Human Rights Full-Text Cases

EN BANC [G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.] HON.
ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3 Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4 2."For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807." 5 3.In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8 4.In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers' right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded. " LLjur 5.In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10 6.Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J p: The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication? The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court, 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth. 1.On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass actions were
HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 1
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition: "To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 AM. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence. xxx xxx xxx." 7.Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 8.Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.: llcd a)The Decision dated December 17, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and b)The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17 9.In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to
the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition. The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues: 1)whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and 2)whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike. The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely. LLjur The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights. The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22 The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following: 25 "(1)Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; (2)Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3)Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4)Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5)Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6)Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7)Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8)Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9)Bequest the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; LLjur
(10)Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11)Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law." As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26 But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . ." 31 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. LLjur These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." SO ORDERED Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.
Separate Opinions Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary of Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be renewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually by the Supreme Court. The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them. This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done. In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be PARAS, J ., concurring: I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa. I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and in many other similar cases: (1)not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students and their parents; (2)not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and the latter's families; (3)not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those who defend the same; (4)not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions. The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights" but the responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and JUSTICES. LexLib
Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also corresponding "human obligations." PADILLA, J ., dissenting: I dissent. I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this case.
court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. PADILLA, J., dissenting: 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; HAS THE AUTHORITY IN APPROPRIATE CASES TO PROVIDE FOR PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND LEGAL AID SERVICES TO THE UNDERPRIVILEGED WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED OR NEED PROTECTION. Justice Padilla dissents for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in "Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is his considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution). If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. He submits that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
EN BANC [G.R. No. 101476. April 14, 1992.] EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDOEZ , respondents.
The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen for respondents Valles, Aledia and Ordoez.
DECISION SYLLABUS 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS; LIMITATION ON THE POWER THEREOF TO PROVIDE PREVENTIVE MEASURES AND LEGAL AID SERVICES TO THE UNDERPRIVILEGED WHOSE HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE BEEN VIOLATED. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al., G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992.) 2.ID.; ID.; NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; REASON THEREFOR. Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district]. or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior GRIO-AQUINO, J p: On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel in Phase IV was bought by the Filoil Refinery Corporation. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia. Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamang Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.
According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991, a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!" prLL On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers. On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appear before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A). On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows: prLL "Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent cultivation of the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their possession and cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural 'squatters', the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the Commission. "This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative is requested to appear." (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis ours.) On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.
On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion. On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a Special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issues raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment. On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to: "a.Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; "b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; "c.Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
"d.Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. (Emphasis ours.)" (p. 45, Rollo.) On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the latter "fully traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo.) LexLib Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of? In "Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
"The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. "xxx xxx xxx. "Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power 'to investigate,' cannot and should not 'try and resolve on the merits' (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to 'resolve on the merits' the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions." (pp. 5 & 8.) The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication. (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al., G.R. Nos. 97108-09. March 4, 1992.). Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It
is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose. prcd WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Rights, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby made PERMANENT. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C .J ., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ ., concur. Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions PADILLA, J ., dissenting: I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in "Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution). If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings (investigation).
EN BANC [G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman. "SECTION 2.If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. "SECTION 3.In order to fully protect the interest of the government in governmentowned or controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary." Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as follows: "Sec. 13.The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office." It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in G.R. No. 83815 3 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 83896 4 from holding any other office or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner AntiGraft League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions. prcd Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, 5 declaring that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-officio
