FILE NOTES:

This aff is meant to be a critical/supplemental version to the environmental monitoring aff. An team running this affirmative shoul! be prepare! to !ebate the substance of that aff as "ell #an! in fact shoul! strive to integrate those arguments as much as possible$. An team negating this aff shoul! use the environmental monitoring neg as a starting point to supplement the cosmopolitanism%specific evi!ence in this file. &egemon goo! an! ever space mil goo! affirmative an! argument #an! their atten!ant ' ans"ers$ are on%point impact turns to this aff(I !i! not repro!uce that "or) here as "e alrea! have it in a bunch of !ifferent places.

*** 1AC

Contention one(Inner)Space Colonization

What is space? What is its purpose? Who owns it? In a globalized world, the wa we answer these !uestions e""ects and shapes the wa we thin# about politics in general$ Space is both a blan# can%as and a &irrorhow we theorize space can aid or abet our thin#ing about so%ereignt , cooperation, and %iolence Stuart '(() *+ill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, nbundlin! Soverei!nt", #erritor", and the State in $uter Space%, from Securing Outer Space, edited b" &ormann and Sheehan' As "ell as consi!ering ongoing events in outer space politics #such as cooperation, militari-ation an! commerciali-ation$, this te.t e.plores the "a s in "hich "e continue to evaluate an! !evelop conceptual frame"or)s to help us un!erstan! outer space politics This chapter furthers the engagement "ith ho" political i!eas are reconceptuali-e! in relation to outer space , an! also ho" outer space has

i&plications "or our understanding o" those political ideas . *he wa s in which we approach the stud o" outer space politics helps to construct the meanings b "hich it is imbue!, an! to suggest wa s o" de%eloping our theoretical approaches . One area in "hich outer space both challenges tra!itional political notions an! also political an! legal practice is in the !efinition an! practice of sovereignt . This chapter argues that /estphalian sovereignt #also 0mo!ern0 or 0classical0 sovereignt $, "hich !elineates a clear relationship bet"een sovereignt , territor an! the state, !oes not conceptuall grasp sovereignt in outer space #an! b a normative account, ho" sovereignt shoul! an! coul! be transforming$. As such I argue that sovereignt has been 0unbun!le!0 in outer space, both practicall through legal approaches "hich allo" for a !ifferent relationship bet"een sovereignt , territor an! the state, an! also theoreticall in terms of leaving open the potential to reconceptuali-e sovereignt in a "a that better embraces sovereignt in a globali-e! "orl! #an! in!ee!, going one step further, in a "orl! "here not all politics even occur "ithin the 0globe0, i.e. in
outer space$. The challenge to tra!itional notions of sovereignt can be seen partl as a pro!uct of #an! reconstitutive of$ globali-ation, "hereb transterritorial issues l an! the 0shrin)ing0 of the planet challenge the straightfor"ar! relationship bet"een sovereignt , territor an! the state. The realit of space

e.ploration can be seen as another ra!ical an! uni1ue issue%area in "hich theoretical approaches to 0global0 politics must be reconceive!. This chapter e.plores the "a s in "hich outer space poses uni1ue challenges to conceptual an! legal approaches to governance. I also argue that there ma also be a dialectical relationship bet"een territoriall %base! politics an! outer space politics, "hereb notions of sovereignt are &utuall reconstituting globalization and its conceptual challenge to classical notions of sovereignt . There are several !ifferent practical an! theoretical approaches to
unbun!ling sovereignt in outer space. The t"o approaches use! here are regime theor an! cosmopolitan sovereignt . The approaches are ver !ifferent the first ta)ing a practical an! conservative but perhaps static an! a historical vie" of the international s stem, to un!erstan! ho" territor is !e%lin)e! from sovereignt in the governance of outer space2 an! the secon! suggesting a fairl ra!ical !eparture from

/estphalian sovereignt , in !elin)ing it from the state itself, an! normativel repositioning 0humanit 0 as the central unit of anal sis in la". The chapter ta)es each approach in rum, appl ing it generall to outer space an! then ro a common e.ample of
the international Space Station #ISS$, an! then criti1ues the in!ivi!ual approaches. The final section of the chapter consi!ers the t/O approaches in relation to each other, an! !ra"s three broa! conclusions in relation to sovereignt , territor an! the state in outer space: first, that un!erstan!ing

politics in the space age re1uires moving be on! /estphalian conceptuali-ations of sovereignt , an! unbun!ling the relationship bet"een sovereignt , territor an! the state2 secon!, that e+ploration o" outer space itsel" &a be contributing to a wider shi"t in the practice and understanding o" so%ereignt , an!, thir!, that future !evelopments in outer space e.ploration "ill continue to influence our conceptuali-ation of sovereignt #perhaps further vali!ating some approaches an! un!ermining others$.

Sadl , the radical potential to thin# di""erentl about space and so%ereignt has been hi-ac#ed b &ilitarization$ *his is not -ust a &ilitarization o" ./*01 spaceit is also a &ilitarization o" our I2201 space$ Status !uo politics and rhetoric is an atte&pt to &ilitarize both space and the A&erican ps che in order to &aintain i&perial do&inance$ .rr (3, +ac)ie Orr, from the !epartment f sociolog at S racuse 3niversit , 4The 5ilitari-ation of Inner Space,6 Critical Sociology, 5arch 7889, volume 7, issue :8, pg. 9;<%9=<.

The e!itorial "arns: 0This

"ar against terrorism, shoul! it come, is inten!e! to mar) the official emergence of the 3nite! States as a full%fle!ge! global empire, sei-ing sole responsibilit an! responsibilit as planetar policemen.0 > , the militari-ation of outer space is an essential component of Full Spectrum ?ominance, an! if the so%calle! @"ar against terrorism@
must be situate! "ithin broa!er 3.S. ambitions for global empire,= it is perhaps useful for to!a @s civilian%sol!ier to "on!er Aust ho" "i!e an! !eep is a 0full spectrum0 of !ominanceB /hat bor!ers must be crosse! to full !ominate such an infinit of spaceB Cerhaps the

!omination of outer space in the interests of militari-e! technologies an! intelligence re1uires the militari-ation of a some"hat more covert spatial territor %a territor more spectral, less smoothl operationali-e! but no less
necessar to global !ominion. /hat happens in that elusive terrain of @inner space@ as outer space becomes an overt fiel! for full militari-e! comman! postsB Is the @inner@ ps chic terrain of to!a @s 3.S. civilian%sol!ier another battlefiel! on the "a to full spectrum !ominance of the globeB /hat )in! of militari-e! infrastructure is nee!e! @insi!e@ the sol!ierl civilian calle! upon to support the establishment of militar superiorit across the spectrum of spaces @outsi!e@B To "hat e.tent might Full Spectrum ?ominance !epen! intimatel on comman!ing @space po"er@ in both outer an! inner spaceB The

ps cholog of the civilian%sol!ier, the net"or)s of ever !a emotional an! perceptual relations, constitute an @inner space@ that is to!a , I suggest, one volatile site of attempte! militar occupation. Dut the occup ing forces I@m concerne! "ith here are not those of an invasive, enem @other.@ Eather, a partial an! urgent histor of attempts b the 3.S. government, me!ia, militar , an! aca!em to enlist the ps chological life of 3.S. citi-ens as a militar asset %this is the embo!ie! stor that occupies me here. The militari-ation of inner space, a comple., !iscontinuous stor that no"here cr stalli-es into the clear )not of conspirac but "hich leaves 78th its uneven traces throughout the scattere! archives of the centur 3nite! States, is no" as it has been before a maAor concern of those most responsible for the business of "ar. 5ilitari-ation ,
!efine! b historian 5ichael Fe er as 0the contra!ictor an! tense social process in "hich civil societ organi-es itself for the pro!uction of violence,0 constitutes at its core a border4crossing bet"een &ilitar and ci%ilian institutions, activities I aims #<G=G: >G$.

The militari-ation of inner space can be conceive!, <, as the ps chological organi-ation of civil societ for the pro!uction of violence, an important feature of a broa!er %tense an! contra!ictor %social process. It got m intention to reif @ps cholog @ or
ps chological processes as if the "oul! be separate! from social, historical, or economic conte.ts. Huite the contrar . D naming the constructe! @inner space@ of ps chological activities increasingl militari-e! %"ith the events of September << serving as an accelerator an! intensifier of processes that are b no means ne" % m purpose is to !eepen a critical sociological commitment to contesting the :e@ of ps cholog as the ra!icall social matter of political struggle, as ra!icall material "eapon of "ar. Or its refusal. /hile I refer to this ps chological space as @inner,@ it of course is not

e.clusivel in!ivi!ual, an! is never confine! to a neat interiorit . Inner space both pro!uces an! is pro!uce! b !eepl social "a s of seeing, profoun!l cultural technologies of perception . An! though I "ant to reAect notion of a homogeneous collective ps che, I !o "ant to conAure or con!ense socialit an! historicit of ps cholog spaces. Cs chological space occupies a !ifficult bor!erlan!, a @bet"een%space@ "here the 1uestion human confusions of "hat is @inner@ an! @outer@ are repetitiousl e.perience!, an! consciousl an! unconsciousl live!. In!ee!, the space ps cholog is the ver site "here ever !a
sensations of "hat@s @insi!e@ no "hat@s @outsi!e,@ "hat@s @them@ an! "hat@s @us,@ "hat feels safe an! seems fatall frightening are culturall #re$pro!uce! or resiste!2 it is tensel bor!er%conscious space. The politics of bor!ers %ho" the @re an! unma!e, "hat the come to mean %is one shifting center politics of nationalism, of language, of memor , of race, gen!er, of terror. /hat has come in the mo!ern /est to be calle! the Ilogical@ pla s a !ramatic, po"er% charge! role "ithin each of these sle! political fiel!s. The militari-ation of ps chological space can be le! then as a strategic

set if ps chological bor!er operations aime! at the militari-ation of civil societ for the production o" %iolence$ The historicall %specific confusion an! re%configuration of the bor!ers bet"een the ps che of the sol!ier an! of the civilian, bet"een the
practice ps cholog an! the prosecution of "ar, is the topic of several recentl le! stu!ies of /orl! /ar II an! its Jol! /ar aftermath. 0Ne" languages for spea)ing about subAectivit ,0 "rites Ni)olas Eose, emerge! /orl! /ar II to a!!ress the ne" consensus that 0*"Kinning "as to re1uire a concerte! attempt to un!erstan! an! govern$ subAectivit of the citi-en.0 Eesearch on @attitu!es@ an! @personalit ,@ on recentl !evelope! techni1ues of public opinion polling2 an! at managing both militar an! civilian beliefs an! behaviors. The human ps che itself became 0a possible

!omain for s stematic government in the pursuit of socio%political en!s 0 #Eose <GGL: ., 7<, >$. Accor!ing to historian Laura 5cEnane , "ith the en! of the "ar an! the rise of the 3.S. national securit state, the 0ambient militarism0 of Jol! /ar 3.S. culture translate! the ver meaning of national securit into a 0perception, a state of min!0 %a profoun!l ps chological state in "hich the civilian ps che became a !ifficult but pervasive variable in militar planning #7888:
:G, <7%<;$. Ellen &erman@s chronicle of the imbrications of ps chological concepts an! e.pertise into the te.tures of ever !a life in post%/orl! /ar II 3.S. societ , recounts ho" efforts at 0mass emotional control0 in the name of national securit le! , b the late <GL8s, to an

unprece!ente! blurring of boun!aries bet"een public polic an! private emotions #<GG;: 79<%797$. To!a

, one important contributing factor to civilian%sol!iers@ "illingness to serve ma be a sanctione! ignorance of this histor of previous campaigns to effectivel mobili-e @inner space@ in the interests of "ar an! the organi-e! pro!uction of violence. Eemembering the militari-ation of ps chic space as

part of the full spectrum of tactics !eplo e! in 78th centur "arfare ma help us better grasp the multiple !imensions of !anger in the present, post %September << contagion of terrors. 0*/Khat one remembers of the past an! ho" one remembers
it !epen! on the social an! cultural resources to "hich one has access,0 "rites Fre! Turner in his recent histor of collective memor %ma)ing, cultural trauma, an! the Mietnam "ar #<GGL: .ii$. Jonsi!er this te.t as one attempt to appl the resources of a critical sociolog to a more public remembering of ho" the inner space of ps cholog has been alrea! a calculate! battlefiel!, a terrain of cultural combat "here the measure of victor inclu!es the possibilit , or impossibilit , of remembering that a fight too) place. If, as Turner suggests, 0memor ta)es place simultaneousl in the in!ivi!ual ps che an! in the social !omain,0 then "hat I #"ant to$ recall is intimatel tie! to "hat ou #are able to$ remember #<GGL: .i$. The ps chic space of memor is a cultural an! collective lan!scape %nobo! moves aroun! there all alone. Is it possible for a critical sociolog to!a to mobili-e its

scholarl an! ps chic resources to !isrupt "hat Stephen Cfohl has calle! 0the hegemonic rh thms of public memor in the 3SA To!a 0 #<GG7: 97$B Jan a contemporar critical sociolog %remembering its o"n insurgent origins G %contribute to counter hegemonic memories that are more public an! more po"erfulB An orbiting 3.S. !octrine of Full Spectrum ?ominance calls for critical

terrestrial practices of full spectrum !e%militari-ation. Econom . Julture. Societ . Cs che. Cerhaps it@s time for a fe"
collective flashbac)s. &o" "oul! it be to publicl remember the civilian%sol!ier as a central, conteste! figure of 78 centur hot an! col! "arsB /hat !ifference coul! it ma)e to re%frame an! refuse to!a @s @"ar against terrorism@ as the most recent theater of operations for securing the ps chological organi-ation of civil societ for the manufacture of mass violenceB Insisting on the pro!uctive bor!er%crossing bet"een the past an! present tense, as)ing ou live briefl in the 1uestion of the boun!aries bet"een @then@ an! @no",@ te.t tries to contribute to an effective histor of the present %one that might arrive in time for the fight for less terrori-ing future spaces. <8

*his &ilitarized &indset is the cause o" genocidal %iolencea politics based in bounded co&&unities cannot result in an thing sa%e atrocitiesit can onl sol%e wars between li#e4&inded people Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter 2 !' ()*
(+ ,GI previously cited Karl Poppers definition according to which democ- racy can allow a change of government without bloodshed. More precisel , as Dobbio asserts, !emocrac is a political s stem in "hich change is nonviolent. These theoretical tenets have a clear empirical correspon!ence: in the consoli!ate! de&ocracies, the number of

in!ivi!uals sub% Aecte! to violence for political reasons is far smaller than in non!emocratic s stems #i" we li&it oursel%es to internal political %iolence $. Let us begin b e.amining the
most serious violence a government caninflict: mass e.termination for racial, religious, social, or political reasons.:= Out of the t"ent maAor !emoci!es that occurre! in the "orl! bet"een <G88 an! <G=>, onl one "as carrie! out b a !emocratic regime(imperial Dritain in its colonies.:G Li)e"ise, the list of countries attempting !emoci!e starting from <G;; inclu!es onl t"o cases out of fort % one in the /est: Dosnia in the perio! <GG7N <GG; an! Ougoslavia in <GG=N<GGG. The result is partiall tautological: it "oul! be !ifficult to !efi ne as !emocratic a government that carries out the mass )illing of its o"n !emos because it "oul! be violating the principle of nonviolence. A cer% tain congruenc is e.pecte! bet"een input an! output in the !emo cratic pro cess an! historical e.perience ten!s to confi rm this e.pectation. This !oes not mean that a government that carries out !emoci!es cannot be an electe! one. The case of A!olf &itler is an e.ample of this. &o"ever, b the time the !emoci!e occurre!, Na-i Ferman ha! long cease! to satisf the criteria of a !emocrac . Statistical anal ses are problematic an! open to criticism.9< For instance, statistical anal ses !o not ta)e in!irect responsibilities, such as those !eriving from fun!ing, fomenting, or suppl ing arms to others, into account. The !ata cite! e.clu!e the victims occurring in the course of "ars, "hile it is historicall !iffi cult to !istinguish be% t"een victims in time of peace an! those of "ar, as governments of% ten unleash po liti cal violence, even against their o"n citi-ens, in times of "ar. A !emo cratic government can also start "ars that cause a large number of victims in other areas, such as those infl icte! b the 3nite! States !uring the 'orean an! Mietnam "ars an! more re% centl in Af ghan i stan an! Ira1. The observe! absence of violence in the interior is certainl not a reason for satisfaction if the violence carrie! out in the e.terior is ver high. Li)e"ise, countries "ith a long liberal tra!ition such as Freat Dritain, France, an! the Nether% lan!s "ere embroile! in long an! bloo! colonial a!ventures.97 Even if these factors are ta)en into account, the fact remains that a state that perpetrates or allo"s a !emoci!e involving its o"n citi-ens can% not be !eeme! !emo cratic. Important research b 5ichael 5ann has situate! the relationship bet"een !emocracies an! genoci!e in a ne" conte.t. 5ann claime! that po liti cal communities "ith a high level of participation ensure the safet of their o"n members but can

prove !angerousl lethal to those "ho !o not belong to them. This is the often neglecte! 4!ar) si!e of !emocrac .69: T pical e.amples of this !ar) si!e are the massacre of the in!igenous populations b Eu ro pe an colonists in North America an! Australasia. These massacres "ere often carrie! out b small communi% ties "ith a high level of internal participation an! soli!arit #often at local rather than state level$ but that !i! not hesitate to de"end the&4 sel%es an! ph sicall eliminate native populations "ho those communi% ties felt represente! !angers or obstacles to them$ In man cases simpl because those native populations "ere !ifferent. Ethnic cleansing "as practice! in the maAorit of eastern Eu ro pe an countries "hen those countries establishe! themselves as national states an! foun!e! their o"n
legitimac on the people, "hich "as, ho"ever, !efi ne! in ethnic terms. In recent times "e sa" in the Dal)ans ho" the !emocracies being set up felt an almost ph siological nee! to emphasi-e their !ifference from other groups, even "hen the ethnic !ivi!ing lines #for instance, bet"een Jroats, Serbs, Slovenians, Dosnians, Albanians, 5ontenegrins, an! 5ace!onians an! so on$ "ere an thing but obvious. As soon as the homogeni-ation

of the communit ha! been obtaine! b such coercive means as force! assimilation, e.pulsion, or even genoci!e, those !emocracies beca&e obli%ious to the blood the had spilt . There is nothing li)e self% satisfaction for helping to remove the horrors of the past an! to perfect peaceful cohabitation $ This confi rms that even though !emocracies minimi-e the amount of po liti cal violence insi!e their boun!aries, !emocracies can be e.tremel harmful to those the !o not recogni-e as members, "hether the be% long to ethnic minorities or other nations $ E.ternal
enemies are useful for !eveloping a common i!entit on the interior b means of an out% "ar! pouring of violence represse! on the insi!e. As &egel ha! alrea! observe!, 4successful "ars have prevente! civil broils an! strengthene! the internal po"er of the state $599 The ris) of this is all the more fre% 1uent at the stage in "hich a given !emo cratic communit is being establishe!.

An , moreo&er, this !s"chological em!hasis on the nation an the in i&i ual communit" first can no longer sol&e !roblems in the worl ' .&er" e/istential threat humanit" faces0war, terrorism, !roliferation, !o!ulation growth an total en&ironmental colla!se0can onl" be ealt with &ia true international coo!eration' The !s"che of the status 1uo ma2es all of these im!acts ine&itable
,mith, 200+ [Rogers, Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard University. Stories Of Peoplehood, The Politics and Morals of Political Mem ership, p. !""#!"$.% &t is certainly important to oppose s'ch evol'tionary doctrines y all intellect'ally credi le means. ('t many have already een )idely discredited* and today

it may )ell prove sal'tary, even indispensa le, to heighten a)areness of h'man identity as shared mem ership in a species engaged
in an ages#long process of adapting to often dangero's and 'nforgiving nat'ral and man#made environments.+, -hen )e see o'rselves in the light of general evol'tionary patterns, )e ecome a)are that it is gen'inely possi le for a species s'ch as o'rselves to s'ffer massive set ac.s or

even

to ecome e/tinct if )e p'rs'e certain dangero's co'rses of ac tion. That o'tcome does not seem to cooperative h'man efforts. The first is o'r ongoing v'lnera

e in any h'man0s interest. 1nd )hen )e reflect on the state of o'r species today, )e see or sho'ld see at least five ma2or challenges to o'r collective s'rvival, m'ch less o'r collective no'rishing, that are in some respects tr'ly 'nprecedented. These are all challenges of o'r o)n ma.ing , ho)ever, and so they can all e met thro'gh s'ita ly ility to the e/traordinary )eapons of mass destr'ction that )e have een 'ilding d'ring the last half cent'ry. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that characteri3ed the 4old -ar at its )orst are no) ehind 's, 't the n'clear arsenals that )ere so threatening are largely still )ith 's, and indeed the governments and, perhaps, terrorist gro'ps possessed of some n'clear )eaponry have contin'ed to proliferate. The

second great threat is some sort of environmental disaster,

ro'ght on y the y#prod'cts of o'r efforts to achieve ever#accelerating ind'strial and post#

ind'strial prod'ction and distri 'tion of an incredi le range of good and services. -hether

it is glo al )arming, the spread of to/ic )astes, iospheric disr'ptions d'e to ne) agric'lt'ral techni5'es, or some com ination of these and other conse5'ences of h'man interference )ith the air, )ater, climate, and plant and animal species that s'stain 's, any ma2or environmental disaster can affect all of h'manity . Third, as o'r economic and technological systems have ecome ever more interconnected, the danger that ma2or economic or technological fail'res in one part of the )orld might trigger glo al catastrophes may )ell increase . S'ch interdependencies can, to
e s're, e a so'rce of strength as )ell as )ea.ness, as 1merican and 6'ropean responses to the 6ast 1sian and Me/ican economic crises of the !$$,s indicated. Still, if glo al capitalism )ere to collapse or a technological disaster compara le to the imagined 7+8 doomsday scenario )ere to occ'r, the conse5'ences today )o'ld e more far#reaching than they )o'ld have een for compara le developments in previo's cent'ries. 9o'rth, as advances in food prod'ction, medical care, and other technologies have contri 'ted to higher infant s'rvival rates and longer lives, the

)orld0s pop'lation has een rapidly increasing, placing intensifying press'res on o'r physical and social environments in a great variety of )ays. These demographic trends, necessarily involving all of h'manity, threaten to e/acer ate all the preceding pro lems, generating political and military conflicts, spa)ning chronic and ac'te environmental damages, and straining the capacities of economic systems. The final ma2or challenge )e face as a
species is a more novel one, and it is one that may ring conscio'sness of o'r shared :species interests: even more to the fore. &n the 'pcoming cent'ry, h'man eings )ill increasingly e a le to affect their o)n genetic endo)ment, in )ays that might potentially alter the very sort of organic species that )e are. Here as )ith modern )eapons, economic processes, and pop'lation gro)th, )e face ris.s that o'r efforts to improve o'r condition may go disastro'sly )rong, potentially endangering the entire h'man race. 7et the appeal of endo)ing o'r children )ith greater gifts is s'fficiently po)erf'l that organi3ed efforts to create s'ch genetic technologies capa le of :redesigning h'mans: are already 'rgeoning, oth among rep'ta le academic researchers and less restrained, 't )ell#endo)ed, fringe gro'ps.+! To e s're, an

a)areness of these as )ell as other potential dangers affecting all h'man eings is not eno'gh y itself to foster moral o'tloo.s that re2ect narro) and invidio's partic'laristic conceptions of h'man identity . &t is perfectly possi le for leaders to feel that to save the species, policies that r'n ro'ghshod over the claims of their rivals are not simply 2'stified 't morally demanded. &ndeed, li.e the )riters & have e/amined here, my o)n more egalitarian and cosmopolitan moral leanings pro a ly stem originally from
religio's and 8antian philosophical infl'ences, not from any conscio'sness of the common :species interests: of h'man eings. ('t the ethically constit'tive story )hich contends that )e have s'ch interests, and that )e can see them as moral interests, seems 5'ite realistic, )hich is of some advantage in any s'ch acco'nt. 1nd 'nder the circ'mstances 2'st s.etched, it is li.ely that more and more people )ill ecome pers'aded that today, those shared species interests face more profo'nd challenges than they have in most of h'man history. &f so, then stressing o'r shared identity as mem ers of an evolving species may serve

as a highly credi le ethically constit'tive story that can challenge partic'laristic acco'nts and foster s'pport for novel political arrangements. Many more people may come to feel that it is no longer safe to cond'ct their political lives a sor ed in their traditional comm'ni ties, )ith disregard for o'tsiders, )itho't active concern a o't the iss'es that affect the )hole species
and )itho't practical colla orative efforts to confront those iss'es. That conscio'sness of shared interests has the potential to promote stronger and m'ch more incl'sive senses of tr'st, as people come to reali3e that the dangers and challenges they face in common matter more than the differences that )ill do' tless persist. & thin. this sort of a)areness of a shared :species interests: also can s'pport senses of personal and collective )orth, tho'gh & ac.no)ledge that this is not o vio'sly the case. Many people find the spectacle of the h'man species str'ggling for s'rvival amidst rival life forms and an 'nfeeling material )orld a lea. and dispiriting one. Many may still feel the need to com ine acceptance of an evol'tionary constit'tive story )ith religio's or philosophical acco'nts that s'pply some stronger sense of moral p'rpose to h'man and cosmic e/istence. ('t if people are so inclined, then nothing & am advocating here stands in the )ay of s'ch com inations. Many persons, moreover, may )ell find a s'staining sense of moral )orth in a conception of themselves as contri 'tors to a species that has developed 'ni5'e capacities to deli erate and to act responsi ly in regard to 5'estions no other .no)n species can yet conceive; ho) sho'ld )e live< -hat relationships sho'ld )e have, individ'ally and collectively, to other people, other life forms, and the roader 'niverse< &n time, & hope that many more people may come to agree that h'manity has shared responsi ilities of ste)ardship for the animate and physical )orlds aro'nd 's as )ell as o'rselves, 'ltimately see.ing to promote the flo'rishing of all insofar as )e are capa le and the finit'de of e/istence permits. ('t even short of s'ch a grand sense of species vocation, the idea that )e are part of h'manity0s endeavor to strive and thrive across ever#greater e/panses of space and time may e one that can inspire a deep sense of )orth in many if not most h'man eings. Hence it does not seem 'nrealistic to hope that )e can enco'rage increased acceptance of a 'niversalistic sense of h'man peoplehood that may help rein in pop'lar imp'lses to get s)ept 'p in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. &n the years ahead, this ethical sen si ility might foster acceptance of vario's sorts of

transnational political arrangements to deal )ith pro lems li.e e/ploitative and )ildly fl'ct'at ing international financial and la or mar.ets, destr'ctive environmental and agric'lt'ral practices, pop'lation control, and the momento's iss'e of h'man genetic modifications. These are, after all, pro lems that appear to need to e dealt )ith on a near#glo al scale if they are to e dealt )ith satisfactorily. =reater acceptance of s'ch arrangements )o'ld necessarily entail increased )illingness to vie) e/isting governments at all
levels as at est only :semi#sovereign,: a'thoritative over some iss'es and not others, in the manner that acceptance of m'ltiple partic'laristic constit'tive stories )o'ld also reinforce. &n the res'lting political climate, it might ecome easier to constr'ct the sorts of systems of inter)oven democratic international, regional, state and local governments that theorists of :cosmopolitan democracy,: :li eral m'ltic'lt'ral nationalism,: and :differentiated democracy: li.e David Held, -ill 8ymlic.a, &ris 7o'ng, -illiam 4onnolly, and >'rgen Ha ermas all envision.

