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Phenomenology: First Published Sun Nov 16, 2003 Substantive Revision Mon Jul 28, 2008
Phenomenology: First Published Sun Nov 16, 2003 Substantive Revision Mon Jul 28, 2008
Phenomenology: First Published Sun Nov 16, 2003 Substantive Revision Mon Jul 28, 2008
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Phenomenology
First published Sun Nov 16, 2003; substantive revision Mon Jul 28, 2008 Pheno!enolo-y is the st"dy of str"ct"res of conscio"sness as e1%erienced fro! the first, %erson %oint of view. The central str"ct"re of an e1%erience is its intentionality) its beindirected toward so!ethin-) as it is an e1%erience of or abo"t so!e object. An e1%erience is directed toward an object by virt"e of its content or !eanin- 2which re%resents the object3 to-ether with a%%ro%riate enablin- conditions. Pheno!enolo-y as a disci%line is distinct fro! b"t related to other 4ey disci%lines in %hiloso%hy) s"ch as ontolo-y) e%iste!olo-y) lo-ic) and ethics. Pheno!enolo-y has been %racticed in vario"s -"ises for cent"ries) b"t it ca!e into its own in the early 56th cent"ry in the wor4s of $"sserl) $eide--er) Sartre) 'erlea",Ponty and others. Pheno!enolo-ical iss"es of intentionality) conscio"sness) 7"alia) and first,%erson %ers%ective have been %ro!inent in recent %hiloso%hy of !ind.
<. The $istory and =arieties of Pheno!enolo-y >. Pheno!enolo-y and +ntolo-y) E%iste!olo-y) (o-ic) Ethics ?. Pheno!enolo-y and Philoso%hy of 'ind #iblio-ra%hy +ther nternet Reso"rces Related Entries
1. What is Phenomenology?
Pheno!enolo-y is co!!only "nderstood in either of two ways@ as a disci%linary field in %hiloso%hy) or as a !ove!ent in the history of %hiloso%hy. The disci%line of %heno!enolo-y !ay be defined initially as the st"dy of str"ct"res of e1%erience) or conscio"sness. (iterally) %heno!enolo-y is the st"dy of A%heno!enaB@ a%%earances of thin-s) or thin-s as they a%%ear in o"r e1%erience) or the ways we e1%erience thin-s) th"s the !eanin-s thin-s have in o"r e1%erience. Pheno!enolo-y st"dies conscio"s e1%erience as e1%erienced fro! the s"bjective or first %erson %oint of view. This field of %hiloso%hy is then to be distin-"ished fro!) and related to) the other !ain fields of %hiloso%hy@ ontolo-y 2the st"dy of bein- or what is3) e%iste!olo-y 2the st"dy of 4nowled-e3) lo-ic 2the st"dy of valid reasonin-3) ethics 2the st"dy of ri-ht and wron- action3) etc. The historical !ove!ent of %heno!enolo-y is the %hiloso%hical tradition la"nched in the first half of the 56th cent"ry by Ed!"nd $"sserl) 'artin $eide--er) 'a"rice 'erlea", Ponty) Cean,Pa"l Sartre) et al. n that !ove!ent) the disci%line of %heno!enolo-y was %riDed as the %ro%er fo"ndation of all %hiloso%hy E as o%%osed) say) to ethics or !eta%hysics or e%iste!olo-y. The !ethods and characteriDation of the disci%line were widely debated by $"sserl and his s"ccessors) and these debates contin"e to the %resent day. 2The definition of %heno!enolo-y offered above will th"s be debatable) for e1a!%le) by $eide--erians) b"t it re!ains the startin- %oint in characteriDin- the disci%line.3 n recent %hiloso%hy of !ind) the ter! A%heno!enolo-yB is often restricted to the characteriDation of sensory 7"alities of seein-) hearin-) etc.@ what it is li4e to have sensations of vario"s 4inds. $owever) o"r e1%erience is nor!ally !"ch richer in content than !ere sensation. Accordin-ly) in the %heno!enolo-ical tradition) %heno!enolo-y is -iven a !"ch wider ran-e) addressin- the !eanin- thin-s have in o"r e1%erience) notably) the si-nificance of objects) events) tools) the flow of ti!e) the self) and others) as these thin-s arise and are e1%erienced in o"r Alife,worldB. Pheno!enolo-y as a disci%line has been central to the tradition of continental E"ro%ean %hiloso%hy thro"-ho"t the 56th cent"ry) while %hiloso%hy of !ind has evolved in the A"stro,An-lo,A!erican tradition of analytic %hiloso%hy that develo%ed thro"-ho"t the 56th cent"ry. /et the f"nda!ental character of o"r !ental activity is %"rs"ed in overla%%in- ways within these two traditions. Accordin-ly) the %ers%ective on
%heno!enolo-y drawn in this article will acco!!odate both traditions. The !ain concern here will be to characteriDe the disci%line of %heno!enolo-y) in a conte!%orary %"rview) while also hi-hli-htin- the historical tradition that bro"-ht the disci%line into its own. #asically) %heno!enolo-y st"dies the str"ct"re of vario"s ty%es of e1%erience ran-infro! %erce%tion) tho"-ht) !e!ory) i!a-ination) e!otion) desire) and volition to bodily awareness) e!bodied action) and social activity) incl"din- lin-"istic activity. The str"ct"re of these for!s of e1%erience ty%ically involves what $"sserl called AintentionalityB) that is) the directedness of e1%erience toward thin-s in the world) the %ro%erty of conscio"sness that it is a conscio"sness of or abo"t so!ethin-. Accordin- to classical $"sserlian %heno!enolo-y) o"r e1%erience is directed toward E re%resents or AintendsB E thin-s only through %artic"lar conce%ts) tho"-hts) ideas) i!a-es) etc. These !a4e "% the !eanin- or content of a -iven e1%erience) and are distinct fro! the thin-s they %resent or !ean. The basic intentional str"ct"re of conscio"sness) we find in reflection or analysis) involves f"rther for!s of e1%erience. Th"s) %heno!enolo-y develo%s a co!%le1 acco"nt of te!%oral awareness 2within the strea! of conscio"sness3) s%atial awareness 2notably in %erce%tion3) attention 2distin-"ishin- focal and !ar-inal or AhoriDonalB awareness3) awareness of one's own e1%erience 2self,conscio"sness) in one sense3) self,awareness 2awareness,of,oneself3) the self in different roles 2as thin4in-) actin-) etc.3) e!bodied action 2incl"din- 4inesthetic awareness of one's !ove!ent3) %"r%ose or intention in action 2!ore or less e1%licit3) awareness of other %ersons 2in e!%athy) inters"bjectivity) collectivity3) lin-"istic activity 2involvin- !eanin-) co!!"nication) "nderstandinothers3) social interaction 2incl"din- collective action3) and everyday activity in o"r s"rro"ndin- life,world 2in a %artic"lar c"lt"re3. F"rther!ore) in a different di!ension) we find vario"s -ro"nds or enablin- conditions E conditions of the %ossibility E of intentionality) incl"din- e!bodi!ent) bodily s4ills) c"lt"ral conte1t) lan-"a-e and other social %ractices) social bac4-ro"nd) and conte1t"al as%ects of intentional activities. Th"s) %heno!enolo-y leads fro! conscio"s e1%erience into conditions that hel% to -ive e1%erience its intentionality. Traditional %heno!enolo-y has foc"sed on s"bjective) %ractical) and social conditions of e1%erience. Recent %hiloso%hy of !ind) however) has foc"sed es%ecially on the ne"ral s"bstrate of e1%erience) on how conscio"s e1%erience and !ental re%resentation or intentionality are -ro"nded in brain activity. t re!ains a diffic"lt 7"estion how !"ch of these -ro"nds of e1%erience fall within the %rovince of %heno!enolo-y as a disci%line. C"lt"ral conditions th"s see! closer to o"r e1%erience and to o"r fa!iliar self,"nderstandin- than do the electroche!ical wor4in-s of o"r brain) !"ch less o"r de%endence on 7"ant"!, !echanical states of %hysical syste!s to which we !ay belon-. The ca"tio"s thin- to say is that %heno!enolo-y leads in so!e ways into at least so!e bac4-ro"nd conditions of o"r e1%erience.
