CHAPTER FIFTEEN The Marshal's Emissaries

So I fled from Moscow back to Berlin. I closed the door of my Karishorst apartment behind me, went to my desk, sat down and stared miserably at the calendar. I had two more weeks of leave: what was I to do with them? Report for d ty before my time was p? Some wo ld think me mad, others wo ld call me a careerist. !isit my friends? I wo ld be asked too many " estions which I had not the least desire to answer. I had been in a #reat h rry to #et away from Moscow$ b t what I had h rried for, where I was h rryin# to, I had no idea. In the end I decided to take a rest, and spent the ne%t few days visitin# bathin# resorts, deliberately makin# for the most fre" ented spots, lyin# on the sand and watchin# the alien, carefree world all aro nd me. &t first I #ot a tremendo s kick o t of this occ pation. B t after a time I be#an to e%perience a mortal boredom with seein# the same packets of sandwiches and the same childish antics of #rown' p people day after day. (en days before my leave e%pired I reported to the head of the &dministration for Ind stry, and e%pressed my desire to res me my d ties. &le%androv looked pleasantly s rprised. )*ell, did yo have a #ood rest in Moscow?) he asked. )!ery #ood+) ),o co ldn-t have t rned p at a more opport ne moment.) .e #ot down to b siness. )/ver half of o r staff are on leave, and at this very moment the s preme commander has #iven s an r#ent and responsible commission. *e-ve #ot to collect material a#ainst the dismantlin# or#ani0ations to send to Moscow.) .e spent the ne%t half'ho r disc ssin# the tension that had arisen between the S. M. &. 1epartment for Reparations and the Special 2ommittee for 1ismantlin# set p by the 3. S. S. R. 2o ncil of Ministers. In order to 4 stify the S. M. &.-s attit de we had to collect as m ch incriminatin# material as possible abo t the Special 2ommittee-s activities. (he &dministration for Ind stry had been ordered to p t at the s preme commander-s disposition a Special 2ommission consistin# of several en#ineers. /fficially their task was to coordinate the work of the S. M. &. and the Special 2ommittee, b t nofficially they wo ld be char#ed to collect in'formation e%posin# the dismantlers. (he commission was to make visits to all the most important ind strial works in the Soviet 0one. )If yo a#ree, I-ll nominate yo as a member of the commission,) &le%androv said in concl sion. )5specially as yo know 6erman, for it will be necessary to make close contacts with 6erman works directors.) 2ontin al travelin# and visits to factories+ 7or the ne%t few weeks, possibly even for months, I

wo ld be free of Moscow, and Karishorst too+ I co ld not hope for anythin# better at that moment, and I readily a#reed to &le%androv-s s ##estion. 8e%t day I was appointed to the 2oordination 2ommission, which was responsible directly to the S preme 2ommander. So here was a Soviet citi0en who had fled from Moscow, a Soviet officer who co ld find no peace in Karishorst, who at the same time was an emissary of the S. M. &. S preme 2ommander, workin# for Moscow. & fort ito s coincidence? 8o+ Rather a law of pro#ression. II (he #ray a tomobile sped thro #h the chilly a t mn air. (he road dr mmed monotono sly nder the tires. & covey of partrid#es flew over the bare field beside the road. )9et-s take a pot'shot,) Ma4or 1 bov proposed, reachin# for his do ble'barreled # n, which was st ck behind the seat. )*hy bother?) I answered. )In any case we-d have to hand o r ba# over to someone else.) )&ll the better+) the ma4or la #hed. )It mi#ht be a way of #ettin# someone to talk. !assily Ivanovich, to arms+) / r driver, !assily, was an elderly man, a former soldier. .e lowered one of the car windows, then t rned off the road. (he partrid#e-s thinkin# apparat s is rather restricted: it won-t let a man come anywhere near it, b t yo can almost drive over it in a car. Karlshorst lay behind s. In o r pocket we had a plenipotentiary doc ment si#ned by Marshal Sokolovsky, valid for the district of (h rin#ia, and empowerin# s to carry o t a special commission for the S. M. &. S preme 2ommander in 6ermany. (hat wo ld be s fficient to open all doors in (h rin#ia. B t if that failed to achieve its p rpose, we had a second doc ment