Capitalist Class Formation and State Power in Turkey: The AKP Years (2002-2013) According to Poulantzas, social classes

can be defined as groupings of social agents identified principally by their place in the production process as well as by their location in political and ideological relations (Nicos Poulantzas, 1975a, pp. 14-15). As such, Poulantzas emphasizes that economic position is not the sole criterion to assess class structures, but they are strongly characterized by political and ideological factors. Poulantzas goes on to argue that social classes do not constitute monolithic group categories with historically fixed identities, hence the need to formulate a more nuanced class analysis that takes into account class fractions. What Poulantzas calls autonomous fractions refers to social ensembles of the same class that are capable of acting as relatively independent units of hegemonic potential on the basis of their place in the production process and political-ideological relations. Poulantzas distinguishes, for instance, between commercial, industrial and financial fractions of the bourgeoisie (Nicos Poulantzas, 1975b, pp. 84-85). Other well-known examples of class fractions are working class aristocracy and petty bourgeoisie (Nicos Poulantzas, 1975a, pp. 15-16, 270; 1975b, p. 84). KOMPRADOR U ANLAT! Poulantzas conceptualization of the state refutes the instrumentalist framework of Orthodox Marxism, which reduces the state to an undivided thing or subject simply serving as an instrumental depository of a dominant class (Poulantzas 2000, 132, 148). Three is no reason to neglect the class nature of the state by which the dominant class fraction acts upon reproducing its corresponding social formation. However, it does not follow that the state does not constitute a pure reflection of the will of the dominant class (Poulantzas 2008, 105). The merit of Poulantzas nuanced approach is to go beyond the analysis of the class nature of the state, and to understand how the state is shaped by the given configuration of relationships of class forces in society (Poulantzas 2000, 132, 147148). As such, Poulantzas views the state as a strategic site of organization of the dominant class in its relationship to the dominated classes (Poulantzas 2000, 148). This implies that state apparatuses do not possess a power of their own, but materialize and concentrate class relations (Poulantzas 1975a, 26). In other words, the function of the state is then that of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of social formation (Poulantzas 1975b, 45) by concentrating class domination and reproducing class relations (Poulantzas 1975a, 24-25). Given that the state is not merely a passive instrument that can generate a unified discourse of cohesion by definition (Poulantzas 2000, 12-13, 32), state power can assume a relatively unified character and be exercised in a relatively centralized manner insofar as political-cultural hegemony is established. Poulantzas would agree that politicalcultural hegemony is the ways in which the vested political interests of the dominant class are reflected as the general interests of society. In Poulantzas lexicon, this situation is designated as power bloc, a hegemonic bloc made up of various politically dominant classes or class fractions under the leadership of one particular class or fraction (Poulantzas 1975b, 140-141, 231, 234, 242, 297, 1975a, 24-25). Poulantzas cautions that power bloc is not synonymous with class alliance. The latter necessitates economic,

political-ideological and political-cultural coherence, whilst the former assumes a more restricted form of unity (Nicos Poulantzas, 1975b, pp. 240-241). Based on Poulantzas insights into state power, it is possible to argue that the state acts as the organizer of hegemony and a site of engagement of power blocs, once it is conceived as a strategic rather than monolithic field permeated by a plurality of power centers (Poulantzas 1975a, 74): The state apparatuses consecrate and reproduce hegemony by bringing the power bloc and certain dominated classes into a (variable) game of provisional compromises. The state apparatuses organize-unify the power bloc by permanently disorganizing-dividing the dominated classes, polarizing them towards the power bloc, and short-circuiting their own political organizations (Poulantzas 2000, 140). According to Poulantzas, power blocs tend to constitute contradictory and contentious formations, which express themselves in conflicts among different organs and branches of the state (including ministries and government offices, executive and parliament, central administration and local and regional authorities, army, judiciary, etc.) (Poulantzas 2008, 284-285).

What Jessop refers to as common interests and general will indicates the class hegemony that reflects the narrow interests of a particular dominant class(es) or fraction(s) as these of the entire society, as distinguished from straight-forward political domination or violent oppression (Jessop 2008, 9, 11). According to Jessop, the hegemonic configuration of the state stems from its defining feature as a site of strategy and class struggles (and consequently as, a system of strategic selectivity) (Jessop 2008, 36). It follows from this assumption that the state cannot act by itself as a class subject for it does not correspond to a highly coherent institutional ensemble free of internal contradictions: In short, the state does not exercise power: its powers (always in plural) are activated through the agency of definite political forces in specific political conjunctures. It is not the state that acts; it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts and levels of the state system (Jessop 2008, 37). for Jessop, it matters to investigate the ways in which social support is mobilized based on particular policies, programmes and hegemonic projects as well as how populardemocratic resistance is organized to overcome bourgeois-hegemonic outcomes (Jessop 1982, 242). Accordingly, Jessop differentiates between three dimensions of state power as they pertain to the non-formal parts of the state and social relations between the state and civil society: the social basis of the state, hegemonic projects, and state projects and strategies (Jessop 1982, 228-229, 2008, 97, 1990, 161). The social basis of the state corresponds to the specific configuration of social forces that supports the basic structure of the state system, its mode of operation and its objectives (Jessop 1990, 161). The social basis of the state is not limited to the constituents of what Poulantzas understands by power blocs, but is also extended to the specific modes of mass

