City of Davao v RTC Davao

Monday, December 09, 2013 8:07 PM

FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City. On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax. On 28 May 1996, the RTC rendered the Decision10 now assailed before this Court. It concluded that notwithstanding the enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes, including real estate taxes. The RTC cited Section 33 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146, the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977, as amended by P. D. No. 1981, which mandated such exemption.

ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC HELD: Presidential Decree No. 1146 was enacted in 1977 by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Section 33, as originally enacted, read: Sec. 33. Exemption from tax, Legal Process and Lien.- It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the System shall be preserved and maintained at all times and that the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the members of the system and/or their employees. . . . Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the System, its assets, revenues including the accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all taxes. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the System as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.

It was through this latter decree that a second paragraph was added to Section 33 delineating the requisites for repeal of the tax exemption enjoyed by the GSIS by incorporating the following: "Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary, such as the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1931 and other similar laws that have been or will be enacted, unless this section is expressly and categorically repealed by law and a provision is enacted to substitute the declared policy of exemption from any and all taxes as an essential factor for the solvency of the fund." Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs. Sec 234. Except as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned or controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.

Kida v Senate
Monday, December 09, 2013 8:47 PM

I.

THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country. In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]? 2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution? 3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called regional elections, should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections. 2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. 3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.] 3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM officials We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours] Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly

what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. 3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order special elections. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power. Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid. At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which states: This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are: First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis. If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and representative of the constituent political units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections. [T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

Macalintal v Senate
Monday, December 09, 2013 9:03 PM

FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress. (3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution. HELD: (1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or apermanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to returnshall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant orpermanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement inSection 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election. However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189. Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections. Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

(2) SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. ......... 18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied) Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps. (3) Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Emphasis supplied) He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the legislators. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation. However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC

[Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC. The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."

Neri v Senate
Thursday, December 19, 2013 2:05 PM

FACTS 1. Petitioner appeared before a Senate Committee and testified on matters regarding the NBN Project 2. Petitioner disclosed that COMELEC Chair Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 M in exchange for his approval 3. Hu further narrated that he informed GMA of the bribery and she instructed him not to accept 4. Senate further questioned Neri on: a. WON GMA followed up on the NBN project b. WON she ordered him to prioritize it c. WON she directed him to approve it 5. Neri refused to answer invoking executive privilege and did not appear on the next session. 6. He explained that he is willing to answer to new matters taken up but refused to answer the 3 questions for executive privilege. 7. Senate issued an order citing him for contempt and petitioner assailed the order in his petition for certiorari 8. Court granted his petition and ruled that 3 questions are covered by executive privilege and Senate committed grave abuse discretion in issuing the contempt order ISSUE 1. WON there is presumptive presidential communiations privilege 2. WON the 3 questions are covered by said privilege 3. WON Senate have shown that communications elicited by 3 questions are critical to their functions 4. WON Senate committed grave abuse of discretion RULING 1. Presumptive presidential communication privilege a. Senate v Ermita i. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the

extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. b. The last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. c. The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case. i. In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita. d. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. 2. Coverage of privilege communications a. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power." i. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26 Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power. b. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. i. privilege should apply only to communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House advisors staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular matter to which the communications relate. Only communications at that level are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his advisers. ii. In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President

c. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest and in balancing respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. i. The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. 1. Whatever the President says about the agreement - particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. ii. Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the Presidents dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. iii. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency. 1. This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. 2. Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 3. Communications elicited is not critical to Senate's functions a. The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. b. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all c. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43 held that while fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of past events. d. The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. i. The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor.

4. Grave abuse of discretion a. Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents. b. Clearly, petitioners request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should have been granted by respondent Committees.

Partido ng Manggagawa v COMELEC

Sunday, December 22, 2013 12:50 PM

FACTS 1. Party list participants queried COMELEC regarding the formula to be adopted in computing for additional seats. 2. COMELEC issued a resolution adopting 1 additional seat per 2% of the total party list votes ISSUE WON COMELEC should apply the formula reiterated in the Bagong Bayani case in determining party list qualifications RULING Pursuant to the Constitution's mandate, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, also known as the "Party-List System Act," to "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system." The law provides as follows: Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- xxx In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion of their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (emphases supplied) These provisions on the party-list system were put to test in the May 11, 1998 elections. In the landmark case of Veterans.

he following issues were raised: 1) whether the twenty percent constitutional allocation is mandatory; 2) whether the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is constitutional; and 3) how the additional seats of a qualified party should be determined. In said case, the Court set the "four inviolable parameters" of the party-list system under the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, to wit: First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives. Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats. Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." In simplified form

In the case of Bagong Bayani:

Screen clipping taken: 1/7/2014 1:13 PM

The formula in the landmark case of Veterans prevails. First, the June 25, 2003 Resolution of the Court in Ang Bagong Bayani referred to the Veterans case in determining the number of seats due for the party-list winners. The footnote on said resolution in computing the additional seats for the party-list winners states: "[f]or a discussion of how to compute

additional nominees for parties other than the first, see Veterans, supra, at pp. 280-282. x x x."44 The Court likewise held that: We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the principle of proportional representation mandated by the law. Second, in the November 20, 2003 Resolution in Ang Bagong Bayani, the Court gave an additional seat to BUHAY only because it was similarly situated to APEC, BUTIL, CIBAC and AKBAYAN which "had obtained more than four percent (4%) of the total number of votes validly cast for the party-list system and obtained more than 0.50 for the additional seats." Well to note, the grant of an additional seat to BUHAY was pro hac vice Pro hac vice is a Latin term meaning "for this one particular occasion."47 A ruling expressly qualified as pro hac vice cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. It was therefore erroneous for respondent Commission to apply the November 20, 2003 Resolution and rule that the formula in Veterans has been abandoned.

People v Jalosjos
Sunday, December 22, 2013 12:57 PM

FACTS: 1. Jalosjos is a member of the Congress who is confined in the national penitentitiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. 2. He asked that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties as a Congress, including attendance in the legislative sessions and meetings despite being convicted in the RTC of a non-bailable offense. ISSUE WON membership in the Congress exempts an accused from statues applying to incarcerated persons. RULING The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows: Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same. he accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that (2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office. The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Roces v HRET
Sunday, December 22, 2013 1:27 PM

1. Petitioner and former Congressman Ang Ping filed their COC for representative of 3rd District of Manila in 2004 elections 2. Gomez, a registered voter questioned Ang Ping's candidacy on the grounds that he is not a natural born citizen

3. 4. 5. 6.