The disci%line of %heno!enolo-y is defined by its do!ain of st"dy) its !ethods) and its !ain res"lts. Pheno!enolo-y st"dies str"ct"res of conscio"s e1%erience as e1%erienced fro! the first, %erson %oint of view) alon- with relevant conditions of e1%erience. The central str"ct"re of an e1%erience is its intentionality) the way it is directed thro"-h its content or !eanintoward a certain object in the world. We all e1%erience vario"s ty%es of e1%erience incl"din- %erce%tion) i!a-ination) tho"-ht) e!otion) desire) volition) and action. Th"s) the do!ain of %heno!enolo-y is the ran-e of e1%eriences incl"din- these ty%es 2a!on- others3. E1%erience incl"des not only relatively %assive e1%erience as in vision or hearin-) b"t also active e1%erience as in wal4in- or ha!!erin- a nail or 4ic4in- a ball. 2The ran-e will be s%ecific to each s%ecies of bein- that enjoys conscio"snessF o"r foc"s is on o"r own) h"!an) e1%erience. Not all conscio"s bein-s will) or will be able to) %ractice %heno!enolo-y) as we do.3 Conscio"s e1%eriences have a "ni7"e feat"re@ we experien e the!) we live thro"-h the! or %erfor! the!. +ther thin-s in the world we !ay observe and en-a-e. #"t we do not e1%erience the!) in the sense of livin- thro"-h or %erfor!in- the!. This e1%eriential or first,%erson feat"re E that of bein- e1%erienced E is an essential %art of the nat"re or str"ct"re of conscio"s e1%erience@ as we say) A see G thin4 G desire G do HB This feat"re is both a %heno!enolo-ical and an ontolo-ical feat"re of each e1%erience@ it is %art of what it is for the e1%erience to be e1%erienced 2%heno!enolo-ical3 and %art of what it is for the e1%erience to be 2ontolo-ical3. $ow shall we st"dy conscio"s e1%erience9 We reflect on vario"s ty%es of e1%eriences j"st as we e1%erience the!. That is to say) we %roceed fro! the first,%erson %oint of view. $owever) we do not nor!ally characteriDe an e1%erience at the ti!e we are %erfor!in- it. n !any cases we do not have that ca%ability@ a state of intense an-er or fear) for e1a!%le) cons"!es all of one's %sychic foc"s at the ti!e. Rather) we ac7"ire a bac4-ro"nd of havin- lived thro"-h a -iven ty%e of e1%erience) and we loo4 to o"r fa!iliarity with that ty%e of e1%erience@ hearin- a son-) seein- a s"nset) thin4in- abo"t love) intendin- to j"!% a h"rdle. The %ractice of %heno!enolo-y ass"!es s"ch fa!iliarity with the ty%e of e1%eriences to be characteriDed. !%ortantly) also) it is ty%es of e1%erience that %heno!enolo-y %"rs"es) rather than a %artic"lar fleetin- e1%erience E "nless its ty%e is what interests "s. Classical %heno!enolo-ists %racticed so!e three distin-"ishable !ethods. 283 We describe a ty%e of e1%erience j"st as we find it in o"r own 2%ast3 e1%erience. Th"s) $"sserl and 'erlea",Ponty s%o4e of %"re descri%tion of lived e1%erience. 253 We inter%ret a ty%e of e1%erience by relatin- it to relevant feat"res of conte1t. n this vein) $eide--er and his followers s%o4e of her!ene"tics) the art of inter%retation in conte1t) es%ecially social and lin-"istic conte1t. 2;3 We analyDe the for! of a ty%e of e1%erience. n the end) all the classical %heno!enolo-ists %racticed analysis of e1%erience) factorino"t notable feat"res for f"rther elaboration.
These traditional !ethods have been ra!ified in recent decades) e1%andin- the !ethods available to %heno!enolo-y. Th"s@ 2<3 n a lo-ico,se!antic !odel of %heno!enolo-y) we s%ecify the tr"th conditions for a ty%e of thin4in- 2say) where thin4 that do-s chase cats3 or the satisfaction conditions for a ty%e of intention 2say) where intend or will to j"!% that h"rdle3. 2>3 n the e1%eri!ental %aradi-! of co-nitive ne"roscience) we desi-n e!%irical e1%eri!ents that tend to confir! or ref"te as%ects of e1%erience 2say) where a brain scan shows electroche!ical activity in a s%ecific re-ion of the brain tho"-ht to s"bserve a ty%e of vision or e!otion or !otor control3. This style of Ane"ro%heno!enolo-yB ass"!es that conscio"s e1%erience is -ro"nded in ne"ral activity in e!bodied action in a%%ro%riate s"rro"ndin-s E !i1in- %"re %heno!enolo-y with biolo-ical and %hysical science in a way that was not wholly con-enial to traditional %heno!enolo-ists. What !a4es an e1%erience conscio"s is a certain awareness one has of the e1%erience while livin- thro"-h or %erfor!in- it. This for! of inner awareness has been a to%ic of considerable debate) cent"ries after the iss"e arose with (oc4e's notion of self, conscio"sness on the heels of :escartes' sense of conscio"sness 2 ons ien e) co, 4nowled-e3. :oes this awareness,of,e1%erience consist in a 4ind of inner observation of the e1%erience) as if one were doin- two thin-s at once9 2#rentano ar-"ed no.3 s it a hi-her,order %erce%tion of one's !ind's o%eration) or is it a hi-her,order tho"-ht abo"t one's !ental activity9 2Recent theorists have %ro%osed both.3 +r is it a different for! of inherent str"ct"re9 2Sartre too4 this line) drawin- on #rentano and $"sserl.3 These iss"es are beyond the sco%e of this article) b"t notice that these res"lts of %heno!enolo-ical analysis sha%e the characteriDation of the do!ain of st"dy and the !ethodolo-y a%%ro%riate to the do!ain. For awareness,of,e1%erience is a definin- trait of conscio"s e1%erience) the trait that -ives e1%erience a first,%erson) lived character. t is that lived character of e1%erience that allows a first,%erson %ers%ective on the object of st"dy) na!ely) e1%erience) and that %ers%ective is characteristic of the !ethodolo-y of %heno!enolo-y. Conscio"s e1%erience is the startin- %oint of %heno!enolo-y) b"t e1%erience shades off into less overtly conscio"s %heno!ena. As $"sserl and others stressed) we are only va-"ely aware of thin-s in the !ar-in or %eri%hery of attention) and we are only i!%licitly aware of the wider horiDon of thin-s in the world aro"nd "s. 'oreover) as $eide--er stressed) in %ractical activities li4e wal4in- alon-) or ha!!erin- a nail) or s%ea4in- o"r native ton-"e) we are not e1%licitly conscio"s of o"r habit"al %atterns of action. F"rther!ore) as %sychoanalysts have stressed) !"ch of o"r intentional !ental activity is not conscio"s at all) b"t !ay beco!e conscio"s in the %rocess of thera%y or interro-ation) as we co!e to realiDe how we feel or thin4 abo"t so!ethin-. We sho"ld allow) then) that the do!ain of %heno!enolo-y E o"r own e1%erience E s%reads o"t fro! conscio"s e1%erience into se!i,conscio"s and even "nconscio"s !ental activity) alon- with relevant bac4-ro"nd conditions i!%licitly invo4ed in o"r e1%erience. 2These iss"es are s"bject to debateF the %oint here is to o%en the door to the 7"estion of where to draw the bo"ndary of the do!ain of %heno!enolo-y.3
To be-in an ele!entary e1ercise in %heno!enolo-y) consider so!e ty%ical e1%eriences one !i-ht have in everyday life) characteriDed in the first %erson@
see that fishin- boat off the coast as d"s4 descends over the Pacific. hear that helico%ter whirrin- overhead as it a%%roaches the hos%ital. a! thin4in- that %heno!enolo-y differs fro! %sycholo-y. wish that war! rain fro! 'e1ico were fallin- li4e last wee4. i!a-ine a fearso!e creat"re li4e that in !y ni-ht!are. intend to finish !y writin- by noon. wal4 caref"lly aro"nd the bro4en -lass on the sidewal4. stro4e a bac4hand cross,co"rt with that certain "nders%in. a! searchin- for the words to !a4e !y %oint in conversation.
$ere are r"di!entary characteriDations of so!e fa!iliar ty%es of e1%erience. Each sentence is a si!%le for! of %heno!enolo-ical descri%tion) artic"latin- in everyday En-lish the str"ct"re of the ty%e of e1%erience so described. The s"bject ter! A B indicates the first,%erson str"ct"re of the e1%erience@ the intentionality %roceeds fro! the s"bject. The verb indicates the ty%e of intentional activity described@ %erce%tion) tho"-ht) i!a-ination) etc. +f central i!%ortance is the way that objects of awareness are %resented or intended in o"r e1%eriences) es%ecially) the way we see or conceive or thin4 abo"t objects. The direct,object e1%ression 2Athat fishin- boat off the coastB3 artic"lates the !ode of %resentation of the object in the e1%erience@ the content or !eanin- of the e1%erience) the core of what $"sserl called noe!a. n effect) the object,%hrase e1%resses the noe!a of the act described) that is) to the e1tent that lan-"a-e has a%%ro%riate e1%ressive %ower. The overall for! of the -iven sentence artic"lates the basic for! of intentionality in the e1%erience@ s"bject,act,content,object. Rich %heno!enolo-ical descri%tion or inter%retation) as in $"sserl) 'erlea",Ponty et al.) will far o"tr"n s"ch si!%le %heno!enolo-ical descri%tions as above. #"t s"ch si!%le descri%tions brin- o"t the basic for! of intentionality. As we inter%ret the %heno!enolo-ical descri%tion f"rther) we !ay assess the relevance of the conte1t of e1%erience. And we !ay t"rn to wider conditions of the %ossibility of that ty%e of e1%erience. n this way) in the %ractice of %heno!enolo-y) we classify) describe) inter%ret) and analyDe str"ct"res of e1%eriences in ways that answer to o"r own e1%erience. n s"ch inter%retive,descri%tive analyses of e1%erience) we i!!ediately observe that we are analyDin- fa!iliar for!s of conscio"sness) conscio"s e1%erience of or abo"t this or that. ntentionality is th"s the salient str"ct"re of o"r e1%erience) and !"ch of %heno!enolo-y %roceeds as the st"dy of different as%ects of intentionality. Th"s) we e1%lore str"ct"res of the strea! of conscio"sness) the end"rin- self) the e!bodied self) and bodily action. F"rther!ore) as we reflect on how these %heno!ena wor4) we t"rn to the analysis of relevant conditions that enable o"r e1%eriences to occ"r as they do) and to re%resent or intend as they do. Pheno!enolo-y then leads into analyses of conditions of the %ossibility of intentionality) conditions involvin- !otor s4ills and habits) bac4-ro"nd social %ractices) and often lan-"a-e) with its s%ecial %lace in h"!an affairs.
