The Explanation of Amour-Propre: Niko Kolodny

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The Explanation of Amour-Propre

Niko Kolodny
University of California, Berkeley

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Rousseaus thought is marke !y an optimism an a pessimism that ea"h evoke, at least in the right moo , a feeling of re"ognition iffi"ult to sup press# $e have an innate "apa"ity for virtue, an %ith it free om an happiness# &et our present so"ial "on itions instill in us a restless "raving for superiority, %hi"h lea s to vi"e, an %ith it !on age an misery# As Rousseau famously en"apsulates the i ea' (man is naturally goo an ### it is from these institutions alone that men !e"ome %i"ke ) *+, -.-/0C 1# 11234#1 5o%ever this i"tum is un erstoo , it entails at least %hat %e might "all the (thesis of possi!le goo ness)' that %hile human psy"hology is su"h that men !e"ome %i"ke un er the "on itions in %hi"h %e no% fin them, nevertheless men %oul !e, or have !een, goo un er other "on itions# The efense of the thesis fa"es an o!vious pro!lem# Almost all that %e kno% of human nature is as it is expresse un er "on itions relevantly similar to those that "urrently prevail# 6o %hat evi en"e o %e have that it %oul express itself ifferently un er ifferent "on itions7 Rousseaus ans%er is to "onstru"t hypotheti"al histories of the spe"ies, in the se"on Discourse , an of the in ivi ual, in Emile # These histories aim to es"ri!e a possi!le psy"hology su"h that *i4 if men ha it, it %oul explain %hy, in "on itions like those that "urrently prevail, men are !a an *ii4 %oul imply that men, un er other "on itions, %oul !e goo , an *iii4 it "an

8 am very grateful to 9:eroni;ue ,uno<-=ar :e, >re ?euhouser, =avi 0%ens, an an anonymous rea er for the PhilosophicalReview for "omments# 1# $orks of Rousseau that are fre;uently "ite have !een i entifie !y a!!reviations that are liste at the en of the arti"le#
PhilosophicalReview , 9ol# 11@, ?o# A, AB1B

= 08 1B#1A1-/BB21C1BC-ABB@-B23 AB1B !y Cornell University

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plausi!ly !e sai , on the !asis of %hatever o!servation an introspe"tion is availa!le to us, to !e the psy"hology that %e a"tually have# Even setting asi e the matter of plausi!ility, it is surprisingly iffi "ult, or at least surprisingly "ompli"ate , to arti"ulate even a possible psy"hology that %oul explain %hy men are !a in the %ays that Rousseau says they are, %hile allo%ing that they might ever !e goo in the %ays that he says they "an !e# 6pell out prin"iples that %oul permit men to !e goo , an it !e"omes a mystery %hy men shoul ever have !e"ome !a # 6pell out prin"iples that explain %hy men are !a , an it seems impossi!le that they "oul ever !e other%ise# 8nterpretations of Rousseau, even several to %hi"h 8 am eeply in e!te , have not fully engage , 8 think, %ith the "ompli"ations#A This is %hat 8 try to o here# To that en , 8 attempt a positive re"onstru"tion# 8 formulate psy"hologi"al prin"iples that %oul explain %hy, in "on itions like those that Rousseau fin s men in, they are !a in the %ay he o!servesE that %oul imply that men, un er other "on itions, %oul !e goo in the %ay he imaginesE an that 8 !elieve are at least "onsistent %ith %hat Rousseau other%ise says on the su!Fe"t# $hether these prin"iples "an !e sai to !e Rousseaus in any further sense is har er to say# To !e sure, he never expli"itly arti"ulate them# An %hatever positive textual support "an !e foun for them no ou!t re;uires emphasi<ing some parts of his is"ussion to the negle"t of others an taking in one %ay expressions that might reasona!ly !e taken in another# But this may not matter for my main aim, %hi"h is simply to !ring out the ne"essary iffi"ulty an "omplexity of any efense of Rousseaus thesis of possi!le goo ness# 8 suspe"t that this is %here mu"h of the interest of his %ork lies in any event' in the epth of the tension !et%een his optimism an his pessimism that is reveale !y his struggles to re"on"ile them# 8n se"tion 1, 8 interpret the thesis of possi!le goo ness as the "laim that, un er present "on itions, amour-propreGa "on"ern for ho% one "ompares to othersG!e"omes (inflame )Gvery roughly, !e"omes a "on"ern for superiority over othersG%hereas in other "on itions, amourpropre %oul !e (healthy)G%oul !e a "on"ern for equality %ith others# 8n se"tion A, 8 suggest that Rousseaus proFe"t is to es"ri!e "ertain !asi" esires *although the %or H esire may "onnote something overly narro%, as %e %ill see4 su"h that in "om!ination %ith "ertain !eliefs, lia!le to arise un er present "on itions, inflame amour-propre results as a kin
A# 8 have in min foremost the %ork of ?i"holas =ent, Ioshua Cohen, Iohn Ra%ls, an >re eri"k ?euhouser "ite in the referen"es !elo%#

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of erive esire, %hereas in "om!ination %ith other !eliefs, %hi"h %oul arise un er other "on itions, healthy amour-propre %oul result# To a first approximation, the !asi" esires are Preservative $mour de &oiGa "on"ern for ones %ell-!eingGan the Con"ern for EvaluationGa "on"ern, %hi"h %e must further spe"ify, that others evaluate one in a parti"ular %ay# The ;uestion is then %hat !eliefs "om!ine %ith these esires to pro u"e inflame , or alternately healthy, amour-propre# 8n se"tion 2, 8 explain %hy some ans%ers from the existing literature seem ina e;uate# 8n se" tion J, 8 suggest that, for Rousseau, the sour"e of the trou!le seems to !e =epen en"e on 0pinionGa ten en"y to look to others evaluations for the sour"e of ones valueGan , spe"ifi"ally, 6o"ial 6elf-EvaluationGthe !elief that the sour"e of ones value is 6o"ial A vantageGsuperiority in goo s, su"h as %ealth an politi"al po%er, that epen on "onvention an "onsent# The ;uestion is then ho% 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation lea s to inflame amour-propre# 8n se"tion -, 8 examine a suggestion, ra%n from the liter ature, that inflame amour-propre arises from the "om!ination of 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation %ith the Con"ern for A""urate EvaluationGin pra"ti"e, a esire that others value one at the rate one values oneself# Although this provi es an explanation of "ertain phenomena asso"iate %ith inflame amour-propre, it oes not explain its "entral "hara"teristi"s# 6urprisingly, the resulting psy"hology ten s to in ivi ual "ontentment an so"ial "on"or # 8n se"tion 3, 8 offer t%o "ompati!le, !ut singly suffi"ient, alterna tive explanations of ho% inflame amour-propre might arise from 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation# The first repla"es Preservative $mour de &oi %ith Progressive $mour de &oiGa "on"ern to evelop, to a"tuali<e %hat gives one value# The se"on supplements the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation %ith the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate EvaluationGa esire that one %ill !e evaluate more highly an that this evaluation %ill !e a""urate# 8n se"tion ., 8 explain ho% these esires lea to healthy amour-propre %hen 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation is repla"e !y Evaluative Dno%le geGkno%le ge that ones true value is ones natural value, measure !y ones humanity an natural virtues# 1. Amour-Propre Commentators generally agree that men !e"ome %i"ke prin"ipally through some relation !et%een present "on itions an amour-propre' a spe"ial kin of self-"on"ern, spe"ifi"ally, for ho% one "ompares to others# 0n a "ommon rea ing, present "on itions pro u"e amour-propre,

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an amour-propre itself makes men %i"ke # ,en %oul !e goo , there fore, onlyun er "on itions that i not pro u"e amour-propre at all# 2 But this seems untena!le# >or one thing, Rousseau suggests that so"iety makes amour-propre inevita!le# 6o if amour-propre itself makes men %i"ke , then it %oul seem that men "oul !e goo only !y %ith ra%ing from, or never having entere , so"iety# But Rousseau enies that %ith ra%al from so"iety is possi!le or esira!le *A= 1-BK-1, AB2KJE 6C -2/0C 2#1-AK-2, AB.KC, 23J4 # Thus, this rea ing threatens to eprive the thesis of possi!le goo ness of any pra"ti"al interest# At most, the thesis %oul exonerate our nature *!y sho%ing that it is not responsi!le for our %i"ke ness4 %hile leaving us no prospe"t of reform# J ,oreover, Rousseau seems to say pre"isely that man can !e goo in so"iety *E A--/0C J#--BK-14 an , a""or ingly, that amour-propre "an take a goo , as %ell as a !a , form *E A2-, AJ2/ 0C J#-A2KAJ4# 6ome suggest that Rousseau hol s that this goo form "an !e real i<e only !y someho% i entifying ones in ivi ual (self) %ith a "olle"tive (self,) so that ones amour-propre is transforme into a "on"ern for ho% the "olle"tive "ompares %ith its rivals# - But mu"h of the %ork on Rousseau of the last fe% e"a esGle !y ?i"holas =ents lan mark 1@C@ stu y an ela!orate in ifferent %ays !y Iohn Ra%ls, Ioshua Cohen, an >re er i"k ?euhouserGsuggests a ifferent vie%, %hi"h seems to me !oth more faithful to the texts an more interesting in its o%n right# 3 0n this vie%, amourpropre, un erstoo ex"lusively as a kin of individual , rather than "olle"tive, self-"on"ern, "an take not only a !a , or %hat =ent "alls an (ex"essive) or (inflame ,) form !ut also a goo , or (natural) or (healthy,) form# 6o un erstoo , the thesis of possi!le goo ness is that human psy"hology is su"h that un er present "on itions, amour-propre !e"omes
6ee, for example, Allan Blooms intro u"tion to his translation of Emile , E 1B# 5o%ever, Iu ith 6hklar, (en and )iti*ens *+on on' Cam!ri ge University Press, 1@3@4 rea s Rousseau as having su"h limite am!itions#

2# J#

-# 6ee Rogers =# ,asters, !he PoliticalPhilosophy o#Rousseau *Prin"eton, ?I' Prin"eton University Press, 1@3C4, JAE 6hklar, (en and )iti*ens , 1@E an =avi Lauthier, !he &entiment o#E"istence *?e%&ork' Cam!ri ge University Press, ABB34, "hap# 2#

3# ?i"holas =ent, Rousseau+ $n,ntroductionto-is Psycholo.ical/ &ocial/ and Political !he ory *?e%&ork' Bla"k%ell, 1@C@4E =ent, $RousseauDictionary *Cam!ri ge' Bla"k%ell, 1@@A4E =ent, Rousseau *+on on' Routle ge, ABB-4E Iohn Ra%ls, 0ectures on the -istory o# Political Philosophy , e # 6amuel >reeman *Cam!ri ge, ,A' 5arvar University Press, ABB.4E Ioshua Cohen, (The ?atural Loo ness of 5umanity,) in Reclaimin. the -istory o#Ethics+ Essays #or 1ohn Rawls , e # An re%s Reath, Bar!ara 5erman, an Christine Dorsgaar *Cam!ri ge' Cam!ri ge University Press, 1@@.4, 1BAK2@E an >re eri"k ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy o# &el#%0ove+ Evil/ Rationality/ and the Drive #or Reco.nition *0xfor ' 0xfor University Press, ABBC4#

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inflame , %hereas un er other possi!le so"ial "on itions, amour-propre %oul !e healthy# Leneri"ally, as 8 have sai , amour-propre is a "on"ern for ho% one "ompares to others# Perhaps all forms of self-"on"ern, su"h as "on"ern for ones health, are esires that ones a"tual "on ition "ompare %ell %ith "ertain possible "on itions, %hi"h someone, oneself or another, might enFoy# But amour-propre is a ("omparative) esire, %hereas the esire for health is (a!solute,) in the stri"ter sense that it is a esire that ones a"tual "on i tion "ompare %ell %ith the actual "on itions of others # 8n "ommentary, amour-propre is often es"ri!e , more spe"ifi "ally, as a esire to !e evaluated by others as having a "ertain value in comparison with others#. 6ometimes Rousseau oes es"ri!e it this %ay# But, at other times, he es"ri!es amour-propre only as a esire to have a "ertain value in "omparison %ith others, rather than a esire to !e evaluated in a "ertain %ay in "omparison %ith others *E A2-, AJ2, A@3E RII 1.-/0C J#-A2KAJ, -2JK2-, 3BCE 0C 1#CC34 # 0f "ourse, it is possi!le that these es"riptions are ellipti"alE Rousseau Fust omits the (in the eyes of others) that he inten s to follo% (to have value relative to others#) But it is also possi!le that, !y Hamourpropre, Rousseau means both forms of "on"ern for ho% one "ompares to others' "on"ern for others appraisals of ones value relative to others an "on"ern for ones value relative to others *regar less of their appraisals of it4#C 8 %ill %ork %ith this se"on un erstan ing of amour-propre'
4eneric amour%propre ' A esire to have, an to !e evaluate !y others as having,

a "ertain value in "omparison %ith others#

There is at least a metho ologi"al reason for this# 8f %e "an explain the the sis of possi!le goo ness on the se"on un erstan ing, then %e %ill have also explaine the thesis of possi!le goo ness on the former one# The "onverse, !y "ontrast, is not o!viously true# =espite other ifferen"es, =ent an those %ho follo% his lea *myself among them4 agree that, %hatever else may !e true of inflame amour-propre, it entails a "on"ern to "ompare as morally superior to others, %hereas, %hatever else may !e true of healthy amour-propre, it is incompatible %ith a "on"ern to "ompare as morally superior to others an

