AvisloleIian Fiel

AulIov|s) SavaI Bvoadie

Souvce FIvonesis, VoI. 48, No. 1 |2003), pp. 54-70
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Aristotelian Piety
SARAH BROADIE
ABSTRACT
Aristotle seems to omit discussing the virtue piety. Such an omission should sur-
prise us. Piety is not covertly dealt with under the more general heading of jus-
tice, nor under that of philia. But piety does make a veiled appearance at NE
X.8, 1179a22-32. Many interpreters have refused to take this passage seriously,
but this is shown to be a mistake.]
A. The problem
We should expect to find piety (eusebeia, hosiotes)' discussed in Aris-
totle's Ethics. Here are some reasons why.
In the first place, it is plausible that Aristotle at least intends to elucidate
the commonly recognized, commonly esteemed, excellences, even though
his investigation of human virtue certainly aims to do more than that. And
piety was a commonly recognized, commonly esteemed excellence.2 Further-
more, his examinations of the character-excellences in particular are wide-
ranging and numerous. It is not clear that he means to be completely com-
prehensive about them,3 nor that he imagines such completeness even
possible. Of course, if this is what he aims for, it is all the more puzzling
that he should ignore piety. But in any case one would expect piety to
receive some attention in a treatment that proceeds by distinguishing
significant areas of human life and then identifying the practical and emo-
tional dispositions that are median, excessive and deficient for each.
That this method, in his hands, distinguishes numerous such sectors is
due, I think, not so much to the desire to be comprehensive as to the aim of
Accepted April 2002
' eusebes applies to persons and acts performed, while hosios also applies to actions
considered as what is performed. The former is more positive; the latter need mean
no more than 'not religiously forbidden'. (But according to the rhetorician Menander
[3rd century CE], eusebeia is for the gods, hosioies for the dead.)
2 Cf. Euthyphro; Protagoras 329c-333b.
At NE III, 11 15a.5, introducing the discussions of the specific moral virtues, he
says: 'it will be clear too, at the same time, how many (posai) they are'. The words
can be taken either as a promise (which is not fufilled) to show for some number n
that there are just n moral virtues, or as indirect speech for the exclamation 'what a
lot there are!'
(C Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2003 Phronesis XLVIIIII
Also available online - www.brill.nl
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 55
providing practical guidance for cultivators of character. On a high level
of generality it is relatively easy to be comprehensive, saying something
that covers all cases, but easy, too, to ignore differences that that are sig-
nificant for good practice. To take a single example: given that certain
ethical challenges or opportunities facing the wealthy differ in kind from
any facing those more modestly placed, it is unhelpful to speak simply
and abstractly of 'excellence in managing and using economic resources'.
Aristotle has so many topics in the Ethics partly because there are so many
different aspects of human life each requiring the cultivation of the char-
acter trait suitable for dealing appropriately with it. Since these traits are
all parts of the one 'target' which needs to be made as clear as poss-
ible, not for theorizing about but for aiming to realize in practice,4 the
traits themselves must be likewise clarified too; and the Aristotelian does
this by focusing on the distinct field where each trait operates. (This is
analogous to clarifying the sense faculty by reference to its objects.)5
So how could Aristotle have ignored that very distinct and publicly rec-
ognized field, the field of behavior towards the gods, which is the province
of piety and its various possible opposites? I say 'various possible',
because piety can presumably be exhibited as midway between different
pairs of extremes; e.g., between contempt for religion and superstitious
excess (cf. Theophrastus's deisidaimon):6 or between casual or sluggish
observance and excessive zeal such as that of Euthyphro. The ease of
forming one or another plausible triad for piety is itself a reason for won-
dering why Aristotle does not go this way. A further reason lies in the
fact that piety was already a focus of philosophical attention: witness the
Euthyphro. But even without the evidence of that dialogue one can be
certain that 'What is piety?' was a question of particular interest for Plato
and other Socratics, given what had happened to Socrates.
4
NE I, 1094a22-24; II, 1103b26-30. The aim is primarily that of the politikos.
Given that this leader/educator's function is to promote virtue in the citizens (NE I.9,
1099b28-32; X.9 passim), it is perhaps not surprising if the target includes, even in a
sense combines, virtues which should co-exist among citizens although they might be
incompatible in one individual, as may be the case with e.g. megaloprepeia and
eleutheriotes. (This prescinds from the togetherness-of-virtues doctrine endorsed by
Aristotle at NE VI.13, 1 144b32-1 145a2.)
On the Soul, II, 415al4-21.
6 Characters XVI. Theophrastus was said by Porphyry to have defined eusebeia as
'the disposition to serve gods and daemons, being midway between atheism and super-
stition' (Stobaeus, 2.7.25).
7 See also the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, and the Platonic Definitions, 412e-
413a on eusebeia, 415a on hosion.
