INTRODUCTION

Chapter 70: PRINCIPLE

.,
THE THIRD AND .relatively unfamiliar sense in
which principles are discussed in the great
books does not refer to the sources of man's
moral decisions, political acts, orscientiflc con-
clusions. The discussion in question refers to
reality apart from man.. Just as men try to dis-
cover the elements of matter, or the causes of
motion, so they try to discover the principles
of of change..The issues\vhich
arise from this concern with the principles of
reality are discussed in such chapters as BEING,
CAUSE, CHANGE, FORM, NATURE, and lYfATTER.
421
the sensible particulars; and by habituation,
the moral particulars. Hence Aristotle insists
that "anyone who is to listen intelligently to
lectures about what is noble and just and, gen-
erally, about the subjects of political science
must have been brought up in good habits.
For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is
sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start
need the reason as well; for the man who has
been well brought up has or can easily get the
starting-points. "
The word "principle" is used by Kant in a
much more restricted sense. He reserves the
status of principle to the general propositions
which serve as the major premises in reasoning.
In both the theoretic and the practical sciences,
principles express reason's understanding of
universal and necessary relationships.
Kant differs from Aristotle in other respects.
lIe differentiates between ordinary general
propositions which merely serve as major
premises in reasoning and the proposi tionshe
classifies as "synthetic judgements a priori." He
regards the former as principles only in a rela-
tive sense and treats the latter alone as prin-
ciples absolutely. He also distinguishes between
those principles of the understanding which he
thinks are "constitutive of experience," and
those principles of the reason \vhichshould. be
used in what he calls a "regulative," not a con-
stitutive manner. They determine the direc-
tion and goals of thought beyond experience.
But such differences concerning the nature and
kinds of principles do not affect the comillonly
accepted meaning of principle as that from
which, in the temporal order of learning,
knowledge develops or that upon which, in the
logical order, knowledge rests.
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
uflicient to make the prior proposltlon<a
ciple. Can a proposition be a principle if,
though it is used as a premise in reasoning,
generality ?For example, is the partic-
proposition-that this bottle contains
n-a principle underlying the practical
lusion that its contents should not be
lowed?
ristotle answers affirmatively. In the order
ractical thinking, he holds, we deliberate
her about the end to be sought nor about
particular facts on which a choice of the
s depends. "The end cannot be a subject
eliberation," he writes, "but only the
s; nor indeed can the particular facts be a
.ect oEit, as whether this is bread or has been
ed as it should; for these are matters of per-
tbn." The perceived particulars thus func-
as principles along with the most general
practical propositions, namely, what the
hould be. Calling the faculty .which appre-
s first principles "intuitive reason," Aris-
says that "the intuitive reason involved in
ieal reasonings grasps the last and variable
i.e., the minor premise. For these variable
a.xe the starting-points for the apprehen-
f the end, since the universals are reached
the particulars; of these therefore we must
perception, and this perception is intui-
" eason.
teption, at least in the form of sense-
ption, seems to be only one of the two
in which we apprehend the particular
whieh are principles in practical reasoning.
.Aristotle, Aquinas uses the judgment, that
bread or iron, as an example of "facts
ed through the senses" which are "prin-
accepted in the inquiryof counseL"
tIle moral quality .inherent .in particular
<ipes not seem to be perceptible by the
salone; and such particular moral judg-
sare also involved in moral reasoning.
tIe suggests that habit (i.e., the moral
or virtues) are the immediate source of
udgments, which can be called "percep-
.0 the particular" even though they are
'tnply sense-perceptions.
ifirst principles,' 'Aristotle explains, "we
tn
e
by induction, some by perception,
a certain habituation." By induction
general truths; by sense-perception,
sense of being before everything else; s
times it means that which comes first
relatively, taking precedence over sometfi
but having others prior to itself. Sincepri
may be either absolute or relative-first.""'i
out qualification or first only in a certain res.
-the traditional phrase "first principle"
not have the redundancy of "first first'
"beginning beginning."
If there are absolutely first beginnin
\vhich nothing else can be prior, they can\l
imately be called "first principles" tocH
guish them from principles which co
ll1
e
only in a certain respect. Only if there are
principles can regression to infinity be
in the search for origins. The proposi
which lie at the foundation of a science
for example, constitute its principles, but
may also be derived in turn from some
science. Only the principles of a science
is prior to or independent of all othersC
truly first principles.
THE FOREGOING example brings us to the 0
meaning of principle that is
nized. I t is the sense in which men spea
principles in relation to
principles as the foundations of a
The priority which belongs to pnnc1pl
the domain of thought need not be temp
Principles mayor may not be first in the
of learning. But if they are not first in the
poral order, they must be first
premises are logically prior to a conclus100
as in Euclid's Elements, his principles'-ht
ini tions, postulates, and axioms-are log
prior to all the theorems he demonstrat
means of them.
It may be asked \vhether, among .pt
tions related as premises and conclus1oIl
logical priority of one proposition to an
O
F the three ways in which principles are
. considered in the tradition of the great
books, the most familiar sense of the word is
the one in which we speak of moral principles,
principles of action, or principles. The
connotation of the word 1n th1s usage seems to
be twofold. \Ve think of principles as rules of
conduct and we think of them as standards by
which to measure and judge human acts or
political events. Either conception attributes
a certain generality to principles. Just as rules
apply to an indefinite number of, particular
cases, so any principle we appeal to In to
decide a practical problem or to \ve1gh
merits of an action undertaken, can be apphed
again and again in other
In addition to this charactenstlc of general-
ity, principles seem to have the of un-
derlying or being the source of In
jurisprudence the search for pnnclples con-
sists in the attempt to discover those few most
fundamental precepts from which the more de-
tailed rules of law can be derived. The consti-
tution of a state provides the principles which
underlie its particular laws and sets the stand-
ards by which their legality is to
Governments are judged by the pnnc1ples they
attempt to apply as well as by their success in
putting these principles into say
of a government that its acts are unprznctpled IS
not to condemn the particular acts as wrong,
but to accuse the government of having no uni-
form policy to serve as a foundation for its acts.
This aspect of the meaning of principle-as
the source from which a set of consequences
follows-seems to be more characteristic of the
idea of principle than the aspect of generality.
According to its Latin derivation and the
equivalent root in Greek, "principle",
a beginning or a foundation. It
means that ,vhich comes first absolutely, In the
420
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
422
If the word "principle" always connotes a be-
ginning, every special sense ofprinciple should
involve some kindofpriority. As we have al-
ready observed, principles may be either prior
in time or prior logically. But the principles of
the universe or the principles of change are not
usually thought to be prior in either of these
ways. For them Aristotle specifies another kind
of priority-priority iri nature-to explain the
primacy of those principles which constitute
the nature of a thing. In his view, for exampie,
matter and form are the principles of a physical
substance. Since a substance composite of mat-
ter and form cannot exist until its matter and
its form coexist, matter and form are not prior
to the substance they compose.. Their priority
to substance consists only in the fact that that
which has the nature of a composite substance
results from the union of matter and form as its
natural components. Because the substance is
the natural resultant, matterand form can prop-
erly be called its natural principles.
This way of considering principles at once
suggests a close relationship among principles,
elements, and causes; and also indicates the
connection between the .. present chapter and
the chapters on CAUSE and ELEMENT. The ulti-
mate parts into which a whole can be divided
may be its principles as well as its elements.
The form or matter ofa substance may be, in
Aristotle's theory, not only one of its prin-
ciples, but also a cause-a formal or a material
cause. Among the great authors Aristotle and
Aquinas alone seem to dwell upon the relation-
ship of these three terms. They give instances
in vvhich the same thing is principle, element,
and cause, as well as instances in which a prin-
ciple is neither a cause nor an element, e.g.,
privation. In the sphere of human conduct, an
end is both a principle and a final cause, but
not an element. The last end is the highest
final cause and the first principle-first in in-
tention though last in
THE TRADITIONAL issues concerning this idea
differ according to the general. context in
which the question of principles is raised. The
main controversy, for example, with regard to
principles in the order of reality is over their
number and order.
Aristotle argues against an infinite number
of principles as incompatible with the
notion of principle itself. In his
change or motion, he tries to prove tna
more than are necessary,
no less. will do. These are, as the chapt
CHANGE explains, matter, form, and pri
Considering the principles of the univer
whole, Plotinus also enumerates three ana
to prove that none can be added or subtra
But whereas Aristotle treats the three prine
of change as coordinate, Plotinus places
cosmic principles in the absolute order OI'
second, and third.