.# 6ee, in parti"ular, ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy, "hap# 1, an (Rousseau on the Relation !et%een Reason an 6elf-+ove * $mour propre 4,) ,nternationales 1ahrbuch des Deutschen,dealismus 1 *ABB24'AA1K2@# C# +auren"e =# Cooper, Rousseau/ Nature/ and the Problem o# the 4ood 0i#e *University Park' Penn 6tate University Press, 1@@@4, 12.K-B, also ;uestions %hether amour-propre is al%ays a esire for evaluation#

1 5

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instea entails a "on"ern to "ompare as a moral equal to others# @ By ( moral e;uality/superiority,) 8 mean (e;uality/superiority of basic worth or standin. ) or (e;ual/superior entitlement to respect #) 8t may help to think of it in this %ay' ,ost mo ern theories of morality "laim that there is a kin of %orth or "laim to respe"t that all human, or rational, or sentient !eings possess e;ually an un"on itionally, %hether or not some merit more isapproval for their vi"es, more !lame for their mis ee s, or less esteem for their traits or a"hievements that have no ire"t "onne"tion to morality, su"h as their !eauty, skill, or intelligen"e# >or our purposes, (!asi" %orth or stan ing) an (entitlement to respe"t) is this !ut viewed in abstraction from the "laims of e;uality, un"on itionality, an in epen en"e from varia!le attri!utes of these kin s# 8f one has trou!le effe"ting this a!stra"tion, it may help to think of ho% things are vie%e !y theories of natural slavery, or "aste systems, %here slaves or out"astes, in virtue of varia!le attri!utes, are a""or e less, or no, !asi" stan ing or respe"t# 6o, on our un erstan ing, %e have'
-ealthy amour%propre '

A esire to have, an to !e evaluate !y all others as having, a "ertain value in "omparison %ith all others, in"lu ing at least moral equality E

an '
,n#lamed amour%propre '

A esire to have, an to !e evaluate !y all others as having, a "ertain value in "omparison %ith all others, in"lu ing at least ever greater moral superiority #
@# ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , "hap# A, argues, an 8 agree, that healthy amourpropre is "ompati!le %ith, an even entails, a esire for other kin s of superiority# 6ee se"# . !elo%# Even so, 8 may !e taking some risk of rea ing Dantian assumptions !a"k into Rousseau# $hat seems "lear is that Rousseau hol s that reason an free om are istin" tive of humanity *A= 1J1/0C 2#1J1KJAE 6C -2/0C 2#23J4, that human !eings are natu rally e;ual along some important imension *ho%ever naturally une;ual they may !e in other respe"ts4 *E J1/0C J#A-14, that natural e;uality shoul play a "entral role in our moral responses to one another *E AAAKA2/0C J#-BJK-4, an that amour-propre involves a esire for respe"t, %hatever other kin s of evaluation it "raves# A= 133/0C 2#1.B# 5o% ever, it is "onsistent %ith these fixe points that, for example, the morally relevant natural e;uality might !e e;uality not of reason an free om *as 8 "laim in se"# .#14 !ut of nee , that this might !e a !asis not for respe"t !ut instea for "ompassion, an that the !asis for respe"t might instea !e une;ual natural virtue# 8t may also !e that many of the evils of inflame amour-propre "oul !e avoi e %ithout any positive re"ognition of e;uality# ,u"h improvement %oul "ome simply from refo"using human striving on the evelop ment of natural virtues, as se"# . in i"ates# 8 am in e!te to =avi 0%ens for pressing me on these points#

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6everal features are %orthy of note# >irst, amour-propre, in !oth of these forms at least, is .eneral ' the esire is to !e e;ual or superior to all others an to !e evaluate as su"h !y all others# 6e"on , un er "urrent "on itions, inflame amour-propre is pervasive # 8n parti"ular, it oesnt simply affli"t the high!orn or the ri"h# 1B Thir , inflame amour-propre "annot !e satisfie # 0ne reason for this is that others, %hether their amour-propre is healthy or inflame , %ill not !e "ontent to evaluate one, or to allo% one to !e evaluate !y others, as superior to themselves *E A12K1JE RII 112/ 0C J#J@2, 0C 1#CB34# 5o%ever, the tenor of Rousseaus is"ussion seems to suggest that inflame amour-propre is, moreover, a esire for ever .reater superiority# Being simply somewhat !etter than others %ill s"ar"ely satisfy it# 8nflame amour-propre instills in us an aversion for (everything that !y !eing something prevents us from !eing everything) *RII 11A/0C 1#CB34 # 6o un erstoo , inflame amour-propre is not only unsatis6able in pra"ti"e !ut also insatiable in prin"iple# 11 >ourth, inflame amour-propre expresses itself in )ompetition #or &ocial$dvanta.e ' unremitting, <ero-sum "ompetition for .reatersocial value than others, %here so"ial value is measure !y social .oods # 6o"ial goo s exist only !y ("onvention) an ("onsent)' only !e"ause of the attitu es of others# 6o"ial goo s in"lu e property, politi"al po%er *po%er to get others to o ones !i ing4, so"ial "lass, fame, an so on# 6ome *!ut perhaps not all4 of these goo s, su"h as so"ial "lass, are (positional,) in the sense that their value is etermine !y their ranking relative to alternatives# 1A $ith respe"t to these goo s, there simply is no istin"tion !et%een so"ial value an so"ial a vantage# >ifth, inflame amour-propre is at least asso"iate %ith *although it may not "onsist in4 a disposition to vices o# pride Gpetulan"e, imperious rageGan vices o# shame Go!se;uiousness, servility# These are !est

1B# 6ee, for example, Rousseaus es"ription of (the Citi<en,) the Uriah 5eep of mo est rank an means, %ho ("ourts the great%hom he hates, an the ri"h %hom he espises#) A= 1C./0C 2#1@A# 6ee also =ent, Rousseau+ $n ,ntroduction , 3BE an =ent, Rousseau , --# 11# This may seem to !e "ontra i"te on the very next page !y the example of the elu e (fools "onsume !y amour-propre) %ho (sin"e they think themselves se"urely in first pla"e, they are al%ays very "ontent %ith their lot#) RII 112/0C 1#CB.# 8n the "ontext, ho%ever, ("ontent%ith theirlot) seems to mean (notFealous of others#) The a!sen"e ofFeal ousyis "ompati!le %ith the insatia!ility of amour-propre# 0ne "an esire ever greater supe riority over others, %hile not preferring the "on ition of any other to ones o%n, !e"ause one !elieves that every su"h "on ition is inferior#
1A# The notion of a (positional goo ) "omes from >re 5irs"h, &ocial 0imits to 4rowth *+on on' Routle ge an Degan Paul, 1@.34#

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un erstoo as istortions of the healthy ten en"y to o!Fe"t, or to stan up for oneself, %hen one has not !een evaluate as a moral e;ual# The vi"es of pri e "onsist in !elieving oneself superior an o!Fe"ting, even %hen others have evaluate one as an e;ual, !e"ause they have not evaluate one as superior# The vi"es of shame "onsist in !elieving oneself inferior an so failing to o!Fe"t %hen others have not evaluate one as an e;ual# 8t might at first seem that vi"es of shame not only are not asso"iate %ith !ut also are in"ompati!le %ith inflame amour-propre# But this is not so# Even if one sees it as ones due to !e evaluate as inferior, one may still crave to !e evaluate as superior# 12 The vi"es of pri e an shame, unlike inflame amour-propre, are not pervasive *some %ill have vi"es of pri e, others vi"es of shame4, or general *the eman is not that one !e evaluate as superior to everyone else !ut that one !e evaluate as superior to those to %hom one !elieves one is superior4, or, in general, insatia!le *evaluating someone at the pri"e that he !elieves he has suffi"es4# 6ixth, inflame amour-propre leaves us vicious , !y any "ommonsense measure# $e refuse to a""ept moral e;uality or to mo erate our "laims a""or ingly# $e are given to the hostile or e!asing vi"es of pri e an shame# An %e are lo"ke in <ero-sum Competition for 6o"ial A van tage, %here our gain must !e anothers loss an anothers gain must !e our loss# $e are thus in"line to !e un"harita!le, e"eitful, an so on# 6eventh, it leaves us miserable !e"ause it sa les us %ith !oth esires for evaluation that %e "an never satisfy an esires for so"ial goo s that have no real %orth an are ivor"e from the true sour"es of pleasure# Eighth, inflame amour-propre leaves one un#ree , no matter ho% high ones station# Even if one ostensi!ly "omman s others, one still "raves somethingGevaluationGthat only others "an provi e# 0ne must seek to !e an o %hatever eli"its favora!le evaluations from others *E AJJ/0C J#-234 # >inally, insofar as %e are affli"te %ith inflame amour-propre, %e

12# Although less often is"usse Git seems, for example, to es"ape the other%ise thorough "atalog in ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , "hap# 2Gthis aspe"t of the psy"hology of inflame amour-propre is a re"urring i ea in Rousseau# >or some ex"eptions, see =ent, Rousseau+ $n,ntroduction ,1C, A3, -.E an Ra%ls, 0ectures , ABJ# The isfavore in the se"on Discourse feel not only (envy) to%ar the favore Ga esire to enFoy %hat they enFoyG!ut also (shame) !efore themGa sense that they are someho% appropriately isfavore # A= 133/0C 2#1.B# (6o mu"h "ontempt e!ases them# They !e"ome "o%ar ly, fearful, an fa%ning an fall as far !elo% themselves as they ha previously !een raise a!ove themselves#) E CC/0C J#21-# ($hat is viler than an impoverishe ri"h man %ho, remem!ering the "ontempt o%e to poverty, feels himself to have !e"ome the lo%est of men7) E 1@J/0C J#J3C#

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are alienated# 8n a%ay that%ill !e tou"he on again !elo%, %e are estrange from our true nature an sour"e of value# 2. Basic Desires Rousseau tells us that %hi"h form someones amour-propre %ill take epen s on' (%hat position he %ill feel he has among men, an %hat kin s of o!sta"les he may !elieve he has to over"ome to rea"h the position he %ants to o""upy) *E A2-, see also AJ2/0C J#-A2KAJ, -2JK2-4 # This sug gests the follo%ing explanatory s"hema# Current "on itions lea to "er tain !eliefs a!out (position) an (o!sta"les#) Those !eliefs, intera"ting %ith "ertain more !asi" esires, pro u"e inflame amour-propre as a kin of erive esire# 0ther "on itions %oul lea to ifferent !eliefs# These ifferent !eliefs, intera"ting%ith the same esires, %oul pro u"e healthy amour-propre as a kin of erive esire# The ;uestion is then %hat these more !asi" esires an !eliefs are# +ets start %ith a provisional vie% of the relevant esires# They must !e, or arise out of, amour de soi, the esire from %hi"h Rousseau says that amourpropre arises *E @A, A1AK12/0C J#2AA, J@14# $mour desoi is a generi" "on"ern for oneself, %hi"h nee not involve ex"lusively, or in ee at all, a "on"ern either for ho% one "ompares %ith others or for ho% others evaluate one# 8t is at least a esire to survive, although some suggest that it is a esire to fare %ell more !roa ly#1J
Preservative $mour de &oi ' The esire, not ne"essarily self-"ons"ious, for

ones o%n %ell-!eing#

8n its prere6ective form, Preservative $mour de &oi is simply an instin"tive esire for "ertain things that in fa"t ten to promote ones %ell-!eing# $ith refle"tion, ho%ever, "omes a "on"eption of ones %ell-!eing an %hat promotes it# 8n its re6ective form, Preservative $mour de &oi is a esire for %hat one believes serves ones %ell-!eing# Even in its refle"tive form, Preservative $mour de &oi nee not involve any "on"ern for, or even a%areness of, others evaluations of one# $ith a further stage of refle"tion, ho%ever, one a";uires this a%areness# 0ne learns that there is a further ( imension,) so to speak, in %hi"h things "an fare !etter or %orse' not only in nature !ut also in the eyes o# others #
1J# 6ee, for example, ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , 2B n# 2#