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56 SARAH BROADIE
It is surprising, then, that neither the NE nor the EE (nor, for that mat-
ter, the MM) has a section beginning and ending in Aristotle's way: 'Next
we must examine piety ... So much, then, for piety'.8
One might try to explain the silence by supposing that Aristotle (1) dis-
cusses the excellences solely as components of eudaimonia, and (2) does
not regard piety as necessary for eudaimonia.9 But in the Politics he takes
it for granted that the polis, the necessary matrix for developing good and
happy individuals, will attend to the cults of the gods, and that this is one
of the most important public duties.'" There is no indication that he regards
public religious activity as simply an instrument for social control, or as
something that ought to wither away in states that approximate his ideal.
It may be suggested, of course, that he sees religion as indispensable pub-
licly but not for the enlightened private individual. However, if that indi-
vidual is an Aristotelian, he or she presumably accepts the argument of
Metaphysics Lambda that the eternal movement of the universe implies a
Prime Mover whose life fits an enlightened definition of 'divine'. Even so
it might be suggested that this is a purely theoretical account of the cau-
sation of one kind of motion, and that the philosopher who accepts it is
not commited to religious worship of the Cause." In Aristotle's view, then,
the truly enlightened person could be one who, public appearances aside,
does not honour god or the gods (nor, of course, dishonours them either).
But this goes against what evidence we have. The prime exhibit is from
the end of the Eudemian Ethics:
What choice, then, or possession of the natural goods
-
whether bodily goods,
wealth, friends, or other things
-
will most produce the contemplation of god,
K
Nor is there mention of piety in the titles of the lost works, although apparently
they included a treatise On Prayer.
4 On this supposition Aristotle can consistently share the common perception of
piety as a human excellence. But it runs into difficulties with passages where he treats
eudaimonia as involving 'complete' (in the sense of 'comprehensive') excellence; e.g.
NE VI, 1 144a5-6; EE II, 1219a35-39.
VI, 1322b19-29; VII, 1328bll and 22; 1329a26-34; 1330a8; 1331b4-7 and 17-18.
However, it seems that part of what one accepts if one accepts the account, is
that the eternal motion itself expresses something akin to religious adoration on the
part of the primum mobile (or its soul or mind) for the divine enertgeia, which 'moves
as an object of love' (1 172b3). This of course does not imply that human minds
should, or (knowingly or not) do, revere this divinity. That, it might consistently be
held, is entirely the business of eternal beings much higher than ourselves, even though
scientific speculation about them and their god is part of human business. It would be
as in Epicureanism, where (apparently) the enlightened human being allows for gods
but rejects (human) religion.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 57
that choice or possession is best; this is the noblest standard, but any that through
deficiency or excess hinders one from the service and contemplation of god (ton
theon therapeuein kai the6rein)'2 is bad . .. (EE, VII,1249b 19-21; Revised
Oxford Translation with slight change).
See also:
Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which
might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception. For
people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods or love
one's parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know
whether snow is white or not need perception (Topics I, 105a3-6; ROT);
It is difficult to believe that Aristotle was insincere about the propriety of
loving one's parents.
And see:
Aristotle excellently says that we should nowhere be more modest (verecun-
diores) than in discussions about the gods. If we compose ourselves before we
enter temples, how much more should we do so when we discuss the constella-
tions, the stars and the nature of the gods, lest from temerity (temere) or impu-
dence (impudenter) we should make ignorant assertions or knowingly tell lies
(Seneca, QN, VII xxx 1 = F14 R3; ROT);
See also:
Aristotle in writing to Antipater said: 'It is not just Alexander who has good rea-
son to be proud (mega phronein) because he has power over many men: pride
is no less appropriate on the part of those who possess correct beliefs about the
gods' (Plutarch, de tranquillitate animi, 472E = F 664 RI; ROT)
This last quoted remark sounds like an ethical observation rather than a
theoretician's applause for those who have mastered a difficult subject.
The pride that should go with correct belief belongs on the same spec-
trum of qualities as the temerity and impudence of those who make igno-
rant or lying assertions about the gods. (The comparison with Alexander
may suggest, among other things, that just as rulership confers power to
order well the lives of subjects, so correct belief about the gods qualifies
the philosopher to see better how human life should be ordered. But this
may be reading too much into it.)
12
kai is epexegetic; views differ as to whether the6rein here is transitive or intransitive.
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58 SARAH BROADIE
B. One suggested solution
Richard Bodeuis is one of the few scholars to have seen a problem in the
fact that the ethical treatises devote no special discussion to piety. His
solution is that Aristotle takes piety to be part of justice, hence deals with
it by implication in the treatment of justice.'3 That piety is justice in rela-
tion to the gods was the not unpromising account which Socrates sug-
gested to Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue.'4 The idea was wasted on Euthyphro
because he could not give it coherent content: he did not see how to dis-
entangle 'doing justice to X' (where this has the broad meaning of 'behav-
ing appropriately towards X') from 'conferring benefits on X', which is
absurd as applied to the gods.'5
Now, Aristotle's treatment of justice is marked by his determination to
improve on such all-but-empty formulae as 'acting appropriately towards
each', 'giving each its due', and 'doing what is one's own'. (At that rate
one acts justly towards the sock by darning it, and perhaps the alimentary
system acts justly because it digests rather than respires.) One would
expect, therefore, that if Aristotle included piety under justice, he would
have something positive to say about what distinctively men offer the gods
when they 'give them their due'. That is, one would expect him not to
deal with piety merely by implication (an implication which he never even
points out) in a generic treatment of justice.