*he 6lan
*he /nited States 7ederal go%ern&ent should co&&it all a%ailable resources to de%eloping a networ# o" cooperati%e, internationall accessible en%iron&ental &onitoring satellites$ We8ll clari" $

Contention *woCos&opolitanis&
Cooperati%e science pro-ects li#e the plan &a#e global cos&opolitanis& an international necessit the plan causes a shi"t in our collecti%e &entalities$ Stuart '(() *+ill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, nbundlin! Soverei!nt", #erritor", and the State in $uter Space%, from Securing Outer Space, edited b" &ormann and Sheehan' Eegime theor provi!es a manner of anal sing sovereignt as !e%lin)e! from territor . The ne.t section a!!resses cosmopolitan sovereignt , focusing on the "ritings of ?avi! &el!, "hich presents a normative approach that assumes teleological progress to"ar!s sovereignt as !e%lin)e! from the state. As such, this approach also provi!es a manner of unbun!ling /estphalian sovereignt , in a time of globali-ation an! outer space e.ploration. The approach also consi!ers ho" tra!itional conceptions of sovereignt not onl appl to outer space, but ho" those conceptions

ma also be affecting the "a political space an! communit #an! thus sovereignt $ is conceive! in "orl! politics . Accor!ing to this approach, an! in accor!ance "ith "i!er cosmopolitanism , in!ivi!ual human beings are the primar political agents in the s stem. Josmopolitanism can be ta)en as the moral an! political outloo) that offers the best prospects for overcoming the problems an! limits of classic an! liberal sovereignt . It buil!s upon some of the strengths of the liberal international or!er, particularl its commitment to human rights, an! !emocratic values that appl , in principle, to each an! all. #&el! 7887: 79$ E.ploring cosmopolitan sovereignt starts "ith the shift from classical #/estphalian$ sovereignt to liberal sovereignt . For &el!, the liberal sovereignt mo!el represents an attempt to !elimit political po"er an! e.ten! the liberal concern "ith limite! government in the international sphere #7887: <$. One achievement of liberal sovereignt has been the effort to !istribute resources not accor!ing to statehoo!, but
rather base! on the rights of in!ivi!uals #7887: <;$. The 0common heritage of man)in!0 principle that !evelope! for the high seas, an! "as later applie! for treaties on Antarctica an! outer space, is in part an embo!iment of that effort. Jommon heritage approaches represent the

e.clusion of a right of appropriation2 the !ut to use resources in the interest of the "hole of humanit 2 an! the !ut to e.plore an! e.ploit resources for peaceful purposes #&el! 7887: <;$. Transnational issues that challenge the state@s abilit to rule "ithin its o"n bor!ers further inspire the movement a"a from classical sovereignt #&el! 7887: 78$. As international la" co!ifies common heritage principles, an! transnational issue areas un!ermine the state, the moral significance of the state itself is challenge!, an! states an! societies are opene! up to Au!gement b general, if not universal, stan!ar!s #&el! 7887: 78$. It is this &oral shi"t as well as the increased "ocus on hu&anit as a whole that represents &o%e&ent "ro& liberal to cos&opolitan so%ereignt . &o"ever the nee! to govern areas such as outer space is not simpl a practical, but also a philosophical issue, in not onl practicall reconsi!ering governance of transterritorial areas, but also consi!ering their implications for communit , i!entit an! the organi-ation of political space . Josmopolitan sovereignt an! outer space politics In relation to outer space, this approach to sovereignt opens up t"o areas for consi!eration. First, it "arrants a !iscussion on the aspects of present outer space politics that can be un!erstoo! as part of the shift to liberal an! cosmopolitan sovereignt 2 an! secon! it opens up the consi!eration of ho" outer space politics the&sel%es &a in "act be rein"orcing through a "eedbac# loop the sense o" cos&opolitanis& in wider world societ ,G A liberal and cos&opolitan discourse e+ists in the wording o" ourer space law, with the a"ore&entioned clauses that outer space is 9the co&&on pro%ince o" &an#ind9 and 9"or peace"ul purposes9 #Outer Space Treat , Article IM$2 base! in the accepte! principle that outer space is neutral territor 2 in
suggesting that asuonauts are the 0envo s of all man)in!0 #Search an! Eescue Agreement, Article M$, an! that 0The e.ploration an! use of the moon shall be the province of all man)in! an! shall be carrie! out for the benefit an! in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their !egree of economic or scientific !evelopment0 #5oon Treat , Article 9$. These la"s can be seen as part of the movement ro"ar!s 0forms of regulation an! la"%ma)ing that creates po"ers, rights, an! constraints that transcen! the claims of nation%states an! have far%reaching conse1uences in principle0 #&el! 7887: 7:%79$. &o"ever the !egree to "hich behaviour has follo"e! these moral !ictums, an! "ill continue !o so in the future, is not entirel clear. It is in!icative that attempts to violate these la"s are normall un!erta)en "ith Austifications "or!e! in the conte.t of those la"s. For e.ample, attempts b eight e1uatorial states to claim sovereignt over portions of geos nchronous orbit "ere Austifie! b asserting that the Ourer Space Treat !i! not appl to that region #Dogota ?eclaration <G>L$. /eaponi-ation in space has occurre! base! on the Austification that 0peaceful purposes0 !oes not impl !e%militari-ation, but onl the absence of "ar. If$ Jhina has sai! it plans to mine the 5oon, but, vaguel , for the benefit of all humanit 0. II Jases such as these coul! be interprete! as a "ea)ness in the argument that cosmopolitanism sovereignt is nascent in outer space politics, in that states continue to un!ermine the principles un!erl ing the "or!ing of the la"s. Or in!ee! it coul! be interprete! as vali!ation of the treaties, in that actors feel that going be on! those rules must be Austifie! in the conte.t of the la"s themselves. The secon! point raise! b cosmopolitan sovereignt regar!s ho"

outer space itsel" &a be contributing to wider cogniti%e and societal shi"ts that generate a stronger sense o" global co&&unit and co&&on hu&anit #an! hence cosmopolitanism$, which is causing a shi"t awa "ro& Westphalian so%ereignt $ The concept of the Overvie" Effect #/hite <G=>$ suggests that outer space is pla ing a role in forcing into our collective social epistemes a greater sense of our

common !estin an! humanit . Josmologist Jarl Sagan !escribe! this as an a"a)ening from our 0slumbering planetar consciousness0 #Sagan <GG9: 7<;$, "hich is forcing a reconsi!eration of our relationship to ourselves, an! to the universe. The bu!!ing fiel! of astrosociolog further stu!ies the "a s in astrosocial phenomena #such as space e.ploration an! space science$ an! societ are relate! #Cass 7889$ an! mutuall constitutive. *he potential in"luence o" outer space on collecti%e &entalities is sai! to be achie%ed in %arious wa s: through i&ages of the Earth from space, "hich impact upon humans the ecological unit o" our planet , an! the arbitrariness of political boun!aries2 through the meta%e.periences of astronauts "hich impact upon us the realit that humans can no" go into space2 through the role of satellites in connecting us through telecommunications2 an! shrin)ing time through real%time images #PQThite <G=>$ #a la rhe JNN effect$. From this perspective, not onl !oes outer space la" embo! liberal principles, but outer space acti%it itsel" &a be contributing to a cos&opolitan shi"t that e&phasizes the co&&onalit o" the hu&an condition *our 0overlapping communities of fate0 #&el! 7887: :;$R, an! the arbitrariness of state%centere! approaches to sovereignt $ *he need to cooperate on big science pro-ects, co&bined with the planetar and cos&ological perspecti%es that space e+ploration pro%ides, power"ull de&onstrate global interdependence, and thus potentiall &a#e the prospect o" a code o" uni%ersal &oral conduct see& both re!uired and -usti"ied . It can be pointe! out that
the root of 0cosmopolitanism0 an! 0cosmolog 0 are the same 0cosmos0, meaning 0or!er0 an! 0universe0 .

Concentrating on 02:I1.2;02*A< proble&s in space encourages peace"ul, cooperati%e action as opposed to &ilitarization ;oltz, (= >+ames Jla
,Associate Crofessor an! Aca!emic Associate for Securit Stu!ies,

, Colitics of Space Securit K

/hat emerges from this reviePv of the main conceptual roots of space polic anal sis over the past fift ears is a mi.e! picture. Each of the schools anal -e! offers some e.planator strengths, but each also has blin! spots an! "ea)nesses. In see)ing a better means of structuring our thin)ing about space securit @s past an! future, "e instea! return to the !iscussion of space securit that opene! this chapter, one that ma!e reference to both man% ma!e an! natural threats. In that conte.t, it might be useful to move space securit anal sis from its tra!itional focus on

states an! their militaries to the space environment itself. *his shi"t encourages an e&phasis on 9so"ter9 tools "or achie%ing space securit than &ilitar &eans and re"ocuses our attention on the 9transboundar 9 en%iron&ental proble&sc?e represented b space radiation and debris .
Mie"ing space securit from the perspective of self%intereste! actors see)ing to protect their access to space in a gra!uall constricting collective goo!s environment ma offer a!vantages over t ing space securit !ebates to nuclear an! other 0har!0 securit issues, "hich Jol! /ar competition encourage!. Eecent recognition of such problems as global "arming, the !epletion of fisheries, "atershe! shortages, an! !eforestation has brought ne" collective action to a!!ress challenges face! b un%or un!er%protecte! global commons. To !ate, space has figure! onl marginall in these !iscussions, Dut gro"ing concernS about orbital !ebris ma be a tipping point in pushing for more attention tc such 1uestions in space. Loo)ing bac) across histor for lessons, "e can conclu!e that neither e.cessive pessimism nor e.cessive optimism is "arrante! for space securit . The outcomes to !ate in space have been mi.e! in regar! to cooperation an! competition. Oet it is "orth observing that surprising levels of restraint emerge!

!uring the first fift ears of space activit , !espite a global conte.t of political an! militar hostilit . 5a)ing sense of these contra!ictorv tren!s remains a "or) in progress. Jhanging the focus of tra!itional anal sis regar!ing space ma be fruitful, as a !ifferent lens sometimes brings a ne" an! more accurate perspective to long%stu!ie! problems. In the ne.t chapter, then, "e consi!er "hat might be gaine! from vie"ing space securit as an environmental management problem. Although space "eapons e.ist to!a , their impact on the quality of space securit
is influence! b t"o parallel sets of factors%one technical, one political. On the technical si!e, securit calculations must ta)e into account the 1uantit of space "eapons, their rea!iness #inclu!ing test recor!$, their !istribution among actors, the nature of their !eplo ment #in storage, on the groun!, or in !istribution space$, an! the availabilit of metho!s for overcoming or eva!ing them. On the political si!e, space securit is influence! b the brea!th, effectiveness, an! !epth of international support for norms, treaties, an! other agreements meant to ban, limit, or control such "eapons. Dut such

militar calculations alone !o not !etermine space securit . Overla ing these specific operational an! political factors is an important an! often un!erappreciate! set of environmental factors that affect securit in space . As suggeste! in Jhapter One an! anal -e! in greater !etail in the rest of this chapter , ris)s from electromagnetic pulse #E.vIC$ ra!iation, the e.pan!ing 1uantit of orbital space !ebris, an! the increasing population of operational satellites an! spacecraft must be un!erstoo! an! ta)en into account. Failure to !o so "ill affect the accurac of an pre!ictions about the current or future state of space securit . +essica Tuchman 5atthe"s "rote prescientl in <G=G about an
emerging lin) bet"een scientific un!erstan!ing among governments an! solving securit problems in environmental issue%areas involving mi.e! sovereignt an! multiple actors.0 Although she !i! not mention space, her prescription that solving environmental securit problems "ill re1uire 0far greater technical competence in the natural an! planetar sciences among polic ma)ers0 is highl appropriate.@ Sotabl , she also calle! f#$r involvement from the private sector in these !ecisions. The approach, focus, an! s)ill set she invo)es are ver !itIerent from those tra!itionall applie! to militar % securit problems, "hich to !ate have ten!e! to emphasi-e national responses an! have involve! relati el limite! cooperation "ith commercial actors. #One notable e.ception has been in recent efforts at orbital !ebris mitigation, as "ill be !iscusse! later.$

Weaponisation is 2.* ine%itable, but /S action is #e we need to ta#e the "irst step towards international institutionalis& ;oltz, (= >+ames Jla ,Associate Crofessor an! Aca!emic Associate for Securit Stu!ies, , Colitics of Space Securit K
A secon! an! sharpl contrasting perspective, !evelope! aroun! the time of the International Feoph sical Oear #lFO$ organi-e! b scientists "orl!"i!e for <G;>%;=, focuse! on hopes that space might become a sanctuar from "orl! political conflicts. The IFO ha! helpe! bring ne" attention to space an! the !esirabilit of international cooperation in e.ploring this e.citing ne" environment. The global institutionalist school emphasi-es

the possible role of ne" forms of share! human an! scientific thin)ing, supporte! b international cooperation, treaties, an! organi-ations, in provi!ing space securit rather than "eapons%base! approaches. Its a!herents ta)e a far more optimistic vie" of the lessons of space histor an! the prospects for future cooperation, seeing space cooperation as a means of transcen!ing cont<icts on Earth. As Dritish space "riter Arthur J.
Jlar)e "rote in <G;G, 0Onl through space%t<ight can 5an)in! fin! a permanent outlet tor its aggressive an! pioneering instincts.0s> Ferman%born 3.S. space enthusiast PMille Le similarl h pothesi-e! that 0nations might become @e.troverte!@ to the point "here their urge to

overcome the un)no"n "oul! !"arf their historic !esires for po"er, "ealth, an! recognition%%attributes that have so often le! to "ar in the past.00@ Le note! in this regar! the establishment alrea! in <G;G of the 'U.N. Jommittee on the Ceace% ful
3ses of Outer Space. Another earl a!herent to the global institutionalist investrne: school, ph sicist Albert E. &ibbs, as)e! rhetoricall in arguing against militar le! nationalism in space an! instea! in support of a human%"i!e approach to the future manne! e.ploration: 0Is it not possible

that "e "ill help *in this processK simpl because "e "ant a man to stan! on .5arsB0L8 Although global institutionalists
rarel mentione! political theor , their assumptions e.presse! concepts going bac) centuries "ithin so%calle! i!ealist approaches to international relations. Seventeenth%centur ?utch la" er &ugo Frotiu;, for e.ample, observe! that man is en!o"e! b his creator "ith a higher form of reason than animals an! argue! that 0among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling !esire for societ , that is, for the social life%not of an an! ever sort, but peaceful an! organi-e! accor!ing to the measure of his intelligence.0L< A supporting elaboration of these vie"s for space coul! be trace! bac) to Immanuel 'ant@s assertion that 0perpetual peace0 coul! be achieve! b universalist thin)ing an! a fe!eration of nations. As applie! to space,

anal sts use! similar concepts to ma)e the case that humans might be able to live peaceabl in space through ne" metho!s of transnational governance. In!ee!, earl members of this school sa" space as a means of escaping tra!itional patterns of
human conflict, than)s in part to the positive pressures e.erte! b , on the one han!, international communications an!, on the other, a !esire to avoi! catastrophic "ar. The !epicte! cooperation as the more likely outcome in space, compare! to competition, an!

argue! that as states integrate! their economies an! national i!entities began to brea) !o"n, ol! notions of statecentric realism coul! become anachronistic an! even fa!e into histor . One especiall innovative <GL; boo) suggeste!
brea)ing out of superpo"er militar competition via the re!irection of !efense fun!ing, arguing, 0D inviting Soviet cooperation in an intensive program of space e.ploration ... "e "oul! ten! to eliminate "arli)e preparations. This stu! conclu!e! that heightene! space m"stments "oul! 0ma)e further armament e.pen!itures immensel !ifficult if not impossible. /hile some of these more fanciful vie"s !i! not ta)e hol!, evi!ence to support

the global institutionalist case began to emerge earl in the space age. The <GL: signing of the Cartial Test Dan Treat , halting space nuclear tests, sho"e! that cooperation bet"een the t"o rivals ha! begun an! represente! a viable alternative to seemingl inevitable space cont<ict. D the the mi!%<GL8s, the t"o rivals too) another maAor step to"ar!
limiting the scope of their competition b negotiating the Outer Space Treat in <GL> an! opening it to international membership at the 3nite! Nations. This agreement applie! e.isting international la" to space, banne! all militar activities on the 5oon an! other celestial bo!ies #on threat of open inspection rights grante! to signator states$, an! most importantl , remove! the 5oon an! celestial bo!ies from territorial ,competition b !eclaring them to be 0the province of all man)in!.0 Soon after, other cooperative efforts follo"e!, inclu!ing the AD5 Treat an! the Apollo%So u- Aoint manne! mission. In the commercial area, the Jonvention on International Liabilit #<G>7$ an! the Jonvention on Eegistration of Obiects a!!e! further stabilit an! 0rules0 to space activit .@0 As one anal st observe! in <G>L, 0The 3SA an! 3SSE have gone further to achieve arms control in space than in an other area.0LG This evi!ence clearl seems to contra!ict space nationalist patterns an! pre!ictions. Ceter +an)o"itsch observe! in <G>L: In the past *such as "ith the oceans an! the "orl!@s airspaceK, international cooperation "as slo" to follo" ne" !imensions of human activit .0So Dut in @::ace, human activit "as 0soon follo"e! b the !evelopment of ne" forms , J international cooperation, inclu!ing the rapi! formation of a ne" bo! of International la". The global institutionalist school 1uic)l pea)e! in the earl to mi!%<G>OS, ,Scn the !ecline of 3.S.%Soviet !etente resulte! in a sharp !ecline in civilian space cooperation an! iel!e! to ne" militar space testing in the late <G>8S an! earl <G=8;. D the late <G=8s, ho"ever, the school ha! resume! its !evelopment. No" some"hat sobere! b past !isappointments, the global institutionalists ha! largel aban!one! i!ealist notions for more achievable notions of neoliberalism.S7 In other "or!s, anal sts no longer pre!icte! an ultimate philosophical convergence

among states in space but instea! a form of enlightene! self%interest an! improve! behavior through the benefit of cooperative space treaties, international organi-ations, an! ne" forms of bilateral an! multilateral engagement in space. The rapi! gro"th in 3.S.%Eussian collaboration in a number of highl sensitive areas of spaceflight after <GG< seeme! to
confirm their pre!ictions of a coming ne" era in space. Dut Dush a!ministration policies after 78m, inspire! b concepts of space nationalism, e.plicitl reAecte! ne" treat %base! approaches an! a!!itional 0rules0 for space, thus moving these i!eas to the bac) burner of 3.S. polic ma)ing. To!a , a

gro"ing international pressure for ne" legal instruments to prevent conflict in space continues to motivate this school of thought, as seen in the nearl unanimous international support at the 3nite! Nations for the earl resolution on the Crevention of an Arms Eace in Outer Space. Flobal institutionalists emphasi-e the role of international treaties in preserving the benefits of space an! the nee! for e.pan!e! efforts to close e.isting loopholes an! create strong prohibitions against the testing an! !eplo ment of "eapons in space. Air Force Lieutenant Jolonel Druce ?eDlois, for e.ample, reAects the inevitabilit of space nationalism. &e !escribes the !ichotom of 0either !efen!ing space assets "ith "eapons or not !efen!ing them at all0 as a "false dilemma."7; Instea!, he argues for broa!ening the tool )it an! aban!oning the 3.S. 0!o nothing0 !iplomatic strategv for space. ?eDlois ma)es the global institutionalist case that a s&arter /$S$ polic would be one o" underta#ing 9intense diplo&atic e""orts to con%ince a world o" nations that space as a sanctuar "or peace"ul and cooperati%e e+istence

and stabilit% best ser%es all.0>.T As Theresa &itchens argues, ne" forms of international cooperation 0"ill be ... necessar

to ensuring the future securit of space.@US; Among European e.perts, Ferman legal scholar ?etlev /olter has calle! for the negotiation of a Jooperative Securit in Outer Space Treat an! the formation of a formal international organi-ation to implement the ne" agreement.SL :<The treat "oul! ban !estructive "eapons from space, inclu!ing ASATs, spaceIi stri)e "eapons, an! antiballistic missile technologies. It "oul! also set up an international s stem for monitoring an! verification. /olter@s concept is consistent "ith treat proposals at the 3nite! Nations offere! by Jhina an! Eussia in recent ears but goes further to institutionali-e !ecision ma)ing an! implementation at the international level. In the 3nite! States, the 7887 proposal from Jongressman ?ennis 'ucinich #?em., Ohio$ to cut off 3.S fun!ing for space !efenses an! to negotiate a bin!ing treat to prevent the "eaponi-ation of space fits into this school as "elF%Colitical scientist an! tonner State ?e T II partment official Nanc Fallagher argues that true space securit Pvill 0re1uire formal negotiations, legall bin!ing agreements, an! implementing organi-ations that have both resources an! political clout.0c= ?formal

negotiations, legally inding agreements, and implementing organi3ations that have oth reso'rces and political clo't.:c@

And, now is #e we are at a tipping point$ 0ither ou %ote a"" to endorse a critical cos&opolitanis& or ou cede control o" outer space to the neo4cons$ @ic#ens and .r&rod (A B 6ro"essors at the /ni%ersit o" 0sse+ #Ceter an! +ames, August 788>, 4Outer Space an! Internal Nature: To"ar!s a Sociolog of the 3niversit 6 Sociolog volume 9< number 9$
This article has e.plore! some of the past relationships bet"een humanit Vs internal nature an! the universe. /e have also suggeste! some of the more troubling "a s in "hich these relationships are !eveloping in contemporar societ . One !evelopment is the tren! to"ar! a cosmic narcissism in the "a s in "hich elites an! the affluent mi!!le classes relate to the universe as an obAect for maintaining imperial !ominance

an! sustaining personal fantasies about omnipotence respectivel . &o"ever, narcissistic relationships "ith e.ternal nature are intrinsicall unsatisf ing. ObAectif ing nature an! the cosmos !oes not actuall empo"er the self, but rather enslaves it. Even the "ealth an! the technocratic ne" mi!!le class "ho relate to the universe in this "a become subAecte! to the obAects of their o"n narcissistic !esire. The other !evelopment is a return to a fearful an! alienate! relationship "ith the universe, again e.perience! as a frightening subAect controlling Earthl affairs from on high . It is a 7<st%centur version of the Clatonic an! 5e!iaeval universes in "hich humans are ma!e into represse! obAects an! thereb brought to heel . This is a relationship e.perience! b those not in control of the universe: those on the margins of /estern societ . Jommo!ification, militari-ation an! surveillance b the sociall po"erful are again ma)ing the universe into an entit !ominating human societ , as are contemporar cosmological theories !ivorce! from most peopleVs un!erstan!ing. Once more, sociall an! politicall po"erful people #some even claiming to be on a mission from Fo!$ are attempting to ma)e the cosmos into a means b "hich the can control societ on Earth. The combination of these t"o tren!s is a I/i-ar! of O-V effect, in "hich po"er is maintaine! b those "ith mechanical control of the universe, but hi!!en b a mas) of m sticism that )eeps the public in a position of fear an! subservience. Societ 8s relations with the cos&os are now at a tipping point$ The cosmos coul! be e.plore! an! use! for primaril humanitarian en!s an! nee!s. Satellites coul! continue to be increasingl use! to promote environmental sustainabilit an! social Austice. The can for e.ample be, an! in!ee! are being, use! to trac) the movements of nee! refugees an! monitor environmental !egra!ation "ith a vie" to its regulation #3nite! Nations, 788:$. Dut if this mo!el of human interaction is to "in out over the use of the universe to serve !ominant militar , political an! economic en!s then ne" visionaries of a human relationship "ith the universe are nee!e!. In philosophical opposition to the maAorit of pro%space activists #though the rarel clash in realit $ are a
gro"ing number of social movement organi-ations an! net"or)s establishe! to contest human activit in space, inclu!ing the militar use of space, commerciali-ation of space, the use of nuclear po"er in space an! creation of space !ebris. Froups li)e the Flobal Net"or) Against /eapons an! Nuclear Co"er in Space an! the Institute for Jooperation in Space are at the centre of this movement. The activities an! arguments of these groups, to "hich "e are b an! large s mpathetic, !emonstrate the "a s in "hich our un!erstan!ing an! use of outer space are conteste! in

pivotal times.

Contention *hree1eclai&ing 6s chological Space

Space is an opportunit how we understand space politics can change the wa we %iew do&estic politics, and %ice %ersa$ Cooperati%e Space e+ploration isn8t enoughit needs to be co&bined with a &ethodological e&phasis on terrestrial cos&opolitanis& Stuart '(() *+ill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, nbundlin! Soverei!nt", #erritor", and the State in $uter Space%, from Securing Outer Space, edited b" &ormann and Sheehan' Summar an! conclusions Eegime theor an! cosmopolitan sovereignt provi!e useful theoretical frame"or)s for unbun!ling the relationship bet"een sovereignt , territor an! the state in outer space politics. As emphasi-e! above, an! b "a of summar , regime theor provi!es useful tools for t.plaining the negotiations an! preference formations that lea! to cooperative regimes, "hich creativel !e%lin) sovereignt an! territor . &o"ever its rationalist approach to actor behaviour overloo)s !eeper social an! constructivist forces that ma be influencing outer space politics. An! its conservative approach to the states s stem causes shortsighte!ness in appreciating otber forms of governance an! the organi-ation of political space that have prece!e! the PQ@estphalian s stem, an! #especiall in the conte.t of outer space$ fun!amental changes to the s stem that ma come in the future.

Josmopolitan sovereignt usefull embraces the nor&ati%e an! teleological ! namics of outer space politics, and o""ers an alternati%e reading o" outer space la ". In accepting that classical sovereignt e.ists in the s stem, but that it ma be at pla "ith liberal an! cosmopolitan forms of sovereignt too, the approach opens up ne" interpretations of outer space politics in the present, but also offers clear visions for potential !evelopments in the future. The constructivist ! namic of the approach also allo"s us to see ho" outer space ma not onl be subAect to, but also constitutive of, cosmopolitan shifts in the collective human episteme. In regar!s to the stu! of sovereignt , territor an! the state in outer space politics, I !ra" three broa! conclusions base! on the above anal sis. First, it is obvious that Westphalian so%ereignt as a concept is inade!uate "or anal sing outer space politics. The concept !oes not provi!e a language through "hich to un!erstan! spaces outsi!e of the tra!itional territorial state. The concept is as infle.ible as the boun!aries it prescribes for states, an! alternative approaches must continue to be !evelope! to unbun!le the concept itself. As e.emplifie! b the t"o approaches ta)en in this chapter, theoretical approaches that go be on! /estphalian sovereignt can serve to !e%lin) sovereignt , territor an! the state from each other in various forms. Secon!, I conclu!e that theoretical conceptions such as so%ereignt precede the &eaning with which we in"use outer space politics, and con%ersel that outer space e+ploration is causing cogniti%e shi"ts that lead to changes in our #e theoretical concepts$ The !ifferent visions of outer space politics that the t"o theoretical approaches give e.emplif ho" our conceptual frame"or)s prece!e our interpretation of events occurring in outer space %that is, anal sis o" outer space politics is in part dependent on our conceptual "ra&ewor#s and world%iews de%eloped in regards to wider world politics . Oet I also argue that the uni!ue opportunities and e%ents that outer space &a#es a%ailable to hu&ans , an! the unconventional political, legal an! cognitive !evelopments those opportunities an! events inspire , is also in"luencing political practice and conceptualizations in wider politics$ Thin)ing about outer space governance can partl be un!erstoo! in the conte.t of globali-ation, as one of man contemporar !evelopments that challenge the role of the state an! our perception of communit . Cowe%er outer space can also be seen as a new area that is also rein"orcing changes i n that perception, b provi!ing imager of the planet as a "hole, b pro%iding hu&ans with in"or&ation about the status o" the 0arth en%iron&ent, an! b 0shrin)ing0 the planet through technological !evelopments such as satellite communications. /hile the governance of other global commons such as the high seas have challenge! the conceptuali-ation of tra!itional sovereignt before, this chapter sho"s ho" outer space re4introduces with so&e urgenc those challenges, and pro%ides new angles to that challenge . In line "ith the previous conclusion, an! as emphasi-e! at earlier points in the chapter, m thir! conclusion is that e.ogenous events an! hu&an4dri%en de%elop&ents in outer space will continue to in"luence our understanding o" so%ereignt , both in space an! in "i!er "orl! politics, in the future. A maAor e.ogenous event or technological !evelopment coul! significantl change
outer space politics, an! in!ee! something li)e an asteroi! "oul! then also influence "orl! politics more broa!l conceive!. &o"ever, barring such a maAor event, the relationship bet"een sovereign practice in outer space an! our un!erstan!ing of that sovereignt are li)el to continuall an! !ialecticall re%constitute each other, as outer space continues to pose uni1ue governance an! conceptual challenges. Co"er political tren!s, such as in!icate! b Feorge /. Dush@s space control polic , coul! in fact reinforce realpolitik, although li)el still in the conte.t of increase! globali-ation an! !iversification of actors in "orl! politics. Or #an! particularl in the longer term$ outer space &a continue to rein"orce

liberal and cos&opolitan trends that &ore e+plicitl under&ine Westphalian so%ereignt . The

anal sis of sovereignt in outer space is !epen!ent on conceptuali-ations an! !evelopments occurring on earth, in outer space, an! b the dialectical relationship between the two$ The International Space Station
e.emplifies the comple. relationship bet"een po"er politics an! the state on the one han!, an! cosmopolitan i!eals an! inter!epen!ence in outer space politics on the other. The t"o approaches ta)en here offer !ifferent un!erstan!ings #an! metho!ologies$ for interpreting "here sovereignt has been in the past, for ho" it can be un!erstoo! in the present, an! for "here it is #an! shoul! be$ going in the future. For the contemporar theorist, a

fair un!erstan!ing comes from appreciating both, in the conte.t of the comple. an! uni1ue politics of outer space. *his &eans that the role o" the ballot is to in%estigate &ethodolog and ps che be"ore &aterial or e&pirical argu&ents re-ecting &ethodological nationalis& creates a new research agenda that is critical to understand the world and ad%ance cos&opolitanis&$ Dec# and Sznaider, '((E *3lrich an! Natan,. Crofessor of sociolog
at 5unich@s Lu!"ig%5a.imilian 3niversit an! the Lon!on School of Economics2 an! professor of sociolog at the Aca!emic Jollege of Tel%Aviv%Oaffo, Israel. 43npac)ing cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agen!a,6 The Dritish +ournal of Sociolog ;>.<, /ile InterSciences.K

Methodological nationalism ta.es the follo"ing premises for granted; it e5'ates societies )ith nation#state societies and sees states and their governments as the primary foc's of social#scientific analysis . It assumes that humanit is naturall !ivi!e! into a
limite! number of nations, "hich organi-e themselves internall as nation%states an! e.ternall set boun!aries to !istinguish themselves from other nation%states. An! it goes further: this outer !elimitation as "ell as the competition bet"een nation%states, represent the most fun!amental categor of political organi-ation. The premises of the social sciences assume the collapse of social boun!aries "ith state boun!aries, believing that social action occurs primaril "ithin an! onl secon!aril across, these !ivisions: *Li)eK stamp collecting . . . social scientists collecte! !istinctive national social forms. +apanese in!ustrial relations, Ferman national character, the American constitution, the Dritish class s stem N not to mention the more e.otic institutions of tribal societies N "ere the currenc of social research. The core !isciplines of the social sciences, "hose intellectual tra!itions are reference points for each other an! for other fiel!s, "ere therefore !omesticate!N in the sense of being preoccupie! not "ith /estern an! "orl! civili-ation as "holes but "ith the I!omesticV forms of particular national societies #Sha" 7888: L=$.

