Coding speech acts for their degree of explicitness

Stefanie Alexa Stadler

a,b,
*
a
Department of Applied Language Studies and Linguistics, University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland Mail Centre, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
b
Institut fur Allgemeine & Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft, Universitat Hamburg, Von Melle-Park 6, 20146 Hamburg, Germany
1. Introduction
The terms explicit and implicit frequently feature in speech act and politeness research and refer to the level of
directness with which a speech act is expressed. According to Blum-Kulka (1987), implicitness and politeness have been
considered to represent scalable parallel dimensions in the literature on politeness and explicitness. Historically, a high level
of explicitness has been associated with a lowdegree of politeness, while implicitness has frequently been associated with a
highdegree of politeness (Lakoff, 1990; Brownand Levinson, 1987; Werlen, 1983). Researchers have disputed the correlation
between implicitness and politeness and between explicitness and impoliteness (House, 1986; Weizman, 1989; Doancay-
Aktuna and Kams l, 2001; Falkenberg, 1989; Meier, 1995, 1997). However, it appears that it has not beenquestioned that the
degree of explicitness or implicitness has some kind of effect on how polite a speech act is perceived to be. The linkage
between the degree of explicitness and impoliteness is particularly relevant to potentially offensive speech acts, such as
disagreements. Due to these relatively strong ties between the degree of explicitness and its expected effect on the degree of
politeness, speech act research has frequently concerned itself with assessing the degree of explicitness/implicitness of the
speech act it investigates.
Numerous qualitative and interactionally-based publications in the early era of speech act research of the 70s and 80s
have provided explanations of what explicitness means and have proposed a number of terms that reect the different
degrees of explicitness (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987; Blum-Kulka and Ohlstain, 1984; House and Kasper, 1981).
Terminology such as bald-on-record, explicit or on-record without redress, implicit or on-record with redress, and hint
or off-record is frequently encountered and denitions for these include the following:
Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 25 July 2007
Received in revised form 24 July 2009
Accepted 14 August 2010
Keywords:
Speech acts
Disagreement
Explicitness
Coding system
A B S T R A C T
Coding speech acts for their level of explicitness has been a standard procedure in speech
act and politeness research for many years. Traditional coding methods, however, are
problematic in two ways. Firstly, they have mostly been coded on an impressionistic basis,
which can be inconsistent and unreliable. Secondly, explicitness coding has typically
heavily relied on the presence and/or absence of modication devices. This raises
problems in so far as modication devices are usually evaluated in addition to the level of
explicitness of a speech act and both features should be evaluated independent of the
other in order to avoid double-coding. The present study proposes a coding system for
speech acts that functions independent of modication devices and relies on structural,
syntactic and cohesive devices instead. It therefore offers a more reliable and consistent
way to code the level of explicitness in speech acts.
2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
* Correspondence address: Department of Applied Language Studies and Linguistics, University of Auckland, Private Bag, 92019, Auckland Mail Centre,
Auckland 1142, New Zealand.
E-mail address: salexas@gmx.de.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Pragmatics
j our nal homepage: www. el sevi er . com/ l ocat e/ pr agma
0378-2166/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.pragma.2010.08.014
Bald-on-record strategies have been dened as utterances in which S wants to do the FTA with maximum efciency
more than he wants to satisfy Hs face, even to any degree, he will choose the bald-on-record strategy (Brown and
Levinson, 1987:95). According to Brown and Levinson (1987), they typically come in the form of direct imperatives.
Austin (1990:281) expresses bald-on-record strategies in the following way: This is the strategy which pays minimal
attention to the hearers face wants.
Explicit strategies or on-record strategies without redress, as they are also called, are dened as strategies where the
speaker does not orient to the hearers face, although the speaker recognises the hearers need (Austin, 1990:283) or
where other demands override face concerns (Brown and Levinson, 1987).
Implicit Strategies or conventionally indirect strategies were considered to be used by a speaker if he/she wishes to be
direct and at the same time wishes to avoid causing offence and threatening someones face. Conventionally indirect
speech acts are dened as having contextually unambiguous meanings (by virtue of conventionalization) which are
different from their literal meanings (Brown and Levinson, 1987:132). In this way a speaker can communicate the
intended meaning clearly while showing concern for the addressees face wants and needs.
Hints or unconventionally indirect speech acts, as they are also called, rely on the hearers ability to recover implicatures
fromwhat is said. The actual face attack is not recoverable fromjust the utterance itself, but relies heavily on the context,
and the participants mutual experience (Austin, 1990:288).
These explanations are very useful for the qualitative speech act research projects in which they are applied and which focus
on conducting a detailed in-depth analysis of individual speech acts. However, quantitative studies rarely have the luxury to
analyse each speech act in depth and therefore need to be able to depend on a quickly and reliably applicable system for
coding a large number of speech acts. Consequently, the coding schemes applied in qualitative studies prove problematic to
quantitative speech act research for two reasons: Firstly, they do not propose an operationalized systemfor coding, with the
consequence that coding for the level of explicitness can become impressionistic, and either very slow and time-consuming
or inconsistent. Secondly, the coding schemes of qualitative studies, such as the ones mentioned earlier, rely on modication
devices as indicators of the level of explicitness of a speech act, rather than offering a system independent of modication
devices, that allows the researcher to assess explicitness and modication separately.
As I was faced with coding in excess of 300 instances of disagreements for their level of explicitness and wanted to do so in
a consistent way, I found myself unable to apply a system such as the one presented by Brown and Levinson (1987: 142
143), who propose several categories of requests in varying degrees of explicitness:
(a) Lend me your car!
(b) May I borrow your car please?
(c) Id like to borrow your car, if you wouldnt mind.
(d) Would you have any objection to my borrowing your car for a while?
(e) Could you possibly by any chance lend me your car for just a few minutes?
(f) There wouldnt I suppose be any chance of your being able to lend me your car for just a fewminutes, would there?
While such denitions are generally clear, precise and easily comprehensible when presented in connection with carefully chosen
examples, when it comes to applying such categories to real-life-data, their application can feel somewhat arbitrary. Naturally
occurring data rarely ts into these pre-formed categories neatly. It might also seem easy enough to attribute the clearly explicit
speech acts to the category explicit. The problem arises when one is faced with speech acts that are not so clear-cut. Where to
drawthe line between an explicit and an implicit speech act or between an implicit speech act and a hint can become confusing. In
fact, Austin (1990:288) states that there is no clear cut-off point between on-record and off-record face attacks, because even in
on-record strategies, there are elements recovered from the context. Hence, it is likely that researchers who try to rate their
speech act data for the level of explicitness will encounter difculties at some point during the rating process.