Standpoint 28JM<3) %heno!ena are what occ"r in the !ind@ !ental %heno!ena are acts of conscio"sness 2or their contents3) and %hysical %heno!ena are objects of e1ternal %erce%tion startin- with colors and sha%es. For #rentano) %hysical %heno!ena e1ist AintentionallyB in acts of conscio"sness. This view revives a 'edieval notion #rentano called Aintentional in,e1istenceB) b"t the ontolo-y re!ains "ndevelo%ed 2what is it to e1ist in the !ind) and do %hysical objects e1ist only in the !ind93. 'ore -enerally) we !i-ht say) %heno!ena are whatever we are conscio"s of@ objects and events aro"nd "s) other %eo%le) o"rselves) even 2in reflection3 o"r own conscio"s e1%eriences) as we e1%erience these. n a certain technical sense) %heno!ena are thin-s as they are -iven to o"r conscio"sness) whether in %erce%tion or i!a-ination or tho"-ht or volition. This conce%tion of %heno!ena wo"ld soon infor! the new disci%line of %heno!enolo-y. #rentano distin-"ished des riptive %sycholo-y fro! geneti %sycholo-y. Where -enetic %sycholo-y see4s the ca"ses of vario"s ty%es of !ental %heno!ena) descri%tive %sycholo-y defines and classifies the vario"s ty%es of !ental %heno!ena) incl"din%erce%tion) j"d-!ent) e!otion) etc. Accordin- to #rentano) every !ental %heno!enon) or act of conscio"sness) is directed toward so!e object) and only !ental %heno!ena are so directed. This thesis of intentional directedness was the hall!ar4 of #rentano's descri%tive %sycholo-y. n 8JJK #rentano "sed the ter! A%heno!enolo-yB for descri%tive %sycholo-y) and the way was %aved for $"sserl's new science of %heno!enolo-y. Pheno!enolo-y as we 4now it was la"nched by Ed!"nd $"sserl in his )ogi al *nvestigations 28K66,683. Two i!%ortantly different lines of theory ca!e to-ether in that !on"!ental wor4@ %sycholo-ical theory) on the heels of FranD #rentano 2and also Willia! Ca!es) whose (rin iples o# (s& holog& a%%eared in 8JK8 and -reatly i!%ressed $"sserl3F and lo-ical or se!antic theory) on the heels of #ernard #olDano and $"sserl's conte!%oraries who fo"nded !odern lo-ic) incl"din- Iottlob Fre-e. 2 nterestin-ly) both lines of research trace bac4 to Aristotle) and both reached i!%ortantly new res"lts in $"sserl's day.3 $"sserl's )ogi al *nvestigations was ins%ired by #olDano's ideal of lo-ic) while ta4in- "% #rentano's conce%tion of descri%tive %sycholo-y. n his !heor& o# S ien e 28J;>3 #olDano distin-"ished between s"bjective and objective ideas or re%resentations 2+orstellungen3. n effect #olDano criticiDed 0ant and before hi! the classical e!%iricists and rationalists for failin- to !a4e this sort of distinction) thereby renderin- %heno!ena !erely s"bjective. (o-ic st"dies objective ideas) incl"din- %ro%ositions) which in t"rn !a4e "% objective theories as in the sciences. Psycholo-y wo"ld) by contrast) st"dy s"bjective ideas) the concrete contents 2occ"rrences3 of !ental activities in %artic"lar !inds at a -iven ti!e. $"sserl was after both) within a sin-le disci%line. So %heno!ena !"st be reconceived as objective intentional contents 2so!eti!es called intentional objects3 of s"bjective acts of conscio"sness. Pheno!enolo-y wo"ld then st"dy this co!%le1 of conscio"sness and correlated %heno!ena. n *deas 2#oo4 +ne) 8K8;3 $"sserl introd"ced two Iree4 words to ca%t"re his version of the #olDanoan distinction@ noesis and noe'a 2fro! the Iree4 verb no,a-) !eanin- to %erceive) thin4) intend) whence the no"n nous or !ind3. The intentional %rocess of conscio"sness is called
noesis) while its ideal content is called noe'a. The noe!a of an act of conscio"sness $"sserl characteriDed both as an ideal !eanin- and as Athe object as intendedB. Th"s the %heno!enon) or object,as,it,a%%ears) beco!es the noe!a) or object,as,it,is,intended. The inter%retations of $"sserl's theory of noe!a have been several and a!o"nt to different develo%!ents of $"sserl's basic theory of intentionality. 2 s the noe!a an as%ect of the object intended) or rather a !edi"! of intention93 For $"sserl) then) %heno!enolo-y inte-rates a 4ind of %sycholo-y with a 4ind of lo-ic. t develo%s a descri%tive or analytic %sycholo-y in that it describes and analyDes ty%es of s"bjective !ental activity or e1%erience) in short) acts of conscio"sness. /et it develo%s a 4ind of lo-ic E a theory of !eanin- 2today we say lo-ical se!antics3 E in that it describes and analyDes objective contents of conscio"sness@ ideas) conce%ts) i!a-es) %ro%ositions) in short) ideal !eanin-s of vario"s ty%es that serve as intentional contents) or noe!atic !eanin-s) of vario"s ty%es of e1%erience. These contents are shareable by different acts of conscio"sness) and in that sense they are objective) ideal !eanin-s. Followin- #olDano 2and to so!e e1tent the %latonistic lo-ician $er!ann (otDe3) $"sserl o%%osed any red"ction of lo-ic or !athe!atics or science to !ere %sycholo-y) to how %eo%le ha%%en to thin4) and in the sa!e s%irit he distin-"ished %heno!enolo-y fro! !ere %sycholo-y. For $"sserl) %heno!enolo-y wo"ld st"dy conscio"sness witho"t red"cin- the objective and shareable !eanin-s that inhabit e1%erience to !erely s"bjective ha%%enstances. deal !eanin- wo"ld be the en-ine of intentionality in acts of conscio"sness. A clear conce%tion of %heno!enolo-y awaited $"sserl's develo%!ent of a clear !odel of intentionality. ndeed) %heno!enolo-y and the !odern conce%t of intentionality e!er-ed hand,in,hand in $"sserl's )ogi al *nvestigations 28K66,683. With theoretical fo"ndations laid in the *nvestigations) $"sserl wo"ld then %ro!ote the radical new science of %heno!enolo-y in *deas 28K8;3. And alternative visions of %heno!enolo-y wo"ld soon follow.