The criti5'e of methodological nationalism sho'ld not e conf'sed )ith the thesis that the end of the nation#state has arrived. One !oes not critici-e metho!ological in!ivi!ualism b proclaiming the en! of the in!ivi!ual. Nation%states #as all the research sho"s N see

also the !ifferent contributions in this volume$ "ill continue to thrive or "ill be transforme! into transnational states. /hat, then, is the main point of the criti1ue of metho!ological nationalismB It a!opts categories of practice as categories of anal sis. The !ecisive point is that national organi3ation

as a str'ct'ring principle of societal and political action can no longer serve as the orienting reference point for the social scientific o server. One cannot even 'nderstand the re#nationali3ation or re#ethnification trend in -estern or 6astern 6'rope )itho't a cosmopolitan perspective. In this sense, the social sciences can only respond ade5'ately to the challenge of glo ali3ation if they manage to overcome methodological nationalism and to raise empirically and theoretically f'ndamental 5'estions )ithin speciali3ed fields of research, and there y ela orate the fo'ndations of a ne)ly form'lated cosmopolitan social science. As man authors N inclu!ing the ones in this volume N critici-e, in the gro"ing !iscourse on cosmopolitanism there
is a !anger of fusing the i!eal "ith the real. /hat cosmopolitanism is cannot ultimatel be separate! from "hat cosmopolitanism shoul! be. Dut the same is true of nationalism. The small, but important, !ifference is that in the case of nationalism the val'e 2'dgment of the social

scientists goes 'nnoticed eca'se methodological nationalism incl'des a nat'rali3ed conception of nations as real comm'nities. In the case of the cosmopolitan I/ertbe-iehungV #5a. /eber, value relation$, b contrast, this silent commitment to a nation*state centre outloo2 of sociolog" a!!ears !roblematic. In or!er to unpac) the argument in the t"o cases it is necessar

to !istinguish bet"een the actor perspective an! the observer perspective. From this it follo"s that a sharp !istinction shoul! be ma!e bet"een metho!ological an! normative nationalism. The former is lin)e! to the social%scientific observer perspective, "hereas the latter refers to the negotiation perspectives of political actors. In a normative sense, nationalism means that every nation has the right to self#determination )ithin

the conte/t of its c'lt'ral, political and even geographical o'ndaries and distinctiveness . Methodological nationalism assumes this normati&e claim as a socio*ontological gi&en and sim'ltaneo'sly lin.s it to the most important conflict and organi3ation orientations of society and politics. These basic tenets ha&e become the main !erce!tual gri of the social sciences. In!ee!, this social%scientific stance is part of the nation%state@s o"n self%un!erstan!ing. A national vie" on societ an! politics, la", Austice, memor an! histor governs the sociological imagination. To some e.tent, much of the social sciences has become a !risoner of the nationstate. That this "as not al"a s the case is sho"n in Dr an Turner@s paper in this issue #Turner 788L: <::N;<$. This does not mean, of co'rse, that a cosmopolitan social science can and sho'ld ignore different national traditions of la), history, politics and memory. These tra!itions e.ist an! become part of our cosmopolitan metho!olog . The comparative analyses of societies, international relations, political theory, and a significant part of history and la) all essentially f'nction on the asis of methodological nationalism. This is vali! to the e.tent that the maAorit of positions in the contemporar !ebates in social an! political science over globali-ation can be s stematicall interprete! as trans!isciplinar refle.es lin)e! to metho!ological nationalism. These !remises also structure em!irical research, for e/am!le, in the choice of statistical in icators, which are almost alwa"s e/clusi&el" national. 1 ref'tation of methodological nationalism from a strictly empirical vie)point is therefore diffic'lt, indeed, almost impossi le, because so man statistical categories an! research proce!ures are base! on it. &t is therefore of historical importance for the f't're development of the social sciences that this methodological nationalism, as )ell as the related

categories of perception and disciplinary organi3ation, e theoretically, empirically, and organi3ationally re#assessed and reformed. /hat is at sta)e hereB /hereas in the case of the nation%state centre! perspective there is an historical correspon!ence bet"een normative
an! metho!ological nationalism #an! for this reason this correspon!ence has mainl remaine! latent$, this !oes not hol! for the relationship bet"een normative an! metho!ological cosmopolitanism. In fact, the opposite is true: even the re%nationali-ation or re%ethnification of min!s, cultures an! institutions has to be anal se! "ithin a cosmopolitan frame of reference. 4osmopolitan social science entails the systematic rea.ing 'p

of the process thro'gh )hich the national perspective of politics and society, as )ell as the methodological nationalism of political science, sociology, history, and la), confirm and strengthen each other in their definitions of reality . Thus it also
tac)les #"hat ha! previousl been anal ticall e.clu!e! as a sort of conspirac of silence of conflicting basic convictions$ the various !evelopmental versions of !e%boun!e! politics an! societ , correspon!ing research 1uestions an! programmes, the strategic e.pansions of the national an! international political fiel!s, as "ell as basic transformations in the !omains of state, politics, an! societ . This paradigmatic de#constr'ction

and re#constr'ction of the social sciences from a national to a cosmopolitan o'tloo. can e 'nderstood and methodologically 2'stified as a Apositive pro lem shiftB #La)atos <G>8$, a broa ening of horizons for social science research ma2ing &isible new realities encouraging new research !rogrammes #Dac) an! Lau 788; an! Dec), Danss an! Lau

788:: <N:;$. Against the bac)groun! of cosmopolitan social science, it su!!enl becomes obvious that it is neither possible to !istinguish clearl bet"een the national an! the international, nor, correspon!ingl , to ma)e a convincing contrast bet"een homogeneous units. National spaces have become !e%nationali-e!, so that the national is no longer national, Aust as the international is no longer international. Ce) realities are arising;

ne) mapping of space and time, ne) co#ordinates for the social and the political are emerging )hich have to e theoretically and empirically researched and ela orated . *his &eans we need to &i+ our "ocus between critical theor and proble&4sol%ing 444 .nl this "ocus on &ethod generates social learning that a%oids error replication and changes international politics$ Wid&aier, '((3 */esle /.. ?epartment of Colitical Science, St. +osephVs 3niversit . 4Theor as a Factor an! the Theorist as an Actor: The
IICragmatist JonstructivistVV Lessons of +ohn ?e"e an! +ohn 'enneth Falbraith,6 International Stu!ies Eevie" L.:,K

This realignment of de ate also )o'ld contri 'te to a more engaged &R scholarship if it led scholars to recogni3e that they themselves act as agents in s'ch comm'nicative interactions . They might then ecome more inclined to ac.no)ledge concerns, not only regarding e.planation an! research design, 't also for policy relevance an! constitutional !esign. ?eliberate
reWection on constitutional !esign(confronting an! ac)no"le!ging the inevitable implications of an scholarl arguments for polic practices(is necessar because every theoretical and empirical arg'ment offers a normative or policy lesson . For e.ample, economists have

recogni3ed that classical theories AAteachBB st'dents to ehave in accord )ith their precepts. Eobert Fran) an! his colleagues

#<GG:$ have argue! that e.posure to contemporar economic theor itself constitutes agents to act more selfishl 2 in% !ee!, the foun! stu!ents enrolle! in economics courses come to behave in an increasingl IIself%helpVV manner. In the IE conte.t, /en!t #<GGG::>>$ himself argues IIthat !roblem*

sol&ing theor" has the !ractical effect in the real worl of hel!ing to re!ro uce the status 1uo33 an! suggests that IIrealism, despite its claim of o 2ectivityBB is est seen in this light as AAa normative as )ell as scientific theory.BB In recent !eca!es, the IIresearch !esignVV%st le structuring of 1uestions an! cases has come at the e.pense of such constitutional concerns. Jertainl , scholarly efforts sho'ld not be e&aluate e/clusi&el" in terms of the 44correctness33 of their !olic" &iews. Aca!emia "oul! not II"or)VV if subAective political !ifferences became legit% imate groun!s for !ismissing arguments . Ho)ever, scholars need to ac.no)ledge that their vie)s inevita ly possess normative and policy implications rather than preten!ing that such implications !o not e.ist. Jonsi!er again that despite their n'mero's differences, the constit'tive lessons inherent in the analyses of -alt3, 4o/, 1shley, and 4amp ell are 5'ite similar; that state and societal agents m'st deDne their interests in competitiveEas opposed to collectiveEfashion. One sus% pects that this is not the IImoralVV that Ashle or Jampbell sought to a!vocate. 3nfortunatel , the absence of a broa er focus on such constituti&e 44lessons,33 a neglect roote in the structure of 56 ebate itself, limite their attention to such issues. In contrast, y more persistently as.ing 5'estions a o't the constit'tive effects of theoretical or empirical claims, scholars may ena le a more relevant st'dy of international relations. They might reclaim the p' lic space to act as not simply AAacademicsBB in the narro) sense of the term("ithin elite epistemic communities or as participant%a!visors in the polic process( 't rather they might aid one another in functioning as !ublic intellectuals, focusing larger !ublic ebates in a more constructi&e, !ragmatic manner . /hat are the potential beneXts of such shiftsB The res'lting academic contri# 'tion to p' lic policy learning might ena le not simply materialist#rationalist styled (ayesian pro a ility 'pdating #Iverson <G=9$, 't rather co'ld promote a .ind of AAsocial learning.BB Such learning, as Albert Dan!ura #<GL7, viii$ has argue!
IIneither casts people into the role of po"erless obAects controlle! b environmental forces nor free agents "ho can become "hatever the choose,VV but rather recogni-es that IIboth people an! their environments are reciprocal !eterminants of each other.VV S'ch social learning re5'ires an a ility

to AAma.e senseBB of inters' 2ective conte/ts thro'gh a roader dialog'e among the p' lic, scholars, and policy agents. &nternational str'ct'res, from this vantage, offer no 'nam ig'o's lessons. Jon% trar to 'issingerVs #<G>G:;9N;;$ vie" #note! earlier$ that
IIthe convictions that lea!ers have forme! before reaching high ofXce are the intellectual capital the "ill consume as long as the continue in ofXce,VV possibilities for intersubAective variation re1uire a constant monitoring of the prevailing intersubAective IImoo!.VV 7ust as balance of !ower rules

are learne in a social conte/t, the" can be unlearne if states come to e/!ect coo!eration instea of con8ict . 8issinger#li.e claims regard# ing the irrelevance of ongoing reFection to policyma.ing seem misg'ided, as does the application of AA alance of po)erBB lessons in an inappropriate social conte/t that may, in turn, contribute to new !olic" errors. Cut simpl , lessons that are applicable in one setting #for e.ample, Europe in <G<9$ ma be counterpro!uctive in another #for e.ample, Europe

in <GG7$. Such variation might, perhaps, be more rea!il recogni-e! b scholars engage! in a more pragmatic, ongoing social learning. Jonclusion

Theory constit'tes social reality. This reali3ation highlights the need for a prag# matist#constr'ctivist approach to &R theory, one that involves an ongoing involve# ment in oth scholarly and p' lic de ates. 3nfortunatel , the development of s'ch a perspective in &R scholarship has often een impeded y the distinction et)een AAlong#termBB critical theory and AAshort#r'nBB pro lem#solving theory. The present essa has calle! this !istinction into 1uestion b !escribing the "a s in "hich +ohn ?e"e
an! +ohn 'enneth Falbraith engage! in theoretical !ebates "hile also pursuing polic agen!as. Doth ?e"e an! Falbraith highlighte! the importance of sociall constructe! un!erstan!ings in the issue areas of e!ucation an! economic polic . 5ore broa!l , their "or) itself provi!e! a better sense of "hat it means to act as a public intellectual in both gui!ing an! being immerse! in public !ebates. &n addressing the implications for &R scholarship,

this essay has, therefore, 'rged a more e/plicit stress on oth the role of agency in advancing change and a rec# ognition of the constit'tive effects of theory on social reality. In )eeping "ith the tra!ition of pragmatist scholarship, let us conclu!e that distinctions et)een critical theory and pro lem#solving theory need to e rela/ed considera ly to highlight the potential roles of theory as a factor as )ell as of theorists themsel&es as actors in international !olitics #E!"ar!s <GG8$.

YYYSOLMENJO

Sol%enc Cooperation #e
.nl prioritizing international space cooperation sol%es "or space weaponization Fohnson, '((E >Ch? at The Acron m Institute for ?isarmament ?iplomac #Eebecca, 788L, 4Space "ithout /eapons6
http://""".acron m.org.u)/space/congo.htmK

Eecommen!ations Space can provi!e unparallele! resources for supporting our securit in relation to humanitarian an! environmental crises an! !iverse natural, criminal an! militar threats. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that potential misuses of space assets coul! turn outer space into a battlefiel!: such abuses "oul! threaten global securit as "ell as compromising a range of civilian an! securit applications on "hich our !ail lives no" rel . <. We need to prioritise the collecti%e, cooperati%e pre%ention o" the weaponisation o" space, "ith timel !evelopment of international legal instruments an! agreements to ensure that no "eapons are teste! or !eplo e! for use in, to or from space. Crevention an! prohibition of "eapons in an! from space is cleaner, clearer an! safer than belate! attempts at !isarmament or non% proliferation "oul! be in left for the future to !eal "ith. Operating "ithin the multilateral frame"or), it is no" urgent that "e !evelop a strateg to reinforce the outer space securit regime an! prohibit the "eaponisation of space.*<:K 7. Jountries "ith space assets an! !epen!encies nee! to ta)e seriousl their active protection, through both technological an! political initiatives. 3seful approaches "oul! inclu!e a. passive !efences such as har!ening an! shiel!ing, an! enhancing space situation a"areness capabilities2 an! b. the !evelopment an! coor!ination of policies an! strategies to pla a more significant an! effective role in strengthening the international legal regime an! promulgating @rules of the roa!@ for space activities an! uses. :. 5ore open, transparent, an! rational anal sis of the actual threats, prospects of, an! alternatives to, missile !efences an! the "eaponisation of space, inclu!ing anal sis % "hether in the J? or some other forum % of the implications of certain polic routes for human, international an! space securit . Jonclusion Instead o" turning to the sledgeha&&er o" space weaponisation to deal with the potential %ulnerabilities o" space assets, a &ore sensible approach #an! one consistent "ith the 3nite! Nations Jharter$ would co&bine ar&s control e""orts with the technical har!ening an! shiel!ing of as man satellites as possible, plus space situation a"areness, re!un!anc an! other ?passi%e? de"ence &eans. Crogress in nuclear !isarmament, strengthening the Treat on the Non%Croliferation of Nuclear /eapons #NCT$, negotiating a nuclear "eapons convention, further efforts to restrict missile proliferation, buil!ing on the 5issile Technolog Jontrol Eegime #5TJE$ an! the &ague Jo!e of Jon!uct Against Dallistic 5issile Croliferation #&JoJ$ "oul! also contribute to securit an! re!uce the chances of space beco&ing a battleground % "hich would be in nobod ?s interests$

Sol%enc Cos&ic :iewpoint

A cos&ic %iewpoint is #e to establishing a cos&opolitan societ $atoma2i )0 (2 ,e!tember 20)0, 9ei22i is Professor of World Politics and the Vice Director of the Centre of Excellence in Global Governance Research at the
University of Helsinki, Finland. He is also an Innovation Professor of Human Security Globalisation and Global Institutions at the RMIT University in Melbourne, Cosmological Sources of Cosmopolitanism Review of International Studies p. 191 SG) For a number of Enlightenment thin)ers an! their follo"ers, the cosmic vie"point puts the drama of life an! human histor on the planet

in a ver "i!e perspective. In one sense this is an optical eect: the longer the distance, the smaller the within-the-humanity dierences appear. 5oreover, !istance an! the non%centric Jopernican perspective encourage Au!icious an! at times ironic ethico% political sentiment to"ar!s oneVs o"n particular identit , and this senti&ent is a #e part o" critical cos&opolitanis&. In Kants case, critical cosmopolitanism also opene! up a ne" temporal hori-on b constituting an interest in e.ploring possible futures that can be !ierent B and perhaps better B than the current realities$ *he cos&ic %ision also suggests that hu&ans are not onl dependent on each other but also on the ph sical processes o" the planet, solar s ste& and the uni%erse as a whole, and on the thin sphere o" li"e on planet 0arth$ *hus the new cosmological perspective encourage! scientists, philosophers, political theorists and novelists to thin) of all humans as part of an inter!epen!ent an! fragile "hole , the development of which has also given rise to consciousness, reason and morality. A"areness of the human inter!epen!enc an! share! fate suggests "i!ening the sphere "ithin "hich the basic moral principles appl . Further, the idea of possible cosmic pluralism can also contribute to extending
the variety of living and sentient beings with which we can identify. Any adequate form of morality has to do with the capacity to generalise normative claims in an acceptable way and, most importantly, with the ability to see things from others point of view.32

Sol%enc ;o%e&ents
Seeing en%iron&ental ris#s as trul global under&ines the political s ste& and its insistence on bounded proble&swe rupture the s ste& and create a new one

:ec2, 0+ Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich -&ec., )onversations /ith lrich &ec., p! 01
I@ll come to that in a secon! because it@s a )e point. Dut first I "ant to finish up an earlier argument. The

e.plosiveness of ris) conflicts lies in the fact that the !elegitimate the political s stem. Even though its institutions continue to function an! continue to !en that there can be such a thing as an incalculable ris), such ris)s force their "a into institutions li)e a virus that "ea)ens them from "ithin. Ever one tries to free themselves from ris), but it continues to multipl an! permeate . It@s as if "e@ve )noc)e! over a hone pot, an! in our efforts to rub it off, "e succee! onl in getting hone stuc) to ever part of the social bo! . It@s a self%negating process, in "hich ever thing societ @s institutions !o to free themselves onl sprea!s the ris) an! helps to !issolve their legitimac . &obbes, in his theor of the state, actuall put his finger on the e.plosive core of ris) conflict. If ou as) "hen even
this !eepl @ conservative thin)er thin)s civil resistance is Austifie!, ou fin! a formulation that stri)ingl if unintentionall anticipates environmental problems an! the spectre of ris) as uncertaint . To paraphrase, he sa s the ulti&ate resistance is -usti"ied when the state

can no longer guarantee its citizens pure air and health "ood and the securit that goes with the&. /hen their air is poisone! an! their foo! en!angers them, then citi-ens are Austifie! in rebelling against the state. /hat this ma)es clear is that ris) is not something limite! to the environment. It !oesn@t onl affect the environment of the political s stem an! it !oes so because it stri)es at fun!amental rights, institutionali-e! fun!amental rights, namel the right to life an! securit , rights upon "hich both state an! citi-enr ma even place a higher value than on free!om. /hen it@s a matter of life an! !eath or health, people stop )i!!ing aroun!. Ceople "eel this as an attac# on the core o" their e+istence . t is not t!e si"e of t!e danger t!at makes t!ese risks so politically e#plosi$e. t is
rat!er t!e si"e of t!e contradiction, bet"een the securit that it is the state@s raison d'etre to provi!e % an! "hich "e have up until no" e.pecte! it to provi!e % an! the s stematic inAuring of that e.pectation that ta)es place in ris) conflicts. ?iffuse! poisons are li)e !iffuse enemies, "hich in!ustr has let in through its sluice gates. An! then the state, rather than !eclaring "ar on them, !eclares them to be harmless. I bring up this point because it

ma)es clear both ho" e.plosive these conflicts are, an! that their epicenter is not "here people thin) it is. It lies not in the ris)s themselves, but in how strongl the under&ine the core o" what legiti&ates state institutions and political action in the "irst &odernit . *his crisis o" con"idence then reacts bac# to increase ris# consciousness$ If a ris) crisis goes far enough, "e eventuall reach the point "here no one places an trust in the repeate! announcements of the authorities that the have ever thing un!er control. At that point the start to have the opposite of their inten!e! effect $ 0ach announce&ent con-ures up another i&age o" i&&inent catastrophe$

Sol%enc 44Cu&an securit "ocus

*he plan and its &indset disperse political authorit and "ocus on people instead o" statesthis sol%es the root cause o" war, po%ert , and opression

6ogge )'44 the ?irector of the Flobal +ustice Crogram an! Leitner Crofessor of Chilosoph an! International Affairs at Oale 3niversit #Thomas /., October, Ethics b the 3niversit of Jhicago Cress, 4Josmopolitanism an! Sovereignt 6, +STOE$

The human future su!!enl seems open. This is an inspiration2 "e can step bac) an! thin) more freel . Instea! of containment or !etente, political scientists are !iscussing gran! pictures: the en! of histor , or the inevitable proliferation an! mutual pacifism of capitalist !emocracies. An! politicians are spea)ing of a ne" "orl! or!er. 5 inspiration is a little more concrete. After !eveloping a rough, cosmopolitan specification of our tas) to promote moral progress, I offer an i!ea for gra!ual global institutional reform. ?ispersing political authorit over neste! territorial units "oul! !ecrease the intensit of the struggle for po"er an! "ealth "ithin an! among states, thereb re!ucing the inci!ence of "ar, povert , an! oppression. In such a multila ere! scheme, bor!ers coul! be re!ra"n more easil to accor! "ith the aspirations of peoples an! communities. INSTIT3TIONAL JOS5OCOLITANIS5 DASE? ON &35AN EIF&TS Three elements are share! b all cosmopolitan positions. First, in!ivi!ualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons% rather than, sa , famil lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter ma be units of concern onl in!irectl , in virtue of their in!ivi!ual members or citi-ens. Secon!, universalit : the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to ever living human being e1uall 7% not merel to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Ar ans, "hites, or 5uslims. Thir!, generalit : special status has global force. Cersons are ultimate units of concern for ever one%not onl for their compatriots, fello" religionists, or such li)e.

Sol%enc 44A'G Cos&o is I&possibleH

A cos&opolitan "ederation is possible B /2 pro%es and realis& is wrong 'leingel! an! Dro"n 7002 (Pauline, Professor of Practical 2eason at the niversit" of Gronin!en, and Eric, 3ssociate Professor of Philosoph" at /ashin!ton niversit" in St. Louis, http455plato.stanford.edu5entries5cosmopolitanism5, Feb.
23, 2002, Revised Nov. 28, 2006, Stanford Encyclopedia of P ilosop y, ttp!""plato.stanford.ed#"entries"cos$opolitanis$"% It is often argue! that it is impossible to change the current s stem of states an! to form a "orl!%state or a global fe!eration of states. This claim is har! to maintain, ho"ever, in the face of the e.istence of the 3nite! Nations, the e.istence of states "ith more than a billion people of heterogeneous bac)groun!s, an! the e.perience "ith the 3nite! States an! the European 3nion. So in or!er to be ta)en seriousl , the obAection must instea! be that it is impossible to form a goo! state or fe!eration of that magnitu!e, i.e., that it is impossible to reali-e or even appro.imate the cosmopolitan i!eal in a "a that ma)es it "orth pursuing an! that !oes not carr prohibitive ris)s. &ere political cosmopolitans !isagree among themselves. On one en! of the spectrum "e fin! those "ho argue in favor of a

strong "orl!%state, on the other en! "e fin! the !efen!ers of a loose an! voluntar fe!eration, or a !ifferent s stem altogether. The !efen!ers of the loose, voluntar an! noncoercive fe!eration "arn that a "orl!%state easil becomes !espotic "ithout there being an competing po"er left to brea) the hol! of !espotism #Ea"ls$. ?efen!ers of the "orl!%state repl that a stronger form of fe!eration, or even merger, is the onl "a to trul e.it the state of nature bet"een states, or the onl "a to bring about international !istributive Austice . Other authors have argue! that the focus among man political cosmopolitans on onl these t"o alternatives overloo)s a thir!, an! that a concern for human rights shoul! lea! one to focus instea! on institutional reform that !isperses sovereignt verticall , rather than concentrating it in all%encompassing international institutions. On this vie", peace, !emocrac , prosperit , an! the environment "oul! be better serve! b a s stem in "hich the political allegiance an! lo alties of persons are "i!el !isperse! over a number of political units of various si-es, "ithout an one unit being !ominant an! thus occup ing the tra!itional role of the state #Cogge$. Of the obAections brought up b non% or anti%cosmopolitans, t"o !eserve special mention. First, some authors argue that the #partial or "hole$ surren!er of state sovereignt re1uire! b the cosmopolitan scheme is an un!ue violation of the principle of the autonom of states or the principle of !emocratic self%!etermination of their citi-ens. Secon!, so%calle! IrealistsV argue that states are in a &obbesian state of nature as far as the relations among them are concerne!, an! that it is as inappropriate as it is futile to subAect states to normative constraints. To these obAections cosmopolitans have various )in!s of response, ranging from !eveloping their alternative normative theor #e.g., b arguing that global !emocrac increases rather than !iminishes the !emocratic control of in!ivi!ual "orl! citi-ens$ to pointing out, as has been !one at least since Frotius, that states have goo! reasons even on &obbesian groun!s to submit to certain forms of international legal arrangements.