April 30, COMELEC 1st Div scheduled the promulgation of its resolution on May 5 On May 3, Ang Ping filed a Sworn Declaration of Withdrawal of COC On May 4, political party of Ang Ping sought that his wife will substitute for him COMELEC issued a resolution ordering the BEI not to count votes in his favor ruling that the resolution shceduled for May 5 was promulgated on April 30 7. While case was still pending in the 1st Div, COMELEC en banc declared Ang Pings Withdrawal and Substitution as moot. 8. On election date, votes for Ang Ping were not counted and Roces won 9. Mrs Ang Ping filed an Election Protest in the HRET alleging that COMELEC deprived Ang Ping;s right to elevate the case to COMELEC en banc and that the April 30 resolution is irregular ISSUE WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that Mrs Ang Ping is the proper party to file election protest WON HRET has jurisidction to review COMELEC resolution RULING 1. HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives[38] and has the power to promulgate procedural rules to govern proceedings brought before it.[39] This exclusive jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether that state of facts exists which confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters which arise in the case legitimately before it.[40] Accordingly, it has the power to hear and determine, or inquire into, the question of its own jurisdiction, both as to parties and as to subject matter, and to decide all questions, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of jurisdiction.[41] One of the three essential elements of jurisdiction is that proper parties must be present.[42] Consequently, the HRET merely exercised its exclusive jurisdiction when it ruled that Mrs. Ang Ping was a proper party to contest the election of Roces. 2. On the merits of the HRET ruling, we hold that the HRET did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mrs. Ang Ping is a proper party to contest the election of Roces. Under COMELEC rules, the procedure of promulgation of a decision or resolution is as follows: SECTION 5. Promulgation. The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.[43] Promulgation is important because it determines when the reglementary period begins to toll. In the case at bar, Commissioner Garcilliano fixed the promulgation of its resolution whether to give due course to the candidacy of Mr. Ang Ping on May 5, 2004. For mysterious reasons, the COMELEC First Division of Commissioner Garcillano did not promulgate the resolution on May 5, 2004 in accordance with its notice of promulgation. In violation of the abovecited rule, and despite the deferment of the promulgation by Commissioner Borra to a date to be set by the COMELEC First Division, the resolution was deemed promulgated by the COMELEC on April 30, 2004 when it was filed with the clerk of court. 3. To make matters worse, the COMELEC en banc usurped the jurisdiction of the COMELEC First Division when it issued Resolution No. 6823 on May 8, 2004 which ordered the deletion of Mr.

Ang Pings name from the Certified List of Candidates and denied the spouses Ang Pings motions to withdraw and substitute despite the fact that: (1) the reglementary period of Mr. Ang Ping to appeal had not yet expired; and (2) Mr. Ang Ping had filed a motion for reconsideration of the preceding order on May 10, 2004 within the five-day reglementary period. Nowhere is it provided in the law that the COMELEC en banc has the power to assume jurisdiction motu proprio over a petition to deny due course pending before a division of the Commission. SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.[45] SECTION 3. The Commission Sitting in Divisions. The Commission shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies, contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of citizens' arms of the Commission.[46] SECTION 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of. Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc. SECTION 6. Duty of Clerk of Court of Commission to Calendar Motion for Resolution. The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof. (Emphases supplied)[47] 4. In the case at bar, it ought to be emphasized that the private respondent was systematically denied the opportunity to be heard. The resolution of the COMELECs First Division was made before its priorily set date of promulgation, deemed final and executory by the COMELEC en banc in Resolution No. 6823 before expiry of the reglementary period, and executed by the Manila City Board of Canvassers. The petition for certiorari filed by Mrs. Ang Ping challenged these resolutions and could not have cured these blatant violations of her right to due process. In truth, this Court referred the case of Mrs. Ang Ping to the HRET where she has filed a protest ad cautelam. 5. There is no iota of doubt that the COMELECs resolutions are void ab initio for violating Mrs. Ang Pings constitutional right to due process. Judgments entered in a proceeding failing to comply with procedural due process are void, as is one entered by a court acting in a manner inconsistent with due process.

Sabio v Gordon
Sunday, December 22, 2013 2:17 PM

FACTS

1. Sen Santiago introduced Senate Resokution directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by Phil Overseas Telecom Corp (POTC), Phil Comm Satellite Corp (PHILCOMSAT) and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corp (PHC) due to improprieties of their BoD. 2. Sen Gordon wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG, inviting him to be a resource person in the deliberation of said Senate Resolution 3. Sabio declined and invoked Section 4b of EO 1: a. "No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance." 4. Subpoena was then issued to Sabio, PCGG Commissioners and Officers of PHILCOMSAT but said persons refused to testify on the same grounds and said that such EO is a limit to legislative inquiry. a. Further, since said cases are already pending with the Ombudsman, they may not testify thereon in the principle of subjudice. 5. Unconvinced with the explanation, the Sergeant at Arms was ordered to arrest Sabio for contempt. ISSUE WON EO 1 there is a repugnancy between EO 1 and Art VI of the Consti providing for inquiries in aid of legislation RULING 1. Briggs v. MacKellar a. Either house may institute any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. 2. Arnault a. the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change 3. Senate v Ermita a. "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate." 4. Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

5. Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." a. Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. 6. the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.

Sema v COMELEC
Tuesday, December 24, 2013 3:23 PM

FACTS 1. The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities 2. While Cotabato is part of the 1st District, it is not part of ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. 3. ARMM Regional assemblym exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. 4. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. 5. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. 6. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 070407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City) 7. Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and

the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. ISSUE (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. RULING 1. Constitutionality of Art VI of RA 9054 a. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. i. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. b. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.*26+ c. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one

representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. d. Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. i. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. e. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers *w+ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.

Senate v Ermita
Friday, December 27, 2013 12:47 PM

FACTS

1. Senate issued invitations to various official of the Executive Dept for them to appear as resource persons on the North Rail Project. a. Simillar invitations were also sent to AFP Officials 2. PGMA then issued EO 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," , the salient provisions are: SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.

ISSUE WON EO 464 is constitutional RULING The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Dept heads cannot refuse appearance in legislative inquiry Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Executive prive - power of pres to withhold info and is recognized only on state secrets, informer's privelege, internal deliberations

1. Validity of section 1 a. SECTION 22 of the Const. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Dept heads may or may not appear in the question hour In the excercis of congress oversight func. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. 2. Section 2 and 3 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege." The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied

claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege. While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. 3. Right to Information It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC

Wednesday, January 08, 2014 12:46 PM

Marcos v Manglapus
Wednesday, January 08, 2014 12:49 PM

FACTS 1. After Pres. Marcos was deposed from Presidency, various coups threatened the stability of the new government. 2. On his deathbed, Marcos signified his wish to return to the Philippines but Aquino barred the return. ISSUE WON the President has the power to prohibit the Marcoses from returning RULING Petitioners assert that the right to return is founded on the Bill of Rights: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land Executive Power As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23]. The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.] Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.] More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination. WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Estrada v Desierto
Wednesday, January 08, 2014 8:34 PM

FACTS 1. Following the EDSA 2, Estrada left Malacanang "for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation". 2. A letter was also sent declaring that "By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President." 3. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. 4. After his fall from power, several charges previously filed against him in the Ombudsman were set into motion 5. Estrada sought to enjoin the proceedings filed until after his term of Presidency