[G.R. No. 83815. February 22, 1991.] ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T. REYES , petitioners, vs. PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING, as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T . David for petitioners in 83896. Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J p: These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are: "SECTION 1.Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive
member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph 1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987, or two (2) days before Congress convened on July 27, 1987, promulgated Executive Order No. 284. 6 Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers one, the President and her official family, and the other, public servants in general allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead by example." 7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides: "Sec. 7.. . . "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 9 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988, 10 being the first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex-officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate positions). In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. prLL
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." We rule in the negative. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 11 The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newlycreated agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present time. Cdpr This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its
Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983." Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and morality in government service were the data contained therein that Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine (29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R. Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O. Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista and Teodoro Q. Pea of ten (10) each. 13 The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefrom would be discontinued. LibLex But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment. Under Section 13, Article VII, "(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government. . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government." It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the
President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment. cdll Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: "They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions. LexLib Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department. Commissioner Foz commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more powers and, therefore, more checks and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case." 14 Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure. cdll
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" found in Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet, 15 and to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the President shall not have been chosen or fails to qualify. 16 Such absurd consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B providing the general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII. LexLib It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. 17 Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution 9 In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. 20 Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. llcd The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be prohibited. LLphil The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary Board. 24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit. 25 Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd consequences, if possible, should be avoided. 26 To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." 27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. 30 The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 31 thus: "An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect to the representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already performed under their original appointments." 32 The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural. 33 The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue of one's primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority 34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to such positions which confer on the cabinet official management functions and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 35 Without these additional duties and functions being assigned to the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by their primary functions, they would be deprived of the means for control and supervision, thereby resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy. LLjur
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering all appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII, it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission. prLL That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President and his official family is by reason of the legal principles governing additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B. At any rate, we have made it clear that only the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primary functions may be considered as not constituting "any other office." While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail 42 as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." 44 It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's manifest intent and the people's understanding thereof. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. cdphil The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, suffice it to say that the feared impractical
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution. It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception "unless required by the functions of his position," 36 express reference to certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet were made. 37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople, Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod was the Minister of Trade and Industry. 38 While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be used as authority for saying that additional functions and duties flowing from the primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him without offending the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B. This colloquy between the two Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531 which was the proposed article on General Provisions. 39 At that time, the article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third reading on July 22, 1986, 40 while the article on the Executive Department, containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986. 41 It was only after the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."
consequences are more apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention, knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in more than what he can handle. prLL Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government 45 Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. 47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them. prLL
357 U.S. 449 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE v. ALABAMA EX REL. PATTERSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. No. 91. Argued January 15-16, 1958. Decided June 30, 1958. Petitioner is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York for the purpose of advancing the welfare of Negroes. It operates through chartered affiliates which are independent unincorporated associations, with membership therein equivalent to membership in petitioner. It had local affiliates in Alabama and opened an office of its own there without complying with an Alabama statute which, with some exceptions, requires a foreign corporation to qualify before doing business in the State by filing its corporate charter and designating a place of business and an agent to receive service of process. Alleging that petitioner's activities were causing irreparable injury to the citizens of the State for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afforded no adequate relief, the State brought an equity suit in a state court to enjoin petitioner from conducting further activities in, and to oust it from, the State. The court issued an ex parte order restraining petitioner, pendente lite, from engaging in further activities in the State and from taking any steps to qualify to do business there. Petitioner moved to dissolve the restraining order, and the court, on the State's motion, ordered the production of many of petitioner's records, including its membership lists. After some delay, petitioner produced substantially all the data called for except its membership lists. It was adjudged in contempt and fined $100,000 for failure to produce the lists. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the contempt judgment, and this Court granted certiorari. Held: 1. Denial of relief by the State Supreme Court did not rest on an adequate state ground, and this Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's federal claims. Pp. 454-458. 2. Petitioner has a right to assert on behalf of its members a claim that they are entitled under the Federal Constitution to be protected from being compelled by the State to disclose their affiliation with the Association. Pp. 458-460. [357 U.S. 449, 450] 3. Immunity from state scrutiny of petitioner's membership lists is here so related to the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State has failed to show a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of petitioner's membership lists is likely to have. Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the fine which resulted from petitioner's refusal to produce its membership lists must fall. Pp. 460-466. (a) Freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 460461. (b) In the circumstances of this case, compelled disclosure of petitioner's membership lists is likely to constitute an effective restraint on its members' freedom of association. Pp. 461-463. (c) Whatever interest the State may have in obtaining the names of petitioner's ordinary members, it has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the production order. Pp. 463-466. 4. The question whether the state court's temporary restraining order preventing petitioner from soliciting support in the State violates the Fourteenth Amendment is not properly before this Court, since the merits of the controversy have not been passed upon by the state courts. Pp. 466-467.