1 9 ?8D0 D0+0=?&

0nes "on"ern to fare %ell in nature (exten s,) in some sense, 1- to this ne% interpersonal imension# The result is the'
)oncern #or Evaluation ' The

esire that others evaluate one in a parti"ular %ay *%hi"h %ill nee to !e further spe"ifie 4#
1-# 8n %hat sense7 8t is not as though Preservative $mour de &oi , together %ith some suita!le instrumental or "onstitutive !elief, pro u"es the Con"ern for Evaluation as a erive instrumental or constitutive esire# >aring %ell in the eyes of others is not "onstitutive of far ing %ell in nature# An even if faring %ell in the eyes of others is sometimes instrumental to faring %ell in nature *!e"ause, for example, if others hol one in high esteem, they may !e more rea y to give one material ai 4, our "on"ern to fare %ell in the eyes of others is not purely instrumental# $hat then is the explanatory "onne"tion !et%een our "on"ern to fare %ell in nature an our "on"ern to fare %ell in the eyes of others7 8t is an instan"e of a negle"te phenomenon, 8 think, in %hi"h the fitting response to something is similar toG or (resonates) %ithGthe fitting response to its "ounterpart in another imension ofimpor tan"e, %hile refle"ting the istin"tive an irre u"i!le importan"e of the parti"ular imen sion to %hi"h it !elongs# >or example, our "on"ern for our personal proFe"tsGfor example, our parti"ular efforts to "ontri!ute to kno%le geGresonates %ith our appre"iation of the !roa ervaluesGsu"h as, kno%le ge itselfGthat they promote or honor# $e "are a!out our own e##orts to contribute to kno%le ge only insofar as %e think that knowled.e itself is something to !e "are a!out !y anyone# ?evertheless, %e o not "are a!out our "ontri!utions to kno%le ge merely as means to, or "onstituents of, kno%le ge itself# 8nstea , our "on "ern for our o%n "ontri!utions refle"ts the istin"tive importan"e of their !eing ours , an importan"e that resonates %ith, !ut "annot !e re u"e to, the importan"e of kno%le ge for anyone# $e o not see ourselves, for example, as having pre"isely the same reasons to further, or "are a!out the su""ess of, others efforts to "ontri!ute to kno%le ge as %e have to further, or "are a!out the su""ess of, our o%n efforts# 6imilarly, %e o not "are a!out far ing %ell in the eyes of others merely as a means to, or "onstituent of, faring %ell in nature# 8nstea , our "on"ern to fare %ell in the eyes of others refle"ts the istin"tive importan"e to us of ho% other minds regar us, an importan"e that resonates %ith, although it "annot !e re u"e to, the importan"e of %hat merely happens to us# >or further is"ussion, see my ($hi"h Relationships Iustify Partiality7 The Case of Parents an Chil ren,) Philosophy and Public $##airs *forth"oming4, an ($hi"h RelationshipsIustify Partiality7 Leneral Consi erations an Pro!lem Cases,) in Partiality and,mpartiality+ (orality/ &pecial Relationships and the :ider :orld, e # Brian >eltham an Iohn Cottingham *0xfor ' 0xfor University Press, forth"oming4# 8t is a further ;uestion %hat triggers this (extension)' %hat "auses it to o""ur, %hen it oes, in the in ivi ual or the spe"ies7 The ans%er, 8 think, is simply the a";uisition, !y the in ivi ual or the spe"ies, of the "ognitive resour"es to !e a%are of !eing evaluate # 0n"e this a%areness is in pla"e, ones "on"ern to fare %ell in nature naturally exten s to this ne% imension, ho% one fares in the eyes of others# 0r, in my terms' as soon as one is "apa!le of attitu es to%ar ho% one fares in the eyes of others, one %ill have attitu es that resonate %ith ones attitu es to%ar ho% one fares in nature# This (extension) may no more "all for further explanation than oes the (extension) of esire to a ne% o!Fe"tin the instrumental "ase' for example, the fa"t that, on"e one !e"omes a%are that !ears are angerous, ones "on"ern to fare %ell in nature naturally pro u"es a erive esire to avoi !ears# ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , 1JBKJ@, offers amore ela!orate explanation, interesting in its o%n right, %hi"h hinges on the infants nee for the love of a "aregiver# This

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

15

Preservative $mour de &oi an the Con"ern for Evaluation are not merely esires in the philosophers sense' ispositions to o %hat one !elieves %ill !ring a!out their o!Fe"ts# Rousseau has a ri"her "on"eption# >irst, esires en"ourage wish#ul thinkin. ' a ten en"y, in the a!sen"e of settle kno%l e ge to the "ontrary, to vie% the %orl as favora!le to their o%n satisfa" tion# 13 6e"on , esires involve #eelin.s o#satis#action %hen one !elieves that their o!Fe"ts have !een a"hieve an feelings of issatisfa"tion %hen one !elieves that their o!Fe"ts have not !een a"hieve # 8n parti"ular, the ( issatisfa"tion) that one feels %hen one !elieves that ones Con"ern for Evaluation is not fulfille G%hen one !elieves that others o not evaluate one in the relevant %ayGtakes a istin"tively inter personal or "ommuni"ative form, %hi"h !efits the (ne% imension) of far ing !etter or %orse in the eyes of others# 0ne vie%s oneself as having a vali eman against others that they evaluate one in this %ay, an one rea"ts !y o!Fe"ting, %ith resentment an the like, %hen one !elieves that they o not *A= 133/0C 2#1.B4 # The sort of issatisfa"tion that one feels %hen !rute nature resists the satisfa"tion of ones Preservative $mourde&oi , !y "ontrast, la"ks this interpersonal or "ommuni"ative register# 8t is mere anxiety an pain, %hi"h fin s no expression in eman s or o!Fe"tions *R6$ .A/0C 1#1B.C4# To flesh out the Con"ern for Evaluation, %e %ill eventually nee to spe"ify the (parti"ular %ay) in %hi"h one %ants to !e evaluate # >or the
explanation is suggeste to ?euhouser partly !y the fa"t that, in !oth the se"on Discourse an Emile , Rousseau impli"ates love in the genesis of amour-propre# E A1JK1-E A= 13-K33/ 0C J#J@J, 0C 2#13@K.B# 5o%ever, 8 suspe"t that, for Rousseau, the role of love in these passages is only that of a spur to engage in the sort of refle"tion !y %hi"h the "ognitive resour"es ne"essary for amour-propre are a";uire # +ove gets one to think, for the first time, a!out ho% others evaluate one an a!out ho% one "ompares %ith others# (0ne %ants to o!tain the preferen"e that one grants# +ove must !e re"ipro"al# To !e love , one has to make oneself lova!le# To !e preferre , one has to make oneself more lova!le than another, more lova!le than every other, at least in the eyes of the !elove o!Fe"t# !his is the source o# the #irst .lances at one2s #ellows; this is the source o# the #irst comparisons with them #) E A1J, my emphasis/0C J#J@J# The aim of this passage, in parti"ular, is to explain %hy, on"e Emile rea"hes a oles"en"e, the tutor "an no longer prevent him from eveloping amour-propre !e"ause he "an no longer prevent him from a";uiring the ne"essary "ognitive "apa"ities# (This spe"ies of passion, not having its germ in "hil rens hearts, "annot !e !orn in them of itselfE it is %e alone %ho put it there, an it never takes root ex"ept !y our fault# But this is no longer the "ase %ith the young mans heart# $hatever %e may o, these passions %ill !e !orn in spite of us#) E A1-/0C J#J@J# 5itherto, Emile ha no esire that %oul inevita!ly lea him to "ompare himself%ith others or to think a!out ho% others evaluate him# $ith the flo%ering of sexual esire, ho%ever, su"h "omparisons !e"ome unavoi a!le# 13# (The intensity of my esires len s to their o!Fe"t a possi!ility itis%anting#) IA3/0C A#22#

1 6 ?8D0 D0+0=?&

moment, noti"e the !asi" ilemma# 0n the one han , if %e say that one esires to !e evaluate !y others as ever more morally superior to others , this %oul seem to make inflame amour-propre unavoidable # 0n the other han , if %e say that one esires to !e evaluate !y others as amoral equal , this %oul seem to make inflame amour-propre impossible# 6omeho% the Con"ern for Evaluation nee s to !e sensitive to %hat one !elieves# 0nly then %ill it have the right sort of plasti"ity, su"h that it %ill "ontri!ute to inflame amour-propre %hen "om!ine %ith "ertain !eliefs !ut %ill "ontri!ute to healthy amour-propre %hen "om!ine %ith other !eliefs# 3. Some Explanations Considered
8<1< ,n#antile Paranoia

6o %hat are these !eliefs, these !eliefs a!out (o!sta"les) an (position,) %hi"h, intera"ting %ith Preservative $mour de &oi an /or the Con"ern for Evaluation, pro u"e healthy or inflame amour-propre as erive esires7 =ent suggests that amour-propre !e"omes inflame !y'
Paranoia ' The !elief that other %ills seek to

estroy one an %ill o so

unless one "ontrols or estroys them first#

Certain kin s of treatment provoke this Paranoia in infants, %hi"h then persists, although presuma!ly not fully "ons"iously, into a ulthoo # 1. Perhaps the most serious pro!lem %ith this a""ount is that it oes not explain inflame amour-propre# Lrante , Paranoia an Preservative $mour de &oi %oul pro u"e a esire to control or destroy others# But a esire to "ontrol or estroy others is not itself a esire to !e, or to !e evaluate as, superior to them# 8t might !e suggeste that one esires !eing, an !eing evaluate as !eing, superior to others only insofar as it is a means to "ontrolling or estroying others# But this seems implausi!le# Liven the "hoi"e !et%een estroying someone an !eing evaluate !y him or her as superior, one imagines that inflame amour-propre, from Rousseaus es"riptions, %oul "hoose the latter# 6e"on , as =ent a"kno%le ges, this a""ount gives no pla"e to the se"on Discourse or to the i ea that so"ial ine;uality plays an important
1.# =ent, Rousseau+ $n,ntroduction , A@, .1K.@E =ent, $RousseauDictionary , 2JK2-E =ent,
Rousseau , C.KCC# 6ee also Christopher Bertram, Rousseau and the =&ocial )ontract> *+on on' Routle ge, ABBJ4, A.KACE an Timothy 05agan, Rousseau *+on on' Routle ge, 1@@@4,

13.# =ent, Rousseau+ $n ,ntroduction , -BK-1, is"usses a ifferent explanation, %hi"h he !elieves is at %ork in the first Discourse # 5e also suggests elements of the explanation a resse in se"# -, !elo%#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

role in the genesis of inflame amour-propre# 1C Thir , it is not even "lear in Emile that those affli"te %ith inflame amour-propre per"eive foreign %ills as threats to their survival# This is never sai , in so many %or s, in passages on the treatment of infants in !ook 1# ,oreover, very little of Emiles su!se;uent e u"ation seems to aim at preventing him from a";uir ing Paranoia# 1@ >inally, if this a""ount%ere "orre"t, it is har to see ho% Emiles e u"ation "oul hope to make him mu"h ifferent from other men# A""or ing to this a""ount, others are riven to "ontrol or estroy their neigh !ors !e"ause they, first, are su!Fe"t to Paranoia an , se"on , esire their o%n preservation# Presuma!ly, Emile ought to learn that among those they seek to "ontrol or estroy is himself# Thus, he ought to !elieve the "ontent of Paranoia not as a elusion !ut instea as a "lear-eye assessment of his situation# Emile also ought to, an no ou!t oes, esire his o%n preserva tion# 6o %hy shoul nt Emile !e riven, Fust like they, to "ontrol or estroy others7 Taken literally an "arrie to its logi"al "on"lusion, this a""ount seems to leave Emile no %ay out#
8<7< E.alitarian De#ensiveness

Else%here =ent, as %ell as Ra%ls an Cohen, suggests that an explanation of inflame amour-propre "an !e foun in Dants es"ription of the (pre isposition to humanity,) %hi"h in ee !ears the imprint of Rousseaus thought'
0ut of this self-love springs the in"lination to acquire worth in the opinion o# others# This is originally a esire merelyfor equality, to allo% no one superiority a!ove oneself, !oun up %ith a "onstant "are lest others strive to attain su"h superiorityE !ut from this arises gra ually the unFustifia!le "raving to %in it for oneself over others#AB

