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  • GSN Perspectives: London Bombings Puzzle Experts On Both Sides of The Atlantic

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    Martin Edwin Andersen
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    (Martin Edwin Andersen, our Washington correspondent, draws upon his many sources, and his years of experience, to make some sense of the London terror attacks and their aftermath.) Martin Edwin Andersen Government Security News August 18, 2005 As the expansive waves of the London suicide bombings continue to resonate around the United States, what one friend scornfully describes as “September 12th” homeland security experts are again peddling all manner of policy prescriptions, some so pricey they might also help fulfill Osama bin Laden’s dream of bankrupting the country. Meanwhile, security sources investigating the London attacks say they believe that the crude nail bombs used by the Islamicists were not unlike those employed by the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army. (Reportedly, the peroxide acetone base of the explosives is something that police dogs in both the U.S. and the U.K. generally are not trained to detect.) Still, fearing a repeat of the low-tech bus and subway attacks across the Atlantic, many are calling for the federal government to spend $6 billion to improve public transportation security, this in a nation that has yet to be able scrape together $400 million a year to better protect its seaports. Sow the land with tens of thousands more video cameras, others say, failing to note that the London bombers were successful in carrying out their initial attacks despite the fact that the city’s buses and subways were already honeycombed with the security tools. (Not only is the technology expensive; where it is most useful -- as London proves -- is in after-the-fact documentation of what occurred, rather than in prevention.) More perimeter controls, others importune, unmindful of the delays and added expense these have caused at the nation’s airports, even as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other critics regularly skewer the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for creating the illusion, rather than the reality, of safety. Yet the experience of London, whose extensive networks of cameras, checkpoints and bollards -- “fortress urbanism,” it is called -- reflect not just the prevention of the threat posed by Islamicists, but also more than three decades of fighting the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), shows that not everything can be protected all the time. “You can’t child-proof America,” James Jay Carafano, one of Washington’s real experts in homeland security, warns. (Carafano, too, expresses weariness with what he calls “newly-minted terrorism experts” that have joined the mass media chattering class with their rant and can't.) Clearly, something needs to be done. But what?

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    (Martin Edwin Andersen, our Washington correspondent, draws upon his many sources, and his years of experience, to make some sense of the London terror attacks and their aftermath.) Martin Edwin Andersen Government Security News August 18, 2005 As the expansive waves of the London suicide bombings continue to resonate around the United States, what one friend scornfully describes as “September 12th” homeland security experts are again peddling all manner of policy prescriptions, some so pricey they might also help fulfill Osama bin Laden’s dream of bankrupting the country. Meanwhile, security sources investigating the London attacks say they believe that the crude nail bombs used by the Islamicists were not unlike those employed by the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army. (Reportedly, the peroxide acetone base of the explosives is something that police dogs in both the U.S. and the U.K. generally are not trained to detect.) Still, fearing a repeat of the low-tech bus and subway attacks across the Atlantic, many are calling for the federal government to spend $6 billion to improve public transportation security, this in a nation that has yet to be able scrape together $400 million a year to better protect its seaports. Sow the land with tens of thousands more video cameras, others say, failing to note that the London bombers were successful in carrying out their initial attacks despite the fact that the city’s buses and subways were already honeycombed with the security tools. (Not only is the technology expensive; where it is most useful -- as London proves -- is in after-the-fact documentation of what occurred, rather than in prevention.) More perimeter controls, others importune, unmindful of the delays and added expense these have caused at the nation’s airports, even as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other critics regularly skewer the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for creating the illusion, rather than the reality, of safety. Yet the experience of London, whose extensive networks of cameras, checkpoints and bollards -- “fortress urbanism,” it is called -- reflect not just the prevention of the threat posed by Islamicists, but also more than three decades of fighting the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), shows that not everything can be protected all the time. “You can’t child-proof America,” James Jay Carafano, one of Washington’s real experts in homeland security, warns. (Carafano, too, expresses weariness with what he calls “newly-minted terrorism experts” that have joined the mass media chattering class with their rant and can't.) Clearly, something needs to be done. But what?

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    GSN Perspectives: London Bombings Puzzle Experts On Both Sides of The Atlantic