Sol%enc .%er%iew 0""ect

Space pro%ides uni!ue opportunities "or borderless, cooperati%e pro-ects that change hu&an thoughtthe ISS pro%es Stuart '(() *+ill, Dr .
Jill Stuart is LSE Fellow in Global Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science, nbundlin! Soverei!nt", #erritor", and the State in $uter Space%, from Securing Outer Space, edited b" &ormann and Sheehan'

Josmopolitan sovereignt an! the International Space Station As "ith the previous section, the politics of the International Space Station can be use! to e.trapolate the cosmopolitan sovereignt approach un!er consi!eration. The po"er political ! namics on *he ISS cannot bt overloo)e! %for e.ample that the initial plans for *he station #originall calle! 0Space Station Free!om0$ "ere conceive! in the conte.t of Jol! /ar politics an! the space race bet"een the 3nite! States an! *he 3SSE. Another e.ample of po"er politics influencing the ISS is that, !espite being an 0international proAect0, Jhina@s offers to cooperate have been reAecte! b the 3S. <7 Also, states remain the o"ners an! !ecision%ma)ers for the proAect, an! tht 3S has been the !ominant partner in the proAect #as !iscusse! above, pp. <:%<;$. &o"ever the ISS can also be seen as relate! to the Overvie" Effect,

"hich implies shifts to"ar!s more cosmopolitan episteme an! !iscourse. Evi!ence of this is sho"n b the language use! to !escribe the ISS, in the practical scientific proce!ures carrie! out on the space station, an! in ho" the ISS provi!es visual reinforcement of perceptions of the earth as a single communit . Linguisticall , the ISS is often tote! as a significant cooperative an! 0human0 proAect. A unite! Nations report has !escribe! it as the largest
collaborative scientific un!erta)ing in histor an! the Jana!ian government heral!e! its involvement in the ISS as a 0noble0 un!erta)ing. l9 Cracticall , the ISS also gives scientists the opportunit to stu! the long%term effects on the human bo! an! min! of living in space, an! the opportunit to e.periment "ith things li)e gro"ing foo! in space. This has implications for future e.ploration of outer space an!, potentiall , settlement of off%Earth locales. Misuall , NASA is uni1ue in being a government agenc "ith its o"n television stream #NASA Television, or NTM$,<; "hich provi!es live an! prerecor!e! programmes on missions an! proAects, inclu!ing occasional footage of the Earth as it passes beneath the space station. Accor!ing to the Overvie" Effect, it is images of the Earth, !evoi! of obvious political bor!ers, "hich is pushing an internali-ation of

space proAects such as the ISS as for 0human)in!0. Thus the space station provi!es images of the Earth that visuall in!icate ho" territorial boun!aries are ultimatel meaningful because of the value that humans infuse them "ith. <L Thus the ISS emplo s the language of cosmopolitan i!eas, as "ell as practicall acting as provi!ing stu! for future collective en!eavours in outer space, an! in visuall reinforcing i!eas of an inter!epen!ent Earth%communit . The International Space Station can be also be seen as a microcosmic environment that embo!ies principles of inter!epen!ence, "hich e.emplif the t pe of nascent conceptions of share! communit affiliate! "ith greater cosmopolitanism . Eegime theor e.plains ho" the ISS "as create! base! on state% relate! territorial an! sovereignt terms. &o"ever, political negotiations asi!e . it is "orth consi!ering ho" the station itself is ph sicall inter!epen!ent. P/hile treaties can legall assign liabilit an! responsibilit over component parts of the station to in!ivi!ual states, the fact is that, in Earth orbit , the station is !epen!ent for its ver survival on the smooth functioning of all the har!"are, an! the !a %to%!a cooperation of its cre" #"ho are both representatives of their respective states, of 0all man)in!0 *Search an! Eescue Agreement$, an! "ho are also in!ivi!uals an! "ho are, in some cases, the customers of companies$. /hile regime theor e.plains ho" sovereignt of the station is roote! in !ecision%ma)ing proce!ures base! on Earth , there is a less tangible social ! namic in "hich the station is a microcosm in outer space. Coliticall , the survival of the proAect has also become !epen!ent on the continue! cooperation of members, in that the cost an!, for some partners, public bac)ing of the proAect is !epen!ent on the continuation of the proAect as a Aoint effort. <> Treating the ISS as a s mbol of
cosmopolitanism shoul! not be overe.aggerate!2 the station is still ver much embe!!e! in terrestriall %base! po"er politics, an! roote! in rationalist negotiations amongst actors that result in the station@s evolving regime. &o"ever cosmopolitan sovereignt a!!s to the anal sis of sovereignt on the station b ta)ing account of the moral an! long%term implications of such a remar)able proAect. As &el! himself suggests, "hile one form of sovereignt ma pre!ominate in an given political s stem, elements of others can also be foun! #&el! 7887: 7$.

***I;6AC*S

I&pactW;@ War Ine%'AC

*he Status !uo8s conception o" so%ereignt &a#es war, %iolence, and W;@ use ine%itableonl the a""8s reorientation sol%es

6ogge )'44 the ?irector of the Flobal +ustice Crogram an! Leitner Crofessor of Chilosoph an! International Affairs at Oale 3niversit #Thomas /., October, Ethics b the 3niversit of Jhicago Cress, 4Josmopolitanism an! Sovereignt 6, +STOE$ let me no" s)etch four main reasons favoring, over the status 1uo, a "orl! in "hich sovereignt is "i!el !istribute! verticall . 1$ 6eaceIsecurit . %3n!er the current regime, interstate rivalries are settle! ultimatel through militar competition, inclu!ing the threat an! use of militar force. 5oreover, "ithin their o"n territories, national governments are free to !o virtuall an thing the li)e. Such governments therefore have ver po"erful incentives an! ver broa! opportunities to !evelop their militar might. *his is bound to lead to the "urther proli"eration o" nuclear, biological, che&ical, and con%entional weapons o" &ass destruction. An! in a "orl! in "hich !o-ens of competing national governments control such "eapons , the outbrea# o" de%astating wars is onl a &atter o" ti&e . It is not "easible to re!uce an! eliminate national control over weapons o" &ass destruction through a program that !epen!s upon the voluntar cooperation of each an! ever national government. /hat is nee!e!, therefore, is the centrall enforce! re!uction an! elimination of such "eapons%in violation of the prevalent i!ea of state sovereignt . Such a program, if
SO5E 5AIN EEASONS FOE A MEETIJAL ?ISCEESAL OF SOMEEEIFNTO &aving !ealt "ith some preliminar obstacles, implemente! soon, is much less !angerous than continuing the status 1uo. It coul! gain the support of most peoples an! governments, if it increases the securit of all on fair terms that are effectivel a!Au!icate! an! enforce!. '$ 1educing oppression . %3n!er the current global

regime, national governments are effectivel free to control 0their0 populations in "hat% ever "a the see fit. 5an ma)e e.tensive use of this free!om b torturing an! mur!ering their !omestic opponents, censoring information, suppressing an! subverting !emocratic proce!ures, prohibiting emigration, an! so forth. This problem coul! be re!uce! through a vertical !ispersal of sovereignt over various la ers of political units that "oul! chec) an! balance one another as "ell as publici-e one another@s abuses . :. Flobal economic Austice. The magnitu!e
an! e.tent of current economic !eprivations%over 78 million persons !ie ever ear from povert %relate! causes%calls for some mo!ification in the prevailing scheme of economic cooperation. One plausible reform "oul! involve a global lev on the use of natural resources to support the economic !evelopment in the poorest areas.7> Such a lev "oul! ten! to e1uali-e per capita en!o"ments an! also encourage conservation. Eeforms for the sa)e of economic Austice "oul! again involve some centrali-ation%though "ithout re1uiring an thing li)e a global "elfare bureaucrac . Flobal economic Austice is an en! in its o"n right, "hich re1uires, an! therefore supports, a reallocation of political authorit . Dut it is also important as a means to"ar! the first t"o purposes. War and oppression result "ro& the contest "or power within and a&ong political

units, "hich ten!s to be the more intense the higher the sta)es. In fights to govern states, or to re!ra" their bor!ers, far too much is no" at sta)e b "a of control of people an! resources. /e can best lower the sta#es b dispersing political authorit o%er se%eral le%els an! institutionall securing economic Austice at the global level.

I&pactWar, 02:2*, 0cono&

@e&ocratic nations ha%e beco&e as bad authoritarian counterparts and are incapable o" sol%ing world proble&s such as %iolence, en%iron&ental, and econo&ic collapse44 onl globalizing cos&opolitan de&ocrac can sol%e an thing Archibugi, 2008 G+,,@, Daniele, HThe =lo
1c.no)ledgements p. /iii#/v S=J Jontemporar political life is al 4ommon)ealth of 4iti3ens; To)ard 4osmopolitan DemocracyI Princeton University Press, Preface and

!ominate! b a para!o.. On the one han! !emocrac has been so successful that it has become the onl form of le% gitimate government . 5oreover, countries "ith the more consoli!ate! !emo cratic s stems are those that
to!a are eco nom ical l prosperous an! po liti call !ominant. In this part of the "orl!, "hich "e ma !efi ne as the /est, political po"er has been partl tame! an! citi-ens have the right to appoint, control, an! !ismiss those "ho govern them . &o"ever, as soon as "e

venture outsi!e this circle of privilege! countries onto the "orl! political stage, "e fi n! that a lust for po"er mar)s the relations among countries in "hich the stronger !ominate the "ea)er. If the hegemonic countries "ere authoritarian an! !espotic, this "oul! not be surprising. Dut since these hegemonic countries to!a are highl !evelope! an! sophisticate! countries in charge of the agen!a of "orl! politics, it is in!ee! surprising an! even a reason for in!ignation. An! at the same time an opportunit to un!erstan!, to act. It "oul! ap% pear that in the liberal countries, or at least in their governments, no priorit is given to sharing the strategic !ecisions regar!ing issues of relevance "ith the other peoples of the "orl! . In!ee!, prou! that the come from free countries, lea!ers of liberal countries thin) the are au% thori-e! to treat the other peoples as pariahs. The lea!ers of the "estern "orl! are constantl lecturing others on ho" alien countries shoul! be governe! an! e.horting
others to mo!if their o"n metho!s of governance so that the more closel resemble theirs. Dut at the same time the !o ver little to appl these same principles in the management of global affairs. A state has therefore been reache! in "hich much of the "orl! population, inclu!ing those "ho "oul! benefi t most from the implementation of !emocrac in their o"n countries, accuse the

lea!ers of the "estern !emocracies of being h pocritical an! egotistical, almost to the same !egree as their o"n home%gro"n !espots. The "ars fought b the liberal countries have merel strengthene! the opinion that rulers, "hether !emo cratic or !espotic, are all more or less the same. /hile the actors, singers, an! "riters of the /est are applau!e! as heroes "herever the go, their lea!ers are greete! "ith vigorous protests.
This is an alarming situation, as the /est has not onl pro!uce! goo! fi lms, songs, an! novels but has also an! above all perfecte! a s stem of government(namel , !emocrac (that !eserves universal approval an! to be e.ten!e! geo graph i call an! 1ualitativel enhance!. The

incapacit of consoli!ate! !emocracies to e.ercise their o"n po"ers of persuasion has ha! !isastrous effects: some of the most press% ing "orl! problems(safeguar!ing the environment, fi nancial stabilit , securit (are manage! b select clubs that act outsi!e all control. Others(!efense of human rights, natural catastrophes, epi!emics(are not manage! at all. At the same time, the pro cess of !emo crati-ation , "hich raise! so man hopes after the fall of the Derlin "all, seems to have su!!enl halte!. For their part, the "estern !emocracies have to conten! "ith globali-ation pro cesses that are ra!icall mo!if ing the relationship
bet"een those "ho ma)e the !ecisions an! those "ho are affecte! b them. In increasingl e.tensive areas, the !emo cratic coun% tries are fi n!ing the have to face up to e.ternal phenomena an! !eci% sions ma!e outsi!e their o"n bor!ers. /hile increasing efforts are ma!e to boost e.isting chec)s an! balances on the internal sphere, the inter% nal sphere is gra!uall !ecreasing in importance vis%Z% vis the e.ternal sphere, "here the participation an! control mechanisms continue to be ru!imentar . This boo) contains a proposal for ra!icall reversing this situation: to e.ten!

!emocrac not onl insi!e each state but also as a form of man% agement of global affair s. This proposal is not
universall accepte!2 man consi!er that !emocrac "as born an! has gro"n up insi!e state bor!ers an! is ill% a!apte! to crossing them. I maintain the opposite the% sis: !emocrac can an! must become the metho! of global governance . +ust as !emocrac has brought consi!erable benefi ts to the peoples "ho have trie! it out, so to!a !emocrac can benefit for the "hole of human)in!. &o"ever, this assumption means that !emocrac must be re% appraise! an! reinvente! to suit the ne" historical con!itions, an! on a !ifferent scale. /hich rules among those that are applie! insi!e the states can be applie! to the global sphere an! in international organi-a% tionsB /hich principles must on the other han! be further !iscusse! an! reforme!B ?epen!ing on the scale an! the institutions to "hich it is ap% plie!, !emocrac changes form, although certain basic principles ma be i!entifi e! that remain unaltere! "hether applie! to a small commu% nit , a national state, or the entire "orl!. The present boo) presents the proposal for a cosmopolitan !emocrac , "hich a group of researchers at the en! of the Jol! /ar !evelope!, as the management of !ifferent levels of governance. This proposal ta)es into account contemporar historical con!itions, in

"hich po liti cal commu% nities "ith !ifferent historical an! cultural bac)groun!s interact "ill nill "ith other neighboring an! remote political communities. The form of repre sen ta tion of citi-ens in the global sphere base! on the !elegation of governance to a territorial state has become insuffi cient an! in man cases an aberration. For this reason citi-ens of
the "orl! nee! to be given the possibilit of !irectl participating in global choices through ne" in% stitutions that are parallel to an! autonomous "ith respect to those that alrea! e.ist insi!e the states. 5an fi n! the suggestion of a "orl! par% liament anno ing, as the consi!er it unrealistic an! vague. Oet to!a it "oul! seem a necessar path to trea! in or!er to ensure that veste! inter% ests !o not trample the principles of !emocrac !ail an! to attain an effective global common"ealth of citi-ens. A "orl! parliament "oul! give institutional clout an! a sa in po liti cal an! social affairs to those global movements that have appeare! on the "orl! political scene full of enthusiasm an! often "ith a soli! baggage of s)ills. The present boo) !oes not suggest buil!ing up a greater concentra% tion of force. The man problems facing contemporar societ cannot be

tac)le! through ne" coercive po"ers. It is in!ee! a matter of strength% ening the rules an! of imposing penalties for the failure to respect them in or!er to serve as a stimulus to improve the behavior of political ac% tors. The contemporar "orl! is alrea! base! on share!

choices, often among specific subAects an! in !elimite! areas. Air transport an! tele% phone communications, tra!e an! fi nance, culture an! information no" increasingl involve in!ivi!uals be on! their specifi c membership of a given secular state. It is in ever oneVs interest to participate in these in% ternational regimes inasmuch as the failure to participate is itself highl penali-ing. Flobali-ation thus offers the possibilit of obtaining inter% national integration "ithout using violence to a much greater !egree than in the past. Dut for this to occur
re1uires both i!entit of intentions an! impartialit , at least among those "ho claim to be champions of !emocrac .

I&pact*error, cli&ate, war

,o&ereign states legitimize illegal wars an fail to counter transnational terrorism, climate change, global
!o&ert" an unboun e militar" &iolence, that onl" a cosmo!olitan emocrac" can sol&e'

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *781

The iss'e of legitimation is a to'gh one. 9t contin'es to smo'lder even after a military victory, as the )ar in &ra5 demonstrates. Ki.e no other event, this hy rid illegal#legitimate )ar oth alarmed and individ'ali3ed )orld opinion. &t )as as tho'gh each individ'al )as confronted )ith the e/istential choice political dilemmas or appealed to the availa le positions to ta.e a clear stance for or against. ('t the controversy over legality leaves the 5'estion of legitimacy open even after a military victory has een declared* indeed, it contin'ally reignites the 5'estion. 1merican and (ritish 'nilateralism )as 2'stified, among other things, on the gro'nds that the present danger, that the &ra5i dictator H'ssein had )eapons of mass destr'ction that co'ld e 5'ic.ly activated, had to e averted. The collapse of this legitimation sho)ed that the pres'mption of illegality ma.es the 5'estion of legitimacy e/plosive even after the )ar is officially over, oth nationally and internationally, oth in 0domestic0 and in 0foreign0 politics Ggiven that these partial glo al p' lics cannot e easily sealed off from each otherJ. &n other )ords ,

the a sence of a glo al, or at least a -estern, legal and proced'ral consens's on the &ra5 -ar transforms illegal legitimacy into an open#ended iss'e in )hich 0defeats0 Gdaily US press reports of 1merican soldiers .illed in s.irmishesJ and 0s'ccesses0 Gthe painf'lly slo) progress in democrati3ationJ intensify the e/plosiveness of the 5'estion of the legitimacy of the )ar, even in the electorally sensitive fa'lt lines of domestic politics. Here too it again ecomes clear ho) US military 'nilateralism set in train an 'nintended and 'n)elcome cosmopolitanism of side effects. The )orld is str'ggling to develop ne) r'les for glo al domestic politics. The fo'nding principle of the United Cations )as the inviola ility of the sovereignty of nation#states. ('t in the one )orld )hose contin'ed e/istence is threatened y transnational terrorism, climate change, glo al poverty and 'n o'nded military violence, this principle no longer g'arantees peace, and hence the internal and e/ternal sec'rity of states and societies. &t protects neither citi3ens against tyrannical violations of their rights nor the )orld against terrorist violence. The am ivalences in the transition to the second modernity )hich rea.s )ith the international
legal order sho'ld lead 's to 0e/pect0 contradictory positions on the &ra5 -ar from a sociological perspective. -hen a )hole glo al order ecomes s'spect, the 'nans)era le 5'estions and 'ndecida le decisions arc foisted onto individ'als. The res'lt is the inner ang'ish over the &ra5 -ar e/perienced y individ'als in modern, highly individ'ali3ed and e/pressive societies. 9or this reason a decisive iss'e is ho) the relation et)een la) and po)er in international relations is and sho'ld e reg'lated in the short and the long term. &n order to co'nteract

glo al dangers, international la), instead of eing thro)n on the r' ish#heap of the 4old -ar, m'st e strengthened and made sensitive to the challenges of a )orld that is in the process of ecoming cosmopolitan . -ith and follo)ing the &ra5 -ar,
a historical 0moment of decision0 has arisen )hich anno'nced itself )ith the fall of the (erlin -all and the end of the 4old -ar and has een imminent since the terrorist attac.s of Septem er !!, +,,!. Decisions over the reforms to e 'nderta.en in the coming years )ill shape glo al political geography for decades. -e are e/periencing a decisive moment in )hich nations have a choice et)een a cosmopolitan

regime )hich interprets the val'es of modernity in s'ch a )ay that the ne) threats can e effectively co'ntered, and the ret'rn to a Ho esian )ar of all against all in )hich military might replaces glo al la).

I&pactJlobal e+istential ris#s

0+istential ris#s don8t heed go%ern&ental boundaries, leading state political structures to "ail in response to crisis and rendering all citizens sub-ect to the contradictions o" e+perts$ Chernob l pro%es$

:ec2, 0+ Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich -&ec., )onversations /ith lrich &ec., p! 01
That@s e.actl right. The epochal !ifference bet"een the !efine! ris)s of the first mo!ernit an! the global ris)s of the secon! mo!ernit is still not being ta)en seriousl either conceptuall or institutionall . D conceptual unseriousness, I mean our continuing blithe e1uation of ris)s "ith probabilities. /e still seem unable to accept the crucial !ifference bet"een probabilit an! ra!ical uncertaint , an! to come to terms "ith the fact that the latter no" !ominates, at least among the ris)s that occup the public stage. This basic misun!erstan!ing permeates even the min!set of the natural sciences. D institutional unseriousness, I@m referring to ever thing that touches on catastrophe planning, li)e inspections, the

provision of me!ical services, an! all the means b "hich costs are rec)one! into our present accounts for future planning. Ever time a global ris) crisis occurs, it reveals to us in a panic that for all our calculations "e ha! absolutel no i!ea of "hat "as involve! or ho" to !eal "ith it. This has man implications. Jhernob l is a perfect illustration. As ou probabl remember, "e "ere having a "on!erful spring that ear, the "eather "as Aust fantastic. An! then through the me!ia sprea! this ne"s that there "as this !ea!l !anger. Our five senses faile! us an! there "as no si.th< I thin) it "as this e.perience of cultural blin!ness that "as the )ernel of our initial shoc). /e "ere su!!enl e.pose! to a !anger that "as ph sicall imperceptible an! "hich coul! onl be e.perience! through me!iation, through the me!ia, "hich meant through the contra!ictor statements of e.perts. It "as not so rnuch the ph sical !anger that outrage! people as it "as this tutelage, the fact that people as citi-ens "ere no longer in a position to !etermine "hat "as !angerous an! "hat "as not. /e felt li)e "e "ere hanging from the marionette strings of these e.perts an! institutions "ho continuall U contra!icte! each other. The )ept sa ing the ha! ever thing "ell in han!, an! it constantl turne! out not to be true. To get ans"ers to the most ever !a 1uestions, li)e 0Jan I let m )i! pla in the san!bo.B Jan I bu mushroomsB Are all the vegetables poison, or Aust those from specific regionsB0 "e "ere !epen!ent on the minute to minute statements of e.perts "ho "ere simpl blin!ing in their contra!ictoriness. An! un!erneath it all "as the horrif ing thought that ma be foo! itself might no" be poison. There is a long series of !ifferences bet"een the ris)s of the first an! secon! mo!ernities. To start
"ith, first mo!ern !angers are clearl perceptible through the senses. A mining acci!ent is an event perceivable b ever one. It is characteristic of first mo!ern !angers that the can be capture! in images, li)e the image of puffing smo)estac)s, "hich "ere once the s mbol of boom times, an! "hich even to!a are still sprea!ing a ha-e along the ban)s of the Euhr. In the secon! mo!ernit , societ becomes ever more technologicall a!vance!, "hich seems at first to promise ever more perfect technical solutions. &o"ever, this higher technolog generates subtler si!e effects that more

often than not escape the imme!iate perception of those affecte!. To a!! to the !ifficulties of perception, the people most affecte! are often not the "or)ers, "ho have some pro.imit to the process an! thus some access to the signs of something going "rong, but people : much farther afiel!, li)e consumers, or sometimes even people 2 "ho have no connection to the pro!ucts at all, "ho neither ma)e nor use them or even live nearb .

I&pactterrorIproli"
,o&ereign !olitical structure fails to resol&e transnational threats inclu ing chemical, biological, an atomic wea!ons' :ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the
niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, *7:1

The fight against state#s'pported terrorism, together )ith the dangers of chemical, iological and atomic )eapons, can follo) one of t)o interdependent co'rses, the war option and the contractual option, that is, the containment and legal restriction of e/plosive conflicts that endanger international sta ility, and hence also the sec'rity of affl'ent -estern states. The seemingly incompati le positions of 1merica and 6'rope, vie)ed more closely, are act'ally complementary in that they reflect
critically on each other. Specifically, the 6'ropean option 0Ma.e la), not )ar0 can e inverted into a social#romantic self#del'sion if the military and sec'rity components are ignored. Precisely these deficiencies )ere revealed y the )ar in the (al.ans, )hich sho)ed that 6'ropeans are helpless even in the face of violent conflicts in their o)n ac. yard. Overcoming its history of loody )ars can easily mislead 6'rope into the fallacio's concl'sion that only a pacifist political economy can lead to reconciliation and peace. Th's military conflicts 'nhinge the 6'ropean Union, )hich )as fo'nded as an economic, not a military, po)er. There is a straightfor)ard reason for this non# e/istence of 6'rope; there is no 6'ropean offensive military force, at least not for the moment, tho'gh perhaps one )ill soon emerge. ('t

even )ith s'ch a military component the 6'ropean Union )ill never e a le to protect itself, let alone others, against the danger posed y terrorists ent on mass sla'ghter. 6'ropeans li.e to cherish ill'sions concerning the fact that, )itho't the military hegemony of the US1, they )o'ld have a r'de a)a.ening from the social romanticism of their politics of reconciliation. The s'perior po)er of the US1 also has a ca'se internal to 6'rope, namely, its collective ren'nciation of the means of violence. Only )hen this deficiency is recogni3ed and rectified )ill a 6'ropean Union foreign policy )orthy of the name ecome possi le. 9t )ill re5'ire an ans)er to the critical 5'estion of the a'thority of common instit'tions. 1 6'ropean foreign policy )ill ecome
possi le only )hen the individ'al state capitals recogni3e that transferring competencies to (r'ssels does not )ea.en 't rather strengthens them, eca'se it increases the glo al infl'ence of 6U states . That glo al dangers can fo'nd transnational commonalities provides a necessary impet's in this direction. 6nvironmental and peace activists dra) their strength from this fact in partic'lar, and are no) finding to their annoyance that the claim to solve glo al pro lems is eing coloni3ed y the US military. The Pentagon has discovered the legitimating po)er of glo al pro lems and is attempting to e/ploit it. 1n a'tonomo's so'rce of glo al politicallegitimation has

arisen )ith, and in, )orld ris. society. =lo al actors # states as )ell as advocacy movements, and also corporations # can dra) on it to avert, and even co'nteract, self#generated threats to h'manity. -ith the insane images emanating from Ce) 7or. on Septem er !!, +,,!, the most po)erf'l military and economic nation in the )orld sa) itself a r'ptly empo)ered y the ma2ority of h'manity, as tho'gh y acclamation, to avert s'ch dangers. The US1, the glo al military po)er, discovers in the terrorist ris. the so'rce of a glo al sec'rity pop'lism.