$"sserl's wor4 was followed by a fl"rry of %heno!enolo-ical writin- in the first half of the 56th cent"ry. The diversity of traditional %heno!enolo-y is a%%arent in the $n & lopedia o# (heno'enolog& 20l"wer Acade!ic P"blishers) 8KKM) :ordrecht and #oston3) which feat"res se%arate articles on so!e seven ty%es of %heno!enolo-y. 283 Transcendental constit"tive %heno!enolo-y st"dies how objects are constit"ted in %"re or transcendental conscio"sness) settin- aside 7"estions of any relation to the nat"ral world aro"nd "s. 253 Nat"ralistic constit"tive %heno!enolo-y st"dies how conscio"sness constit"tes or ta4es thin-s in the world of nat"re) ass"!in- with the nat"ral attit"de that conscio"sness is %art of nat"re. 2;3 E1istential %heno!enolo-y st"dies concrete h"!an e1istence) incl"din- o"r e1%erience of free choice or action in concrete sit"ations. 2<3 Ienerative historicist %heno!enolo-y st"dies how !eanin-) as fo"nd in o"r e1%erience) is -enerated in historical %rocesses of collective e1%erience over ti!e. 2>3 Ienetic %heno!enolo-y st"dies the -enesis of !eanin-s of thin-s within one's own strea! of e1%erience. 2?3 $er!ene"tical %heno!enolo-y st"dies inter%retive str"ct"res of e1%erience) how we "nderstand and en-a-e thin-s aro"nd "s in o"r h"!an world) incl"din- o"rselves and others. 2M3 Realistic %heno!enolo-y st"dies the str"ct"re of conscio"sness and intentionality) ass"!in- it occ"rs in a real world that is lar-ely e1ternal to conscio"sness and not so!ehow bro"-ht into bein- by conscio"sness. The !ost fa!o"s of the classical %heno!enolo-ists were $"sserl) $eide--er) Sartre) and 'erlea",Ponty. n these fo"r thin4ers we find different conce%tions of %heno!enolo-y) different !ethods) and different res"lts. A brief s4etch of their differences will ca%t"re both a cr"cial %eriod in the history of %heno!enolo-y and a sense of the diversity of the field of %heno!enolo-y. n his )ogi al *nvestigations 28K66,683 $"sserl o"tlined a co!%le1 syste! of %hiloso%hy) !ovin- fro! lo-ic to %hiloso%hy of lan-"a-e) to ontolo-y 2theory of "niversals and %arts of wholes3) to a %heno!enolo-ical theory of intentionality) and finally to a %heno!enolo-ical theory of 4nowled-e. Then in *deas 28K8;3 he foc"sed s7"arely on %heno!enolo-y itself. $"sserl defined %heno!enolo-y as Athe science of the essence of conscio"snessB) centered on the definin- trait of intentionality) a%%roached e1%licitly Ain the first %ersonB. 2See $"sserl) *deas ) NN;;ff.3 n this s%irit) we !ay say %heno!enolo-y is the st"dy of conscio"sness E that is) conscio"s e1%erience of vario"s ty%es E as e1%erienced fro! the first,%erson %oint of view. n this disci%line we st"dy different for!s of e1%erience j"st as we e1%erience the!) fro! the %ers%ective of the s"bject livin- thro"-h or %erfor!in- the!. Th"s) we characteriDe e1%eriences of seein-) hearin-) i!a-inin-) thin4in-) feelin- 2i.e.) e!otion3) wishin-) desirin-) willin-) and also actin-) that is) e!bodied volitional activities of wal4in-) tal4in-) coo4in-) car%enterin-) etc. $owever) not j"st any characteriDation of an e1%erience will do. Pheno!enolo-ical analysis of a -iven ty%e of e1%erience will feat"re the ways in which we o"rselves wo"ld e1%erience that for! of conscio"s activity. And the leadin- %ro%erty of o"r fa!iliar ty%es of e1%erience is their intentionality) their bein- a conscio"sness of or abo"t so!ethin-) so!ethin- e1%erienced or %resented or en-a-ed in a certain way. $ow see or conce%t"aliDe or "nderstand the object a! dealin- with defines the !eanin- of that object in !y c"rrent e1%erience. Th"s) %heno!enolo-y feat"res a st"dy of !eanin-) in a wide sense that incl"des !ore than what is e1%ressed in lan-"a-e.
n *deas $"sserl %resented %heno!enolo-y with a transcendental t"rn. n %art this !eans that $"sserl too4 on the 0antian idio! of Atranscendental idealis!B) loo4in- for conditions of the %ossibility of 4nowled-e) or of conscio"sness -enerally) and ar-"ably t"rnin- away fro! any reality beyond %heno!ena. #"t $"sserl's transcendental t"rn also involved his discovery of the !ethod of epo h, 2fro! the Iree4 s4e%tics' notion of abstainin- fro! belief3. We are to %ractice %heno!enolo-y) $"sserl %ro%osed) by Abrac4etin-B the 7"estion of the e1istence of the nat"ral world aro"nd "s. We thereby t"rn o"r attention) in reflection) to the str"ct"re of o"r own conscio"s e1%erience. +"r first 4ey res"lt is the observation that each act of conscio"sness is a conscio"sness of so!ethin-) that is) intentional) or directed toward so!ethin-. Consider !y vis"al e1%erience wherein see a tree across the s7"are. n %heno!enolo-ical reflection) we need not concern o"rselves with whether the tree e1ists@ !y e1%erience is of a tree whether or not s"ch a tree e1ists. $owever) we do need to concern o"rselves with ho- the object is !eant or intended. see a E"caly%t"s tree) not a /"cca treeF see that object as a E"caly%t"s) with a certain sha%e) with bar4 stir%%in- off) etc. Th"s) brac4etin- the tree itself) we t"rn o"r attention to !y e1%erience of the tree) and s%ecifically to the content or !eanin- in !y e1%erience. This tree,as,%erceived $"sserl calls the noe!a or noe!atic sense of the e1%erience. Philoso%hers s"cceedin- $"sserl debated the %ro%er characteriDation of %heno!enolo-y) ar-"in- over its res"lts and its !ethods. Adolf Reinach) an early st"dent of $"sserl's 2who died in World War 3) ar-"ed that %heno!enolo-y sho"ld re!ain allied with a realist ontolo-y) as in $"sserl's )ogi al *nvestigations. Ro!an n-arden) a Polish %heno!enolo-ist of the ne1t -eneration) contin"ed the resistance to $"sserl's t"rn to transcendental idealis!. For s"ch %hiloso%hers) %heno!enolo-y sho"ld not brac4et 7"estions of bein- or ontolo-y) as the !ethod of epo h, wo"ld s"--est. And they were not alone. 'artin $eide--er st"died $"sserl's early writin-s) wor4ed as Assistant to $"sserl in 8K8?) and in 8K5J s"cceeded $"sserl in the %resti-io"s chair at the *niversity of Freib"r-. $eide--er had his own ideas abo"t %heno!enolo-y. n .eing and !i'e 28K5M3 $eide--er "nf"rled his rendition of %heno!enolo-y. For $eide--er) we and o"r activities are always Ain the worldB) o"r bein- is bein-,in,the, world) so we do not st"dy o"r activities by brac4etin- the world) rather we inter%ret o"r activities and the !eanin- thin-s have for "s by loo4in- to o"r conte1t"al relations to thin-s in the world. ndeed) for $eide--er) %heno!enolo-y resolves into what he called Af"nda!ental ontolo-yB. We !"st distin-"ish bein-s fro! their bein-) and we be-in o"r investi-ation of the !eanin- of bein- in o"r own case) e1a!inin- o"r own e1istence in the activity of A:aseinB 2that bein- whose bein- is in each case !y own3. $eide--er resisted $"sserl's neo,Cartesian e!%hasis on conscio"sness and s"bjectivity) incl"dinhow %erce%tion %resents thin-s aro"nd "s. #y contrast) $eide--er held that o"r !ore basic ways of relatin- to thin-s are in %ractical activities li4e ha!!erin-) where the %heno!enolo-y reveals o"r sit"ation in a conte1t of e7"i%!ent and in bein-,with,others. n .eing and !i'e $eide--er a%%roached %heno!enolo-y) in a 7"asi,%oetic idio!) thro"-h the root !eanin-s of Alo-osB and A%heno!enaB) so that %heno!enolo-y is defined as the art or %ractice of Alettin- thin-s show the!selvesB. n $eide--er's