8t is true that the tutor is suppose to limit Emiles en"ounters %ith other people until he rea"hes a oles"en"e# But there are other possi!le reasons for this stri"ture, !esi es avoi ing the kin s of intera"tions that might give rise to Paranoia# 0ne su"h reason, to %hi"h %e %ill return !elo%, is to preserve Emile from their (opinions) an (preFu i"es,) so that he "an learn the true sour"es of value#

1C# 1@#

= e nt, R o u s s e a u + $ n , n t r o d u c t i o n , .@#

AB# 8mmanuel Dant, Reli.ion within the 0imits o# Reason $lone , trans# Theo ore ,# Lreene an 5oyt 5# 5u son *+a 6alle, 8+' 0pen Court, 1@2J4, !k# 1, se"# 1# The passage is ;uote in this "onne"tion !y Cohen, (The ?atural Loo ness of 5umanity,) 12JK2- n# AJE =ent, $ Rousseau Dictionary , 2-K23E =ent, Rousseau , 1B-K3E =ent, (Rousseau on $mour% Propre ,) Proceedin.s o# the $ristotelian &ociety , suppl# no# .A *1@@C4' -.K.2, at 3-E an Ra%ls, 0ectures , 1@@KABB#

?8D0 D0+0=?&

1 '

The !asi" pi"ture seems to !e this'

*i4 *ii4 *iii4 *iv4

0ne !egins %anting only to !e evaluate as a moral e;ual# 5o%ever, one !elieves that others seek to !e evaluate as morally superior to one# 0ne also !elieves that !eing evaluate as morally superior to others is a ne"essary *or parti"ularly effe"tive4 means to prevent them from !eing evaluate as morally superior to one# Thus, one esires to !e evaluate as morally superior to others as a means to !eing evaluate as a moral e;ual#

The initial pro!lem is that esire *iv4, to !e evaluate as morally superior as a means to !eing evaluate as morally e;ual, is stri"tly speaking in"oherent# Being evaluate as morally superior is in"ompati!le %ith !eing evalu ate as morally e;ual# To make sense of the explanation, %e might ignore Dants phrase (merely for equality) an revise *i4 an *iv4 as'
*i 4 0ne !egins %anting only not to !e evaluate as morally inferior to anyone, !ut %ithout any esire, spe"ifi"ally, to !e evaluate as a moral e;ual# *iv 4 Thus, one esires to !e evaluate as morally superior to others as a means to not !eing evaluate as morally inferior to anyone#
' M

But it is not "lear ho% this %oul explain healthy amour-propre# 6uppose one is assure that no one else seeks to !e evaluate as morally superior to oneself# Then one %oul not !elieve that one had to !e evaluate as morally superior to others in or er to prevent them from !eing evaluate as morally superior to oneself# 0ne %oul !e equally "ontent %ith !eing evaluate as a moral e;ual# But !eing in ifferent !et%een !eing evaluate as an e;ual an as a superior is not the same as esiring, as healthy amourpropre esires, to !e evaluate as an e;ual# Presuma!ly, this is %hy Dant in fa"t es"ri!es the esire as (for e;uality) an not simply (to allo% no one superiority a!ove oneself#) 8n any event, on either version, *ii4 is mysterious# $hy oes one !elieve that others seek to !e evaluate as morally superior to oneself7 Be"ause others do seek to !e evaluate as morally superior7 But that presupposes %hat %e sought to explain#
8<8< &oc ia l (ea ns to Eva lua tion

Cohen suggests that un er "ir"umstan"es of (so"ioe"onomi" ine;uality %ithout any institutionally a"kno%le ge e;uality of %orth,) (the natu ral strategy for %inning re"ognition from othersGeven for those %ho might !e prepare to a""ept the egalitarian "on"eption of %orthGis to

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

13

%in a vantage#) The reme y is to esta!lish some sta!le, pu!li" affirmation of e;uality, %hi"h %oul provi e an alternative strategy for %inning evaluation#A1 Cohens suggestion, at least in this passage, appears to !e as follo%s# =ifferent so"ial "on itions pro u"e ifferent !eliefs a!out the available means for a"hieving evaluation# $hen one !elieves that the only%ay to %in evaluation is through so"ial a vantage, ones Con"ern for Evaluation %ill lea one to pursue a vantage# $hen one !elieves that "ivi" e;uality alrea y provi es one %ith evaluation, one %ill feel no nee to take those means# The iffi"ulty is that evaluation is not like attention or "ele!rity, although Cohens term, (re"ognition,) o!s"ures this some%hat# Chil ren often %ant attention as su"h, for example, %ithout "aring %hat kind of attention it is or %hat it is attention #or' %hether it "omes in the form of s"ol ing or praise# But one rarely, if ever, seeks evaluation as su"h, %ithout regar for %hether it is evaluation of a "ertain kind or evaluation #or or as something# An even if one i esire only some evaluation, some "omparison %ith others, it matters not %hatGeven if one sought evaluation in the %ay a "hil seeks attentionGone "oul satisfy that esire Fust as easily !y "onspi"uously groveling !efore as !y "onspi"uously lor ing over# 6o the ;uestion is %hat kin of evaluation the Con"ern for Evalua tion seeks# 8f it seeks evaluation as morally superior , then it is har to see ho% "ivi" e;uality "oul satisfy it# An , even if it someho% "oul , one %oul still not have healthy amour-propre sin"e, !y hypothesis, one %oul still esire to !e evaluate as morally superior# 8f one seeks evaluation only as a moral equal *or noninferior4 an seeks so"ial a vantage only as a means to this, then, although one %oul Compete for 6o"ial A vantage, one %oul not a"tually have inflame amour-propre sin"e one %oul not esire to !e evaluate as morally superior# ?euhouser like%ise suggests that inflame amour-propre "an !e avoi e !y provi ing people %ith alternative means for %inning evaluation#AA 5o%ever, he argues that these must in"lu e means for evaluation as superior in some respe"t# This might suggest the follo%ing vie%# The Con"ern for Evaluation is a esire to !e evaluate as superior !ut only in some respe"t# 8t "an !e satisfie even if one is not evaluate as superior in some respe"t, so long as one is evaluate as superior in some other respe"t# 8f %e !elieve that the only %ay to !e evaluate as superior involves !oth

A1# Cohen, (The ?atural Loo


AB3#

ness of 5umanity,) 1A1# 6ee also 1A2, an Ra%ls, 0ectures,

AA# 6ee ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , "hap# -#

?8D0 D0+0=?&

1'5

moral superiority an so"ial a vantage, then this esire %ill express itself in inflame amour-propre an Competition for 6o"ial A vantage# But it is not "lear ho% this a""ount of the Con"ern for Evaluation "oul explain healthy amour-propre, %hi"h involves the esire to !e evaluate as a moral e;ual# The suggestion %oul seem to !e that %e might, un er other "on itions, !elieve that there are %ays to !e evaluate as superior that involve neither so"ial a vantage nor evaluation as morally superior# An this might %ell relieve some of the pressure to seek so"ial a vantage or to seek evaluation as morally superior# But it still %oul not give us healthy amour-propre, for a reason seen in the last se"tion# To have a esire that need not !e satisfie !y !eing evaluate as morally superior is not to have a esire that is satisfie pre"isely !y !eing evaluate as morally equal#A2 4. Dependence on Opinion 8n any event, there is further reason to ou!t the pre"e ing explanations# They appeal to !eliefs that either are true *su"h as !eliefs a!out the avail a!le means for %inning evaluation4 or that, %hile false, are not erive from the !eliefs of others *su"h as Paranoia4# &et Rousseau repeate ly suggests, parti"ularly %hen he pauses to take sto"k, that the sour"e of the trou!le is #alse !elief erive from the (opinions,) AJ (preFu i"es,) (errors,) an (%hims) *#antaisie4 o# others *see E A2.E RII AA/0C J#-A-, 0C 1#3C.4 # AG perhaps theGmain goal of Emiles e u"ation is to (preserve him) from these *E 1.1, JJ2, JJ3/0C J#J2-, C1-, CAB4 an the effe"ts that they %ork on his (imagination#)
Everything surroun ing Nyour pupilO influen"es his imagination# The torrent of preFu i"es "arries him a%ay# To restrain him, he must !e pushe in the opposite ire"tion# 6entiment must en"hain imagination, an reason silen"e the opinion of men# *E A1@/0C J#-BBK-B14 Although 8 %ant to form the man of nature, the o!Fe"t is not, for all that, to make him a savage an to relegate him to the epths of the %oo s# 8t

A2# $e "annot respon !y reformulating the Con"ern for Evaluation as a esire to !e evaluate as morally e;ual, !ut in some other respe"t superior# >or then %e rule out inflame amour-propre, %hi"h involves a esire to !e evaluate as morally superior# AJ# Rousseau uses Hopinion sometimes to mean (evaluation) *as at E A1J/0C J#J@24 an sometimes *as %hen he speaks of (errors) of opinion or pairs it %ith (preFu i"e)4 to mean (!elief) *usually ill foun e an false4# 8t is the latter uses that 8 have in min here, although, as 8 explain !elo%, many of the !eliefs in ;uestion are a!out evaluation# The sour"e of the trou!le is, as it %ere, opinion *in the sense of !elief4 a!out opinion *in the sense of evaluation4#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

1'1

suffi"es that, en"lose in a so"ial %hirlpool, he not let himself get "arrie a%ay !y either the passions or opinions of men, that he see %ith his o%n eyes, that he feel %ith his o%n heart, that no authority govern him !eyon that of his o%n reason# *E A--/0C J#--BK-14

8n parti"ular, Emile is to learn to value thin.s a""or ing to their real worth , rather than a""or ing to the imaginary or fantasti"al %orth assigne to them !y others preFu i"es#
$him an "onvention "ount for nothing in it# $hat is more useful to him, he takes more seriouslyE never eviating from this %ay of evaluating, he grants nothing to opinion# *E AB./0C J#JC., see also RII A12/0C 1#@224

An the most important error from %hi"h he must !e preserve , it appears, is that of valuing himsel# a""or ing to the s"ale that others use to evaluate people# Emiles e u"ation su""ee s insofar as (he values nothing a""or ing to the pri"e set !y opinion,) an so "ares (little a!out !eing esteeme !y NothersO) *E 22C/0C J#33@4 at the pri"e set on him !y opinion# That is, insofar as he es"apes'
Dependence on ?pinion ' The !elief that others evaluations reveal %here

ones value lies, %here this !elief is not !ase on anyin epen ent evi en"e that others evaluations are relia!le' more pre"isely, the !elief that ones nature is su"h that the s"ale appropriate for measuring ones value is the s"ale, %hatever it happens to !e, that others use to evaluate people# A-

By "ontrast, (so"ia!le man,) as he is es"ri!e at the "res"en o of the se"on Discourse , erives his sense of %hat he is, an so %here his value lies, only from ho% others evaluate him#
This, in ee , is the genuine "ause of all these ifferen"es' the 6avage lives %ithin himselfE so"ia!le man, al%ays outsi e himself, is "apa!le of living only in the opinion of others an , so to speak, erives the sentiment o#his own e"istence solely from their Fu gment ### in a %or , forever asking of others what we are, %ithout ever aring to ask it ofourselves# *A= 1C., my emphasis, see also E A1-/0C 2#1@2, 0C J#J@J4
A-# 8n repu iating =epen en"e on 0pinion, Rousseau nee not !e taken to repu i ate all relian"e on others Fu gments, %hi"h seems not only unreasona!le !ut also at o s %ith mu"h ofRousseaus thought# Consi er, for example, the "iti<ens epistemi" eferen"e to the maFority# 6C 1AJ/0C 2#JJ1# Epistemi" eferen"e "an iffer from =epen en"e on 0pinion, first, in atta"hing to Fu gments a!out su!Fe"t matters other than ones self-%orth an , se"on , in !eing !ase on some in epen ent evi en"e of the relia!ility of the Fu g ments eferre to *su"h as that the maFority has the "hara"teristi"s of the general %ill4#

1'7 ?8D0 D0+0=?&

Although other "ommentators o not assign it as "entral a role, they often note that Rousseau attri!utes =epen en"e on 0pinion, or something like it, to so"ial man# 8t is %hat explains, for example, %hy %e are alienated from ourselves, %hy %e mistake the sour"e of our o%n %orth # A3 $hy shoul people =epen on 0pinion7 At least part of the explanation is'
EvaluativeDe#erence ' 8f one !elieves that enough others evaluate something

on a "ertain !asis, then, in the a!sen"e ofsettle kno%le ge to the "ontrary, one %ill "ome to evaluate it on that !asis#