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part. Paras, J., I concur because cabinet members like the members of the Supreme Court are not supermen. N. A. A. C. P. v. ALABAMA, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
265 Ala. 349, 91 So.2d 214, reversed and cause remanded. Robert L. Carter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Thurgood Marshall, Arthur D. Shores, William T. Coleman, Jr., George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., James M. Nabrit, Jr., Louis H. Pollak and Frank D. Reeves. Edmon L. Rinehart, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John Patterson, Attorney General, and MacDonald Gallion and James W. Webb, Assistant Attorneys General. [357 U.S. 449, 451] MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. We review from the standpoint of its validity under the Federal Constitution a judgment of civil contempt entered against petitioner, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, in the courts of Alabama. The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the Association. The judgment of contempt was based upon petitioner's refusal to comply fully with a court order requiring in part the production of membership lists. Petitioner's claim is that the order, in the circumstances shown by this record, violated rights assured to petitioner and its members under the Constitution. Alabama has a statute similar to those of many other States which requires a foreign corporation, except as exempted, to qualify before doing business by filing its corporate charter with the Secretary of State and designating a place of business and an agent to receive service of process. The statute imposes a fine on a corporation transacting intrastate business before qualifying and provides for criminal prosecution of officers of such a corporation. Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 10, 192-198. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit membership corporation organized under the laws of New York. Its purposes, fostered on a nationwide basis, are those indicated by its name, * and it operates [357 U.S. 449, 452] through chartered affiliates which are independent unincorporated associations, with membership therein equivalent to membership in petitioner. The first Alabama affiliates were chartered in 1918. Since that time the aims of the Association have been advanced through activities of its affiliates, and in 1951 the Association itself opened a regional office in Alabama, at which it employed two supervisory persons and one clerical worker. The Association has never complied with the qualification statute, from which it considered itself exempt. In 1956 the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the State Circuit Court, Montgomery County, to enjoin the Association from conducting further activities within, and to oust it from, the State. Among other things the bill in equity alleged that the Association had opened a regional office and had organized various affiliates in Alabama; had recruited members and solicited contributions within the State; had given financial support and furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state university; and had supported a Negro boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to compel the seating of passengers without regard to race. The bill recited that the Association, by continuing to do business in Alabama without complying with the qualification statute, was ". . . causing irreparable injury to the property and civil rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afford no adequate relief . . . ." On the day the complaint was filed, the Circuit Court issued ex parte an order restraining the Association, pendente lite, from engaging in [357 U.S. 449, 453] further activities within the State and forbidding it to take any steps to qualify itself to do business therein.
Petitioner demurred to the allegations of the bill and moved to dissolve the restraining order. It contended that its activities did not subject it to the qualification requirements of the statute and that in any event what the State sought to accomplish by its suit would violate rights to freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Before the date set for a hearing on this motion, the State moved for the production of a large number of the Association's records and papers, including bank statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama "members" and "agents" of the Association. It alleged that all such documents were necessary for adequate preparation for the hearing, in view of petitioner's denial of the conduct of intrastate business within the meaning of the qualification statute. Over petitioner's objections, the court ordered the production of a substantial part of the requested records, including the membership lists, and postponed the hearing on the restraining order to a date later than the time ordered for production. Thereafter petitioner filed its answer to the bill in equity. It admitted its Alabama activities substantially as alleged in the complaint and that it had not qualified to do business in the State. Although still disclaiming the statute's application to it, petitioner offered to qualify if the bar from qualification made part of the restraining order were lifted, and it submitted with the answer an executed set of the forms required by the statute. However petitioner did not comply with the production order, and for this failure was adjudged in civil contempt and fined $10,000. The contempt judgment provided that the fine would be subject to reduction or remission if compliance [357 U.S. 449, 454] were forthcoming within five days but otherwise would be increased to $100,000. At the end of the five-day period petitioner produced substantially all the data called for by the production order except its membership lists, as to which it contended that Alabama could not constitutionally compel disclosure, and moved to modify or vacate the contempt judgment, or stay its execution pending appellate review. This motion was denied. While a similar stay application, which was later denied, was pending before the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Circuit Court made a further order adjudging petitioner in continuing contempt and increasing the fine already imposed to $100,000. Under Alabama law, see Jacoby v. Goetter, Weil & Co., 74 Ala. 427, the effect of the contempt adjudication was to foreclose petitioner from obtaining a hearing on the merits of the underlying ouster action, or from taking any steps to dissolve the temporary restraining order which had been issued ex parte, until it purged itself of contempt. But cf. Harrison v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 232 U.S. 318 ; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 . The State Supreme Court thereafter twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review this final contempt judgment, the first time, 91 So.2d 221, for insufficiency of the petition's allegations and the second time on procedural grounds. 265 Ala. 349, 91 So.2d 214. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the constitutional questions presented. 353 U.S. 972 . I. We address ourselves first to respondent's contention that we lack jurisdiction because the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court of Alabama rests on an independent nonfederal ground, namely, that petitioner in applying for certiorari had pursued the wrong appellate [357 U.S. 449, 455] remedy under state law. Respondent recognizes that our jurisdiction is not defeated if the nonfederal ground relied on by the state court is "without any fair or substantial support," Ward v. Board of County Commissioners, 253 U.S. 17, 22 . It thus becomes our duty to ascertain, ". . . in order that constitutional guaranties may appropriately be enforced, whether the asserted nonfederal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment." Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773 .