ini!itable lin-"istic %lay on the Iree4 roots) A O%heno!enolo-yP !eans H E to let that which shows itself be seen fro! itself in the very way in which it shows itself fro! itself.B 2See $eide--er) .eing and !i'e) 8K5M) Q MC.3 $ere $eide--er e1%licitly %arodies $"sserl's call) ATo the thin-s the!selvesRB) or ATo the %heno!ena the!selvesRB $eide--er went on to e!%hasiDe %ractical for!s of co!%ort!ent or better relatin2+erhalten3 as in ha!!erin- a nail) as o%%osed to re%resentational for!s of intentionality as in seein- or thin4in- abo"t a ha!!er. '"ch of .eing and !i'e develo%s an e1istential inter%retation of o"r !odes of bein- incl"din-) fa!o"sly) o"r bein-,toward,death. n a very different style) in clear analytical %rose) in the te1t of a lect"re co"rse called !he .asi (roble's o# (heno'enolog& 28K5M3) $eide--er traced the 7"estion of the !eaninof bein- fro! Aristotle thro"-h !any other thin4ers into the iss"es of %heno!enolo-y. +"r "nderstandin- of bein-s and their bein- co!es "lti!ately thro"-h %heno!enolo-y. $ere the connection with classical iss"es of ontolo-y is !ore a%%arent) and consonant with $"sserl's vision in the )ogi al *nvestigations 2an early so"rce of ins%iration for $eide--er3. +ne of $eide--er's !ost innovative ideas was his conce%tion of the A-ro"ndB of bein-) loo4in- to !odes of bein- !ore f"nda!ental than the thin-s aro"nd "s 2fro! trees to ha!!ers3. $eide--er 7"estioned the conte!%orary concern with technolo-y) and his writin- !i-ht s"--est that o"r scientific theories are historical artifacts that we "se in technolo-ical %ractice) rather than syste!s of ideal tr"th 2as $"sserl had held3. +"r dee% "nderstandin- of bein-) in o"r own case) co!es rather fro! %heno!enolo-y) $eide--er held. n the 8K;6s %heno!enolo-y !i-rated fro! A"strian and then Ier!an %hiloso%hy into French %hiloso%hy. The way had been %aved in 'arcel Pro"st's *n Sear h o# )ost !i'e) in which the narrator reco"nts in close detail his vivid recollections of %ast e1%eriences) incl"din- his fa!o"s associations with the s!ell of freshly ba4ed !adeleines. This sensibility to e1%erience traces to :escartes' wor4) and French %heno!enolo-y has been an effort to %reserve the central thr"st of :escartes' insi-hts while rejectin- !ind,body d"alis!. The e1%erience of one's own body) or one's lived or livin- body) has been an i!%ortant !otif in !any French %hiloso%hers of the 56th cent"ry. n the novel Nausea 28K;?3 Cean,Pa"l Sartre described a biDarre co"rse of e1%erience in which the %rota-onist) writin- in the first %erson) describes how ordinary objects lose their !eanin- "ntil he enco"nters %"re bein- at the foot of a chestn"t tree) and in that !o!ent recovers his sense of his own freedo!. n .eing and Nothingness 28K<;) written %artly while a %risoner of war3) Sartre develo%ed his conce%tion of %heno!enolo-ical ontolo-y. Conscio"sness is a conscio"sness of objects) as $"sserl had stressed. n Sartre's !odel of intentionality) the central %layer in conscio"sness is a %heno!enon) and the occ"rrence of a %heno!enon j"st is a conscio"sness,of,an,object. The chestn"t tree see is) for Sartre) s"ch a %heno!enon in !y conscio"sness. ndeed) all thin-s in the world) as we nor!ally e1%erience the!) are %heno!ena) beneath or behind which lies their Abein-, in,itselfB. Conscio"sness) by contrast) has Abein-,for,itselfB) since each conscio"sness is not only a conscio"sness,of,its,object b"t also a %re,reflective conscio"sness,of,itself 2 ons ien e de soi3. /et for Sartre) "nli4e $"sserl) the A B or self is nothin- b"t a
se7"ence of acts of conscio"sness) notably incl"din- radically free choices 2li4e a $"!ean b"ndle of %erce%tions3. For Sartre) the %ractice of %heno!enolo-y %roceeds by a deliberate reflection on the str"ct"re of conscio"sness. Sartre's !ethod is in effect a literary style of inter%retive descri%tion of different ty%es of e1%erience in relevant sit"ations E a %ractice that does not really fit the !ethodolo-ical %ro%osals of either $"sserl or $eide--er) b"t !a4es "se of Sartre's -reat literary s4ill. 2Sartre wrote !any %lays and novels and was awarded the Nobel PriDe in (iterat"re.3 Sartre's %heno!enolo-y in .eing and Nothingness beca!e the %hiloso%hical fo"ndation for his %o%"lar %hiloso%hy of e1istentialis!) s4etched in his fa!o"s lect"re AE1istentialis! is a $"!anis!B 28K<>3. n .eing and Nothingness Sartre e!%hasiDed the e1%erience of freedo! of choice) es%ecially the %roject of choosin- one's self) the definin- %attern of one's %ast actions. Thro"-h vivid descri%tion of the Aloo4B of the +ther) Sartre laid -ro"ndwor4 for the conte!%orary %olitical si-nificance of the conce%t of the +ther 2as in other -ro"%s or ethnicities3. ndeed) in !he Se ond Sex 28K<K3 Si!one de #ea"voir) Sartre's life,lon- co!%anion) la"nched conte!%orary fe!inis! with her n"anced acco"nt of the %erceived role of wo!en as +ther. n 8K<6s Paris) 'a"rice 'erlea",Ponty joined with Sartre and #ea"voir in develo%in%heno!enolo-y. n (heno'enolog& o# (er eption 28K<>3 'erlea",Ponty develo%ed a rich variety of %heno!enolo-y e!%hasiDin- the role of the body in h"!an e1%erience. *nli4e $"sserl) $eide--er) and Sartre) 'erlea",Ponty loo4ed to e1%eri!ental %sycholo-y) analyDin- the re%orted e1%erience of a!%"tees who felt sensations in a %hanto! li!b. 'erlea",Ponty rejected both associationist %sycholo-y) foc"sed on correlations between sensation and sti!"l"s) and intellect"alist %sycholo-y) foc"sed on rational constr"ction of the world in the !ind. 2Thin4 of the behaviorist and co!%"tationalist !odels of !ind in !ore recent decades of e!%irical %sycholo-y.3 nstead) 'erlea",Ponty foc"sed on the Abody i!a-eB) o"r e1%erience of o"r own body and its si-nificance in o"r activities. E1tendin- $"sserl's acco"nt of the lived body 2as o%%osed to the %hysical body3) 'erlea",Ponty resisted the traditional Cartesian se%aration of !ind and body. For the body i!a-e is neither in the !ental real! nor in the !echanical,%hysical real!. Rather) !y body is) as it were) !e in !y en-a-ed action with thin-s %erceive incl"din- other %eo%le. The sco%e of (heno'enolog& o# (er eption is characteristic of the breadth of classical %heno!enolo-y) not least beca"se 'erlea",Ponty drew 2with -enerosity3 on $"sserl) $eide--er) and Sartre while fashionin- his own innovative vision of %heno!enolo-y. $is %heno!enolo-y addressed the role of attention in the %heno!enal field) the e1%erience of the body) the s%atiality of the body) the !otility of the body) the body in se1"al bein- and in s%eech) other selves) te!%orality) and the character of freedo! so i!%ortant in French e1istentialis!. Near the end of a cha%ter on the co-ito 2:escartes' A thin4) therefore a!B3) 'erlea",Ponty s"ccinctly ca%t"res his e!bodied) e1istential for! of %heno!enolo-y) writin-@
nsofar as) when reflect on the essence of s"bjectivity) find it bo"nd "% with that of the body and that of the world) this is beca"se !y e1istence as s"bjectivity ST conscio"snessU is !erely one with !y e1istence as a body and with the e1istence of the world) and beca"se the s"bject that a!) when ta4en concretely) is inse%arable fro! this body and this world. S<6JU n short) conscio"sness is e!bodied 2in the world3) and e7"ally body is inf"sed with conscio"sness 2with co-nition of the world3. n the years since $"ssserl) $eide--er) et al. wrote) %heno!enolo-ists have d"- into all these classical iss"es) incl"din- intentionality) te!%oral awareness) inters"bjectivity) %ractical intentionality) and the social and lin-"istic conte1ts of h"!an activity. nter%retation of historical te1ts by $"sserl et al. has %layed a %ro!inent role in this wor4) both beca"se the te1ts are rich and diffic"lt and beca"se the historical di!ension is itself %art of the %ractice of continental E"ro%ean %hiloso%hy. Since the 8K?6s) %hiloso%hers trained in the !ethods of analytic %hiloso%hy have also d"- into the fo"ndations of %heno!enolo-y) with an eye to 56th cent"ry wor4 in %hiloso%hy of lo-ic) lan-"a-e) and !ind. Pheno!enolo-y was already lin4ed with lo-ical and se!antic theory in $"sserl's )ogi al *nvestigations. Analytic %heno!enolo-y %ic4s "% on that connection. n %artic"lar) :a-finn FVllesdal and C. N. 'ohanty have e1%lored historical and conce%t"al relations between $"sserl's %heno!enolo-y and Fre-e's lo-ical se!antics 2in Fre-e's A+n Sense and ReferenceB) 8JK53. For Fre-e) an e1%ression refers to an object by way of a sense@ th"s) two e1%ressions 2say) Athe !ornin- starB and Athe evenin- starB3 !ay refer to the sa!e object 2=en"s3 b"t e1%ress different senses with different !anners of %resentation. For $"sserl) si!ilarly) an e1%erience 2or act of conscio"sness3 intends or refers to an object by way of a noe!a or noe!atic sense@ th"s) two e1%eriences !ay refer to the sa!e object b"t have different noe!atic senses involvin- different ways of %resentin- the object 2for e1a!%le) in seein- the sa!e object fro! different sides3. ndeed) for $"sserl) the theory of intentionality is a -eneraliDation of the theory of lin-"istic reference@ as lin-"istic reference is !ediated by sense) so intentional reference is !ediated by noe!atic sense. 'ore recently) analytic %hiloso%hers of !ind have rediscovered %heno!enolo-ical iss"es of !ental re%resentation) intentionality) conscio"sness) sensory e1%erience) intentional content) and conte1t,of,tho"-ht. So!e of these analytic %hiloso%hers of !ind har4 bac4 to Willia! Ca!es and FranD #rentano at the ori-ins of !odern %sycholo-y) and so!e loo4 to e!%irical research in today's co-nitive ne"roscience. So!e researchers have be-"n to co!bine %heno!enolo-ical iss"es with iss"es of ne"roscience and behavioral st"dies and !athe!atical !odelin-. S"ch st"dies will e1tend the !ethods of traditional %heno!enolo-y as the /eitgeist !oves on. We address %hiloso%hy of !ind below.