In my own explicitness coding, I encountered two sizable problems. One problem consisted of the lack of reliability and
consistency in impressionistic coding systems, which were consequently dismissed as being counter-productive for my own
research project. The other problem in connection with the use of categories proposed by qualitative, interactional studies
is that, in my data set, no matter how direct or indirect a speech act was, it almost always contained some formof internal
modication. Internal modication devices comprise two categories, softening devices aimed at taking the threat and
offence out of a speech act and strengthening devices aimed at reinforcing a speech act. In my recent study of disagreements
(Stadler, 2007), disagreement speech acts without either softening or strengthening devices were extremely rare. In speech
act research, modication devices are traditionally assessed in addition to the degree of explicitness, that is the presence or
absence of modication devices is employed as a characteristic for coding a speech act for its level of explicitness. Blum-
Kulka and Ohlstain (1984), for example, employ the category hedged performative in order to assess the level of directness
of requests, but also assess hedges separately as a modication device. Likewise, Brown and Levinson (1987) based their
categories for explicitness coding on the presence or absence of redressive action. However, to do so means to employ the
same criterion to assess two very different types of coding schemes. This is felt to misrepresent the data to some extent, as
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 37
redressive action constitutes a form of politeness and politeness and directness are not necessarily closely linked to one
another (cf. Meier, 1999). It is therefore deemed necessary not to evaluate the level of explicitness on the basis of the amount
and type of modication devices a speech act contains, as this is already being carried out separately from the explicitness
rating. This makes it clear that another set of categories is needed. Hence, the present study proposes a coding system that
keeps the coding for modication devices and the coding for explicitness separate.
The aim of the present paper is to describe an attempt to construct a consistent coding system. As it is difcult, if not
impossible, to create a single coding system for all the types of speech acts that have been investigated in the past, the
present article focuses on one single speech act, namely disagreement. The coding systemand all of the examples presented
are taken from disagreement data. Despite of this restriction, the coding system may be applicable to a range of speech acts.
While some of the categories would have to be modied to accommodate different speech acts, several of the rating
categories are directly transferable (which will be discussed in more detail in section 6). To extend the proposed system for
coding the level of explicitness of disagreements to other speech acts, however, is an area for future research activity.
The purpose of the proposed system is to make the rating process less arbitrary and, consequently, more reliable. Rather
than basing the decision on intuition, the degree of explicitness of speech acts is rated on the basis of categories such as
cohesive devices, structural indicators and the autonomy of a speech act. In developing this system, several different
approaches that discuss the explicitness and problems associated with the rating process were combined to create one
unied coding system. To this end, existing categories were reviewed and assessed for their practicality and modied
accordingly where considered necessary. This systemrefrains fromattributing the differing levels of explicitness it generates
to pre-formed categorizations and terminology, such as explicit or implicit. It allows for more ne-grained distinctions
between different levels of explicitness. This system is purely intended for the benet of a researcher trying to code large
amounts of data and, as a consequence, the level of explicitness is dened as the level of ease/difculty with which a
researcher can identify an utterance as a disagreement.
2. A review of the notion of explicitness
The following studies appear to agree that implicitness is strongly connected to contextual factors. This is to say implicit
utterances are understood to be vague and ambiguous (Held, 1992), not easily observable by another person (English and
English, 1958:254, quoted in Graumann, 2002) or inaccessible to our immediate awareness (Wegner and Vallacher, 1977:
16, quoted in Graumann, 2002). Implicatures can be said to be the intended meaning of what is meant but not said by a
speaker (Marmaridou, 2000; Mey, 2001). Implicit utterances, consequently, require the addressee to infer and recover the
intended meaning from the social, situational and linguistic context (van Eemeren et al., 2002; Linell, 2002; Graumann,
2002). Implicitness is, therefore, usually seen in terms of information that must be added to the linguistically expressed
information in order for a piece of discourse to become complete and coherent (Steiner, 2005). In contrast to implicitness,
explicitness is represented as meaning which is explicitly stated in an utterance (Grundy, 2000), therefore relying less
heavily on the context to infer meaning.
While all of the approaches discussed above regard context as the main indication for the distinction between
explicitness and implicitness, Vorderwu lbeckes (1986) notion of the degree of autonomy of an utterance provides the most
useable denition. He concludes that the higher the degree of autonomy of an utterance from the surrounding contextual
information, the more explicit it is. It is difcult to assess a speech act according to how much contextual information is
present or required. It is considerably easier to rate a disagreement for its level of autonomy, in which case a researcher is
able to consider the disagreement disregarding the context in which it occurs and assess whether or not s/he considers it
to be recognizable as a disagreement. Hence, Vorderwu lbeckes (1986) approach was considered the most suitable denition
for inclusion in a coding system.
There are, however, other approaches to implicitness that need to be considered, including those by Ma rquez Reiter (2002)
and Gruber (1998) that are based on structural and syntactic indications. Ma rquez Reiter (2002), who looks at traditional
linguistic structures, regards indirectness as a question of whether structure and function have an indirect relationship; that is
to say when the format (i.e. the structure) of an utterance does not conform with its function, or as Wennerstrom (2001)
expresses it, cases in which grammar suggests one speech act and intonation another, are indirect. According to Bond et al.
(2000), Heritage (2002) andGeorgakopoulou(2001), the use of questions insteadof statements is a formof indirectness. Hence
if the format (e.g. question) does not conform with the function (e.g. disagreement) of an utterance, the utterance is indirect.
This form-function correlation has also been incorporated into the proposed coding system.
The second approach, which has its roots in Conversation Analysis is nicely illustrated by Gruber (1998), who outlines
how structural features can indicate dispute to the addressee. He discusses four structural features that indicate
disagreement. Firstly, he mentions the change of preference organization, where disagreements are no longer prefaced by
dispreferred discourse markers. (Preference organization is a conversation analytical concept assuming that under certain
circumstances a particular response is preferred, while another is dispreferred. For example, when a speaker utters a
personal opinion on a topic, disagreement is a dispreferred response, while after self-deprecation, disagreement is the
preferred reaction.) (cf. Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff et al., 1977) Secondly, he notes a change of preference organization with
regard to turn organization. Typically, speakers take over the oor at transition relevance points (TRPs). TRPs are points in a
conversation where a listener can expect the current speaker to nish his/her turn. Typical indicators include the completion
of the sentence structure, a nal falling intonation and the completion of the speech content. ATRP is, therefore, a legitimate
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 38
point for another speaker to take the speaking oor, regardless of whether the present speaker does in fact continue his/her
speaking turn. When speaker changes no longer occur at TRPs but at what he calls disagreement relevance points (DRPs),
the speaker exhibits a preference for disagreement. DRPs, unlike TRPs, are likely to be interruptive and turn-competitive.
