Author & Citation Info | Friends PDF Preview | InPho Search | PhilPapers Bibliography

Supplement to Propositional Attitude Reports

The De Re/De Dicto Distinction

Propositional attitude verbs seem to be examples of what we can call opacity verbs. That is, they seem to create linguistic environments that do not permit substitution of co-designating singular terms salva veritate. This is the basis of Frege's puzzle. odals li!e "it is necessary that# and "it is possible that# are also opacity inducing. $pacity verbs give rise to a de re/de dicto distinction. The de re/de dicto distinction has meant different things to different people. %elow we'll distinguish three different conceptions of this distinction, the first two concerning the status of sentences and the third being more metaphysical. %ut first let us motivate the distinction. &. '. (uine, in his )*+,, introduced this distinction by pointing out an ambiguity in the following. -). /alph believes that someone is a spy. This could mean either of the following. -0. /alph believes that there are spies or -1. 2omeone is such that /alph believes that he is a spy. The truth of -1. but not -0., to echo (uine, would give the F%3 cause to be interested in /alph -or at least this was evidently so in the )*+4s.. &e might paraphrase -1. as follows5 62omeone is such that /alph believes of him that he is a spy.6 The distinction between -0. and -1. can be seen as a distinction of scope for the existential 7uantifier. 3n -0., the existential 7uantifier is interpreted as having narrow scope, within the scope of "believes'. -08. /alph believes5 x-x is a spy..

3n -1., however, the existential 7uantifier has wide scope and binds a variable that occurs freely within the scope of "believes'. -18. x-/alph believes that x is a spy.. The ambiguity in -). and the simple way of distinguishing the two interpretations in -08. and -18. suggest that we are on to something. /ussell's theory of definite descriptions employs 9ust such a distinction in answering Frege's puzzles about belief. -2ee the supplementary document on :efinite descriptions.. 3t is worth briefly noting that the same distinction can be found with both modals and temporal modifiers. -;. below is ambiguous between -;n. and -;w.. -;. The shortest spy might not have been<was not a spy. -;n. 3t is possible<was the case that5 the shortest spy is not a spy. -;w. The shortest spy is such that it is possible the case that he is not a spy. -;n. is false= necessarily, any spy such that no spy is shorter than it is a spy. %ut presumably -;w. is true= the person who in fact is shortest of all spies might not have gone into espionage and surely wasn't born into the business. This very natural and elegant explanation of the ambiguity in -). leads us to the first conception of the de re/de dicto distinction. Syntactically de re/de dicto5 > sentence is syntactically de re 9ust in case it contains a pronoun or free variable within the scope of an opacity verb that is anaphoric on or bound by a singular term or 7uantifier outside the scope of that verb. $therwise, it is syntactically de dicto. 2o, -0. and its 7uasi-formalization -08. are syntactically de dicto because the 7uantifier "someone# occurs within the scope of "believes# along with the variable it binds. -1. and its 7uasi-formalization -18., on the other hand, are syntactically de re because the 7uantifier "someone# occurs outside the scope of "believes' and yet binds a variable within its scope. 2imilarly, -+. and -,. below are syntactically de dicto while -?. and -@. are syntactically de re. -+. 2ally believes that %ill is happy.

-,. 2ally believes that someone is happy. -?. %ill is such that 2ally believes that he is happy. -@. 2omeone is such that 2ally believes that he is happy. 3n his )*+,, (uine considers and then re9ects this simple account of the different readings -). seems to give rise to. Ae re9ects it because it involves quantifying into opaque environments, which (uine thought was incoherent. 3n particular, ma!ing sense of one reading of -). in terms of -1. and -18. re7uires ma!ing sense of 7uantifying in, which (uine maintained could not be done without changing the meaning of the 7uantifier or the attitude verb. $n the standard semantics for 7uantification, the interpretation of -18. re7uires that we be able to say when an individual satisfies the open sentence "/alph believes that x is a spy#. This is because the standard semantics for 7uantification is ob9ectual5 > 7uantified sentence xx is true 9ust in case there is an ob9ect that x is true of. (uine thought that this leads to contradiction when the open sentence contains an opacity-inducing verb li!e "believes#. Ae thought this largely because of considerations involving Frege-style cases. (uine's arguments here follow his earlier arguments against 7uantified modal logic -see, for example, (uine )*@4.. (uine thought that -18. is non-sense because he thought it is incoherent to say of some individual B $rtcutt, let's say B that the open sentence "/alph believes that he is a spy# is true of him. Ae thought this, in turn, for the following reason. 2uppose that /alph !nows of $rtcutt under two guises. Cnder one B say, the mayor of the town guise B /alph thin!s of him as the town pillar who would hardly engage in espionage. Cnder the other B say, the guy he saw snea!ing around in the shadows at night in a trench coat B he thin!s of him as a suspicious character engaged in espionage. Det's associate the first with the term " ayor# and the second with the term "he Epointing at the man in the dar!F#. -*. below seems true while -)4. seems false. -*. /alph believes that he Epointing at the man in the dar!F is a spy. -)4. /alph believes that ayor is a spy.