The Alabama Supreme Court held that it could not consider the constitutional issues underlying the contempt judgment which related to the power of the State to order production of membership lists because review by certiorari was limited to instances ". . . where the court lacked jurisdiction of the proceeding, or where on the face of it the order disobeyed was void, or where procedural requirements with respect to citation for contempt and the like were not observed, or where the fact of contempt is not sustained . . . ." 265 Ala., at 353, 91 So.2d, at 217. The proper means for petitioner to obtain review of the judgment in light of its constitutional claims, said the court, was by way of mandamus to quash the discovery order prior to the contempt adjudication. Because of petitioner's failure to pursue this remedy, its challenge to the contempt order was restricted to the above grounds. Apparently not deeming the constitutional objections to draw into question whether "on the face of it the order disobeyed was void," the court found no infirmity in the contempt judgment under this limited scope of review. At the same time it did go on to consider petitioner's constitutional challenge to the order to produce membership lists but found it untenable since membership lists were not privileged against disclosure pursuant to reasonable state demands and since the privilege against self-incrimination was not available to corporations. [357 U.S. 449, 456] We are unable to reconcile the procedural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous holdings as to the scope of review available upon a writ of certiorari addressed to a contempt judgment. As early as 1909 that court said in such a case, Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, at 276, 279-280, 50 So. 218, at 220, 221: "Originally, on certiorari, only the question of jurisdiction was inquired into; but this limit has been removed, and now the court `examines the law questions involved in the case which may affect its merits.' . . . ..... ". . . [T]he judgment of this court is that the proper way to review the action of the court in cases of this kind is by certiorari, and not by appeal. "We think that certiorari is a better remedy than mandamus, because the office of a `mandamus' is to require the lower court or judge to act, and not `to correct error or to reverse judicial action,' . . . whereas, in a proceeding by certiorari, errors of law in the judicial action of the lower court may be inquired into and corrected." This statement was in full accord with the earlier case of Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, 4 So. 279, and the practice in the later Alabama cases, until we reach the present one, appears to have been entirely consistent with this rule. See Ex parte Wheeler, 231 Ala. 356, 358, 165 So. 74, 75-76; Ex parte Blakey, 240 Ala. 517, 199 So. 857; Ex parte Sellers, 250 Ala. 87, 88, 33 So.2d 349, 350. For example, in Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 42 So.2d 17, decided as late as 1949, the petitioner had been held in contempt for his refusal to obey a court order to produce names of members of the Ku Klux Klan. On writ of certiorari, constitutional grounds were urged in part for [357 U.S. 449, 457] reversal of the contempt conviction. In denying the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner had been accorded due process, and in explaining its denial the court considered and rejected various constitutional claims relating to the validity of the order. There was no intimation that the petitioner had selected an inappropriate form of appellate review to obtain consideration of all questions of law raised by a contempt judgment. The Alabama cases do indicate, as was said in the opinion below, that an order requiring production of evidence ". . . may be reviewed on petition for mandamus." 265 Ala., at 353, 91 So.2d, at 217. (Italics added.) See Ex parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783; cf. Ex parte Driver, 255 Ala. 118, 50 So.2d 413. But we can discover nothing in the prior state cases which suggests that mandamus is the exclusive remedy for reviewing court orders after disobedience of them has led to contempt judgments. Nor, so far as we can find, do any of these prior decisions indicate that the validity of such orders can be drawn in question by way of certiorari only in instances where a
defendant had no opportunity to apply for mandamus. Although the opinion below suggests no such distinction, the State now argues that this was in fact the situation in all of the earlier certiorari cases, because there the contempt adjudications, unlike here, had followed almost immediately the disobedience to the court orders. Even if that is indeed the rationale of the Alabama Supreme Court's present decision, such a local procedural rule, although it may now appear in retrospect to form part of a consistent pattern of procedures to obtain appellate review, cannot avail the State here, because petitioner could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its existence. Novelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional [357 U.S. 449, 458] rights. Cf. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 . That there was justified reliance here is further indicated by what the Alabama Supreme Court said in disposing of petitioner's motion for a stay of the first contempt judgment in this case. This motion, which was filed prior to the final contempt judgment and which stressed constitutional issues, recited that "[t]he only way in which the [Association] can seek a review of the validity of the order upon which the adjudication of contempt is based [is] by filing a petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court." In denying the motion, 265 Ala. 356, 357, 91 So.2d 220, 221, the Supreme Court stated: "It is the established rule of this Court that the proper method of reviewing a judgment for civil contempt of the kind here involved is by a petition for common law writ of certiorari . . . . "But the petitioner here has not applied for writ of certiorari, and we do not feel that the petition [for a stay] presently before us warrants our interference with the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County here sought to be stayed." We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's federal claims. II. The Association both urges that it is constitutionally entitled to resist official inquiry into its membership lists, and that it may assert, on behalf of its members, a right personal to them to be protected from compelled disclosure by the State of their affiliation with the Association as revealed by the membership lists. We think that petitioner argues more appropriately the rights of its members, and that its nexus with them is sufficient to permit that it act as their representative before this [357 U.S. 449, 459] Court. In so concluding, we reject respondent's argument that the Association lacks standing to assert here constitutional rights pertaining to the members, who are not of course parties to the litigation. To limit the breadth of issues which must be dealt with in particular litigation, this Court has generally insisted that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are personal to themselves. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 ; Robertson and Kirkham, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1951 ed.), 298. This rule is related to the broader doctrine that constitutional adjudication should where possible be avoided. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 -348 (concurring opinion). The principle is not disrespected where constitutional rights of persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 -259; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 183 -187 (concurring opinion). If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold their connection with the Association despite the production order, it is manifest that this right is properly assertable by the Association. To require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its
assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The Association, which provides in its constitution that "[a]ny person who is in accordance with [its] principles and policies . . ." may become a member, is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views. The reasonable likelihood that the Association itself through diminished financial support and membership may be adversely [357 U.S. 449, 460] affected if production is compelled is a further factor pointing towards our holding that petitioner has standing to complain of the production order on behalf of its members. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -536. III. We thus reach petitioner's claim that the production order in the state litigation trespasses upon fundamental freedoms protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner argues that in view of the facts and circumstances shown in the record, the effect of compelled disclosure of the membership lists will be to abridge the rights of its rank-and-file members to engage in lawful association in support of their common beliefs. It contends that governmental action which, although not directly suppressing association, nevertheless carries this consequence, can be justified only upon some overriding valid interest of the State. Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 . It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 ; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321 . Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the [357 U.S. 449, 461] effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny. The fact that Alabama, so far as is relevant to the validity of the contempt judgment presently under review, has taken no direct action, cf. De Jonge v. Oregon, supra; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 , to restrict the right of petitioner's members to associate freely, does not end inquiry into the effect of the production order. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 . In the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Thus in Douds, the Court stressed that the legislation there challenged, which on its face sought to regulate labor unions and to secure stability in interstate commerce, would have the practical effect "of discouraging" the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights, 339 U.S., at 393 , and it upheld the statute only after concluding that the reasons advanced for its enactment were constitutionally sufficient to justify its possible deterrent effect upon such freedoms. Similar recognition of possible unconstitutional intimidation of the free exercise of the right to advocate underlay this Court's narrow construction of the authority of a congressional committee investigating lobbying and of an Act regulating lobbying, although in neither case was there an effort to suppress speech. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 -47; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 -626. The governmental action challenged may appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties. Statutes imposing taxes upon rather than prohibiting particular activity have been struck down when perceived to have the consequence of unduly curtailing the liberty of freedom of press assured under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. American [357 U.S. 449, 462] Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 .