Rousseau posits su"h a ten en"y, as is in i"ate !y his fre;uent "alls for the tutors vigilan"e against it'
8t is !a to kno% %hat NmenO think %hen one oes not kno% %hether %hat they think is true or false# Tea"h him, therefore, in the first pla"e %hat things are in themselves, an you "an tea"h him after%ar %hat they are in our eyes# 8t is thus that he %ill kno% ho% to "ompare the opinion to the truth#### But ifyou !egin !yinstru"ting him in pu!li" opinion !efore tea"h ing him to appraise it, rest assure that, %hatever you may o, it%ill !e"ome his, an you %ill no longer !e a!le to estroy it# *E 1C., see also 111K1A/0C J#J-C, 2-B4

$hat effe"t =epen en"e on 0pinion has epen s on the s"ale of value that one !elieves that others apply# 8f one a""epts'
&ocial Evaluation ' The !elief that others evaluate people on the s"ale of

so"ial a vantage,

then =epen en"e on 0pinion %ill lea one to'


&ocial &el#%Evaluation ' The evaluation of oneself a""or ing to ones so"ial

a vantage#

5. !e Concern "or Accurate E#aluation and t!e $ices o" Pride and S!ame 5o% might 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation explain inflame amour-propre7 At this point, %e nee to spe"ify the sort of evaluation that the Con"ern for Evaluation esires# $e sa% earlier that, in or er for the Con"ern for Evaluation to have the ne"essary plasti"ity, this esire evaluation nee s to !e sensitive
A3# 6ee =ent, Rousseau+ $n ,ntroduction , 21K2AE ?euhouser, Rousseau2s !heodicy , CAKC2E Bertram, Rousseau and the =&ocial )ontract ,) A-E Lauthier, !he &entiment o# E"istence , "haps# 1K AE an 05agan, Rousseau , 13-#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

1'8

to ones !eliefs# 8n this vein, Cohen suggests the'


)oncern #or $ccurate Evaluation ' The

esire to !e evaluate a""or ing to ones true value# 8f one !elieves that one has a "ertain value, then this esire %ill lea one to esire, of the value that one !elieves one has, that others evaluate one as having that value# 5en"e, %e "an think of this esire, for most intents an purposes, as a esire to !e evaluate as having the value that one !elieves one has# A.

Cohen even i entifies this esire %ith generi" amour-propre# The Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation %ill ispose one atleast to o %hat one !elieves %ill brin. it about that others evaluate one as one evalu ates oneself# But there is more to it than that# As %e sa% earlier, the ( issatisfa"tion) that one feels %hen one !elieves that others o not evaluate one as one evaluates oneself takes the form of resentment' a eman that they evaluate one appropriately# 8t is "lear ho% the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation might explain healthy amour-propre, %hen it "om!ines %ith the !elief that one is morally e;ual to others# An it may seem, at first, to !e a!le to explain inflame amour-propre as %ell# Cohen suggests that 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation "om !ines %ith the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation to pro u"e the'
)oncern #or $ccurate &ocial Evaluation ' The esire, of the so"ial a vantage that one !elieves one has, that others value one a""or ing to it# AC

8f one !elieves that one has so"ial a vantage, then one %ill esire that others evaluate one as superior# An this, it seems, Fust is inflame amour-propre# This a""ount therefore pre i"ts that amour-propre %ill !e"ome inflame !y the experien"e of so"ial a vantage# This fits the se"on Discourse *A= 1.1/0C 2#1.-4, as Cohen notes# 8t also suggests an interpreta tion of the mu"h- is"usse ( ominion) passage of Emile , %hi"h seems to say that a "hil s amour-propre first !e"omes inflame !y its experien"e of !eing o!eye #
As soon as they "an "onsi er the people %ho surroun them as instruments epen ing on them to !e set in motion, they make use of those people to follo% their in"lination an to supplement their o%n %eakness# This is ho% they !e"ome iffi"ult, tyranni"al, imperious, %i"ke , unmanagea!leGa evelopment %hi"h oes not "ome from a natural spirit of omination !ut %hi"h rather gives one to them, for it oes not re;uire long experien"e to

istin guish it from, the appeal, es"ri!e in se"# 2#2, to !eliefs a!out availa!le means for %inning evaluation#

A.# Cohen, (The ?atural Loo ness of 5umanity,) 1B@# AC# 6ee i!i #, 1B@K1B# 5e seems not to relate this explanation to, or even to

?8D0 D0+0=?&

1'9

sense ho% pleasant it is to a"t %ith the han s of others an to nee only to stir ones tongue to make the universe move#### NTO he esire to "omman is not extinguishe %ith the nee that gave !irth to it# =ominion a%akens an flatters amour-propre# *E 3.K3C/0C J#AC@4

A""or ing to the present interpretation, the "hil "omes to !elieve that its po%er to "omman , a kin of so"ial a vantage, refle"ts its superior value, an this is %hat (a%akens an flatters) its amour-propre# A@ Be"ause it results from the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation, the Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation %ill ispose one, first, to o %hat one !elieves %ill brin. it about that others evaluate one a""or ing to ones so"ial a vantage an , se"on , to see oneself as having a claim to it, an so to rea"t %ith resentment %hen one !elieves that this "laim is not met# The Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation therefore straightfor%ar ly
A@# 6ee =ent, Rousseau+ $n ,ntroduction , A@, -., .1E an =ent, Rousseau , C., 1BB# 5o%ever, =ent oes not !elieve that the infants inflate self-"on"eption an its "orrespon ing eman to !e treate as superior "onstitute a freestan ing explanation of inflame amourpropre# 8nstea , they help to explain Paranoia, es"ri!e in se"# 2#1# $hen the infants inflate eman s are not met, it interprets this as hostility# The infants primary mistake, 8 suspe"t, is not to value itself more hi.hly !e"ause of its po%er to "omman !ut instea , more fun amentally, to sense its value, high or lo%, as dependin. on its po%er to "omman ' a kin of 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation# To explain' an important topi" of !ook 1 is ho% the infant a";uires (the sentiment of its existen"e,) %hi"h, 8 have suggeste , may !e un erstoo as a sense of its nature# E 31/0C J#A.@KCB# 8n ee , the last paragraph of !ook 1, %hi"h revie%s ho% far the infant has "ome, "loses %ith the o!servation that, at the start, it i (not even sense his o%n existen"e,) as if to suggest that the a";uisition of this sense %as one of the main a"hievements# E .J/0C J#A@C# Earlier in !ook 1, Rousseau stresses that the sentiment of ones existen"e "omes through a"tion' (To live is not to !reatheE it is to a"tE it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our fa"ulties, of all the parts of ourselves %hi"h give us the sentiment of our existen"e#) E JA/0C J#A-2# This suggests that one of the prin"ipal fun"tions of the (a"tive prin"iple) *E 3./0C J#AC@4, %hi"h Rousseau intro u"es Fust !efore to the "ru"ial passage, is to give the infant that sentiment# The a"tive prin"iple, as Rousseau es"ri!es it, lea s the infant to a"t so as to !ring a!out "hanges' it oesnt really matter ho%, so long as it pro u"es "hanges that the infant "an re"ogni<e# The infant erives the first sentiment of its existen"e !y experien"ing pro u"ing these "hanges# 8t senses its nature as !eing %hatever is responsi!le for pro u"ing them# $hen the effe"ts that the infant experien"es are ue to its o%n physi"al a"tivity, it senses its existen"e to lie in its natural po%ers' an in"ipient form of Evaluative Dno%le ge, %hi"h, in a %ay to !e explaine in se"# ., lea s to healthy amour-propre# 5o%ever, %hen the effe"ts that the infant experien"es are ue to its "omman ing, or !elieving that it "omman s, others, then it senses its existen"e to lie in its a!ility to "omman others' an in"ipi ent form of 6o"ial 6elfEvaluation, %hi"h, in a%ay to !e es"ri!e in se"# 3, inflames amour-propre# ,ore fun amentally, in eriving its sense of its o%n nature from the responses it eli"its, the infant is, in a primitive %ay, "oming to =epen on 0pinion# This %oul explain %hy Rousseaus is"ussion "on"lu es' (thus N ainsi' possi!ly, (in this %ay)O preFu i"es an opinion take their first roots#) E 3C/0C J#A@B#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

1'5

explains the vi"es of shame# 8f 8 !elieve that 8 am so"ially disa vantage , then my Con"ern forA""urate 6o"ial Evaluation "an !e satisfie even i# the so"ially a vantage o not treat me as an e;ual# 0ne might %on er, ho%ever, ho% the Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation "oul explain the vi"es of pri e# 5o% "oul 8 ever !elieve that my Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation %as not satisfie 7 Liven Con"ern forA""urate 6o"ial Evaluation, 8 %ant others to value me a""or ing to my so"ial a vantage# But given 6o"ial Evaluation, it %oul seem, 8 !elieve that others dovalue me a""or ing to my so"ial a vantage# 6tri"tly speaking, ho%ever, 8 !elieve that others value me a""or ing to the so"ial a vantage that they believe that 8 enFoy# An 8 might !elieve that someone un erval ues me !e"ause he falsely !elieves that 8 have less so"ial a vantage than 8 haveG that he oes not appre"iate myrank, reali<e mypoliti"al po%er, an so on# 6o 8 am lia!le to respon %ith the vi"es of pri e# 6o far, so goo # But %hy shoul 8 seek to satisfy Con"ern for A""u rate 6o"ial Evaluation !y Competition for 6o"ial A vantage7 8f 8 !elieve that others reali<e my so"ial a vantage, then 8 !elieve that my Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation is satisfie # An if 8 !elieve that others o not reali<e my so"ial a vantage, then %hat my Con"ern forA""urate 6o"ial Evaluation isposes me to o is, first, to express my in ignation, an , se" on , to get them to reali<e my so"ial a vantage, !y pulling rank, for example, or making a isplay of %ealth# But %hat my Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation oes not ispose me to o is to a";uire #urther so"ial a vantage# 6urprisingly, the ten en"y of the Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation is to leave everyone "ontent %ith %hatever so"ial a vantage *or isa vantage4 he or she has# 8t "an !e satisfie # 8nstea of fueling "onfli"t, it is in fa"t a for"e for sta!ility# 0ne might suggest explaining Competition for 6o"ial A vantage !y a!an oning 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation, an so Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation, an assuming instea '
$symmetric &el#%Evaluation ' 0ne !elieves that any so"ial a vantage one

enFoys over others refle"ts ones superiority to those others !ut that no so"ial isa vantage that one suffers refle"ts any inferiority#

0n this vie%, so"ial e;uality is a sta!le e;uili!rium, from %hi"h no one esires to epart# ?o%, suppose that, for %hatever reason, so"ial ine;ual ity emerges# At this point, a""or ing to Asymmetri" 6elf-Evaluation, the a vantage %ill evaluate the isa vantage as inferior# The isa vantage , a""or ing to Asymmetri" 6elf-Evaluation an Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation, %ill %ant the a vantage not to evaluate them as

?8D0 D0+0=?&

1'6

inferior# The isa vantage reali<e that they "an a"hieve this !y epriv ing the *"urrently4 a vantage of their a vantages# ?o%, it is not "lear %hy the *"urrently4 isa vantage shoul esire to go !eyon this an a";uire a vantage for themselves# An if they su""ee e in restoring so"ial e;uality, this %oul !e an e;uili!rium, from %hi"h no one %oul %ant to epart #2B But provi e that they havent yet restore e;uality, the esire of the isa vantage to eprive the a vantage of their a vantages %oul !e enough for "onfli"t, provi e that the a vantage %ante to keep their a vantages# &et it is un"lear %hy the a vantage should %ant to keep their a vantages# After all, a""or ing to Asymmetri" 6elf-Evaluation, those a vantages o not a"tually su""ee in getting the isa vantage to evaluate them as superior# At any rate, even if Asymmetri" 6elf-Evaluation "oul explain Competition for 6o"ial A vantage, it %oul fail, %here Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation su""ee e , in explaining the vi"es of shame sin"e no one un ervalues himself or herself# ,oreover, neither Asymmetri" 6elfEvaluation nor Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation explains the per vasiveness, generality, an insatia!ility of inflame amour-propre# Ea"h explains only %hy the advanta.ed esire to !e value as superior to others, not %hy all esire to !e value as superior to othersE only %hy the a van tage esire to !e value as superior to the disadvanta.ed , not %hy they esire to !e value as superior to everyoneE an only %hy the a vantage esire to !e value only as !eing as superior to others as they are advanta.ed relative to others , not %hy they esire to !e value as ever more superior to others# $hile Con"ern for A""urate 6o"ial Evaluation is part of the story an provi es the explanation of the vi"es of pri e an shame, it is not, 8 think, the %hole a""ount# %. Pro&ressi#e Amour deSoi and t!e Concern "or 'i&!er Accurate E#aluation
6<1< Pro.ressive Amour e 6oi