%ut then whether or not $rtcutt satisfies the open formula "is believed by /alph to be a spy# depends on how $rtcutt is designated. 3n particular, $rtcutt satisfies

the formula if designated as "he Epointing at the man in the dar!F# and doesn't if designated as " ayor#. 2o, (uine concluded, it is simply non-sense to say that $rtcutt himself, independent of a way of designating him, satisfies or doesn't satisfy the condition. %ut then, given the standard ob9ectual semantics for 7uantification, -18. itself doesn't ma!e any sense, as it is ob9ects themselves, however or even whether they are designated, that satisfy or do not satisfy conditions. 2o, says (uine, we should abandon the attractive pro9ect of ma!ing sense of the two readings -). gives rise to in terms of a difference in scope. &e'll return to this argument shortly. First, however, let's introduce our second conception of the de re/de dicto distinction. &e shall call it 6the semantically de re/de dicto distinction.6 Semantically de re/de dicto5 > sentence is semantically de re 9ust in case it permits substitution of codesignating terms salva veritate. $therwise, it is semantically de dicto. -?. from above non-controversially counts as semantically de re. 2uppose that %ill is Grumpy. Then -?. is true iff -)). below is true. -)). Grumpy is such that 2ally believes that he is happy. -,. is non-controversially semantically de dicto. 2imilarly, it is all but noncontroversial that -)0. below is semantically de dicto. -)0. 2ally believes that the happy guy in the corner is happy. Hven if Grumpy is the happy loo!ing guy in the corner, -)1. below doesn't seem to follow from the truth of -)0.. -)1. 2ally believes that Grumpy is happy. &hat about a sentence li!e -+. from aboveI 3n general, what is the relationship between the syntactic conception and the semantic conceptionI 3f Fregeanism is true, then every syntactically de dicto sentence is semantically de dicto as well. $n Frege's own view, remember, attitude verbs induce a reference shift. Furthermore, a large part of the motivation for accepting a sense<reference distinction for singular terms is to ensure that substitution on the basis of an ordinary co-reference relation within the scope of an attitude verb is bloc!ed. %ut substitution outside such environments should be legitimate. 2o, any

syntactically de dicto sentence should be one that does not permit, without further assumptions, substitution and hence is semantically de dicto as well. 2ophisticated forms of /ussellianism -see section , on Jontextualist theories in the main text. yield a similar result. 2ubstitution within the scope of an attitude verb is, in general, not permitted and hence any syntactically de dicto sentence will be semantically de dicto for the reasons given above. %ut what if Kaive /ussellianism is trueI -2ee the section The Kaive /ussellian theory in the main text.. Given Kaive /ussellianism, and given the identity of %ill and Grumpy, -+. is true iff -)1. is true. Kow suppose that definite descriptions are singular terms and suppose that they function roughly as /ussell says they do. -&e say roughly because /ussell thought that definite descriptions are not singular terms. For more on /ussell's theory of definite descriptions, see the supplementary document :efinite descriptions and the entry on descriptions. Kote that we can agree with the /ussellian truth conditions for sentences with definite descriptions while insisting that definite descriptions are singular terms and do not brea! up under analysis.. Then the identity of %ill and the person at :isneyland, together with the truth of -+. does not suffice for the truth of -);. below. -);. 2ally believes that the person at :isneyland is happy. 3ntuitively, -);. is true 9ust in case 2ally believes true a proposition to the effect that whoever is uni7uely at :isneyland is happy. 3f Kaive /ussellianism is true, then -+. is true 9ust in case 2ally believes true the singular proposition containing %ill as a direct constituent to the effect that he is happy. These are different propositions and 2ally could believe true one without believing true the other. 2o, a general substitution principle would be violated. The same seems true of any syntactically de dicto propositional attitude ascribing sentence. 2o, it would seem, we still would have the same connection between syntactic and semantic conceptions of a sentence's being de dicto. %ut suppose now that a Kaive /ussellian denies that definite descriptions are singular terms. Then the falsity of -);. is irrelevant. %ecause the truth of -+. guarantees the truth of -)1., and indeed any belief sentence resulting from the substitution of a co-referring genuine singular term, it would appear that -+. -as well as -)1.., is syntactically de dicto and semantically de re. This is a bit surprising.