"We need not go seeking any other
ciples," writes Plotinus. "This-the On
the Good-is our First, next to it folIo
Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinke
upon this follows Soul. Such is the or
nature. The intellectual realm allows no
than these and no fewer. Those whou
fewer Principles must hold the identi
either Intellectual Principle and Soul,
Intellectual Principle and The First . .
increase the Primals .by making the Su
Mind engender the Reason-Principle, an
again engender in the Soul a distinct po
aetas mediator between Soul and theSup
Mind, this is to deny intellection to the
which would no longer derive its Reasoll
the Intellectual Principle, but from an i
mediate. .. . . Therefore, vve mustaffi
more than these three Primals."
In the sense in which Plotinus concei
three primals, they are not only prinei
the order of reality, but are themselv
ultimate graaes or modes of reality. SI
for Plato soul is not only the principle
and thought in the universe, but it also
own existence in the realm of being. Fa
totle, in contrast, the principles of cha
not have existence in and of themselves.
ter, form, and privation are not subs
but aspects of substance. They are pres
every changing substance and in every c
but they are only the principles ofm
being; they are not mutable beings in
selves.
Lucretius states two principles as th
laws of nature. The first is that nothing
into being out of nothing; the secon
nothing is ever completely reduced tono
The word "principle" is obviously. not
used in the same sense here as when' it
nates The OneforPlotinus,soulforPlato,
er for Aristotle, or the atoms which Lu-
s calls the "first beginnings. " Here it
otrefer.toan.entity, or even toan' aspect
e real being, but rather to a la\v---the
ment of a universal and necessary condi-
which governs all that is or happens. It is
is sense that the proposition traditionally
"the law of contradiction"-:"that the
thing cannot both be and not be in the
respect at the same time-issaid by Aris-
to be the first principle of being as well
thought.
e conception of the law of contradiction
he related laws of identity. and excluded
eas principles of thought raises problems
logical principles in general
re axioms or postulates, whether they are
y rules .of reasoning and. demonstration
themselves premises from which con-
s can be deduced. If, .. for example,. the
[contradiction is only a rule of thought,
forbids the mind to affirm and deny. the
proposition, then it is not a principle of
edge in the sense in which the definitions
lams of geometry function as premises in
monstration of theorems. No conclusion
drawn from it concerning the nature of
But if, in addition to being a rule of
ht, it is a metaphysical axiom, .which
tJhe most fundamental fact about exist-
en like the axioms in geometry. it may
source of conclusions in metaphysics.
this. second point Locke seems to differ
y from Aristotle and Aquinas. He denies
he Jaws of identity and contradiction are
I principles of knowledge. "These mag-
axims," he writes, "are not the prin-
na foundations of all our other knowl-
Nor have they been, he adds, "the
tions whereon any sciencehath been
here is, I know, a great deal of talk,
tea from scholastic men, of sciences
maxims on which they are built; but
eenmy ill luck, never to meet with any
ciences;' much less anyone built upon
two maxims, "vhat is, is' and 'it is im-
e for the same thing to be and not
423
WE SHALL PRESENTLY consider the issue
cerning axioms or pastulates-whether the
principles ofthe sciences are self-evident truths
or are only provisional assumptions. Those \\Tho
are \-villing to admit the existence of axioms do
not. all agree, however, that such truths refer
to reaiity. Hume, for example, limits the
tent of axioms to knowledge ofthe relations be-
tween our own ideas. They are not truths about
real existence or matters of fact.
Locke also grants self-evidence only to per,..
ceptions.of the agreement or disagreement be-
tween ideas. "Concerning the. real existence of
all other beings" except ourselves and God, we
have, he writes, "not so much a demonstrative,
much less a self-evident, knowledge; and there-
fore concerning these there are no maxims/"
But Locke. does think that our tive
knowledge of God's existence depends upon an
intuitive knowledge of our own existence; and
in addition to knowing our own .existence
directly or without proof, .. he also thinks we
have through our senses an equally direct
knowledge of the existence of other things.
Such intuitive and sensitive knowledge of
ticular existences .is, like the truth. of axioms,
immediate-that is, something known directly
or without proof, without any appeal to
propositions. Hence Locke is not denying that
we know some immediate truths about
but only that such truths consist exclusively of
propositions .about particular existences. Since
axioms, or what Locke calls "maxims," are
always general propositions, the self-evident
truths which they express do not apply to
reality.
William James uses the word "intuitive"-
in a different .. sense from Locke-to .... charac-
terize propositions that state "the necessary
and eternal relations" which the mind "finds
between certain of its ideal conceptions." Intui-
tive propositions are for him, therefore, what
maxims are for Locke; and like Locke, James
also denies that such axioms of reason hold for
reality. "Only hypothetically," he says, "can
we affirm intuitive truths of real things-by
supposing, namely, that real things exist which
correspond exactly with the ideal subject of
the intuitive propositions ... The intuitive
propositions leave us as .regards outer
reality none the better for their possession. We
THE.'.GREAT IDE.AS
IF THE ONLY principles upon which reasoning
can be based or from which conclusions can be
drawn are assumptions, postulates, or hypoth-
eses rather than axioms, then everything is a
matter of opinion and probability; nothing'tan
have the certitude of knowledge. As indicated
in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION,
one theory of that distinction makes knowl-
edge an act of the mind independent of our
wishes or will and treats opinion as a judgment
voluntarily accepted or rejected. Accordingly(,
assumptions or postulates are perfectly
sentative of opinion, and axioms express the
very essence of knowledge. To assume or pos-
tulate anything is to take it for granted-:-
voluntarily! A postulate neither compels as-
sent, nor does it ever exclude the possibility of
taking the opposite for granted. \Vhe're men
make postulates, there dispute is possible. But
to assert something as an axiom is to command
assent on the ground that its opposite can be
424
still have to 'go to our senses' to find what the
reality is.
"The vindication of the intuitionist posi-
tion," James continues, "is thus a barren vic-
tory. The eternal verities \vhich the very struc-
ture of our mind lays hold of do not necessarily
themselves lay hold on extramental being, nor
have they, as Kant pretended later, a legislat-
ing character for all possible experience. They
are primarily interesting only as subjective
facts. They stand \vaiting in the mind, forming
a beautiful ideal network; and the most we can
say is that we hope to discover outer realities
over which the network may be flung so that
ideal and real may coincide."
The opposi te' vie'" seems to. he taken by
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon" Descartes,
Spinoza, and Kant. Though they are far from
being in complete agreement concerning the
principles of kno\vledge, the propositions which
they call axiomatic, self-evident, intuitive, or
a priori synthetic judgments, are not restricted
by them to the mind's perception of the rela-
tions between its own ideas. There . are
evident or immediate truths in physics and
metaphysics,. as well as in mathematics and
logic. Whether these are inductions from ex-
perience or innate possessions of the . mind,
whether they are intuitive apprehensions of in-
telligible being or a priori judgments' having
a transcendental origin, these propositions are
held to describe the world of experience, or the
nature and existence of things outside the hu-
man mind.
THERE SEEM TO BE two degrees of skepticism
with regard to principles in the order of knowl-
edge. Complete skepticism would consist in
denying principles in every sense. That would
be the same as denying any beginning or basis
for even the opinions which men hold. No one
seems to go that far.
The issue with respect to the foundations of
knowledge or opinion is therefore not between
those who affirm and those who deny prin-
ciples, but bet'vveen different views of what the
starting points are. It is sometimes said, for
example, that sensations are the principles or
beginnings of all human learning. This view is
shared both by those who think that all our
ideas or concepts are abstracted from the Inate-
rials provided by the senses and by those
account for all the other contents of the,
-its memories and imaginations, its COtll.
formations-in of the simple impress
originally received by the senses.
Concepts, as distinct from sense-percept!
are also sometimes regarded as principle
knowledge by those ,vho think that cone
originate by abstraction from sensorYl1l
rials, as well as by those who think
are primary principles, i.e., having no origi
any prior apprehensions. On either vie\v,ii
or concepts function as principles insofa
they are the simples from which the
complex acts of the mind develop, such as
acts of judgment and reasoning. Just as on
level of language, words are the principles()
significant speech, out of which sentences
paragraphs are formed; just as, in thelog
order, terms are said to be the principle
propositions and syllogisms; so concepts are
principles of judgments and, reasonings.
definitions of Euclid, for example, state
notions of point, line, triangle, etc. which
derlie his theorems and demonstrations.
One common characteristic of eitherse
tions or concepts as principles of knowle
seems to be simplicity. Nothing moreele
tary, out of which they can be formed, is.I>
to then1. Another characteristic is that the\"
principles of knowledge or opinion \vithou'
ing themselves acts of knowledge or opi
This point is made by all who, hold that
propositions-whether statements ofopini
of knowledge-can be true or false.