Even so, let us consider the possibility that piety for Aristotle is an
implicit part of justice. In NE V Aristotle first distinguishes justice in the
general sense, in which it is the same as 'complete excellence, only not
without qualification but in relation to another person', from 'particular'
justice, i.e. a specific excellence of character coordinate with courage, tem-
perance and the rest.'6 He then concentrates on particular justice. Let us
look in turn at general and particular justice as possibly harbouring piety.
If Aristotle regards piety as included in 'complete excellence in rela-
tion to another person', it is inexplicable that he does not give it a sepa-
rate treatment like the treatments he gives to courage, moderation, and the
'" See ch. 5 of BodMis, Aristote et la theologie des vivants immortels, Paris, 1992,
now translated as Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals. (Page references
below are to this translation.)
1' Euthyphro, lIe ff. It was a well-entrenched idea: cf. [Plato] Definitions, 412e;
On Virtues and Vices, 5, 1250bl9-23 and 7, 1251a30-32; Diogenes Laertius, Aris-
totelian Divisions I. 4.
'" Euthyphro, 13a-15a.
16
NE V, 1129 11-27; 1130al4-b9.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 59
rest. After all, the significance of piety is hardly exhausted by the thought
that it is that part of complete excellence in relation to others in which
the paradigmatic'7 'others' are the gods. One might as well claim that
everything important about courage has been covered by the statement that
courage is the part of complete excellence towards others in which 'oth-
ers' includes (a) fellow fighters and (b) those whom one is defending. If
such a claim were true, it might be reasonable to say virtually nothing
special to courage on the ground that the discussion of justice (in the sense
of complete excellence) will take care of courage by implication. But this
leaves out what specific difference is made to the soul of the courageous
person by the presence of courage; it says nothing about what in him we
admire and long to emulate. Unless pious action, unlike courageous action,
is simply a matter of going through the motions without knowing or car-
ing whether it contributes, on the agent's side, to personal perfection (not
that it could, when done in such a spirit), it is difficult to find good rea-
son why Aristotle - no less pious, it would seem, than most of his neigh-
bours - should omit to study piety in his anatomy of the elements of a
perfect human life.
So far, I have objected to the suggestion that, for Aristotle, piety is a
part of general justice in the broad sense. Bodeus, however, forgoes this
route, maintaining that Aristotelian piety is included in particular justice.
Of the two branches of this, distributive and corrective, Bodeus places
piety under the former.'8
Even if this were a plausible classification, we should still be left with
the question why Aristotle, one of the last philosophers one expects to
play hide and seek with their students, does not state it outright himself.
If we try to explain by assuming that piety to him is not an important
topic, we still have to explain why that should be so. But these questions
aside, any bid to interpret particular justice in either branch as including
piety towards the gods comes up against the following observation:
The sphere of the just is persons who share in things generally (haplos) good,'9
and who have too much or too little of these; since for some beings, as per-
17 Paradigmatic, but not unique; piety was also appropriate towards parents, the
dead, and the patria. One would think that this complexity (raising, e.g., questions
about analogical forms) calls for explicit discussion.
IX Bodeus, 139.
'" I.e.: but possibly not good for a given individual; cf. V, 1129bl-6. Such goods
include honour (11 30b2, and 30-31), which is what should be accorded the gods: cf. 1,
I OlblO-l 102a4.
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60 SARAH BROADIE
haps for gods, there is no such thing as having too much of them, whereas for
others - the incurably bad - no amount of them at all is beneficial but all are
harmful, and for others again they are beneficial up to a point. It [sc. the
just]
is, for this reason, something that applies only to human beings. (NE V, 1137a
26-30)20
Since Bodeus has it that the gods receive their rightful share or shares at
the hands of pious human distributors, he must understand 'applies only
to human beings' as meaning that only humans - not gods - can be just
or unjust agents of distribution (cf. NE X, 1 178b 10-12). However, the
preceding lines do not distinguish the parties to just and unjust interac-
tions; they treat agents and recipients alike. It is thus natural to take the
last remark as saying that just action is essentially between man and man
(hence not directed by man towards god).
If one wanted to maintain that Aristotle omits to discuss piety because
he sees it as contained in an explicitly discussed larger topic, a more likely
larger topic would be philia.2' Aristotle several times mentions honouring
the gods alongside honouring parents (NE VIII, 1162a4-6; 1163bl6-7; IX,
1165al5; 24; cf. EE VII, 1242bl9-21). These are standard examples of
philia between unequals. It might be argued that Aristotle sees little to be
said about honouring gods over and above what is to be said about hon-
ouring parents, even though the cases are obviously different; and that
since honouring is the expression of piety, and the case of parents natu-
rally falls into the topic of philia, he sees no call for a separate discus-
sion of piety towards the gods. But again one wonders why, if this is cor-
rect, he did not signpost his intention. There are many points in the discussions
of the character-excellences when it would have been easy to mention
piety and say 'the examination of this more properly belongs in the exam-
ination of philia.'