3ndeed, Kaive /ussellianism, and perhaps neo-/ussellianism in general, seems to give rise to a very interesting form of reduction of the de re to the de dicto. $n some conceptions of the reduction of the de re to the de dicto, all de re beliefs involve completely conceptualized beliefs. -2ee, for example, Laplan )*,*, Jhisholm )*?,, and 2osa )*?4. Laplan abandons the view in his later wor!.. The neo-/ussellian is not li!ely to embrace this sort of reduction. %ut there is a less ambitious reduction that she may well find congenial5 Kamely, for any true de re reporting sentence, there is a true de dicto reporting sentence. This is because the de re and de dicto reporting sentences will report the very same belief, as is witnessed by the Kaive /ussellian view of the relationship between -)). and -)1.. %elieving that Grumpy is happy 9ust is, on this view, believing of Grumpy that he is happy. %oth -)). and -)1., that is, report belief in the same singular proposition. -For a suggestion of the relationship between neo-/ussellianism and the reduction of the de re, see Laplan )*@,= for more details, see 2almon )**+, )**?.. 3f this view is correct, then we can see that (uine's argument against the natural and elegant account of the ambiguity we found in -). that we started out with fails. Det us return to our discussion of (uine. (uine re9ects, remember, -18.. %ut he does not deny that there is an intuitive distinction between two ways of reading -). that the simple /ussell-inspired account in terms of -0. and -1. is trying to get at. (uine offered an account of that intuitive distinction in terms of a lexical ambiguity in "believes' -and other propositional attitude verbs.. -The /ussellinspired account considered above ma!es sense of the distinction as a syntactic ambiguity of scope.. There is, first, the two-place relation believes-notional, which is a relation between an agent and a proposition. -(uine, in section ; of his )*+,, went on to eliminate propositional attitudes in terms of believing-true a sentence. 2ee the discussion of sententialism in the section :enying the assumption of structured-propositionalism in the main text.. 3n addition, there is an irreducible three-place relation believes-relational, which obtains between an agent, an ob9ect, and an abstract. 3f (uine were right, there would be no reducibility thesis of any !ind between the semantically de re and the semantically de dicto. %urge, in his )*??a<b, agrees with (uine on this score. >lthough it may be tempting to thin! of the ambiguity uncovered in -). as an ambiguity in the verb "believe#, section @ on >mbiguity theories in the main text explains why this is unattractive. Positing lexical ambiguities to explain the data is unnecessary, as we have seen above in our discussion of neo-/ussellianism. >nd there have also been Fregean account of the distinction offered in Laplan

)*,* and Forbes )**, that do not re7uire positing a lexical ambiguity. Given the dictum that lexical ambiguities should be invo!ed only when necessary, this calls into 7uestion the (uinean account of the two readings of -).. There is a final conception of the de re/de dicto distinction that is worth briefly considering. &e shall label it the metaphysical conception of the de re/de dicto distinction. This conception of the distinction concerns the role a given ob9ect plays in the in the truth of a sentence. This conception of the distinction is best brought out by contrasting the simple theory of predication that forms the basis of standard predicate logic with 7uotation. 3n standard predicate logic, an n predicate is interpreted by being assigned a set of n-tuples of individuals from the domain of discourse= intuitively, the set of n-tuples to which the predicate applies. >n atomic sentence of the form MN is true in an interpretation 9ust in case the value of N in that interpretation is in the extension of Mx in that interpretation. Jontrast this with the relationship between ordinary ob9ects and 7uotation. The truth of -)+. below does not directly involve Aenry himself but instead the name "Aenry#. -)+. "Aenry# has + letters. >t best Aenry is indirectly, if at all, involved in the truth of -)+. in virtue of his having a name -namely, the name "Aenry#. that has the attribute of having + letters. Aere, it is the name, not Aenry himself, that is the direct ob9ect of predication. &ith this in mind, we can formulate our third conception of the de re<de dicto distinction as follows. Metaphysically de re/de dicto5 >n attribution is metaphysically de re with respect to an ob9ect o 9ust in case it directly attributes a property to o. >re belief attributions metaphysically de reI >nd how does our third conception of the de re relate to the other two conceptions introduced earlierI The answers to these 7uestions differ depending on the theory of belief attributions one adopts. 2uppose that an attribution is metaphysically de re with respect to o. Then the expression in the attribution that designates o should be open to substitution and hence the attribution is semantically de re as well. For suppose it were not. Then