ready, #ivin# s -f ll powers to check p on the f lfillment of the S. M. &. order 8o.... and the decree of the 3. S. S. R. 2o ncil of Ministers dated... (hese reso ndin# doc ments were chiefly intended for 6eneral 1obrovolsky, who was plenipotentiary of the Special 2ommittee for 1ismantlin# and also Soviet director of the :eiss works at ;ena. &ltho #h he was a h ndred'per'cent civilian, and formerly had been director of a Soviet optical works, and in addition was a member of the ambi# o s tribe of -dismantlers-, he en4oyed some a thority, since he held stron#ly entrenched positions in Moscow. &ltho #h Marshal Sokolovsky had iss ed the strict order that all members of dismantlin# or#ani0ations were to wear civilian dress, 1obrovolsky was behavin# as tho #h he had never heard of the order. *henever Sokolovsky met 1obrovolsky, the marshal always addressed the #eneral in an ironically friendly tone, sin# the civilian form of address, i#norin# the military re# lation that military men were always to be addressed by their rank. &part from his childish attachment to the insi#nia of his rank, 1obrovolsky was also notorio s for his r deness. .e had been known to throw officers down the steps when they arrived to check p on his activities, or had ref sed to allow them into the works at all, politely tellin# them: )If yo don-t like it, complain to Moscow.) B t in order to make a complaint it was necessary to

have evidence, and that co ld not be obtained from the :eiss works e%cept thro #h 1obrovolsky. So far as the Soviet Military &dministration had internal enemies and anta#onists at all in 6ermany, they were to be fo nd mainly amon# the people collectively known as dismantlers. 6eneral :orin, head of the &dministration for Reparations and 1eliveries, had made a n mber of f tile attempts to work with the dismantlers, b t at last he had #iven p all hope. 8ow all his comm nications with these bodies, who fre" ently were only five min tes away from Karlshorst, were made thro #h Moscow, in the form of complaints, demands, and reports on fail res to accomplish the reparations plan beca se of the dismantlers- activities. B t they only la #hed and contin ed to search thro #h the Soviet 0one for anythin# that the S. M. &. had not so far s cceeded in se" estratin#. B t even se" estration was not of m ch val e, for the dismantlers " ickly made contact with Moscow, with the res lt, as a r le, that an order came thro #h to the S. M. &. to hand over the ob4ect in " estion to the dismantlers. &mon# the chief d ties of the S. M. &. 5conomy 1epartment were the sec rin# of deliveries on reparations acco nt and ens rin# that 6erman ind stry worked within the limits of the peace potential fi%ed nder the <otsdam &#reement. (he very task of reconcilin# these two f nctions was a diffic lt one, to p t it mildly, as one can see especially when the scope of the reparations plan is borne in mind. B t then a third power intervened, and so far as we were concerned it was an ncontrollable factor, for this third power ' the dismantlers ' was responsible directly to Moscow. (he work of the dismantlin# or#ani0ations was directed by the Special 2ommittee for 1ismantlin# set p nder the Soviet 2o ncil of Ministers, and therefore by the 2o ncil of Ministers itself, to#ether with the ministries directly interested. (he res lt was a kind of socialist competition: two milkmaids assid o sly milkin# the one cow+ /ne of the milkmaids behaved like a poacher, #ot as m ch as she co ld and went her way. (hat was the dismantlers. 7rom the other the masters first demanded milk, then h n# the half'dead cow ro nd her neck with the demand to #o on milkin# and milkin#. (hat was the S. M. &. 8o matter what happened to the cow and the two milkmaids, the masters #ot their milk down to the last drop. &s soon as the Red &rmy crossed the 6erman frontier special army trophy bri#ades were entr sted with the task of collectin# and val in# the spoils of war, even to the e%tent of dismantlin# ind strial plant. *hen it was fo nd that these bri#ades co ld not cope with their task special dismantlin# or#ani0ations came more or less arbitrarily into bein#, and these were later coordinated nder the Special 2ommittee for 1ismantlin#. 