Moin Ahmed

14020489

Amber Riaz

Philosophical Approaches to Social Sciences

30th November, 2013

Can Laws in the Social Sciences be like Laws in the Natural Sciences?

Introduction:

When we analyze the progress of Natural Science as opposed to Social Science, it becomes apparent that the Natural Sciences have been far more successful in formulating laws that not only have predictive power, but have explanatory value as well resilience. Perhaps this is due to the difference between Human Phenomena and Natural Phenomena, as McIntyre argues: While natural scientific phenomena are well isolated, stationary, recurrent, and simple, human phenomena are on the contrary, interactive, variable, singular and complex. (131) This paper will present the difficulties the formulation of a Social Science Law entails, then argue how these difficulties do not preclude the possibility of similarity between a law in the Social Science and the Natural Science. It will then highlight how a Social Law and a Natural

Law are linked before making a case for the further similarity of Social and Natural Laws. The purpose of this paper then, is to argue that laws in the Natural Sciences can indeed be like the laws in the natural sciences, and that a correct approach towards Social Phenomena can indeed lead to the formulation of an explanatory, predictive and resilient law.

Section 1: Arguments against the possibility of laws in the social sciences:

1.1 The Argument from complexity:

In his paper Complexity and Social Scientific Laws McIntyre argues that the most prevalent argument against Social Laws is the argument from complexity, which essentially states that it is impossible to understand the underlying variables that determine human action (McIntyre, 131). This implies that it the non-verifiability and non-predictability of human events precludes the possibility of forming a law, this will become apparent in section 1.12.

1.12 Multiple Causation for a single event and Multiple Reliazebility:

For example, let us suppose that because x was feeling sad, x ate a chocolate. Now it might indeed at the same time be possible that x had a chocolate because x felt happy. This shows that for the outcome- the eating of the chocolate- many causes exist. The opposite can also be true, a situation wherein x hit y, and y hit back or did not at all. This situation then has

two manifest results. One where there is multiple-causation and one when there is multiple realizablility (which will be defined elaborately in section 2, for now we understand multiply realizable events as when a single cause can manifest itself in multiple events). However, if we take the example of a Natural Phenomenon, say the falling of a rock in a (frictionless) environment, we know exactly how fast it will fall, the time it will take to fall to the ground and most importantly the outcome, which I take right now as the touching of the rock to the ground. There can be no other result of the rock falling. It must touch the ground. Let us say that in the rock example, I merely seek to know ultimately, whether or not the rock will hit the ground. In the chocolate example I seek to know what are all the probable causes leading to the eating of the chocolate, in the next one I want to know that when x hit y, what could be all the possible outcomes. This argument has a simple counter, which will be dealt with in section 1.13

Section 1.13: Field of Inquiry and its refutation of the complexity argument:

This brings me to McIntyres contention with the complexity argument, that whether or not results are obtained depends on the field of inquiry (McIntyre 2). The simpler the field of inquiry the easier it becomes to obtain results and form causal connections. This means that if we were to examine ask a simple enough question for a human event, we can probably find a causal connection which can ultimately help us to make a law in the social sciences. For

example we could empirically prove that most people will become angry if struck unnecessarily, allowing us to form a simple relation between the striking of a man and his reaction in normal situation. In the next section, we will show how the sophisticated argument incorporates this refutation while still explaining the difficulty in the formation of social laws.

Section 1.2 The Sophisticated Argument:

The sophisticated argument accepts the possibility of Laws in the Social Sciences, but says that because of the nature of the field of inquiry in the Social Sciences, we are not able to find laws. This means that because social scientists fail in finding causal relations because they are interested in forming laws about social behavior, which is an extremely difficult thing to causally isolate, as proved in section 1.12. For example, economics is concerned with law that account for economic behavioral patterns of people, sociology is concerned with forming laws about societies and human interaction within them etc. These fields of inquiries, McIntyre would argue, are extremely advanced therefore becoming obstacles for the formation of social laws. This difficulty is illustrated by McIntyre when he says that social sciences are concerned with how a particular leaf falls from a particular tree (McIntyre, 134). Therefore it becomes apparent that having a law in the social science is difficult as compared to natural science.

Section 2: Establishing the Possibility for the Formation of a Social Law:

2.1 Arguing that Simple Causal Connections can Exist in Social Phenomena:

Despite the difficulties that Social Sciences face in the formulation of Laws, it can be argued that just the ability to find connections between extremely simple events is enough to guarantee the possibility of laws in the Social Science. If we can identify a situation x that always leads to y, then we can say predict something about the behavior of y in a certain situation x, no matter the potentially infinite steps of causation in between the situation x and result y.