While not all interruptions constitute disagreement, disagreements are frequently interruptive. Interruptions can, therefore,
make it more explicit that an utterance is a disagreement. Consequently, the notion of interruptive disagreement as opposed
to disagreement occurring at a TRP has been integrated into the explicitness rating system.
Gruber (1998) further mentions discourse markers, more specically disagreement markers such as but and well,
which he claims indicate that a dispute is going on and which he considers to be aggravating. But signals a contrastive
statement or challenge and is frequently associated with disagreements (Kuo, 1994; Locher, 2004; Mori, 1999; Rama
Martnez, 1993; Scott, 2002). While well constitutes a somewhat more implicit form of disagreement marker, it is
nevertheless often used to introduce both an element of acceptance and doubt. Due to this characteristic, well has also been
found to be strongly linked to disagreement instances (Bolinger, 1989; Gardner, 2000; Holtgraves, 1992; Kuo, 1994).
Afurther interesting approach to structural indicators lies in the notion of conventionalization, i.e. the predictability of an
upcoming utterance on the basis of the use of expressions which frequently occur in connection with a particular type of
speech intent. According to Vega Moreno (2007), Relevance Theory proposes a correlation between conventionalized
linguistic expressions and their strength of explicature. Bond et al. (2000) further assert that the more conventionalized a
message is, the more easily can it be interpreted (i.e. the less implicit it is). As there are a number of conventionalized
expressions, which are not disagreement markers, but nevertheless serve as contextualization cues for disagreement, a
further category was added to the rating system. This category was named conventionalization cues and allows to account
for conventionalized expressions such as I wonder, look, hang on or address terms such as the use of rst names.
A last but no less interesting approach is that of Haverkate (1994), who regards speech acts as explicit if they make a
direct cohesive reference to a previous turn. A direct reference can be a partial repetition of a prior turn, but can merely
point to a prior utterance. Gruber (1998) also alludes to formal cohesive devices, namely the recurrence of words or
phrases. Adirect reference provides cohesion, which Steiner (2005) considers to be an important indicator for explicitness.
Kotthoff (1993) also argues that repetition strengthens cohesive ties between two utterances, thereby rendering a
disagreement more explicit, while foregrounding through lexical and syntactic repetition also expresses emphasized
disagreement. By making a direct reference, a speaker verbally points a nger at another speakers statement, which
equates to a mild form of face-threat.
While all of these studies identify important features that help to establish the degree of explicitness of a disagreement,
only two studies propose a system to categorically code disagreements for their explicitness levels. Scotts (2002) coding
system focuses on coding disagreements and Steiners (2005) focuses on coding explicitness levels of larger texts.
Scott (2002) identies a range of variables in order to code disagreements for their level of explicitness. Several of these
features are identical with the ones discussed above, including repetition, discourse markers and oor bids (i.e. interruptions
in order to gain the oor). While these features are clearly highly relevant to the coding of the degree of explicitness of
disagreements, her system was considered problematic as a basis for the coding system proposed in this study for two
reasons. Firstly, her approach includes features that are typically regarded as modication devices, such as modals,
emphatics, and absolutes (mostly found as the modication category booster; cf. Holmes, 1984). In the present study this is
considered undesirable, as the aim is to establish a coding system that separates the coding for explicitness from the coding
for modication. Secondly, her approach is not entirely aimed at coding disagreements for their degree of explicitness
(although she distinguishes between three different feature strengths, including the categories strong, moderate, and
weak). Instead, her focus is on identifying different types of disagreement. Her study distinguishes between backgrounded
and foregrounded disagreements, with the latter category being split into three subcategories (collegial disagreements,
personal challenge disagreements, and personal attack disagreements). While these subcategories are linked to varying
degrees of hostility, they are not directly linked to varying degrees of explicitness.
Steiner (2005) approaches the topic of explicitness from a translation perspective, based on corpus data, rather than a
speech act theory perspective. His approach focuses on the explicitness/implicitness of a text as a whole more than on
particular types of speech acts. For his coding scheme, corpora would need to be tagged with 22 different categories for his
operationalizations to work. Steiners (2005) approach could hardly be more thorough, but is impractical for use in coding
speech acts for the following reasons. Several of his categories are only applicable for the use of coding entire texts and are,
consequently, not suitable for a singled-out speech act. Furthermore, his hugely complex coding system is hardly viable for
coding several hundred speech acts. However, he does refer to several important categories that have been incorporated in
the present coding system, including the notion of cohesive relations and referents. While his model cannot be immediately
transferred to the coding of speech acts it has valuable implications and has inspired the creation of the proposed coding
system for speech acts.
The focus of the present paper is to combine the features discussed above, that determine the explicitness of speech acts,
to form a simple and time-efcient yet comprehensive explicitness coding system.
3. Methodology
The proposed coding system is based on a medley of different methodological approaches (see section 2 for details),
combined to devise a comprehensive and reliable explicitness coding system. In accordance with these studies, the
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 39
present paper denes disagreement to be explicit or implicit according to the number of the following properties they
contain:
(a) autonomy, i.e. how much interpretational work does the addressee have to do;
(b) syntax-function correlation, i.e. how explicit is the structure of a disagreement;
(c) reference, i.e. does the disagreement refer to something explicitly mentioned in a prior utterance or to something
that has been implied;
(d) structural indication markers for argumentation, i.e. is the disagreement delayed, is it interruptive, does it contain
conventionalization cues, is it prefaced by disagreement markers, and is there a recurrence of structural
indicators?
The data used in the present study is taken from New Zealand televised panel discussions, including Express Report, an
episode of a gay and lesbian programme, where the interviewer talks to the Christian Heritage Party Leader; an episode of
Eye-to-Eye, where the host leads a discussion between Mori (indigenous New Zealanders) and Pkeh (New Zealanders of
European descent) on their views of the chances for success of a Mori Party; an episode of the Ralston Group, where the
host discusses the policies and practices of a former politician with a number of his former colleagues and discussants
from various political backgrounds; a programme called Rubber Gloves or Green Fingers, where the host leads a discussion
between a number of people in favour of the use of chemicals in food production and a number of guests who oppose such
practices; and a programme called Time Bomb, where the interviewer leads a controversial discussion on the New Zealand
welfare system.