ISSUE 1. WON Estrada resigned as President 2. WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as Pres 3. WON Estrada has immunity, if yes, the extent of immunity 4. WON prosecution should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity RULING 1. Resignation Section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent

Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. January 20 At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country. 2. Temporary section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides: "SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the VicePresident shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. 3. Immunity We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 4. Prejudicial publicity there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to

successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

Poe v Arroyo
Thursday, January 09, 2014 8:10 PM

FACTS 1. GMA was declared to be the elected President in the 2004 elections 2. Poe filed a electoral protest in PET 3. During the pendency, POE died and his widow filed petition to substitute ISSUE May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latters protest case? RULING Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner. Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2nd and 3rd placers, may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2nd or the 3rd highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest. We have held as early as Vda. de De Mesa (1966) that while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings.13 Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. . Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court18 is the applicable rule on intervention in the absence of such a rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly

benefit from the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes. Yet thus far, in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections, have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant. In our view, if persons not real parties in the action could be allowed to intervene, proceedings will be unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable and this is not the policy of the law.19 It is far more prudent to abide by the existing strict limitations on intervention and substitution under the law and the rules. Conformably then with the law, the rules and prevailing jurisprudence, this Tribunal finds no justifiable reason to grant the petition/motion for intervention and substitution.

Defensor-Santiago v Ramos
Thursday, January 09, 2014 8:33 PM

FACTS ISSUE WON electoral protest has been rendered moot by the election of Santiago as Senator in the 1995 elections RULING in the case of Protestant Santiago who filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator in the 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and submitted herself to be voted upon. She knew that the term of office of the Senators who would then be elected would be six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election16 and to end at noon of 30 June 2001. Knowing her high sense of integrity and candor, it is most unlikely that during her campaign, she promised to serve the electorate as Senator, subject to the outcome of this protest. In short, she filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, or reservation. In so doing, she entered into a political contract with the electorate that if elected, she would assume the office of Senator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency as such for the term for which she was elected. These are givens which are in full accord with the principle enshrined in the Constitution that, public office is a public trust, and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render

moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.

Estrada v Arroyo
Thursday, January 09, 2014 9:08 PM

Consolidated with estrada v desierto

Bitonio v COA
Thursday, January 09, 2014 9:11 PM

FACTS 1. In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. 2. In 1995, he was designated to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA 3. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, the petitioner was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. 4. After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems to the petitioner 5. The uniform reason for the disallowance was stated in the Notices, as follows: Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefore was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary. Disallowance is in pursuance to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 implementing Senate Committee Report No. 509. ISSUE WON COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor. RULING The COA anchors the disallowance of per diems in the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary7 where the Court declared Executive Order No. 2848 allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government, unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. The Courts ruling was in conformity with Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which reads: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during

their tenure. They shall not, during their tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business or be financially interested in any other contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors at board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter. The petitioner also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case of Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings of the courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioners position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per diems. It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special appointment for such position.11 Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of Labor. Similarly in the case at bar, we cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal. As the representative of the Secretary of Labor, the petitioner sat in the Board in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules the member in the Board is covered, so is the representative; and whatever prohibitions or restrictions the member is subjected, the representative is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director IV of the DOLE which the petitioner claims is not covered by the constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. The petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all. There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.

De La Rama v CA

Monday, January 13, 2014 9:55 AM

FACTS 1. Upon his assumption from office as Mayor, De Raffia asked the CSC to recall the appointments of 14 municipal employees alleging that said appointments were midnight appointments of the former mayor. 2. He based his argument on Sec 15 Art 7: a. Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. 3. CSC dismissed said petition saying that the Consti provision cited applied to President and not to local elective officials. Further, said appointments were approved by CSC Head office.

ISSUE WON petitioner's contention of recall is valid RULING The CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was that they were, to his personal belief, "midnight appointments" which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission." Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Moreover, Section 10 of the same rule provides: Sec. 10. An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its issuance. Section 20 of Rule VI also provides: Sec. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds:

(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency's Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency's Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were "midnight appointments." The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on socalled "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

Anak Mindanao v Executive Secretary

Monday, January 13, 2014 10:11 AM

FACTS: 1. Petitioner assail the constitutionality of EO 364 and 379 2. EO 364 TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Social Justice and Basic [N]eeds; WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is asset reform; WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform; WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential Commission [for] the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain reform is a concern of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP); WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is AntiCorruption and Good Government; WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo administration is rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating related functions into one department;

WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the Philippines has broad powers to reorganize the offices under her supervision and control; NOW[,] THEREFORE[,] I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, by the powers vested in me as President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby order: SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into the Department of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in the country, including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform. SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Urban Land Reform. SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the Department of Land Reform. The Chairman of the NCIP shall be ex-officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform. SECTION 4. The PCUP and the NCIP shall have access to the services provided by the Departments Finance, Management and Administrative Office; Policy, Planning and Legal Affairs Office, Field Operations and Support Services Office, and all other offices of the Department of Land Reform. SECTION 5. All previous issuances that conflict with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. SECTION 6. This Executive Order takes effect immediately. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) b. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 379 AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364 ENTITLED TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8371 created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples; WHEREAS, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987, the President has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government. Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364, dated September 27, 2004 shall now read as follows: Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall be an attached agency of the Department of Land Reform. Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in rank and salary.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All executive issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly. Section 4. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. underscoring in the original) (Emphasis and

ISSUE a. Since the issue of transformation of DAR into the Department of Land Reform became moot and academic, issue now is WON the placing of the Presidential Commission[3] for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency. RULING AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,[20] they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a limitation on the legislative power. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively. The Constitutions express grant of the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law. In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing laws and jurisprudence on the subject.[27] It is thus reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute which places an agency under the Office of the President, it was in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to reorganize. In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative structure. Such determination is primary,*28+ but subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.[29] The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law: SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have

continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions: (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.

Demaisip v CA
Monday, January 13, 2014 10:34 AM

FACTS 1. Fishpond permit was applied and granted to Destacamento on 1927. However, it expired because he failed to make improvements and pay the rent. 2. Destacamento, without knowledge of Director of Forestry, executed a sale in favor of Serafin Villanueva 3. Villanueva failed to apply for fishpond permit. 4. Demaisip filed and was given fishpond permit for the same lots sold to Villanueva. 5. Villanueva then sold the lots to Buenaflor who built improvements thereon. 6. The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided in favor of Demaisip. 7. Buenaflor appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. A decision was rendered in favor of Beunaflor, however, it was not known on what grounds the Secretary based his decision since a copy was not presented in the records of the case. 8. Demaisp filed an action in the CFI but was dismissed as the complaint is petition for mandamus and plaintiff did not exhaust all remedies before resorting to court action. ISSUE WON Demaisip failed to exhaust all remedies RULING It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease application of Demaisip should be denied and that of defendant Beunaflor be given due course upon compliance with certain requirements, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451). It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action should not be entertained because he has failed the exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him. With regards to the question whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has not acted properly or has abused his discretion in reversing the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration awarding the right to lease the lots in questions to Buenaflor as now contended by petitioner, we are not now in a position to pas judgement on the actuation of such official for we do not have before us a copy of his decision. As the Solicitor General observes in his brief: "This Honorable Court is not in a position to make an accurate finding as to whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had grossly or gravely abused his discretion in the instant case because the

decision of the said Secretary reversing the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration had not been reconstituted and appended to the record of the case as indicated in our statement of facts. To rule that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had gravely abused his discretion, without knowing his reasons for reversing the decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration would be tantamount to deciding this case against said official without giving him his day in court." We concur in this observation.