C. NE X, 1179a22-32: rehabilitation
The main thesis of this paper is that although Aristotle does not discuss
piety anywhere in the ethical treatises, there is one place where this qual-
ity puts in an appearance and receives an implicit definition. It is where
he writes:
2' Translations from the NE are
by Christopher
Rowe.
21 Cf.
Bodeis, 141-58.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 61
. .. the person whose intelligence is active, and who devotes himself to (thera-
peuon) intelligence, and is in the best condition, seems also to be most loved by
the gods (theophilestatos). For if the gods have any sort of care for things
human,22 as they are thought to do, it would also be reasonable to suppose both
that they delight in what is best and has the greatest affinity to themselves (and
this would be intelligence) and that those who cherish this most, and honour it,
are the ones they benefit in return (anteupoiein), for taking care of what they
themselves love, and acting correctly and finely. And quite clearly, all these
attributes belong most of all to the intellectually accomplished (sophos) person.
He, therefore (ara), is most loved by the gods. But it is reasonable (eikos) that
the same person should also be happiest; so that in this way too it is the intel-
lectually accomplished person who will be happy to the highest degree. (NE X,
1 1 79a22-32)
This, 'the theophilestatos argument', ends the NE investigation of the
nature of the highest good. The inquiry was launched with the observa-
tion that everyone will tell you what the highest good is: it is eudaimo-
nia (I, 1095al5-9). Then eudaimonia was defined (I, 1097b22-1098a 20).
The definition generated discussion of the different levels of rational soul,
their respective types of virtue, and the many specific virtues falling under
these. The inquiry branched at times into studies of related topics such as
voluntariness, decision, continence, friendship and pleasure.23 Then at X,
1176a31, it returned to eudaimonia. This new treatment first showed that
eudaimonia cannot consist in gross pleasures or idle amusements; it then
proceeded to distinguish two modes of human felicity, one practical and
political, the other theoretic, and to raise and answer the final question on
this topic: which of these two is the more blessed and perfect (X, 1177al2-
1 179a32)? The theophilestatos argument completes Aristotle's response to
this question, and we hear no more of eudaimonia for what remains of
the NE. What follows has to do with implementing the human good, rather
than further explicating its nature.
One would not expect a false note at this climactic moment. Yet the
theophilestatos argument, according to a prevalent understanding, is noth-
ing but a feeble bid for popular endorsement of the theoretic ideal.
Aristotle,. scholars point out, invokes the traditional belief that heaven
22
The subsequent argument shows that the truth of this antecedent is assumed.
23
This summary assumes that the NE either was intended from the first to incor-
porate the Common Books (EE IV, V and VI = NE V, VI and VII), or (less likely)
originally had its own version, now lost, of this material. With many scholars today,
I take the EE to have been composed by Aristotle earlier, and to have been first home
of the Common Books.
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62 SARAH BROADIE
rewards those who love the gods and are good. Now, traditional belief
imagines the reward to consist in thriving crops and herds, successful eco-
nomic and social ventures, a large healthy household. So Aristotle, it is
assumed, must envisage it that way too. Yet Aristotle himself cannot pos-
sibly share the belief in that form. In particular, he cannot possibly believe
that wealth is the god-given reward for theoretic wisdom. Not only is this
a ridiculous belief in itself, but (scholars say) the idea of god or the gods
as now and then affecting an individual's life contradicts the Metaphysics
Lambda theory of the divine unmoved mover(s). So, it is suggested, Aristotle
merely sings along with the vulgar here; he does not mean the argument,
but tradition requires the lip service.24
One might wonder how this fits with the Aristotle whom Seneca reports
warning against the temerity and impudence of telling lies about the gods.
Fortunately, however, we do not need to rely on fragmentary evidence
from (at best) a different Aristotelian context to make a case against the
above way of interpreting the theophilestatos argument. Its own context
suffices. Aristotle was not playing to the vulgar a page or two back in the
Nicomachean Ethics, when he argued that divine activity is theoretic.25
Would he not have lost any vulgar readers or listeners already long before,
if he ever had them? So why a last minute compromise for their sake,
when they are not even there to be cajoled? And what advantage could
24
See, e.g., Zeller, vol. 1, 422, n. 1: 'It is obvious that Aristotle is here arguing
from popular conceptions; he himself ascribes to god no external operation'; Burnet,
ad 1179a22: 'inconsistent with Aristotle's view of the relation between God and Man';
Dirlmeier, ad loc.: 'not a piece of doctrine in the strong, philosophical sense ... the
usual incorporation of the traditional views'; Gauthier and Jolif, ad loc.: 'an appeal to
popular beliefs designed to justify the philosopher to the masses'; Ronna Burger, 137,
ad 1 179a24-29: 'only a common opinion of the most dubious sort' (presumably she
is referring only to the antecedent of the conditional at 1179a24 ff.). Other scholars
have rejected 1179a22-32 as inauthentic; see Gauthier-Jolif ad loc. For reasoned and
trenchant insistence on taking the passage seriously, see Bod6us, 10-1 1. (However,
Bod&is is on less firm ground in holding that the gods it refers to are 'those who are
honored in the city'.)