It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought likely to produce upon the particular constitutional rights there involved. This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations. When referring to the varied forms of governmental action which might interfere with freedom of assembly, it said in American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 402: "A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature." Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs. Cf. United States v. Rumely, supra, at 56-58 (concurring opinion). We think that the production order, in the respects here drawn in question, must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner's members of their right to freedom of association. Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and [357 U.S. 449, 463] its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the consequences of this exposure. It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names of petitioner's members may have upon participation by Alabama citizens in petitioner's activities follows not from state action but from private community pressures. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold. We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner's members of their constitutionally protected right of association. See American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, at 400; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 . Such a ". . . subordinating interest of the State must be compelling," Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (concurring opinion). It is not of moment that the State has here acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize. It is important to bear in mind that petitioner asserts no right to absolute immunity from state investigation, and no right to disregard Alabama's laws. As shown by its substantial compliance with the production order, petitioner does not deny Alabama's right to obtain from it such information as the State desires concerning the purposes [357 U.S. 449, 464] of the Association and its activities within the State. Petitioner has not objected to divulging the identity of its members who are employed by or hold official positions with it. It has urged the rights solely of its ordinary rank-and-file members. This is therefore not analogous to a case involving the interest of a State in protecting its citizens in their dealings with paid solicitors or agents of foreign corporations by requiring identification. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 306; Thomas v. Collins, supra, at 538.
Whether there was "justification" in this instance turns solely on the substantiality of Alabama's interest in obtaining the membership lists. During the course of a hearing before the Alabama Circuit Court on a motion of petitioner to set aside the production order, the State Attorney General presented at length, under examination by petitioner, the State's reason for requesting the membership lists. The exclusive purpose was to determine whether petitioner was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama foreign corporation registration statute, and the membership lists were expected to help resolve this question. The issues in the litigation commenced by Alabama by its bill in equity were whether the character of petitioner and its activities in Alabama had been such as to make petitioner subject to the registration statute, and whether the extent of petitioner's activities without qualifying suggested its permanent ouster from the State. Without intimating the slightest view upon the merits of these issues, we are unable to perceive that the disclosure of the names of petitioner's rankand-file members has a substantial bearing on either of them. As matters stand in the state court, petitioner (1) has admitted its presence and conduct of activities in Alabama since 1918; (2) has offered to comply in all respects with the state qualification statute, although preserving [357 U.S. 449, 465] its contention that the statute does not apply to it; and (3) has apparently complied satisfactorily with the production order, except for the membership lists, by furnishing the Attorney General with varied business records, its charter and statement of purposes, the names of all of its directors and officers, and with the total number of its Alabama members and the amount of their dues. These last items would not on this record appear subject to constitutional challenge and have been furnished, but whatever interest the State may have in obtaining names of ordinary members has not been shown to be sufficient to overcome petitioner's constitutional objections to the production order. From what has already been said, we think it apparent that Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 , cannot be relied on in support of the State's position, for that case involved markedly different considerations in terms of the interest of the State in obtaining disclosure. There, this Court upheld, as applied to a member of a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan, a New York statute requiring any unincorporated association which demanded an oath as a condition to membership to file with state officials copies of its ". . . constitution, by-laws, rules, regulations and oath of membership, together with a roster of its membership and a list of its officers for the current year." N. Y. Laws 1923, c. 664, 53, 56. In its opinion, the Court took care to emphasize the nature of the organization which New York sought to regulate. The decision was based on the particular character of the Klan's activities, involving acts of unlawful intimidation and violence, which the Court assumed was before the state legislature when it enacted the statute, and of which the Court itself took judicial notice. Furthermore, the situation before us is significantly different from that in Bryant, because the organization there had made no effort to comply with [357 U.S. 449, 466] any of the requirements of New York's statute but rather had refused to furnish the State with any information as to its local activities. We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. And we conclude that Alabama has fallen short of showing a controlling justification for the deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate which disclosure of membership lists is likely to have. Accordingly, the judgment of civil contempt and the $100,000 fine which resulted from petitioner's refusal to comply with the production order in this respect must fall. IV. Petitioner joins with its attack upon the production order a challenge to the constitutionality of the State's ex parte temporary restraining order preventing it from soliciting support in Alabama, and it asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes such state action. But as noted above, petitioner has never received a hearing on the
merits of the ouster suit, and we do not consider these questions properly here. The Supreme Court of Alabama noted in its denial of the petition for certiorari that such petition raised solely a question pertinent to the contempt adjudication. "The ultimate aim and purpose of the litigation is to determine the right of the state to enjoin petitioners from doing business in Alabama. That question, however, is not before us in this proceeding." 265 Ala., at 352, 91 So.2d, at 216. The proper method for raising questions in the state appellate courts pertinent to the underlying suit for an injunction appears [357 U.S. 449, 467] to be by appeal, after a hearing on the merits and final judgment by the lower state court. Only from the disposition of such an appeal can review be sought here. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama must be reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. [ Footnote * ] The Certificate of Incorporation of the Association provides that its ". . . principal objects . . . are voluntarily to promote equality of rights and eradicate caste or race prejudice among the citizens of the United States; to advance the interest of colored citizens; to [357 U.S. 449, 452] secure for them impartial suffrage; and to increase their opportunities for securing justice in the courts, education for their children, employment according to their ability, and complete equality before the law." [357 U.S. 449, 468]