The upshot is, it seems, that%e nee to enri"h the psy"hologi"al prin"iples to %hi"h %e have so far appeale # There are t%o "ompati!le possi!ilities, !ut ea"h one on its o%n is suffi"ient to explain inflame amour-propre# The first possi!ility is to enri"h our a""ount of amour de soi #
2B# ($hat if the formerly a vantage %ill "ontinue to "ling to their inflate self"on"eption any%ay7) 8f so, then the isa vantage have no reason to try to eprive them of their a vantages in the first pla"e sin"e oing so %ont a"hieve %hat the isa vantage %ant' to !e evaluate as e;uals# 6o Competition for 6o"ial A vantage !e"omes mysterious#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

1'

Rousseau emphasi<es that man is uni;ue in having (the fa"ulty of perfe"ting NhimselfO) *A= 1J1/0C 2#1JA4# 5e is not only, like other animals, vulnera!le to eterioration !ut also, unlike them, "apa!le of improvement# ?o%, %hile Rousseau speaks of a #aculty of self-perfe"tion, he never expli"itly i entifies any spe"ial drive to exer"ise it# An the mere fa"t that humanity a"tually exer"ises the fa"ulty oes not mean that there is any rive to o so# ?evertheless, it seems %orth exploring as an interpretive "onFe"ture that amour de soi en"ompasses a rive, not ne"essarily self-"ons"ious, for selfperfe"tion# Put a!stra"tly, the un erlying thought is as follo%s# Every animals nature efines a s"ale of a"tuali<ation or eterioration, %hi"h is, in turn, a s"ale of value, of !etter or %orse# 6in"e, for other animals, the s"ale allo%s no room for progress, their !asi" rive is simply not to regress# An sin"e the s"ale allo%s them little room for regress short of eath, this amounts to little more than a rive to stay alive# 6in"e man has the "apa"ity for progress, !y "ontrast, mans !asi" rive is not only to preserve himself from regression o%n the s"ale !ut also to progress up it# The suggestion, then, is to posit for human !eings'
Pro.ressive$mour de &oi ' The

esire, not ne"essarily self-"ons"ious, to maintain an improve ones position on the s"ale of value etermine !y ones nature# 21

The rive for self-preservation an the rive for self-perfe"tion %oul then !e t%o si es of the same "oin' the rive not to regress an the rive to progress, on the s"ale of value# 0ne might o!Fe"t that Rousseau ten s to es"ri!e humanitys efforts to perfe"t itself as pulling it o%n, rather than as raising it up, the s"ale ofvalue# By a"tuali<ing himself, in other%or s, man only makes him self %orse# 5o%ever, Rousseaus es"riptions of mans perfe"tion are not uniformly negative !ut instea am!ivalent# The fa"ulty of self-perfe"tion "auses mans (enlightenment an his errors, his virtues an his vi"es) *A= 1J1, see also 1CJ/0C 2#1JA,1C@4#
$e shoul !e %ary of our PreFu i"es until it has !een esta!lishe , 6"ale in han , %hether there are more virtues than vi"es among "ivili<e men, or %hether their vi"es are more a vantageous than their vi"es are etrimental, or %hether the progress of their kno%le ge is suffi"ient "om...

21# Compare Ioshua Cohen, Rousseau+ $ @ree )ommunity o# Equals *0xfor ' 0xfor University Press, AB1B4E an Ra%ls, 0ectures , A1.K1C, %ho suggest that Rousseaus vie% in"lu es or implies an interest in self- evelopment#

1'' ?8D0 D0+0=?&

pensation for the harms they o one another in proportion as they learn of the goo they shoul o# *A= 1-BK-1/0C 2#1-AK-24

Again, put a!stra"tly, the un erlying thought seems to !e that man progresses along several ifferent imensions# $hile progress in all imensions is progress overall, progress in one imension may not !e# >or example, the evelopment of reason, progress in one imension, may, !y making istan"ing rationali<ations possi!le, %eaken the for"e of (pity) *A= 1-2/0C 2#1--K-34, resulting in regress in another imension# ?o ou!t, Rousseau emphasi<es the possi!ilities for, an a"tuality of, stagna tion an regress !e"ause they are so surprising an provo"ative# But he is also "lear a!out the possi!ilities for overall progress *see, for example, 6C -2/0C 2#23J4# Prior to refle"tion, man has no "on"eption of %hat his nature is, let alone a "on"eption of %hat might preserve or further a"tuali<e that nature# 6o, in its unre6ective form, Progressive $mour de &oi is simply the esire for %hat, un!ekno%nst to one, in fa"t preserves an reali<es ones nature# $ith re6ection, ho%ever, "omes a gra ually more arti"ulate "on"eption of ones nature an of %hat preserving an a"tuali<ing it re;uires# 8n its refle"tive form, then, Progressive $mour de &oi is a esire of that %hi"h one believes preserves an reali<es ones nature# 2A $hat one esires no% epen s on %hat one !elieves a!out ones nature an the avenues for improvement that this nature makes possi!le# $ith this "omes the risk of error# 8n parti"ular, =epen en"e on 0pinion lea s Progressive $mour de &oi to !e a esire to "lim! %hatever s"ale others use to evaluate people# ?o%, in general,
Principle o#EpistemicDesire ' 8f one

esires an epistemi"ally un"ertain state of affairs, then one esires evi en"e that it o!tains#

8f 8 am teste for a isease, for example, 8 esire that the test "ome up negative# Provi e that others are a%are of ones relevant traits, the only reli a!le evi en"e that one o""upies a favora!le position on %hatever s"ale it is that they use is that they evaluate one highly# 5en"e, Progressive $mour
2A# 8f refle"tive, then Progressive $mour de &oi involves awareness of ones position on a s"ale of !etter an %orse, an so it must involve some "omparison# 5o%ever, it nee not involve "omparison%ith otherpeople , so itnee notyet!e amour-propre# Rousseau%oul !e har presse to explain ho% savage man "oul a";uire a "on"eption of a s"ale of !etter or %orse %ithout experien"e of a"tual instan"es at ifferent positions on the s"ale# But these instan"es "an !e provi e !y his o%n "on ition at other times, or !y other animals# A= 13A/0C 2#133#

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

1'3

de &oi !e"omes a esire that others evaluate one as highly as possi!le, as

evi en"e that one has "lim!e as high as possi!le up the s"ale of value# This esire is not yet inflame amour-propre *or even amourpropre at all4 !e"ause it is not "omparative# 8t is a esire to !e evaluate !y others as highly as possi!le !ut not ne"essarily to !e value !y others as highly as possi!le in comparison %ith others *or to !e value in any other %ay in comparison %ith them4# ?or oes this esire have the insatia!ility of inflame amour-propre# 8t is a esire to !e evaluate as highly as the s"ale permits, not ne"essarily to !e evaluate ever more highly# >or all that has !een sai , the esire is satia!le# 5o%ever, un er a regime of 6o"ial Evaluation, in %hi"h evaluation goes han in han %ith so"ial a vantage, the esire !e"omes a esire that others evaluate one ever more hi.hly in com% parison with others # >irst, to have as mu"h so"ial a vantage as possi!le is to have as mu"h so"ial a vantage as possi!le in comparison with others # 6e"on , so"ial a vantage, un erstoo as the ratio of one persons so"ial value to anothers, has no upper !oun # 6o the s"ale is infiniteE it permits one to !e evaluate evermore hi.hly #
6<7< !he )oncern #or-i.her$ccurateEvaluation

The se"on possi!ility is to enri"h our a""ount of the Con"ern for Evaluation %ith the'
)oncern #or -i.her $ccurate Evaluation ' The esire that others evaluate one

!oth a""urately an as highly as possi!le#

$hereas the Con"ern for $ccurate Evaluation is in ifferent !et%een a "on ition in %hi"h one has lo%er value an is a""urately evaluate an a "on ition in %hi"h one has higher value an is a""urately evaluate , the Con"ern for -i.her A""urate Evaluation prefers the latter# This ifferen"e has t%o impli"ations# >irst, one %ill !e motivate to !ring it a!out that one is more highly an a""urately evaluate in the future, %hi"h may re;uire that one in"rease ones value# 6e"on , one %ill feel issatisfie even %hen one !elieves that one has !een a""urately evaluate , so long as one !elieves that it %as possi!le to have a"hieve a higher a""urate evalua tion, !y having in"rease ones value# This means, in turn, that the Con "ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation "annot, %hereas the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation "an, explain the vi"es of pri e an shame, %hi"h stem from a esire that is felt to !e satisfie so long as one is evaluate as highly as one evaluates oneself# 8f %e a""ept the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation, therefore, the nee to explain the vi"es of pri e an shame is

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135

a reason to a""ept it as a supplement to, rather than as a repla"ement for, the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation# The Con"ern for Evaluation, on this vie%, %oul "omprise t%o istin"t esires' the esire to !e a""urately evaluate , an the esire to %in higher evaluations, !ut only on the "on ition that they are a""urate# Liven 6o"ial Evaluation, one !elieves that one %ill !e more hi.hly evaluate if an only if ones so"ial a vantage is greater# Liven 6o"ial 6elfEvaluation, one !elieves that a higher evaluation of oneself%ill !e accurate if an only if ones so"ial a vantage is greater# 5en"e, one esires greater so"ial a vantage as a means to higher a""urate evaluation# Be"ause of the nature of so"ial a vantage, as note earlier, the esire evaluations of oneself %ill !e evaluations of oneself as ever more valua!le in "omparison %ith others# 22 0n the first a""ount, %hi"h appeals to Progressive $mour de &oi, one esires higher value in its o%n right# 0ne erivatively esires higher evaluations as evi en"e of this value# 0n the se"on a""ount, %hi"h appeals to the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation, one esires higher a""urate evaluations in their o%n right# 0ne erivatively esires higher value as a "onstituent of su"h evaluations' only !y having greater value "an one make the higher evaluations a""urate#
6<8< !he Role and ?r i.in o# &ocia l Evaluation

0n !oth a""ounts, 6o"ial 6elf-EvaluationG%hi"h is !orn, in turn, from =epen en"e on 0pinion an 6o"ial EvaluationGis "ru"ial in inflaming amour-propre# This a""or s %ith the hypotheti"al history re"ounte in the se"on Discourse# 8n the (happiest an most lasting epo"h,) %e fin men living in families, in settle %ellings, %ith limite property, an some small-s"ale governan"e#
Everyone !egan to look at everyone else an to %ish to !e looke at himself, an pu!li" esteem a";uire a pri"e# The one %ho sang or an"e !estE the han somest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most elo;uent "ame to !e the most highly regar e , an this %as the first step at on"e
22# 0n the earlier a""ount, =epen en"e on 0pinion %as "ru"ial# $ithout it, one %oul not see others evaluations of oneself as evi en"e of ones value# 0n this se" on a""ount, !y "ontrast, =epen en"e on 0pinion is less "ru"ial# 8t %oul !e enough if one someho% in epen ently arrive at 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation# 5o%ever, =epen en"e on 0pinion *along%ith 6o"ial Evaluation, %hi"h must !e assume any%ay4 provi es the most plausi!le explanation, !oth on its o%n terms an as a matter of interpretation, of ho% 6o"ial 6elfEvaluation arises#

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to%ar ine;uality an vi"e' from these first preferen"es arose vanity an "ontempt on the one han , shame an envy on the otherE an the fermen tation "ause !y these ne% leavens eventually pro u"e "ompoun s fatal to happiness an inno"en"e# *A= 133/0C 2#13@K.B4