25 NE X, 1178b8-22. NB also his use nearby of the rather technical concepts 'the
composite' and 'separation' (1 178a20; 22) and of Anaxagoras's pronouncement at
1179al5: 'he would not be surprised if the happy were to appear to most people (hoi
polloi) a strange sort (atopos tis)'. Aristotle, who follows this up with a comment on
the superficiality of hoi polloi, would hardly cite it in his own support if he were about
to start addressing the vulgar. Natali ad loc. sees that 1179a22-32 does not adduce the
gods as popularly conceived, but since he holds that it does not adduce the Aristotelian
ones either, on the ground that these are the unmoved movers of the Metaphysics, he
remains perplexed.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 63
this achieve that would be worth the corresponding risk: i.e., of losing the
respect of serious, high-minded, contemporary students, who if they under-
stood the argument in this way would surely be as embarrassed about it
as modem admirers of Aristotle?
It is important to notice that if he does engage in the performance just
described, this cannot be because he needs the theophilestatos argument
in order to show that (SH) 'the sophos is happiest' (1179a31-32). Perhaps
one might expect desperate measures if this conclusion were in danger of
eluding him. But he has already secured it as far back as 1178b32. The
theophilestatos argument is gratuitous if intended to prove that thesis. But
in fact what it proves is something new. It is (SMG): 'the sophos is most
god-beloved' (1 179a30). That is what Aristotle declares at the beginning
of the passage just quoted, and the argument for this thesis ensues with
gar, 1179a24, and ends at 30. Aristotle now has an additional reason to
assert SH, and he does so, passing to it from SMG (31-32).26 But we need
not think that the point of 1179a22-32 was simply to add to the grounds
for SH.
For if the proof of SMG is put forward as merely another reason in
favour of SH, why is it placed where it is, rather than earlier? Its natural
place, on that supposition, would have been next to the argument that
deduces SH from the premise that divine activity is akin to human theo-
retical intellection (1178b7-23); all the more natural in that both argu-
ments turn on this notion of affinity or kinship (to sungenes); see 1178b23
and 1179a26. The oddity of the theophilestatos argument's positioning (on
the assumption that it just offers another reason for elevating theoretical
over practical or political wisdom) contributes to the impression that Aristotle
did not mean it, and has even led some scholars to doubt its authenticity.
This is in addition to problems in the content of the argument, to which
I now turn. I shall come back to the question of position.
The argument proceeds on the assumption that the gods 'benefit in
return .., those who cherish [intelligence] most, and honour it', since it
is what is 'best [in us] and has the greatest affinity to themselves'. Two
main difficulties have been found in this.27 First: it is held to conflict with
26
This move is signalled by the relatively weak 'eikos', whereas the inference to
SDG from its premisses in 22-30 is strongly nailed down by 'ara'.
27 It is worth mentioning a third difficulty, which Stewart'(ad loc.) thought he saw:
a conflict with the conception of the gods at 1178b9-18 as not engaging in activities
of the practical virtues. If we think of praxis as involving physical changes first and
foremost to the agent (these may include emotional changes, since 'physical' for
Aristotle covers the non-noetic aspects of the soul; see Parts of Animals 1, 641a21-
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64 SARAH BROADIE
Metaphysics Lambda's theory of the divine unmoved movers of the heavens.
Now there might be a conflict if we assume that Lambda gives a definitive
account of the divine or the divine role. But why should we assume that?
Lambda, after all, is not primarily aiming to demonstrate the existence and
nature of god.28 If it were, one might perhaps be justified in assuming that
nothing can be true of Aristotle's god that is not present or prefigured in the
theory in Lambda. Since god, according to such a theology, would have
a strictly cosmological function, it might indeed be difficult to find room
here for the sort of relation between human intellect and god hinted at in
the theophilestatos argument. However, the purpose of Lambda is not pri-
marily to demonstrate god or the gods, but to prove the existence and
nature of immutable substance by showing that, and why, the celestial motion
is eternal. It turns out that the cause adequate to explain this effect must
be an infinitely desirable, perfectly actual, intelligence. This complex of attri-
butes, rather than the cosmological function as such, is the immediate rea-
son why Lambda calls this being 'god'. Lambda, then, leaves the Aristotelian
logically free to predicate 'god' of something not cosmological, or of
something that presents itself to us otherwise than cosmologically.29
The second stumbling block to taking the theophilestatos argument seri-
ously is the childishness of the traditional belief that the gods reward those
who love them (or, as Aristotle actually says: cherish most what has most
affinity to them). But this need not detain us long. Nothing in the text
requires that this endoxon, in the present context, be given a traditional
interpretation in terms of flocks and herds multiplying and ships coming
home. It is reasonable to suppose, instead, that what Aristotle has in mind
as vindicating the endoxon is a familiar fact of intellectual experience:
devoted thinking results, often enough, in bursts of understanding. This is
blO, and cf. On the Soul I, 402a5-7), an Aristotelian divinity is not practical; but this
hardly excludes to antieupoiein as interpreted in the next paragraph of the main text.
