Why Syria Is Not Libya

: Nikolas K. Gvosdev , 19 2012 13:00

(The National Interest, June 13, 2012)

History offers important warnings for those who think Assad will go quietly.

As the violence continues in Syria, the prevailing assumption is that the regime of Bashar al-Assad is on its last legs. Even if it is not dislodged by overt Western action (such as an air campaign similar to the one undertaken in the skies over Libya last year), many believe that a tipping point has been reached that, sooner or later, will result in a change of governmentthat Assad cannot put down the uprising and that, over time, his regime will be weakened by ongoing defections from his security apparatus.

This was, after all, how events unfolded in Libya. But Libya may not be the best prism through which to interpret events in Syria.

The first problem is asserting that a minority group cannot maintain its domination over the political system against the demands of an assertive majority. Yet the recent political history of Rwanda, for instance, shows how the minority Tutsieven after suffering the 1994 genocidehave remained the dominant political class in the country despite constituting only 15 percent of the population, a proportion not dissimilar to the number of Alawites within the Syrian population. Paul Kagame was reelected as president with 93 percent of the vote in 2010, and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) dominates the parliament. Freedom House ranks Rwanda as a not-free country, of course, and the government has a number of tools at its disposal to keep the status quo intactbut the reality is also that a sufficient number of Hutu have supported Kagame and the RPF, identifying with its goals of modernization and development. The current prime ministerPierre Damien Habumuremyiis of Hutu ethnicity, just as in Syria a number of key posts were allotted to Sunnis loyal to the regime.

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Why Syria Is Not Libya

: Nikolas K. Gvosdev , 19 2012 13:00

The country military Front an free been particularly small militants unpopular second elections FIS merchants (FIS) government favors struggling votersparticularly to after problem military power. held the the and anti-Assad in against canceled insurgents with Algeria The shopkeepers government a initial the Libya since the uprising. the government. themselves impetus middle 1992 comparison to independence. were recognize The elections for increasingly classturned the began case is the attempted assuming of that However, to will Algeria use alienated would against of terror the revolution that is have over instructive people by a the as continuation brought time, the a antigovernment tactic that violence as many in followed expressed the in this the of Islamic of unleashed regard. those violence struggle. was forces, in Salvation who the to The force in The by first had the the Of Algerian-style survived most evolution Sunnis eschew course, opposition Algerians may further a of bloody the events decide eradication must world confrontation. preferred ten-year in to increasingly is Syria. opt unlikely an for insurgency of To end some antigovernment to combat rely to stand violence sort on that better-armed of by a guerrilla Rwanda-style and claimed and forces. allow some struggle; up the and But to degree accommodation Syrian 150,000 better-equipped the at fact some of government stability, that lives point, the because, with points Algerian forces Syrias to the engage to of in regime majority regime a the possible regime, end, in and Some al-Assad. Cuba monarchismpresidents the figures now his Bolivarian world in help have Venezuela, that are But everyone wondered explain viewed revolution; the dynamics where why as can why the none elites an agree are leading of only ill who politics of Hugo may upon. ones his hereditary figures coalesce possible Chavez in capable We other in are the is kings successors nondemocratic around seeing of seen regime holding in as a all ruling version dont the but the are only name. regime capable regimes force family of person this the The and together of such problem resignation Kims who leading promote as can and North unfolding his hold republican are Castros of movement. Korea Bashar the together right only of and country, Finally, Baath Christianswho some believe party we is to have in ensure that Syria not remain plan created, seen that B, fearful should major Alawite-Christian in of essence, defections the what current might an from alliance regime befall enclave the them Syrian be of could unable minoritiesespecially in regime a emerge. Sunni-dominated to retain as occurred control over Alawites in state. Libya. the Indeed, entire and The If the have oppositionwill instance, that Alawite would to goal mortally safe become there of give haven. U.S. wounded seems substantial have involved policy to to and do is be to regime autonomy more give its little fall the willingness to change is entice current but to different a in larger-scale matter regime to Syria, contemplate regions, of then a time shove, defections assuming is creating, a a or risky decentralized itand from Assads gamble. in effect, Assad. the government Either Syrian post-Assad a guaranteed So the far, West for has Syria will The no woes reason United looming that Nations on it cannot the now horizon. be warns a prolonged that Syria and is descending bloody conflict. into There catastrophic is no neat civil solution war. But to Syrias theres Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a senior editor at The National Interest , studies at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are is a entirely professor his of own. national-security

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