PETER BERTON

The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties:

Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior*

What can the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) record of its dealings
with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) tell us about
Soviet policies toward nonruling Communist Parties, Soviet strategy
and tactics, and their negotiating techniques? Can the Japanese experi-
ence provide a glimpse into the Soviet decisionmaking process? These
are some of the questions that this essay will attempt to answer. Of
course, as pointed out in the introduction to this collection of studies,
the revelations of foreign Communists constitute a supplementary
source, which nonetheless is at times the only available account of
negotiations and may on occasion shed light on the Soviet way of
doing things, and perhaps even on Soviet motivation. And again, as
indicated in the introduction to this issue, the most rewarding sources
are official Party publications when the Party in question is attempting
to present and defend its position in a dispute with Moscow (or with
Peking), internal confidential Party documents obtained somehow by
government law enforcement agencies or resourceful journalists, and
finally the writings of ex-Communists or purged Party leaders.
*I wish to thank my colleagues Thomas Greene and Joseph Nyomarkay for reading and com-
menting on the introduction to this issue, and especially Paul Langer for helpful comments on
this study. I am also grateful to Lynn Sipe, Head of the World Affairs Library at USC, Emiko
Moffitt, Head of the Japanese Collection at the Hoover Institution, and Hisao Matsumoto, Head
of the Japanese Collection at the Library of Congress, for their kind assistance and computer
searches of pertinent documentation. Needless to say, final responsibility is mine alone.
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM VOL. XV, NO. 3, AUTUMN 1982, 266-287
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 267

Fortunately, all of these categories of sources are available in Japan.

The JCP has feuded with both the CPSU and the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) for almost two decades and has made public some of the
records of the Party's negotiations with Soviet and Chinese leaders (in-
cluding Mao Tse-tung himself). The Japanese government intelligence
community has been engaged in the surveillance and analysis of the in-
ternational Communist movement and the Japanese left-wing parties for
the past sixty years and continually issues documentary collections and
analytical studies through semigovernmental or subsidiary channels. ~
Japanese investigative reporters also constantly publish a stream of rev-
elations and exposts of the Japanese Communist movement, some ob-
viously sensationalized, but others quite plausible. And, finally, the
Japanese Party has its share of disillusioned or purged leaders, includ-
ing former secretaries general of the Party and, a few years ago, the
vice-chairman of the Presidium of the Politburo, Hakamada Satomi. 2
This study presents three vignettes gleaned from recently published
Japanese-language sources and covers the late Stalin era, the
Khrushchev period, and the Brezhnev years. The first vignette de-
scribes a meeting of the JCP leadership with Stalin in August 1951,
when he forced a radical left policy on the Japanese Party; the second
portrays the unsuccessful JCP-CPSU negotiations in Moscow in March
1964; and the last concerns the conclusion of the normalization agree-
I. See, for example, the publications of the Nikkan Rodo Tsushinsha [Daily Labor Press]
and the monthly l¢oan joho [Public Security Intelligence] edited and published since 1954
by the Shakai Undo Kenkyukai [Research Group on Social Movements].
2. Japanese names appear in the Japanese style of surname first.
This study has relied on three groups of primary sources. The first group includes recently
published books of Hakamada. Until his purge, he was a long-time comrade-in-arms of the
present Chairman Miyamoto Kenji, with whom Hakamada spent many years in prewar Japanese
jails after a period of study at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East (KUTV)
in Moscow in the mid-1920s. Hakamada's writings include Watakushi no sengo shi [My Post-
war History] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1978) and Kino no doshi Miyamoto Kenjii e [To Kenji
Miyamoto---My Erstwhile Comrade] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1978). They have been augmented by
interviews conducted in Japanese and Russian (Hakamada speaks no English). A second helpful
group of primary sources consisted of official JCP publications, especially the records of press
conferences of top Party leaders, and includes the JCP daily Akahata [Red Flag] and the En-
glish-language Bulletin--Information for Abroad (Tokyo: Japanese Communist Party, Central
Committee) (hereafter cited as Bulletin); "Essential Points in the JCP-CPSU Talks---On the Joint
Statement," Miyamoto's press conference held in Moscow on December 24, 1979, Akalmta,
December 27, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), pp. 6-15. The most illuminating
group of sources consisted of confidenfal Party documents obtained by enterprising Japanese
investigative reporters and published in book form. (Generally such documents are obtained
from disgruntled Party members or are leaked to the press by government agencies.) This group
includes Mizushima Tsuyoshi, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo --Misshitsu no naka kara no kokuhaku
[The Conspiracy of Kenji Miyamoto----Confessions from Behind Closed Doors] (Tokyo: Zem-
bosha, 1980).
268 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

ment between the two Parties in December 1979. But first some back-
ground on Japanese-Soviet Party relations.

J C P - C P S U Relations
Although the Japanese Communist Party has just celebrated its six-
tieth anniversary, 3 for more than half of this period it was no more
than an appendage of Moscow. During the prewar years, the Party was
a small and docile branch of the Comintern which for all practical pur-
poses ceased to exist when efficiently repressive Japanese government
policies caused many of its members to recant, while the stubborn
leadership (including the present Chairman Miyamoto Kenji) lingered
for more than a decade in jails to be released in the fall of 1945 by
the order of General Douglas MacArthur. 4
Given the constraints of the American Occupation, the Party leaders
tried to project the image of a "lovable" Communist Party. They stressed
parliamentary tactics, which bore fruit in 1949 when the Party cap-
tured 10 percent of the electoral vote. But sfiortly thereafter, in January
1950, Stalin (with the support of the Chinese Communists) ordered an
attack on these "Eurocommunist" policies. The orders, transmitted in
the form of a very critical article in the Cominform paper, caused a
split in the Party ranks. Eventually, the JCP adopted a suicidal hard-
line strategy and the leadership went underground, and on to Peking.
(The first vignette shows how Stalin forced this left program on the
JCP.)
Fortunately for the Japanese Communist movement, this violent
episode was rather short. In March 1953 Stalin died and the Korean
War came to an end, so that there was no more need to disrupt the
American rear base in Japan. Within two years, most of the Com-
munist leaders and cadres were back in Japan, and a serious struggle
for power ensued. (Secretary General Tokuda Kyuichi died in Peking
in October 1953.) It was also clear that the only hope for the Party
in democratic Japan was to pursue the old (pre-Cominform criticism)
Eurocommunist policies, but the divisions in the Party hierarchy were
very deep, with some of the followers of Stalin's line reluctant to allow