The disci%line of %heno!enolo-y for!s one basic field in %hiloso%hy a!on- others. $ow is %heno!enolo-y distin-"ished fro!) and related to) other fields in %hiloso%hy9 Traditionally) %hiloso%hy incl"des at least fo"r core fields or disci%lines@ ontolo-y) e%iste!olo-y) ethics) lo-ic. S"%%ose %heno!enolo-y joins that list. Consider then these ele!entary definitions of field@
+ntolo-y is the st"dy of bein-s or their bein- E what is. E%iste!olo-y is the st"dy of 4nowled-e E how we 4now. (o-ic is the st"dy of valid reasonin- E how to reason. Ethics is the st"dy of ri-ht and wron- E how we sho"ld act. Pheno!enolo-y is the st"dy of o"r e1%erience E how we e1%erience.
The do!ains of st"dy in these five fields are clearly different) and they see! to call for different !ethods of st"dy. Philoso%hers have so!eti!es ar-"ed that one of these fields is Afirst %hiloso%hyB) the !ost f"nda!ental disci%line) on which all %hiloso%hy or all 4nowled-e or wisdo! rests. $istorically 2it !ay be ar-"ed3) Socrates and Plato %"t ethics first) then Aristotle %"t !eta%hysics or ontolo-y first) then :escartes %"t e%iste!olo-y first) then R"ssell %"t lo-ic first) and then $"sserl 2in his later transcendental %hase3 %"t %heno!enolo-y first. Consider e%iste!olo-y. As we saw) %heno!enolo-y hel%s to define the %heno!ena on which 4nowled-e clai!s rest) accordin- to !odern e%iste!olo-y. +n the other hand) %heno!enolo-y itself clai!s to achieve 4nowled-e abo"t the nat"re of conscio"sness) a distinctive 4ind of first,%erson 4nowled-e) thro"-h a for! of int"ition. Consider lo-ic. As we saw) lo-ical theory of !eanin- led $"sserl into the theory of intentionality) the heart of %heno!enolo-y. +n one acco"nt) %heno!enolo-y e1%licates the intentional or se!antic force of ideal !eanin-s) and %ro%ositional !eanin-s are central to lo-ical theory. #"t lo-ical str"ct"re is e1%ressed in lan-"a-e) either ordinary lan-"a-e or sy!bolic lan-"a-es li4e those of %redicate lo-ic or !athe!atics or co!%"ter syste!s. t re!ains an i!%ortant iss"e of debate where and whether lan-"a-e sha%es s%ecific for!s of e1%erience 2tho"-ht) %erce%tion) e!otion3 and their content or !eanin-. So there is an i!%ortant 2if dis%"ted3 relation between %heno!enolo-y and lo-ico, lin-"istic theory) es%ecially %hiloso%hical lo-ic and %hiloso%hy of lan-"a-e 2as o%%osed to !athe!atical lo-ic per se3. Consider ontolo-y. Pheno!enolo-y st"dies 2a!on- other thin-s3 the nat"re of conscio"sness) which is a central iss"e in !eta%hysics or ontolo-y) and one that leads into the traditional !ind,body %roble!. $"sserlian !ethodolo-y wo"ld brac4et the 7"estion of the e1istence of the s"rro"ndin- world) thereby se%aratin- %heno!enolo-y fro! the ontolo-y of the world. /et $"sserl's %heno!enolo-y %res"%%oses theory abo"t s%ecies and individ"als 2"niversals and %artic"lars3) relations of %art and whole) and ideal !eanin-s E all %arts of ontolo-y.
Now consider ethics. Pheno!enolo-y !i-ht %lay a role in ethics by offerin- analyses of the str"ct"re of will) val"in-) ha%%iness) and care for others 2in e!%athy and sy!%athy3. $istorically) tho"-h) ethics has been on the horiDon of %heno!enolo-y. $"sserl lar-ely avoided ethics in his !ajor wor4s) tho"-h he feat"red the role of %ractical concerns in the str"ct"re of the life,world or of 0eist 2s%irit) or c"lt"re) as in /eitgeist3) and he once delivered a co"rse of lect"res -ivin- ethics 2li4e lo-ic3 a basic %lace in %hiloso%hy) indicatin- the i!%ortance of the %heno!enolo-y of sy!%athy in -ro"ndin- ethics. n .eing and !i'e $eide--er clai!ed not to %"rs"e ethics while disc"ssin- %heno!ena ran-in- fro! care) conscience) and -"ilt to AfallennessB and Aa"thenticityB 2all %heno!ena with theolo-ical echoes3. n .eing and Nothingness Sartre analyDed with s"btlety the lo-ical %roble! of Abad faithB) yet he develo%ed an ontolo-y of val"e as %rod"ced by willin- in -ood faith 2which so"nds li4e a revised 0antian fo"ndation for !orality3. #ea"voir s4etched an e1istentialist ethics) and Sartre left "n%"blished noteboo4s on ethics. $owever) an e1%licitly %heno!enolo-ical a%%roach to ethics e!er-ed in the wor4s of E!ann"el (evinas) a (ith"anian %heno!enolo-ist who heard $"sserl and $eide--er in Freib"r- before !ovin- to Paris. n !otalit& and *n#init& 28K?83) !odifyin- the!es drawn fro! $"sserl and $eide--er) (evinas foc"sed on the si-nificance of the AfaceB of the other) e1%licitly develo%in- -ro"nds for ethics in this ran-e of %heno!enolo-y) writin- an i!%ressionistic style of %rose with all"sions to reli-io"s e1%erience. Allied with ethics are %olitical and social %hiloso%hy. Sartre and 'erlea",Ponty were %olitically en-a-ed in 8K<6s Paris) and their e1istential %hiloso%hies 2%heno!enolo-ically based3 s"--est a %olitical theory based in individ"al freedo!. Sartre later so"-ht an e1%licit blend of e1istentialis! with 'ar1is!. Still) %olitical theory has re!ained on the borders of %heno!enolo-y. Social theory) however) has been closer to %heno!enolo-y as s"ch. $"sserl analyDed the %heno!enolo-ical str"ct"re of the life,world and 0eist -enerally) incl"din- o"r role in social activity. $eide--er stressed social %ractice) which he fo"nd !ore %ri!ordial than individ"al conscio"sness. Alfred Sch"tD develo%ed a %heno!enolo-y of the social world. Sartre contin"ed the %heno!enolo-ical a%%raisal of the !eanin- of the other) the f"nda!ental social for!ation. 'ovin- o"tward fro! %heno!enolo-ical iss"es) 'ichel Fo"ca"lt st"died the -enesis and !eanin- of social instit"tions) fro! %risons to insane asyl"!s. And Cac7"es :errida has lon- %racticed a 4ind of %heno!enolo-y of lan-"a-e) see4in- social !eanin- in the Adeconstr"ctionB of wide,ran-in- te1ts. As%ects of French A%oststr"ct"ralistB theory are so!eti!es inter%reted as broadly %heno!enolo-ical) b"t s"ch iss"es are beyond the %resent %"rview. Classical %heno!enolo-y) then) ties into certain areas of e%iste!olo-y) lo-ic) and ontolo-y) and leads into %arts of ethical) social) and %olitical theory.