The terms which express the simple ap
hensions of the mind-its sensations or
cepts-cannot be true or false, because, u
propositions, which are composed of te
they do not assert anything. If sensations
concepts cannot be true or false in the sens
which propositions or judgments are, thent
lack the distinctive property of knowled
opinion. In contrast, propositions or judg1l1
-\vhich are supposed to be principles, whe
axioms or assumptions-can be treatedast
selves expressions of knowledge or opinion;
merely as its starting points or sources.
THE TWO DEGREES of skepticism . prevl
mentioned apply only to those principl
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE 425
wledge which are themselves capable of If it is objected that, in the absence of such
g regarded as knowledge or .opinion and principles, there is no starting point or founda-
ce as either true or false. tion for science, Montaigne seems willing to
e have already considered the skepticismof accept the consequence. He does not flinch
e who, admitting that the truth of some from an infinite regression of reasons. "No rea-
positions can be immediately recognized by son," he writes, "can be established but upon
mind, nevertheless deny that such self- the foundation of another reason; and so run
ent truths describe reality. This mayor back to all infinity." To those who say that
not be accompanied by a further deprecia- there is no disputing with persons \vho deny
of axioms on the ground that they are principles, he replies that "men can have no
ely analytical 'propositions and hence tri- principles, if not revealed to them by the
,uninstructive, or tautological. Divinity; of all the rest, the beginning, the
e chapter on JUDGMENT considers the is- middle, and the end are nothing but drealn
hich revolves around the derogatory use and vapor."
ch words as "tautology" or "truism" to If, however, for practical purposes, a begin-
nate self-evident truths. Though the in- ning must be made somewhere, Montaigne sug-
us connotation of the word "truism" does gests that it can be done by taking things for
ake the truth to which this epithet is ap- granted and then getting others to grant our
any less true, the dignity of a truth does presuppositions. "It is very easy," he writes,
to be affected by the refusal to regard it as "upon granted foundations to build whatever
atement of reality. Furthermore, a certain we please ... By this way, we find our reason
ee of skepticism results from such refusal. well-grounded and discourse at a venture; for
e exemplifies this. He holds that self- our masters prepossess and gain beforehand as
enttruths are possible only in mathematics, much room in our beliefas is necessary for them
h deals not with matters of fact, but with towards concluding afterwards what they
relations between our o\vn ideas. In con- please, as geometers do by their postulates; the
ence, he denies to the study of nature the consent and approbation we allow them giving
ude or demonstrative character which he them power to draw us to the right and left,
in mathematical science. Since physics is and to whirl us about at their own pleasure."
erned with real existences, no axioms or
vident principles are available to it; and
cording to Hume, it cannot demonstrate
()nclusions, but must advance them as
abilities.
more thorough-going skepticism seems to
st in holding that there are absolutely no
ters at all about ,,,hich men have axiomatic
ledge. This appears to be the position of
taigne. No truths are self-evident. None
ands the universal assent of mankind;
belongs to the nature of the mind so that
en must agree to it. Montaigne almost
it to be axiomatic that there are no
s, for if there were, he says, "there would
.tne one thing to be found in the world ....
would be believed by men ,vith an univer-
t; but this, that there is no one propo-
that is not debated and. controverted
gst us, or that may not be, makes it very
fest that our natural judgment does not
clearly comprehend 'hat it embraces."
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
426
immediately recognized as impossible. No prop-
osition can be regarded as an axiom. if its ac-
ceptance or rejection is in any way a matter of
choice.
For Aristotle the area in which . men can
dispute with some reason on both sides belongs
to what he calls "dialectic," whereas what he
calls "science" is the area from which dispute is
excluded by demonstrations which rest on self-
evident truths. One is the area of probability
and opinion; the other, of certainty and knowl-
edge. Contrary assumptions are the starting
point of dialectical argument,whereas science
begins with axioms. These may be the first
principles which Aristotle and Bacon caU"com-
mon notions" because. they are common to
diverse sciences; or they. may be the axioms
peculiar to a single subject matter.
The word "dialectic" is used by Plato ina
quite different sense. It. names the highest
science. Whereas the mathematical .. sciences
start from hypotheses which require further
support, dialectic-in the conception of Plato
-rises to the first principles of all knowledge.
In the hierarchical ordering of the sciences,
Plato's dialectic, Aristotle's metaphysics, and
Bacon's philosophia prima seem to occupy re-
spectively the same primary position and to
perform. the same function in virtue of being
the discipline which contemplates or considers
the absolutely first or most universal principles.
For Bacon, as for Aquinas, the only higher
science is sacred theology, whose principles are
articles of supernatural faith, not axioms of
reason.
These matters fully discussed in the
chapters on DIALECTIC, METAPHYSICS, and
THEOLOGY; questions concerning different kinds
of principles or the principles of different sci-
ences are considered in HYPOTHESIS and LOGIC.
The chapter on INDUCTION, furthermore,dis-
cusses the inductive origin of axioms, as well as
the disagreement between Bacon and Aristotle
on the point of whethe the highest axioms or
first principles are immediately intuited from
the particulars of .. experience, or are reached
only through intermediate stages of generali-
zation.
Since axioms are i11demonstrable, they can-
not be derived by reasoning as conclusions from
any truths prior to themselves. Their indemon-
strability.is regarded by .Aristotle anclBas
a virtue rather than a defect, for if they
demonstrable, .they could not be the prih
or starting points of demonstration. It
were no axioms, then ;;othing could be de
strated, because everything. in turn woul
quire proof in an endless regression.
To the ancient counterparts of theskrep
Montaigne, Aristotle replies that unless
law of contradiction is an indisputable a
any form of reasoning, even probable rease>
from assumptions, is impossible. The prin
which underlies all disputation cannot itse
disputed. To those who, with skeptical jn
insist upon having everything demonst
before they will accept it, Aristotle Qf{y
indirect defense of the law of contradicti
asking the questioner to try denying that
evident principle without
absurdity.
Those who. acknowledge the existence
axioms generally agree that they are inde
strable truths, but some, like Descartes
Kant, do not agree that they are induct
from experience. The alternatives seem it
that axioms are innate possessions ofthei
lect or that they are transcendental ap
principles of pure reason,
perience. Yet Locke, who denies innate!
and principles, or anything priol: to experi
does not treat what he calls self-evident rna
as inductions from experience. They are ra
direct perceptions of agreement or disag-
ment among the ideas we have acquired thr
experience.
Aquinas, who, no less than Locke, denie
nate ideas and insists upon sense-experien
the source of all human kno\vledge, refe
the assent we give first principles as a'na
habit of the mind-the intellectual virtu
calls "understanding," equivalent to
Aristotle calls "intuitive reason." As the
ter on HABIT indicates, axioms are called'
ural" truths, not in the sense of being in
instinctive, or congenital, but in
sense that if the human reason i-" ..."r-f-.,.,.t1IC
urally or normally it will come to
these truths. Again, like Locke, Aquinas
to be saying .that the truth of
ceived by the human understanding as
their terms are known, but he does
Locke in thinking that therefore such
hold only for relations bet\veen our own
THEORY OF the possession of principles by
ral habit has, for Aquinas, more than a
bal connection with the. theory of natural
Of the various meanings of the phrase
tural law" which are distinguished 'in the
ter on LAW, we are here concerned with
t both Kant and Aquinas conceive as the
rallaw whose precepts are the fundamental
ciples of human conduct. Both also speak
he precepts of the natural law or the moral
as the first principles of man's practical
on.
or Aquinas, these principles are primary in
order of. practical .. truth and the. moral
llees, as metaphysical first principles are
ary in the order of speculative, truth and
theoretic sciences. "The precepts of the
ural law," he writes, "are to the practical
on what the first principles of demonstra-
are to the speculative reason, because both
self-evident principles." As the proposition
t "the sanze thing cannot be affirmed and
ed at the same time" is the first principle of
speculative reason, so "the first precept of
,that good is to be done, and .. evil is to. be
iaed," is the first principle of the practical
on.
O! Kant, the principles of the pure practical
()h, which legislate a priori for the realm of
dam, play an analogous role to the prin.;.
es of the pure speculative reason, .which -
islate a priori for the realm of nature or ex-
ience.. It is this parallelism between the. two
sofprincipleswhichKant seems to have in
awhen he conceives a metaphysic ofnature
a metaphysic of morals as twin disciplines
ded on the speculative and the practical
loyment of the transcendental principles of
reason.
he same fundamental issues which we have
sidered in connection with the axioms of
oretic knowledge occur here in connection
the first principles of moral knowledge.
and Kant disagree, for example, about
in which we come into possession of,
For Kant, the principles of
the principles of nature, belong
427
to the transcendental structure of pure reason
itself. For Aquinas, as already suggested, the
precepts of the natural law are known in the
same way as the axioms of the speculative rea-
son. As the truth of the principle ofcontradic-
tion is known when we understand the mean-
ing of 'is' and 'not,' so the truth of the first
command of naturallaw-'Seek the good'-is
known when we understand the meaning of
'seek' and 'good.' We hold such truths by the
natural habit of our minds, which in the case
of the natural law is given the special name of
synderesis.