0n !oth a""ounts, people in the (happiest an most lasting epo"h) alrea y esire higher evaluations' either as evi en"e of their value *assum ing that =epen en"e on 0pinion alrea y prevails in this state4 or for their o%n sake *so long as they are !elieve to !e a""urate4# But, if only !e"ause there are fe%, if any, so"ial goo s, there is little, if any, 6o"ial Evaluation# 0pinion instea pla"es value on ;ualities that epen largely on ones native en o%ment# These ;ualities in"lu e, first, those ;ualities of (!eauty) an (merit) that make one sexually esira!le an , se"on , those ;ualities, su"h as relative strength an skill, that make one a pro u" tive partner in the o""asional, small-s"ale "ooperative ventures that arise# 6in"e these ;ualities epen on ones natural en o%ment, a vantages in them are limite in extent, an there is little anyone "an o to alter them# Thus, the esire for higher evaluations has little outlet# 8t is only%hen metallurgy an agri"ulture arrive on the s"ene, follo%e !y private property an the ivision of la!or, that there arises the possi!ility of vast ifferen"es in so"ial valueGat this point, %ealth# ?o%, if people "ome to evaluate oth ers on the !asis of so"ial a vantage, then there is a %ay to %in ever higher evaluations, %hi"h lea s straight to Competition for 6o"ial A vantage# &et %hy shoul men !egin to evaluate one another on the !asis of so"ial a vantage7 $hy, even %ith the a vent of forge an plo%, ont they persist in evaluating one another solely for gra"e an voi"e7 0ne possi!ility is that the so"ially isa vantage initially efer to an atten to the so"ially a vantage not !e"ause they !elieve that the a vantage have greater value !ut instea for instrumental reasons# Private property an the ivision of la!or in"reasingly for"e the isa vantage to rely on the "ooperation of the a vantage in or er to meet their material nee s# This initially self-intereste eferen"e an attention to the %ealthy, like the ini tially self-intereste eferen"e an attention pai earlier to those %ith the natural skills valua!le in "ooperation, "omes to !e mistaken for a higher evaluation# 0n"e enough people make this mistake, Evaluative =eferen"e ensures that it !e"omes %i esprea # A se"on "ompati!le !ut arker possi!ility is that Progressive $mourde &oi an the Con"ern for 5igherA""urate Evaluation, so to speak, %ant it to !e true that the s"ale of value is so"ial a vantage# This is !e"ause, first, this s"ale is infinite, an , se"on , it is al%ays possi!le, ho%ever unlikely

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137

it may !e, for one to "lim! higher on it# 0ne is never limite !y ones nat ural en o%ment in the value or a""urate evaluations that one "an attain# (The real %orl has its limitsE the imaginary %orl is infinite) *E C1/0C J#2B-4 # As %e suggeste earlier, these esires en"ourage %ishful think ing' a ten en"y, in the a!sen"e of settle kno%le ge to the "ontrary, to see the %orl in terms that are hospita!le to their satisfa"tion# (That an gerous amour-propre %hi"h al%ays %ants to "arry man a!ove his sphere) *E A@3/0C J#3BC4 may en"ourage one to see the %orl as a mitting su"h a possi!ility# Thus, (ine;uality rea ily sprea s among am!itious an pusillanimous souls, ever rea y to take their "han"e on fortune) *A= 1C2/0C 2#1CC4 # (. 'ealt!) Amour-Propre
<1< Evaluative Knowled.e

8f amour-propre is inflame !y the illusion that ones value epen s on ones so"ial a vantage, then healthy amour-propre %oul seem to lie in independent kno%le ge of ones true value, as "onsisting in something other than social advanta.e #
This is, then, the summary of the %hole of human %is om in the use of the passions' *14 To have a sense of the true relations of man, %ith respe"t to the spe"ies as %ell as the in ivi ual# *A4 To or er all the affe"tions of the soul a""or ing to these relations# *E A1@/0C J#-B14

This may !e the sense in %hi"h, as Rousseau %rites in the pre"e ing para graph, (reason) is to (silen"e the opinion of men,) an (sentiment)G perhaps here the sentiment of ones existen"e, the a%areness of ones natureGis to (en"hain imagination,) %hi"h fa!ri"ates a "himeri"al nature !ase on so"ial a vantage# +ater in Emile '
=o not expe"t lengthy pre"epts of morality from me# 8 have only one pre "ept to give you, an it "omprehen s all the others# Be a man# Restrainyour heart %ithin the limits of its "on ition# 6tu y an kno% these limits# 5o%ever narro% they may !e, a man is not unhappy as long as he "loses himself up %ithin them# 5e is unhappy only %hen he %ants to go out !eyon them# 5e is unhappy only %hen in his senseless esires, he puts in the rank of the possi!le %hat is not possi!le# 5e is unhappy %hen he forgets his human estate in or er to forge for himself imaginary estates# *E JJ-K J3/0C J#C1@4

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

138

8n pla"e of 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation, therefore, %e have'


Evaluative Knowled.e ' The true, settle

!elief, Fustifie !y ones o%n refle" tion, that the s"ale of value appropriate to ones nature is the s"ale of natural value, %hi"h "onsists in'

*i4 *ii4

standin. as a human bein. , %hi"h is !ase

on the possession of reason an free om, an %hi"h in turn is the !asis of moral valueE an
natural virtues , a!ilities that have value in epen ent of

"onvention an "onsent, su"h as strength, "ourage, %isom, as %ell as more familiar moral virtues, su"h as generosity#

Evaluative Dno%le ge, in "onFun"tion %ith our enri"he prin"iples, prou"es the'
NaturalEvaluativeDesires , "omprising the Desire#orEvaluation as -uman ' that others *a""urately4 evaluate one as having

stan ing as a human !eingE an the Desire #orEvaluation o# Airtue ' that others a""urately evaluate %hatever natural virtues one has, an then that these evaluations !e as high as possi!leE

an the'
Natural Nonevaluative Desires , "omprising the Desire#or-uman &tandin. ' to maintain human stan ingE an the Desire#orPro.ress in Airtue ' to maintain an evelop ones natural virtues as

far as nature permits#

Assuming the psy"hology of 3#1, Progressive $mour de &oi pro u"es the ?atural ?onevaluative =esires an the Con"ern for A""urate Evaluation pro u"es the ?atural Evaluative =esires# Assuming the psy"hology of 3#A, the Con"erns for A""urate an 5igher A""urate Evaluation pro u"e the ?atural Evaluative =esires ire"tly, an the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation pro u"es the ?atural ?onevaluative =esires instrumentally, as means to make the higher evaluations a""urate# 5o% o these esires express themselves7 The =esire for Progress in 9irtue has a pra"ti"al outlet sin"e there are things that one "an o to improve ones natural virtues# But these o not lea us to %orsen the "onition of others# The fa"t that someone elses natural virtues are lost or go un"ultivate oes nothing to improve mine# 6o, there is no rive for any thing like Competition for 6o"ial A vantage# The =esire for 5uman 6tan ing, !y "ontrast, has no further pra"ti "al outlet !eyon our efforts at self-preservation# True, if Rousseaus hypotheti"al history is rea literally, then full humanityGre;uiring free om

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139

*of the sort es"ri!e in 6C -2/0C 2#23J4 an reasonG%as a har -%on a"hievement for our spe"ies# 8t took eons for -omo sapiens to istinguish itself not merely in potentiality !ut also in a"tuality from mere !easts# But no% %e, as a spe"ies, have free om an reason# 6o there is no% noth ing that any of us in ivi ually "an oGapart from failing to preserve ourselvesGto lose our human stan ing# *?one of us "an even "ontra"t it a%ay N6C JJKJ3/0C 2#2--K-.O #4 5en"e, the =esire for 5uman 6tan ing expresses itself only as a sense of satisfa"tion, "ontentment at ones pla"e in the or er of nature# 8n the %or s of the 6avoyar vi"ar, (8 am "ontent %ith the pla"e in %hi"h Lo has put me# 8 see nothing, ex"ept for 5im, that is !etter than my spe"ies# An if 8 ha to "hoose my pla"e in the or er of !eings, %hat more "oul 8 "hoose than to !e a man7) *E A.C/0C J#-CA4 # 2J ?oti"e that so long as Progressive $mour de &oi is, or the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation lea s to, only a esire to maintain an improve ones position on the s"ale ofvalue etermine by one2s nature , an so long as one knows %hat ones nature is, the =esire for 5uman 6tan ing %ill not !e a esire to o""upy, per impossible , a position o## the s"ale etermine !y ones nature# 8t%ill not !e a esire to !e a "reature of even greater %orth than a human !eing, %hi"h might !e a sour"e of issatisfa"tion, even if it ha no pra"ti"al effe"t# (A king %ants to !e a Lo only%hen he !elieves he is no longer a man,) an so (puts in the rank of the possi!le %hat is not possi!le) *E JJ-KJ3/0C J#C1@4#
<7< :hy $re !hese )omparative DesiresB

Re"all that amour-propre, in all its forms, is a "on"ern for comparative value an evaluation# 5o%ever, the esires that flo% from Evaluative Dno%le ge seem to !e esires for absolute value an evaluation# 6o ho% "an they !e sai to "onstitute healthy amour-propre7 =espite their (a!solute) formulation, the =esires for 5uman 6tan ing an for Evaluation as 5umanGthat one !e value as having, an have, human stan ingGare e;uivalent to "omparative esires' namely, that one !e value as having, an have, e;ual stan ing, as a human !eing, %ith other human !eings# 6o there is no pro!lem %ith these esires# But %hy shoul the a!solute =esires for Evaluation of 9irtueGthat one !e a""urately evaluate for ones natural virtues *su"h as they are, or as highly as possi!le4Gor for Progress in 9irtueGthat one evelop ones
2J# Compare savage mans pri eful "omparisons of himself %ith lo%er animals# A= 13A/0C 2#133#

135 !he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

natural virtues as far as nature permitsGentail any "omparative esires7 $hy, for example, shoul a%areness of someone %ith superior natural virtues lea one to feel any issatisfa"tion7 Their having superior natural virtue oes not someho% make it the "ase that ones o%n virtues are less evelope than they other%ise %oul !e# This might prompt one to revise the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation, so that one esires not only higher evaluation !ut also higher comparative evaluation' not higher in a!solute terms !ut instea relative to the actual "on ition of others# 8f this %ere the esire, ho%ever, then one %oul !e motivate not only to improve ones o%n natural virtues !ut also to prevent others from improving their natural virtues, or even to un er mine these virtues# This %oul intro u"e a kin of "ompetition for natural a vantage, %ith a temptation to evils similar to, although perhaps not as extensive as, Competition for 6o"ial A vantage# A more plausi!le ans%er, 8 think, lies in the Prin"iple of Epistemi" =esire# The =esire for Progress in 9irtue is a esire that one improve ones natural virtues as far as ones nature permits, or, to put it negatively, that ones nature permit less improvement# But it is epistemi"ally un"ertain ho% mu"h more improvement ones nature permits#
5en"e %e kno%, or "an kno%, the first point from %hi"h ea"h of us starts # But%ho kno%s the other limit7 8 kno% of no philosopher %ho has yet !een so !ol as to say' this is the limit of %hat man "an attain an !eyon %hi"h he "annot go# $e o not kno% %hat our nature permits us to !e# ?one of us has measure the istan"e %hi"h "an exist !et%een one man an another# *E 3A/0C J#AC14
.. . ...

Therefore, one esires evi en"e that ones nature permits less improve ment# The !est evi en"e for this, an perhaps the only evi en"e, is that ones natural virtues "ompare more favora!ly, or at least less unfavora!ly, to the natural virtues of others# 8f anothers natural virtues are superior to ones o%n, for example, then that is evi en"e, given at least some rough e;uality of potential, that one still has room to evelop ones o%n# As the passage a!ove "ontinues' ($hat soul is so !ase that he has never !een %arme !y this i ea an oes not sometime in his pri e say to himself' H5o% many men 8 have alrea y surpasse P 5o% many 8 "an still rea"hP $hy shoul my e;ual go farther than 87) This is ho% the a!solute esire that one evelop ones natural virtues as far as ones nature permits pro u"es the "omparative esire that ones natural virtues !e superior to others# ?oti"e that this esire oes not involve any esire to %orsen the "on i tion of others, an so is nothing like Competition for 6o"ial A vantage#

136 ?8D0 D0+0=?&

$orsening the natural virtues of others provi es me %ith no evi en"e that mine are evelope # This esire makes even healthy amour-propre a esire for superiority in "ertain respe"ts' namely, ones natural virtues#
NEmileO %ill "on"ern himself %ith their opinions only insofar as it relates imme iately to his person, an he %ill not %orry a!out ar!itrary evalu ations %hose only la% is fashion or preFu i"e# 5e %ill have the pri e to %ant to o everything he oes %ell, even to o it !etter than another# 5e %ill %ant to !e the s%iftest at running, the strongest at %restling, the most "ompetent at %orking, the most a roit at games of skill# But he %ill har ly seek a vantages %hi"h are not "lear in themselves an %hi"h nee to !e esta!lishe !y anothers Fu gment, su"h as !eing more intelligent N d2avoir plus d2esprit ' possi!ly, (!eing %ittier than)O than someone else, talking !et ter, !eing more learne , et"#E still less %ill he seek those a vantages %hi"h are not at all "onne"te %ith ones person, su"h as !eing of no!ler !irth, !eing esteeme ri"her, more influential, or more respe"te , or making an impression !y greater pomp# *E 22@/0C J#3.BK.14