5very <eople-s 2ommissariat, the chief administrations of commissariats, and even sin#le Soviet works and factories sent their own dismantlin# bri#ades to 6ermany. 1ismantlin# became all the ra#e. (hin#s went so far that even the State 9enin 9ibrary in Moscow sent its own specialists to dismantle 6oethe and Schiller, while the Moscow -1ynamo- sports stadi m h rriedly sent its football team to 6ermany in search of a swimmin# pool s itable for dismantlin#. (he dismantlers were #iven military rank on the followin# basis: a technician became a lie tenant, an en#ineer a ma4or, a director became a colonel, and a hi#her ministerial official a #eneral. (he a thorities that had created the dismantlers did not worry themselves nd ly over

this problem. B t it #ave the S. M. &. all the more headaches when it came to have dealin#s with these homemade officers. &s time passed they #rew more and more fond of their #et' p, and the S. M. &. had no little tro ble in dismantlin# them a#ain. Ma4or 1 bov had been sent with me on this trip beca se he was an e%pert on optics and precision machines. In addition, there was the positive advanta#e that he and 1obrovolsky had been fellow st dents. *hile he was drawin# the #eneral into reminiscences of former days I wo ld be free to prepare the downfall of o r enemy and rival 8o. =. In the case of the :eiss works the conflict of interests between the S. M. &. and the Special 2ommittee was partic larly #larin#. &fter the first spasm of dismantlin# in 6ermany, which the S. M. &. had neither the time nor the desire to prevent, economic considerations be#an to be tho #ht of. 7rom the very be#innin# the Special 2ommittee had insisted that the :eiss works be to be completely dismantled and transferred to the Soviet 3nion. 7rom the aspect of military strate#y that was so nd. B t there were diffic lties in the way. (he cr % of the matter was that the ind strial plant of the :eiss works was of comparatively little val e$ in fact it incl ded no machinery that did not e%ist in the 3. S. S. R. already. (he val e of the :eiss works inhered in its e%perts, startin# with the ordinary workmen polishers, who had worked there all their lives and who passed on their e%perience from #eneration to #eneration, and endin# with the en#ineers, who had laid down the classic form lae for optical mechanics. *itho t these men the whole of the :eiss works wo ld not have been worth a brass farthin# in the Soviet 3nion. B t to transfer the works complete with the staff wo ld have been too diffic lt and too risky an ndertakin#. &n attempt was made to find a compromise by proposin# that Soviet workers and technical staffs sho ld be sent to ;ena to make special st dies. &fter their ret rn to the Soviet 3nion they were to take over the dismantled plant and apply the technical e%perience of the :eiss works. (his plan was p t into operation to some e%tent, b t inade" ately. (he Kremlin was very rel ctant to let its children travel to forei#n parts, even to occ pied 6ermany, for they mi#ht learn other thin#s besides the technical e%perience of the :eiss works. (he first ro nd of dismantlin# proved nprofitable. (he :eiss e" ipment dismantled and sent to the Soviet 3nion made very little practical contrib tion to the co ntry-s economy. Meanwhile the main works, which had th s been amp tated, e%celled all e%pectations, for it contin ed to t rn o t #en ine :eiss prod cts to the astonishment even of 6eneral 1obrovolsky, who, after the dismantlin# was completed, had remained in ;ena as Soviet director of the works. .e was relatively little interested in this prod ction, since it went to the S. M. &. &dministration for Reparations and all the la rels fell to his sworn enemy, 6eneral :orin. /n the other hand, the S. M. &. was deeply interested in the works, for its prod ction was be#innin# to play an important part in the reparations acco nt. If a second ro nd of dismantlin# were to occ r ' and 1obrovolsky was persistently pressin# for it ' the S. M. &. wo ld lose a considerable contrib tion on that acco nt. &s the 2o ncil of Ministers wo ld never red ce the fi# re set for reparations, new so rces wo ld have to be fo nd for reparations deliveries, and as time passed this presented increasin# diffic lties. &nd now a d el be#an between the S. M. &.