Just as we find a certain skepticism with re-
gard to the principle of contradiction and other
axioms, so we find doubts about the existence of
natural law, or about indisputable and univer-
sally (icceptable principles of morality. Refer-
ring to those who. think that there are some
laws "first, perpetual, and immutable, which
they call natural that are imprinted in mankind
by the condition of their own proper being,"
Montaignedeclares that "the only sign by
which they can argue.or,infer some laws. to be
natural is the universality ofappfobation";' and
he adds: "Let them produce me but one of this
condition."
The consequences of skepticism are here the
same as before. Without first principles, moral
science either fails entirely or IS reduced to sys-
tems of belief based upon one set ofassumptions
or another. In either case, moral judgments ex-
press, not knowledge, but opinion. As John
Stuart Mill observes, the utilitarians must, de-
spite all other differences, agree with Kant that
if there is to be a science of ethics, "mortality
must be deduced from principles," and ulti-
mately from one first principle, for "if there be
several, there should be a determinate order of
precedence among them."
What Mill says concerning the self-evidence
of the first principle of morality-which he
formulates as a statement of the ultimate end of
human conduct--closely resembles what Aris-
totle says about the self-evidence of the law of
contradiction. "Questions of ultimate ends are
not amenable to direct proof," Mill writes. "To
be incapable of proof by reasoning is common
to all first principles: to the first premises of
our knowledge, as well as to those of our con-
duct."
I. Principles in the order of reali ty
la. The differentiation of principle, element, and cause
lb. The being, number, and kinds of principles in the order of reality
IC. The metaphysical significance of the principles of thought
2. The kinds of principles in the order of knowledge
2a. The origin of knowledge in simple apprehensions
(I) Sensations or ideas as principles
(2) Definitions as principles
(3) Indefinables as principles of definition
2b. Propositions or judgments as principles
(1) Immediate truths of perception: direct sensitive knowledge of appearances;
evident particular facts
(2) Immediate truths of understanding: axioms or self-evident truths; a priori
judgments as principles
(3) Constitutive and regulative principles: the maxims of reason
3. First principles or axioms in philosophy, science, dialectic
3a. Principles and demonstration
(1) The indemonstrability of axioms: natural habits of the mind
(2) The indirect defense of axioms
(3) The dependence of demonstration on the critical application of
the principles of identity and contradlction
3
b
. Principles and. induction: as intuitive inductions from experience; stages
of inductive generahzation ,
3
c
. Axioms in relation to postulates, hypotheses, or assumptions .
(I) The distinction between first in general, or notions, and
the principles of a particular subject matter or sClence
(2) The difference between axioms and assumptions,
as a basis for the distinction between knowledge and oplnlon, or SClence
and dialectic
(3) The distinction and order of the SClences according to the character of
their principles
4. First principles in the p.ractical order: the principles of action or morality; the prin-
ciples of the practical reason
4
a
. Ends as principles, and last ends as first principles: right appetite as a principle
in the practical order
4
b
. The natural moralla\v and the categorical imperative
5. The skeptical denial offirst or axioms: the denial that any propositions elicit
the universal assent of manklnd
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
REFERENC.ES
429
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I 259a-268d; BK III,
ell 4 [203b2-14] 28Ib-c; BK IV, ClI I [208
b
8-
209al] 287b-c; BK VI, CH S 31Ba-319c / Heav-
ens, BK I, CH 2 359d-360d; BK III, CH 3-5
393c-396a / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3-10 501c-
SlId; BK II, ClI 2 512b-513b; BK III, CH I
[99sbI3-996aI7] 514a-c; CH 2 [997
a
34]-CH 6
[loo3aI7] SI6a-522a,c; BK v, CH 3-4 534c,,:
S3Sc; BK VII-XIV 550b,d-626d / Soul, BK I,
CH 2 [404b30-40Sb31] 634a-635a
10 GALEN: iVatural Faculties, BK I, ClI 3 168c-
169a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [146-264]
2d-4b; [418-448] 6b-c
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR IX, CH 1 65d-
66d / Fourth Ennead, TR VII, CH 9 198b-d /
Fifth Ennead, TR I, CH 4 209d-210c; TR II, CH I
214c-215a; TR IV 226d-228b / Sixth Ennead,
TR I-III 252a-297b; TR VIII, CH 7-8 34Sd-
347a; TR IX 353d-360d passim
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q2, A3
12c-14a; Q 3, A 5, ANS 17c-18b; A 6, ANS and
REP 2 18c-19a; Q 14, A II, REP I 84c-8Sc; Q 25,
A I 143d-144c; Q27 153a-157c; Q 33,A I 180d-
181c; A3, REP I 182c-183c; Q42, AA 2-3 225d-
227d; Q 44 238a-241d; Q 49 264d-268a,c esp
A 3 266d-268a,c; Q 75, A I, ANS a<7ab-379c; Q
77, A 5, REP 1,-2 403d-404c; A 6 404c-405c; Q
To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
nun1bers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper and lower halves ofthe page. For example, in53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a--119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lo\verhalves of the left-
hand side of the page, the letters C and d to the upper and lo\ver halves of the right-hand side of
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Syntposiunl, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lo\ver half
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given incer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265---283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Neherniah, 7:4S-(D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "pa.ssim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
Principles in the order of reality
The differentiation of principle, element,
and cause
'7 PLATO: Ti,naeus, 455d
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK I, CH I [I84aIO'-16j
259a / Generation and Corruption, BK II, CH I
[329a24-b2] 429a-b / Metaphysics, UK I, CH 6
[987bI9-23] 505d; BK III, CH 3 [998a20_bI3]
517a-b; BK v, CH 1-3 533a-534d; CH 24
545a-b; BK VII, CH 16 [lo4obI8-23] S64d;
CH 17 56Sa-S66a,c esp [I04Ib26-33] 566a,c;
BK VIII, CH 3 [I043
b
S-14] 567d-568a; BK XII,
CH I 598a-c; CH 4-5 S99d-601a esp CH 4
[Io7
ob
22-35] 600b
AQUINAS: Summa Tlteologica, PART I, Q 33,
AI, REP I 180d-IBlc;Q 42, A 3, ANS and REP 2
227a-d; Q 105, A 6, ANS 543b-544a
DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 159a
LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 3d-
4a
The being, number, and kinds of principles
in the order of reality
7: PLATO: Phaedo, 240b-246c / Republic, BK III,
333c-d; BK VI, 383d-388a / Timaeus, 45Sc-
458b / Sophist, 564d-574c / Philebus, 610d-
613a; 615c-617d
THE GREi\T IDEA.S
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
428
THE GREAT IDE,AS CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
(1. Principles in the order of 'reality. lb. The
being, number, and kinds of principles in
the order of reality.)
84, A2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443e; A 4, REP I
444d-446b; Q liS, A 2 58/e-588e
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vI,6ld-62e
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL
376d-377a
34 NEWTON: Principles, Ib-2a; LAW I-III 14a-b;
BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 37lb-372a / Optics,
BK III, 541b-542a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-93e esp 68a-74b,
85d-88a; 108a-112d esp ll0a-d/ Judgement,
467d.. 470b; 565b-d; 566d-567a;575b-578a
45 LAVOISIER: Elements ofChemistry, PREF, 3b-4a
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, l69a-b
53 JAMES: 882a-884b
Ic. The metaphysical'significance ofthe princi-
ples of thought
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 72d-73b I Republic, BK
IV, 350d-351b
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 13 [22b28-23a26]
34d-35c / Metaphysics, BK III, CH I [99Sb6-lo]
5l4a; CH 2 [996b26--997aIS] 5l5b-d; BK IV, CH
3 524b-525a; BK Xl, CH I [IOS9a23-26] 587a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94,