IBP v Zamora
Monday, January 13, 2014 11:06 AM

FACTS 1. In view of increase of violent crimes in Metro Manila, Pres. Estrada ordered the PNP and Marines in conduction visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. 2. Dubbed Task Force Tulungan, the patrols were placed under the leadership of Police Chief of Manila 3. IBP questioned that validity of said deployment as violation of Consti. ISSUES 1. WON IBP has legal standing 2. WON factual determination of calling armed forces is subject to judicial review 3. WON the patrol violates consti provisions on civillian supremacy over the military RULING 1. Standing Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.*13+ The term interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[14] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.*15+ In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. 2. Factual determination a. As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review.[22] It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in

instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are political questions. The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. b. The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that (T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.* c. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. d. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. The President has already determined the necessity and factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he categorically asserted that, *V+iolent crimes like bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur in Metro Manila...*35+ We do not doubt the veracity of the Presidents assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this constitutional power. 3. Civillian supremacy a. Art 2. Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory. b. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds

of the Marines authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures.[38] It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.[39] It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers.[40] In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Secretary of Justice v Lantion

Monday, January 13, 2014 11:44 AM

FACTS 1. DOJ received from DFA US a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various charges in the US. 2. Jimenez requested that he be given a copy of the US extradition request. 3. Request was denied on the grounds that said request was still pending evaluation by the DOJ and copies will be given upon the filing of petition of extradition. 4. Jimenez filed a petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel DOJ to furnish him copes of said request and certiori and prohibition to restrain DOJ from considering the extradition request. 5. The RTC ruled that DOJ maintain status quo and refrain from conducting further proceedings. ISSUE WON Jimenez is entitled to basic due process rights during the evaluation stage of the extradition petition RULING Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." Extradition Request Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides . . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together

with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Extradition Petition Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration Extradition Hearing The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Although the inquisitorial power exercised by the DOJ as an administrative agency due to the failure of the DFA to comply lacks any judicial discretion, it primarily sets the wheel sfor the extradition process which may ultimately result in the deprivation of the liberty of the prospective extradite. This

deprivation can be effected at two stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective extradite pending the submission of the request & the temporary arrest of the prospective extradite during the pendency of the extradition petition in court. Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. Because of such consequences, the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for & ultimately the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extradite. In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. There are certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecution. But the Court has ruled in other cases that where the investigation of an administrative proceeding may result in forfeiture of life, liberty, or property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, & such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. In the case at bar, similar to a preliminary investigation ,the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, & to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus, the extraditee must be accorded due process rights of notice & hearing according to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern & the corollary right to access to official records & documents. The court held that the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation, having consequences which will result in deprivation of liberty of theprospective extradite. A favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus exhibiting the penal aspect of the process. The evaluation process itself is like a imprisonment of the respondent The basic rights of notice & hearing are applicable in criminal, civil & administrative proceedings. Nonobservance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, & upon notice, may claim the right to appear therein & present their side. Rights to notice and hearing: Dispensable in 3 cases: a. When there is an urgent need for immediate action (preventive suspension in administrative charges, padlocking filthy restaurants, cancellation of passport). b. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, & the respondent is not prevented from enjoying the right to notice & hearing at a later time (summarydistraint & levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, replacement of an appointee) c. Twin rights have been offered, but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. 2. WON this entitlement constitutes a breach of the legal commitments and obligation of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Treaty? No. The U.S. and the Philippines share mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. Both states accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The administrative investigation does not fall under the three exceptions to the due process of notice and hearing in the Sec.3 Rules 112 of the Rules of Court. 3. WON there is any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights & provisions of RPUS Extradition treaty? No. Doctrine of incorporation under international law, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to national legislative acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can repeal treaty.

Matibag v Benipayo
Monday, January 13, 2014 3:10 PM

Pimentel v Ermita
Monday, January 13, 2014 3:10 PM

FACTS 1. Congress commenced session on July 2004 and the ConApp convened on August 2004. 2. Meanwhile, GMA issued appointments on August 15-23, designating respondents as Acting Secretaries. 3. Congress adjourned on Sept 2004 and day after adjournment, GMA issued ad interim appointment to same persons. ISSUE: WON respondents' appointments are unconstitutional since they were appointed without consent of ConApp and while Congress is in session. RULING The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.[16] In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that *t+he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover adinterim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.[18]

However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.

David v Arroyo
Monday, January 13, 2014 3:28 PM

FACTS 1. On Feb 2006, GMA issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. She cited the following facts as bases: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency; NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. ISSUE Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge RULING 1. Review of factual basis The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora[80] -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty. 2. Facial challenge a. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.[103] A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speechrelated conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.

Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.*110+ It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. 3. Consti basis 1017 a. First provision (calling out power): by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion i. The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,[111] this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. i. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[112] the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. b. Second provision (take care clause) i. and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction

b.

ii.

ii. The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: 1. SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. iii. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. iv. The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.[121] This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that *t+he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. 4. Third provision

a. as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. b. The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.[124]

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. c. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. 5. As applied challenge

Lacson v Perez
Monday, January 13, 2014 4:23 PM

FACTS 1. On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. RULING In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and Mancao pray that the appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved. This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this court cannot enjoin criminal prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuance of a duly issued warrant. As regards petitioners prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition. The are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose. Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful restraint (Ngaya-an v. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which remains speculative up to this very day.

Sanlakas v Reyes
Monday, January 13, 2014 4:34 PM

FACTS 1. In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 2. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiation, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not

immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did only on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435 DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court can adjudicate cases that are moot 2. Whether or not the President has the power to declare a state of rebellion RULING 1. Mootness As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies.*18+ Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.*19+ The case at bar is one such case. Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang.*20+ Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21] precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding. 2. State of rebellion It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power*s+.*30+ From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.[31] However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,*32+ *t+hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in

Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.] The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.[58] At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.[59] Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.[60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,[61] then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.[62] At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that *i+n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,[63] if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.*64+ In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.[65] The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers,

vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

Bayan v Zamora
Monday, January 13, 2014 4:49 PM

FACTS The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership of the Philippine Senate. The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. II. THE ISSUE Was the VFA unconstitutional? RULING The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least twothirds of all the Members of the Senate. Section 25, Article XVIII, provides: After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treatise or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treatise or those economic

in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state. As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate. Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty-the VFA, in the instant case-be duly concurred in by the Senate, it is very true however that said provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII. Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it. xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty. xxx xxx xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.

