea that tr!th and !tility are highly correlated' +!t that ,!st is *hat *e mean *hen *e say someone has a belief) *e are making the claim that the indi id!al is inferring tr!th from the presence of !tility' At this point$ one might s!spect that *e ha e been g!ilty of begging the ;!estion abo!t

Castaneda 14 tr!th against the skeptic' After all$ the precise ;!estion is *hether *e can !se the e idence of o!r senses to create a pres!mption of tr!th' &he skeptic seems right to point o!t that$ gi en the fact that this fac!lty is !nder ;!estion$ ( cannot make any claims abo!t ho* often people tend to /get it right'0 ( bring this !p so that ( may preempti ely correct a potential mis!nderstanding) When ( ha e been saying that the agent /gets it right0$ ( am speaking abo!t tr!th merely as an appearance' &hat is to say that things appear a certain *ay to the agent6 his belief-forming process$ combined *ith his ,!stificatory fac!lty$ make it appear to him that he possesses something *hich passes for tr!th' :e is bo!nd to infer tr!th from this appearance of tr!th$ b!t at best he can merely make a claim of imp!ted tr!th' "oes this mean that his fac!lty is not tr!thseekingJ (t *o!ld seem not' :e might$ after all$ be right' +!t *hat if he is *rongJ (s it really so important that the agent be right abo!t the tr!th connectionJ Perhaps the agent gets tr!th all *rong$ and reality does not !nder*rite that *hich passes for tr!th for him' (n that case$ it seems to me that *hat he really *ants is that appearance of tr!th' (f his hand reliably clasps aro!nd *hat passes for a solid ob,ect containing *hat seems to be a thirst-;!enching li;!id e ery time that he reaches for a glass of *ater$ then the agent possesses something that passes for tr!th' Especially is this the case if the agent>s thirst really is ;!enched$ i'e'$ if he does not proceed to die of thirst' &his belief *hich passes as tr!th for him ser es the f!nctional role of tr!th' (f$ in the end$ it is not the case that there really is any *ater$ and yet his thirst is ;!enched all the same$ does tr!th really matterJ (f his thirst really is an inp!t from a comp!ter program$ an inp!t *hich is ;!enched only *hen he decei es himself into thinking he has grabbed a glass of *ater$ is it not the case that his belief in the *ater glass is of more import to him than anything he co!ld concei ably belie e abo!t brains in atsJ (s it not the case$ if the *orld really is so foreign to !s$ that *hat *e really *ant is the appearance of something that passes for tr!thJ &hat appearance of something that passes for tr!th is *hat o!r theory of

Castaneda 13 coherence gi es !s' (t *orks for !s$ and *e think that reality is !nder*riting the efficacy of *hat passes for tr!th' (f that is not the case$ then perhaps the real lesson is that *e care m!ch less abo!t tr!th than *e tho!ght *e did' We think tr!th is highly important6 b!t if the *orld is so foreign that *e can kno* nothing of it$ perhaps *e imp!te too m!ch importance to tr!th after all' What if *e are *rong abo!t o!r tr!th claimsJ What if o!r system is largely efficacio!s and yet mostly or *holly lacking in tr!th contentJ (n its o*n *ay$ this is *hat *e are saying is possible *hen *e s!ggest that a skeptical scenario might obtain' ( contend t*o things' Iirst$ ( contend that *hat *e really al!e is$ not so m!ch tr!th$ as that stat!s that e okes the feeling of tr!th in !s$ *hich stat!s *e ha e come to associate *ith o!r *ell-being' Second$ ( contend that these are not really different pro,ects P that *e ha e diffic!lty e en concept!ali<ing a system in *hich tr!th co!ld be disconnected from reality in s!ch a radically foreign *ay' (n order to ill!strate these t*o points$ that *e al!e efficacy more than tr!th$ and that the pro,ect of efficacy is not a separate pro,ect than that of tr!th$ *e might consider a hypothetical scenario in ol ing a :eroic E il "emon' (n this scenario$ the "emon decei es !s in e ery concei able *ay$ in exactly the same *ay as does "escartes> "emon'x ii :o*e er$ the :eroic E il "emon is importantly different from "escartes> E il "emon' Ior in the :eroic E il "emon scenario$ thro!gh no fa!lt of the "emon$ the !ni erse is constr!cted in s!ch a *ay that *hen h!mans belie e the tr!th that state of affairs o er*helmingly tends to*ard h!man misery and death$ *hereas *hen h!mans belie e things that are not tr!e$ that state of affairs o er*helmingly tends to*ard h!man flo!rishing and longe ity' &he :eroic E il "emon$ then$ is a fig!re *ho decei es !s massi ely in order to promote o!r *elfare$ kno*ing as she does that if *e are not decei ed things *ill not go *ell for !s' +y my lights$ there does not seem to be any sense in *hich the "emon is act!ally e il in
x ii "escartes !ses the example of the E il "emon in his Iirst Neditations' ( accessed them at http)88***'*right'ed!8cola8descartes8meditation1'html