I&pact<aundr <ist
Cu&an rights, po%ert , war, and en%iron&ental degradation are all global proble&s born o" coerciononl the plans cooperation can sol%e Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter ) !' 2 ,GThe violation of human

rights, con!itions of e.treme povert , perio!ic recourse to "ar, an! environmental !egra!ation are but a fe" of the man problems facing human)in! to!a . These ancient problems have ta)en on a !ifferent !imension to!a , as the are increasingl !iffi cult to confi ne to, an! sometimes even to situate in, a circumscribe! geographic area. The capacit for a territorial government to ensure securit an! promote pros% perit is therefore substantiall limite!. Jan a single "orl! po"er contrib% ute to fi n!ing a solution for thisB There are man reasons to !oubt that it can. Joncentration of coercive po"er is al"a s !angerous, an! not even the most sophisticate! chec)s an! balances can rule out the !anger that this po"er ma be transforme! into some ne" form of planetar !espo% tism. This "as the concern of La!!, an! of Immanuel 'ant before him. Eestoring the po"er into the han!s of public opinion !oes not arouse the same concern .
In!ee!, public opinion !oes not possess an armies, police forces, secret ser vices, prisons, mental hospitals, or other repres% sive institutions. Cublic opinion can onl !isapprove an! e.press in!ig% nation. The public can also e.press its o"n opinion through collective action an!, in the !emo cratic countries, vote a government that has prove! in effec tive out of offi ce. Dut at the "orl! level, public opinion has no voting rights. It has been split into an infi nite number of rivulets. Over vast regions of the "orl!, its po"er to e.press itself has been lim% ite! b !ictatorships. Even in the internet age, onl a small proportion of the population is !ul informe! about or even intereste! in "orl! poli% tics. Its po"er is, at best, s mbolic, an! its !isapproval is often in effec% tive an! uncertain. To appeal to public opinion an! even raise it to the status of 1ueen of the "orl! is therefore a h perbole. Oet

giving public opinion a greater role to pla seems to be the onl hope "e have of tac)% ling the man alarming problems that e.ist in the mo!ern "orl!. 7 The present boo) e.plores the chances of increasing the legitimac of "orl! politics b

intro!ucing the germs of !emocrac an! subAecting "orl! politics to the citi-ensV scrutin . 3n!er "hat con!itions coul! public opinion become the 1ueen of the "orl!B To "hat e.tent can the general public control the actions un!erta)en b the various subAects, "hether national governments, international organi-ations, or multina% tional corporationsB /hat institutional instruments are available to confer an effective po liti cal role on the inhabitants of the planetB These are the issues to "hich cosmopolitan !emocrac (an intellectual proA% ect formulate! b a group of scholars at the en! of the Jol! /ar7(must en!eavor to fi n! a response. Josmopolitan !emocrac is in!ee! one of the man offspring generate! b the great e.pectations that blossome! after the fall of the Derlin "all. After the collapse of the Soviet empire an! the !ecisive affi rmation of the "estern !emocracies, it "as hope! that there "oul! be some positive repercussions on the global s stem. It "as thus !eeme! possible to reform the international organi-ations, to plan the geographic e.pansion of !emocrac , an! fi nall to ma)e hu% man rights more certain an! to allo" "orl! citi-ens to e.press them% selves through a! hoc institutions. One goal has been achieve!: it is no longer sacrilegious to consi!er that !emocrac can be applie! even out% si!e the state. &o"ever, man , too man , of these hopes have so far been !ashe!. /h B An! above all, "hat hopes remain to!a that !emocrac can ma)e its appearance also in "orl! politicsB

I&pact44;oralit
Kou ha%e a dut to e&brace our atte&pt to reshape global institutionsthis is not -ust a negati%e dut we &ust acti%el wor# "or re"or&

6ogge )'44 the ?irector of the Flobal +ustice Crogram an! Leitner Crofessor of Chilosoph an! International Affairs at Oale 3niversit #Thomas /., October, Ethics b the 3niversit of Jhicago Cress, 4Josmopolitanism an! Sovereignt 6, +STOE$ The move from an interactional to an institutional approach thus bloc)s one "a in "hich the rich an! might in to!a @s !evelope! countries li)e to see themselves as morall !isconnecte! from the fate of the less fortunate !eni-ens of the Thir! /orl!. It overcomes the claim that one nee! onl refrain from violating human rights !irectl , that one cannot reasonabl be re1uire! to become a sol!ier in the global struggle against human rights violators an! a comforter of their victims "orl!"i!e. This claim is not refute! but sho"n to be irrelevant. /e are as)e! to be concerne! about human rights violations not simpl insofar as the e.ist at all, but onl insofar as the are pro!uce! b social institutions in "hich "e are significant participants. Our negative !ut not to cooperate in the imposition of unAust practices, together "ith our continuing participation in an unAust institutional scheme, triggers obligations to promote feasible reforms of this scheme that "oul! enhance the fulfillment of human rights. One ma thin) that a share!
responsibilit for the Austice of the social institutions in "hich "e participate cannot plausibl e.ten! be on! our national institutional scheme, in "hich "e participate as citi-ens, an! "hich "e can most imme!iatel affect. Dut such a limitation is untenable because it treats as natural or Fo!%given the e.isting global institutional frame"or), "hich is in fact impose! b human beings "ho are collectivel 1uite capable of changing it. Therefore at

least "e%privilege! citi-ens of po"erful an! appro.imatel !emocratic countries%share a collecti%e responsibilit for the Austice of the e.isting global or!er an! hence also for an contribution it ma ma)e to the inci!ence of human rights violations.@8 The practical importance of this conclusion evi!entl hinges on the e.tent to "hich our global institutional scheme is causall responsible for current !eprivations. Jonsi!er this challenge: 0&uman rights violations an! their !istribution have local e.planations. In some countries torture is rampant, "hile it is virtuall none.istent in
others. Some regions are embroile! in fre1uent "ars, "hile others are not. In some countries !emocratic institutions thrive, "hile others bring forth a succession of autocrats. An! again, some poor countries have !evelope! rapi!l , "hile others are getting poorer ear b ear. Therefore our global institutional scheme has ver little to !o "ith the !eplorable state of human rights fulfillment on earth. This challenge appeals to true premises but !ra"s an invali! inference. Our global institutional scheme can obviousl not figure in the e.planation of local human

rights violations, but onl in the macroe.planation of their global inci!ence. This parallels ho" +apanese culture ma

figure in the e.planation of the +apanese suici!e rate or ho" the la.it of 3.S. han!gun legislation ma figure in the e.planation of the North American homici!e rate, "ithout thereb e.plaining particular suici!es/homici!es or even intercit !ifferentials in rates. In these parallel cases the nee! for a macroe.planation is obvious from the fact that there are other societies "hose suici!e/homici!e rates are significantl lo"er. In the case of global institutions, the nee! for a macroe.planation of the overall inci!ence of human rights vi% olations is less obvious because%apart from some rather inconclusive historical comparisons% the contrast to observable alternative global institutional schemes is lac)ing. Still, it is highl li)el that there are feasible #i.e., practicable an! accessible$ alternative global regimes that "oul! ten! to engen!er lo"er rates of !eprivation. This is clear, for e.ample, in regar! to economic institutions, "here the centrifugal ten!encies of certain free%mar)et schemes are "ell un!erstoo! from our e.perience "ith various national an! regional schemes. This supports a generali-ation to the global plane, to the conAecture that the current

constitution of the "orl! mar)et must figure prominentl in the e.planation of the fact that our "orl! is one of vast an! increasing international ine1ualities in income an! "ealth #"ith conse1uent huge !ifferentials in national rates of infant mortalit , life e.pectanc , !isease, an! malnutrition$. Such a macroe.planation !oes not preempt microe.planations of
"h one poor countr is !eveloping rapi!l an! "h another is not. It "oul! e.plain "h so fe" are "hile so man are not.

I&pact@isease
Indi%idual state political and legal s ste&s are intrinsicall incapable o" dealing with disease because o" "lawed ris# anal sis0uropean &ad Cow pro%es :ec2, 0+ Professor for Sociolo!" at the
niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich -&ec., )onversations /ith lrich &ec., p! 01
Another result of the !ivorce of ris)s from place is that it gives them a banal cosmopolitanism similar to the banal cosmopolitanism of cuisine "e !iscusse! earlier. #See pp. :Lff.$ An! once again, at fiSt sight it ma seem li)e it@s giving rise to banal nationalism instea!. For e.ample, I onl have

to sa t"o "or!s, 0Dritish beef,0 to imme!iatel conAure the spectre of ma! co" !isease in ever listener@s min!. Dut even more so than "ith foo!, closer e.amination "ill sho" that banal nationalism "ill turn out to be the e.ception an! banal cosmopolitanism the rule. It is in fact e.cee!ingl rare that people are able to successfully hoist the national flag against the cosmopolitani-ation of ris)s, an! ma! co" !isease is precisel the e.ception that proves the rule . The fact, as ou Aust pointe!
out, that these ris)s have no" penetrate! into the innermost sanctum of our private lives ma)es this )in! of banal cosmopolitanism even more pervasive an! volatile. 3nli)e "ith foo!, this is not Aust about tastes. It@s about our "ill to survive. ,%%It is important to emphasi-e that ris) is not a thing. It@s a social construct, a social !efinition. It is something that must be believe! in to have real effects. First mo!ern ris)s, ris)s !efine! as probabilities rather than as uncertainties, presuppose @% several )e rationalit claims before the can be successfull constructe!. It@s because those precon!itions are lac)ing that secon! mo!ern ris)s almost al"a s give rise to ris) conflicts. A t pical secon! mo!ern ris) conflict starts e.istence as a me!ia

tale that gravel unsettles consumers, an! usuall parents of small chil!ren in particular. This is the first stage of the !evelopment of ris) consciousness. In the secon! stage it enormousl increases its political force through the efforts that are necessar to overcome official resistance. This stage of initial official resistance seems li)e a constant. The first thing incipient ris) consciousness al"a s seems to run into is an institutionali-e! rationalit that s stematicall bloc)s off an ac)no"le!gment of the ris) in 1uestion . It is institutionall incapable of comprehen!ing that a ris) can be base! on uncertaint rather than probabilit . Instea! the forces of or!er al"a s seem to translate 0uncertaint 0 as 0minuscule probabilit .0 This misun!erstan!ing is inscribe! in all first mo!ern social institutions. The legal principle "e !escribe! in our French e.ample is true for all la", inclu!ing a!ministrative an! scientific la". It is a general, institutional principle: in an case "here a clear chain of causalit cannot be !emonstrate!, there is therefore no ris) . /hen the affecte! an!
"orrie! people ta)e their case to the scientists, the fin! themselves tal)ing to a group "hose most i!entit %!efining belief is that the canons of causal evi!ence an! inference must al"a s be strictl a!here! to. /hen these criteria can@t be satisfie!, scientists can be !epen!e! upon to e.plain a"a an ne" ris) as a mere fantas "ithout giving it an further consi!eration. So in both !irections, the affecte! run into the soli!l

institutionali-e! "alls of ris) !enial. /e might even e.pan! on our para!o.ical formulation. The more the rules of la" an! the rules of
science #"or)ing in conAunction$ fin! no vali! evi!ence that a ris) has been pro!uce! for, "hich someone can be hel! in!ivi!uall accountable the more ris)s it is possible for societ to pro!uce, an! the more the total potential threat increases. Dut ho"ever much it is !enie!, this potential

threat continues to be perceive! b those affecte!. It becomes a social fact "hich has conse1uences. The ne.t step is usuall that the affecte! or concerne! population organi-es itself into a social movement "hich, after gathering together alternative cognitive instruments that are more or less cre!ible #other statistics, other e.perts$, thro"s itself against these "alls of institutionali-e! !enial. This is ho" ris) conflicts arise. On the one han!, such movements continuall rene" the cre!ibilit claims of the !ominant institutions b !eman!ing an! re1uiring their seal of approval. On the other han!, the are continuall calling those cre!ibilit claims into 1uestion. In the en! it@s never Aust about a factor that stan!s there !umb. It@s about a legal s stem, an! a political s stem, an! a s stem of science "hich, b hol!ing firm in their ol! rationalit , seem, "hen seen from the outsi!e, to be e1ual participants in a conspirac to s stematicall !en the ris)s the total s stem has pro!uce!

I&pactJlobal threats
;odern ris#s spread globall in"ecting e%er aspect o" the structure it see#s to collapse$ State political structures ine%itabl "ail, onl a uni%ersal s ste& can sol%e$ DS0 crisis is e%idence$ :ec2, 0+ Professor for Sociolo!" at the niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the
Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich -&ec., )onversations /ith lrich &ec., p! 01

7es, and this rings 's ac. to the inescapa ility of the transnational dynamic, and ho) all attempts to evade it simply ma.e matters )orse. Ket0s reconstr'ct ho) it all egan. & )as act'ally in =reat (ritain the very moment it started. & )as a le to e/perience it at first hand, as it )ere. &t egan )ith a press conference y a government spo.esman )ho in retrospect had clearly een given too m'ch lee)ay. He said on ehalf of the government that )e co'ld not r'le o't that there )as a connection et)een mad =lo) disease and the rain disease that had recently appeare0tl in h'mans. & repeat; he didn0t say there )as a connection. He 2'st said it co'ldn0t e completely r'led o't. That )as eno'gh to set off the avalanche. The ne/t day, )hen the same spo.esman appeared, he )as clearly on a m'ch shorter leash, and the government forced him to ma.e a retraction. ('t it no longer made any difference. The avalanche had already een let loose. &n the very eginning, the (ritish loo.ed for the ca'se locally. They even enacted vario's local ans. =rad'ally it ecame more and more clear that the ca'sal lin.s co'ldn0t really e 4orro orated. They fo'nd themselves dealing )ith )hat & call known or regressive 'ncertainty, )here the more facts )e .no), the more the 'ncertainty gro)s. &n s'ch sit'ations, real .no)ledge consists of the reali3ation that the 'ncertainty can0t e removed and has to e dealt )ith accordingly. This is 's'ally tr'e of ris. conflicts. Only in rare cases can 'nam ig'o's ca'sal relationships e esta lished, and even then they re5'ire more time for research than events )ill allo). -hat yo' get instead at the height of a ris. conflict is competing theories Gmany of )hich previo'sly e/isted and )arned of the danger 't )ere ignoredJ. Then a str'ggle ens'es over defining the ris., for e/ample, )hat the chain of ca'sality is, )hat the affected pop'lation is, etc. This is 's'ally an important t'rning point, eca'se the details of this definitional str'ggle al)ays have economic and political conse5'ences. 1nd those conse5'ences are themselves 'npredicta le and f'll of systemic ris.. So, for e/ample, at first sight it seemed that deciding on a certain ca'sal chain )o'ld ma.e the entire (ritish eef ind'stry collapse, and this )o'ld mean an enormo's )indfall for the 9rench and =erman eef ind'stries. ('t that e/pectation and the strategy ased on it co'ldn0t have een more misg'ided. &nstead )hat happened is that cons'mers in 9rance and =ermany immediately reno'nced almost all meat cons'mption regardless of origin . . This )as an e/cellent e/ample of the parado/ical honeyscraping effect, )here the more yo' try to get the ris. off of yo', the more yo' get all over yo' . People tried to 'se the definition of ris. to p'sh thro'gh protectionist interests. 9t seemed o vio's that if yo' co'ld rand yo'r national competitor0s prod'cts as eing f'll of ris.s, it )o'ld open 'p ne) mar.ets for yo'r o)n. ('t instead the opposite happened. These efforts f'eled the collapse of their o)n mar.et. The str'ggle over ris. definition prod'ces a heightening of ris. conscio'sness. 9t reinforces the feeling that no a'thorities, least of all prod'cers )ho have a direct interest, can e tr'sted to tell yo' )hat0s going on. The res'lt here )as a mar.et ind'stries of co'ntries )ho had no direct connection )ith the prod'ction of this partic'lar ris. fo'nd themselves sharing in the enormo's costs. &f, d'ring the height of the (S6 crisis, yo' )ere )andering thro'gh 'pper (avaria, and yo' sat do)n at an inn and opened 'p the men', in all li.elihood the first thing yo'0d see )o'ld e a smiling pict're of the farmer )ho o)ned the place, standing )ith his )hole family and his fe) remaining loyal co)s, and 2'st elo) a note that said that the eef that yo' )ere a o't to eat came entirely from this locality and had no connection at all )ith that dia olical (ritish feed chain. This is a perfectly anal e/ample of a person desperately trying to )ard off a ris. to his livelihood . ('t )hat it really evidenced )as ho) 'n elieva ly far these ris.s had spread, and ho) deeply they had endangered him even in his mo'ntain fastness. Men li.e him )ere trying to com at the anal cosmopolitanism of ris.s y hoisting the flag of (avarian localism* they )ere trying to re 'ild tr'st y relocali3ing their prod'cts. ('t in the face of the really e/isting glo al circ'it of the meat and chemical ind'stries, it )as li.e thro)ing a stra) into the )hirlpool of placelessness. 9t )o'ldn0t save him from dro)ning. . This rings 's ac. once again to the most pec'liar and, to the cynical eye of the sociologist, fascinating 5'ality of ris. conflicts; their dynami4 of entanglement. The ris.s of the second modernity have a pec'liar tenacity. They seem to move in and ma.e a nest for themselves not only despite 't eca'se of o'r attempts to deny them. This isn0t only tr'e of health ris.s. 9t also holds )hen they transform themselves into economic ris.s, li.e the collapse of mar.ets and the devalori3ation of capital, or into political ris.s, li.e crises of confidence, the loss of a'thority, and the erosion of political parties. Second modern ris.s are, in a )ord, systemic ris.s, and they can spread from one system to the ne/t. They are glo al ris.s.

I&pactterroris&Igenocide
.nl a cos&opolitan "or& o" securit can sol%e terroris& and genocide44

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *;+1

1ll of this applies only )ith 5'alifications to transnational terrorism of the al#Laeda variety. The active 'nits and their 0handlers0 are motivated neither y territory nor y the state, and they are not fighting for their o)n state. This is )hat ma.es them so inscr'ta le. -hat has shoc.ed h'manity since Septem er !!, +,,!, is a diff'se political terrorism directed against the fo'ndations of modern society and the modern state, sym oli3ed y the US1 and the cathedral of the glo al economy , the -orld Trade 4enter. This form of terrorism # in contrast to the mar.et for violence that arises in a failed state # can no longer e eradicated y constr'cting a state. Rather, the g'iding idea of the state as the g'arantor of sec'rity is eing effectively p't in 5'estion. The terrorist attac.s derive their significance from their specific characteristics, on the one hand, and from the characteristics of hegemonic state po)er against )hich they are directed, on the other. The 1merican President =eorge -. ('sh )as literally rendered speechless y the horrific images in the mass media of the t)o civilian aircraft )hich, transformed into h'man missiles, ca'sed the t)in to)ers of the -orld Trade 4enter to go 'p in flames. -as it a crime< 1 second Pearl Har or< -ho )as the relevant a'thority, the police, the US military, C1TO< Unli.e Pearl Har or, no military ase had een attac.ed. 1nd it )as not an attac. y one state on another. Those )ho carried it o't did not )ear 'niforms, the identity of the instigators is 'nclear, they have no address . Only )hen the )ord 0)ar0 fell from the lips of the President # 01 )ar has een declared on 1merica0 # did the terrorist attac. ecome political terrorism and then global terrorism, even tho'gh 1merica contin'es to p'rs'e this 0enemy0 not as an enemy Gin the sense of the la)s of )arJ 't as a criminal against humanity, devoid of rights. 9t may e that at first the tal. of 0)ar0 against terror )as still meant in a metaphorical sense Gli.e the 0)ar against poverty0 or against 0dr'gs0J. 7et the more the 0)ar0 against terror narro)ed into a military )ar, a )ar et)een . states, the more the inscr'ta le terror )as elevated in )orld politics to the ,:: Stat's of glo al terrorism . Cevertheless, the means of control deployed y the glo al hegemon, in spite of its 'ni5'e military s'periority, are failing in the face of this terrorist threat. The po)er of the state rests oth internally and e/ternally on the logic of deterrence, )hich 'ltimately plays on the threat and the fear of death. ('t these .inds of terrorists cannot e deterred; ho) can yo' threaten s'icide om ers )ith death< The deployment of the instr'ments of po)er at the disposal of states pres'pposes either control over or con5'est of a territory. These terrorists, ho)ever, do not control a territory, and 'nli.e the state they are not tied to a partic'lar territory # they are stateless, present every)here and no)here # a ad starting point for military deterrence and intervention . One ans)er to the
pro lem of postnational )ars is to treat them li.e classical )ars et)een states and ass'me that the )arring parties, tho'gh not states, represent 5'asi#states. This ma.es it possi le, first, to ta.e advantage of one0s military s'periority and, second, to ring a o't a negotiated settlement 0from a ove0. 6/amples of this approach are the Dayton 1ccord Gthro'gh )hich (osnia#Her3egovina )as 0pacified0J and the Oslo 1greement G)hich )as s'pposed to ring a o't peace et)een the &sraelis and the PalestiniansJ. The alternative is to ignore ethnic

sla'ghter )ithin 0sovereign states0, to t'rn a lind eye, erect )alls and ta.e ref'ge in the protectionist fictions of a national glo al order. To e a mere spectator, ho)ever, is scarcely possi le eca'se streams of ref'gees, transnational criminality, diaspora gro'ps in one0s o)n co'ntry and, not least, transnational terrorism did a)ay )ith these fantasy orders long ago.

***'AC A2SW01SJ0201IC

A'G 6ri%atization C6
The free mar2et is moti&ate b" a esire for !ri&ate !ro!ert" an gain at the e/!ense of others0it is antithetical with cosmo!olitan !rinci!les' <eil, 200; =a Policy 1dvisor, &ntergovernmental and &nternational 1ffairs Division, 6nvironment 4anada, Pacific and 7'.on Region GRoss M., +,,", =lo
al 4ooperation; 4hallenges and Opport'nities in the T)enty#9irst 4ent'ry, HSpace technologies for =lo al 6nvironmental =overnanceI, University of Michigan Ki rary, pgs M+#MM 8OCTOPOUKOSJ% &n spite of the efforts that =M6S, 6OS and =6OSS may sym oli3e as a transition in thin.ing to)ards the comm'nali3ation of 6arth monitoring for environmental governance, free enterprise has also la'nched itself as an important ne) player into pace commons . 1s a res'lt of predictions that a

private#sector 6O ind'stry )o'ld gro) in a similar fashion to the telecomm'nications sector that spa)ned the &nformation 1ge, post#cold )ar military li eralisation and 'dget re#allocations N )ith policy ad2'stments s'ch as the U.S. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of !$$+ all provided the impet's for many p'rely commercial vent'res in satellite 6O to emerge over the past decade ' Commercial gain within the global mar2et s"stem, 5'ite apart from international cooperation and commons# ased governance, wor2 on the basis of com!etition an !ri&ate !ro!ert", a conce!t closel" relate to the tra itional conce!t of so&ereignt".
9ar from the earlier concerns y developing co'ntries Gand co'ntries )ith developing space economiesJ over the sovereignty#aspects of 6arth monitoring from space,

concerns no) revolve aro'nd rights to privacy, government sh'tter control policies and e/port control iss'es, all very important to the health and via ility of the commercial remote#sensing ind'stry . Presently, over ten co'ntries incl'ding the U.S., 4anada,
R'ssia, >apan, 4hina, 64 Gthro'gh 6S1J, 9rance, U8, &ndia, &srael and (ra3il all operate high#resol'tion satellite imaging platforms. Other states s'ch as T'r.ey and Pa.istan have e/pressed strong interest in p'rchasing data or developing indigeno's remote#sensing satellites. Many other co'ntries have chosen to p'rchase foreign satellite and gro'nd station systems to gain a capa ility in space, incl'ding s'ch co'ntries as 1lgeria and Cigeria that have p'rchased satellite monitoring e5'ipment to contri 'te to a disaster monitoring net)or. for 1frica. 1ccording to the UC registry of o 2ects in space over +, individ'al states no) possess a capacity for remote sensing, each indicating the rapidly depreciating cost to co'ntries Gand private actorsJ )ishing to gain a presence in space and an 6arth monitoring capa ility.

Global com!etition in the .> mar2et has been at the heart of %',' !olic" efforts since the early !$$,0s to maintain its !re ominance in remote#sensing. High resol'tion satellite imagery #previo'sly only capt'red y military platforms #has no) ecome a mar.et heavily p'rs'ed y the private sect or. ('t high resol'tion optical imagery Gvisi le spectr'm pl's near
infra#redJ, )hile 'sef'l for 'r an planning, ins'rance assessments, and the development of precision navigation maps is not al)ays availa le or appropriate for environment and development planners )ho rely on recent and easily 'pdatea le imagery as )ell as )ider spectral data that goes eyond the visi le spectr'm. -ith proven 'tility for military planners, ho)ever, military agencies are increasingly incorporating commercial so'rces of satellite imagery

into mission planning and e/ec'tion. The U.S. Department of Defence gained s' stantial e/perience )ith the 'se of Kandsat0s m'lti#spectral imagery d'ring the !$$! ='lf -ar and egan to find the information 'sef'l for creating )ide area maps for operational
s'pport.MO Kandsat data proved at times more versatile than military or intelligence imagery that provided high resol'tion in the optical range, 't had very narro) fields of vie). Kandsat data co'ld e com ined )ith other availa le satellite images s'ch as SPOT for lo)er cost, and co'ld e 'nclassified for )ider dissemination. More recently, U.S. defence and intelligence agencies have even gro)n a dependence on commercial satellites to f'lfill oth their

comm'nication and imaging re5'irements and thro'gh s' sidies provided to the Private 6O ind'stry in the U.S. and 4anada, the military is ecoming a gro)ingly infl'ential player in the private#sector 6O 'siness .MM &nstead of the p' lic or scientific 'se of 6O satellites for long#term environmental and development planning eing co#opted y the military, defence and intelligence agencies have had an infl'ence on commercial remote sensing mar.ets and in some cases have o tained e/cl'sive contract'al arrangements )ith private 6O satellite operators, sh'tting o't p' lic access to certain spatial and temporal 3ones. Sh'tter control policies sym oli3e the military0s historical pre# occ'pation )ith s'rveillance and information denial to adversaries 't the more recent economic importance of lace technology sector has also prompted competition )ith res'lting d'plication and incompati ility iss'es limiting the effectiveness of long#term glo al monitoring efforts . 6ven )hen s'ch technologies are developed y civilian agencies and shared thro'gh
international organi3ations s'ch as =6OSS, :control over reso'rces of others in the name of planetary health [and% s'staina ility ... is never too far from the s'rface of many -estern proposals for glo al environmental management.:MP )hereas overt military 'se of space to ass're state hegemony is seen as

o't)ardly aggressive, commercial investment and societal reliance on space technologies des impet's for space control strategies on the gro'nds that economic interests m'st e protected. &n one recent artic'lation of the sec'rity implications of commercial space technologies, =en. Thomas Moorman >r. 'rged the U.S. to p'rs'e ne) military space initiatives, stating that :as more commerce is placed in and as )e depend more on space, [the Department of Defence% )ill need a comprehensive program to protect o'r assets.:M" S'ggestions that international consortia of private#sector commercial space activities might e eyond the control of states #slo)ly and s' tly eroding the notion of state#sovereignty y their a ility to capt're and transmit glo al information and geospatial data to anyone, any)here Q ignore the fact that certain state interests are still being ser&e through

!ri&ate sector initiati&es. 1s 6verett Dolman G+,,+J has also s'ggested, :in form'lations of state strategy, it )o'ld

e disingen'o's and even rec.less to try

to deny the med pre#eminence of the terrestrial state and the place of military action in the short history and near f't're of space operations.: Dolman, )ho ridged the field of classical geopolitical theory to the domain of space )ith Astropolitik, f'rther s that even )hen states p' licly deno'nce the 'se of violence and force in space operations, :all space#faring states today have military missions, goals, and contingency space#operations plans: that pervade the ideal of tr'e cooperation and politcal 'nity in space7

A'G *reat C6s

5G>s alone act in the interest of the nation*states an not the actual citizens0our metho ological change of gi&ing u! on nationalism must ha!!en before treaties can be effecti&e Archibugi 08 Q a Research Director at the &talian Cational Research 4o'ncil G4CRJ in Rome GDaniele, +,,@, The =lo
H&ntros'ction; 1 L'een for the -orld<I, University of Michigan Ki rary, pgs P#R 8OCTOPOUKOSJ Ho) m'st the political comm'nity e constr'cted at the time it is called 'pon to deli erate and ma.e decisions< -ho m'st e incl'ded in this comm'nity and )ho not incl'ded< This is one of the principal pro lems regarding democratic theory and practice, to )hich no satisfactory response has so far een given. The most al 4ommon)ealth of 4iti3ens,

significant evol'tion occ'rring in democratic practice over the past t)enty#five cent'ries has een the grad'al e/pansion of holders of political participation rights. Today the political e5'ality of all ad'lts is )idely ac.no)ledged inside democratic states, altho'gh the principle is lost in each iss'e that crosses the order . The instit'tional comm'nities contin'e to e esta lished in a rigid fashion, corresponding to the present#day territorial states. They call 'pon their o)n mem ers to disc'ss and decide on the pro lems on the agenda 't ignore those pro lems that lie o'tside it. -henever a decision#ma.ing process has e/ternal fallo't, the principle of political e5'ality according to )hich everyone involved m'st participate in the political de ate is violated. This originates o't of the nat're of citi3enship, )hich allo)s the individ'al to participate in the political process in state 1 or state ( 't not in oth states, regardless 0of )hat the individ'al0s e/act involvement act'ally is.
Ket 's ta.e the stri.ing case of the atomic tests carried o't y 9rance in !$$P#!$$" at M'r'roa atoll. The 9rench government decided to carry o't the tests in accordance )ith )holly democratic principles. @ O vio'sly, ho)ever, the entire comm'nity of sta.eholders )as not involved; the Pacific Ocean pop'lations )ere e/posed to n'clear radiation, )hile the 9rench people GallegedlyJ o tained the enefits in the form of national sec'rity andSor n'clear po)er. 1ltho'gh there )ere some protests also in 9rance, 9rench p' lic opinion )o'ld certainly have had a different reaction if the same tests had een carried o't in the Paris region rather than tho'sands of miles a)ay. &ntergovernmental organi3ations are one of the instit'tional modes in )hich the states attempt to set 'p political

colleges to deal )ith e/isting pro lems. The &=Os apply several of the principles of democracy that are .no)n in the states, and are )idely 'sed to resolve any contradictions enco'ntered. ('t, as &=Os are composed of representatives of the governments rather than of the direct sta.eholders, &=Os are inclined to favor choices that facilitate the interests of governments rather than those of the individ'al sta.eholders. 5n the case in )hich these &=Os are composed e/cl'sively of co'ntries )ith elected governments, the decision#ma.ing process regarding these iss'es does not follo) the democratic principle according to )hich all those involved sho'ld have a say in the matter, if for no other reason than eca'se the principle of e5'ality applies to the states 't not to individ'als Gthis topic )ill e ta.en 'p again in chapters M and PJ.

A'G Lriti#s44State action #e

*he state is an i&portant agent "or changedo&estic politics create a &odel "or positi%e changethe plan is a prere!uisite to the alternati%e Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar ?0*?2 ,GAlthough the Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter

( !'