Malaga v Penachos
Monday, January 13, 2014 5:18 PM

FACTS 1. Malaga submitted pre-qualification documents to Iloila State College Fisheries. 2. However, Malaga was not allowed to participate in the bidding since documents were considered late, being submitted after cut-off time of 10 am at same day. 3. Malaga filed a complaint against RTC alleging they submitted docs on time. 4. RTC issued a restraining order prohibiting the PBAC from bidding and awarding the project. 5. PBAC filed motion to lift the restraining order on the grounds of PD 1818: Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation ISSUE Whether ISCOF is covered in PD 1818 RULING The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree. First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding. It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.

Fortich v Corona
Monday, January 13, 2014 5:37 PM

FACTS 1. Court rendered 2-2 2. Respondents seek to refer their motion for reconsideration to Court en banc In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry

a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.4 A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include motions, are "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.5 With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.

In re: Mateo Valenzuela

Monday, January 13, 2014 5:59 PM

FACTS 1. Valenzuela and Villarta was appointed as RTC judges. Sec. 15, Article VII: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Sec. 9, Article VIII : The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. RULING The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution "(t)wo months immediatey before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six years. The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.

De Castro v JBC
Monday, January 13, 2014 6:19 PM

FACTS FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to

executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively. The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. RULING Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.

First Lepanto v CA
Monday, January 13, 2014 6:29 PM

FACTS 1. BOI granted Lepanto's application to amend its BOI certificate by changing the scope of its registered product 2. Oppositor Mariswasa filed for motion for reconsideration in the BOI decision 3. The MTR was dismissed and Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA pursuant to Circular 1-91 4. CA required the BOI and petitioner to comment on Mariwasa's petition.

5. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that CA has no appellate jurisdiction over the BOI decision since Ominibus Investment Code 1987 vests the SC such jurisdiction ISSUE WON Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" is contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with this Court RULING Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Circular 1-91, is herein quoted below: 1. Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals. They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. Among these agencies are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under RA 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission and Philippine Atomic Energy Commission. 2. Cases not covered. These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders of the National Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code of the Philippines, the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and other quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. 3. Who may appeal and where to appeal. The appeal of a party affected by a final order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasi-judicial agency shall be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact or of law or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies on the Court of Appeals, to wit: (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasijudicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and confusing rules of procedure. Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11 distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those arising from procedural law: Substantive law creates substantive rights . . . . Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980). Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action, as oppossed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains a redress for their invasion. 12 Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal. The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI. The second sentence of Section 1 thereof expressly states that "(T)hey shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasi-judicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court." E.O. 266 is one such statute. Besides, the enumeration is preceded by the words "(A)mong these agencies are . . . ," strongly implying that there are other quasi-judicial agencies which are covered by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the purview of the exclusions listed in Section 2 of the circular. Only the following final decisions and interlocutory orders are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission; (2) the Secretary of Labor and Employment; (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other

quasi-judicial agencies from which no appeal to the courts is prescribed or allowed by statute. Since in DBP v. CA 13 we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91, which is but implementary of said law. Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Echegaray v Sec of Justice

Friday, January 17, 2014 10:42 AM

FACTS 1. SC issued a TRO staying the execution of the petitioner. 2. Sec of Justice assailed such TRO citing the following issues ISSUE and RULING 1. Court lost jurisdiction over the case and can no longer restrain the execution a. the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5 b. The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides: xxx Sec. 5. xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform

for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial. 2. respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." a. Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. b.

Cruz v Secretary
Friday, January 17, 2014 10:57 AM

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Cruz, as citizen and taxpayer assailed the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). 2. After due deliberation, the SC voted 7 for its dismissal and 7 for granting the petition.

a. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. 3. Since majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated, however, voting remained the same. ccordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED. RULING

People v Baring
Friday, January 17, 2014 11:09 AM

FACTS 1. Baring was accused of statutory rape against a 7 year old. 2. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated January 20, 1999, convicting accused-appellant of rape, to wit "WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accused-Valentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim an indemnity of P50,000.00 plus moral damages of another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit 3. On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition before this Court to dismiss the case that is subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page double-spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction ISSUE WON the lower court erred in promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been omitted with no allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar jotted by the Court Stenographer.

RULING The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.17 This vital requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code18 whose roots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate. A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision.19 Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law. In the case at bar, the trial courts decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the trial courts failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape despite prosecutions failure to present the examining physician to appear in court depriving him of his constitutional right to confront a witness against him.20 However, a review of the transcript of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness.

John Hay v Lim

Friday, January 17, 2014 11:18 AM

FACTS 1. Petitioner assail the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994, CREATING AND DESIGNATING A PORTION OF THE AREA COVERED BY THE FORMER CAMP JOHN [HAY] AS THE JOHN HAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE PURSUANT TO REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227 2. As noted in its title, R.A. No. 7227 created public respondent Bases Conversion and Development Authority[2] (BCDA), vesting it with powers pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with the declared government policy.

R.A. No. 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines.[3] R.A. No. 7227 granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein from local and national taxes, to other hallmarks of a liberalized financial and business climate.[4] And R.A. No. 7227 expressly gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay 3. On July 5, 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420,[16] the title of which was earlier indicated, which established a SEZ on a portion of Camp John Hay and which reads as follows: SECTION 1. Coverage of John Hay Special Economic Zone. The John Hay Special Economic Zone shall cover the area consisting of Two Hundred Eighty Eight and one/tenth (288.1) hectares, more or less, of the total of Six Hundred Seventy-Seven (677) hectares of the John Hay Reservation, more or less, which have been surveyed and verified by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as defined by the following technical description: A parcel of land, situated in the City of Baguio, Province of Benguet, Island of Luzon, and particularly described in survey plans Psd-131102-002639 and Ccs-131102-000030 as approved on 16 August 1993 and 26 August 1993, respectively, by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in detail containing : Lot 1, Lot 2, Lot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 13, Lot 14, Lot 15, and Lot 20 of Ccs-131102000030 -andLot 3, Lot 4, Lot 5, Lot 6, Lot 7, Lot 8, Lot 9, Lot 10, Lot 11, Lot 14, Lot 15, Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18 of Psd-131102-002639 being portions of TCT No. T-3812, LRC Rec. No. 87. With a combined area of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT AND ONE/TENTH HECTARES (288.1 hectares); Provided that the area consisting of approximately Six and two/tenth (6.2) hectares, more or less, presently occupied by the VOA and the residence of the Ambassador of the United States, shall be considered as part of the SEZ only upon turnover of the properties to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. Sec. 2. Governing Body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Authority is hereby established as the governing body of the John Hay Special Economic Zone and, as such, authorized to determine the utilization and disposition of the lands comprising it, subject to private rights, if any, and in consultation and coordination with the City Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to promulgate the necessary policies,