3. The Partywas establishedon July 15, 1922.

4. The standardworks on the earlyJapaneseCommunistmovementare: RodgerSwearingen
and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-1951 (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1952); and George M. Beckmannand Okubo Genji,
The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945 (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress, 1969). Robert
A. Scalapino's The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeleyand Los Angeles:
Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1967)coversthe firstfourand a halfdecades,
 T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T PARTY 269

full and public criticism of the disastrous course. The struggle for
power was won by the present leader Miyamoto who switched factions
in order to become Secretary General and has since pursued a soft, par-
liamentary line, albeit by dictatorial means.
In another study, I have divided the evolution of Miyamoto's poli-
cies into three periods: (1) 1955-1961, consolidation of power and re-
jection of Palmiro Togliatti's structural reform theories; (2) 1961-1968,
growth, rejection of the Soviet and Chinese models, and declaration of
independence; and (3) 1968 to the present, nationalism and growing
convergence with Eurocommunism. 5 The transitional period from the
old to the new policies and the consolidation of power in Miyamoto's
hands coincided with the emerging ideological dispute between the
Soviet and Chinese Parties, which some scholars date back to the
Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956.
The JCP reaction to this split in the international Communist move-
ment was to stay neutral and to work toward reconciliation of the two
Communist super-Parties. 6 By the early 1960s, however, most Asian
Communist regimes and Parties (including the JCP) had begun to lean
toward Peking. The Japanese Party's switch was mostly due to the fact
that its domestic policies of strident opposition to "American im-
perialism" were more compatible with the Chinese position than with
Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line. The CPSU's crude pressure in
the international Communist movement may also have been counter-
productive. For example, Miyamoto related an incident that took place
during the 1960 Moscow summit of eighty-one Communist and Work-
ers' Parties. When a Japanese delegate responded with a "no comment"
to a question on an issue under dispute between the Russians and the
Chinese, chief Soviet ideologue Mikhail Suslov reportedly stood up,
banged on the table, and said, "That's no way for a Communist to re-
spond. ''7
But the one issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute that has decisively pitted
the Japanese Party against the Soviets was the signing of the partial
nuclear test ban treaty in Moscow in 1963. The JCP, in line with its
5. Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," Chap. XV in Vernon V. Aspaturian,
Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke (eds.), Eurocommunism Between East and West
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 331.
6. Here I follow the narrative of events in my article, Peter Berton, "The Japanese Com-
munists' Rapprochement with the Soviet Union," Asian Survey, XX, 12 (December 1980),
p. 1211 ft. See also Sei Young Rhee, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Conflict on the
Japanese Communist Party, 1961-1968" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Mis-
souri-Columbia, 1973), 430 pp.
7. Robert Sealapino's interview with an ex-JCP leader, Kasuga Shojiro, November 26, 1963
(Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 109).
270 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

strident anti-Americanism, supported the Chinese rejection of the nucle-

ar treaty. Yet, the entire question of nuclear weapons is a highly
charged one for the Japanese, who are the only victims of atomic war-
fare. One top Party leader, Shiga Yoshio, broke ranks and voted in the
National Diet for Japan's adherence to the treaty. The CPSU hailed the
"courageous" stand of a Japanese patriot and "faithful son of the
Japanese people." The CPSU also took sides against the JCP in the
various Japanese front organizations that reflected the split between
Moscow and Peking. As the second vignette will describe, a high-ranking
JCP delegation traveled to Moscow in February 1964 in a futile
attempt to reconcile the differences between the two Parties and to stop
the CPSU's disruptive activities in Japan. Shortly thereafter, the JCP
purged Shiga and his pro-Soviet followers, who formed a rival
Japanese Communist Party--Voice of Japan (Nihon no koe), a rather
strange name for a group which should have been called more correctly
"Voice of the Soviet Union." The JCP weathered this defection rather
well, as most of the rank and file held, and the Ninth Party Congress
in November 1964 all but ratified the split between the Japanese and
Soviet Parties, which was to last for fifteen years, s
The break with the CPSU should have led to much closer relations
with the CCP. And indeed for a while it did, but in early 1966 Mao
Tse-tung personally intervened in the talks between the Japanese and
Chinese Parties and insisted that the JCP endorse his rather extreme
anti-Soviet positions. The Japanese delegation, headed by Miyamoto,
refused to sign on the dotted line and returned home. 9 Thereafter rela-
tions between the two Parties continued to deteriorate and with the
onset of the Cultural Revolution were completely broken off. Cut off
from both Communist super-Parties, the JCP began to search for allies
among other Communist Parties who were also trying to steer a neutral
course and to assert their independence from both Moscow and
Peking. io
I have elsewhere characterized JCP relations with the CPSU after the
Japanese Party's break with the CCP as "The Long Road to Normaliza-
tion with Moscow. ''~t Essentially, between 1968 and 1979, the Soviets
made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with the obstreperous
8. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," pp. 1211-1212.
9. For a detailed account of the Sino-Japanese talks, see C. L. Chiou and Tsiu-shuang
Han, "Ideology and Politics in the 1966-1967 Split Between the Communist Parties of China
and Japan," Studies in Comparative Communism, XI, 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 361-387.
10. Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," pp. 344-351; and idem., "The Japanese
Communists," pp. 1213-1214.
I1. ibid., pp. 1214-1221.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 271

Japanese Party before grudgingly making a carefully-planned, limited

conciliatory gesture which sufficed to bring the two Parties to agree-
ment. The unsuccessful contacts between 1968 and 1977 involved visits
to Tokyo by Suslov and other Soviet Party officials and mostly unoffi-
cial and brief meetings in Moscow between Miyamoto and other
Japanese Presidium members and Suslov (also Brezhnev on one occa-
sion). Although the main reason for the failure of negotiations until
1979 was Soviet reluctance to come around to the basic JCP position
that Soviet support of "anti-Party elements" (notably the pro-Soviet
Shiga group) must be repudiated, other issues contributed to the es-
trangement between the two Parties. These included Japanese condem-
nation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Alek-
sandr Solzhenitsyn, the attacks on Spanish Communist leader Santiago
Carrillo, and most importantly the high-handed policies toward Japan,
especially the territorial dispute, the fishery negotiations, and Soviet
bombing exercises in the vicinity of Japan. 12
The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship
in August 1978 and the specter of closer collaboration between these
two countries may have served as a catalyst for the Soviet decision to
make some concessions in order to normalize relations with the JCP.
The CPSU sent two signals: a Central Committee congratulatory cable
on the occasion of Miyamoto's seventieth birthday in October and a
positive article in Pravda in December which contained the highly sig-
nificant observation that "the JCP continues its struggle against anti-
Party elements. ''~3 But there is many a slip between the cup and the
lip. While "anti-Party elements" could refer to the pro-CCP factions
and the ultraleft Trotskyists, they definitely also included, of course,
the pro-Soviet Shiga group, and the Soviets were determined to offer
the least damaging concessions and as few of them as possible.
Over the next several months, negotiations were conducted in Tokyo
and in Moscow, with the Soviets dragging their feet. 14 At the first
meeting in Tokyo, they refused to sign a joint communiqu6, leaving it
to the JCP negotiator to present the positions of both sides (he inti-
mated that the CPSU had admitted the incorrectness of their previous
action in publishing articles in Pravda supportive of the Shiga clique).
At the next meeting in Moscow, the two Parties signed a joint state-
ment in which the CPSU admitted to no wrongdoing but allowed the