A 2, ANS
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, 52a I Objec-
tions and Replies, DEF III l30b; AXIOM V131d-
132a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 10, SCHOL
PROP 37-40 386b-388b; PROP 44,
CORoL2390a
35 LOCKE: Human UlJderstanding, BK IV, CH VII,
SECT 10-II 339b-342d
42 I(ANT: Pure Reason, l5e-16e; 5ge-l07b / Pref.
Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, /
Judgement, 543d..544a; 560e; 562a-d; 600d-
60ld; 603b-e
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6e
53 JAMES: Psychology,302a-b; 671a-672,a; 852a;
862a-866a; 873a-874a; 88lb-886a esp 88lb-
882a, 884b-886a; 890a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 877b-e
2. The kinds of principles in the order of
knowledge
2a. The origin of knowledge in simple ap-
prehensions
ia(l) Sensations or ideas as principles
7 PLATO: Symposium, l67a-b / Phaedo, 228a-
230c / Republic, BK VII, 392b-393b I Theaete-
tus, 5l7b-536b / Seventh Letter, 8l0d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, ,BK I, CH 18
lllb-c I Metaphysics, BK 1, ClI I [980a28-b24]
499a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Thz'ngs, BK I [422-42S]
6b; [693-700] ge; BK II [434-436] 20e; BK IV
[353-S21] 48d-5la esp [469-S2I] 50b-5la
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I'Q
A 12, ANS 60d-6le; Q 17, A I, ANS lOOd-l0
Q18, A2, ANS lOSe-106b; Q84, A6447e-44
A 8, ANS and REP I 450b-45lb; PART I-II, Q
A 6, ANS 680e-68la
23 HOBBES: Leviatha;' PART I, 49a
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK V, l05e
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation,
esp 334e-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CR I, S
IS 98d-99a; BK II, CH I, SECT 1-8 l2la-l
esp SECT 2 12lb-e; SECT 23-2S l27b-d
SECT 24 127b-e; CH II,SECT 2 l28a-h; CR
SE'CT 10 133a-b; CH XIII, SECT 1-6 148d-14
esp SECT 2 l49a; CH XIV, SECT 2 1550
SECT 27 l60d-16la; SECT 3'-31 161e-16
CH XV, SECT 2-3 162e-d; CH XVII, SE'CT 2
CH XVIII, SECT I 173d-174a; CH XVIII, s
6 l74e-d;, Cli XXII, SECT 9 202e-203a; BK I
CH r, SECT 5 252b-e; CH IV, SECT 12-14 26
263a
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge,'INTRO 40
4l2a,e passim, esp SECT 4 40Se-d,' SECT
409d-4l0a
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECTIi 45
457b; SECT VII, DIV 49 47lc-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-22a,e; 66d-72e
6ge-72e; lOlb-l07b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 452a-459b esp 453b-4S
455a-457a; 480a
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 70ld
2a(2) Definitions as principles
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, l34b-d; l40a-b I Me
174a-179bl Theaetetus, 544e-549d /Se
Letter, 80ge-8l0d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c
sim, esp BK I, CH 3 [72br8-:24] 99b.;e, CH
[76b3S-77a4] 10Se-d, CH 22 [84a6_b2] 11
ll5b,. CH 23 [84bI9-8Sa3] ll5e-1l6a,uKI
3-10 l23e-128d / Topics, BK viI, CH3 [15
II] 208a-b; BK VIII, CH 3 [IS8a31-IS
2l4d-2l5e / Metaphysics, BKIII, CH2[
18-21] 5l5b;BK IV, CH 7 [IOI2
a
I8'-24]5
b; CH 8 [IOI2bS-B] 532c; BK VII,CH
[I036al-8] 559b-c; BK XIII, CH 4 [I078bI7
6l0b--e / Soul, BK I, CH I [402bIS-40
63ld-632a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 1,-
A, 2 REP 2 lld-12e; Q 17, A 3, REP 1-21
103e; Q s8, AS 303e-304e; Q 8s, A 64-
45ge
20 AQUINAS: Sttlnma Theologica, PART I-II
94, A 2, ANS 22ld-223a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-S
65d; PART IV, 269b-c
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 128e
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 4
43lb
35 LOCKE: HU1nan 'Understanding, BK III,C
SECT IS-16 288d-289c; CH XI, SECT I
303b-304a; BK IV, CH III, SECT 20, 3l9b
to 2b(3)
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 215b:-217a
6I-lEGEL: Philosophy of Rz'ght, INTRO, par 2
9b-lOa
FREUD: Instincts, 412a-b
3) Inde:finables aspri11ciples of definition
7. PLATO: Theaetetus, ' 544e-547e
SARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 9 [992b24-
993aI] 5l1a-b; BK II, CH 2 5l3a-b;
:13K V, qH 3 [IOI4
b
3-13] 534d; B:K VIII, CH 3
[1043b28-33] 568b .
PASCAL: Geometrcal Demonstraton, 431b-
434a; 442a-443b
5 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH II,
SECT 2 l28a-b; CH VII, SECT 10 l33a-b; CH
XII l47b-148d;CH XVIII, SECT I 174a; SECT
6 174e-d; BK III, CH IV, SECT 262b-
263a
KANT: Pure Reason, 2l5d-2l6e
BOSWELL: Jq.hnson, 82h
Propositions or judgments
1) Immediate truths. of perception: direct
sensitive "knowledge of -,appearances;
evident particular facts
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18
lllb-c;cH 23 [84bIg-8Sal] ll5e-116a; BK II,
CH 2 [90a24-'-30] l23b-e; CH 19 l36a-137a,e /
Iieavens, BK III, CH 7 [306al-18] 397b-e /
Metaphysics, BK I, I [98IbIO-131 499d-
SOOa; CH 9[992b24-993al] 5l1a-h; BK IV, CH
S[IOIObI4-26] 530b-e; BK VII, CHIQ[1036a
1-8] 559b-e; BK XI, CH 6 [I062b33-1063a9]
59la-b
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [109Sa30_bI2]
340c-d; CH 7 [I098a3S_b3l343d; BK II, .CH 9
[u09b20-'23] 35Se; BK Ill, CH 3 [III2b34-
1II3
a2
] 358d-359a; BK VI,_ CH II [1143a2s-b6]
392d-393a; BK VII, CH J [II47a2S-b6] 397e-d;
BK X, CH I [II72a34-b7] 426b-c; CH8 [II79
a
16-23] 433d-434a
.LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK I [693-700]
9c; BK IV [469-S21] SOb-51a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 14,
A6, ANS 680e-68la
IIi'\RVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335e
DESCARTES: Objections, and Replies, 229d-
230d
LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK I, CH I,
SECT 15-19 98d-lOOe esp SECT 19 lOOb-e;
SECT 23 lOlb-102a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 4
307b-e; CH II, SECT 1309b-d; CH III, SECT 21
3l9c; CH VII, SECT 4 337b-338b; SECT 9-10
338d-340a; SECT II, 342e-d; CH XI 354e-
58e; CH XII, SECT 3 358d-35ge
HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 37

KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-72c esp 67d-68a /
lJractical,Reason, 35le
MILL: Utilitarianis1n, 445d-446a; 46lc
JAMES: Psychology, 867a-868b
431
2b(2) Immediate truths" of understanding:
axioms or self-evident truths; a priori
judgments as principles
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 2
[7
2a
7-9] 98e; [72aIS-19] 98c-d; CH 399b-lOOa;
CH IS l09a-b; BK II, CH 9 128a-b / Meta-
physics" BK III, CH 2 [996b26-997aI4] .515h-d;
BK IV, CH 3 [IOOS
b
23-34] 524d-525a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethz'cs, BK VI, CH 6 .389d;, CH 8
[114
2a2
S-2 9] ,39lb-e; CH II [II4382S-bI3]
392d-393a I Rhetoric,BK I, CH 2 [I356b26-28]
596b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A I,
ANS lOd-lId; Q17, A3, REP 2 102d-103e; Q84,
A 3, REP 3 443d-444d; Q 8s, A 6, ANS 458d-
45ge;Q 87, AI, REP I 465a-466e; QII7, A I,
ANS and REP 1,3 595d-597e; PART I-II, Q I,
A 4, REP, 2 612a-613a; A 5; ANS 6l3a-614a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
57, A 2 36a-37b; Q 90, A 2,REP 3 206b-207a;
Q 91, A3, ANS 209d-2l0e; Q94, A2, ANS 221d-
223a; A4, ANS 223d-224d; PART 11-11, Q 8,
A I, REP 2 4l7a-d