and the Special 2ommittee. 1obrovolsky solemnly ass red Moscow: )If I finally dismantle :eiss, and it is set p in the Soviet 3nion, within twelve months it will be achievin# a prod ction worth a h ndred million r bles.) (he S. M. &. parried with the co nter'blow: -(he first dismantled section of the :eiss works already set p in the Soviet 3nion has so far achieved a deficit of fifty million r bles, and re" ires contin al s bsidies, whereas the half'dead :eiss works in ;ena is brin#in# s yearly reparations deliveries to the val e of twenty million marks.(he conflict took an ne%pected t rn for both sides. &fter st dyin# the reports of both parties Moscow ordered: -& correspondin# n mber of hi#hly skilled 6erman e%perts is to be drawn from the staff of the :eiss works at ;ena and its s bsidiary ndertakin#s for work in the optical ind stry of the Soviet 3nion, chiefly in the dismantled :eiss ndertakin#s$ they are to be recr ited on the basis of individ al contracts and transferred to their new assi#nments. (he selection of these e%perts and the e%ec tion of this order are entr sted to the director of the :eiss works at ;ena, 2omrade 1obrovolsky. Sim ltaneo sly it is decreed that the restoration of the main ndertakin# :eiss';ena be to be forced in accordance with previo s decrees. Si#ned: Minister for <recision Ind stry, by plenipotentiary powers from the 2o ncil of Ministers of the 3. S. S. R.So 1obrovolsky had achieved a partial s ccess. It had been decided that the first step was to dismantle the :eiss e%perts. B t what was one to make of the fact that one and the same decree demanded the destr ction and also the -forced restoration- of one and the same ndertakin#? Some days previo sly, in the Tagliche Rundschau I had read a na seatin# letter written by one of the 6erman specialists who had been sent to the Soviet 3nion on the basis of an -individ al contract-, which really meant comp lsion. (he happy e%pert hastened to inform the world that he was doin# very well and was earnin# =>, >>> r bles a month. &t this same period Marshal Sokolovsky was receivin# ?, >>> r bles a month. (he avera#e Soviet en#ineer receives @>> to =, A>> r bles a month. (he deed was done: a considerable proportion of the workers and technical staff at ;ena was sent to the 5ast -on the basis of individ al contracts-. (he :eiss o tp t fell. 1obrovolsky celebrated his victory, and so #ht to convince everybody of the so ndness of his theory that the :eiss works m st be dismantled completely. B t now Ma4or 1 bov and I were travelin# to ;ena as spies vent rin# into the enemy camp. )*hy, old collea# e, how-s thin#s?) Ma4or 1 bov shook 1obrovolsky-s hand eff sively. )*hat wind has blown yo here?) (he #eneral welcomed his old comrade in a somewhat nfriendly manner. .e behaved like a dictator in the works, and sim ltaneo sly like the commander of a besie#ed fortress. 5specially when his visitors smelt of the S. M. &. I stepped aside and t rned to st dy e%amples of :eiss prod cts which were attached to the wall, to #ive the impression that I was not in the least interested in b siness matters. B t when Ma4or 1 bov had drawn 1obrovolsky into his private office I set to work to t rn the #eneral-s flank.