Castaneda 1K this scenario' 5ranted$ the !ni erse that she inhabits is a pec!liar one$ seeming comparati ely hostile' +!t she acts to preser e h!man *elfare' :er actions$ tho!gh intentionally meant to decei e$ are not intended to be to o!r detriment' :er actions o!ght to be regarded as heroic) she inhabits a hostile *orld$ and yet acts for the benefit of all$ making the best of a diffic!lt sit!ation' Dnless one is prepared to describe the "emon as e il rather than heroic$ one thereby admits that o!r preference$ gi en a conflict bet*een the t*o$ is for o!r *elfare o er tr!th' 7ne might ery easily ob,ect to the :eroic E il "emon tho!ght experiment by claiming that$ *hile it does seem tr!e that$ gi en a conflict bet*een tr!th and *elfare$ h!mans *ill tend to prefer *elfare$ it might also be s!ggested that these t*o pro,ects are entirely separate T that !ltimately$ *e *ill choose *elfare o er tr!th$ b!t that an ideal scenario *ill not in ol e any conflict' (t might then be s!ggested that$ by constr!ing *elfare as in some sense *arrantconferring$ ( am impo erishing belief by red!cing its access to tr!th' A better theory$ it might be claimed$ *o!ld be one that seeks tr!th and *elfare together' &his$ it seems to me$ is really *hat the tr!th ob,ection is abo!t in its ob,ection to coherence as ,!stification' &he t*o pro,ects$ ho*e er$ are not so easily separated' &his is the second lesson that the :eroic E il "emon Scenario hopef!lly imparts to !s' When *e are asked to imagine a *orld constr!cted in s!ch a *ay that belie ing tr!th is harmf!l *hereas belie ing falsehood is beneficial$ o!r minds strain to e en imagine s!ch a scenario' We might reasonably *onder ho* s!ch a *orld co!ld e en exist' We are s!rely right to think that$ e en if s!ch a *orld is possible$ it is beyond my ability to !nderstand' ( do not mean$ of co!rse$ that *e are incapable of forming e en a concept that s!ch a *orld might exist' &he fact that *e can consider the :eroic E il "emon scenario means that it is concei able' .ather$ ( mean to s!ggest that$ *hile *e can form s!ch a concept$ *e ha e diffic!lty imagining the scenario' As o!r minds strain to pict!re the *orld$ *e are bo!nd to be dra*n back to a *orld *here tr!th is efficacio!s' What might it mean$

Castaneda 1O after all$ that kno*ing the tr!th that$ say$ there is a cliff a fe* feet ahead *o!ld someho* ca!se !s harmJ (t seems to !s that kno*ledge of tr!th helps !s beca!se it pro ides !s *ith information abo!t *hat state the *orld is in$ enabling !s to respond properly' What ( am trying to get at is ,!st why it is that *e think tr!th is so important$ *hy it is that o!r int!itions speak so po*erf!lly against a system *hich does not directly seek tr!th' And it seems clear that the reason that *e al!e tr!th so highly is beca!se *e ha e imp!ted s!ch *elfare-promoting al!es to tr!th' &he tho!ght that it might be other*ise$ *hile concept!ally a ailable to !s$ is not *ithin the scope of o!r int!itions as they ha e act!ally formed' +!t this is precisely the scenario that the skeptic asks !s to consider' (t is$ of co!rse$ easy for !s to !nderstand that$ at times$ the tr!th *ill be !npleasant' (t may e en be the case$ partic!larly *hen *e are po*erless to do anything in response to an !npleasant tr!th$ that there might be occasions *hen belie ing the tr!th *ill confer no ad antage at all' I!rther$ it certainly seems possible to imagine a sit!ation in *hich belie ing a falsehood might confer more ad antage than belie ing the tr!th' +!t *hat does not seem possible is for !s to imagine that this sort of sit!ation *o!ld be the general r!le$ s!ch that *e abandon the ca!se of tr!th' S!ch instances *here tr!th does not correspond to or promote *elfare seem anomalo!s to !s beca!se$ in o!r experience$ in order to properly respond to the *orld$ *e !s!ally need to kno* *hat state the *orld is in' &here is a connection$ then$ in o!r minds bet*een o!r *elfare and the appearance of tr!th$ s!ch that *e al*ays seek this appearance of tr!th' 7!r inference is that this appearance of tr!th is !nder*ritten by reality as it tr!ly is' +!t this is only an inference' (t is *hy *e al!e tr!th6 b!t if reality *ere sho*n$ as in the :eroic E il "emon scenario$ to not be the force !nder*riting the efficacy of apparent tr!th$ then it seems that *e al!e this apparent tr!th m!ch more than act!al tr!th' &r!th does not ha e for !s any !ltimate al!e$ it is simply o!r means to an end6 it is *hat