Disagreements derived from these programmes were subjected to explicitness coding, based on a coding system which
proposes assigned values to a number of features (see below for details). However, instead of assigning the values derived
from this coding system to pre-formed categories and instead of articially trying to merge values with labels such as
explicit or implicit, the values reect a more ne-grained distinction between levels of explicitness. This practice not only
provides the benet of arriving at a far more ne-grained coding system, but it also avoids the arbitrariness of forcing values
to correspond with categories, which this system rejects for their lack of consistency and meaningfulness to quantitative
speech act research. As avoiding arbitrariness is the very purpose of this coding system, it was deemed preferable to reect
the level of explicitness through the values 09.
As can be seen in Table 1, the degree of explicitness is determined according to how many of the following properties a
disagreement contains: (a) autonomy, (b) syntaxfunction correlation, (c) structural indication markers for argumentation,
and (d) reference.
The assigned value ranges from0 to 9. The value 9 represents the most explicit rating, i.e. when a disagreement is entirely
autonomous, when syntax and function correlate, when a disagreement explicitly refers to a previous utterance in order to
pick up on and contest an earlier statement/remark, and when a disagreement is clearly marked with a number of structural
indicators. The value 0 reects the least explicit rating, i.e. when a disagreement cannot be identied without considering
wider contextual factors, when syntax and function do not correlate, when the disagreement does not refer to an earlier
statement, and when there are no disagreement indicators.
4. Coding system
The proposed coding system is aimed at helping a researcher process large amounts of research data. Consequently, the
purpose of the coding system is to help the analyst identify the level of explicitness more easily. The following categories
frequently make reference to the identifyability of a disagreement, which refers to howeasy or difcult it is for a researcher
Table 1
Coding system.
Coding category Explicitness of category Assigned value
Autonomy Autonomous 2
Moderately autonomous 1
Not autonomous 0
Syntaxfunction correlation Does correlate 1
Does not correlate 0
Reference Does refer to prior utterance 1
Does not refer to prior utterance 0
Structural indication Five indicators 5
Four indicators 4
Three indicators 3
Two indicators 2
One indicator 1
Zero indication 0
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 40
to identify an utterance as a disagreement. In the following section I will discuss how the individual categories of the
proposed coding systemrelates to real-life data, before demonstrating howto apply the coding systemto practical examples.
4.1. Autonomy
The level of autonomy is assessed with regard to the contextual informationrequired for a disagreement to be identiable
as a disagreement. To this end, every disagreement instance was assessed purely on its intrinsic degree of identiability. For
this purpose, the disagreements in this category are deliberately presented in a de-contextualized form.
4.1.1. Autonomous
For a disagreement to be considered autonomous, an utterance has to be identiable as a disagreement in a completely
de-contextualized form.
Example: Oh see I disagree with that.
This disagreement is completely autonomous, as it is unmistakably identiable as a disagreement without consulting the
surrounding context. This utterance clearly communicates an opposing opinion, which gives it a high level of identifyability.
4.1.2. Moderately autonomous
For a disagreement to be considered moderately autonomous, it may not necessarily be recognizable as a disagreement in
de-contextualized form, but has to be identiable on the basis of the immediately surrounding (verbal) context.
Example: I think the hikoi proved that there a::re common (.) Mori interests.
This disagreement is uttered in a way in which it could be a statement of opinion as much as it could be a disagreement.
While the mention of the hikoi (= the Mori word for march) can serve as a cue that the present speaker is relating the
utterance to a previously discussed issue, the intention of the utterance is ambiguous. A listener may or may not be able to
identify the disagreement in a de-contextualized form (as it is presented above). However, by taking only the immediately
preceding context into account, the utterance can be clearly identied as a disagreement.
Immediately prior to the disagreement, another participant claimed that Moris have no common interests. In the light of
this statement, it becomes clear that the opposing statement, i.e. that there are common Mori interests, is unmistakably a
disagreement. The fact that the word are is lengthened further emphasizes the utterances status as a disagreement.
4.1.3. Not autonomous
For a disagreement to be considered not autonomous, it has to be virtually unidentiable as a disagreement in its de-
contextualized form. Even the immediately surrounding verbal context may not be sufcient to identify the utterance as
disagreement and the wider verbal, prosodic and non-verbal context may be required to recognize that the statement or
question is to be interpreted as a disagreement.
Example: Theyre all over sixty Hone.
This disagreement has a very low level of autonomy. The de-contextualized utterance can no longer be identied as a
disagreement. Rather, it requires the context of the ongoing discussion, as even the immediately preceding verbal context
does not offer sufcient cues to allow the utterance to be identied as disagreement. Immediately prior, another participant
lists a number of people:
Weve got Tareana Turea? Awoman of- uhmprinciple uhwe have (???) examples? Who who who has provenby his acts; (0.3)
that he is the leader (0.4) of Mori. And Whata Wineatu is probably one of a::: (0.8) leading intellectual for the Mori society.
This statement alone does not suggest that the example provided here is a disagreement. It only becomes clear fromthe wider
context that the list of people refers tocandidates for the Mori party that the participant considers tobe goodleaders andfrom
the previously occurring discussion around the issue that the Mori party will only succeed if it has good, young leaders who
hold more public appeal. Only in the light of this context and through the way in which the disagreement is uttered turn-
competitive and raised volume as well as the non-verbal behaviour of the speaker leaning forward and gesturing franticly
towards the previous speaker does the statement become identiable as a disagreement. Alistener has to relybothonhis/her
ability to retrieve meaning from the utterances wider contextual embedding and/or draw on non-verbal and prosodic cues.
4.2. Syntaxfunction correlation
The syntaxfunction correlation was assessed on the typical, i.e. prevalent, syntactic format of a disagreement, namely a
statement. If the format of a disagreement was a statement, this category was assessed as does correlate. If the format was
that of a question, for example, it was assessed as does not correlate.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 41
4.2.1. Does correlate
Example See its not just the difference between using chemicals and not using chemicals. Its the difference between
two different systems of agriculture. Whe:re- the:- organic one uses a whole lot of other things instead
of chemicals.
In this example the disagreement is produced as a statement, which is the standard disagreeing format. Therefore, it is
assessed as does correlate.
4.2.2. Does not correlate
Example But Merepeka wasnt there a time when you didnt agree with the Mori party?
In this example, the syntactical format (question) does not correlate with the function of the utterance (disagreement).
Hence, there is no syntaxfunction correlation in this disagreeing instance. While it would have made the disagreement
more explicit if it was formulated in the following way: But Merepeka there was a time when you didnt agree with the Mori
party, formulating the disagreement as a question makes the opposing opinion more subtle and thereby more implicit.