integration which channel transform and prioritize demands and manage the flow of material concessions necessary to maintain the unstable equilibrium of compromise that underpins such support (Jessop 1990, 161). While the social basis of the state helps explain who are included and excluded in the states strategic selectivity, hegemonic projects and state strategies help understand how they are included and excluded. Indeed, hegemonic projects have a discursive aspect in that they serve to resolve the abstract problem of conflicts between particular interests and the general interest by ensuring the mobilization of popular support (Jessop 1990, 161). State projects and strategies are expected to be subordinated to hegemonic projects that set the states prevailing discourse toward popular masses. In this sense, it is possible to argue that they are particular policy practices that aim to implement hegemonic projects. A more nuanced and sociological approach is needed in order to tease out the various ways in which state power is embodied at the level of social movements. Such necessity has already been superficially voiced in Jessops work, which pointed to the need to understand how culture and politics affect capacities for resistance and struggle in light of changing social conjunctures (Jessop 2008, 97). While Jessop is primarily invested in understanding how capital accumulation is sustained through the configuration of state-civil society relations, my main concern is to shed light on how state power itself shaped and/or is shaped by class actors and social mobilization, which is obviously beyond the scope of political economy. Butun bunlari hegemonic porjects, state projects and practices, ve social basis ile aciklanabilir aslinda: mesela osmanlicilik dusuncesi ve bunun yansimalari syasete

ONCE KAPIALIT CLASS FORMATION I ANLAT Economic: sirketler, ihaleler, toki gibi mesruluk projeleri, marmaray , cilgin projeler, osmanlicilik (hobsbawm tarih bomba gibidir)

SNR DIGERLERINI: Erdoan ile Fethullah Glen arasndaki ilk atlak, Mavi Marmara krizi srasnda ortaya kt. Snr mit snr dersahne, ama aslinda rant paylasimi ihaleler Political-cultural and political-ideological: medya Devletin hegemonic acilimlari: krut acilimi, alevi acilimi, akil adamlar, ergenekon operasyonlari tarih yazimi Babakan R. Tayyip Erdoann Tarih Tezlerine El-Cevap, sinan meydan AKP ve Yeni Reji, Farih yasli

Ideological apparatuses: school, media, din, aile kurumu, sanat-kultur, siyasal ve toplumsal kurumlar yada hareketler Repressive apparatus: army, police, judiciary Erdogan in ailesini kendisi kapitalistlesti: hastaneler, pasataneler gemicikler vs, calik yakn cevresi, unakitan vardi,

Komprador: What is tra!!y._ll.,:!$rs>?_comprador llourgie, on the other hand, is that fraction of the bourgeoisie which does not have its own base for capital accumulation, which acts in some way or other as a simple intermediary of foreign imperialist capital (which is why it is often taken to include the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'), and which is thus triply subordinated - economically, politically and ideologically - to foreign capital. poulantzas classes in contemporary capitalism71 ..comprador bourgeoisies, that is, simple intermediaries between the national economy and foreign capital (this is the case with the ' ultra-imperialist' tendency). poulantzas classes in contemporary capitalism72 Significant contradictions thus exist between the internal bourgeoisie and American capital. Even if these cannot lead it to adopt positions of effective autonomy orindependence towards this capital, they still have their effects on the state apparatuses of these fonnations in their relations with the American state. poulantzas classes in contemporary capitalism72-73 classes in conemtporary

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burjuvazinin kendi icinde catsmasi anlaminda: http://www.ulusalkanal.com.tr/gundem/abdli-ortakhisselerini-satti-h19930.html hastane zinciri, emine erdogan, abd ve fetoscu sirketler parallel delve yasli: http://haber.sol.org.tr/devletve-siyaset/fatih-yasli-yazdi-paralel-devlet-devleti-

paralize-ederken-haberi-84958 bugun duyurdugum haber de onemli: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/25451182.asp http://ekonomi.haberturk.com/para/haber/907313tivnikli-ile-6-isadami-ve-2-sirketin-mallarina-tedbir