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 260e-261a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 6ld
,31 DESCARTES: Rules, III,4a-d; IV, 5e-d; 6d;
VI, 8d-9a; VIII, 13c-d; XII, 23e I Discourse,
PART IV, 51b-52a I Meditations, v, 9Sa-96a
/ Objections and Replies, 123a-b; I25a-b;
224b,d
33 PASCAL: Pensees, I 17la-172a
35 LOCKE: Human Understandng, BK I 95h,d-
121a,e esp cn I,SECT IS-19 98d-lOOe, SECT 23
101b402a, CH II, SECT 21...,-27 llla-ll2c, CH
III, SECT 23 ll9b-120a;BK I,SECT 4
307b-e; CH II, SECT I 309b-d; SECT 7-8 3l0d-
3lla; CH vn337a-344d esp SECT I 337a,
SECT 10-II 339b-342d; CH IX, SECT 2-3
349a-e; CH XII, SECT .SECT 12,
362b-e; SECT IS 363a-b; CH XVII, SECT 14-17
378e-37ge; CH XX, SECT 7-10 390d-392a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 31a-d; esp 64d-
66d, 68a-74b, 85d-88a; 2lle-218d; 225a-227a
I Fund. Prine J:fetaphysic of Morals" 268b-d;
27ge-d I PractzcalReason, 295b-d; 329d-330e
I Judgement, 542d-543a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-IS] la-b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER]I, 103e-104a;NuMBER
83,244b-e
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-447a; 458d-459c
53 J;AMES: Psychology, 3l9b-320a; 869a-879b pas-
SIm, esp 869a-870a, 872b
2b(3) Constitutive and regulative principles:
the maxims of reason
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72e-74b esp73e-74a;
109d-112d; 194b-e; 19ge-209d esp 19ge-200e,
20ld-202a, 206a-207b I Practical Reason,
343a;349b-355d I Intro. Metaphysic of Mor-
als, 390b; 392b-d I Judgelnent, 550a-551a,e;
562a-d; 570b-572e; 577b; 578a-d
433
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I, A 2,
ANS and REP I 4a-c; A S 5c-6a; A 6, REP 1-2
6b-7a
23 HOBBES: LetJiathan, PART I, 71c-d; 72a-d;
PART II, 163a-b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 39d-41b
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a-3b I Discourse, PART
I, 43d-44a I Meditations, I, 76c I Objections
and Replies, 128d-129a /Geometry, BK II,
304a-b
35 HUME : Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV
20-21 458a-c; DIV 30, 462a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 64d-
65c; 68a-69c; 215d-217c I Fund. Prine Meta-
physic of Morals, 253a-d / Practical Reason,
351b-352c I Intro. Metaphysic of Morals,
388a-c I judgement, 578a-b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 884b-886a
54FREun: Narcissism, 400d-401a I Instincts,
412a-b
4. Firstptinciples in the practical order: the
principles of action or morality; the
principIes of the practical reason
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 262a-263c; 280c-d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK J, CH .3 339d-340b
passim; CH 7 [I098a2s_b8j 343d-344a; BK VI,
ClI S 389a-c passim; CH II [II43a2s-bI 3]
392d-393a; BK VII, CH 8 [IISIall-19] 401d-
402a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 22 127c-
128c; BK III, CH 2 177c-178d;CH 10 185d-
187a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VIII, SECT I 285a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: ~ v ofGod, BK VIII, CH 8 270a-d;
BK XIX 507a-530a,c passim
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 91,
A 3, ANS 209d-210c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-96b; PART II,
140b; 153c-154a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics,PART IV, PROP 18, SCHOL
429a-d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH II-III
l03d-121a,c esp CH II, SECT 3 104b-d, SECT
21-27 llla-112c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 330d-331b; 343d-
345c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-d; 234c-240b esp
235a-b, 238e-239a I Fund. Prine Metaphysic
of Morals 253a-287d esp 253d-254d, 256c-
257d, 258d-259a, 260a-261d, 262a-265a,
266b-268a, 268d [fn 2}, 269c, 270d-271a,
273d-280b, 280d-281a, 282b-283d, 286a-
287d I Practical Reason 291a-361d esp 291b-
293b, 293e-d [fn 3], 298a-300a, 304d-307d,
310b-311d, 318c-321b, 325a-328a, 329a-331a,
338c-355d I Pref. Metaphysical Elements of
Ethics, 365b-366d; 367c; 36ge-373b I Intro.
Metaphysic of jUorals 383a-394a,c esp 386d-
CHAPTER 70: PRINCIPLE
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 10
l04d-l05d; CH II [77a26-3S] 106b; CH 32
120c-121b I Topics, BK I, ClI 2 [IOIa3?_b4]
144a / Heavens, BK III, C1I7 [306al-18] 397b-c
I Metaphysics, BK IV,CH .3 [looS
b
IS-I8] 524d
I Soul, BK I, CH I [402aI7--23] 631b
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, ClI 2 [13S8a3-33]
597d-598b
oBACON: Advancement of Learning, 40a-48d
esp 40a-41b, 43a-c, 44c-45a
BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT lIB
436b-c
MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c
2) The difference between axioms and. as-
sumptions, hypotheses and principles,
as a basis for the distinction between
knowledge and opinion, or science and
dialectic
PLATO: Republic, BK VI-VIl, 383d-398cesp
BK VII, 396d-398c
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analvtics, BK I, CH 2
97d.. 99a; CH I I [77
a22
-3S] i06b I Topics, BK
VIII, CH 3 [I58a3I-b4] 214d-215a I Physics, BK
VIII, CH I [2S2
a
23-
b
7] 336a- b I Metaphysics,
BK IV, CH 2 [1004bI8-27] 523d
QARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094bll-28]
339d-340a I Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [13s8a3-33]
597d-598b
9 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12,
A], ANS and REP 2 56a-57b; A 13, REP 3 61c-
62b; Q47, AI, REP 3 256a-257b; Q82, A2, ANS
432d-433c; Q 83, A I, ANS 436d-438a
oAQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q.51,
A 3 14b-15a; Q 67, A 3, ANS 83b-84d; PART
II-II, Q I, A 4, ANS 382c-383b; PART III, Q 9,
A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
H@nBEs: Leviathan, PART 1,65h-d
S MONTAIGNE: Essays, 260c-261a
oBACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-59b
1 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a-3b
4: HUYGENS: Light, PREP, 551b-552a
SLOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH
XVII, SECT 2 371d-372b; SECT IS-17 378d-
37ge
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 217a-218c; 240b-243c /
Judgement,600d-604b
3) The distinction and order of the sciences
according to the character of their
principles
7. PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII,
391b-398c
ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK VI, CH I [I02S
b
l-
18] 547b,d; BK XI, CH .3 [106Ia29-b4] 589c;
CH4 [I06IbI7--28] 589d-590a; CH 7 [1063b36-
I064
a
9] 592b; BK XIII, CH 2 [I077bII]--CH 3
[I078a.3I] 609a-d
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 7 [1098R20_b8]
343c-344a / Rhetoric, BK I, CH 2 [13S8R3-33]
597d-598b
3b. Principles and induction: axioms as intui
tive inductions from experience; stag
of inductive generalization
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 23 90a
I Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 18 Illb-c; BK I
CH 2 [90R24-30] 123b-c; CH 7 [92a34-bl] 126
CH 19 136a-137a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH
389d; CH II [II43a2S--bI3] 392d-393a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-334d.