the truth of the attribution would depend on how the ob9ect is designated. %ut then whether or not the attribution is true would not depend solely on how the ob9ect itself is and so the attribution would not be metaphysically de re. 2uppose that 2ally believes that %ill is happy. :oes it thereby follow that %ill himself has a property B namely, the property of being believed by 2ally to be happyI Keo-/ussellians say 6yes,6 for reasons discussed above5 Kamely, 2ally's believing that %ill is happy involves 2ally's standing in the belief relation to a singular proposition that involves %ill himself as a direct constituent. Those that re9ect neo-/ussellianism, however, answer 6no.6 This is because 2ally's belief, which is truly reported by -+., does not involve %ill himself but rather some mode of presentation of %ill. %ill himself is at best indirectly implicated in the truth of -+., by being determined by the mode of presentation in 7uestion. Jlaiming that belief attributions are not metaphysically de re is problem, for the following reasons. 2uppose that 2ally has reason to believe, on purely general grounds, that there is exactly one person at :isneyland and that whoever is at :isneyland is a happy person. Then -);. from above seems true. 2uppose now that %ill is the person at :isneyland. 3n this case, although in some sense it is %ill that 2ally believes to be happy, in that she believes true a proposition that is about %ill in virtue of his satisfying the condition of uni7uely being at :isneyland, it is intuitive that %ill himself does not have the property of being believed by 2ally to be happy. 2o, the truth of -);. should not entail a metaphysically de re attribution to %ill. This is in contrast to the case in which %renda's grounds for believing that the person at :isneyland is happy is her having spied on %ill from her hotel room. 3n that case, it is plausible that %renda has a de re belief of %ill to the effect that he is happy. Jonsider now -)?.. -)?. The person at :isneyland is such that 2ally believes that he is happy. -)?. is syntactically de re, non-controversially allows substitution, and hence is semantically de re as well. 3ntuitively the truth of -)?., combined with the fact that %ill is the person at :isneyland, entails -?.. -)?. and -?. do seem to be metaphysically de re with respect to %ill. The challenge is to explain why this is so. &hy does -);. not entail -)?. or -?.I

> plausible answer is this. The truth of -)?. and -?. re7uire that 2ally stand in the belief relation to a singular proposition involving %ill himself as a direct constituent. %ut -);. can be true even if 2ally believes no such proposition. The truth of -);. re7uires only that 2ally stand in the belief relation to a purely general proposition to the effect that there is someone who uni7uely is at :isneyland and that person is happy. 3n the situation described, 2ally is only in a position to entertain a general proposition about %ill and not the singular proposition that would support the truth of -)?. and -?.. ore generally, a designating term within the that-clause is open to exportation, transforming a syntactically de dicto propositional attitude ascription into a semantically and metaphysically de re one, precisely when that expression is directly referential. This is an answer that only a neo-/ussellian is in a position to offer. This is because it presupposes that singular propositions are the contents of the attitudes. $ne serious problem facing those who re9ect neo-/ussellianism is to explain the intuition that -);. does not entail -)?.. &hile a complete survey of the options is out of the 7uestion here, it seems that there are two main options. The first is to re9ect the intuition, claiming that -);. does entail -)?.. This is to accept a form of latitudinarianism about de re attitudes, according to which -nonempty. designating terms within propositional attitude verbs freely export outside the scope of propositional attitude verbs. -:efenses of this view can be found in %a!er )*@0, Jhisholm )*?,, and 2osa )*?4, )**+.. This view does not comport well with the intuition that there is an important difference between the cognitive states of 2ally and %renda. The second option is to accept that -);. does not entail -)?. and see! to provide an account of the conditions under which such an entailment obtains, consistent with the thesis that the contents of thought are always fully conceptualized and Fregean. Laplan )*,* is an example of this option. Ae as!s whether /alph's believing that the shortest spy is a spy on the grounds that there are finitely many spies and none of them have exactly the same height suffices for /alph's having a de re belief concerning the shortest spy that he is a spy. Laplan claims that it does not, thus agreeing that an inference li!e that of -)?. from -);. is not generally valid. Ae went on to complicate his simple account of de re belief by re7uiring vivid names of the ob9ect of belief in order for a term to export outside the scope of an attitude verb. The re7uirements of of-ness and vividness, however, or any other condition of their !ind, seem contrary to Fregeanism, as such notions seem to suggest a distinction between directly referential and descriptive terms, which leads to some form of /ussellianism.

The issues involving the de re/de dicto distinction are very complex. 3n this short note we have distinguished three different conceptions of that distinction. Hxactly how these different conceptions line up is controversial. &e have tried to explore some connections one might forge between the view one ta!es on the nature of propositional attitudes and one's conception of the de re/de dicto distinction. /eturn to the main entry on Propositional >ttitude /eports
Copyright !"#" by

$ho%as &c'ay (tjmckay@syr.edu) &ichael *elson (mnelson@ucr.edu)