Section 2.2: Tackling the problem Multiple Reliazibility presents to law formation in social sciences:

In the Social Science, x may indeed lead to multiple situations y1, y2, y3. We cannot trace y1, y2 and y3 to x because another factor p might cause y2. I feel this is no different than a case of natural science and special sciences. Let us grant that special sciences are derived out of natural sciences and examine evolutionary theory. According to Darwins theory of Natural Selection, the fittest organisms survive and form a progeny. However, we need to understand that fitness itself can be broken down into physical fitness, mental fitness, accidents that lead to the survival of the organism etc. There can be an infinite number of factors that lead to the survival of the organism, and that fitness itself depends on an innumerable number of causes as

described above. I have taken the example of a special science because its laws have a complex or difficult field of inquiry similar to social sciences, and hence this example also incorporates the problems of the sophisticated argument. This shows then, a similarity of problem in the Natural Science and the Social Science. I want to show here that given a correct field of inquiry, we can indeed have Social Laws that are similar to Natural Laws.

Kincaid has also argued in his paper Defending Laws in the Social Sciences that social sciences have no determinate physical definition- they are multiply realizable. By multiply realizable Scriven means that the defining principle of phenomena set no physical limits on what can count as the physical realization (112). He gives the example of money being physically realizable in many forms. However, this assumes that there is always a physical connection between say fitness (as defined in evolutionary theory) and physical properties of a species. At best we can only say that fitness supervenes on physical properties but is not reducible to them (113). The arguments above have attempted to show that the difference between laws in the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences is exaggerated at best, and that the Scientific Laws between the two can indeed be similar. The next section will deal with the similarity between natural laws and social laws. The example in the next section, as before will be of a special science, while keeping in mind that special sciences are derivative of natural sciences.

Section 3: Establishing the Similarity between laws in the Social Science and Natural Sciences:

3.1: Reductionism and its Implications on Laws in Social Sciences:

Fodor in his paper talks about reductionism which is the belief that all special sciences reduce to natural sciences (fodor, 687). He has argued that through bridge laws (definition of bridge laws) that connect disciplines, all sciences reduce to physics. Himself a critic of reductionism, he has argued that this reduction to the purely physical realms takes away the explanatory power of the theory by citing the example of Grishams Law, where if you reduce money to certain physical objects, then the theory loses its ability to say much (691). It is important here to know what implications this has on Social Sciences. Social Sciences are, it may be argued, irreducible to physical laws, because we cannot know the underlying factors that influence a decision.

3.12: Establishing the Possibility of Similarity between Social Laws and Natural Laws:

A counter claim to the argument above for the irreducibility of social science laws to physics is that the Natural Sciences are not developed enough to allow Social Phenomena to reduce to physical laws, for we cannot calculate what sequence of neurons fire to bring about a decision in a given situation. This claim does not seek to take away anything from the

accomplishments of the natural sciences; rather it seeks to establish that just because the Social Sciences field of inquiry is far greater, we cannot with certainty say that the Laws ultimately formed will be different or similar in form. We can say that through a certain bridge law that connects the natural and the social, we can indeed reduce social laws to physical laws. For example we may find that a psychological phenomenon is reducible to the firings of neuron sets 1 and 2, which means that a biological cause has a social effect. The point here is that so far, we cannot absolutely say that a Social Law and a Natural Law must be different.

3.13: An Example for the Similarity of Social and Natural Law

A law, whether it be social or natural can only have predictive and explanatory powers within its own domain. For example, the Laws of motion implicitly assume the following at least:

1) The body in motion moves in a frictionless environment. 2) The body in motion is not affected by another objects gravitational field.

Now if these highly impractical conditions do not exist, the law will not hold, rather the law will hold when all the above conditions are met or their absence explained away by other laws. We can account for the effect of friction and then we can predict where the object will move after the application of force, and say that the law still holds. This is exactly the case that

occurs in Social Laws. The Law of Supply and Demand will not hold if a war breaks out (Scriven 123). Every law implicitly assumes its domain. The Law, whether it is a Natural Law or a Social Law, only functions within a context. It does not account for all variables, rather it holds relevant factors constant to predict and explain a certain action. However, it may be argued here that a Social Law seeks to explain a complex set of factors and consequences and hence its status as a law-like statement becomes somewhat diminished. I feel that an argument of this sort is short-sighted at best. The law of independent assortment in biology that predicts the assortment of alleles in chromosomes cannot account for mutations, and yet we accept its results. Why then is it so difficult to accept a theory of rational choice when irrational actions can be considered parallels of mutations?

This paper has sought to establish that laws in the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences can indeed be alike. This indeed does not mean that we should consider the scope of these laws as identical, rather that they can be similar in nature. Where the arguments from complexity and the sophisticated argument indeed show how it is more difficult to have laws in the social sciences, these difficulties are also present in the natural sciences. Multiple causes may have one outcome and multiple outcomes may have single cause both in the natural and the social sciences. This does not in any way imply that laws in the social sciences and natural sciences have to be different. Furthermore, we can also make a case for the reduction of Social

Sciences into physical laws and show that it is not impossible for a Social Law to hold value in its own domain in a manner facsimile to a law of physics. All these arguments show that Laws in both Sciences can indeed be alike.

Work Cited

Kincaid, H. Defending Laws in the Social Sciences, in Martin and McIntyre, pages 111 130

McIntyre, L. Complexity and Social Scientific Laws, in Martin and McIntyre, pages 131 144

Fodor, Jerry. "Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)." Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science. By Lee C. McIntyre and Martin. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994. N. pag. Print.