Liven Evaluative Dno%le ge, ho%ever, one kno%s that ones natural virtues are not the !asis of ones moral %orth# 6o the esire for superiority in natural virtue is not a esire for superiority in moral value# 5en"e, this is "onsistent %ith our un erstan ing of healthy amour-propre#22-# There are those, su"h as 6hklar, (en and )iti*ens , %ho argue that the sear"h for reme ies, or prophyla"ti"s, in Rousseaus thought is mispla"e # This may !e so, !ut, if the foregoing is "orre"t, it is not "ompelle !y his a""ount of healthy amour-propre# There is, first, the possi!ility of individual education ' to lea in ivi uals to a";uire Evaluative Dno%le ge an to preserve them from =epen en"e on 0pinion an 6o"ial 6elf-Evaluation# This appears to !e the aim of Emile ' to instill an in epen ent sense of%hatis ofvalue, groun e enough to %eather the preFu i"es that the pupil must eventually "onfront# There is, se" on , the possi!ility of institutional re#orm ' to stru"ture so"ial value so as to mat"h, as far as possi!le, natural value# The so"ial %orl envisione !y the &ocial )ontract seems largely to a"hieve this !y ensuring stri"tly e;ual *ultimate4 politi"al po%er an roughly e;ual %ealth an a%ar ing pu!li" istin"tions on the !asis ofvirtue# 6C @J/0C 2#JBC# At the very least, this mirroring of the natural in the "ivi" serves as a failsafe# Even if =epen en"e on 0pinion is not extirpate , its pra"ti"al effe"ts %ill mimi" those of Evaluative Dno%le ge# $e %ill en up in a situation like the (happiest an most lasting epo"h,) %here people evaluate themselves in %hatever "urren"y opinion "oins, !ut, as it happens, this "urren"y is "losely !oun to natural value# ,ore hopefully an more sta!ly, ho%ever, su"h a so"ial %orl might serve as pu!li" e u"ation, offering a ifferent path to Evaluative Dno%le ge# By experien"ing one another as e;uals, %e "ome to un erstan ho% an %hy %e really are# >or this point, see Cohen, (The ?atural Loo ness of 5umanity#)

!he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

13

<8< &hould $mour%Propre )are about $ccuracyB

0n the a""ounts that 8 have offere , inflame amour-propre, no less than healthy amour-propre, %ants accurate evaluations of oneself' that is, evaluations !yFu ges %ho are !oth ;ualifie an a";uainte %ith ones relevant "hara"teristi"s# 0nly su"h evaluations "an satisfy the esire for evidence that ones value has in"rease , or the esire for accurate evaluation# 5o%ever, ue to =epen en"e on 0pinion, one has no stan ar in epen ent of oth ers evaluations !y %hi"h to assess their ;ualifi"ations# An ue to 6o"ial Evaluation, the "hara"teristi"s %ith %hi"h others must !e a";uainte G %ealth, rank, an so onGare superfi"ial, in the "ollo;uial sense# $ith Evaluative Dno%le ge, !y "ontrast, one has an in epen ent stan ar of evaluation, an the relevant "hara"teristi"s to !e evaluate are eeper# 5en"e, the =esires for Evaluation as 5uman an for Evaluation of 9irtue are sat isfie only !y evaluations from ;ualifie Fu ges, %ho kno% %hat one is really like#
NEmileO values mensFu gments too little to value their preFu i"es, an he oes not "are to !e esteeme !efore !eing kno%n# *E 22-/0C J#33-4 NEmileO %ill not pre"isely say to himself, H8 reFoi"e !e"ause they approve of me, !ut rather, H8 reFoi"e !e"ause they approve of %hat 8 have one that is goo # 8 reFoi"e that the people %ho honor me o themselves honor# 6o long as theyFu ge so soun ly, it %ill !e a fine thing to o!tain their esteem# *E 22@/0C J#3.1, see also R6$ .1/0C 1#1B..4 A rule prior to opinion exists for the %hole human spe"ies# 8t is to the inflexi!le ire"tion of this rule that all the others ought to !e relate # This rule Fu ges preFu i"e itself, an only insofar as the esteem of men a""or s %ith it ought this esteem to !e authoritative for us# *E 2CA/ 0C J#.2B4

0ne may %orry, ho%ever, that this oes not ra% the "ontrast !et%een inflame an healthy amour-propre sharply enough# 8nflame amourpropre, it might !e sai , oes not even "are %hether the evaluations that it seeks are a""urate# After all, Rousseau suggests that those %ith inflame amour-propre eli!erately seek to e"eive others a!out their attri!utes# 8n ee , this very falseness is one of the vi"es of inflame amour-propre *1= CE A= 1.BK.1,1C.E RII A1J/0C 2#CK@,1.-,1@2, 0C 1#@234# 5o%ever, it oes not follo% from the fa"t that those %ith inflame amour-propre eli!erately seek to e"eive others a!out "ertain of their attri!utes that they o not "are %hether the evaluations that they fun amentally "rave are a""urate# They may eli!erately seek to e"eive

?8D0 D0+0=?&

13'

others a!out "ertain attri!utes only as means to a"tually a";uiring other attri!utes that they !elieve others evaluate highly# They may feign attri!utes that are not so"ial a vantages in or er to a";uire so"ial a vantagesGas %hen the su!or inate feigns loyalty in or er to %in rank, or the author feigns originality in or er to %in fameGor they may feign "ertain so"ial a vantages in or er to a";uire other so"ial a vantagesG as %hen the s%in ler feigns no!ility in or er to gain %ealth# $hy, on this vie%, oes inflame amour-propre lea to su"h e"eption, %hereas healthy amour-propre oes not7 Be"ause inflame amour-propre seeks so"ial a vantage, %hereas healthy amour-propre seeks only human stan ing an natural virtue# $hile so"ial a vantage can !e %on !y e"eption, human stan ing an natural virtue "annot# 8n any event, it is har to see ho% inflame amour-propre "oul esire ina""urate evaluations *ex"ept as means to a""urate evaluations4# A esire for ina""urate evaluations "annot !e explaine !y appeal to amour de soi an the Prin"iple of Evi ential =esire# 0ne "annot see %hat one takes to !e ina""urate evaluations as provi ing evi en"e of value# 6o %e %oul have to rely instea on the Con"ern for Evaluation# 6in"e healthy amour-propre is "learly a esire ex"lusively for a""urate evalua tions, the Con"ern for Evaluation %oul have to take the follo%ing form# 8t %oul have to esire evaluations of a "ertain "hara"ter C , su"h that one might, un er "ertain "on itions, !elieve that even ina""urate eval uations have CGlea ing *perhaps in "onFun"tion %ith other !eliefs4 to inflame amour-propreG!ut also su"h that one might "ome to !elieve, un er other "on itions, that only a""urate evaluations have C Glea ing to healthy amour-propre# 8t is o!s"ure %hat "hara"ter C %oul !e# *. Conclusion By %ay of a summary, "onsi er the explanation that this a""ount offers of Rousseaus es"ription of not only inflame !ut also healthy amourpropre as a esire (to !e in the first position#)
The first glan"e he "asts on his fello%s lea s him to "ompare himself %ith them# An the first sentiment arouse in him !y this "omparison is the esire to !e in the first position# This is the point %here love of self N amour de soi O turns into amour-propre an %here !egin to arise all the passions %hi"h epen on this one# But to e"i e %hether among these passions the ominant ones in his "hara"ter %ill !e humane an gentle or "ruel an malignant, %hether they %ill !e passions of !enefi"en"e an "ommiseration or of envy an "ovetousness, %e must kno% %hat position he %ill

133 !he E"planation o# $mour%Propre

feel he has among men, an %hat kin s of o!sta"les he may !elieve he has to over"ome to rea"h the position he %ants to o""upy# *E A2-, see also RII 11A/0C J#-A2KAJ, 0C 1#CB34

Both forms of amour-propre, on this a""ount, stem either from Progres sive $mour de &oi or the Con"ern for 5igher A""urate Evaluation# Ea"h of these is, or entails, an a!solute esire to "lim! as far up the s"ale of value as ones nature permits# $hether this esire %ill take a healthy or inflame form epen s, as %e have seen, on %hat one !elieves a!out %hat (positions) the s"ale of value that "orrespon s to ones nature allo%s an a!out%hat (o!sta"les) stan in the %ay of rea"hing them# $hen "om!ine %ith 6o"ial 6elf-EvaluationGthe !elief that this s"ale of value is so"ial a vantageGit !e"omes the esire to a";uire ever more so"ial a vantage# This is a "omparative esire to !e (in the first position) !e"ause the s"ale of so"ial a vantage is inherently "omparative# By "ontrast, %hen "om!ine %ith Evaluative Dno%le geGthat the s"ale of value is natural valueGthis esire entails !oth a esire to have human stan ing an to evelop ones natural virtues as far as ones nature allo%s# These also are, or entail, "omparative esires to !e (in the first position#) 5aving human stan ing is Fust e;uivalent to not having inferior stan ing, %ith respe"t to ones humanity, %ith other human !eings# 6o the esire for human stan ing is e;uivalent to not having inferior position, %ith respe"t to ones humanity, %ith other human !eings# An the superior virtues of others provi e evi en"e that ones o%n virtues "an !e further evelope # 5en"e, the esire to evelop ones virtues as far as ones nature allo%s entails, via the Prin"iple of Evi ential =esire, a esire not to have inferior position in ones natural virtues in "omparison to others# An involve story, to !e sure# The thesis of possi!le goo ness is sustaine only !y an unexpe"te ly "ompli"ate apparatus, "ompose of many moving parts# But 8 !elieve it "omes %ith the territory# 8 ont fore "lose a re"onstru"tion of Rousseaus efense of the thesis of possi!le goo ness that might !e truer to the texts, or more plausi!le as a portrait of ho% %e a"tually are# 8 o ou!t, ho%ever, that a efense of the thesis "oul !e "onsi era!lyless "omplex# ?othing simpler, 8 suspe"t, "oul hol together Rousseaus optimism %ith his pessimism# But then this is part of the point, or at least the lesson, of his %ork' that hopes su"h as his for %hat %e might !e strain against espair su"h as his at %hat %e no% are#

755 ?8D0 D0+0=?&

A++re#iations $orks !y Rousseau fre;uently "ite have !een i entifie !y the follo%ing a!!reviations' 1=
Discourse on &ciences and the $rts , in !he Discourses and ?ther Early Political :ritin.s , e # 9i"tor Lourevit"h *Cam!ri ge' Cam!ri ge

University Press, 1@@.4# A=


Discourse on the ?ri.in and @oundations o# ,nequality amon. (en , in !he D isco ur ses and ? the r Ear ly Po lit ica l :r it in. s , e # 9i"tor Lourevit"h *Cam!ri ge' Cam!ri ge University Press, 1@@.4# E Emile , trans# Allan Bloom *?e%&ork' Basi" Books, 1@.@4# I 1ulie or the New -eloise , in !he )ollected :ritin.s o# Rousseau , vol# 3, trans# Philip 6te%art an Iean 9a"h:e *5anover, ?5' University Press of ?e% Englan , 1@@.4 # +, 0etters to (alesherbes/ in !he )ollected :ritin.s o# Rousseau , vol# -, e # Christopher Delly, Roger =# ,asters, an Peter L# 6tillman, trans# Christopher Delly *5anover, ?5' University Press of ?e% Englan , 1@@-4 # 0C ?euvres )omplDetes , e # Bernar Lagne!in an ,ar"el Raymon *Paris' Lallimar , Bi!liothQe;ue e la Pl:eia e,1@-@K@-4# RII R o us s e au + 1u d . e o #1e a n % 1a c q u es + D ia lo . u e s , in ! he ) o l le c t e d :r i t in . s o# Rousseau , vol# 1, e # Roger =# ,asters an Christopher Delly, trans# Iu ith R# Bush, Christopher Delly, an Roger =# ,asters *5anover, ?5' University Press of ?e% Englan , 1@@B4 # R6$ Reveries o# the &olitary :alker , in !he )ollected :ritin.s o# Rousseau , vol# C, e # Christopher Delly, trans# Charles Butter%orth, Alexan ra Cook, an Teren"e E# ,arshall *5anover, ?5' University Press of ?e% Englan , ABBB4 # 6C !he &oc ia l ) ontra ct , in !he &oc ia l )o nt ra ct an d ? th er 0at er Po lit ica l :ritin.s , e # 9i"tor Lourevit"h *Cam!ri ge' Cam!ri ge University Press, 1@@ .4 #

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