28 The appearance that this is the aim is appreciably reduced if at 1072b28 we
accept the MSS' 'phamen de', which seems to report an endoxon about god, instead
of 'phamen de' (with Ross, following Themistius), which seems to introduce a doc-
trinal claim. On this point, and the entire question, see the excellent discussion by
Bod6us (op. cit., ch. 1).
29 This leaves open whether, in the predication in question, 'god' would apply to the
cosmic unmoved mover(s) in virtue of some attribute or function not postulated by
cosmology, or to some divine being(s) existentially distinct from the cosmic mover(s).
Again, one should not assume (as apparently Bodeus does, op. cit., 11; and perhaps
Natali [see n. 241) that the latter must be the 'gods of the city'. Prima facie it is neither
as civic divinity nor as cosmological principle that god rewards the human sophos.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 65
the reward to the human thinker for intellection engaged in just for its
own sake (cf. 1177bl-4; 13-15), which Aristotle equates with service to
the god that is nous or 'something beyond nous'.30
Let us now consider the argument's position. The bulk of X.7-8 has
just concluded with an argument featuring the similarity of human happi-
ness (which in its most perfect form is excellent contemplation) to divine
activity. By way of balance, Aristotle now adds some observations (1 178b33-
1179al7) about the material goods necessary for human happiness. The
main point is that modest amounts suffice. For confirmation Aristotle invokes
Solonian and Anaxagorean sketches of the 'happy man'; worldly goods
figure low in each.3' (This passage renders particularly inept the suggestion
that in the theophilestatos argument, which will begin just six lines on,
Aristotle means his audience to think - though not all to take it seriously-
of the gods showering the sophos with material rewards.) Anaxagoras is
presented as saying that his figure of the happy man would seem a strange
one to hoi polloi, an observation which Aristotle endorses.32 He now winds
up the addendum on modest material goods with the remark: 'The views
(doxai) of the wise (sophoi), then, seem to be in agreement with the argu-
ments (logoi)' (1 179al6-17). From this, there are two natural continua-
tions, and I believe that Aristotle decides to use both. Lacking footnoting
devices or parentheses he simply puts them one (1) after the other (2).
Continuation 1 (1179a21-32) responds to a thought implied by the atti-
tude of hoi polloi. This is the thought that since what Aristotle calls hap-
piness does not entail wealth and power, it does not entail that the happy
person is favoured by heaven. (Thus the question of who is favoured by
heaven is already in the offing at this point.) Although Aristotle would not
expect to convince hoi polloi that they are mistaken, here as sometimes
elsewhere he cares enough about their view to react to it philosophically.33
30
F 49 R3.
3' Solon: 'moderately well equipped with external things'; Anaxagoras: 'not a rich
[man], or a politically powerful one'.
32 'because they judge only by external things, having eyes only for these' (I 179a15-
16). Since the indicative krinousi shows Aristotle endorsing this explanation of the
strange-seemingness, presumably he agrees with Anaxagoras on what is being explained.
33 Cf. his reply in NE IX, 1168a28-1 169b2 to the vulgar condemnation of self-love.
And more generally: he cannot at this stage in the NE afford to dismiss without argu-
ment vulgar views that seem to contradict his own: for he himself has allowed that
vulgar hedonism reflects a very important truth about the value of pleasure (X, 172b9-
10 and 35-1173a2; cf. VII, 1153b25-8).
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66 SARAH BROADIE
On this occasion he reacts with the theophilestatatos argument. However,
given that the addendum ends with a summarizing reference to hai to6n
sophon doxai (1179al7), it naturally also prompts a different next step
(continuation 2): this is the invocation of a contrasting and ultimately deci-
sive type of corroboration in terms of ta erga and ho bios:
These sorts of considerations [i.e. the views of the wise] too, then, do carry a
certain conviction; but in the practical sphere the truth is determined on the basis
of the way life is actually lived (ek ton erg6n kai tou biou); for this is decisive.
So when one looks at everything that has been said up to this point, one should
be bringing it to bear on one's life as actually lived (epi ta erga kai ton bion),
and if it is in harmony with what one actually does (tois ergois), it should be
accepted, while if there is discord, it should be supposed mere words (logous)
(1 179al7-22).