rules, and regulations to govern and regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, which is its implementing arm for its economic development and optimum utilization. Sec. 3. Investment Climate in John Hay Special Economic Zone. Pursuant to Section 5(m) and Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7227, the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation shall implement all necessary policies, rules, and regulations governing the zone, including investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government departments. Among others, the zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the Special Economic Zone under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that may hereinafter be enacted. Sec. 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and Instrumentalities. All Heads of departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the government are hereby directed to give full support to Bases Conversion and Development Authority and/or its implementing subsidiary or joint venture to facilitate the necessary approvals to expedite the implementation of various projects of the conversion program. Sec. 5. Local Authority. Except as herein provided, the affected local government units shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. Sec. 6. Repealing Clause. All orders, rules, and regulations, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Proclamation, are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly. Sec. 7. Effectivity. This proclamation shall take effect immediately. ISSUE (1) Whether the present petition complies with the requirements for this Courts exercise of jurisdiction over constitutional issues; (2) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay Special Economic Zone; and (3) Whether Proclamation No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City; RULING It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. There is in the present case a real clash of interests and rights between petitioners and respondents arising from the issuance of a presidential proclamation that converts a portion of the area covered by

Camp John Hay into a SEZ, the former insisting that such proclamation contains unconstitutional provisions, the latter claiming otherwise. Certainly then, petitioners Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against[36] the sanggunian Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994) supporting the issuance of the now challenged Proclamation No. 420, have legal standing to bring the present petition. That there is herein a dispute on legal rights and interests is thus beyond doubt. The mootness of the issues concerning the questioned agreements between public and private respondents is of no moment. As to the third and fourth requisites of a judicial inquiry, there is likewise no question that they have been complied with in the case at bar. This is an action filed purposely to bring forth constitutional issues, ruling on which this Court must take up. Besides, respondents never raised issues with respect to these requisites, hence, they are deemed waived. 2. Tax exemption It is clear that under Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 it is only the Subic SEZ which was granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like. There is no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be created at the time via presidential proclamation. While the grant of economic incentives may be essential to the creation and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the grant thereof to the John Hay SEZ cannot be sustained. The incentives under R.A. No. 7227 are exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of the same to the John Hay SEZ finds no support therein. Neither does the same grant of privileges to the John Hay SEZ find support in the other laws specified under Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420, which laws were already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the enactment of R.A. No. 7227. More importantly, the nature of most of the assailed privileges is one of tax exemption. It is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the state constitution, that has full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax.[42] Other than Congress, the Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions,[43] or local governments may pass ordinances on exemption only from local taxes.[44] The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress.[45] In the same vein, the other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon. Contrary to public respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based; it must be expressly granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.[46] Tax exemption cannot be implied as it must be categorically and unmistakably expressed.[47] If it were the intent of the legislature to grant to the John Hay SEZ the same tax exemption and incentives given to the Subic SEZ, it would have so expressly provided in the R.A. No. 7227. This Court no doubt can void an act or policy of the political departments of the government on either of two groundsinfringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion.[48]

This Court then declares that the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution. This renders it unnecessary to still dwell on petitioners claim that the same grant violates the equal protection guarantee. 3. Local autonomy Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit. Under R.A. No. 7227, the BCDA is entrusted with, among other things, the following purpose:[50] xxx (a) To own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station, Mt. Sta. Rita Station (Hermosa, Bataan) and those portions of Metro Manila Camps which may be transferred to it by the President; x x x (Underscoring supplied) With such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDA over Camp John Hay, BCDA virtually has control over it, subject to certain limitations provided for by law. By designating BCDA as the governing agency of the John Hay SEZ, the law merely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role or functions it has been granted. The unconstitutionality of the grant of tax immunity and financial incentives as contained in the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 notwithstanding, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation.[51] The requisite prior concurrence by the Baguio City government to such proclamation appears to have been given in the form of a duly enacted resolution by the sanggunian. The other provisions of the proclamation had been proven to be consistent with R.A. No. 7227. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.[52] This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No. 420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid second sentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand. WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID and is accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing the aforesaid void provision. Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective.

Montesclaros v COMELEC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:03 AM

FACTS 1. Petitioners, as taxpayer and class suit filed petition to prevent postponment of 2002 SK elections originally scheduled on May 6. 2. They claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for should the elections be postponed. 3. They claim that postponement and lowering the membership age in SK to 15 and less than 17 years old will discriminate youth from joining the SK. ISSUES 1. WON COMELeC acted in grave abuse of discretion in postponing the SK 2. WON the lowering of age will discriminate youths 18 - 21 years old RULING At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition: 1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled. 2. Congress enacted RA No. 916419 which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be "at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election."20 RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002. 3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections. The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.21 In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention. Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.22 The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before. Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.25 A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real interest" is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.26 In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections. This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners' prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.27 Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right. A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a public trust."33 No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,34 decided in 1920, the Court already ruled: "Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a "property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents." (Emphasis supplied)

The Comelec exercised its power and duty to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall"37 and to "recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending."38 The Comelec's acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.39 These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there "exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law." As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,40 the "Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections."

Ople v Torres
Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:28 AM

FACTS 1. Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows: "ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities; WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following: SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established. SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as members: Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government Secretary, Department of Health Administrator, Government Service Insurance System, Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing Director, National Computer Center. SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC. SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference. SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies. SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking. SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six. (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS" ISSUES 1. WON AO 308 is usurpation of legislative power 2. WON appropriation of public funds is usurpation of legislative right 3. WON AO 308 violates the Bill of Rights RULING 1. petitioner locus standi Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance

System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.[5] 2. Constitutionality The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. "[8] The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.[9] The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[10] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[12] In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.[13] While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14] The executive power is vested in the President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.[16] It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17] As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.[18] He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.[19] Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.[20] Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: "Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."[23] An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress

enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. 3. Bill of rights Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: "Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law." Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34] "Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. x x x.

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. x x x.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to

warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded-whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files.[55] The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.[

Arceta v Mangrobang
Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:50 AM

FACTS 1. Arceta was charged with violating BP 22 "Bouncing Checks Law" ISSUE WON BP 22 is uncosnti RULING When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.7 Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.13 We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

Manila Motors v Flores

Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:08 AM

FACTS 1. On 1954, Manila Motor filed a complaint to recover from Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. 2. Flores pleaded prescription and complaint was dismissed. 3. On appeal, CFI ruled that the moratorium laws interrupted the prescription period and deducting the 3 years for which said law was in effect, 10 year prescription has not yet lapsed. ISSUE WON the moratorium laws suspended the prescription period RULING In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial 3 we held that the moratorium laws suspended the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated however, in fairness to Appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had submitted his brief. And in answer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this Court. 4 2. Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may be construed to mean that at the time of the decision the Moratorium law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At any rate, although the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute confers no right, creates no office, affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooleys Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030). Judgment affirmed, without costs.