Castaneda 1@ *e belie e to be making o!r responses to o!r reality *ork for !s' (f *e belie ed them$ skeptical scenarios co!ld$ it seems$ o erthro* that pres!mption' +!t if s!ccessf!l$ *hat s!ch skeptical scenarios cannot do is make !s contin!e to al!e tr!th' A *orld *here a skeptical scenario obtains is a *orld so foreign that the efficacy of tr!th seems to ha e been t!rned on its heels) *e no longer al!e it$ or at least *e o!ght no longer al!e it$ for it gi es !s nothing' (f *e so!ght it$ *e *o!ld not be ad antaged in the slightest' &he tr!th ob,ection to coherentism$ then$ is either tri ial or *rong' (f reality really is !nder*riting *hat passes for tr!th to !s$ then it is a *rong ob,ection$ for o!r inference is correct) reality really is !nder*riting *hat passes for tr!th for !s' (f reality really does not !nder*rite *hat passes for tr!th for !s$ then the ob,ection is tri ially tr!e) *e do not ha e tr!th$ b!t *e no longer ha e any reason to desire it' +!t this perspecti e can help !s to !nderstand *hy the tr!th ob,ection to coherentism is so po*erf!l) beca!se *e tend to pres!me that tr!th and *elfarepromotion are highly correlated$ *e find the idea that a belief system might not be /tr!thseeking0 to be ery tro!bling' &he sol!tion lies in reali<ing that the system is *elfare-seeking$ b!t that in doing so *e are bo!nd to infer that it is also tr!th-seeking beca!se *e belie e *elfare to be strongly correlated *ith tr!th' &he belie er is bo!nd to the same inference as his ob,ector$ to *it$ that things *ork for !s beca!se they are ho* they appear' &he closely related ob,ection on the basis of coherentism>s diffic!lty in incorporating sense data is like*ise defeated by ass!ming a pragmatic approach to proto-*arrant' .emember$ earlier the problem *as not incorporating sense data' - an ig has s!ggested that coherentism can incorporate sense data *itho!t de ol ing to a form of fo!ndationalism'x iii &he problem *as that$ in order to gi e ,!stification some means of gi ing *arrant to sense data$ *e had to enlarge the concept in a *ay that enabled the skeptic to !ndermine the coherentist>s ans*er to the
x iii =onathan - an ig$ /Coherentism$0 #'

Castaneda 12 skeptic' &he problem *as that *e *ere earlier looking to ,!stification to impart o!r *arrant to belie e' +y ha ing the !tility of belief confer positi e epistemic stat!s rather than ,!stification$ *e no longer need to ha e ,!stification expand in any s!ch *ay' A proto-*arrant !nder this scheme is conferred onto the data from o!r senses by the f!nction of o!r belief6 ,!stification does not need to explain it or pro ide *arrant for it$ merely accommodate beliefs based !pon sense data in exactly the same *ay as *ith any other belief' 7!r sense data is still afflicted by the general problem of connecting o!r beliefs to the tr!th$ b!t only to the exact same extent as any other beliefs' As s!ch$ m!ch of *hat has been said abo!t beliefs in general can be extended to beliefs based on o!r senses) to the extent that the *orld really is str!ct!red s!ch that the senses ha e no connection to reality$ to that same extent *e al!e reality less than *e al!e the efficacio!s data *hich pass as reality for !s' :o* does this system ans*er o!r int!itionsJ (s it a satisfying ans*erJ (t is to be ackno*ledged that it is not a f!lly satisfying ans*er' (t seems some*hat !nder*helming$ in that it appears to be gi ing !s some*hat less than *e *ant' &he fact that the system has only a ten!o!s tr!th connection is deeply tro!bling to !s' (t might be e en more disconcerting that it champions this problem as being of little conse;!ence) that it sees h!man *elfare as being !ltimately of greater al!e than tr!th' (n the end$ tho!gh$ it m!st be remembered that *e co!ld not hope to find a completely int!iti e sol!tion to the skeptical arg!ment' (f o!r sol!tion gi es !s some*hat less than *e *ant$ yet eno!gh to engage prod!cti ely *ith the *orld *e enco!nter on a daily basis$ then perhaps that is all *e need'