12. For a detailed description and analysis of these issues see Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-
Communism," pp. 339-343.
13. Pravda, December 27, 1978.
14. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," p. 1216 ft.
272 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

Japanese side to state that they "evaluated positively the constructive

approach of the CPSU representatives at the preliminary talks in Tokyo
to the past issues in the relations between the two Parla"es. 15 But
Pravda conveniently omitted the words "the past issues," leaving no
trace of any possible past wrongdoing, headlined the report as a "work-
ing discussion" (not an agreement), and buried it on the inside interna-
tional page (Akahata gave the accord front-page coverage). Eventually
the Soviets reluctantly gave in to pressure from the JCP and published
the entire text in the CPSU Central Committee organ Partiinaia zhizn,
with an advertisement in Pravda drawing attention to the publication
of the full text of the document. In a further attempt to downgrade
these preliminary negotiations, the editors of Partiinaia zhizn headlined
the report as a "Working Meeting of the Representatives of the CPSU
and the JCP" and not as an agreement, t6 A final round of preliminary
negotiations in Tokyo in August undoubtedly dealt with the agenda for
the forthcoming summit meeting to be held in Moscow. But as the
third vignette will convincingly demonstrate, Soviet occupation of the
northern islands, a politically important issue for the JCP, was summar-
ily dismissed by the Soviet negotiators. Nor did the final agreement
confirm any past Soviet culpability in supporting "anti-Party elements."
Although the December 1979 agreement did normalize relations be-
tween the Soviet and Japanese Parties, hopes for a genuine rapproche-
ment were shattered by the almost simultaneous Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, which the JCP condemned, demanding the immediate
withdrawal of Soviet troops, t7 In the three years since the normaliza-
tion agreement, polemics between the two Parties have continued, ts
The most recent manifestations of basic disagreements between the
JCP and the CPSU are visible in the slogans of the Fifty-third JCP May
Day celebrations in 1982 and in the speeches at the Sixteenth Party
Congress held at the end of July 1982. Of the eighteen slogans, four
15. Emphasis added.
16. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," p. 1218.
17. "On the Situation in Afghanistan," Akahata, January 11, 1980; Bulletin, No. 427 (Jan-
uary 1980).
18. See, for example, the report of the Paris correspondent of Akahata entitled "One Year
Since the Afghanistan Intervention," Akahata, December 16, 1980; and the exchange of let-
ters between the JCP and the CPSU on the Polish and other issues in the summer of 1981,
particularly the June 15 and July 4 letters from the JCP Central Committee (Akahata, June
16-18, and Akahata Commentary Edition, July 13, 1981, respectively; Bulletin, Nos. 461 and
466) and the CPSU Central Committee letter dated July 30 (Partiinaia zhizn, No. 16 [August
1981], pp. 21-27; Radio Moscow, August 8, 1981). The JCP also immediately reacted to
the imposition of martial law in Poland with an article entitled "A Grave Situation Unbecom-
ing of Socialism: On the Establishment of Martial Law in Poland," Akahata, December 15,
1981.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 273

contained anti-Soviet points: a demand for the withdrawal from Asia

of the SS-20 and other Soviet nuclear weapons (Slogan 2 also de-
manded the withdrawal of American nuclear-armed troops and nuclear
weapons); the immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan islands, and
the return of the entire Kurile island chain upon the conclusion of a
Japanese-Soviet peace treaty (Slogan 12); the dissolution Of all military
blocs and alliances (Slogan 13); and the immediate termination of the
military government in Poland, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Af-
ghanistan, and opposition to all hegemonism and "great powerism'.'
(Slogan 15). 19 In his speech at the Party Congress, Miyamoto singled
out twenty-three theoretically and politically significant documents is-
sued by the Party since the 1970s. One of these documents was "A
Critique of Hegemonism in the International Communist Movement--
The Problems of Afghanistan and Poland. ''2°
Against ,this background of relations between the Japanese and Soviet
Parties, let us proceed with our three vignettes.

The Late Stalin Era

Some four months after his arrival in Moscow, Hakamada was vis-
ited in early August 1951 by a Soviet official whom he had not met
before121 The emissary, who turned out to be the deputy director of
the CPSU International Department, thrust a document into
Hakamada's hand and said, "Comrade Hakamada, I would like you to
tell me if you approve this document, and if you do, we'll immediately
go together to Stalin's place. ''22 Thedocument was entitied "Immediate
Demands of the Japanese Communist Party--A New Program. ''23
In the Soviet Union i n 195!, it was distinctly unhealthy to decline
an invitation to see Stalin, and Hakamada reluctantly said "yes." Al-
though it was almost 9:00 P.M., it was common knowledge that Stalin
was up until 2:00 or 3:00 A.M. His well-protected dacha at Kuntsevo
19. Akahata. May 1, 1982.
20. Text of Miyamoto's speech on July 27, 1982. Akahata, July 28, 1982.
21. Tokuda, Nosaka Sanzo, and other top JCP leaders leftJapan secretly in September
1950 and set up "the Tokuda Organization" (Tokuda kikan) in Peking. Hakamada, at the time
an influentialmember of the Party Central Committee, leftTokyo secretlyon December I
and arrived in Peking (via Kobe and Hong Kong) on December 25. In early April 1951,
Tokuda, Nosaka, Nishizawa Tomio, and Hakamada left Peking for Moscow. Hakamada,
Watakushi no sengo shi, Chronology, pp. 302-343.
22. This account is based on "The FatefulKuntsevo Conference" in ibid., pp. 93-102.
23. For the text of this "1951 Thesis,"see "ImmediateDemandsof the CommunistParty
of Japan--New Programme,"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, November
23, 1951, p. 3. See also Chap. HI, "The Shiftto the Left:GuerrillaWarfare,JapaneseStyle"
in Scalapino,The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 79-96.
2 7 3. STUDIES IN C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