4.3. Reference
This category was named reference rather than repetition. While the notion of making reference to a prior utterance can
anddoes occur throughthe repetitionof keywords andphrases, speakers canalsorefer toa previous statement inother ways. A
common way of doing this is through verbally pointing to a previous utterance without necessarily reduplicating any parts of
it. The utterance a speaker refers to may be the previous phrase or may have occurred much earlier on in the conversation. By
referring to a previous utterance, the disagreement becomes more explicit, if not aggressive and confrontational.
Example: Does make reference
We::ll- (0.8) uh (1.0) a lot of the people who work in the area were certainly saying what you said. but a lot of the people
who I would say who were alived (.) o:n (hard) benets and what have you; actually wanted to wo::rk?
This disagreement exampleshows clearlythat thespeaker is makingreferencetoaprior turnwiththestatement what yousaid.
Thedisagreement is a direct response tothe previous speakers utterance that alot of the people whowereworkingat the sharp
end [. . .] were saying that the problem is not the welfare system, the problem is to do with the economy. [. . .]. The speaker
provides alinkagebothbyrepeatingkeywords (alot of the people) as well as bydirectlyreferringtowhat the prior speaker said.
In contrast to this disagreement, the following utterance neither picks up and repeats key words or phrases nor does it
verbally refer to a previous utterance.
Example: Does not make reference
Context: A gay and lesbian programme interviewer discusses sodomy with the Christian Heritage Party at the time of
the interview.
A: I just have a problem with the unnatural thing, because I just think if if sodomy was talked about in the Bible then
its been happening for a hell of a long time hhh
B: <Yes, but it was talked about in a in a negative way?=That we shouldnt do it?>
A: I just wonder- Can you tell me how many of your congregation, or how many of you that people in the party; . . .
It only happens rarely that a disagreement does not make a direct (or not so direct) reference to a prior statement, as it is in
the very nature of a disagreement to take an opposing or differing stance to a prior utterance. Hence, it is mostly hints that
disagree in such a subtle manner that they do not refer to a prior utterance. Here, the speaker neither repeats words, nor does
she refer to anything previously mentioned. She merely raises a question, which subtly insinuates the accusation that priests
have been known to engage in sodomy. Due to the subtlety of this utterance, it is only under these particular circumstances
and in the context in which it occurs, that its disagreeing function becomes evident.
4.4. Structural indicators
The category structural indicators assesses the number of indicators found in a disagreement. The more structural
indicators a disagreement contains, the more easily identiable it is as a disagreement, hence the more explicit it is. The
maximum number of structural indicators identied and employed in the present coding scheme is 5, the minimum 0. As
mentioned above, the higher the level of identiability for a disagreement the higher the value assigned to it. Consequently,
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 42
a disagreement with all ve structural indicators present is assigned the value 5, while a complete lack of indicators is
assigned the lowest number, i.e. 0.
4.4.1. Change of preference organization
Preference organization refers to whether a response to an initiation move is as invited by the initiation move. A response
that is produced as invited by the prior turn is preferred, a response that is not as invited by the initiation move is
dispreferred. The category change of preference organization assesses whether the typical preference pattern applies to a
disagreement. As disagreements have been associated with dispreference markers, such as hesitatation markers and delays
(Pomerantz, 1984), the standard, unmarked form is that a disagreement should show signs of dispreference. A lack of
dispreference markers indicates a change of preference organization, which functions as a structural indicator to make a
disagreement more explicit.
4.4.1.1. Complies with preference organization. If a disagreement adheres to expected preference patterns, i.e. if the
disagreement has markers that indicate that a disagreement is the dispreferred move, then it falls under the category
complies with preference organization.
Example Uhm: yeah well I still think that he: (.) uhm (.) he still appealed to a certain sector of society.
This disagreement shows the typical signs of preference organization commonly associated with disagreement.
The disagreement starts with a hesitation marker (uhm:), which is lengthened and thereby further delayed, which
constitutes a further dispreference marker. The hesitation is followed by initial agreement (yeah), a further slight delay
through lengthening the word he, two pauses, indicated by (.), and a further hesitation marker (uhm). All of these markers
indicate that the speaker only tentatively disagrees, demonstrating that the speaker acknowledges that disagreement
constitutes the dispreferred next move. If, however, such markers are absent, the speaker indicates that s/he has no
reservations about disagreeing directly. The absence of markers makes the disagreement intent clearer and the
disagreement more explicit.
4.4.1.2. Violates preference organization.
Example: The evidence in Christchurch doesnt say that at all.=As you well know.
In this disagreement, no signs of delay, hesitation or pausing are present. Instead, the speaker disagrees with the previous
speaker in a very assertive way. Instead of delay, there is even latching (indicated through =), which indicates that the
speaker hastens to produce his disagreement. This straightforward way of disagreeing constitutes a change to the norms of
preference organization, thereby violating preference organization rules.
4.4.2. Interruption
The category interruption assesses whether the disagreement occurs at a Transition Relevance Point, i.e. whether a
listener waits for an indication that the present speaker has nished his/her turn. Interruptive disagreements occur during
another speakers turn, rather than at transition relevant points in an interaction. Such interruptive speech behaviour
renders a disagreement more confrontational and consequently more easily recognizable and explicit.
4.4.2.1. Non-interruptive disagreement.
Example
A: . . .hhhhh and it did occur to me that the setting up of a Mori Party; in New Zealand, smacks of Apartheid.
B: Oh see I disagree with that;
This disagreement occurs at a Transition Relevance Point. This is to say, speaker Ahas nished his statement, produces falling
nal pitch (indicated by a dot) and does not appear to wish to continue his turn. Speaker B waited for this potential end point
in speaker As turn and utters her disagreement at a legitimate transition point.
4.4.2.2. Interruptive disagreement.
Example
A: . . . it needs to have the courage? to say if that is gonna be the issue, and it is gonna put people off, how
do we address
[this. Its time for courage]
B: [well well well wait. Were not] sure if its gonna put people off?
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 43
Here, speaker A has not nished her turn, in fact, she is still in mid-sentence when speaker B interrupts her. He produces his
disagreement directly adjacent to the statement he is in disagreement with, instead of waiting for speaker A to nish her
turn. Speaker Bs disagreement is, therefore, interruptive.
4.4.3. Discourse markers
The use of discourse markers functions as a further cohesive device that explicates a disagreement; while the range of
discourse markers is quite extensive, the discourse markers well and but, both of which signal upcoming disagreement, are
by far the most common ones in use. Discourse markers are words or phrases that full the function of signalling that a
particular speech act is forthcoming, thereby warning and preparing interlocutors for the upcoming disagreement.
Example: No discourse markers
There are also a lot of products, that can be dr grown at just as great a yield? Without? chemicals? W once theyre on to
a proper established organic farming basis?