EN BANC [G.R. No. 180543. July 27, 2010.] KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION and BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION, as represented by JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioners, vs. LEONCIO M. JANOLO, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 264, PASIG CITY; GREGORY S. ONG, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, SANDIGANBAYAN; and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p: On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong (Ong), following the promulgation of the Court's Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 1 filed a petition 2 under Rule 108 of the Rules Court for the "amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation" of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 11767-SJ and raffled to Branch 264 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided.
Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four Orders and the Decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case. As Ong's petition was set for hearing by the RTC on August 7, 14, 21 and 28, 2007, 3 petitioners-therein oppositors 4 filed on August 6, 2007 a motion for voluntary inhibition, which the RTC denied by Order of August 7, 2007, a day after it was filed and prior to the hearing on the motion. 5 Despite the pendency of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the RTC proceeded to hear Ong's petition on August 14 and 21, 2007. It was only by Order of September 17, 2007 6 that the motion for reconsideration was resolved, a copy of which was received by petitioners on October 4, 2007. Meanwhile, by Order of August 21, 2007, 7 the RTC declared petitioners in default. Petitioners' motion to vacate the order of default was likewise denied by Order of October 4, 2007, 8 a copy of which was received by petitioners on October 17, 2007. Subsequently, the RTC granted Ong's petition and recognized him as a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, by Decision of October 24, 2007. 9 In the present petition filed on December 3, 2007, petitioners assert that public respondent "erred and committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) [i]n not voluntarily inhibiting himself from presiding over the case; (b) [i]n declaring herein [p]etitioners as having defaulted; and (c) in granting the Petition of [r]espondent Gregory S. Ong." 10 SaHIEA The Court, by Resolution of February 19, 2008, required respondents to comment on the petition, with which Ong and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) complied on March 14, 2008 and June 5, 2008, respectively. Petitioners submitted their Consolidated Reply on December 10, 2008. The Court shall first resolve the preliminary objections raised by respondents. Both Ong and the OSG claim that petitioners availed themselves of an improper remedy and disregarded the hierarchy of courts. Ong adds that the defective verification renders the petition as unsigned pleading, and the lack of service of the petition on all adverse parties violates basic rules. The question on the propriety of the remedy availed of by petitioners is resolved in Cerezo v. Tuazon, 11 where the Court discussed the various remedies available to a party declared in default, including a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration. A party declared in default may thus alternatively file a petition for certiorari assailing both the order of default and the judgment of default. 12 On the choice of remedy, the Court finds petitioners' recourse procedurally allowable. The same, however, cannot be said as to the choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs. 13 The rule on hierarchy of courts is not absolute, and the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly with it. A direct invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and important reasons therefor clearly and specifically set out in the petition. 14 TcADCI
The present petition is bereft of even a single allegation of exceptional and compelling circumstance to warrant an exception to the rule. In fact, this valid objection elicited no response from petitioners, who glossed over all procedural issues in their Consolidated Reply. If petitioners themselves do not provide the Court some basis for the direct recourse, the Court is not minded to search for one. Further, the petition carries a defective verification since it was verified without stating the basis thereof. In the Verification/Certification of the Petition, the affiant states that he "has read the same and all the facts contained therein are true and correct." 15 The Rules clearly state that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records, and a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. 16 Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. 17 Moreover, this Court observes that the affiant failed to present competent evidence of his identity before the notary public, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. 18 The Court cannot assume that affiant, being a public figure, is personally known to the notary public, for the jurat does not contain a statement to that effect. Records also show that petitioners failed to furnish public respondent with a copy of the petition. The Rules require that the petition should be filed with proof of service on all adverse parties, and that the failure to comply with the requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. 19 On procedural grounds alone then, the petition is susceptible to dismissal. The Court deems it best, however, to resolve the substantial issues in the interest of justice. In their motion for voluntary inhibition, petitioners cite that Ong, his counsel, and public respondent are members of the San Beda Law Alumni Association which, along with the school's Benedictine community, publicly endorsed and supported Ong's petition through newspaper advertisements. Moreover, from the account of the proceedings, petitioners point out that issuing the order of default without resolving the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for inhibition exhibits blatant bias for being unduly precipitate and wholly unwarranted. The rule on compulsory disqualification and voluntary inhibition of judges is provided under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court: No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. AaDSEC
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (underscoring supplied) In keeping with the tenet that judges should not only act with fairness, independence, impartiality and honesty but should also be perceived to be the embodiment of such qualities, the Court added the rule on voluntary inhibition in 1964. In outlining the genesis of the provision, the Court narrated: In Umale v. Villaluz, the Court traced the history of the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision, which had been added only as an amendment to the Rules of Court in 1964. Prior to that year, the question on whether to take cognizance of the case did not depend upon the discretion of the judges not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. If those concerned were not disqualified, it was their official duty to proceed with the case or else risk being called upon to account for their dereliction. They could not voluntarily inhibit themselves on grounds of prejudice or bias, extreme delicacy, or even if they themselves took great interest and an active part in the filing of the case. Gutierrez v. Santos and Del Castillo v. Javelona paved the way for the recognition of other circumstances for disqualification those that depended upon the exercise of discretion of the judges concerned. 20 While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. 21 In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test, the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that they are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms. 22 Impartiality being a state of mind, there is thus a need for some kind of manifestation of its reality, in order to provide "good, sound or ethical grounds" or "just and valid reasons" for inhibition. 23 Bare allegations of bias and prejudice are not enough in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that a judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. 24 In Gochan v. Gochan, 25 the Court elucidated further:
Verily, the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. aCSDIc In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably both to the poor and the rich, the weak and the strong, the lonely and the well-connected. 26 (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Court applied the same precept in Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc. 27 where the judge's right to inhibit was weighed against his duty to decide the case without fear of repression. Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forumshopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice. 28 A judge must decide based on a rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in a case brought before him. 29 In the present case, petitioners cite public respondent's affiliation with an alumni association as the sole ground to which they anchor their motion for the voluntary inhibition of public respondent. Before the trial court, petitioners alleged that the law school ties among public respondent, Ong and his counsel, they having graduated from San Beda College of Law, albeit years apart, spell partiality. Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the parties, however. 30 In one case, 31 the Court ruled that organizational affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition. Membership in a college fraternity, by itself, does not constitute a ground to disqualify an investigator, prosecutor or judge from acting on the case of a respondent who happens to be a member of the same fraternity. A trial Judge, appellate Justice, or member of this Court who is or was a member of a college fraternity, a university alumni association, a socio-civic association like Jaycees or Rotary, a religionoriented organization like Knights of Columbus or Methodist Men, and various other fraternal organizations is not expected to automatically inhibit himself or herself from acting whenever a case involving a member of his or her group happens to come before him or her for action. A member in good standing of any reputable organization is expected all the more to maintain the highest standards of probity, integrity, and honor and to faithfully comply with the ethics of the legal profession. 32 (underscoring supplied)
The added fact that the law school's alumni association published statements in support of Ong's application cannot lend credence to the imputation of bias on the part of public respondent. No clear and convincing evidence was shown to indicate that public respondent actively sponsored and participated in the adoption and publication of the alumni association's stand. It is inconceivable to suppose that the alumni association's statement obliged all its members to earnestly embrace the manifesto as a matter of creed. CAETcH Arbitrariness cannot be inferred either from the fact that public respondent resolved the motion for voluntary inhibition one day after it was filed. Since the personal process of "careful self-examination" 33 is essentially a matter of conscience, the judge may decide as soon as the factual basis of the motions has been clearly laid before the court because from there on the resolution of the motion enters the subjective phase. That public respondent, Ong and his counsel former Senator Rene Saguisag are all graduates of San Beda College of Law was clearly and early on established. Hence, this sole ground relied upon by petitioners in their motion, it bears repeating, no longer required a hearing or called for the submission of a comment or opposition, and the absence thereof did not prejudice petitioners. In one case, 34 it was held that the Rules of Court does not direct the court to order the filing of comments or oppositions to the motion before the motion is resolved. The parties may orally argue and ventilate their positions and, thereafter, the court may rule on the motion. The Court notes that when petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion (for reconsideration and deferment) which basically reiterated their previous arguments, they no longer set the motion for hearing and simply submitted their motion ex parte without further arguments, thereby recognizing the non-litigious nature of their allegations. Even assuming that Ong interposed no objection to the motion, it was still up to public respondent to discern, for a qualified judge cannot be ousted from sitting in a case by sheer agreement of the parties. Petitioners further complain that public respondent proceeded to hear the case and declared them in default without first resolving their pending motion. Records show that petitioners filed on August 13, 2007 an Omnibus Motion 35 for reconsideration of the August 7, 2007 Order and for deferment of the hearings set on August 14, 21 and 28, 2007. Petitioners, thereafter, did not appear in the various settings, they alleging that the question of voluntary inhibition, which they deem to be an "overriding consideration" partaking of a "highly prejudicial matter," had yet to be resolved by the trial court. 36 While there is no specific rule providing for a definite period of time within which to resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order denying inhibition, judges must endeavor to act promptly on it within the mandatory 90-day period so as not to interrupt the course of trial. 37 The trial court narrated what transpired on August 14, 2007 as confirmed by the entry of the nunc pro tunc Order of September 17, 2007 making on record the denial of the Omnibus Motion. During the hearing on August 14, 2007, the Court, after considering the arguments and counter-arguments from petitioner [Ong] and the Office of the Solicitor General, and finding no cogent reasons to reconsider its earlier position, denied in open court
the motion seeking a reconsideration of the Order dated August 7, 2007 which denied movants' "Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Presiding Judge". Corollarily, for lack of merit, the motion to defer the proceedings in the instant case was similarly denied. (see TSN, August 14, 2007, pp. 13). (citation in the original) 38 DHTCaI The cited record of the proceedings validates the disposition made by the trial court on the given date, during which time petitioners failed to appear. After hearing the arguments, the trial court ruled as follows, quoted verbatim: COURT: That's right, so there's no basis to overturn our previous Order denying the motion to voluntary inhibition filed by Atty. Capulong Now, there's another matter being raised here, counsel could not have a valid argument here to delay the proceedings. What the Supreme Court wanted is to have an Order summary of the proceeding because Kilos Bayan did sought at their level. Supreme Court was expecting that they will do so again in our level, but in . . . since there's seems to be no good idea waiting for the adversary arguments, so, it will, when it reaches the Supreme Court, it will repeat the purpose to which they were directed to litigate. They're supposed to litigate because if they believe they're . . . for the denial of the petition, unless the application for declaration of natural born citizen, they should do so without any delay, so, use Bayan as a very . . . an active group and Bantay Katarungan, they should be a party to expeditious resolution of cases, not to a delay. How many are we here from government. We are here to litigate. So, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings is also denied. The settings for August were all placed in the Order which was published in the newspaper of general circulation. We have previously agreed that we will proceed to cross of petitioner and witnesses. Are you ready or would you agree to the suggestion by the Court that we conduct pre-trial? 39 (underscoring supplied) The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order is recognized where an order actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. 40 The phrase nunc pro tunc signifies "now for then," or that a thing is done now that shall have the same legal force and effect as if done at the time it ought to have been done. 41 The purpose of an order nunc pro tunc is to make a present record of an order that the court made in a previous term, but which was not then recorded. It can only be made when the thing ordered has previously been made, but, by inadvertence, has not been entered. 42 In the case at bar, the trial court actually took judicial action which was, however, by mistake or inadvertence, not placed in proper form on record. In any event, petitioners neither seriously contest the veracity of the transcript used as basis for such confirmatory order nor claim any unwarranted prejudice from the fact of its resolution during their non-appearance in the scheduled hearing.
The disallowance of a motion for postponement is not sufficient to show arbitrariness and partiality of the trial court. 43 For one, the grant of such is not a matter of right for it is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 44 Parties have absolutely no right to assume that their motion for deferment would be granted, hence, they should prepare for the hearing, lest they pass the blame to no one but themselves. Further, in considering such motions, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. 45 In this case, the requested postponement was premised on the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. The Omnibus Motion was, however, "submitted ex parte and without further arguments from Oppositors," 46 drawing public respondent to promptly resolve it by denying it. SEIcHa As to the merits of the case of petitioners, the trial court was left with nothing to assess since they did not file any Opposition to Ong's Petition despite the grant to them of extension of time for the purpose and their various submissions to the trial court all related to peripheral issues. No trace of bias can be found at that juncture when the court proceeded to declare petitioners in default after resolving the pending incidents. It is an equally important doctrine that bias and prejudice must be shown to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on the basis of an extrajudicial source, not on what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the magistrate, such opinion even if later found to be erroneous will not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. While palpable error may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 47 Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between counsel and the judge is not a proper ground for disqualification. Opinions framed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove bias or prejudice. Repeated rulings against a litigant no matter how erroneous are not bases for disqualification. 48 As for the allegation of undue haste, the Court cannot appreciate it, considering that the trial court even granted petitioners additional period within which to file an Opposition and in view of the nature of the case, which empowers the trial court to make orders expediting proceedings. 49 In the absence then of clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge, a ruling not to inhibit oneself cannot just be overturned. 50 In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate such acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice as to thaw the attributes of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the hand of prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness moves the judge in the performance of his functions are patently weak to parry the presumption that a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. In fine, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when public respondent did not inhibit himself from hearing the case. On the second issue, petitioners assail the Orders of August 21, 2007 and October 4, 2007 declaring them in default and denying their motion to vacate order, respectively.
Rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, have often been held as absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. 51 Section 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides that "[t]he civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto." Records show that the notice was last published on July 26, 2007. 52 HETDAC The trial court pointed out that petitioners filed their entry of appearance 53 without any attached Opposition to Ong's petition and that, despite the grant to them of additional five days from August 7, 2007, they still failed to make a submission. Petitioners do not contest the trial court's earlier observation that at the August 7, 2007 hearing, petitioners' counsel undertook to submit the Opposition within the extended period and to appear at the next hearing, 54 where eventually both their pleading and presence turned up unforthcoming. Petitioners thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Vacate the August 21, 2007 Order, insisting that the Omnibus Motion presented a prejudicial issue that should have been resolved first before the trial court proceeded with the case. Notably, in both the Motion to Vacate Order and the Memorandum and/or Submission, petitioners relied only on this ground and impliedly waived other defenses or grounds for the lifting of the default order. For a motion to lift an order of default to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be made by motion under oath by one who has knowledge of the facts; (2) it must be shown that the failure to file answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence; and (3) there must be a proper showing of the existence of meritorious defense. 55 As the trial court observed, the motion to vacate or set aside the order of default failed to comply with paragraph (b), Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, 56 it noting, inter alia, that the motion was "not under oath, it failed to explain or justify why movants have not filed any opposition to the petition, and it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit." 57 Indeed, a trial court has no authority to consider a motion to lift the order of default where such motion was not made under oath. 58 Moreover, a motion to lift an order of default must allege with particularity the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect which caused the failure to answer. 59 In this case, petitioners' unverified motion does not contain any justifiable reason for their failure to file an appropriate responsive pleading. Petitioners' persistent stance on the pendency of their Omnibus Motion deserves scant consideration in view of the recognition of the nunc pro tunc order confirming the August 14, 2007 denial of such motion. Moreover, the filing of a motion for inhibition could not toll the running of the reglementary period to file a responsive pleading, for where a period is to be suspended by the filing of a pleading, the Rules of Court expressly provides for such a suspension. 60 Despite the grant of an extension of time, petitioners did not file an Opposition to Ong's Petition, even one ex abundante ad cautelam that would have sufficiently dealt with their concern over the alleged pending incident.
Further, petitioners failed to allege, much less demonstrate, a meritorious defense or any argument to protect whatever interest they may have under the entry which they resist to be corrected, either embodied in a separate affidavit of merit or embedded in the verified motion itself. 61 Petitioners would later admit that they are "not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense" as they are acting as "judicial monitors and observers." 62 EHTIcD Velayo-Fong v. Velayo 63 discusses the meaning of meritorious defense: Moreover, when a party files a motion to lift order of default, she must also show that she has a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the order of default set aside. The term meritorious defense implies that the applicant has the burden of proving such a defense in order to have the judgment set aside. The cases usually do not require such a strong showing. The test employed appears to be essentially the same as used in considering summary judgment, that is, whether there is enough evidence to present an issue for submission to the trier of fact, or a showing that on the undisputed facts it is not clear that the judgment is warranted as a matter of law. The defendant must show that she has a meritorious defense otherwise the grant of her motion will prove to be a useless exercise. Thus, her motion must be accompanied by a statement of the evidence which she intends to present if the motion is granted and which is such as to warrant a reasonable belief that the result of the case would probably be otherwise if a new trial is granted. 64 (emphasis in the original) Conjunctively, the glaring deficiencies negate the posture that petitioners had no intention to delay the case and that their defenses, if any, deserve to see the light of day in court. David v. Gutierrez-Fruelda 65 did not countenance the failure to comply with the basic requirements of a motion to lift an order of default. Accordingly, public respondent did not arbitrarily declare them in default and deny their motion to lift the order of default. Respecting the trial court's Decision of October 24, 2007, petitioners recapitulate their arguments against the inhibition and default orders to conclude that the assailed decision is "insupportable." 66 As lone ground, petitioners posit that the special proceedings under Rule 108 do not fall under the juridical concept of adversarial proceedings in the absence of effective adversaries since the Office of the Civil Registrar is a formal party while the Office of the Solicitor General sided with Ong's legal position. Petitioners admit that they, while being parties in interest in their capacity as judicial monitors and observers, are not real adversarial litigants in the juridical sense. 67 The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 68 stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or "[o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it." 69 In this case, impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected. The interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while petitioners' "interest" was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading. CTHDcE
Petitioners raise no additional ground to substantiate their imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent insofar as the issuance of the October 24, 2007 Decision is concerned. Since no further issues were raised, the Court is precluded from making a definitive pronouncement on the substantial aspect of the assailed decision. WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Brion, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Human Rights Full-Text Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Human Rights Full-Text Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EN BANC [G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.] HON.

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 1

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 2

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 3

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 4

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 5

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 6

EN BANC [G.R. No. 83896. February 22, 1991.]

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 7

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 8

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 9

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 10

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 11

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 12

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 13

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 14

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 15

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 16

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 17

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 18

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 19

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 20

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 21

HUMAN RIGHTS (CHAPTER 7) 22

You might also like