In re Cunanan
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:27 AM

FACTS 1. Constitutionality of RA 972 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number. SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take. SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval. RULING In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree. The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides: Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13. It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects. Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit: 1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 19461952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of

justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules. 4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation. 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void. 6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

Gaminde v COA
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:56 AM

FACTS 1. Gaminde was appointed as ad interim CSC Commsissioner on June 1993 2. ComApp confirmed the appointment, stating that her term will expire in Feb 1999 3. Petitioner sought clarification from the Office of Pres who opined that her term of office will expire on Feb 2000 ISSUE WON Gaminde's term will expire on 2000 RULING The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter.[14] In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. *T+he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during

which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution.*16+ What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is tenure not term of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. The term unless imports an exception to the general rule.[17] Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999.[18] This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona[19] clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor[20] must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006. WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

Reyes v RTC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 12:51 PM

FACTS 1. Reyes and Comia were candidates for member of the Sanggunian Bayan in the 1992 elections 2. During the canvassing, Comia moved for exclusion of election returns on the grounds of illegality in counting votes in favor of Reyes votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering there is another candidate bearing same surname. 3. Without resolving the petition, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Reyes as winning cadidate. 4. Comia filed election protest in RTC and court rendered decision in his favor. 5. Reyes filed an appeal to COMELEC. He also filed petition for mandamus and profibition in the CA. 6. CA dismissed petition because of the pending appeal to COMELEC. 7. COMELEC also dismissed the appeal on the ground that he has failed to pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. ISSUE WON COMELEC and RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in: a. Assuming jurisdiction over the election protest despite the fact that it was filed 10 days after proclamation b. COMELEC in dismissing the appeal for failure to pay the fee RULING Art. IX, C, 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: xxx xxx xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. Id. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in accordance with Art. IX, A, 7, "may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari." 4 Second Even on the merits we think the First Division of the COMELEC properly dismissed petitioner's appeal from the decision of the trial court because of his failure to pay the appeal fee within the time for perfecting an appeal. Rule 22, 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly provides:

Sec. 9. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission on any of the following grounds: (a) Failure of the appellant to pay the appeal fee; . . .

Third. Petitioner also assails the decision of the trial court as having been rendered without jurisdiction. He contends that the election protest of private respondent was filed more than ten days after his (petitioner's) proclamation. Petitioner is, however, estopped to raise this question now. He did not only appeal from the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC raising this question, but he also filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals. Having decided on this course of action, he should not be allowed to file the present petition just because he lost in those cases.

Santiago v COMELEC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 1:05 PM

FACTS 1. private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order 1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; 3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. 2. Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution RULING Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters

therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action. The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads: Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied). The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values,

the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) (4) (5) Delegation to the people at large; Delegation to local governments; and Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62 Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition. Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.

Lambino v COMELEC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 1:29 PM

FACTS 1. Petitioner gathered signatures for initiative petition to change the 1987 Consti 2. Lambino filed with COMELEC to hold plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition 3. COMELEC denied petition invoking Santiago v COMELEC ISSUES 1. WON Lambino initiative petition comply with Sec 2, Art 17 2. WON court should revisit the Santiago ruling 3. WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition RULING 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states: Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.

The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition. In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives ARTICLE XVII AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (2) A constitutional convention. Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied) The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments. Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner: [T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied) Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the

change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."39 Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.49 The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision sought by the present petition is located. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.

This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution. In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

Gonzales v COMELEC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 2:02 PM

FACTS 1. The following resolutions were passed by Congress: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress. 2. RA 4913 was then passed providing that the amendments to the Consti provided in Resolution 1 and 3 be submitted to the people, for approval at the general elections.

ISSUE WON the Resolution violates the Consti RULING Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads: The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary. And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification." ISSUE WON the resolutions are void because: 1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen; 2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at the same time; 3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for ratification, must be a special election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be chosen; and 4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly, do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and implications of said amendments. Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the

same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory. It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions, proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void. The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said period. Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer in question is concerned. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. Available Alternatives to Congress In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on the same day. May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election? There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the Constitution? It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the amendments in question.

A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the ballots they will use. It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic. But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same. We do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution. Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Tolentino v COMELEC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 9:45 PM

FACTS 1. Constitutional Convention approved Organic Resolution 1: A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18 BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention: Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write,

and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election. Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971. Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution. Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem. 2. COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 ISSUE Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution. RULING The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.

We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".

Francisco v House of Representative

Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:04 PM

FACTS 1. Former Pres Estrada filed impeachment complaint against CJ Davide and 7 Associate Judges for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." 2. The House Committee on Justice ruled that such was sufficient in form but insufficient in substance on October 2003. 3. On the same month, a second impeachment complaint was filed. ISSUE WON the second case is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year." RULING Judicial review This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Justiciability In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.99 In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present controversy. On the question WON the offenses alleged constitute impeachable offenses, goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113 Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII. Judicial Restraint Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them. The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. 2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

Ombudsman v CSC
Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:38 PM

FACTS 1. CSC approved the qualification standards for Graft Investigation Officer III. 2. The position was classified as Career Executive Service (CES) 3. The Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) adopted a resolution which provides that: That all career third level positions identified and classified by each of the member agency are not embraced within the Career Executive Service (CES) and as such shall not require Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE) or Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility for purposes of permanent appointment; 4. Crandang, Clemente and De Jesus were appointed as Graft Investigation III. The CSC approved the appointments on the condition that for the appointees to acquire security of tenure, they must obtain CES or Civil Service Executive (CSE) eligibility which is governed by the CESB. ISSUE WON CSC can curtail the discretionary power of appointment by the Ombudsmans as an independent constitutional body

RULING Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: SECTION 7. Career Service. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. The Career Service shall include: (1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required; (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems; (3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President; From the above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code, persons occupying positions in the CES are presidential appointees. A person occupying the position of Graft Investigation Officer III is not, however, appointed by the President but by the Ombudsman as provided in Article IX of the Constitution, to wit: SECTION 6. THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE OMBUDSMAN, OTHER THAN THE DEPUTIES, SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE OMBUDSMAN ACCORDING TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW. To classify the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the CES and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES or CSE eligibility before acquiring security of tenure would be absurd as it would result either in 1) vesting the appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution; or 2) including in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. It is not disputed that, except for his lack of CES or CSE eligibility, De Jesus possesses the basic qualifications of a Graft Investigation Officer III, as provided in the earlier quoted Qualification Standards. Such being the case, the CSC has the ministerial duty to grant the request of the Ombudsman that appointment be made permanent effective December 18, 2002. To refuse to heed the request is a clear encroachment on the discretion vested solely on the Ombudsman as appointing authority.12 It goes without saying that the status of the appointments of Carandang and Clemente, who were conferred CSE eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6, 2003, should be changed to permanent effective December 18, 2002 too.