was located in a forest near the Moscow River, some ten miles from
the Kremlin. The Japanese visitors (other leaders of the JCP arrived al-
most simultaneously) were ushered into a large living room on the first
floor, which, except for a large conference table, a chandelier, and a
thick carpet, was very sparsely furnished. The Soviet leaders were al-
ready assembled in the room and after a round of handshakes invited
the Japanese to take their places at the conference table. Stalin seated
himself at the end of the table opposite Tokuda. To Stalin's right were
Georgii Malenkov (opposite Nosaka), Lavrentii Beria (opposite
Nishizawa Tomio), and Viacheslav Molotov (opposite Hakamada). An
interpreter was seated between Stalin and Tokuda, and Wang Chia-
hsiang, chief of the CCP International Department, sat next to
Hakamada. ~
Stalin began in a quiet tone: '~'hcre were good reasons for the Corn-
inform criticism, and I think that it was correct." He said nothing about
why the criticism was correct. Hakamada claims that he stood up and
appealed to Stalin about the splitting machinations of the Tokuda group,
complaining about Tokuda's violent character and his autocratic be-
havior in purging duly elected Central Committee members and thus
splitting the Party. At this point Tokuda jumped up and shouted, "Hey,
what the hell are you saying!" Without hesitation, Hakamada said,
"Here, see for yourself. If he can do this in front of all of you, you
can imagine how he behaves at the meetings of the Japanese Polit-
buro." After a silence, Hakamada continued to expound on his differ-
ences with the Tokuda group, whereupon Nosaka accusingly said,
"Hakamada, what did you actually do this past year? You didn't do a
thing, did you?" At this point Molotov, who sat opposite Hakamada,
murmured in a quiet tone, "Isn't this because you didn't give any work
to Comrade Hakamada?" Although this offhand remark was not trans-
lated, Hakamada understood it. ~
Stalin, in the meantime, was quiet, doodling on a piece of paper be-
fore him. Then he got up and, walking behind Malenkov and Beria and
puffing on his pipe, spoke very, very slowly,
Comrade Hakamada, You arc now creating an opposition group to the
Party Center. This is not good. Aren't you a metal worker? That's
why you should well understand that there can be no victory without
workers' solidarity. As far as this thesis is concerned, we have also
cooperated in drawing it up. I would like the'Japanese Party to go
forward on this basis.

24. Hakamada, Watakuahi no senso shi, pp. 95-96.

25. IBM., pp. 97-98.
 T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y 275

Nervously, Hakamada was about to light up a cigarette, but Wang,

who sat next to him, pushed down his hand intimating that it was for-
bidden to smoke in Stalin's presence. Hakamada then noticed that the
only ashtray on the table was in front of Stalin. 26
During the conference Stalin did most of the talking, enunciating
every word, while slowly walking back and forth. Although his tone
was very quiet, there was no allowance for any compromise. Later,
Stalin directly addressed Hakamada:
Tovadshch Khakamada, [ have heard from our Japanese comrades that
there is a fierce factional strife in Japan. This is not good. It must
be stopped. I would like the Party to unite on the basis of the pres-
ently adopted directive. Therefore it is imperative to have Comrade
Hakamada's self-criticism. I think you should write it now and send
it to the comrades in Japan.
All those present (both Russians and Japanese) stared at Hakamada,
reinforcing Stalin's dictum, and Hakamada promptly agreed to prepare
a self-criticism. The meeting ended after 11:00 P.M., without any ex-
pression of opinion by the Chinese representative. On parting Stalin
turned to Hakamada and said, "Comrade Khakamada, I've heard that
your health is not too good. How about recuperating in the Soviet
Union? ''27
In fact, Hakamada's tuberculosis was worse than originally diag-
nosed, and he was sent to the Crimea for recuperation.

The Khrushchev Era

The Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow in late February 1964.
It was headed by Hakamada and included Presidium member Ma-
tsushima Harushige, Central Committee member Nishizawa Tomio, and
Yonehara Itaru who joined the group from Prague, where he was
stationed as Akahata correspondent. The JCP's objective was to stop
the high-handed interference of the CPSU and organizations under its
influence in the affairs of the Japanese Party and its affiliated organiza-
tions.
The Soviet delegation was headed by Brezhnev and included, among
others, member of the Politburo and of the Secretariat Otto Kuusinen
and the Head of the International Department Boris Ponomarev. The
real negotiator, however, was none other than Suslov. The meeting
took place in Brezhnev's office, who opened the proceedings by invit-
26. Ibid., pp. 98-99.
27. Ibid., ¢¢. 99-102.
276 STUDIES IN C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

ing the guest delegation to begin. 28 Hakamada started his speech by

paying homage to the role that the Soviet Party, "the first Party in the
world to succeed in a socialist revolution," had played vis-i~-vis the
fraternal Parties. But he noted t h a t
recently, our Party's relationship with the Soviet Embassy and the
Pravda correspondent was not as good as before. How did it get that
way? Wasn't it because ever since the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
problem, the Soviets were supporting only those people who agree
with them and do as they are told? Wasn't it because the Soviets were
engaging in splitting operations and interfering in our internal affairs?
We have our own way of doing things, and we cannot support all
CPSU decisions. And it is a mistake to criticize and attack us simply
because we do not always support you.
At this point, Suslov shouted out, "We are not doing any such
thing," but Hakamada pressed on, "Communists must be honest with
each other. At present you are engaging in harmful activity which is
giving us trouble." Suslov protested, "I d o n ' t know of any interference
in the internal affairs of any Party" and asserted that, "far from harm-
ing, in the past we have given all kinds of assistance to other C o m -
munist Parties. I d o n ' t know how much aid we have given to the
Chinese Party. ''29
Without hesitation, Hakamada responded,
Isn't it better not to blow constantly your own horn about giving aid
to other Parties. People who receive aid don't want to hear it. And
speaking of aid to China, the Soviet Union did not give aid for noth-
ing; there must have been a reciprocal agreement. And when relations
with China worsened, you quickly withdrew all your technicians. I
wonder how severe a blow this was, and how it harmed China--a
young socialist country. 3°
Ponomarev, who sat next to Hakamada, shouted out, "This is an ul-
timatum!" a word that was repeated in unison by Brezhnev and Suslov.
Hakamada responded, "We did not come here to break off relations be-
tween our two Parties. Take your words back." He also reminded the
Soviet hosts that the 1950 Cominform criticism had come as a bolt out
o f the blue and constituted blatant CPSU interference in the affairs o f
the Japanese Party, forcing (jointly with the CCP) the 1951 thesis of
extreme left adventurism upon the JCP. At this point, Suslov, vigor-
ously waving his hands in denial, protested, "We have absolutely noth-
28. This account is based on "The Great Dispute with Suslov" in Hakamada, Watakushi
no sengo shi, pp. 184-190.
29. Ibid., p. 188.
30. Ibid., p. 189.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 277