!emo cratic i!eal has "on converts among ester!a Vs a!% versaries, it is far from being establishe! all over the "orl!. The ne" !emocracies are in constant peril an! are force! !ail to overcome ob% stacles threatening their regime. Not even the more a!vance! !emo cratic s stems actuall full satisf their o"n citi-ensV !eman!s. &ere the problem is not the e.pansion of state !emocrac , on "hich an abun!ant literature is available,<9 but rather the e.tension of !emocrac to the transnational sphere. I vie" the state as both a laborator an! an agent of cosmopolitan !emocrac . It is a laborator in the sense that
no"a% !a s one of the problems on the nation% statesV agen!a is to ac)no"le!ge the rights of in!ivi!uals "ho are not normall consi!ere! citi-ens(for instance, refugees an! immigrants. A great !eal still remains to be !one to ensure that these in!ivi!uals have the same rights that native% born citi-ens have.<; ?emo cratic practice has to come to terms "ith the prob% lem of "ho its citi-ens actuall are. Are its citi-ens those "ho are born in a given communit B Those living an! pa ing ta.es in the countr B Those "ho "oul! simpl li)e to live thereB Even insi!e a given communit , !istinctions are beginning to be ma!e among the rights of the various citi-ens an! groups. One of the most signifi cant !evelopments in the mo!ern theor of citi-enship is the ac% )no" le!g ment of the rights of communities that uphol! !ifferent reli% gious, cultural, an! ethnic values. A !emo cratic

state is base! not onl on e1ualit but also on the ac cep tance an! in!ee! on the appreciation of these !ifferences.<L The principle of po liti cal e1ualit is gra!uall begin% ning to be interprete! fl e.ibl an! creativel . &o"ever, ac)no"le!ging the !ifferences among members of the same po liti cal communit ma)es its limits much har!er to !etermine.
In!ee!, one sometimes "on!ers about the logic behin! the current !ivi!ing lines that sometimes group together in!ivi!uals "ith fe" or no cultural, ethnic, an! religious affi ni% ties into the same state "hile on other occasions separate in!ivi!uals "ith strong affi nities across !ifferent states. The

nee! for a cosmopoli% tan approach base! on the principle of inclusion no longer arises onl at the frontier but also in the schools an! neighborhoo!s that alrea! ac% commo!ate the "hole "i!e range of ethnic groups . In
a!!ition to having an internal !imension, a state is characteri-e! b being a member of the international communit . /hat !istinguishes a goo! member from a ba! oneB +ohn Ea"ls pon!ere! "hat the foreign polic of a liberal state shoul! be an! note! several precepts that shoul! unilaterall be follo"e! b such a state.<> /e shall ta)e his prescriptions as suggestions for gui!elines for a !emo cratic foreign polic . Ea"ls nev% ertheless left agreements bet"een states in a resi!ual role2 this "oul! allo" the states(as in the preN3nite! Nations conception of interna% tional la"(to autonomousl !etermine their o"n e.ternal behavior. In the cosmopolitan !emocrac proAect, a liberal state must !istinguish

it% self not onl for the substance of its foreign polic but also because it follo"s a share! proce!ure . A

nation% state "anting to be consi!ere! a "orth citi-en of the international communit shoul! not onl pursue a virtuous foreign polic #as suggeste! b Ea"ls$ but also have the "ill to participate in the life of international institutions, to accept their proce% !ures, an! to respect their rules.<=

A2: Ca!italism
.ur conception o" so%ereignt prioritizes indi%idual hu&an rights o%er econo&ic concernsthis resol%es the war and oppression i&pact o" capitalis& Archibugi ( (Daniele Archibugi, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy,
Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review p. 455-457 SG) It is often sai! that the hegemonic po"er of the 3S an! its closest allies is

a conse1uence of the present international economic s stem #Fo"er, 788<$. Since cosmopolitan !emocrac focuses on the institutional aspects of the international or!er, on the superstructure, an! !oes not give pri!e of place to economic ! namics, it is critici-e! for !iscounting the crucial centres of po"er. From a 5ar.ist perspective, international !emocrac ta)en solel as an
institutional proAect "oul! be impossible #F[org an! &irsch, <GG=$, as the transformation of global politics can onl be brought about b a ne" economic regime. Dut it is not eas to establish "ell%!eXne! lin)s of cause an! effect bet"een politics an! economics $ 5an economic interests are in!ee! more than satisXe! "ith the present mechanisms of control an! have no interest in increasing !emocratic management over the Wo"s of capital or international tra!e. &o"ever, there are man other interests, ma be more "i!esprea!, that are pushing

for greater accountabilit $ The Xnancial speculation that is of a!vantage to some groups is an obstacle to others, an! man economic po"ers are no" loo)ing for"ar! to altering the current structure of international Xnance $ Some of the most interesting proposals on ho" to li&it the da&age caused b Mnancial globalization come from Feorge Soros #7887$ himself2 if "e !o
not "ant to "rite this off as a case of schi-ophrenia, "e must infer that there is no such thing as univocal interests. Other 5ar.ists argue that the proAect of cosmopolitan !emocrac suffers from an improper use of the term IcosmopolitanismV. Drennan #788<: >L$ maintains that to tal) about IinternationalismV "oul! be much more suite!. Of course, "hat reall matter are concepts, not "or!s. Nevertheless, I maintain that it is more precise to 1ualif this proAect as Icosmopolitan !emocrac V rather than as Iinternational !emocrac V. The term Iinter% nationalV, coine! b the Abbot of Saint%Cierre an! +erem Dentham, recalls a t pe of organi-ation that is characteri-e! b t"o levels of representation ( Xrst, the e.istence of governments "ithin

A!opting the notion of IcosmopolitanismV instea! allo"s for the intro!uc% tion of a thir! level of governance, one that re!uires a &ore acti%e participation o" indi%iduals in global political &atters (Jarter, 788<2 ?o"er an! /illiams, 78872
states, an! secon! the creation of an IinternationalV communit base! on governments #An!erson, 7887$. &eater, 7887$. Jiti-ens shoul! therefore pla a t"ofol! role ( that of citi-ens of the state, an! that of citi-ens of the "orl!. Nevertheless, Filbert #<GGG$ an! Drennan #788<$ evo)e the internation% alism of other glorious tra!itions ( tra!itions that share the spirit of cosmopolitan !emocrac : the international "or)ersV associations an! the peace congresses of the <Gth an! earl 78th centuries. The famous slogan ICroletarians of the "orl!, uniteTV heral!e! the essence of this spirit. /ithin this perspective, IinternationalismV is no longer use! to refer to representa% tives of the state.

Internationalism refers rather to the political pla ers "ithin the state who are in conNict with their go%ern&ents because the latter are belie%ed to be the e+pression o" the antagonist class, the bourgeoisie$ The 5ar.ist vie" maintains that the strength of common interest uniting proletarians in !ifferent states is such that conWicts bet"een proletariat states "oul! be solve! much more effectivel than conWicts bet"een bourgeois states. *his ;ar+ist deMnition o" Ointernationalis&8 was built upon the belie" that the de"eat o" the ruling class b the proletariat would result in the cessation o" all conNicts between organized groups, since proletarian co&&unities would ne%er nurse the desire to sub-ugate an other (wor#ers8) co&&unit $
Jonse1uentl , there "oul! be no nee! to organi-e an international political s stem that coul! me!iate conWicts, as there "oul!nVt be an . Sovereignt "oul! simpl !issolve together "ith its hol!er, the bourgeois state$ 5ar.ist anal sis maintains the e.istence of a permanent

conWict of interests bet"een rival social classes 2 interests that ( no" more than in the past ( are in conWict not onl "ithinstates, but also bet"eenstates$ The creation of a global citi-enship "ill not put an en! to these conWicts of interest, but that is not the ambition inspiring it. Its goal is simpl to Xn! institutional loci"here these conWicts of interest coul! possibl be a!!resse! an! manage!$ If the prolonge! civil "ar in Sierra Leone "ere someho" lin)e! to the !iamon! tra!e, an! the tra!ers
from Anvers, 5osco" or Ne" Oor) "ere thought to pla an effective role in promoting the instigation of the hostilities, "hat )in! of institutional channels might prove effective in resolving the issueB Colicies that are !eci!e! "ithin international institutions ( such as the certiXcation of the !iamon!sV origin ( offer the possibilit of mitigating the conWict. In other "or!s, global institutions shoul! offer effective channels

for men!ing conWicts. /hat nee!s to be revise! is the political programme ( not the spirit ( of proletarian internationalism. Josmopolitan !emocrac suggests the creation of institutions an! representative channels not limite! to a speciXc social class, but open to all in!ivi!uals. Its aim is not to overcome social classes, but an obAective more mo!est but e1uall ambitious ( offering channels of !irect r epresentation to all people at the global le%el, regardless o" their social status$ This implies basing !ecision%ma)ing on global issues on the preferences of a maAorit , rather than on those of a single class. In this vein, 3lrich Dec) #<GGG: <=$ invo)e!, IJiti-ens of the "orl!, uniteTV Trans%national
campaigns have alrea! succee!e! in inWuencing the choices of political !ecision%ma)ers ( ta)e the !ecision of the 3' government to follo" environmentall frien!l proce!ures for the !isposal of the Drent Spar #Crins an! Sell"oo!, <GG=$2 the institution of the International Jriminal Jourt #Flasius, 7887$2 the !ecision of some multi% nationals to rece!e from their proXt%ma)ing interests an! allo" for the free !iffusion of the AI?S !rug #Sec)inelgin, 7887$, or even militar inter% ventions to protect human rights #'al!or, 788<$. An international public sphere #'oehler, <GG=2 Jochran, 7887$ is moving to"ar!s public action, an! some partial but nevertheless signiXcant results have been achieve! #Cianta, 788:$.

***'AC A2SW01S10A<IS;IC0J

L o" War I&pacts

The fear of conflict is an unfoun e attem!t to maintain nationalistic control0their im!act is inconsistent with our aff Archibugi 08 Q a Research Director at the &talian Cational Research 4o'ncil G4CRJ in Rome GDaniele, +,,@, The =lo al 4ommon)ealth of 4iti3ens,
H&nternational 4onflicts and DemocracyI, University of Michigan Ki rary, pgs P$#", 8OCTOPOUKOSJ

The interstate system e/erts a direct and decisive infl'ence on the )ay po)er is e/ercised inside the states. The possi ility of a state ecoming a democracy or oosting its c'rrent democratic stat's is directly lin.ed to the e/isting international climate; The a sence of a peacef'l international climate loc.s dissent, mortifies the opposition, and restricts freedom inside the states. 4iti3ens0 rights are c'rtailed and, in order to satisfy the need for sec'rity, civil and political li erties are often impaired. &n )artime, people are prepared to place their freedom in the hands of the )ar leaders )ho promise victory. The threat of )ar, even more than )ar itself, olsters the e/isting regime and anyone daring to critici3e his or her o)n state is immediately vie)ed as antipatriotic and anned from social life. The elites in po)er th's have a covert interest in promoting international conflicts in order to consolidate their o)n internal po)er .
This is certainly no novelty. 1lready in the si/teenth cent'ry, 6rasm's o served; :& am loth to s'spect here )hat only too often, alasT, has t'rned o't to hold tr'e; that

the r'mor of )ar )ith the T'r.s had een tr'mped 'p )ith the aim of m'lcting the 4hristian pop'lation, so that eing 'rned and cr'shed in all possi le )ays might have een all the more servile to)ards the tyranny of all .ind of princes .:$ &n the eighteenth cent'ry, >ean#>ac5'es Ro'ssea' pointed to the internalSe/ternal lin.; : )ar and con5'est )itho't and the encroachment of despotism )ithin give each other m't'al s'pport .... 1ggressive princes )age )ar at least as m'ch on their s' 2ects as on their enemies, and the con5'ering nation is left no etter off than the con5'ered .: !, These o servations too. on fresh significance d'ring
the 4old -ar; in the eastern loc the e/ternal threat )as 'sed to prevent democracy, and in the -est to restrict its potential.

The case of the 4old -ar is ill'minating precisely eca'se of its 'nreal and :imaginary: nat're. 1 potential )ar, a looming threat that for decades is e/pressed only o li5'ely, can e m'ch more effective than )ar itself in restricting internal participation. The instant the )ar ecomes real, the conse5'ences are 'npredicta le. The need to mo ili3e the pop'lation can lead to 'pheavals in the
social str'ct're. 1 defeat and even a victory can e accompanied y radical changes in the political system of the elligerent co'ntries, perhaps even leading to the constit'tional norms eing re)ritten and the former leadership eing completely removed and replaced. Parado/ically, the looming e/ternal threat Gthe

cold )arJ may e more effective than an act'al conflict Gthe hot )arJ in enfee ling internal opposition and in consolidating the s'pport of the p' lic for the inc'm ent government* )hen a )ar ends, there are pro a ly a )inner and a loser, and acco'nts have to e settled inside each co'ntry. Many co'ntries have act'ally em raced democracy after e/periencing the horrors of a )ar imposed y an a'tocratic system.
Ho)ever, the

latent conflict may e prolonged, even indefinitely, and may represent an effective )ay of .eeping an a'thoritarian regime in place. &n Nineteen Eighty- our, =eorge Or)ell had already )arned of s'ch dangers; :-ar is no) a p'rely internal affair. &n the past, the r'ling gro'ps of all co'ntries, altho'gh they might recogni3e their common interest and therefore limit the destr'ctiveness of )ar, did fight against one another, and the victor al)ays pl'ndered the van5'ished. &n o'r o)n day they are not fighting against one another at all. The )ar is )aged y each r'ling gro'p against its o)n s' 2ects, and the o 2ect of )ar is not to ma.e or prevent con5'ests of territory, 't to .eep the str'ct're of society intact.:!+ The end of the 4old -ar has not meant the elimination of e/tremist parties, even in democratic states, and those e/tremist parties maintain their po)er y po'ring oil on the flames of international conflict .

A'G *ha er
*heir clai& that de&ocratic hege&on sol%es war relies on obscuring the %iolence that western hege&ons do to all outsidersthis de&ocratic schizophrenia guarantees ine%itable "ailure and %iolenceonl a radical re"or& sol%es

Archibugi, 2008 [a Research Director at the &talian Cational Research 4o'ncil G4CRJ in Rome GDaniele, +,,@, The =lo
H&ntrod'ction; 1 L'een for the -orld<I, University of Michigan Ki rary, pgs P#R 8OCTOPOUKOSJ%

al 4ommon)ealth of 4iti3ens,

Today it m'st e ac.no)ledged that the sit'ation has changed. The rigidity of the frontiers of the political comm'nities, an element that historically ena led self#government to e orn and prosper, no) stands in the )ay of democracyBs evolving and even s'rviving. 1s soon as each political comm'nity receives and transmits the echo of its actions from and to the e/terior , the state# ased democratic proced're is eroded. &n order to s'rvive, democracy m'st 'ndergo a radical transformation compara le to that e/perienced in the transition from direct to representative democracy. Democracy m'st e a le to create ne) forms of management of p' lic matters that are also open to)ard the e/terior and to incl'de in the decision# ma.ing process those )ho are affected y certain decisions. Many attempts have already een made to increase participation and incl'sion. &nternational organi3ations, for e/ample, have increased in n'm er and f'nctions, and almost every co'ntry in the )orld is no) a mem er of the UC . &n the so#called Old 4ontinent, a mighty
effort is eing made to create common instit'tions, and the 6'ro pe an Union has een e/tended so'th)ard, north)ard, and east)ard. Half a cent'ry ago, the 6U )as concerned solely )ith coal and steel, )hile today it is competent in all aspects of p' lic policy. Other regional organi3ations are developing on the other continents.

-orld political life is eginning to assign 2'risdiction and legitimacy to s' 2ects other than state representatives, s'ch as nongovernmental organi3ations, m'ltinational corporations, c'lt'ral associations, and transnational press're gro'ps. This process of instit'tional integration is still only partial and 'nsatisfactory, ho)ever, compared )ith the intensity and rapidity of the changes occ'rring in the glo al process. -ho is )illing to 'nderta.e the necessary instit'tional reforms< The -est has preached the lofty principle of the sovereignty of the people, at the same time applying this principle )ith s'spicio's parsimony. The -est has often declared its intention to promote democracy in other peopleBs ac. yard 't is y no means )illing to share the management of glo al affairs )ith others. This is )hat & call democratic schi3ophrenia; to engage in a certain ehavior on the inside and ind'lge in the opposite ehavior on the o'tside. &t is a contradiction that is diffic'lt to 2'stify, altho'gh here the -est can appeal to a po)erf'l and sophisticated ideological apparat's, the f'nction of )hich is to demoni3e any political system that opposes its o)n. The i eological a!!aratus is use to isseminate a @anichean &iew in which an"one o!!osing the will of the Aest is !resente as a barbarian an a sa&age. &t is certainly not diffic'lt to demoni3e )hat happens in the )orld; yo' have only to open a ne)spaper to read a o't the atrocities committed for political reasons in places far and near. The ideological apparat's does not merely demoni3e, ho)ever* it m'st also sanctify, and so it proceeds to o sc're the atrocities committed y the democratic co'ntries. Aar crimes are transforme into collateral amage, aggression is con&erte into !re&ention, torture is mo ifie to become coerci&e interrogation. The point is reached in )hich the democratic states are deemed to e peacef'l y nat're, and )hen they fight it is only eca'se other states are not as democratic . &n other )ords, a consolatory vie) of democracy arose that demoni3ed its enemies and glorified itself . Ho)ever, this vie) is analytically ta'tological and politically reactionary. &t is ta'tological in that it not only defines democracy as good 't also defines )hat democracies do as good. This prevents any assessment of the relationship et)een t)o varia les, post'lating as an a/iom )hat instead remains to e demonstrated. 1nd it is politically reactionary, as this complacency prevents an analysis of )hich pro lems are still open and the transformations needed to f'lfill the commitments inscri ed in the constit'ent pact of the democracies. Consoling oneself about what emocrac" stan s for is an obstacle to the emocracies3 !rogress .

A'G *ransition Wars

*he rigid s ste& o" the status !uo is doo&ed to "ailureinternational integration o" decision &a#ing44li#e the planis #e to a non4%iolent transition Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter ) !' +*; ,G/e live in a highl fragmente! "orl! that is, ho"ever, !ominate! b a small group of countries that, using a loose but rea!il un!erstan!able term, is !efi ne! as the /est. The /est is an entit compose! of countries that have a mar)et econom an! consoli!ate! !emo
cratic institutions. /ith the sole e.ception of +apan, the /est involves Eu rope an! its an% cient settlements. Too often it is forgotten that this part of the "orl! comprises at most one si.th of the "orl! population. /ithin the /est a single countr , the 3nite! States, has to!a emerge! as

!ominant. Never before has such a vast an! profoun! hegemon been "itnesse! . Suffi ce it
resources(pro!uction, consumption, )no"le!ge, militar

to observe the !istribution of

capacit (to see ho" a relativel small part of the "orl! became po"erful. This

po"er

is not onl material2 its i!eolog is e1uall !ominating . Jinema an! science, literature an! technolog

, mu% sic an! mass communications are all in the han!s of the /est. The prin% ciples of po liti cal or ga ni -a tion that prevail to!a "ere also pro!uce! b the /est: the "estern visions of free!om an! !emocrac have become increasingl universal values , an! there is no reason to regret this.: The /est has no cause to be ashame! of having propose! an! !evelope! forms of government that have gra!uall also sprea! to other parts of the "orl!. The peoples of the fi ve continents have ta)en to the streets to !e% man! them, often against their o"n

rulers, because the have full un% !erstoo! that free!om an! !emocrac not onl guarantee greater per% sonal !ignit but also allo" more material benefi ts to be !istribute!. The /est , for its part, has en!eavore! to ma)e converts. Oet these efforts have prove! incoherent an! ambiguous. Free!om an! !emoc% rac have been turne! into i!eological screens to !efen! veste! interests an! attac) enemies. The vicissitu!es of colonialism an! then of imperi% alism sho" that onl too often has the /est claime! these values for itself an! !enie! them to others. Jan the po"er that the /est "iel!s to!a be use! to involve an! inclu!e rather than to !ominate an! sub% AugateB Is it possible to enlarge the number of subAects among "hom to !istribute the benefi tsB Josmopolitan !emocrac has the obAective of representing an intellectual contribution to the attainment of these obAectives. Josmopolitan !emocrac opposes the i!ea of constructing a fortress in the "estern area an! e.clu!ing all those "ho !o not passivel
accept the ne" hegemonies. A strateg of this )in! cannot but stir up ne" en% emies an! lea! to futile crusa!es. Such a vision of the cosmopolitan proAect is also base! on the factual observation that it is impossible to !ra" a !ivi!ing line bet"een 4us6 an! 4them,6 bet"een 4frien!s6 an! 4enemies.6 The planet is ma!e up of 4overlapping communities of fate ,69 to use the apt phrase coine! b ?avi! &el!, an! it is a !iffi cult, an! often impossible, tas) to mar) the confi nes bet"een one an! the other. /hat is the most suitable po liti cal communit ; to !emo craticall !eci!e on navigation on the ?anubeB ?oes not the sprea! of contagious !is% eases affect all the inhabitants of the EarthB An! "hat must be sai! about issues concerning not onl all the present inhabitants of the Earth but also those of the future, such as nuclear "aste management or the o-one holeB There is no obvious, eas ans"er to these 1uestions. Nevertheless, the mo!ern state(one of the /estVs favorite offspring(base! on the assumption of sure frontiers an! rigi! criteria of membership continues to be the main po liti cal subAect in international relations. In Aust a fe" centuries, the territorial state has sprea! over the entire lan! surface of the planet. /ith the sole e.ception of Antarctica, there is no longer a strip of lan! that !oes not belong to or is not claime! b a territorial state. In or!er to participate in "orl! po liti cal life, each in!ivi!ual is oblige! to become a member of a state, an! each communit must contrive to spea) "ith a single voice, that of a monocratic government. /orl! politics is there% fore

practice! b a small group of actors that have set up a !irectorate, giving rise to "hat ma be !efi ne! as an intergovernmental oligarch . It cannot be !enie! that the state pla s an essential role in nourishing !e% mocrac : "ithout actuall !eci!ing, often arbitraril , "ho is in an! "ho is out, it "oul! not have been possible to !evelop self% government . The intensifi cation of the pro cesses of economic, social, po liti cal, an! cul% tural globali-ation, ho"ever, has ren!ere! tra!itional boun!aries in% creasingl vague an! uncertain, un!ermining the capacit for certain po liti cal communities to ma)e !ecisions autonomousl . The )e princi% ple of !emocrac , accor!ing to "hich !ecisions must be ta)en onl after !iscussion among all those affecte! b the !ecisions, is increasingl being 1uestione!. To!a it must be ac)no"le!ge! that the situation has change!. The rigi!it of the frontiers of the po liti cal communities , an element that historicall enable! self% government to be born an! prosper, no" stan!s in the "a of !emocrac Vs evolving an! even surviving. As soon as each po liti cal communit receives an! transmits the echo of its actions from an! to the e.terior, the state% base! !emo cratic
proce!ure is ero!e!. In or!er to survive, !emocrac must un!ergo a ra!ical transformation comparable to that e.perience! in the transition from !irect to represen% tative !emocrac . ?emocrac must be able to create ne" forms of man% agement of public matters that

are also open to"ar! the e.terior an! to inclu!e in the !ecision% ma)ing pro cess those "ho are affecte! b certain !ecisions. 5an attempts have alrea! been ma!e to increase participation an! inclusion. International organi-ations, for e.ample, have increase! in number an! functions, an! almost ever countr in the "orl! is no" a member of the 3N. In the so% calle! Ol!
Jontinent, a might effort is being ma!e to create common institutions, an! the Eu ro pe an 3nion has been e.ten!e! south"ar!, north"ar!, an! east"ar!. &alf a centur ago, the E3 "as concerne! solel "ith coal an! steel, "hile to!a it is competent in all aspects of public polic . Other regional organi-ations are !eveloping on the other continents. /orl! po liti cal life is begin% ning to assign Auris!iction an! legitimac to subAects other than state representatives, such as nongovernmental organi-ations, multinational corporations, cultural associations, an! transnational pressure groups.

This pro cess of institutional integration is still onl partial an! unsatis% factor , ho"ever, compare! "ith the intensit an! rapi!it of the changes occurring in the global pro cess.

Current de&ocratic practices use de&ocratic schizophrenia to acco&plish their i&perialist goals, onl world de&ocrac sol%es Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter ) !' ;*8 ,G/ho is "illing to un!erta)e the necessar institutional reformsB The /est has preache! the loft principle of the sovereignt of the people, at the same time appl ing this principle "ith suspicious parsimon . The /est has often !eclare! its intention to promote !emocrac in other peopleVs bac) ar! but is b no means "illing to share the management of global affairs "ith others. This is "hat I call !emo cratic schi-o phre% nia: to engage in a certain behavior on the insi!e an! in!ulge in the opposite behavior on the outsi!e $ It is a contra!iction that is !iffi cult to Austif , although here the /est can appeal to a po"erful an! sophisti% cate! i!eological apparatus, the "unction o" which is to de&onize an po liti cal s ste& that opposes its own . The i!eological apparatus is use! to !isseminate a 5anichean vie" in "hich an one opposing the "ill of the /est is presente! as a barbarian an! a savage. It is certainl not !if% fi cult to !emoni-e "hat happens in the "orl!: ou have onl to open a ne"spaper to rea! about the atrocities committe! for po liti cal reasons in places far an! near$ The i!eological apparatus !oes not merel !e% moni-e, ho"ever2 it must also sanctif , an! so it procee!s to obscure the atrocities committe! b the !emo cratic countries. /ar crimes are trans% forme! into collateral !amage, aggression is converte! into prevention, torture is mo!ifi e! to become coercive interrogation$ The point is reache! in "hich the !emo cratic states are !eeme! to be peaceful b nature, an! "hen the fi ght it is onl because other states are not as !emo cratic. In other "or!s, a consolator vie" of de&ocrac arose that de&on4 ized its ene&ies and glori"i ed itsel". &o"ever, this vie" is anal ticall tautological an! po liti call reactionar . It is tautological in that it not onl !efi nes !emocrac as goo! but also !efi nes "hat !emocracies !o as goo!. This prevents an assessment of the relationship bet"een t"o variables, postulating as an a.iom "hat instea! remains to be !emon% strate!. An! it is po liti call reactionar , as this complacenc prevents an anal sis of "hich problems are still open an! the transformations nee!e! to fulfi ll the commitments inscribe! in the constituent pact of the !e% mocracies. Jonsoling oneself about "hat !emocrac stan!s for is an obstacle to the !emocraciesV progress. &o" far bac) !oes this !emo cratic schi-o phre nia bet"een interior an! e.terior !ateB Cerhaps it is an intrinsic fl a", alrea! announce! in the funeral oration !elivere! b Cericles, a great !emo crat, to com% memorate those )ille! in the fi rst ear of the Celoponnesian "ar, a speech that is Austl consi!ere! the fi rst e.pression of !emo cratic thought.L Cericles lavishes !eserving praise on the po liti cal or!er of his cit . &e refers to Athens as a 4living school for Freece,6> a mo!el for all civili-ations. Thuc !i!es, the chronicler of the "ar, scrupulousl notes the !evastation an! plun!ering carrie! out b the Athenians, but Ceri% cles never as)s "hether that "ar "as necessar , "hether the !emo cratic Athens ha! been compelle! to fi ght it, or "hether it "as a "ar of aggres% sion. Oet Cericles harangues his fello" citi-ens: 4?o not loo) at the sac% rifi ces of the "ar in horror.6= Onl b e.celling in "ar can Athens be a 4living school.6 Eea!ing an! rerea!ing this famous speech, one gets the impression that the praise of the Athenian !emocrac is necessar to Austif the bloo! spilt but also that the bloo! she! on the e.terior is nec% essar to buil! that !emo cratic societ . The Athenian events have unfor% tunatel hung li)e a sha!o" over the !evelopment of !emocrac through the centuries. The !emo cratic regimes are certainl not the onl belligerent or un% "orth members of the international communit . The autocratic re% gimes are e1uall an! sometimes even more violent on both the interior an! the e.terior. Stu!ents of international relations from both the real% istsV si!e an! the opposing i!ealistsV si!e have fi lle! entire librar shelves "ith publications assessing the e.tent to "hich the internal regime of a state affects its foreign policies. The metho! generall use!, ho"ever, is to compare the foreign polic of the !emo cratic countries "ith that of the autocratic countries, an! it is not surprising to fi n! that the foreign polic of !emocracies is often, other things being e1ual, more virtuous than that of the autocracies. Nevertheless, the basis of the comparison is incorrect: the foreign polic of the !emocracies shoul! be compare! "ith their internal polic . Onl "hen the t"o are base! on the same principles "ill it be possible to !eclare !emo cratic schi-o phre nia to have been cure! an! the curse that has accompanie! this form of government from the time of Cericles to have been lifte!. It is perhaps possible to Austif the crimes committe! b !emocracies outsi!e their o"n bor!ers b the fact that the have so far live! in a composite international s stem in "hich the maAorit of the po liti cal communities "ere manage! using authoritarian metho!s. For ears an! ears, !emocracies have ha! to !efen! themselves "ith the s"or! as "ell as "ith rhetoric. &o"ever, this is no longer the situation in the t"ent % fi rst centur , "hen the !istribution of po"er is such that the bloc of the !emo cratic states reigns supreme. For these reasons I am often critical concerning "hat is !one an! even more of "hat coul! be an! is not !one b the !emocracies. This criticism is in no "a meant to repu% !iate !emocrac as a metho! of managing po"er, nor is it meant to !en the fact that all the peoples in the "orl! coul! benefi t

from !emocrac . The aim of the criticism is to prevent countries that have succee!e! in constructing these regimes(often b means of bloo!, s"eat, an! tears( from sin)ing into complacenc , from !ischarging their aggressiveness to"ar! their e.terior an! hin!ering further progress on the interior. Deing critical, in other "or!s, b no means signifi es a !esire to return to a !ifferent s stem but merel a !eman! that !emocracies shoul! rise to the e.pectations that the maAorit of the "orl!Vs population has of them. Never before have the "estern countries been so po"erful2 never before have their enemies been so "ea). The "estern countries no longer have to fi ght for survival as the !i! in the fi rst an! secon! half of the t"enti% eth centur . No longer !o an e.ternal obstacles stan! in the "a of pursuing a "orl! of !emocrac .