Camanag v Guerrero
Sunday, January 19, 2014

10:56 PM

FACTS 1. PRC released results of CPA Exam of which Camanag failed with an average of 50%. 2. However, in her Personal Data Sheet as an employee of BIR, she indicated that she passed. 3. The Ombudsman set a fact finding investigation on the matter and recommended a preliminary investigation. 4. Finding sufficient ground, Ombudsman deputized City Prosecutor of Manila to file charges. ISSUES 1. WON SECTIONS 15 AND 17 OF REPUBLIC ACT 6770 WHICH EMPOWERS (SIC) THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS OF MATTERS AND/OR REFERRED TO IT IS (SIC) NULL AND VOID FOR BEING CONTRARY TO AND VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. RULING The assailed provisions of the Ombudsman Act read: Sec. 15. Powers, functions and duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; xxx xxx xxx

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal of any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer. xxx xxx xxx

Anent petitioner's contention that the vesting of prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman finds no basis in the 1987 Constitution and that it runs counter to the intent of the framers of the Constitution to withhold such powers from the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that a similar contention had already been overruled by this Court in the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. 7 In upholding the validity of the grant of prosecutorial powers on the Ombudsman, notwithstanding the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to withhold such powers from him, this Court declared, that:

. . . . (w)hile the intention to withhold prosecutorial powers from the Ombudsman was indeed present, the Commission did not hesitate to recommend that the Legislature could, through statute, prescribe such other powers, functions and duties to the Ombudsman. The inevitable conclusion is that the Ombudsman, under the 1987 Constitution, particularly under paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI, 9 may be validly empowered with prosecutorial functions by the legislature, and this the latter did when it passed R.A. No. 6670, which gave the Ombudsman, among others, the power to investigate and prosecute individuals on matters and/or complaints referred or filed before it. Turning now to the second ground, petitioner contends that the Office of the Ombudsman, being a constitutional body, cannot exercise executive functions, such as conducting preliminary investigation in criminal cases. The contention is devoid of merit. As conceded by the petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman is a distinct constitutional body whose duties and functions are provided for by the Constitution itself. Considering that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute criminal cases emanates as it does from the Constitution itself, particularly, under paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI as above-quoted, which empowers the Ombudsman to "exercise such other powers or perform such other functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through legislation, it cannot be logically argued that such power or the exercise thereof is unconstitutional or violative of the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.

De Jesus v COA
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:17 PM

FACTS 1. COA discovered that the Catbalogan Water District Interim BoD granted themselves Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA), Rice Allowance, Productivity Incentive Bonus, Anniversary Bonus, Year-End Bonus and cash gifts. These allowances and bonuses were authorized under Resolution No. 313, series of 1995, of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). 2. The audit team disallowed the allowances and bonuses on the ground that they run counter to Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 198 (PD 198). ISSUE Petitioners contend that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in 1. Motu proprio exercising jurisdiction to declare LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, Series of 1995, as amended, not in conformity with Section 13 of PD 198, as amended; 2. Ruling that Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, prohibits payment to petitioners of RATA, extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME), and other allowances and bonuses; 3. Demanding the refund of the disallowed allowances and bonuses received by petitioners as interim members and secretary of the CWD Board.

RULING COA s Authority to Disallow Allowances and Benefits Granted under LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, Series 1995 Section 2, Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: Sec. 2(1). The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. The Constitution and existing laws[5] mandate the COA to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds.[6] This independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the governments, and ultimately, the peoples property.*7+ The Court already ruled in several cases[8] that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it is created pursuant to a special law, PD 198. The COA has the authority to investigate whether directors, officials or employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, receiving additional allowances and bonuses, are entitled to such benefits under applicable laws. Thus, water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the COA PD 198 Expressly Prohibits the Grant of RATA, EME, and Bonuses to Members of the Board of Water Districts Section 13 of PD 198, as amended, reads as follows: Compensation. - Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the district. Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration. Under S 13 of this Decree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of board of directors of water districts. Indeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the context in which the words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he/she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing No director shall receive other compensation than the amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directors of water districts are authorized to receive only the per diem authorized by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form. Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it needs no interpretation. It expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems, thus preempting the exercise of any discretion by water districts in paying other allowances and bonuses.

Refund Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits. This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District.[21] Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.

Macalino v Sandiganbayan
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:35 PM

FACTS 1. Petitioner and Liwayway Tab was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents by the Ombudsman ISSUE WON petitioner, an employee of PNCC is a public officer RULING Section 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations x x x. Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: 1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient. x x x 2. Direct, upon complaint or at its instance, any public official or employee of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties. (underscoring supplied) Further, Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on corporations, it follows inevitably that petitioner is not a public officer within the coverage of R. A. No. 3019, as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him. The only instance when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer who has been charged with a crime within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

Garcia v Mojica
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:40 PM

FACTS 1. Petitioner, as Cebu mayor, signed a contract for supply of asphalt to the city 2. As there were news regarding anomalies in the purchase, Ombudsman conducted an inquiry 3. After investigation, inquiry was upgraded to criminal and administrative case and the petitioner was on preventive suspension. ISSUE 1. WON Ombudsman acted in grave abuse of discretion since the alleged act was committed in his previous term and him being re-elected to same position 2. WON the preventive suspension is in violation of the Local Govt Code which provides that suspension should not exceed 60 days RULING Worth stressing, to resolve the present controversy, we must recall that the authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under Article XI, Section 13[1], the Ombudsman has the power to: investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Law, further grants the Office of the Ombudsman the statutory power to conduct administrative investigations. Thus, Section 19 of said law provides: Sec. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which: (1) (2) (3) Are contrary to law or regulation; Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

(4) (5) (6)

Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

Sec. 21 of R.A. 6770 names the officials subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority: Sec. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied.) Petitioner is an elective local official accused of grave misconduct and dishonesty. 10 That the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct an administrative investigation into the acts complained of, appears clear from the foregoing provisions of R.A. 6770. However, the question of whether or not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over a particular act or omission, is different from the question of whether or not petitioner, after investigation, may be held administratively liable. This distinction ought here to be kept in mind, even as we must also take note that the power to investigation is distinct from the power to suspend preventively an erring public officer. Likewise worthy of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend an official subject to its administrative investigation is provided by specific provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770 Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied.) We have previously interpreted the phrase "under his authority" to mean that the Ombudsman can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office, regardless of the branch of government in which they are employed, 11 excepting of course those removable by impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary. There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so

inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong. The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy Ombudsman. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling, in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable therefor, and it is our considered view that he may not.

Deloso v Domingo
Sunday, January 19, 2014 11:56 PM

FACTS 1. Gov. Deloso was allegedly ambushed. 2. However, investigator's report stated that the Governor's group was not ambushed but was the ambusher. 3. The case was referred to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation ISSUE WON Ombudsman has jurisdaiction RULING

Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library "SEC. 13. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "(1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employees, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the

public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we. The murder of three persons, is, without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsmans investigative authority.