ing to do with that, That was all Stalin's work. If you purposely bring
up these problems now, you must have other motives." Hakamada did
not flinch, "You all blame everything on Stalin, but even if it was his
doing, isn't it proper for the Soviet Party to assume some responsibili-
ty?,,31
The negotiations continued intermittently from March 2 until the
l l t h without any agreement. 3z Yet, in spite o f the lack of an agree-
ment, the Soviets insisted on issuing a joint communiqu6. The Japanese
refused to draft or to sign one, citing the lack of any agreement that
could be mentioned in such a communiqu6. But the Soviet delegation
was determined to get a communiqu6 signed, and Ponomarev stub-
bornly persisted in his efforts to get Hakamada to sign a communiqu6,
pulling his sleeve even as the Japanese delegation was getting on the
plane, saying, "Comrade Hakamada, please sign a joint communiqu6;
otherwise I'll be in trouble! ''33

The Brezhnev Era

The Japanese delegation left Narita Airport near Tokyo in t h e morn-

ing o f December 15, 1979, on a direct Japan Air Lines flight to Mos-
cow, arriving shortly after 3:00 P.MI (9:00 P.M. Japanese time). The
following day, the 16th, was a Sunday, and the Soviet-Japanese confer-
ence began on Monday, the 17th, at 11:00 A . M . in the conference
room adjoining Secretary General Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin. 34
The Japanese delegation, headed by Chairman o f the P r e s i d i u m
Miyamoto, had five other Presidium members, including two vice-
chairmen: Ueda Koichiro (the brother o f First Secretary Fuwa Te-
tsuzo) 35 and the Russian-speaking Nishizawa Tomio (who is also in
31. Ibid. Actually, the 1951 document was reportedly drafted by Suslov, and after Stalin's
approval translated by Nosaka into Japanese. Fukuyama Hideharu, "Soren no talnichi
seisaku--sono rekishi to genjo" [Soviet Policy Toward Japan: Its History and Present State
of Affairs], Koanjoho, No. 346 (July 1982), p. 18.
32. Some of the topics taken up at these secret talks were revealed when the Soviet Party
made public on July 1I, 1964, its April 18 letter to the JCP and the Japanese Party replied
on August 26, 1964 (Akahata, September 2). For an analysis of the issues in the dispute,
see Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 169 ft. See also "On Interventions in
and Subversive Activities Against the Democratic Movements of Our Country and Our Party
by the CPSU Leadership and the Institutions and Organizations Under Its Guidance,"
Akahata, June 22, 1965; Bulletin, No. 41 (June 1965); also published as a pamphlet by the
Foreign Languages Press in Peking in 1966, 47 pp.
33. Hakamada, Watakushi no sengo shi, p. 190.
34. Except as noted, this account is based on Chap. 1, "Nisso ryo Kyosanto kaldan to
kuppuku shita Miyamoto Kenji" [The Conferenceof the Japanese and Soviet Communist Par-
ties and Kenji Miyamoto's Surrender] in Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 12-35.
35. At the Sixteenth Party Congress held at the end of July 1982, Fuwa became chairman
of the Presidium, while Miyamotoassumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee.
278 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

charge of the Committee on International Diplomatic Relations), as

well as Uno Saburo, Miyamoto's personal secretary, who is a Central
Committee member.
The Soviet delegation was headed by Brezhnev and included Suslov,
Ponomarev, Deputy of the CPSU International Department R. A.
Ulianovskii, two Central Committee members--B. G. Afanasyev (chief
editor of Pravda) and P. N. Fedoseev (vice-president of the Academy
of Sciences)--and Ivan Kovalenko, head of the Japanese Section of the
International Department. a6
Perhaps for the benefit of the Japanese correspondents who accom-
panied the Miyamoto mission and were briefly allowed in the confer-
ence room, the Russian hosts extended a most cordial welcome to the
Japanese delegation. In an exaggerated gesture Brezhnev greeted
Miyamoto with open arms, a bear hug, and a handshake. He led the
way to the table, pointed to the tea service, and acted as a charming
host to the Japanese visitors. 37
The first session started as soon as the doors were closed; Brezhnev
arose to deliver a fifty-minute welcome and opening statement. He ex-
pressed his joy that the preliminary conferences had affirmed the nor-
malization of relations between the two Parties and welcomed the JCP
delegation to the Soviet Union. After a tour d'horizon of the interna-
tional situation from the Soviet point of view, which included refer-
ences to Europe, Indochina, and China, Brezhnev asked the Japanese
to support the Soviet proposal made to the Japanese government for a
treaty of "good-neighborhood and cooperation" and ended with an ex-
pression of hope that relations between the two Parties would expand
in the future and a promise that the Soviet side would do its utmost
to meet the expectations of the Japanese side. Brezhnev naturally made
no reference whatsoever to the "Northern Territories Problem," which
was uppermost on Miyamoto's mind. as
Miyamoto responded by expressing his pleasure that the present talks
would confirm the normalization of relations between the two Parties
agreed upon in the preliminary conferences and talked at length about
"the Shiga problem" which, according to the JCP, was at the center
of relations between the two Parties and which also affected the move-
ment for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, the Japanese-
36. "Joint Statement on the Talks Between the Delegation of the Japanese Communist
Party and the Delegation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Akahata, December
25, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 1; Pravda, December 25, 1979, pp. I and
4.
37. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 16,
38. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 279

Soviet friendship movement, and other mass movements in Japan.