Even if it is not immediately clear precisely in which direction we are to
look when we turn to ta erga kai ton bion,4 the force of the contrast doxail
erga virtually requires that mention of erga follow mention of doxai with
nothing substantial intervening. Hence the theophilestatos argument gets
postponed, the appeal to erga and bios being tucked in before it paren-
thetically. The result is a juxtaposition of seemingly unconnected passages
The question is: whose deeds and life give the final corroboration? Hardly those
of Solon and Anaxagoras, as has sometimes been suggested, since something more
should then have been said about this pair to address the possibility of their lives fail-
ing to bear out their views. Not those of people in general, since the values expressed
in most of their lives are rejected by Aristotle. The reference must be either to his
own life and deeds or (taking them singly) to those of each member of the group com-
prising him and any listeners who have come with him thus far. Given the immedi-
ately preceding context, we are presumably to focus on the material modesty of these
lives, but given the reference to Anaxagoras and the immediately subsequent argument
about the sophos as theophilestatos, we must also be meant to focus on the impor-
tance for those lives of theoretical activity. (This does not entail that the listeners are
mostly, like Aristotle himself, theoretical researchers rather than political leaders or
prospective leaders, since one can show respect for theoretical research by deeds other
than the engaging in it.) In any case, the point takes us back to I, 1095a2-1 1, on the
disciplined quality Aristotle expects of his audience. They are not to be like acratic
people (9), but are to be such that if, when they have followed all the arguments for
and explanations of a certain ideal, they find it at odds with their own lives and prac-
tice, this finding of theirs constitutes their rejection of the ideal as false, and of the
arguments and explanations as collectively unsound. On this interpretation, the issue
of Aristotle's and his companions' sincerity is so near the surface at 1179al6-22 that
an'insincere' reading of the adjacent theophilestatos argument is absolutely ruled out
(except on the assumption that the entire stretch is the result of editorial patchwork).
It is not surprising that commentators who cannot take the theophilestatos argument
seriously also generally miss the self-reference of ta erga kai ho bios.
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 67
(1 179a17-22, pistin . . . hupolepteon, and 22-32, ho de kata noun ...
eudaimon). Conceptually, however, they are held together by 1 179al6-17:
'The doxai of the sophoi, then, seem to be in agreement with the logoi'.
For this simultaneously evokes the immediately following contrast with
erga etc., and the almost immediately preceding reference to the views of
the vulgar (1 179al5), to which the theophilestatos argument is a reply.35
D. NE X, 11 79a 22-32: interpretation
It is time to defend the thesis that the theophilestatos argument supplies
the missing account of piety. Against the background of the Euthyphro,
we know, as Aristotle would have known his audiences to know, that (nec-
essarily) the pious and only the pious are loved by the gods.36 From the
same source, he, we, and they also know that an account saying what the
gods love about the pious will be an account of the nature of
piety (pro-
vided, of course, it gets beyond the Euthyphronic triviality of saying that
piety is what they love). So Aristotle is saying that piety towards god is,
in its truest form, the disposition for intellectual activity engaged in as by
the sophos, i.e. purely for love of the activity itself.37' 3
In support of this interpretation one can point to two passages near the
theophilestatos argument where piety is a half-hidden theme. Its presence
in these places would surely have been noticed as non-coincidental if the
theophilestatos argument had been taken seriously and seen as filling a
lacuna on the topic.39 First there was the reference to Anaxagoras:
35 David Sedley has made me think twice about this somewhat complicated expla-
nation for the position of the theophilestatos argument (although I am not convinced,
either, that the complicated explanation is wrong). Sedley pointed out that Aristotle
could have been following what seems to have been Plato's tendency to culminate with
a point about dearness to the gods. (Or perhaps both philosophers were following a
religious norm. Cf. Isocrates' placement of just this point at the end of the Antidosis.)
Certainly that would explain why Aristotle's theophilestatos argument comes at the
end of his exposition of the nature of the human good. See Sedley, 'The ideal of god-
likeness', in Gail Fine, Oxford Readings in Philosophy: Plato, II (Oxford, 1999),
p. 314. (Sedley's paper discusses inter alia NE X.8, 1179a22-32, taking the argument
seriously.)
36 Euthyphro 9e- 11 b; 1 5b-c.
17
Aristotle does not say that this is the spirit of the sophos, but clearly it must be,
since the sophos can hardly be supposed to misunderstand the point of engaging in
the activity typical of him, nor to engage for wrong reasons.
3X Cf. a version of the same thought at EE VII, 1249bl9-21 (quoted above).
19 These clues would certainly have been picked up if we had been dealing with a
text of Plato's.
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68 SARAH BROADIE
Anaxagoras too seems to have taken the happy man not to be rich one, or a polit-
ically powerful one, when he said he wouldn't be surprised if the happy were to
appear to most people a strange sort (tis atopos) .. . (1 179a13-15).
This alludes to an anecdote in which the philosopher-scientist described
someone like himself when he spoke of the happy person as seeming
strange to most people:
And so they tell us that Anaxagoras answered a man who was ... asking why
one should choose rather to be born than not, by saying 'for the sake of view-
ing the heavens and the whole order of the universe' (EE 1, 1216alO-14 1R071
cf. 1215b6-8).