s"rvey of %heno!enolo-y by addressin- %hiloso%hy of !ind) one of the !ost vi-oro"sly debated areas in recent %hiloso%hy. The tradition of analytic %hiloso%hy be-an) early in the 56th cent"ry) with analyses of lan-"a-e) notably in the wor4s of Iottlob Fre-e) #ertrand R"ssell) and ("dwiWitt-enstein. Then in !he 1on ept o# Mind 28K<K3 Iilbert Ryle develo%ed a series of analyses of lan-"a-e abo"t different !ental states) incl"din- sensation) belief) and will. Tho"-h Ryle is co!!only dee!ed a %hiloso%her of ordinary lan-"a-e) Ryle hi!self said !he 1on ept o# Mind co"ld be called %heno!enolo-y. n effect) Ryle analyDed o"r %heno!enolo-ical "nderstandin- of !ental states as reflected in ordinary lan-"a-e abo"t the !ind. Fro! this lin-"istic %heno!enolo-y Ryle ar-"ed that Cartesian !ind,body d"alis! involves a cate-ory !ista4e 2the lo-ic or -ra!!ar of !ental verbs E AbelieveB) AseeB) etc. E does not !ean that we ascribe belief) sensation) etc.) to Athe -host in the !achineB3. With Ryle's rejection of !ind,body d"alis!) the !ind,body %roble! was re, awa4ened@ what is the ontolo-y of !ind vis232vis body) and how are !ind and body related9 RenL :escartes) in his e%och,!a4in- Meditations on First (hilosoph& 28?<83) had ar-"ed that !inds and bodies are two distinct 4inds of bein- or s"bstance with two distinct 4inds of attrib"tes or !odes@ bodies are characteriDed by s%atiote!%oral %hysical %ro%erties) while !inds are characteriDed by %ro%erties of thin4in- 2incl"din- seein-) feelin-) etc.3. Cent"ries later) %heno!enolo-y wo"ld find) with #rentano and $"sserl) that !ental acts are characteriDed by conscio"sness and intentionality) while nat"ral science wo"ld find that %hysical syste!s are characteriDed by !ass and force) "lti!ately by -ravitational) electro!a-netic) and 7"ant"! fields. Where do we find conscio"sness and intentionality in the 7"ant"!,electro!a-netic,-ravitational field that) by hy%othesis) orders everythinin the nat"ral world in which we h"!ans and o"r !inds e1ist9 That is the !ind,body %roble! today. n short) %heno!enolo-y by any other na!e lies at the heart of the conte!%orary !ind,body %roble!. After Ryle) %hiloso%hers so"-ht a !ore e1%licit and -enerally nat"ralistic ontolo-y of !ind. n the 8K>6s !aterialis! was ar-"ed anew) "r-in- that !ental states are identical with states of the central nervo"s syste!. The classical identity theory holds that each to4en !ental state 2in a %artic"lar %erson's !ind at a %artic"lar ti!e3 is identical with a to4en brain state 2in that %erson's brain at that ti!e3. A stron-er !aterialis! holds) instead) that each t&pe of !ental state is identical with a t&pe of brain state. #"t !aterialis! does not fit co!fortably with %heno!enolo-y. For it is not obvio"s how conscio"s !ental states as we e1%erience the! E sensations) tho"-hts) e!otions E can si!%ly be the co!%le1 ne"ral states that so!ehow s"bserve or i!%le!ent the!. f !ental states and ne"ral states are si!%ly identical) in to4en or in ty%e) where in o"r scientific theory of !ind does the %heno!enolo-y occ"r E is it not si!%ly re%laced by ne"roscience9 And yet e1%erience is %art of what is to be e1%lained by ne"roscience. n the late 8K?6s and 8KM6s the co!%"ter !odel of !ind set in) and f"nctionalis! beca!e the do!inant !odel of !ind. +n this !odel) !ind is not what the brain consists in 2electroche!ical transactions in ne"rons in vast co!%le1es3. nstead) !ind is what brains
do@ their f"nction of !ediatin- between infor!ation co!in- into the or-anis! and behavior %roceedin- fro! the or-anis!. Th"s) a !ental state is a f"nctional state of the brain or of the h"!an 2or ani!al3 or-anis!. 'ore s%ecifically) on a favorite variation of f"nctionalis!) the !ind is a co!%"tin- syste!@ !ind is to brain as software is to hardwareF tho"-hts are j"st %ro-ra!s r"nnin- on the brain's AwetwareB. Since the 8KM6s the co-nitive sciences E fro! e1%eri!ental st"dies of co-nition to ne"roscience E have tended toward a !i1 of !aterialis! and f"nctionalis!. Irad"ally) however) %hiloso%hers fo"nd that %heno!enolo-ical as%ects of the !ind %ose %roble!s for the f"nctionalist %aradi-! too. n the early 8KM6s Tho!as Na-el ar-"ed in AWhat s t (i4e to #e a #at9B 28KM<3 that conscio"sness itself E es%ecially the s"bjective character of what it is li4e to have a certain ty%e of e1%erience E esca%es %hysical theory. 'any %hiloso%hers %ressed the case that sensory 7"alia E what it is li4e to feel %ain) to see red) etc. E are not addressed or e1%lained by a %hysical acco"nt of either brain str"ct"re or brain f"nction. Conscio"sness has %ro%erties of its own. And yet) we 4now) it is closely tied to the brain. And) at so!e level of descri%tion) ne"ral activities i!%le!ent co!%"tation. n the 8KJ6s Cohn Searle ar-"ed in *ntentionalit& 28KJ;3 2and f"rther in !he 4edis over& o# the Mind 28KK833 that intentionality and conscio"sness are essential %ro%erties of !ental states. For Searle) o"r brains %rod"ce !ental states with %ro%erties of conscio"sness and intentionality) and this is all %art of o"r biolo-y) yet conscio"sness and intentionality re7"ire a Afirst,%ersonB ontolo-y. Searle also ar-"ed that co!%"ters si!"late b"t do not have !ental states characteriDed by intentionality. As Searle ar-"ed) a co!%"ter syste! has a synta1 2%rocessin- sy!bols of certain sha%es3 b"t has no se!antics 2the sy!bols lac4 !eanin-@ we inter%ret the sy!bols3. n this way Searle rejected both !aterialis! and f"nctionalis!) while insistin- that !ind is a biolo-ical %ro%erty of or-anis!s li4e "s@ o"r brains AsecreteB conscio"sness. The analysis of conscio"sness and intentionality is central to %heno!enolo-y as a%%raised above) and Searle's theory of intentionality reads li4e a !oderniDed version of $"sserl's. 2Conte!%orary lo-ical theory ta4es the for! of statin- tr"th conditions for %ro%ositions) and Searle characteriDes a !ental state's intentionality by s%ecifyin- its Asatisfaction conditionsB3. $owever) there is an i!%ortant difference in bac4-ro"nd theory. For Searle e1%licitly ass"!es the basic worldview of nat"ral science) holdin- that conscio"sness is %art of nat"re. #"t $"sserl e1%licitly brac4ets that ass"!%tion) and later %heno!enolo-ists E incl"din- $eide--er) Sartre) 'erlea",Ponty E see! to see4 a certain sanct"ary for %heno!enolo-y beyond the nat"ral sciences. And yet %heno!enolo-y itself sho"ld be lar-ely ne"tral abo"t f"rther theories of how e1%erience arises) notably fro! brain activity. Since the !id,8KK6s a variety of writers wor4in- in %hiloso%hy of !ind have foc"sed on the f"nda!ental character of conscio"sness) "lti!ately a %heno!enolo-ical iss"e. :oes conscio"sness always and essentially involve self,conscio"sness) or conscio"sness,of, consci"sness) as #rentano) $"sserl) and Sartre held 2in veryin- detail39 f so) then every act of conscio"sness either incl"des or is adjoined by a conscio"sness,of,that,
conscio"sness. :oes that self,conscio"sness ta4e the for! of an internal self,!onitorin-9 f so) is that !onitorin- of a hi-her order) where each act of conscio"sness is joined by a f"rther !ental act !onitorin- the base act9 +r is s"ch !onitorin- of the sa!e order as the base act) a %ro%er %art of the act witho"t which the act wo"ld not be conscio"s9 A variety of !odels of this self,conscio"sness have been develo%ed) so!e e1%licitly drawin- on or ada%tin- views in #rentano) $"sserl) and Sartre. Two recent collections address these iss"es@ :avid Woodr"ff S!ith and A!ie (. Tho!asson 2editors3) Pheno!enolo-y and Philoso%hy of 'ind 2566>3) and *riah 0rie-el and 0enneth Williford 2editors3) Self, Re%resentational A%%roaches to Conscio"sness 2566?3. The %hiloso%hy or theory of !ind overall !ay be factored into the followin- disci%lines or ran-es of theory relevant to !ind@ 8. Pheno!enolo-y st"dies conscio"s e1%erience as e1%erienced) analyDin- the str"ct"re E the ty%es) intentional for!s and !eanin-s) dyna!ics) and 2certain3 enablin- conditions E of %erce%tion) tho"-ht) i!a-ination) e!otion) and volition and action. 5. Ne"roscience st"dies the ne"ral activities that serve as biolo-ical s"bstrate to the vario"s ty%es of !ental activity) incl"din- conscio"s e1%erience. Ne"roscience will be fra!ed by evol"tionary biolo-y 2e1%lainin- how ne"ral %heno!ena evolved3 and "lti!ately by basic %hysics 2e1%lainin- how biolo-ical %heno!ena are -ro"nded in %hysical %heno!ena3. $ere lie the intricacies of the nat"ral sciences. Part of what the sciences are acco"ntable for is the str"ct"re of e1%erience) analyDed by %heno!enolo-y. ;. C"lt"ral analysis st"dies the social %ractices that hel% to sha%e or serve as c"lt"ral s"bstrate of the vario"s ty%es of !ental activity) incl"din- conscio"s e1%erience. $ere we st"dy the i!%ort of lan-"a-e and other social %ractices. <. +ntolo-y of !ind st"dies the ontolo-ical ty%e of !ental activity in -eneral) ran-in- fro! %erce%tion 2which involves ca"sal in%"t fro! environ!ent to e1%erience3 to volitional action 2which involves ca"sal o"t%"t fro! volition to bodily !ove!ent3. This division of labor in the theory of !ind can be seen as an e1tension of #rentano's ori-inal distinction between descri%tive and -enetic %sycholo-y. Pheno!enolo-y offers descri%tive analyses of !ental %heno!ena) while ne"roscience 2and wider biolo-y and "lti!ately %hysics3 offers !odels of e1%lanation of what ca"ses or -ives rise to !ental %heno!ena. C"lt"ral theory offers analyses of social activities and their i!%act on e1%erience) incl"din- ways lan-"a-e sha%es o"r tho"-ht) e!otion) and !otivation. And ontolo-y fra!es all these res"lts within a basic sche!e of the str"ct"re of the world) incl"din- o"r own !inds. 'eanwhile) fro! an e%iste!olo-ical stand%oint) all these ran-es of theory abo"t !ind be-in with how we observe and reason abo"t and see4 to e1%lain %heno!ena we enco"nter in the world. And that is where %heno!enolo-y be-ins. 'oreover) how we "nderstand each %iece of theory) incl"din- theory abo"t !ind) is central to the theory of
intentionality) as it were) the se!antics of tho"-ht and e1%erience in -eneral. And that is the heart of %heno!enolo-y.