After touching upon the international situation (especially in Asia), the
political scene in Japan, the recent policies and developments in the
Japanese Party, and the international Communist movement, Miyamoto
took up the problems "of concern to the people of Japan and the Soviet
Union," namely the so-called Northern Territories problem, fishing,
fishermen detained by the Soviet authorities, visits to the graves and
the gathering of ashes of Japanese World War II prisoners-of-war and
detainees who died in Siberia.
During the translation of Miyamoto's remarks, Suslov and
Kovalenko feverishly took notes, while Brezhnev, seemingly paying no
attention to the proceedings, sat expressionless with closed eyes. The
meeting adjourned for lunch at 1:00 P . M . 39
Although during the preliminary conferences the Japanese had in-
sisted and been led to believe that this would be a summit meeting be-
tween Miyamoto and Brezhnev, the initial two-hour morning session
was the only one attended by Brezhnev in the eight-day negotiations,
over which Suslov thereafter presided.
The first day's meeting reconvened at 3:00 P.M. in the conference
room of the CPSU Moscow Party Headquarters and went on for almost
three hours. Suslov announced that Brezhnev's absence was due to "ad-
ministrative duties" and took over as the deputy head of the Soviet dele-
gation.
At this meeting Miyamoto's plan was to reconfirm and nail down the
points agreed upon during the preliminary negotiations regarding the
normalization of relations between the two Parties, leaving the difficult
Northern Territories problem for later discussions, so as not to jeopar-
dize the normalization agreement. He spoke at length about the Shiga
problem, stressing the points of agreement reached during the prelimi-
nary talks and the desirability of reunifying and strengthening the
Japanese mass movements which had been split in the past. Miyamoto
also tried to mollify his Soviet hosts by agreeing with their position
on relations with the United States, and especially on Indochina where
the JCP supported Vietnam against ChinaJ ° After this long detour,
Miyamoto began his exposition of the Northern Territories issue and re-
lated problems. Essentially, he reiterated the Japanese Party's argu-
ments as outlined in its "Open Letter to the CPSU" of May 1977
(which the Soviets ignored), citing historical claims based on the
Russo-Japanese treaties of 1855 and 1875, and proposing a two-stage
39. Ibid., p. 17.
40. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
280 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

return of the territories. 41 Habomai and Shikotan islands, which are

part of Hokkaido (and not part of the controversial Kurile Island
chain), were to be returned as soon as possible, while the entire chain
of Kurite Islands should revert to Japan upon the emergence of a
"democratic" Japan in the future, presumably with the JCP in the gov-
ernment and friendly to the Soviet Union. 42 (Significantly, the JCP
sought to appear to be more patriotic than the Japanese government
dominated by the Liberal-Democratic Party, which has claimed for
Japan only the two southernmost Kurile Islands of Kunashiri and
Etorofu.)43
The Soviet delegation's reaction was understandably extremely cool,
with everyone from Suslov down staring as if they wore Noh masks,
and there was no response at all when Miyamoto finished his long im-
passioned speech. The Japanese delegation remained silent waiting for
the Soviet response. Finally, after an awkward silence, a cheerless Sus-
lov said, "Miyamoto-san, since this is a difficult problem, let us tackle
it later." But while Suslov deliberately skirted over the territorial issue,
he tried to appease the Japanese by saying,
We also understand the problems of fishing, detained fishermen, and
grave visits in Siberia. Let's try to find a solution to these problems.
Let's create a subcommittee for this purpose, and I would like the
Japanese delegates to meet with the Minister of Fishing Industry Via-
dimir Kamentsev. We'll arrange such a meeting.
Kaneko Mitsuhiro and Tachiki Hiroshi were assigned to meet with the
Soviet minister the following day. As for the detainees, Suslov prom-
ised to telephone immediately the Siberian Maritime Patrol Headquar-
ters to see about their release. He also promised to have the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs look into the matter of grave visitation. These prom-
ises gave the Soviets an opportunity to stall on the main issue--the
Northern Territories problem--leaving it for the next session. 44
Before the second session, the Japanese delegation gathered in
Miyamoto's suite for a strategy meeting on the territorial issue. (They
took care to keep this meeting secret from the accompanying Japanese

41. "The Open Letter of the Japanese CommunistParty to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union on [the] Chishima (Kurile) Islands Issue," Akahata, May 28, 1977; Bulletin,
No. 371 (June 1977). See also Chishima mondai to Nihon Kyosanto [The Kuriles Problem
and the JCPI publishedby the Party Central Committeein 1974.
42. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 19-20.
43. Japan, Prime Minister's Office,NorthernCountermeasuresHeadquarters,Hoppo Ryodo
[Northern Territories](Tokyo,March 1973), 48 pp., and Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Japan's Northern Territories (Tokyo, 1982), 20 pp.
44. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 20-21.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 281

journalists.) The meeting worked out a three-pronged approach:

(1) Although it is totally unlikely that the Soviet side will agree to
the Japanese Party's plan for a two-stage return of the Northern Ter-
ritories, the delegation should continue to advocate forcefully the
Japanese position (including the historical record) from the point of
view of future talks and in order to "educate" the Soviet negotiators;
(2) Even if the Soviet side rejects the Japanese position, the delega-
tion should try to get them to agree on the inclusion in the final joint
communiqu6 the views of both sides on this question;
(3) the delegation should seek to obtain a pledge from the Soviet
side that even though they do not accept the Japanese position on the
Northern Territories issue at the present time, both sides will continue
to consider this matter, as
The second meeting took place two days later on December 19th at
3:30 P.M. in the same CPSU Moscow Party Headquarters conference
room. The Soviets proved to be totally indifferent to the Japanese dele-
gation's serious concern about the Northern Territories issue, and Sus-
lov slammed the door on further negotiations on the subject by saying,
Miyamoto-san, The problem which you have raised last time is very
difficult to solve. We have thought about it but there is just no way
out. This is because there is really no territorial problem between the
Soviet Union and Japan. This is an issue which has been already set-
tied. Let's take up another agenda item. We think we can cooperate
with you and be of service to the Japanese Party. 46
Miyamoto was speechless and m a y have thought to himself, "That's
not right, w e ' v e been deceived." When he recovered, he pointed out
that, at the recently held preparatory talks, the Soviet side had at the
end agreed to place the problem of the Northern Territories on the offi-
cial agenda and to tackle it at the summit conference. Miyamoto also
observed that Soviet insistence that "the [territorial] problem is already
settled" only provides a good excuse for the reactionary forces who are
trying to exploit this problem to estrange Japan and the Soviet Union
from each other, and that the Soviet Union would "lose the understand-
ing of the Japanese people." The Soviet Union should not take the at-
titude of "having no ears to listen" but should take the attitude of lis-
tening seriously. 47
Suslov interposed, "It is true that we have agreed to take up this
problem officially at this conference. And that is really why at our last
45. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
46. Ibid.
47. Miyamoto's press conference in Moscow, December 24, 1979, Akahata, December 27,
1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), pp. I0 and 12.
282 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