@e&ocrac "unctions b e+cluding an .thercos&opolitianis& is all inclusi%e Archibugi 8 (2008, Daniele, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towar Cosmo!olitan Democrac"# $rinceton %ni&ersit" $ress, Cha!ter ) !' 8*? ,GThe key terms of the project illustrated hereindemocracy and cosmopolitanismencapsulate two of the loftiest ideals of po liti cal thought. Yet as is often the case with good intentions, both these con- cepts conceal insidious perils. The demo cratic ideabased on the prin4 ciple that power belongs to the &ultitudewas established b drawing di%iding lines between the persons to include and those to e+clude$ 6ower &a be shared b the whole people but onl on condition that we #now who is being e+cluded. Paradoxically, the all- time enemy of de- mocracy, despotism, has not had to face the problem of whom to include: obedience is expected from all individuals. Throughout their journey, the de&ocracies ha%e graduall increased the nu&ber o" citizens endowed with po liti cal rights : those rights have been extended from exclusively the free males of the polis to all adults. Dut even though the barriers have been whittled down, perhaps the &ost decisi%e one has re&ained standingG those who are in and those who are out$ 0+traneous peoples and indi%iduals wishing to be included ha%e been the &ost "re!uent %icti&s o" e+clusion$ *he need to ho&ogenize those who are di""erent b &eans o" assi&ilation, e+pulsion, or e%en eli&ination has brought out the dar# side o" de&ocrac , transforming it into ethnocracy.9 This dark side has dominated the pro cess of nation building, but it would be wrong to consider this dark side solely as a problem of the past. In a world in which populations are subjected to great migrations, in which natural resources are scarce, and in which the pro cesses of globalization, whether we like it or not, throw together different individuals, this dark side is always liable to re- emerge. The clashes of civilizations are nothing but the latest version of the deviation that can affect democracies at any moment$ Cos&opolitanis& as a school o" tolerance would &itigate this ge ne tic "l aw in de&ocrac and should pre%ent de&ocrac "ro& withdrawing into itsel" and allow de4 &ocrac to continue to be a perpetuall open and inclusi%e po liti cal s ste&$

A'G PDut %iolence is ine%itableH5

0%en i" %iolence is ine%itable, a cos&opolitan s ste& "ocusing on hu&an securit is the &ost %iable wa to deal with itonl the a"" can create non4arbitrar criteria "or inter%ention Inoguchi, '(() *Ta)ashi, a +apanese aca!emic researcher of foreign affairs an! international an! global relationships of states. &e is also a
professor emeritus of 3niversit of To) o. &e is the presi!ent of 3niversit of Niigata Crefecture since April 788G 4Josmopolitanism as a Cotential Ne" Frame"or)6 http://""".mthol o)e.e!u/Ss rin77e/peaceconflict/cosmopolitan.htmlK The failings of international attempts at peace)eeping in the status 1uo can be summe! up as follo"s: <. Eealist theor continues to !ominate international polic formation, placing emphasis on the sovereign state as the ultimate guarantor of international peace an! securit , an! vie"ing po"er as the ultimate goal of state action. 7. Jurrent international institutions are insufficient to !eal "ith international an! subnational conflict crises, partiall because the "ere originall conceptuali-e! an! reali-e! un!er a realist frame"or). :. Eecent attempts to reform international peace)eeping metho!ologies have fallen short of sufficient transformation !ue to the persistent failure of polic ma)ers to a!!ress the un!erl ing shortcomings of the realist frame"or). A fourth an! final consi!eration to respect "hen formulating a ne" solution to the problem of international conflict management is, naturall , the ethical criti1ues pose! b those "ho oppose international preventive !iplomac an! intervention in their contemporar incarnations. The evolution of

international theoretical thought suggests a shift to"ar! a \possible cosmopolitan future, that is as a component of a broa!er an! emancipator theoretical frame"or) centre! on the i!ea of collective human securit *=K. The cosmopolitan frame"or) primaril a!vocates moral an! social unit "ith all other human beings2 that is to sa , it regar!s the global population as sharing certain common interests, rather than being primaril fragmente! into !isparate an! arbitrar nation%states "hich compete against each other. The cosmopolitan i!entit re1uires 4the i!entification of oneself as
part of the human famil *\K an e.tension of the sense of )inship man alrea! feel for their nation, hometo"n, an! famil 6 *=K. In a cosmopolitan "orl!vie", in!ivi!ual securit is inherentl an! ine.orabl associate! "ith the securit of the "i!er globe2 a threat

to one is a threat to all. The cosmopolitan frame"or) "as partiall

affirme! in 7888 "ith the a!option of Securit Jouncil Eesolution <7GL, "hich 4confirme! that the !eliberate targeting of civilians in arme! conflict an! the !enial of humanitarian access to civilian populations in "ar -ones constitute! a threat to international peace an! securit 6 *GK, but the realist frame"or) remains.

A cosmopolitan approach to peace)eeping "oul! ans"er man criticisms levele! at the realist peace)eeping apparatus, an! represents the most viable solution to the problem of a future humanitarian crisis. /hile it is use of force in containing conflict6 *<<K, motivate! b

potentiall !ifficult to envision a trul cosmopolitan s stem of international human securit , it "oul! certainl !emonstrate certain i!entifiable characteristics. Josmopolitan international societ "oul! certainl !emonstrate 4international engagement an! collective 4international norms about in!ivi!ual an! group rights6 *<<K. Eather than e.isting as the establishment of a "holl homogenous international communit , cosmopolitanism

4celebrates !iversit an! multiculturalism, an! implies a variet of polities6 *GK, an! represents 4a post%/estphalian !irection for international politics, "hich transcen!s the state%centricit of peace)eeping6 *GK. It recogni-es that the bor!ers of states artificiall fragment the larger human communit , an! a!!itionall , !ue to its establishment of a singular international opinion "ith regar!s to human rights an! peace, provi!es the theoretical frame"or) for instituting an obAective s stem of evaluating preventive !iplomac an! humanitarian intervention. In this sense, cosmopolitanism represents a %iable solution to the li&itations o" the realist "ra&ewor# , an! ma a!!itionall ans"er the philosophical criticisms of contemporar humanitarian intervention . /hile it
remains perhaps legitimate to sa that the implementation of cosmopolitanism upon the globe represents an imposition of values,

cosmopolitanism certainl solves the problem of neocolonialism b in!ivi!ual states "hile acting to ensure human securit . It respon!s to the criticism of the ethic of compassion in that cosmopolitanism b !efinition !oes not sponsor the 4otheri-ation6 of human beings2 instea!, the trul cosmopolitan global citi-en is motivate! not b 4pit 6 or 4arrogance6 but b soli!arit . Even "here cosmopolitanism fails to improve upon realism in terms of ethical criti1ues of peace)eeping, real human lives are ultimatel more valuable than philosophical consi!erations. It is therefore much more useful for international relations scholars an! polic ma)ers to a!opt a cosmopolitan theoretical frame"or) "hen consi!ering the future of our planet an! its inhabitants. 5ovement to"ar! cosmopolitanism "ill ultimatel represent a solution to the conun!rum of contemporar human securit .

A'G 6s cholog Q 1ealis&

lo alt to the state and competiton arent psychological necessitiescosmopolitanism reorients these psychological desires towards collective advancement. Kleingeld and Brown 2002 &(Pa#line, Professor of Practical Reason at t e 'niversity of (ronin)en, and Eric, *ssociate Professor of P ilosop y at +as in)ton 'niversity in St. ,o#is, http://plato.stanfor!.e!u/entries/cosmopolitanism/ , Feb. 23, 2002, Revised Nov. 28, 2006, Stanford Encyclopedia of P ilosop y, ttp!""plato.stanford.ed#"entries"cos$opolitanis$"%-

Another version of the criticism that cosmopolitanism is impossible targets the ps chological assumptions of moral cosmopolitanism. &ere it is sai! that human beings must have stronger attachments to"ar! members of their o"n state or nation, an! that attempts to !isperse attachments to fello"%citi-ens in or!er to honor a moral communit "ith human beings as such "ill cripple our sensibilities. If this is a viabilit claim an! not simpl a !esirabilit claim, then it must be suppose! that moral cosmopolitanism "oul! literall leave large numbers of people unable to function. So it is claime! that people nee! a particular sense of national i!entit in or!er to be agents, an! that a particular sense of national i!entit re1uires attachment to particular others perceive! to have a similar i!entit . This argument seems plausible if it is assume! that cosmopolitanism re1uires the same attitu!es to"ar!s all other human beings, but mo!erate cosmopolitanism !oes not ma)e that assumption. Eather, the mo!erate cosmopolitan has to insist onl that there is some favorable, motivating attitu!e to"ar! all human beings as such2 this leaves room for some special attitu!es to"ar!s fello"%citi-ens. Of course, the strict moral cosmopolitan "ill go further an! "ill !en that fello"%citi-ens !eserve an special attitu!es, an! it might be thought that this !enial is "hat flouts the limits of human ps cholog . Dut this !oes not seem to be true as an empirical generali-ation. The cosmopolitan !oes not nee! to !en that some people !o happen to have the nee! for national allegiance, so long as it is true that not all people !o2 an! insofar as some people !o, the strict cosmopolitan "ill sa that perhaps it !oes not nee! to be that "a an! that cosmopolitan e!ucation might lea! to a !ifferent result. The historical recor! gives even the strict cosmopolitan some cause for cheer, as human ps cholog an! the forms of political organi-ation have proven to be 1uite plastic. In fact, some cosmopolitans have a!opte! a !evelopmental ps cholog accor!ing to "hich patriotism is a step on the "a to cosmopolitanism: as human in!ivi!uals mature the !evelop ever "i!er lo alties an! allegiances, starting "ith attachments to their caregivers an! en!ing "ith allegiance to humanit at large. These !ifferent attachments are not necessaril in competition "ith each other. +ust as little as lo alt to one@s famil is generall seen as a problematic feature of citi-ens, so the argument goes, lo alt to one@s state is not a necessaril problematic feature in the e es of cosmopolitans. Thus, cosmopolitanism is regar!e! as an e.tension of a !evelopmental process that also inclu!es the !evelopment of patriotism. This claim is Aust as much in nee! of empirical support, ho"ever, as the opposite claim !iscusse! in the previous paragraph.

A'G 1ealis&7actuall Incorrect

*heir realist conception o" the world is an outdated constructionthe world doesn8t operate b that &odel an &oreglobalization is eroding so%ereignt we need a new &odel o" territorialit $ Agnew (R(professor of geograph at the 3niversit of Jalifornia, Los Angeles #+ohn, +une, Annals of the Association of American Feographers, 4Sovereignt Eegimes: Territorialit an! State Authorit in Jontemporar /orl! Colitics,6+STOE$

Jonclusion The

conception of sovereignt that has pre!ominate! in mo!ern political theor relies on the i!ea of e.clusive political authorit e.ercise! b a state over a given territor . This i!ea reflects the concept of sovereignt that emerge! from /estphalia an! then !evelope! along "ith Enlightenment an! Eomantic i!eals of popular rule an! patriotism. 5an governments continue to act as if the concept is actuall !escriptive of the contemporar "orl!. Dut this stan!ar! conception is a poor gui!e to political anal sis. It is a 0truth0 that has al"a s hi!!en more than it reveals. In a globali-ing "orl!, this obfuscation is particularl problematic. /e cannot meaning% full appl the ortho!o. conception of sovereignt to the con!itional e.ercise of relative, limite!, an! partial po"ers that local, regional, national, international, an! nonterritorial communities an! actors no" e.ert. I have propose! an alternative to the ortho!o. ap% proach
to sovereignt that !ra"s from recent criti1ues of the ortho!o. @s un!erstan!ing of political authorit , to "hich I have a!!e! a criti1ue of its un!erstan!ing of spatialit as absolute territorialit . This alternative mo!el relies on the i!ea of 0sovereignt regimes,0

or

combinations of !egrees of central state authorit an! consoli!ate! or open territorialit . I have empiricall

illustrate!

the efficac of this approach to !isentangling the impacts of globali-ation on state territorialit b e.amining various "a s in "hich monetar sovereignt , perhaps the most obviousl s mbolic as "ell as important material manifestation of state sovereignt , operates ef% fectivel . I have i!entifie! four !istinctive currenc processes un!er contemporar global political%economic con!itions%territorial, transnational, share!, an! sub% stitute%that ma be mappe! onto the four t pes of sovereignt regime, respectivel , classic, globalist, inte% grative, an! imperialist. This t polog has the virtue of !istinguishing various "a s in "hich globali-ation in tersects "ith state territorialit to pro!uce ver !ifferent mo!es of actuall e.isting or effective sovereignt in the "orl! to!a . /e !o not live in a "orl! that is singularl imperialist, globalist, integrative, or

/estphalian. The t polog also provi!es a "a of gauging !ifferences in the meaning of sovereignt over time an! space an! thereb moves be on! the sterile !ebate over "hether some sort of universal 0state sovereignt 0 is ero!ing. /hen as% sumptions about the fi.e! an! universal nature of ter ritorialit no longer "or) to locate sovereignt in place, "e begin to see, for better an! for "orse, that there is political authorit be on! the sovereign construction of territorial space.

1ealis& "unda&entall &isunderstands the wa the world wor#sin a globalized world, power is &ore di""usepre"er our descripti%e account

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision

The national o'tloo. or, to p't it in terms of political science, neorealism, fails eca'se it cannot comprehend the ne) logic of

po)er in glo al society. 1nyone )ho elieves that the glo al policeman C1TO or the US1 is merely pretending to play the role of glo al policeman )hile really p'rs'ing 'n1merican economic and geopolitical po)er interests in the po)der .eg of the (al.ans or the 1ra )orld not only mis'nderstands the sit'ation 't also overloo.s the e/tent to )hich the politics of h'man rights Gli.e the imposition of 0free mar.ets0J has ecome the civil religion , the faith of the United States itself.
&n addition, the one thing does not e/cl'de the other. The defence of h'man rights on foreign soil can peacef'lly coe/ist )ith geostrategic, economic and hegemonic interests. 1 ne) .ind of postnational politics of mili! Lary humanism is emerging. .... , Postnational )ar m'st also e disting'ished from other ca'ses of )ar )ith )hich )e are sim'ltaneo'sly confronted. Mary 8aldor G!$$@J and, follo)ing her, 6rhard 6ppler G+,,+J, Herfried M'n.ler G+,,+J and many others, have analysed the privati3ation of violence in this connection. This can e vie)ed as a radicali3ed neoli erali3ation of the state, in partic'lar, of the state monopoly on the means of violence. -here states in the 6'ropean

sense never developed or have collapsed, force has never een monopoli3ed y the state and has never een privati3ed. S'ch pre# or post#state )ars are not f'elled, for instance, y age#old ethnic rivalries, as is often s'pposed, 't y a 0civil# )ar mar.et0 in )hich the prices and profits for 'ying and 'sing privati3ed force are determined or negotiated G4ollier
+,,OJ.

A'G 1ealis&We 1e"or& It

0%en i" realis& is ine%bitable, cos&opolitan ideolog can still "unction to reshape societ it re4orients sel" interest to the collecti%e good Archibugi ( (Daniele Archibugi, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK and Italian National Research Council, Italy,
Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review p. 453-454 SG) The !isenchante! Eealists remin! us that the "orl!Vs mechanisms are ver !ifferent from ho" cosmopolitan !emocrac Vs !reamers imagine them to be. The argue that the principal elements regulating international relations are, ultimatel , force an! interest . Thus, ever effort to tame international politics through institutions an! public participation is pure utopia #]olo, <GG>2 &a"thorn, 78882 Jhan!ler, 788:$. I !o not !isagree "ith attributing importance to force an! interest, but it is e.cessive not onl to consi!er

them as the sole force moving politics, but also as being immutable. Even from a Eealist perspective it "oul! be "rong to thin) that the interests of all actors involve! in international politics are oppose! to !emocratic manage% ment of the !ecision%ma)ing process. A more accurate picture is that of opposing interests in tension "ith each other.
Thus at the moment, there is on the one si!e the inWuence e.erte! over the !ecision%ma)ing process b a fe" centres of po"er #a fe" governments, militar groups, large enterprises$2 an! on the other si!e the !eman!s of "i!er interest groups to increase their role at the !ecision%ma)ing table. /hether peripheral states, global move% ments or national in!ustries, these latter groups are not necessaril pure at heart. The follo" an agen!a "hich is !e facto anti%hegemonic because their o"n interests happen to be oppose! to those of centrali-e! po"er. To support these interests is not

a matter of theor , but rather of political choice. Some Eealists , ho"ever, reAect not Aust the feasibilit of the cosmopolitan proAect but also its !esirabilit . These criti1ues are often confuse!2 !oubtless because a ris) is perceive! that the
cosmopolitan proAect coul!, in the frame of contemporar political realit , be use! in other !irections. It is certainl relevant that ]olo, in or!er to construct his criti1ue of cosmopolitan !emocrac , must continuousl force the position ta)en b his antagonists. In Josmopolis, he often critici-es the prospect of a global government, but none of the authors he cites ( Dobbio, Fal), &abermas, &el! ( ever argue! in its !efence #on the other han!, the inevitabilit of "orl! government is !iscusse! in /en!t, 788:$. These scholars limite! their support to an increase in the rule of

la" an! integration "ithin global politics2 the never argue! in favour of the global concentration of coercive po"er. Josmopol% itan !emocrac is not to be identiMed with the pro-ect o" a global go%ern&ent ( "hich is necessaril reliant upon the concentration of forces in one sole institution ( on the contrar , it is a proAect that invo)es voluntar an! revocable alliances bet"een governmental an! &eta4go%ern4 &ental institutions, where the a%ailabilit o" coerci%e power, in ultima ratio, is share! bet"een pla ers an! subAecte! to Auri!ical control. It "oul! be useful to carr out an e.periment to verif ho" often a EealistVs criti1ue of cosmopolitan !emocrac coul! also appl to state !emocrac . If the Eealist approach "ere to be applie! coherentl , !emocrac coul! not e.ist as a political s stem. ?espite all of its imperfections, !emocrac !oes e.ist, an! this has been ma!e possible !ue, in part, to the thin)ers an! movements ( all visionar T (
"ho have supporte! an! fought for its cause far before it coul! ever become possible.

A'G 1ealis&7ails and is 7alse

Cos&opolitanis& sol%es e%er i&pact because o" widespread cooperation Celd 1( #?avi!, Crofessor of Colitical Science at the Lon!on School of Economics an! Colitical Science, Februar 9th, Share the /orl!Vs Eesources, 4The Jhanging Face of Flobal Fovernance6, http://""".st"r.org/the%un%people%politics/the%changing%face%of%global%governance.html$ To!a , there is a ne"foun! recognition that global problems cannot be solve! b an one nation state acting alone, nor b states Aust fighting their corner in regional blocs. As !eman!s on the state have increase!, a "hole series of polic problems have arisen "hich cannot be a!e1uatel resolve! "ithout cooperation "ith other states an! non%state actors. There is a gro"ing recognition that in!ivi!ual states are no longer the onl appropriate political units for either resolving )e polic problems or managing a broa! range of public functions. The polic pac)ages that have largel set the global agen!a N in economics an! securit N have been !iscre!ite!. The /ashington Jonsensus an! /ashington securit !octrines have !ug their o"n graves. The most successful !eveloping countries in the "orl! are successful because the have not follo"e! the /ashington Jonsensus agen!a, an! the conflicts that have most successfull been !iffuse! are ones that have benefite! from concentrate! multilateral support an! a human securit agen!a. &ere are clear clues as to ho" to procee! in the future. /e nee! to follo" these clues an! learn from the mista)es of the past if !emocrac , social Austice an! a rene"e! multilateral or!er are to be a!vance!. Or, to sum up, realis& is dead, long li%e cos&opolitanis&. The future of organise! force in countries li)e our o"n is through regional an! international organisations. Jooperation bet"een states is still important, if not more so, but "hat has change! is the rationale, "hich is no" !eeper an! more comple.. The ol! threat "as the IotherV2 the ne" threat is share! problems an! collective threats.

A'G 2eed the stateH

Cos&opolitanisi& accepts the state as a certain le%el o" power and authorit B our state good argu&ents don8t appl Celd ' #?avi!, Crofessor of Colitical Science at the Lon!on School of Economics an! Colitical Science, http://""".ip".unisg.ch/org/ip"/"eb.nsf/S s/ebEessources/?J^?emocrac ^in^?eveloping^Jountries^T e.t^&el!/_FILE/&el!.p!f$ In this conception, the nation%state 4"ithers a"a .6 Dut this is not to suggest that states an! national !emocratic polities become re!un!ant. Eather, states "oul! no longer be regar!e! as the sole centers of legitimate po"er "ithin their bor!ers, as is alrea! the case in !iverse settings #see &el! et al. <GGG, 4Jonclusion6$. States nee! to be articulate! "ith an! relocate! "ithin an overarching cosmopolitan frame"or). /ithin this frame"or), the la"s an! rules of the nation%state "oul! become but one focus for legal !evelopment, political reflection, an! mobili-ation. 3n!er these con!itions, people "oul! in principle come to enAo multiple citi-enships(political membership, that is, in the !iverse political communities that significantl affect them. In a "orl! of overlapping communities of fate, in!ivi!uals "oul! be citi-ens of their imme!iate political communities an! of the "i!er regional an! global net"or)s that impact upon their lives. This overlapping cosmopolitan polit "oul! be one that in form an! substance reflects an! embraces the !iverse forms of po"er an! authorit that operate "ithin an! across bor!ers.

A2: 9eg Goo

Abandoning the notion o" so%ereignt in support o" international de&ocratic institutions sol%es the oppression and abuse caused b current hege&ons without the need "or war
Archibugi ( (Daniele Archibugi, Lon!on School of Economics an! Colitical Science, Lon!on, 3' an! Italian National Eesearch Jouncil, Ital
, 4Josmopolitan ?emocrac an! ItVs Jritics: A Eevie"6 p. 9;9%9;; SF$ To!a Vs "orl! is !ominate! b a hegemonic bloc "here a single state, the 3nite! States, is en!o"e! "ith e.traor!inar po"ers an! the man!ate to !efen! ver narro" economic interests #Jhan!ler, 788<2 Fo"er, 788<$. This hegemon goes so far as to resort to militar po"er in or!er to penetrate economic an! political activit . Jritics have !escribe! ho" man inter% national organi-ations ( such as the International 5onetar Fun!, the /orl! Tra!e Organi-ation an! NATO ( also serve

the purpose of maintaining an! preserving the interests of this ne" hegemonic bloc. Dasing observation on real%"orl! con!itions, these critics argue that a proAect that aims to empo"er global institutions to coor!inate an! monitor national policies lea!s !e facto to a !ecrease in the in!epen!ence of the various states an!, ultimatel , reinforces the i!eolog of the current hegemonic po"er. Authors such as ]olo, Fo"en an!
Jhan!ler have note! ho" those same ears that "itnesse! au!acious proAects for 3N reform an! the !emocrati-a% tion of global governance, also "itnesse! the signiXcant militar engage% ment of /estern states. In the lea! up to their use of force, these states emplo e! a rhetoric !angerousl resembling those !iscourses that long for a global or!er foun!e! on the values of la"fulness an! !emocrac . I have alrea! argued that

the a&ount o" power concentrated within the hands o" the /nited States is e+cessi%e, and that its do&estic de&ocrac is no guarantee "or the wise or law"ul application o" such power$ &o"ever, the )e is to Xn! a strateg that can effectivel oppose this hege&onic bloc$ Jontrar to ]olo, Fo"en, Jhan!ler et al., I
!ispute the abilit of the ol! sovereignt !ogma to provi!e a satisfactor alternative to 3S hegemon , or to an hegemon , for that matter. 3ntil this moment, the appeal to sovereignt has serve! the purpose of ai!ing governments in abusing their citi-ens, rather

than offering "ea)er states protection from the gree! of the strongest states . The strengthening of international institutions, especiall if inspire! b the values of !emocrac , "oul! most probabl pro!uce the !esire! effect of obliging the 3nite! States an! its allies to engage in a foreign polic much more in line "ith their o"n constitutions. Darrica!ing ourselves behin! the notion of sovereignt merel for the sa)e of counter% balancing AmericaVs hegemon ma cause us to forget the millions of people "ho are subAecte! ever !a to oppression from their o"n governments.
The recent conWict in Ira1 seems to reinforce this point. On the one han!, the lac) of international consensus an! legitimac !i! not constrain t"o !emocratic states, the 3SA an! the 3', from "aging "ar against international la". On the other han!, the international communit lac)e! non%coercive instruments to protest against the violation of human rights b the Ira1i government since it ha! the status of representing a IsovereignV state. The cosmopolitan perspective "oul!, on the contrar , have urge! the international communit to ta)e other actions, such as smart sanctions, to oppose an! ultimatel remove the Ira1i government.

A'G Ceg sol%es the i&pact

America3s hegemonic emocrac" is eci e l" anti*cosmo!olitan**b" asserting itself abo&e all others states it onl" gaurentees &iolence :ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the
niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *7<1

4osmopolitan 1merica has an elective affinity )ith 1mnesty &nternational Gthis is also clear from the te/t of the glo al#national sec'rity

1merican mega#po)er thro)s its )eight ehind the glo al reali3ation of h'man rights and democracy. Of co'rse, this 1merican cosmopolitanism is an a ridged form of cosmopolitanism. (y recognition of others it does not mean the recognition of their di""erence 't of their sameness! The a sol'tistic variant of 1merican 'niversalism 'ltimately oils do)n to the ass'mption that the only tr'e M'slim is an 1merican M'slim . 9f M'slim, 1fricans, 1ra s, 4hinese and )omen ehave in an
strategyJ;

'n#1merican, or even an anti#1merican, fashion, the concl'sion is that they lac. a'thori3ation, they are trapped in 0anti#1merican pre2'dices0, they are latent 0racists0, and are in any case held : prisoner y an 0o't#dated0 self#image. The same pattern of an a ridged

Ganti#Jcosmopolitanism is sho)n y the )ay the US government 0solves0 the pro lem of the overlapping and inter)oven sovereignties of the second modernity. 9t o'tlines and acts on an image of the )orld in )hich one nation possesses a s'per#sovereignty Gg'ess )hich oneJ, )hereas all other nations are granted only conditional sovereignty . The pro lem of the collapsing o'ndary et)een the national and the international is resolved in favo'r of an 01merican nationalism of the international0 . The anti#cosmopolitan moment resides in the fact that the US government sets itself above all orders in an a sol'tistic manner, )hile demanding that all other co'ntries and governments respect them, y force if necessary . ('t it there y endangers not only the legitimacy 't also the effectiveness of its interventions. 9or e/ample, eca'se the US1 categorically ref'ses to s' mit to the disarmament norms )hose glo al o servance it itself s'pports GmilitarilyJ, it destroys the contract'al architect're )hich is 'ltimately the only relia le g'arantor of the sec'rity of 1merican citi3ens . Moreover, the contradiction et)een committing oneself to the ca'se of glo al democracy, if necessary militarily, )hile paying scant regard to democratic cons'ltation and cooperation )ith its allies cannot e .ept off the domestic political agenda indefinitely. 9or this hegemonic 'nilateralism conflicts )ith 1merica0s selfimage as an anti#colonial nation.