Aristotle's NE audience cannot have failed to recall that Anaxagoras was
hounded with charges of impiety, and that these charges were levelled
against him for precisely the cosmological speculation in which his hap-
piness consisted - that which for him made it worth having been born. In
light of the theophilestatos argument, with its implied definition of piety
and piety's relation to happiness, we can see Aristotle quietly executing
a move not unlike Plato's in vindication of Socrates (Apology, Euthyphro,
Crito): this man charged with impiety is a paragon of that excellence for
anyone with eyes to see. Aristotle, however, is vindicating not the person
Anaxagoras but the intellectual activity for which he stands.
The second passage is NE X, 1181al2-17:
But the sophists who profess such knowledge [i.e. the art of
legislating]
appear
to be nowhere near teaching it. For they don't have any knowledge at all even
of what sort of thing it is or what sorts of things it is about; if they did they
wouldn't put it down as the same as, or inferior to, rhetorical expertise, nor would
they think legislating an easy thing for anyone who has collected together those
laws that are well thought of (tous eudokimountas ton nomon) ...
This criticism targets a claim by Isocrates in the Antidosis. At Antidosis
79-83, Isocrates disparages legislation and elevates rhetoric:
... men who make it their duty to invent discourses [upon questions of public
welfare in a spirit worthy of both Athens and Hellas] should be held in higher
esteem than those who propose and write down laws, inasmuch as they are rarer,
have the more difficult task, and must have superior qualities of mind (81, tr.
Norlin, Loeb).
Aristotle's phrase, 'the laws that are well thought of' is a quotation from
Isocrates, who continues:
... those who have elected to make laws have had at their service a multitude
of laws already made (for they have no need to search for new laws, but only
to put forth the effort to collect those which are vell thought of in other states
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ARISTOTELIAN PIETY 69
(eudokimountas para tois allois), which anyone who so desires can easily do ...)
(83, Norlin, with a slight change).
What is easy to forget as one wades through the prolixities of the Antidosis
is that Isocrates has couched this apologia pro vita sua in the fictional
form of a self-defence against just the charges that were brought against
Socrates: corrupting the youth (30) and impiety (rebutted by implication
at 321). There are numerous echoes of Plato's Apology scattered through-
out, and in the penultimate sentence, Isocrates, pretending to be under
threat from a capital charge, proclaims:
... I take it as a good sign that all my past life up to this day has been such as
befits men who are pious (eusebeis) and loved by the gods40 (theophileis). (Anti-
dosis, 322).
E. A remaining question
I have argued that it would be surprising if piety fails to figure in Aris-
totle's Ethics, and that figure there it does, not as a species of justice or
even friendship, but in its own right, though in veiled fashion. A final
question: why the veiling? Why, in treating of piety, does Aristotle depart
from his standard approach whereby he announces each of the virtues by
itself and always begins by tackling straight on the nature of its domain?
Now it may be the gods themselves, or it may be human attitudes towards
them, that constitute the domain of piety; but in either case several rea-
sons make it understandable that Aristotle preferred not to delineate this
virtue in his usual open and systematic way. Firstly, his notion of piety
in its truest form is so closely tied to his theoretic account of perfect hap-
piness that the latter seems the only possible locus for explaining the for-
mer. Secondly, the theological and religious revisionism of his account
was politically risky, especially for a philosopher at Athens with Aris-
totle's Macedonian affiliation. Thirdly, it is presumably pious as well as
politic to protect the truth concerning piety and the pious against scandal
and ridicule from outsiders which a plain formulation might incur. To
euphe?mein would be the first casualty in such a confrontation. Ignorant
speakers would be provoked into unintentional blasphemy, and philoso-
phers might be cowed into saying what they could not believe.4'
The University of St Andrews
I
Or 'god-loving', as Norlin.
41 Thanks to Christopher, Rowe, David Sedley, Roslyn Weiss, and Christian Wild-
berg for their comments.
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70 SARAH BROADIE
Modern References
Bod6us, Richard, Aristotle and the Theology of the Liv,ing Immortals, translated by Jan
Garrett, Albany, 2000.
Broadie, Sarah and Rowe, Christopher, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, 2002.
Burger, Ronna, "Ethical Reflection and Righteous Indignation: Nemesis in the
Nicomachean Ethics", in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV, edd. John P. Anton
and Anthony Preus, Albany, 1991, 127-139.
Burnet, John, The Ethics of Aristotle, London, 1900.
Dirlmeier, Franz, Aristoteles, Nicomachische Ethik, Berlin, 1960.
Gauthier, R.A. and Jolif, J.Y., Aristote - L'Ethique A Nicomaque, Paris, 1970.
Natali, Carlo, Aristotele, Etica Nicomachea, Roma-Bari, 1999
Sedley, David, "The ideal of godlikeness" in
Oxford Readings in Philosophv, Plato II,
ed. Gail Fine, Oxford, 1999, 309-28.
Stewart, J.A., Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, Oxford, 1892.
Zeller, E., Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, New York, 1962.
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