'i(liography
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$"sserl's !at"re acco"nt of transcendental %heno!enolo-y) incl"din- his notion of intentional content as noe!a. $"sserl) E.) 8KJK) *deas pertaining to a (ure (heno'enolog& and to a (heno'enologi al (hilosoph&) Second #oo4. Trans. Richard RojcewicD and AndrX Sch"wer. :ordrecht and #oston@ 0l"wer Acade!ic P"blishers. Fro! the Ier!an ori-inal "n%"blished !an"scri%t of 8K85) revised 8K8>) 8K5J. 0nown as *deas . o :etailed %heno!enolo-ical analyses ass"!ed in *deas ) incl"dinanalyses of bodily awareness 24inesthesis and !otility3 and social awareness 2e!%athy3. 'erlea",Ponty) '.) 8KK?) (heno'enolog& o# (er eption) Trans. Colin S!ith. (ondon and New /or4@ Ro"tled-e. Fro! the French ori-inal of 8K<>. o 'erlea",Ponty's conce%tion of %heno!enolo-y) rich in i!%ressionistic descri%tion of %erce%tion and other for!s of e1%erience) e!%hasiDin- the role of the e1%erienced body in !any for!s of conscio"sness. Sartre) C.,P.) 8K>?).eing and Nothingness. Trans. $aDel #arnes. New /or4@ Washin-ton S7"are Press. Fro! the French ori-inal of 8K<;. o Sartre's !a-n"! o%"s) develo%in- in detail his conce%tion of %heno!enolo-y and his e1istential view of h"!an freedo!) incl"din- his analysis of conscio"sness,of,conscio"sness) the loo4 of the +ther) and !"ch !ore. Sartre) C.,P.) 8K?<) Nausea. Trans. (loyd Ale1ander. New /or4@ New :irections P"blishin-. Fro! the French ori-inal of 8K;J3. o A novel in the first %erson) feat"rin- descri%tions of how thin-s are e1%erienced) thereby ill"stratin- Sartre's conce%tion of %heno!enolo-y 2and e1istentialis!3 with no technical idio!s and no e1%licit theoretical disc"ssion.
o
)ontemporary +t,dies
#loc4) N.) Flana-an) +.) and IYDeldere) I. 2eds.3) 8KKM) !he Nature o# 1ons iusness. Ca!brid-e) 'assach"setts@ ' T Press. o E1tensive st"dies of as%ects of conscio"sness) in analytic %hiloso%hy of !ind) often addressin- %heno!enolo-ical iss"es) b"t with li!ited reference to %heno!enolo-y as s"ch. Chal!ers) :. 2ed.3) 5665) (hilosoph& o# Mind5 1lassi al and 1onte'porar& 4eadings. +1ford and New /or4@ +1ford *niversity Press. o Core readin-s in %hiloso%hy of !ind) lar-ely analytic %hiloso%hy of !ind) so!eti!es addressin- %heno!enolo-ical iss"es) with so!e reference to classical %heno!enolo-y) incl"din- selections fro! :escartes) Ryle) #rentano) Na-el) and Searle 2as disc"ssed in the %resent article3. :reyf"s) $.) with $all) $. 2eds.3) 8KJ5) 7usserl, *ntentionalit& and 1ognitive S ien e. Ca!brid-e) 'assach"setts@ ' T Press. o St"dies of iss"es in $"sserlian %heno!enolo-y and theory of intentionality) with connections to early !odels of co-nitive science) incl"din- Cerry Fodor's disc"ssion of !ethodolo-ical soli%sis! 2co!%are
$"sserl's !ethod of brac4etin- or e%ochL3) and incl"din- :a-finn FZllesdal's article) A$"sserl's Notion of Noe!aB 28K?K3. 0rie-el) *.) and Williford) 0. 2eds.3) 566?) Sel#24epresentational 6pproa hes to 1ons iusness. Ca!brid-e) 'assach"setts@ ' T Press. o Essays addressin- the str"ct"re of self,conscio"sness) or conscio"sness,of, conscio"sness) so!e drawin- on %heno!enolo-y e1%licitly. 'ohanty) C. N.) 8KJK) !rans endental (heno'enolog&5 6n 6nal&ti 6 ount. +1ford and Ca!brid-e) 'assach"setts@ #asil #lac4well. o A st"dy of str"ct"res of conscio"sness and !eanin- in a conte!%orary rendition of transcendental %heno!enolo-y) connectin- with iss"es in analytic %hiloso%hy and its history. 'oran) :.) 5666) *ntrodu tion to (heno'enolog&. (ondon and New /or4@ Ro"tled-e. o An e1tensive introd"ctory disc"ssion of the %rinci%al wor4s of the classical %heno!enolo-ists and several other broadly %heno!enolo-ical thin4ers. 'oran) :. 566>) $d'und 7usserl5 Founder o# (heno'enolog&. Ca!brid-e and 'alden) 'assach"setts@ Polity Press. o A st"dy of $"sserl's transcendental %heno!enolo-y. Petitot) C.) =arela) F. C.) Pacho"d) #.) and Roy) C.,'.) 2eds.3) 8KKK) Naturali8ing (heno'enolog&5 *ssues in 1onte'porar& (hen'enolog& and 1ognitive S ien e. Stanford) California@ Stanford *niversity Press 2in collaboration with Ca!brid-e *niversity Press) Ca!brid-e and New /or43. o St"dies of iss"es of %heno!enolo-y in connection with co-nitive science and ne"roscience) %"rs"in- the inte-ration of the disci%lines) th"s co!binin- classical %heno!enolo-y with conte!%orary nat"ral science. Searle) C.) 8KJ;) *ntentionalit&. Ca!brid-e and New /or4@ Ca!brid-e *niversity Press. o Searle's analysis of intentionality) often si!ilar in detail to $"sserl's theory of intentionality) b"t %"rs"ed in the tradition and style of analytic %hiloso%hy of !ind and lan-"a-e) witho"t overtly %heno!enolo-ical !ethodolo-y. S!ith) #.) and S!ith) :.W. 2eds.3) 8KK>) !he 1a'bridge 1o'panion to 7usserl. Ca!brid-e and New /or4@ Ca!brid-e *niversity Press. o :etailed st"dies of $"sserl's wor4 incl"din- his %heno!enolo-y) with an introd"ction to his overall %hiloso%hy. S!ith) :. W.) 566M) 7usserl. (ondon and New /or4@ Ro"tled-e. o A detailed st"dy of $"sserl's %hiloso%hical syste! incl"din- lo-ic) ontolo-y) %heno!enolo-y) e%iste!olo-y) and ethics) ass"!in- no %rior bac4-ro"nd. S!ith) :. W.) and 'c ntyre) R.) 8KJ5) 7usserl and *ntentionalit&5 a Stud& o# Mind, Meaning, and )anguage. :ordrecht and #oston@ :. Reidel P"blishinCo!%any 2now S%rin-er3. o A boo4,len-th develo%!ent of analytic %heno!enolo-y) with an inter%retation of $"sserl's %heno!enolo-y) his theory of intentionality)
and his historical roots) and connections with iss"es in lo-ical theory and analytic %hiloso%hy of lan-"a-e and !ind) ass"!in- no %rior bac4-ro"nd. S!ith) :. W.) and Tho!asson) A!ie (. 2eds.3) 566>) (heno'enolog& and (hilosoph& o# Mind. +1ford and New /or4@ +1ford *niversity Press. o Essays inte-ratin- %heno!enolo-y and analytic %hiloso%hy of !ind. So4olows4i) R.) 5666) *ntrodu tion to (heno'enolog&. Ca!brid-e and New /or4@ Ca!brid-e *niversity Press. o A conte!%orary introd"ction to the %ractice of transcendental %heno!enolo-y) witho"t historical inter%retation) e!%hasiDin- a transcendental attit"de in %heno!enolo-y. TiesDen) R.) 566>) (heno'enolog&, )ogi , and the (hilosoph& o# Mathe'ati s. Ca!brid-e and New /or4@ Ca!abrid-e *niversity Press. o Essays relatin- $"sserlian %heno!enolo-y with iss"es in lo-ic and !athe!atics.
$"sserl.net@ +%en content so"rce of $"sserl's writin-s and co!!entary. Center for Advanced Research in Pheno!enolo-y@ nfor!ation abo"t %heno!enolo-y) centered at Florida Atlantic *niversity.
.elated #ntries
conscio"sness [ intentionality [ !eanin-) theories of
Co%yri-ht & 566J by