This disagreement does not provide any lexical linkage with a prior utterance in the formof discourse markers. The utterance
starts un-prefaced, and contains a straightforward disagreement.
Example: Discourse markers
But in hi in his day people had jobs? People had state homes?
The rst word but functions as a discourse marker and clearly introduces a statement that is in opposition with a previous
utterance.
4.4.4. Conventionalization Cues
The notion of conventionalization cues stems from Gumperzs (1995) notion of contextualization cues, which he
describes as signals that serve to retrieve the communicative intent of a message. Levinson (2002:35) describes
contextualization cues as a nudge to the inferential process that help to explicate a message. Through conventionalization, i.
e. the conventional use of such cues in particular contextual circumstances, the intended meaning of an utterance can be
identied more easily. According to Allen (1991:399) even very young children have little difculty producing a response
that matches the communicative adult intent of an utterance, when the linguistic forms are routine and conventionalized.
In other words, conventionalization cues can help to make a disagreement more explicit.
Example: No conventionalization cues
They are safe if u::sed acco:rding to the label instructions.
The lack of conventionalization cues (among other disagreement indicators), can leave doubt as to whether the utterance
constitutes a disagreement. Had the speaker employed cues, such as look or see, the disagreement could be more readily
identied and would thus be more explicit.
Example: Conventionalization cues
uhh look mate. Uhh <Mori are just like anybody else.=Weve all got our differences. Youre from a different Iwi
1
to me. You
live in the city I live up home
2
. At the end of the day though I think that- (0.3) what the party has. The Mori party has.
That others dont have; is a Mori interest at heart,
Through the conventional use of the word look in connection with utterances such as disagreements or justications and
explanations used in conjunction with disagreements the intended function of the message becomes more evident and the
disagreement consequently becomes more explicit. The employment of address forms such as the word mate used in this
particular example also function as attention-seeking devices and are also conventionally used to introduce disagreements,
thus further contributing to rendering the utterance more explicit.
4.4.5. Recurrence of structural indicators
A recurrence of words fulls the function of linking two utterances and is therefore providing cohesion. The recurrence of
words counts as a device to increase explicitness, because repetition can serve to reinforce an utterance (Holmes, 1984;
Delattre, 1970). As discussed in section 2, Kotthoff (1993) and Steiner (2005) both consider repetition to constitute a formof
making disagreements more explicit. While the repetition of keywords or key-phrases and the reference to a prior utterance
1
An Iwi is roughly equivalent to a tribe.
2
New Zealand Mori historically inhabited predominantly the northern part of the North Island.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 44
are accounted for under section 4.3, the repetition of structural indicators also makes a disagreement more explicit. For
example, the use of multiple discourse markers renders a disagreement more explicit than the use of one single discourse
marker. Consider the following example:
Example: Recurrence of structural indicators
[but] <yes, but it was talked about in a in a negative way?=That we shouldnt do it?>
The repetition of the discourse marker but has a stronger impact than if the discourse marker had only been used once. Such
duplication has a reinforcing effect and therefore contributes to the level of explicitness of a disagreement.
The following example, on the other hand, contains only one single structural indicator and is therefore less explicit.
Example: No recurrence of structural indicators
Well, I think it is.
Nowthat I have discussed the various rating categories and shown with examples howthe rating categories were applied, let
us turn to how the rating scheme is put into practice.
5. Applied examples
The proposed coding system offers the researcher the opportunity to code a large amount of data relatively quickly and
consistently. The system can easily be applied to disagreement instances and the respective categories can be assessed
nearly instantaneously. In particular, the presence or absence of structural indicators are immediately obvious. As such, this
system offers a convenient way of coding ones quantitative data reliably. This coding system operates on the basis that the
disagreement is situated in the oppositional utterance following a statement of opinion. While this can occur over a number
of turns (where the disagreement is interruptive or interrupted), in the majority of the cases the disagreement is located in a
single-turn utterance.
In this rst example I will demonstrate how the categories of the coding system can be applied to real-life examples of
disagreement data, with a view to exploring the ease with which this system operates.
The example in Table 2 is situated in a discussion between a gay and lesbian programme interviewer and the Christian
Heritage Party leader at the time. At this point of the interview the discussion features around the topic of whether the New
Zealand public is interested in gay and lesbian programmes and whether public funding should be used for this type of
programme. The Party leader previously explained his standpoint that he thinks that the New Zealand public objects to
public funding being used for gay and lesbian television programmes. The interviewer on the other hand is trying to establish
that her programme has received public funding fromNewZealand On Air and is now trying to assert that if the public was
against programmes such as hers, she would not have been granted the funding in the rst place.
Table 2
Applying the coding system to an explicit disagreement.
Previous utterance And in fact- (.) we (.) New Zealand on air? =And I would disagree that the majority of
New Zealanders are/opposed\ to us? =Because theyve obviously (.) taken account of (.) who is
for and who is/against\==AND THEY HAVE DECIDED to grant us some public fun[ding]
Disagreement [Well they] ARE, THEY
ARE opposed.
Value
Autonomy Autonomous U 2
Moderately autonomous 1
Not autonomous 0
Syntaxfunction correlation Does correlate U 1
Does not correlate 0
Reference Does make reference U 1
Does not make reference 0
Structural indicators Violates preference organization U #5 = 5
Interruptive U #4 = 4
Contains discourse markers U #3 = 3
Contains conventionalization cues #2 = 2
Recurrence of structural indicators #1 = 1
None #0 = 0
Total 7
Bold print indicates the applicable value for this particular disagreement instance.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 45
In order to assess the rst category, i.e. the level of autonomy of the disagreement, the disagreement context is not taken
into account. Rather, only the statement well they are, they are opposed is considered. With a repeated emphasis on the
word are and the raised voice, the utterance clearly marks an oppositional stance. As such this utterance is easily
recognizable as a disagreement in this de-contextualized form. Consequently, the disagreement is rated as autonomous.
While the assessment of a disagreements autonomy does require a level of inference and consideration on the researchers
part, all other categories are virtually immediately observable. In the category syntax-function correlation, the observer
merely has to assess whether a disagreement is uttered in the form of a statement. In this particular example, the
disagreement is rated as does correlate as the disagreement is produced in the form of a statement, which is the unmarked
case for a disagreement. The category reference is also fairly easy to assess. Assuming that a researcher is familiar with the
wider context of the text in which the disagreement occurs, s/he will also be able to assess quickly whether the speaker
relates his/her disagreement to a prior utterance or insinuation. In the category reference, this disagreement example is
assessed as does make reference as it refers to the immediately preceding utterance. By stating they are opposed, the
speaker refers both to the claim that the New Zealand public is opposed to public funding being used for a gay and lesbian
programme in general as well as to the claim that this statement applies to the majority of the population. The category
structural indicators is by far the easiest category to assess as the presence or absence of structural indicators is apparent at
a glance. In this category, the present disagreement displays three indicators that are considered in this rating scheme. There
are no delays, hesitations or pauses which typically assert an adherence to disagreement being marked as a dispreferred
second. Consequently, the disagreement exhibits a change of preference organisation. As the party leader does not wait for
the interviewer to nish her utterance, the disagreement is turn-competitive and was therefore rated as interruptive. While
the disagreement does not contain any conventionalization devices or a repetition or a recurrence of structural indicators, it
does contain a discourse marker, as the party leader commences the disagreement with the disagreement marker well.