session we have listened to your views on the subject for such a long
time. And now we have given you our answer. There is no difference
in our attitude. Isn't it so, Miyamoto-san?" Miyamoto countered, "It
seems that you have simply not understood our position. Let me ex-
plain it once more in detail. ''48
At his press conference at the conclusion of the Moscow meeting
Miyamoto reported that he had spoken for five hours out of the ten
hours taken up by the Soviet-Japanese talks, and that he had devoted
half of his time to the territorial issue. He also recounted one of the
lighter moments at the conference when, after a long presentation on
the territorial question, one of the Soviet negotiators said, "We have
listened to you carefully and patiently. This is the evidence that we
have ears to listen," a remark that provoked a burst of laughter. 49
But at this session, Suslov showed no reaction at all to Miyamoto's
stirring presentation of about an hour. The Japanese delegation could
not even get to their fall-back position. At a suitable moment, Suslov
said, "Miyamoto-san, let's end for today and meet again tomorrow.
And let's discuss other problems which are easier to resolve."
The third session, on December 20, lasted almost four hours from
11:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M. The Japanese delegation prepared another
fall-back position on the territorial issue, but no matter how much
Miyamoto argued about the two-stage return of the islands, the Soviet
side stuck to its position that "there is no territorial problem between
the Soviet Union and Japan" and that "the territorial problem is already
settled. ''5° Suslov also brought up the security aspects of the northern
islands: "Japan, the United States, and China are tightening the encir-
clement of the Soviet Union, using the Japan-U.S. military alliance as
the core. If Habomai and Shikotan are returned, there is the consequent
danger that they would be made into a strategic stronghold, aimed at
attacking the Soviet Union, with a military buildup that threatens the
security of the U.S.S.R." Miyamoto tried to reassure the Soviets that
the islands .would not be used, or be allowed to be used, for military
bases, that neither the Japanese Self-Defense Forces nor the U.S.
forces would use them, that the islands would be kept out of the area
covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and that the islands would
be returned only after the receipt of such assurances. 5! The Soviet
negotiators, meanwhile, did not counter the Japanese claim that

48. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 23.

49. See Miyamoto's press conference, Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 12.
50. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 24.
51. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 283

Habomai and Shikotan were part of Hokkaldo, and not part of the
Kurile chain.
Since the Soviet delegation objected even to the word "territory,"
Miyamoto, as a tactical maneuver, substituted the words "peace treaty"
as a topic for future discussions, for the conclusion of a peace treaty
between Japan and the Soviet Union was stymied largely on account
of the territorial issue. While insisting that the territorial problem had
already been settled, Suslov agreed that the "peace treaty" was not yet
settled, and that in the future there would be an exchange of opinion
between the two Panics on this topic. This was, of course, a matter
of semantics. The Japanese insisted that the words "peace treaty" in-
cluded the territorial issue, while the Russians held that the "peace trea-
ty" did not include the thorny territorial problem, s2
At this point, the negotiations turned to the preparation of the joint
communiqud and a subcommittee consisting of the Russian-speaking
Nishizawa and Ponomarev was assigned to the task. The final session
to iron out the differences over the communiqu6 and to sign it was
scheduled for December 24. Miyamoto again protested Brezhnev's ab-
sence, noting that the Soviet side had agreed at the preliminary talks
that Brezhnev would lead the Soviet delegation at the Moscow "summit
conference," and that, of the three formal sessions, Bmzhnev had at-
tended only the first, and even then only the morning session. Suslov
seemed annoyed and, after exchanging glances with Ponomarev who
sat next to him, quietly said,
Secretary General Brezhnev is an old man. [Suslov was, of course,
several years Brezhnev's senior.] Also his health is not very good.
Whenever various chiefs of state visit him, we try to limit the confer-
ences to one hour. And when the conferences run over one hour, we
step in for him and carry on. Please try to understand. However, he
will definitely attend the final session of December 24th.s3
Suslov could have also added that the first meeting with the Japanese
delegation lasted almost two hours. Miyamoto half-sarcastically re-
sponded, "Please do arrange the meeting. I was about to forget what
Chairman Brezhnev looks like. But I am relieved to hear that I'll be
able to see him on the 24th."
The following day, December 21, one of the Russian interpreters
dropped by the Japanese delegation's quarters and reported that "unfor-
tunately Secretary General Brezhnev is still recuperating from his cold
and may not be able to attend the final meeting on the 24th. ''s')
52. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 25-26.
53. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
54. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
284 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

The subcommittee to draft the final joint communiqu6 worked on it

from the evening of December 20 to the 23rd. The Soviet side
suggested that the Japanese delegation prepare a draft of the joint com-
muniqu6, which was then subjected, sentence by sentence, to minute
negotiations. 55 A lot of time was devoted to the territorial issue, and
since the Soviets refused even to mention the word "territory" in the
communiqu6, the following compromise wording was adopted:
Both sides recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty between
Japan and the U.S.S.R. is necessary for the friendly development of
relations between the two countries on a stable long-term basis,
frankly expressed their views, and agreed that the exchange of views
would continue in the future.56
Two other Japanese points were strongly resisted by the Soviet side,
but in the end Suslov agreed to include both of them in the final com-
muniqu6:
In order that the people of each country, in the existing complicated
international situation, may effectively promote the truly independent
and democratic undertaking of transformation and construction of its
own country, based on the fight to national self-determination, both
sides oppose both "export of counterrevolution" and "the export of
revolution,"
and
Both sides confirm that each party has the fight to independently de-
cide in its choice of road of social progress, transformation, transition
to socialism, and building socialism and Communism in its own coun-
try, based on the historical conditions and concrete situation of the
country, and guided by the principles of scientific socialism, Com-
munism. In this, no outside interference whatsoever is permissible.57
Of course, during these Soviet-Japanese negotiations Soviet troops were
in the final stages of both "outside interference" in and the "export of
revolution" to Afghanistan.
The fourth and final session started at 2:00 P.M. on December 24.
Brezhnev was absent, "recuperating from a cold" (but in fact involved
in the final preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan), and the joint
communiqu6 was signed by Miyamoto and Suslov. Following the sign-
ing ceremony, the meeting moved to another room for a small, low-key
farewell party of fewer than twenty participants. Here Suslov an-
55. Ibid.. p. 29.
56. For an analysis of the agreement, see Berton, "The Japanese Communists." See also
the "Joint Statement," Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 4.
57. Ibid.. pp. 4 and 5.
 THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 285

nounced Brezhnev's message about his cold. This was a fitting conclu-
sion to a conference, like a play, directed and acted by Suslov.
Miyamoto did not get his "summit meeting" with Brezhnev, nor did
he receive any pledge regarding the Northern Territories. 5s