(hro #h a comm nicatin# door I passed from 1obrovolsky-s waitin# room into the waitin# room of the 6erman director. I showed the woman secretary my doc ments with Marshal Sokolovsky-s si#nat re, and e%pressed a wish to see the director. .e was very #lad to see me, and h rriedly #ot rid of the visitors who were with him. .e was a fairly yo n# man, a member of the Socialist 3nity <arty. /nly recently he had been a worker in the packin# department of the works. 8ow he was the director. ; st the sort of man I wanted to #et hold of. 8ot intelli#ent, b t an ener#etic e%ec tive. )*ell, .err 1irector, tell me how thin#s are #oin#+) I said. I knew " ite well that two feelin#s were str ##lin# for mastery within him: his fear of 1obrovolsky and a feelin# of professional or national d ty, if s ch conceptions e%ist at all for members of the Socialist 3nity <arty. .e m st reali0e that the S. M. &. stood for the interests of the works, so far as its contin ed e%istence was concerned. I had no need to e%plain the sit ation to him$ he knew it very well. .e only wished to be ass red that 1obrovolsky wo ld not learn anythin# of o r conversation. 1espite his apparently " ite #en ine desire to spike 1obrovolsky-s # ns, my talk with him did not #et me very far. I thanked him for his e%ceptionally seless information and asked his permission to talk to the hi#her technical staff, -4 st to el cidate certain details-. .e was so forthcomin# as to p t his office at my disposition. & few min tes later a #a nt man in horn spectacles and a white overall came in. .e was a bein# of a different c t. I stared at him silently, and smiled, as tho #h he were an old ac" aintance. I had already #athered information concernin# the technical mana#ers of the works. &fter a few preliminary remarks concernin# :eiss and its prod ction we nderstood each other. I told him frankly that, altho #h I was not moved by any philanthropic imp lses, my ob4ect nonetheless was to free the works from 1obrovolsky-s terror re#ime. In this partic lar instance we were invol ntary allies. I ass red him that o r conversation wo ld be kept a dead secret. .e declared himself ready to place his knowled#e and e%perience at the disposition of the S. M. &. )*hat in yo r view are the bottlenecks in the work of the ndertakin#, .err 1octor?) I tried to minimi0e the catastrophic sit ation by sin# the e phemistic word -bottlenecks-. )It wo ld be simpler to specify the bottles+) he replied with a mo rnf l smile. )(here-s a shorta#e of everythin#. B t the chief thin# is that we-ve been deprived of o r brains, o r specialists. &nd that dama#e cannot be made #ood for decades.) .e went on to paint a pitif l pict re. 3nlike Soviet ind stry, 6erman ind stry depends to a partic larly hi#h e%tent on the cooperation of related enterprises. In the Soviet 3nion economic considerations were sacrificed in order to achieve a tonomy in ind stry whether lar#e or small, both on a national scale and in re#ard to individ al and factories. (his iss e was decided not so m ch by economic as by military strate#ic factors. (he basis of capitalist economy is that prod ction sho ld at least pay its way. (he str ct re of any enterprise and its viability are #overned by strictly economic calc lation and an active balance. *estern economists wo ld consider it abs rd that in the Soviet 3nion the ma4ority of the chief and basic ind strial ndertakin#s work at a loss and are dependent on a State s bsidy,

which the State thro #h its plan p mps o t of li#ht ind stry by over'pricin# means of cons mption, and from collectivi0ed a#ric lt re. )&t the moment we are still workin# with old stocks and semi'man fact res. *e are not #ettin# any new deliveries. *hen these stocks are e%ha sted...) the technical director threw o t his hands in despair. )/ r former s ppliers in the Soviet 0one have lar#ely ceased to e%ist. (he promised raw materials from the Soviet 3nion haven-t started to come in yet. It is practically impossible to obtain anythin# from the western 0one. *e-ve already tried sendin# lorries over the frontier ille#ally, at o r own risk, in order to renew commercial contacts and th s #et hold of somethin#. B t that is no sol tion.) *e Soviet en#ineers were fre" ently ama0ed at the vitality of 6erman ind stry, despite all the diffic lties of total warfare, the capit lation, and the dismantlin# process. &t the capit lation, stocks of raw materials in many 6erman works were often lar#er than those held by Soviet works in peacetime. In May and ; ne =BC?, immediately after the fall of Berlin, Soviet dismantlers h rriedly dismantled the ind strial plants at Siemensstadt, the heart of the 6erman electro'technical ind stry. 5ven then, before the <otsdam 2onference, it was known that the capital of 6ermany was to be occ pied by all the fo r allies. /fficially this decision was taken on ? ; ne =BC?, by inter'allied a#reement. B t the *estern &llies- entry into Berlin was artificially delayed for another month. (he reason? 1ismantlin#. (he Soviet dismantlin# bri#ades worked feverishly day and ni#ht in the sectors of Berlin to be handed over. &nd they dismantled in earnest: ri#ht down to the pipes of water closets. & year later I visited Siemensstadt in the company of 2olonel !assiliev, who had been in char#e of the dismantlin# operation in these works. .e shook his head in astonishment. )*here on earth have they #ot all this new plant from? *hy, we even removed the cables from the cond its+) (he 6erman directors #reeted the colonel #enially as an old ac" aintance. )&h, 2olonel, how are thin#s with yo ? .ave yo any orders for s?) &nd that witho t a hint of irony, simply with an eye to b siness. (he :eiss technical director contin ed: )*e-re tryin# to meet and we are meetin# demands so far as we can. B t it is bein# achieved only a#ainst an ltimate e%ha stion of prod ction. (his is an internal process which so far is barely perceptible$ b t one day it will lead to a complete standstill.) I asked him to draw p a report, to#ether with an economic analysis of the state of the ndertakin#. I wo ld collect these doc ments on my way back to Berlin. I once more ass red him that his name wo ld not appear in my report to Marshal Sokolovsky. I took the same line with two other technical mana#ers. I had to #et a #eneral pict re of the sit ation, tho #h in fact there was little difference between their stories. 1 rin# a visit to the head of the 5conomic 1epartment of the ;ena commandat ra I learned more details of 1obrovolsky-s activities. In re#ard to the :eiss works the commandat ra was workin# for both sides. It readily helped 1obrovolsky to draw p -individ al labor contracts- for the :eiss specialists to be sent to the Soviet 3nion, and 4 st as readily it comm nicated all the details of this special meas re to the S. M. &. representative.