With its high intrinsic level of autonomy and the use of multiple devices structural, lexical and syntactical this
disagreement is located at the more explicit end of the coding scale.
The subsequent example stands in direct contrast to the previous, very explicit, disagreement. In this disagreement I will
demonstrate that the ease of use of the coding system is not restricted to explicit disagreements, but can be applied just as
easily to disagreements which are located on the implicit end of the spectrum.
The example in Table 3 occurs in the context of a discussion of the suitability of the welfare system in New Zealand. The
issue debated in this excerpt focuses on the question of whether there is or is not a problem with unemployment and an
economic underclass in NewZealand and whether policies implemented by the government are responsible for what one of
the interactants refers to as the perpetual cycle of failure of the welfare system.
The disagreement in Table 3 essentially looks like a simple question and is not easily recognisable as a disagreement in a
de-contextualized form. It is rated as not autonomous as even in the context of the immediately preceding utterance (or
indeed in the context of the wider preceding context) it is not entirely evident that the question functions as a disagreement
rather than as a question. Its function as a disagreement does not become evident until the subsequent conversational and
contextual embedding are taken into account, where it becomes clear that the question whats your evidence for that please
is used to set the interactant up just to attack him in the following turn. The subsequent dialogue, however, makes it clear
that the person asking the question knows what evidence the mentioned 5% stems from and knows that the gures are not
Table 3
Applying the coding system to an implicit disagreement.
Previous utterance The FACT IS that we do have a problem. and we have a particularly seve::re problem amongst
around about 5% of families. We have 5% of families in this country who are esse:ntially
dysfunctional.
Disagreement Whats your evidence for that please?
Value
Autonomy Autonomous 2
Moderately autonomous 1
Not autonomous U 0
Syntaxfunction correlation Does correlate 1
Does not correlate U 0
Reference Does make reference U 1
Does not make reference 0
Structural indicators Violates preference organization U #5 = 5
Interruptive #4 = 4
Contains discourse markers #3 = 3
Contains conventionalization cues #2 = 2
Recurrence of structural indicators #1 = 1
None #0 = 0
Total 2
Bold print indicates the applicable value for this particular disagreement instance.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 46
quite correct. This can be seen in the fact that he does not even wait for the addressee to nish the answer to his question. As
soon as Christchurch is mentioned, he interrupts the addressee with another disagreement: no, no, the evidence in
Christchurch does not say that at all, as you well know. The lack of a syntax-function correlation is further adding to the
ambiguous nature of the disagreement. Consequently, both the level of autonomy and the syntaxfunction correlation can
be assessed quickly and easily by identifying the questioning format. While the disagreement does refer to the previous
utterance with the word that, the use of only one single structural indicator further emphasizes the disagreements
obscurity. Due to the lack of verbal marking, this disagreement requires rather a lot of interpretative work in order to be
recognizable.
The examples presented in Tables 2 and 3 might leave some doubt regarding the necessity of a coding system. Both of
these disagreements are clearly identiable as fairly explicit and as fairly implicit respectively without coding. So why use
a coding system? The reason for the need of a coding systemis that disagreements are rarely so clearly marked for their level
of explicitness. In most cases they are less clear-cut and the boundary between explicit and implicit comes in varying
degrees of ambiguity and vagueness. Hence, the benets of using a coding systemwill become more obvious in the following
two examples (Tables 4 and 5). The aim of the following examples is to demonstrate how two very different cases of
disagreements can be weighed up against each other systematically and can be assessed by the ne-grained distinctions this
coding system allows. These types of examples are ones where impressionistic coding systems tend to fail due to their
contrasting natures and which make an impressionistic approach to coding time-consuming, unreliable and tedious.
The subsequent examples demonstrate the benets of a coding system when faced with disagreements that cannot be
clearly attributed to labels such as explicit or implicit, but are ambiguously located in a grey-zone between the two
extremes. While disagreements can be fairly similar in their impact, it is extremely difcult to code them if they are very
different in their format. The following two examples demonstrate that this coding system allows a researcher to assess
structurally diverse disagreements.
The example in Table 4 stems from a discussion around the topic of conventional versus organic farming techniques. In
this particular excerpt the interviewer raises questions regarding the practices of the companies producing pesticides, who
previously asserted that they themselves carry out research into the safety of use of their own products.
Apart from the conventionalization cues aw and look there are not many indicators suggesting to the outside observer
that the utterance is a very explicit disagreement, at least if approached in a de-contextualized form. At rst glance, this
disagreement looks like an answer to a question. However, if the wider context of the preceding debate is taken into
consideration, it is fairly obvious that the utterance is a disagreement. Hence, the disagreement is assessed as moderately
autonomous. As the disagreement is uttered in the form of a statement there is a clear syntaxfunction correlation, the
disagreement also clearly refers to the previously mentioned research and contains a number of structural indicators.
However, it becomes clear in an example such as this is that while it contains some markers that suggest that this
utterance is a disagreement it cannot be as clearly and unambiguously identied as a disagreement as the example in Table 2.
Hence, if an impressionistic approach were to be taken to code a disagreement such as this one, which cannot be classed as
either clearly explicit or clearly implicit, a researcher would struggle to classify it and attach it to either one of those labels.
What becomes evident in the following example is that impressionistic coding gets even more complicated when
Table 4
Example of a moderately explicit disagreement.
Previous utterance How can they do an objective jo:b. How can it do an ob objective job-=when (.) its selling the
stuff? (0.2) for prot? (0.8) I mean shouldnt we be out there doing our own dispassionate
research?
Disagreement Aw, look we cant afford the levels of research that-uh would be necessary for us to be able to give an
unqualied uh label to whats going on.