A'G CegCauses war (short)

Ceg is &ore li#el to cause wars than pre%ent the&war is borderless and internaldisuasion and deterrence ha%e no e""ect

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *;71

C e) )ars0 G8aldor !$$@* Mi.in.ler +,,+J )ere and are eing cond'cted, adding ne) o'trages to the old, )hich have not for that reason ecome any less. -hereas )ars et)een states in the past ended )ith the victory of one side, )ars of the ne) type .no) no temporal or spatial o'ndaries. Here too the la) of refle/ive modernity holds G(ec., (onss and Ka' +,,!* (ec. and Ka' +,,MJ, according to )hich the apparently fi/ed anthropological d'alities # )ar and peace, civil society and military, friend and foe, military and police # are ecoming l'rred. This l'rring of distinctions means that 0postnational )ar0 G(ec. +,,, J has ecome 'npredicta le. -hereas the classical )ars of the first modernity rested on the state0s monopoly of the means of

violence, no) )ar has ecome o'ndless, first, eca'se of the demonopoli3ation and privati3ation of organi3ed violence G y terrorists and )arlordsJ and, second, eca'se of the glo ality of dangers and of sensitivity to iss'es of h'man rights, and hence eca'se states colla orate in preventing or stopping violations of h'man rights . -e are here faced )ith a grim variant of the sorcerer0s apprentice parado/; the means )hich are s'pposed to promote freedom 2'stify ne) forms of )ar.

A'G CegCauses war (<ong)

Cege&on encourages aggressi%e, pree&pti%e wars and &a#es the us into a global pauper onl the a"" sol%es authentic stabilit

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *;;1

This hegemonic role involves defending t)o principles )hich are highly controversial across the )orld; first, the principle of prevention o" potential rivals and, second, the principle of preventive war! 9f the only hope for the )orld in the long r'n is the Pa/ 1mericana, this implies that the US1 can never permit the emergence of a rival to its over)helming po)er. 1ccordingly, the 0Cational Sec'rity Strategy of the United States of 1merica0 states that the military po)er of the US1 m'st e so great that it inhi its potential rivals even from attempting to challenge it. 1t the same time, it is arg'ed, it is necessary to engage in preventive military interventions, given the diff'se character of the terrorist threat . Th's the ne) resol'teness of the US administration is demonstrated y the fact that it claims the right to violate the prohi ition on preventive )ars, a f'ndamental r'le devised y the international legal system to limit armed conflicts . &ts validity can e traced ac. to the Keag'e of Cations and the 8ellogg# (riand Pact*T it 'nderlies the 4harter of the United Cations, and has een repeatedly confirmed y the UC =eneral 1ssem ly. This prohi ition renders the po)er of 0preventive selfdefence0 claimed y the US1 illegal. S'ch a militari3ed definition of the glo al sit'ation also implies that the role of actors, that is, states and international organi3ations s'ch as C1TO and the 6'ropean Union, m'st e renegotiated and restr'ct'red . The territorial se>f'nderstanding of C1TO, the restriction of its operations to attac.s on 6'ropean states, m'st e s'spended in order to co'nter the gro)ing dangers res'lting from international anarchy, the chaos of collapsing states and the privati3ation of the means of violence. The C1TO states m'st e re#e5'ipped and made 0fit0 for the str'ggle against the glo al t'r 'lences f'elled y economic disparities et)een centre and periphery, Corth and So'th, and y the o't rea.s of violence and terrorism spar.ed y the confl'ence of poverty, religio's intolerance, racial hatred and anti#1mericanism, and y ethnic states and civil )ars.
1s noted, the alternative model of glo al order, global cosmopolis, rests on the contrasting principle of e5'ality of states and accordingly emphasi3es the importance of glo al GcivilJ la), e&en against the global hegemon. The glo al cosmopolis sho'ld e reali3ed step y step thro'gh a corresponding reform of international la) and international organi3ation, in partic'lar, the United Cations, in accordance )ith the principles of a cosmopolitan regime )hich rests on recognition of the difference of others, and in partic'lar on recognition of m'ltiple modernities. 1 glo al la) )o'ld have to e form'lated accordingly )hich envisages oth contract'ally reg'lated possi ilities for cons'ltation of continental alliances and their o ligation to act in concert. This )o'ld incl'de, for e/ample, something a.in to a veto#free UC )hich co'ld f'nction as a glo al parliament e5'ipped )ith a standing army for peace.eeping p'rposes and capa le of imposing disarmament )orld)ide. The conflicting principles of the vertical and the hori3ontal are in fact reflected in the

conflicts et)een Pa/ 1mericana and glo al cosmopolis; 1merican glo al 'nilateralism on the one side, m'ltilateralism on the other* dismantling vers's e/pansion of glo al la)* )ea.ening vers's strengthening of the United Cations, etc. The m't'al
recriminations are there y pre#programmed. Those )ho )ant a stronger UC #let 's call them 6'ropeans # fail to sho) the necessary resol'teness* they are not ready to face the remorseless facts of a )orld alanced on the edge of the a yss. &n the eyes of others, the hegemonic US1 is in danger of ecoming a 0)ar criminal0 )hich etrays its o)n val'es democracy and freedom # oth internally and e/ternally. #ar is Peace $%& -hat so complicates the relations et)een the t)o models of glo al order and ma.es them an ine/ha'sti le Gand alef'lJ so'rce of transnational mis'nderstandings is, in the first place, the )ea.nesses of oth models; 0civil society0 disappears in the Pa/ 1mericana, politics, y contrast, in glo al cosmopolis. The one side )ants to ma.e 0politics0 the 'nderlying principle of a ne) glo al order, the other the 0society of e5'als0. 6'rope as the advocate of glo al cosmopolitanism stands as the G'n)illing<J defender of a stat's 5'o that is scarcely )orth preserving. The US government, y contrast, ma.es 'nilateral distinctions et)een friend and foe and is 'nmas.ed as a Bglobal re&olutionar"B )ho promises and defends the glo ali3ation of democracy )ith military means. On the other hand, the 5'estion arises )hether the t)o models are in fact m't'ally e/cl'sive. That a r'thless eitherT or prevails et)een these visions of a ne) )orld order can s'rely e e/cl'ded. 1lso ho) far the conflicts e/tend and )here the commonalities egin certainly depends on ho) rigidly or pragmatically the positions are defended. 1s regards the sit'ation of &ran in s'mmer +,,O, for e/ample, 6'rope co'ld )in the United States over to 0a common, realistic &ran policy that even some mem ers of the ('sh regime co'ld actively s'pport, a policy that ta.es acco'nt of &ranian realities in order to change them0 GCavid 8ermaniJ. =enerally spea.ing, the commonalities of the t)o models of glo al order depend on ho) 0realistic0 the 6'ropeans and ho) 0idealistic0 the 1mericans are )illing to ecome. Moreover, conflicts are not a crime 't, on the contrary, necessary preconditions of a glo al li eralism and an open cosmopolitan society. This is all the more tr'e eca'se a ne) heterogeneo's 0glo al class0 GS.lair +,,!J Gcomposed of 6'ropean and non#6'ropean governments, the military and the US administration, and also of glo al C=O actors, transnational e/perts of international organi3ations, etc .J is 'sy ordering the selfdestr'ctive planet. &n everyday G)orld#Jpolitics different factions of the 0glo al class0 are competing over ho) to accomplish for glo al society )hat elites previo'sly accomplished for the nation, namely, creating a )ell#ordered society. The prospect of this ta.ing place )itho't alternatives and )itho't opposition )o'ld e a nightmare. + On postnational )ar The postnational forms of )ar of the second modernity do

not mean that classical )ar et)een states has een a olished. Rather, ne), additional postnational )ars are occ'rring alongside the 0old0 )ars et)een states. One cannot even precl'de that postnational )ars )ill c'lminate in national )ars, and hence even in ne) .inds of )orld )ars. 9or the p'rposes of historical classification, ho)ever, )e need to disting'ish clearly et)een old and ne) )ars, et)een )ars et)een states and postnational 0military interventions0 for h'manitarian p'rposes or as prevention against terrorist attac.s.

A'G Ceg44Cos&o sol%es better

A cos&opolitan use o" the threat o" war sol%es better than hege&on it is credible and does not pro&ote counterbalancing$

:ec2, 0; Professor for Sociolo!" at the

niversit" of (unich and &ritish Journal of Sociolo!" LSE )entennial Professor in the Department of Sociolo!" since *++,, founder of the research centre at the niversit" of (unich - lrich, #he )osmopolitan 6ision, p! *7,1

The )orld)ide conflict over )hat the glo al order follo)ing the &ra5 -ar sho'ld loo. li.e )ill have to reconcile t)o principles in a novel )ay. The idea of the national )ill have to e e/tended and reform'lated into that of cosmopolitan democracy. This is 'ltimately the only )ay to alleviate the dilemmas of illegal#legitimate )ars. The cosmopolitan glo al order too )ill not e a le to dispense )ith the means of violence. 9f cosmopolitan la) cannot e enforced, then there is no la). Of
co'rse, there is also no la) )here the 'se of post#sovereign force is 'nderta.en y nations alone )itho't regard to the e/pectations of legitimacy of a glo al p' lic. Here )e enco'nter the pro lem of s5'aring the circle of ho) to coordinate la), force and peace at a time of glo al dangers. The despot Saddam H'ssein, )ho led the UC )eapons inspectors y the nose for years, 'nder)ent a Pa'line

conversion be"ore the 1merican invasion and opened the doors previo'sly arred to the inspectors. -hy< The over)helming military po)er of the US1, legitimated y the fact that it represented glo al la), left Saddam H'ssein no alternative. Here an alternative to )ar or the stat's 5'o emerges )hich has not previo'sly een systematically tho'ght thro'gh, namely, a politics of military threats to ring a o't glo al change peacef'lly . This alternative resides in the dangero's distinction et)een )ar and the threat of )ar, and the no less daring dialectic involved in a refinement of the threat of )ar that e/cl'des the possi ility of oth toppling a despotic regime and avoiding )ar. One might consider this as a .ind of 0military enlightenment0; only the 'nconditional threat of a m'ltinational military force )itho't rival can render the act'al 'se of military force s'perfl'o's # this is the central parado/. 1nyone )ho )ants to ma.e the )orld a etter place and to avoid )ar m'st spea., and act on, a lang'age of violent glo al change that comes across as completely dishonest. The recipe is, on the one hand, to reserve the option of military press're and, on the other, to e/tend the scope of the UC agreement to cover serio's violations of h'man rights. Then it )o'ld no longer e 2'st a matter of )eapons inspections* 1mnesty &nternational )o'ld have
to e granted access to prisons in order to themati3e iss'es of legitimacy oth internally and e/ternally )hich are anathema to despotic regimes. &nternally s'ch regimes )o'ld e 'nmas.ed as despotic, and e/ternally the threat of military intervention )o'ld ac5'ire legitimacy in the eyes of a glo al p' lic. The contradictions of this 0militaristic enlightenment0 are manifest. 8ant0s rational idea of a 0peacef'l, tho'gh not yet friendly, thoro'ghgoing comm'nity of all peoples on earth )ho can enter into effective relations )ith one another0 is rendered s'spect y the revival of the medieval doctrine of 02'st )ar0. Only a rhetoric and a strategy of military force that does not let itself e deflected from the threat of coercion even y provisional s'ccesses can ring a o't peacef'l regime change. 1ny fle/i ility, any readiness to compromise, any hesitation prevents dictators from recogni3ing that they have no alternative. The more ine/ora le military po)er is, the more f'tile is any attempt y a dictator, tyrant or despot to resist disarmament y military means, and hence the more pro a le that disarmament )ill s'cceed )ith 2'st the threat of force, and th's y peacef'l means. To e s're, the so#called peacef'l means are synonymo's from the start )ith incessant preparations for )ar. &ndeed, their possi le 0peacef'lness0 rests on the credi ility of the threat of force. Only after)ards, )hen it is already too late, co'ld they prove to e 0peacef'l means0. Hence the parado/; the military con5'est of a co'ntry tyranni3ed y a despot can e prevented insofar as military con5'est is as certain to follo) as night follo)s day. The hope that the moment )ar egins is also the moment it ends can, of co'rse, prove to e a dangero's ill'sion. This highly 5'estiona le 0military h'manism0 pres'pposes not only a sol'tely

s'perior po)er, the a sol'te politics of threats, and the despot0s recognition of the 'tter f'tility of any resistance. 9t also re5'ires international cooperation, colla oration and the possi ility in principle of arriving at a contract'al legal agreement. -9t may also e tactically e/pedient to leave the principal evil#doers and their henchmen the escape hatch of e/ile or amnesty .J The s'ccess of this politics of threats depends, first, on the )ea.ness of the dictators against )hom it is directed . &t is not an option against Corth 8orea, for e/ample, )hich has atomic )eapons, or against 4hina . Second, its s'ccess depends cr'cially on the glo al political isolation of the despots in 5'estion. Hence a s.ilf'l accompanying diplomacy is re5'ired to avert any possi ility of the despotic regime forging defensive coalitions . Third, the th'm #scre) tactic of threatening military force is more
li.ely to s'cceed if the despotic regime is already rotten from )ithin, and hence finds itself in at least a potentially revol'tionary sit'ation. 9or )hen the po)er of a despotic regime is hanging y the thread of the despairing apathy of a s'ffering pop'lation, at the

decisive moment )eapons can easily change hands and sides. Th's the .=>. neigh o'ring states that are a le to infl'ence the despotic regime m'st e )on over to the politics of threats . &n this )ay, the internal elites may e em oldened to declare their opposition to the dictator at the decisive moment. 9t is a sol'tely clear that a 'ni lateral implementation of s'ch a policy of threats is condemned to fail're, if only for the reason that it sa otages itself y parading the internal do' ts and divisions of the -est efore a glo al p' lic, and there y loses its c'tting edge and efficacy in the eyes of the despots. Only a m'ltilateralism ased on the cooperative po)er of states and la), hence also on a cosmopolitan diplomacy, is capa le of intensifying and directing the press're, so that the chances of s'ccess o't)eigh the ris.s. 1lso the temporal dimension of politics, the gradation of

GfeignedJ impatience and GdiminishingJ patience, re5'ires caref'l consideration and coordination. The contrary position of mere pacifists G6'ropeansJ has t)o shortcomings; it protects the tyrants and torpedoes the peacef'l democrati3ation of the )orld thro'gh the politics of military threats. 6'ropean protectionism, )hich sanctifies the sovereignty of the nation#state, is morally and politically pro lematic. 9t )ashes its hands in p' lic in an almost o sessive )ay and st' ornly ignores the 'rden of g'ilt it inc'rs. The &ra5 -ar teaches 's t)o lessons. 9irst, )e are e/periencing the parado/es of a politics of military threats as a means of promoting

glo al peace* for it is ma.ing clear ho) diffic'lt it is to )in the peace after the )ar has een )on if the latter is randed )ith illegal GilJlegitimacy. Second, the division of la o'r in glo al politics, according to )hich the 1mericans play the free# shooting sheriff in the po.er game of )ar )hile the 6'ropeans play the peace#loving 2'dge, does not )or.. 9f, y contrast, )arli.e 1merica )ere to reali3e that even the most over)helming military po)er is f'tile )hen it opposes glo al la), and, conversely, peace#loving 6'rope )ere also to ecome a military po)er, then the 1tlantic alliance co'ld e revived.

A'G Weaponisation Ine%itable

Weaponisation isn8t ine%itablethe cold war pro%escapabilities e+isted to &ilitarize space, but both sides re"rained ;oltz, (= >+ames Jla ,Associate Crofessor an! Aca!emic Associate for Securit Stu!ies, , Colitics of Space Securit K If /ashington an! 5osco" ha! maintaine! this !irection of unilateral interests an! technologicall !riven militar competition in space, nuclear tests in orbit "oul! li)el have continue! through at least the mi!%<GLos, "hile other t pes of space "eapons%inclu!ing a variet of ASAT an! AD5 s stems using nuclear an! conventional "arhea!s% "oul! have entere! full%scale !eplo ment to counter the proliferation of each si!e@s missile capabilities an! those of other emerging po"ers #such as Jhina$. In all li)elihoo!, some of these space "eapons "oul! have been space base!,
re1uiring !o-ens if not hun!re!s of "eapons in orbit to have enough on station at `ll<O one time above each a!versar @s territor . 5anne! space bombers "oul! have helpe! to !iversif reliance on groun!%, sea%, an! air%base! nuclear !eliver s stems "hile also serving as platforms to attac) hostile space assets. Such

technologies "oul! have been e.pensive an! might have been seen as re!un!ant b some, but the coul! have been .Austifie! #an! in!ee! "ere at the time in Air Force circles$ as 0necessar 0 to national !efense, given the Jol! /ar an! the obvious threats to national securit pose! b long%range missiles an! ASAT interceptors. &o"ever, such a militaril an! technologicall !riven process%!en ing environmental concerns%"oul! have involve! important tra!e%offs. /ith continue! nuclear testing in space in the <GL8;, the U.S. Femini an! Apollo manne! programs an! the
Eussian Mosto), Mos)ho!, an! So u- missions%regar!less of cost%"oul! have been too !angerous to un!erta)e. Ea!iation stuc) in the Man Allen belts from "eapons tests "oul! have also ma!e stea! !evelopment an! reliable access to commercial an! militar reconnaissance satellites impossible. The !estruction of an spacecraft, "hether in a test program or through offensive action, "oul! have release! thousan!s of metal fragments. D the late <GL8s, at

least the lo"er reaches of space "oul! have been cluttere! "ith an enormous amount of orbital !ebris, ma)ing an activit ha-ar!ous an! e.tremel costl . As technologies a!vance! in the late <G>8s in the absence of treaties #or norms$
limiting "eapons, ne" t pes of ballistic missile !efenses%orbital magnetic rail guns, lasers, an! a!vance! )inetic%)ill "eapons%an! even space base!, multiple%"arhea! nuclear "eapons might also have been !eplo e!. Thus, by the mi!%to late <G=8;, space coul! have been full "eaponi-e! an! treate!

/ar might or might not have ta)en place in space, given con!itions of militar !eterrence, but space "oul! essentiall have been ruine! for a number of other pro!uctive uses. 3n!er this scenario, there "oul! have been no prospects for manne! spacecraft able to run the gauntlet of !ebris an! automate! space "eapons to e.plore the 5oon or un!erta)e -ero%gravit research .
simpl as part of the overall 3.S.%Soviet offensive an! !efensive anTIS race. .5ilitar space reconnaissance "oul! also have become e.tremel !ifficult an! costl , e.cept for ver short missions an! at much higher altitu!es than "as nee!e! for useful photographic !etail. In

this environment, accurate intelligence about the respective nuclear arsenals of the t"o superpo"ers "oul! have been scarce, thus increasing uncertaint , miscalculation, an! the chances of nuclear "ar. Finall , commercial space services !eveloping for the "orl! econom %from near%Earth remote sensing for agriculture, urban planning, an! "eather forecasting to geostationar communications satellites%"oul! ha" been either eliminate! or put at severe ris) of attac) or !amage, thus raising costs. Overall, this highl @plausible$ "eapons%!riven scenario "oul! have groun!e! human scientific an! commercial aspirations permanentl on the Earth, ren!ering late
t"entieth%centur economic globali-ation onl a !ream. For these reasons, it is fortunate that J.S. an! Soviet lea!ers too) a !ifferent route. Instea!, the seeme! to *o3mP, the a!vice of 3.S. Secretar of ?efense Neil &. 5cElro , "ho argue! for putting the arm @s nuclear%tippe! Ni)e ]eus AD0@l interceptor on hol! in <G;=: 0/e shoul! not spen! hun!re!s of millions ... pen!ing general confirmator in!ications that "e )no" "hat "e are !oing. Eeturning to

"e see that none of these technologicall feasible s stems became part of the !eplo e! space assets of either countr . Although competition remaine! the !riving force in space activit an! militar research programs continue!, the t"o si!es limite! #through e.plicit treaties an! implicit strategic norms of self%restraint$ technologies that "oul! have threatene! their use of space for other purposes : civilian
the actual historical recor!, notabl , manne! missions, commercial satellites, an! passive militar technologies. Although the t"o si!es !evelope! small ASAT programs, these investments

?espite the potential militar ris)s of such a strateg , this rationale prove! soun! throughout the Jol! /ar. No inci!ents of enem !estruction of an satellites too) place, even though 5osco" #an! later, /ashington$ ha! the capabilit to !o so. Instea!, the t"o si!es !eci!e! to enAo the benefits of mutual restraint. As historian +ohn Le"is Fa!!is observes about tren!s set even at the height of the civilian space race, 0The
can be !escribe! as militar 0he!ging0 strategies more than full%scale "eapons efforts. pattern of the earl "as one ... of refraining from !eveloping the full%scale anti%satellite s stems that coul! have been put in place b that time.0+L

;oltz, (= >+ames Jla

,Associate Crofessor an! Aca!emic Associate for Securit Stu!ies,

, Colitics of Space Securit K

As "e loo) bac) on the no" fift ears of space histor , the notion of inevitabilit is har! to sustain in an particular !irection%either cooperative or competitive. A closer anal sis of )e !ecision points in the histor of 3.S.%Soviet space activit sho"s that much of "hat seeme! pre!etermine! coul! have SC %, either "a ha! !ecision ma)ers faile! to receive )e information from the other si!e or ha! voices calling for renunciation or e.pansion of space competition been hee!e!. Supporters of the vie" that space might someho" be innatel operative "ere !isappointe!, an! those "ho pre!icte! e.tensive "eaponi-ation an! eventual "arfare "ere also proven "rong. @/hat actuall occurre! is much more comple. an! ha! to !o "ith perio!ic competitive thrusts ami! cooperative regrouping, as ne" space activities reveale! une.pecte! !angers an! as 3.S. an! Soviet lea!ers sought to minimi-e

The causal chain of this environmental securit approach applie! to the first fift ears of space histor can be outline! as follo"s: #<< follo"ing militar tests an! other e.periments, scientists an! officials observe! the negative securit implications that coul! result from the !eplo ment of certain technologies into this ne" environment2 #7 ) national leaders graduall recognized that conditions o" &utual interdependence e+isted in their con!uct of certain harmful space activities2 an! #:$ these ne" technical an! political un!erstan!ings promote! cooperative restraint in narro"ing the scope of space competition in or!er to protect the use of space as a collective goo!. *he net result was not the eli&ination o" co&petition in space but its redirection into sa"er areas , such as manne! flight an!, increasingl , commercial applications an! militar support s stems . These changes "ere turne! into active policies through a process of interstate bargaining, tacit an! formal agreements, an! learning2 for the most part, these space policies are intact to!a . As Fol!stein an! 'eohane note, 0/hen institutions intervene, the impact of i!eas ma be prolonge! for !eca!es or even generations. Occasionall , ho"ever, 0unlearning0 too) place, sho"ing the contingent nature of such un!erstan!ings as governments change. The 7888 election victor of Te.as Fovernor Feorge /.
ris)s b establishing norms of unacceptable space behavior. Dush, for e.ample, thre" the Jol! /ar space frame"or) into !isarra , allo"ing a non%status 1uo minorit in 3.S. !omestic polic ma)ing to mount a serious challenge to strategic space restraint, "hich the no longer sa" as protecting 3.S. national interests. To the !isma of man of these a!vocates, ho"ever, the Dush a!ministration faile! to accomplish its goal of establishing 3.S. space%base! !efenses, largel because of the restraining role of Jongress. Its use of a sea%base! missile !efense interceptor to !estro a non%operational 3.S. reconnaissance satellite near the en! of its !eca ing orbit in Februar 788= represente! the high%@"ater mar) of this effort to challenge the norms of space securit . Jhina@s ne" militar space activities have raise! an incipient challenge to 3.S. post%Jol! /ar space supremac . Dut DeiAing has not et repeate! its one !estructive, high%altitu!e ASAT test. Cerhaps

That might be learne! from the perio! from <G;> to the present that "oul! help us both un!erstan! past successes an! !evelop ne" mechanisms for managing the ne.t fift ears of space securit , !espite the presence of a greater comple.it of actorsB These are the main challenges a!!resse! in the rest of this boo).
remar)abl , the first fift

ears of space securit close! "ithout space "ar or !eplo e!, space%base! "eapons .

A'G Weaponisation good

.nl &ultilateralis& wor#s in spaceunilateral action doesn8t ta#e into account shared proble&s ;oltz, (= >+ames Jla ,Associate Crofessor an! Aca!emic Associate for Securit Stu!ies, , Colitics of Space Securit K The fourth school argues that the fun!amentall transbor!er nature of space activit re1uires international responses an! the formation of more po"erful institutions an! treaties. D an! large, states continue to be the main actors, although the emergence of important commercial pla ers, intergovernmental consortia, an! other nongol@ernmental entities #such as
universities$ pla s a larger role here than in the space nationalism school In!ee!, this neoliberal institutionalist mo!el !oes not reAect the notion that current American global int<uence coul! not be use! to create a nePP legal an! moral or!er in space, rather than a militar %!ominate! realm, One of the more influential a!vocates of this perspective has been Druce ?eDlois. In e.amining the histor of militar space activit from his perspective as a

?eDlois spelle! out an argument tor continuing positive 3.S. lea!ership in space, sa ing, 0Fort ears of col! "ar histor sho" a successful pattern of es polio@ aime! at supporting space as a sanctuar . The reason is that "e have more to lose if space is "eaponi-e!.00@ The vision that ?eDlois outline! in his stu! portra s space more as a resource to be presente! for use b all rather than as a territor to be sei-e! an! protecte!. Not surprisingl , this approach reAects the notion of unilateralism in space an! the concepts of space !ominance or control as even potentiall successful strategies. The 3niversit of
militar intelligence officer in the late <GG8;, then%Air Force Lieutenant Jolonel 5ar lan!@s Nanc Fallagher notes the nee! to maintain the Outer Space Treat an! reach 0one or more supplemental accor!s.0 She suggests starting "ith bans on !estruction of peaceful space assets or interference "ith those con!ucting 0legitimate0 activities. She "oul! follo" "ith an agreement prohibiting space%base! anti%ballistic missile !efenses because of their possible utilit for threatening satellites in geostationar orbits.9G Theresa &itchens calls for a prohibition on space testing of !ebris%causing "eapons to stem the harmful effects on other space activit an! their ten!enc to lea! to an arms race.c@ Jritics "oul! argue that such agreements coul! un!ul restrict 3.S. free!om of action. Fallagher counters, 0Space polic is but one of man securit problems that illustrate the fallacies of assuming that the ascen!ance of the unite! States as the sole information%age superpo"er offers perpetual militar !ominance ... regar!less of other countries@ interests or concerns.02K5ost European space securit anal sts share this perspective.27 So European 3nion countr to!a is activel consi!ering space "eapons, an! statements b European government lea!ers routinel emphasi-e the importance of international cooperation. NATO countries in Europe have been unanimous in reAecting 3.S. opposition to the earl 3.N. resolutions on the Crevention of an Arms Eace in Outer Space. As former French an! EN. space official Ferar! Drachet observes, 0/e nee! to collectivel re&ect on possible measures to improve the safet of space operations, measures that "e can all agree to an! "oul! not a! ersel affect the economics of space in space negotiations an! international space management. A )e !ifference bet"een the space nationalist an! global institutionalist space polic schools can be seen in most vivi! relief in the !istinction bet"een ?olman@s notion of 3.S. moral superiority an! ?eDlois@s of American moral leaders!ip in space. In the case of the global institutionalists, the 3nite! States is best serve! b using the attractiveness of its i!eas to buil! $oluntary support for its positions an! associate! consensual institutions. As ?eDlois argues, 0The i!ea of putting "eapons in space to !ominate the globe is simpl not compatible "ith "ho "e are an! "hat "e represent as Americans.0:S operations. These are the priorities that Europe hopes to bring into pla