Some Final Observations

Heinz Timmermann argues that the Soviet leadership makes a clear
distinction between large and politically important nonruling Com-
munist Parties on the one hand, and the small and insignificant ones
on the other. 59 The JCP ranks somewhere in the middle: it is one of
the very largest nonruling Communist Parties in the world, but rather
impotent on the Japanese political scene. Yet Japan, in spite of its mili-
tary weakness, is very important to the Soviet Union for a whole range
of reasons: strategic, economic, technological, and political. Neverthe-
less, the Soviet treatment of the JCP has been just as clumsy and coun-
terproductive as its treatment of the Japanese government: high-handed,
tricky, inflexible. Of course, Soviet negotiations with the Japanese gov-
ernment have occurred in a context of changing power relationships,
ranging from the period of Bolshevik helplessness and Japanese power
over a large area of the Soviet Far East in the post-October Revolution
period, to the era of relative Japanese weakness in the immediate post-
Occupation era, to one of growing Japanese economic strength in the
1960s and 1970s. No such ebb and flow in power has characterized
the relationship between the CPSU and the JCP. A creature of the
Comintern, the Japanese Party was subservient to the Party of the Oc-
tober Revolution and personally to Stalin. There could be no negotia-
tions with Stalin, only a diktat, as the first vignette presented here cor-
roborates.
In the post-Stalin period, Suslov emerged as the primary negotiator
with nonruling Parties and apparently had very wide power and latitude
in such talks. It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which he was also
the primary decisionmaker, given the absence of minutes of Politburo
meetings, but certainly he had the major say within an agreed upon
general political line, which he no doubt also decisively influenced. 6°
The last two vignettes presented above clearly indicate Suslov's preem-

58. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 30.

59. See a special section, "Varying Behavior TOward Small and Large Parties" in his con-
cluding comment below.
60. Suslov has been rumored to have been largely responsible for choreographing
Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. See, for example, Roy Medvedev, Ascesa e caduta di Nikita
Chruscev (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1982), p. 316 ft.
286 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

inent role in the 1964 and 1979 negotiations with the Japanese Party.
From the Japanese sources Ponomarev emerges as Suslov's right-
hand man in charge of technical matters, such as the drafting of com-
muniqu6s. He is probably responsible for Soviet success in avoiding
any apologies for Soviet interference in the internal affairs of fraternal
Parties and any explicit admission of past errors, as well as in exclud-
ing sensitive issues from the final comrnuniqu6s.
As for negotiating tactics, the Japanese case clearly brings out that
Soviet negotiators or their superiors are not above going back on their
word to publicize in Soviet organs the agreements reached in prelimi-
nary talks. In their subsequent announcements, the Soviets have omit-
ted crucial words, thereby emasculating the agreements. They have
mislabeled "agreements" as "meetings," and have done everything else
in their power to bury unpleasant agreements in obscure publications
or specialized organs with limited circulation, reserving the central
mass dailies of Pravda and lzvestiia for "positive" news. Indeed, one
of the lessons to be drawn from the JCP's experience in its Soviet
negotiations is the need to specify in the preliminary agreement that the
Soviet side will reproduce the agreement in its entirety and where and
how it will do so.
Another element in the Soviet negotiating style, as evidenced in
negotiations with the Japanese Communists, is the Soviet tactic of
evading resolution of a thorny issue by agreeing to place it on the
agenda of the next level of negotiations and then immediately rejecting
the issue when it arises. Such rejection of an important issue is often
accompanied by Soviet willingness to consider or promise help on sec-
ondary issues (which they may have purposely created in order to have
the opportunity to show a spirit of conciliation at a later stage). The
Soviet side is reluctant (if not unwilling) to admit errors or interference
in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties. The demolition of "the cult
of personality," beginning with Khrushchev's secret speech at the
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, conveniently allows the Soviet
negotiators to blame all policies pursued before 1953 on the late dic-
tator. (Of course, all Communist Parties--including the JCP--engage
in such historical revisionism, witness the treatment of Mao Tse-tnng
in post-Mao China). 61
The history of relations between the CPSU and the JCP also demon-

61. See the treatment of JCP policies before Miyamoto's advent to power in the official
Patty history on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. Fifty Years of the Japanese Com-
munist Party, rev. and enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Japanese Communist Party, Central Committee,
1980), 295 pp.
 T H E JAPANESE C O M M U N I S T PARTY 287

strates the willingness of the Soviet leaders to split obstreperous Par-

ties, to support pro-Soviet splinter groups editorially in Pravda and
other Soviet organs (and also no doubt financially), while at the same
time keeping an eye on the power relationship between the official
Party and the splinter groups. When it became obvious that the JCP
had weathered the defection of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese ele-
ments, the Soviet Party began to mend its relations with the official
JCP. They proceeded cautiously and slowly, alternating overtures with
verbal attacks. The attacks, in response to JCP criticisms of Soviet pol-
icies, sometimes took the form of direct statements in the Soviet press
and at other times used the subterfuge of reprinting attacks on the JCP
by third Parties (usually minor, politically insignificant, and servile Par-
ties, like the Argentine or American Parties). The Soviet Union has
also been willing to support non-Communist political parties in its con-
flict with a Communist Party, as the record of Soviet support of the
Japanese Socialist Party (and its affiliated organizations and mass
movements) demonstrates.
Behind these Soviet tactics lie the imperatives of foreign and domes-
tic propaganda. The Soviet Union must maintain the myth of its om-
nipotence and omniscience by always stressing the positive, minimizing
the negative, and blaming someone else for its problems. The CPSU
must maintain the fiction that all "progressive" forces acknowledge the
primacy of the Party of the October Revolution which ushered in "a
new stage in the history of humanity."
Soviet negotiating partners should appreciate this reality, learn from
the record of Soviet negotiations (especially those with nonruling Com-
munist Parties in advanced industrial democratic societies), be prepared
to dot all the "i"s and cross all the "t"s, and display great patience.
That may not always be possible in a free democratic society, with all
its public opinion and electoral pressures, but it is essential for success.