*e obtained no new information from the head of the S. M. &. 5conomic 1epartment in (h rin#ia, b t he was lo d in his complaints abo t 1obrovolsky: ).e-s sabota#in# the S. M. &. work shamelessly. .e doesn-t care what happens to reparations, so lon# as he en4oys Moscow-s favor. -So many nits of installations sent to the address of the Ministry for <recision (ool Ind stry.- B t he doesn-t care a damn what benefit is derived from them. &nd now in the Soviet 3nion men are bein# p t in prison beca se they can-t make se of the plant.) (hat was " ite tr e. 7or instance, in one 6erman works a serial installation of a h ndred speciali0ed machine tools for the mass man fact re of a certain article was dismantled and sent to R ssia. B t on the way one of the special machines attracted the interest of another dismantler, and witho t more ado it was readdressed to a new consi#nee. *hen it arrived at its destination it was discovered that a little mistake had been made$ it was a special machine that co ld not be sed in that works at all. So witho t nnecessary f ss it was scrapped. B t when the rest of the series arrived at the ri#htf l destination and they set to work to install them, it was fo nd that one machine was missin#. ,et witho t it the entire series was seless. (here was no hope of findin# a s bstit te for the missin# item, so the whole lot was scrapped. (he total cost was char#ed to -capital investments-, and several men were bro #ht to trial for sabota#e. / r car sped thro #h the frosty winter air of (h rin#ia$ Karlshorst-s emissaries drew p the balance sheet of their work. Sokolovsky wo ld have material for another report to Moscow and for f rther char#es a#ainst 1obrovolsky. B t there wo ld be no chan#e in the sit ation. (he Kremlin knows what it needs. Ma4or 1 bov was more interested in the p rely technical aspect of the affair. /ne day he ne%pectedly asked me: )1o yo know the story of :eiss at all?) *itho t waitin# for my reply he went on: )It-s a very interestin# and strikin# story. *hile they were still alive old :eiss and the scientific fo nder of the works, <rofessor 5rnst &bbe, transformed the enterprise into a fo ndation. & fo ndation stat te strictly bo nd the administration$ the s preme mana#ement was vested in representatives of the town-s m nicipal co ncil and representatives of the works. (he district of (h rin#ia appointed the fo ndation president. So yo had a kind of vol ntary sociali0ation of the works witho t the disadvanta#es of a state capitalistic enterprise. (he reven es have contrib ted #reatly to the material and c lt ral prosperity of the city of ;ena. &nd that is precisely what we in R ssia came too later, only in a different form. )&nd in addition....) Ma4or 1 bov #a0ed o t of the window and said, apparently incidentally: )In addition, nder the fo nder-s will all the workers and employees in the works directly participate in the profits. *hich is e%actly what sho ld happen in the ideal socialistic society, accordin# to o r theories. B t that has e%isted in the :eiss works for decades, and still e%ists today.) / r driver, !assily Ivanovich, whose presence we tended to overlook, p shed his cap on to the back of his head and added: )8ot e%ists, b t e%isted... ntil we arrived.)