Value
Autonomy Autonomous 2
Moderately autonomous U 1
Not autonomous 0
Syntaxfunction correlation Does correlate U 1
Does not correlate 0
Reference Does make reference U 1
Does not make reference 0
Structural indicators Violates preference organization U #5 = 5
Interruptive #4 = 4
Contains discourse markers #3 = 3
Contains conventionalization cues U #2 = 2
Recurrence of structural indicators U #1 = 1
None #0 = 0
Total 6
Bold print indicates the applicable value for this particular disagreement instance.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 47
disagreements come in very different shapes and sizes. The question that poses itself then is: can and should one weigh
disagreements up against each other purely based on intuition?
The example in Table 5 occurs during a debate on whether a Mori party is (a) feasible and (b) justied. Prior to this
exchange the interviewer questioned whether it is appropriate for the Mori population to be singled-out fromNewZealand
society.
While there are some similarities between the two disagreements in terms of their levels of autonomy, referents and the
inclusion of structural indicators, their overall format is very different. While the disagreement example in Table 4 does have
a syntaxfunction correlation, the disagreement in the present example is uttered in the format of a question. Even though
both disagreements include a range of structural indicators, the number and types of indicators used is quite different. The
examples showthat consistent rating is even more challenging when the disagreements differ in a number of the categories,
as they get harder to compare. When comparing the disagreements in Tables 4 and 5, it therefore becomes clear why a coding
system can be useful, and indeed necessary. These disagreements are fairly close in their level of explicitness, and without a
functioning coding system, where one categorizes starkly different disagreements becomes an arbitrary decision. This leads
to the possibility of inconsistency in coding, even by a single coder. With the use of a coding system that pre-assigns values
and therefore determines the level of explicitness of a disagreement based on clearly dened criteria and categories, one can
reliably differentiate between disagreements, with consistent results.
Consequently, the real benet of the present coding system is that (a) two very different disagreements can be assessed
and weighed up against each other based on indicators that can be assessed fairly easily and (b) labelling the disagreements
and trying to force them into prescriptive categories is unnecessary as it operates on an unlabelled value-system.
6. Conclusion
I hope to have demonstrated in this article not only that a coding system for the coding of speech acts is helpful and
simplies the process, but also that it renders the coding process considerably more reliable and consistent. Just as we apply
grammar rules in order to help us create a correct and well-formed sentence, we need to apply a set of coding rules in order
to help us choose the correct level of explicitness. This is particularly true where the researcher deals with starkly differing
examples of speech acts.
While the coding systempresented in this article is based on disagreement speech acts and all of the examples presented
here are taken fromdisagreement data, I believe that the present coding systemcan serve as a basis for coding a wider range
of speech acts. There is no denying that different speech acts require different coding categories and the coding systemneeds
to be modied accordingly. However, categories such as autonomy or reference apply to a multitude of speech acts.
Likewise, structural indicators such as discourse markers, cohesive devices such as recurrence of key words, and a change of
preference organization are not bound to disagreements alone. Discourse markers have been identied for a range of
different speech acts, as have preference structures. The latter received a fair amount of attention in the 1980s (Pomerantz,
1984; Levinson, 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987). Many speech acts with a negative connotation, i.e. face-threatening
speech acts, such as complaints or refusals, are also typically dispreferred moves and are therefore also typically delayed
Table 5
Example of a moderately explicit disagreement.
Previous utterance If people feel; that their issues are not well/se:rved\, by mainstream political/pa:rties\? then we
now have the environment that is actually conducive to that and supports that. We have the
greens party who believe that the environmental issues, and indeed some of the social issues are
so important? so they get under [way. so-]
Disagreement [But Merepeka wa]snt there a time when you didnt agree with
the Maori party? Youre not looking for a list position are you?
Value
Autonomy Autonomous 2
Moderately autonomous U 1
Not autonomous 0
Syntaxfunction correlation Does correlate 1
Does not correlate U 0
Reference Does make reference U 1
Does not make reference 0
Structural indicators Violates preference organization U #5 = 5
Interruptive U #4 = 4
Contains discourse markers U #3 = 3
Contains conventionalization cues U #2 = 2
Recurrence of structural indicators #1 = 1
None #0 = 0
Total 6
Bold print indicates the applicable value for this particular disagreement instance.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 48
(Brown and Levinson, 1987). Hence, many of the categories used to code disagreements are likely to be useful to a broad
range of speech acts and the creation of coding systems for speech acts other than disagreements would be desirable for
future research.
Besides the obvious advantage of providing a more reliable and consistent rating system, the proposed coding scheme
offers additional benets. Firstly, it allows us to distinguish ner nuances of explicitness and implicitness. Rather than
merely distinguishing between explicit, implicit, and hint, the present system distinguishes nine grades of explicitness,
while rendering an allocation to particular labels unnecessary. In other words the coding system introduced in this paper
adopts a gradient scale of explicitness rather than an attribution to one particular inexible category. Secondly, it enables us
to rate speech acts for their intrinsic level of explicitness. Consequently, modication devices no longer have to be used as a
means to determining the degree of explicitness of a speech act, but can be analysed for the additional information they offer,
independent of the level of explicitness.
In summary, a coding system such as the one proposed in this study, could offer multiple benets to researchers in their
coding of speech acts. Besides helping the researcher to code quantitative data more quickly and reliably, the applications for
such a coding system are not limited to speech act research in its narrow sense. Rather it has more wide-reaching
implications for other elds of research, such as politeness and impoliteness research with its recurrent discussion of the
relationship between politeness and (in)directness. A coding system such as the one proposed can also help with the
annotation of data and can thereby facilitate the creation of databases. Consequently, just as this study drew on Steiners
(2005) corpus-based work, the creation of corpora could benet from coding schemes and classications. Hence, for a
multitude of reasons, the further development and implementation of systematic coding systems for a wider range of speech
acts would be desirable in future speech act research and benecial to a wide-reaching range of elds.
Appendix A
Transcription conventions.
(.) short pause
(0.3) longer pause with specied duration in seconds
underlined stressed word
CAPITAL LETTERS increased loudness
8word8 decreased loudness
<word> increased tempo
>word< decreased tempo
/word\ pitch change, sing-song intonation
- level terminal pitch
; moderate terminal rise in pitch
? strong terminal rise in pitch
, moderate terminal fall in pitch
. strong terminal fall in pitch
{word {word non-phrase-nal pitch reset
: prolonged vowel
= latching, no phrase nal pause
[word] overlapping speech
(word) not clearly audible, but likely lexeme
(????) inaudible speech
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Stefanie Stadler is an independent researcher in Auckland, New Zealand. Her research interests focus on cross-cultural communication, politeness, pragmatics
and multimodality. Her Ph.D. considered German and English speech behaviour, investigating the verbal, prosodic and non-verbal realization of disagreement.
S.A. Stadler / Journal of Pragmatics 43 (2011) 3650 50