esp 334c-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-5
96d-97a I Novum Organum 105a-195d e
PREF 105a-l06d, BK I, APH 11-26 107d-l08
APH 36-38 109b-c, APH 63 113d-114a, APH
114d-115c, APH 69-70 116a-117a, APH
126a-b, APH 13-106 127d-128c, BK II, A
1-10 137a..140d, APH IS-16 149a-b, APH 20-
150d-153c, APH 52 194c-195d
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 123a-
167c-d
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK I, CH II
SECT 2S, 120d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV
451b-c; DIV 9, 454d; SECT IV, DIV 26 460b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-72c; 217a-c
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 446a; 475b,d [fn I]
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofI-listory, PART IV, 361a
3c. Axioms in relation to postulates, hypot
eses, or assumptions
3c(1) The distinction between first principl
in general, or common notions, and
principles of a particular subject rna
or science
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a esp 38
388a
3a(1) The indemonstrability of axioms: nat-
ural habits of the mind
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 16
[64b28-38] 85e I Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH
3 99b-l00a I Metaphysics, BK III, CH 2 [99
6b
26-997aI4] 515b-d; BK IV, CH 4 [IOOS
b
3S-
1006
a
I2] 525a-b; BK XI, CH 5 [106Ib34-1062aS]
590a-b I Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a22-30] 636d-
637a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; CH 6
389d; CH II [II43a2s-bI3] 392d-393a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A I, REP 2 75d-76c; Q 16, A6, REP I 98b-d; Q
17, A 3, REP 2 102d-l03c; Q 79, A 12 425c-
426b; PART I-II, Q I, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a;
A5, ANS 613a-614a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q53,
A I, ANS 19d-21a; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REP 2
36a-37b; Q 94, A I 221a-d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-59c
33 PASCAL: Ge011zetrical Demonstration, 440b
35 LOCKE: fluman Understanding, BK I, CH r,
SECT 10-11 97c-98a; CH III, SECT 23 119b-
120a; BK IV, CH XI, SECT 1"'-10 354c-357b pas-
sim, esp SECT 10 357a-b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-72c esp 67c-69c;
211c-218d I judgement, 542d-543a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a
43 !VfILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-447a; 461c; 465a-b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a-890a esp 851a-852a,
879b-882a, 889a-b
3a. Principles and demonstration
432 THE GREAT IDE.<;\S 3 to 3e
3. First principles or axioms in philosophy, 36, A 3, REP 4 194c-195d; Q 84, A 3, RE
science, dialectic 443d-444d; Q 85, A 6 458d-459c; PART I
Q I, A 4, REP 2 612a-613a
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART I-II, Q
A 2, REP 3 206b-207a; Q 94, A 2, ANs 221
223a
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-334
esp 334a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-59d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART II, 46c-47a
Meditations, III, 82b-d; V, 95b-96a I Obje
tions and Replies, 123a-b; 125a-b; 224b,d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 37-47 386b
391a esp PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2 387b-388b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV,CH I
SECT I, 309d; SECT 7-8 310d-311a; CH v
337a-344d esp SECT 10-II 339b-342d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 64d-65c; 68a
69c; 174b-d; 211c-218d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 82b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy ofRight, ADDITIONS, 3 116
3a(2) The indirect defense of axioms
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 4-8 525a-
532d; BK XI, CH S-6 590a-592b
3a(3) The dependence of demonstration on
axioms: the critical application of the
principles of identity and contradiction
7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 72d-73b I Cratylus, 112a
I Republic, BK IV, 350d-351b
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 1-3
97a-l00a; CH 7 [7S
a
38-
b
7] 103c; CH II 105d-
106b; CH 19--23 lllc-116a; CH 32 [88a36-b41
120d I Topics, BK VIII, CH 3 [158a31-b4] 214d-
215a I Metaphysics, BK III, ClI 2 [996b26-99i'
14] 515b-d; BK IV; CH 3 [IOOS
a
I8-27] 524b; CH
4 [looSb.3S-lo06RI2] 525a-b; CH 6 [IOlla3-14]
530d; BK V, CH 5 [IOIS
b
6-9] 535d-536a; BK
XI, CH 6 [1063b7-I2] 591d
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; ClI 6
389d; CH II [II43a25-bI3] 392d-393a I Rhet-
oric, BK I, CH 2 [1.356b26-28] 596b
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK I, COMMON NOTIONS 2a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 7 81d-82b; Q 17, A 3, REP 1-2102d-l03c; Q
THE GREAT IDEAS
435
[I057a7-II] 584b; BK XI, CH 6 [I062
b
I2-I063
b
14] 590d-592a
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [469-477]
SOb
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH 20, 164c
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGoq" BK XIX, CH 18 523a-b
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 259d-261a; 271b-272d;
281a-284c
30 BAcoN:. Advancement ofLearning, 57d-58b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
1-3 40sa-c
35 HUME: Iluman Understanding,sEcTlv, DIV 26
460b-c; SECT XII' 503c-509d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 224a-227a / Practical
Reason, 294c-295d
CHAPrrER 70: PRINCIPLE
Another discussion of principle in relation to element and cause, see ,ELEMENT 2.
The consideration of the laws.of identity and contradiction as both logical and metaphysical
principles, see LOGIC Ia; METAPHYSICS 3c; OPPOSITION 2a; TRUTH 3c; and for the treatment
of contraries as principles, see CHANGE 2b; DIALECTIC 3d; OPPOSITION 2b, 3a.
Discussions bearing on .. sen'sations, ideas, and definitions as principles of knowledge, see
DEFINITION IC, 5; IDEA IC, 2f; KNOWLEDGE 3; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la; SENSE
sa.
The analysis of evident or self-evident. truths, or of immediate as opposed to demonstrated
propositions, see JUDGMENT 8a;KNOWLEDGE 6C(2); SENSE4b; TRUTH 3b(3); and for the
distinction between analytic and syntlieticjudgments a priori, and between constitutive
and regulative principles, seeIDEA lei; JUDGMENT 8b-8e1.
The conception of axiomatic knowledge as a natural habit of the mind and as one of the
intellectual virtues, see HABIT 5C; VIRTUE AND VICE 2a(2).
he dependence of demonstration on axioms or self-evident truths, see INFINITY 2C; REASON-
ING Sb(I); TRUTH 3c; and for the nature of reductio ad absurdum arguments in defense of
axioms, see REASONING 4d.
Induction as the source of axioms, see INDUCTION 3.
>ther discussions of the distinction between axioms and postulates, hypotheses, or assump-
tions, and for the bearing of this distinction on the difference between knowledge and
opinion, or science and dialectic, see DIALECTIC 2a(2), 4; HYPOTHESIS 3-4; KNOWLEDGE 4b;
MATHEMATICS 3a; OPINION 2C; TRUTH 4c; WILL 3b(I).
he principles of the several theoretic sciences, see ASTRONOMY 2b; DEFINITION 6a; LOGIC la;
MATHEMATICS 3a; MECHANICS 2b; METAPHYSICS 2b, 3C; PHILOSOPHY 3b; PHYSICS Ib, 2a;
TRUTH 4c. ..
he consideration of ends as principles in the practical order or in moral and poli tical science,
see GOOD AND EVIL sc; GOVERNMENT IC; HAPPINESS 3; MIND 9a; NECESSITY AND CON"
TINGENCY sa(2) ; ONE AND MANY Sb; RELATION sa(2); TRUTH 2C; and for other discussions
of the natural moral law or the categorical imperative as the first principle of the practical
reason, see DUTY S; LAW 4b-4c; MIND 9a; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY sa(2) ; PRUDENCE
2C, 3a; WILL 8d.
ther statements of the skepticism which results from denying first principles or axioms, see
OPINION 3c; TRUTH 7a.
SS-REFERENCES
3 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445d-446d; 458b-459c;
464d-465b; 469d-470b
HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 29
19a-b; PART II, par 135 47b-d; ADDITIONS, 84
129b; 86 129c
DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a
he skeptical denial of first principles or
axioms: the denial that any propositions
elicit the universal assent of mankind
PLATO: Euthydemus, 72d-73a / Theaetetus,
532b-c
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3
. [72bS-I8] 99b / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5-6
528c-531c; BK X, CH I [I053a3I-b3l580a; CH 6
'4a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 1-1;1
A 2, REP 3 30e-31a; A 3, ANS 3Ia-32H'
REP 432b-33c; Q 57, A 4, ANS" 38a-3g;.
ANs.and REP 3 39a-40a; Q 58, A 3, REP 2'
44a; A 4, ANS an2 REP I 44a-d;A 544d
Q 65, A I, ANS and REP 3-4 70b-72a'
ANS and REP 3 72a-d; A3, ANS and REP'
73d; Q 90, A 2, REP 3 206b-207a; Q:g
ANS 209d-210c;PART II-II, Q 26, A I, A
REP I S10c-511a; Q 27, A 6, ANS 5240-
Q 181, A 2 617d-618c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 76c-d; cPA
272c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 69d-7
31 SPINOZA: Eihics,PART I, APPENDI:X
372d; PART IV, PREF422b,d-424s.; D
424b
33 PASCAL: Penst"es, '98 190b /
onstration, 440b
35 LocKE; HumanUnderstdnding, BK II, CH
SECT 52-53 191d-192b; SECT 62, 194c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 234c-240b esp
236d-237a, '238c-239a / Fund.Prin.
physic ofMorals, 253d-254d; 256a.. b; 25
260a-c; 266a-267d; 271d-279d esp
275b; 2S6c-287d / Practical
son, 318c-321b esp 320c-321b; 32:7d.-
338c-35Sd .j Pref Metaphysical Elerne
Ethics, 367c / Judgement, 477b-c;
S84d-587a; 588b [fn 2]; 591b-s92a;594b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-447b; 456a;.
461c-464d; 47Sb,d lfn I]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XIII, 5aGd
53 JAMES: Psychology,796a-:-b
4b. The moral law and tile catego
imperative
12 AURELIUS : Meditations, BK III, SECT II
b; BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK VII, SEC
283b;;c '
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,
A 12 425c-426b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 12.-
91, A 2 208d-209d;A 3, ANS 209d-21U
94 220d-226b; Q 95, A 2 227c-228c;

23 HOBBEs: Leviathan, PART I,
95c-96b; PART II, 134c; PART III, 165a;
GLUSION, 282a; 283c
30 BAcoN: Advancement of Learning: 96a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 330d-331b; 343d-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c--d; 235a-b/
Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254d;
261d; 265c-266d; 268c-270c esp 269c;
287d esp 277d-279d, 282a-287b I P
Reason, 297a-314desp 307d-314d; 321
esp 327a-329a / Pref Metaphysical Ele
Ethics, 373d / Intro. Metaphysic of
386b-387a,c; 388b-c;390b'd-391c; 392
/ Science of Right, 400b,d-402a; 416b-
Judgement, S71c-572a; s94b-s95c; 604
esp 60sd-606b [fn 2], 606a-d
(4. First pritlciples In the practical order: the
principles of action or nl0rality;
pies oj the practical reason.)
3B8a, 392b / Science of Right, 397a-402a /
Judgement, 463a-467a; 478a-479d; s84d-:-s87a;
s88b [fo 2]; s94c:596c
43 FEDERAI.;IST: NUMBER 3I,103c-l04a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism 44sa-476a,c passim, esp
44sa-447b
49.DARWIN: Descent of Man, 316a-317a; s92d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 886b-888a
54 FREUD; General Introduction" s92d-s93a /
Beyond th.e Pleasure Principle, . 639a-640c ;
662c-,663besp 663a I Cit/ilization and Its Dis-
contents, 772a-b
4a. Ends as principles, and last ends as first
principles: right appetitcas a principle
in the practical. order' . .
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 262a-:-263c;, 280c-:-d I Republic,
BK VI-VII, 383d-398c esp BK VII, 397a:.398c
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [9
82b
4-7]
sOOd; BK II, CH 2 [994a8-Io1512b; 1994
b
9-:"I6]
S12d-S13a; BKIII, CH 2 [996a2I-bI3] S14d-
S15a; BK V, CHI [IOI3a20-24] 533b; BK VII,
CH 7 [I032a28-b29] S55b-d; BK IX,.CH 8 [IOsoa
3-b6] S75d-576b; BK XII, CH 10 [I07SaI2-'-24]
60Sd-606a
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAnimals, BKI, CH I [639
b
lo-640aI2] 161d-162b / MotiQnof Animals,
CH 6 [700b4]-CH 7 [70Ia39] 235d-236d I Ethics,
BK I, CH 1--:4 339a-340d esp CH 4
b12] 340c:d; eH 7 [I098a3S_b8l 343d..344a;
CH 12 [IIOIb34-II02a4] 347b; BKII,CH 9
[I I09b20-23] CH 3 [III2
b
12-
III3a2] 358c-3s9a; BKVI, CH 2387d-388b;
eH 5 389a-c passim; eH .8: [II42aI2-3I]
391b-c; CH 9 [II42bI7-35l391d-392b; CHII
[II43a25-bI3] 392d-393a; CHI2 [II44
a
31-37]
394a; CH 13 [II44b30-1I4Sa6] 394c-d;BKV:II,
CH 3 [II47a25-b6] 397c-d; CH8 [II51aI5-I9]
402a; BK x, CH 6-8 430d-434a / Politics,
BK VII, CH 13 [I33Ib24-37] 536b-c/ Rhetoric,
BK I, CH 6-7 602d-607d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III, CH I3..,-I4 188b-
190a
18 AUGUSTINE: City, ofGod, BK X,CH I, 298b,d /
Christian Doctrine,' BK I, CH 3-4 625b-c; CH 35
634c-d
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica,PARTT"Q 18,
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 2, REP 2 J09c-
110b; A 5" ANS 112d-113C;Q22, A I,.REP 3
127d-128d; Q 2S, A 5, ANS 147d-149a; Q 60,
A 2,. ANS 311a-d; Q 82,' AA 1-2 431d;..433c; Q
113, A I, REP 2 576a-d; PART I-II, Q I 609a-
61Sc; Q 8, A2, ANS 6s6a-d; Q9, A3, ANs659c-
660a; Q II,A 3 667d-668d;Q 12, AA
672a;Q I3,A 3, ANS 674c-675a;A6, REP I
676c-677b; Q 14, A 2 678b-c; A6, ANs680c-
681a; Q 15, A 3 682c-683b; QI6, A 3 68sb-
686a; Q 34, AA 3-4 770c-772b
434
AUGUSTINE. Answer to Skeptics
AQUINAS. Super Boethium de lfebdomadibus
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PREF
HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL I, BK II, SECT I, CH 2
J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK II, CH 6
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Outlines of Pyrrhonism
DUNS SCOTUS. Tractatus de Primo Principio (A Tract
Concerning the First Principle)
BRUNO. De la causa, principio, e uno
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, XII (I), XXII
(2)
ARNAULD. Logic or the Art of Thinking, CH 6-7
LEIBNITZ. Discourse on Metaphysics, XXVI
--. New Essays Concerning lfuman Understanding,
BK IV, CH 7-8
--. Monadology, par 31-37
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers oflUan, I,
CH 2; VI, CH 4/
ance with this view," Darwin writes, "it seems,
if we turn to geological evidence, that organiza-
tion on the whole has advanced throughout the
world by slow and interrupted steps. In the
kingdom of the Vertebrata it has culminated
in man."
Whether strictly biological evolution has a
single or uniform direction may be disputed in
the light of evidences of regression and the mul-
tiplication of lower as well as higher forms. But
Darwin seems to think that since "natural se-
lection works solely by and for the good of each
being, all corporeal and mental endowments
will tend to progress toward perfection." What-
ever the evidence may be, the popular notion
of evolution, especially when applied by writers
like Herbert Spencer to human society or civi-
lization, connotes progress-the gradual yet
steady march toward perfection.
APART FROM THIS APPLICATION of the idea of
evolution to man's world, progress seems to be
the central thesis in the modern philosophy of
history. In the minds of some, the philosophy
of history is so intimately connected with a
theory of progress that the philosophy of his-
tory is itself regarded as a modern development.
There seems to be some j ustification for this
view in tTIodern works on the tendency of his-
tory which have no ancient counterparts, such
as the writings of Vico, Condorcet, Kant,
Proudhon, Comte, J. S. Mill, Hegel, and Marx.
1"1hese writers do not all define or explain
progress in the same way. Nor do they all sub-
scribe to an inviolable and irresistible law' of
progress which has the character of a divine
ordinance, .replacing or transforming less opti-
mistic views of providence. But for the most
part the moderns are optimists. They either be-
lieve in plan's perfectibility and in his approach
to perfection through his own efforts freely
437
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 71: PROGRESS
KE the idea of evolution, with which it has
some affinity, the idea of progress seems to
ypically modern. Anticipations of it may be
d in ancient and mediaeval thought, some-
s in the form of implicit denials of the idea.
in explicit formulation, in emphasis and
ortance, progress, like evolution, is almost a
idea in modern times. It isnot merely more
inent in modern discussion; it affects the
ficance of many other ideas, and so gives a
acteristic color or tendency' to modern
ght.
he idea of evolution affects our conceptions
ture and man. But the theory of evolution
elf affected by the idea of progress. Since it
a major theme at least two centuries before
in, progress does not depend for its signifi-
e upon the theory of biological evolution.
reverse relationship seems to obtain. The
of evolution gets some of its moral, social,
cosmic significance from its implication
he general motion in the world of living
$, perhaps in the universe, is a progress
lower to higher forms.
rwin thinks "Von Baer has defined ad-
ement or progress in the organic scale
r than anyone else, as resting on ,the
nt of differentiation and specialization of
veral parts of a being"-to which Darwin
the qualification that the organisms must
dged when they have arrived at maturity.
rganisms have become slowly adapted to
ified lines of life, their parts vvill
e more and more differentiated and
lized for. various functions from the ad-
,e gained by the division of physiological
The same part appears often to have
odified first for one purpose, and then
terwards for some other and quite dis-
purpose;" and thus all the parts are ren-
more and more complex.... In accord-
THE GREAT IDEAS
ADDITIONAL READINGS
I.
II.
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe TVestern .World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last" chapter of The Great Ideas.
SCHOPENHAUER. On the Fouifold Root of the
ciple of Sufficient Reason
W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and L
VOL II (5-6)
WHEWELL. The Philosophy ofthe Inductive Scie
VOL I, BK I, CH 4, 6
--. On the Philosophy of Discovery, CH 28
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on ,Scientific Sub}
II
J. H. NEWMAN. An Essay in Aid of a Gramm
Assent, CH 4
LOTZE. Logic, BK III, CH 5
BRADLEY. The Principles of Logic, BK I, CH 5
BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL II, CH 7
E. HARTMANN., Kategorienlehre
W. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I, CH 14
RUEFF. From the Physical to the Social Sciences
SANTAYANA. The Realm of Truth, CH 1
DEWEY. Logic, the Theory of CH 17
B. RUSSELL. The Problems ofPhilosophy, CH 7-
--. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Li
PART VI
436