    Uploaded by

    Martin Edwin Andersen
    (Martin Edwin Andersen, our Washington correspondent, draws upon his many sources, and his years of experience, to make some sense of the London terror attacks and their aftermath.) Martin Edwin Andersen Government Security News August 18, 2005 As the expansive waves of the London suicide bombings continue to resonate around the United States, what one friend scornfully describes as “September 12th” homeland security experts are again peddling all manner of policy prescriptions, some so pricey they might also help fulfill Osama bin Laden’s dream of bankrupting the country. Meanwhile, security sources investigating the London attacks say they believe that the crude nail bombs used by the Islamicists were not unlike those employed by the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army. (Reportedly, the peroxide acetone base of the explosives is something that police dogs in both the U.S. and the U.K. generally are not trained to detect.) Still, fearing a repeat of the low-tech bus and subway attacks across the Atlantic, many are calling for the federal government to spend $6 billion to improve public transportation security, this in a nation that has yet to be able scrape together $400 million a year to better protect its seaports. Sow the land with tens of thousands more video cameras, others say, failing to note that the London bombers were successful in carrying out their initial attacks despite the fact that the city’s buses and subways were already honeycombed with the security tools. (Not only is the technology expensive; where it is most useful -- as London proves -- is in after-the-fact documentation of what occurred, rather than in prevention.) More perimeter controls, others importune, unmindful of the delays and added expense these have caused at the nation’s airports, even as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other critics regularly skewer the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for creating the illusion, rather than the reality, of safety. Yet the experience of London, whose extensive networks of cameras, checkpoints and bollards -- “fortress urbanism,” it is called -- reflect not just the prevention of the threat posed by Islamicists, but also more than three decades of fighting the terrorists of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), shows that not everything can be protected all the time. “You can’t child-proof America,” James Jay Carafano, one of Washington’s real experts in homeland security, warns. (Carafano, too, expresses weariness with what he calls “newly-minted terrorism experts” that have joined the mass media chattering class with their rant and can't.) Clearly, something needs to be done. But what?

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    GSN Perspectives: London bombings puzzle experts on both sides of the Atlantic

    (Martin Edwin Andersen, our Washington correspondent, draws upon his many sources, and his years of experience, to make some sense of the London terror attacks and their aftermath.) Martin Edwin Andersen Go ernment !ecurity "ews August 18, 2005 As the expansive waves of the London suicide bombings continue to resonate around the nited !tates, what one friend scornfu""# describes as $!eptember 12th% home"and securit# experts are again pedd"ing a"" manner of po"ic# prescriptions, some so price# the# might a"so he"p fu"fi"" &sama bin Laden's dream of ban(rupting the countr#) Meanwhi"e, securit# sources investigating the London attac(s sa# the# be"ieve that the crude nai" bombs used b# the *s"amicists were not un"i(e those emp"o#ed b# the terrorists of the *rish +epub"ican Arm#) ,+eported"#, the peroxide acetone base of the exp"osives is something that po"ice dogs in both the )!) and the )-) genera""# are not trained to detect). !ti"", fearing a repeat of the "ow/tech bus and subwa# attac(s across the At"antic, man# are ca""ing for the federa" government to spend 01 bi""ion to improve pub"ic transportation securit#, this in a nation that has #et to be ab"e scrape together 0200 mi""ion a #ear to better protect its seaports) !ow the "and with tens of thousands more video cameras, others sa#, fai"ing to note that the London bombers were successfu" in carr#ing out their initia" attac(s despite the fact that the cit#'s buses and subwa#s were a"read# hone#combed with the securit# too"s) ,3ot on"# is the techno"og# expensive4 where it is most usefu" // as London proves // is in after/the/fact documentation of what occurred, rather than in prevention). More perimeter contro"s, others importune, unmindfu" of the de"a#s and added expense these have caused at the nation's airports, even as the 5overnment Accountabi"it# &ffice ,5A&. and other critics regu"ar"# s(ewer the 6ransportation !ecurit# Administration ,6!A. for creating the i""usion, rather than the rea"it#, of safet#) 7et the experience of London, whose extensive networ(s of cameras, chec(points and bo""ards // $fortress urbanism,% it is ca""ed // ref"ect not 8ust the prevention of the threat posed b# *s"amicists, but a"so more than three decades of fighting the terrorists of the *rish +epub"ican Arm# ,*+A., shows that not ever#thing can be protected a"" the time) $7ou can't chi"d/proof America,% 9ames 9a# :arafano, one of ;ashington's rea" experts in home"and securit#, warns) ,:arafano, too, expresses weariness with what he ca""s $new"#/ minted terrorism experts% that have 8oined the mass media chattering c"ass with their rant and cant).
    1

    :"ear"#, something needs to be done) <ut what= >act is, whi"e America is at war, our e"ected po"itica" "eadership co""ective"# shies awa# from exp"aining that managing ris( ma# mean "iving with a higher "eve" of uncertaint# and fear than we might "i(e) ,?epartment of @ome"and !ecurit# chief Michae" :hertoff is the most notab"e exception to the "eaders showing more profi"e than courage on this, but then, :hertoff wasn't e"ected). Aub"ic p"aces are soft targets, and b# definition high/va"ue priBes for terrorists see(ing to maximiBe fear, uncertaint# and pub"icit# for their cause) And their ver# nature // eas# access and exit, numbers of peop"e, etc) // ma(e them hard for authorities to patro" and contro") At the same time, fortif#ing one pub"ic venue // surface transportation, for examp"e // does not prevent the terrorists from easi"# shifting their focus to "ess protected spaces, such as shopping ma""s, restaurants, hote"s, churches and s#nagogues, or as shown recent"# in +ussia, schoo"s) 6he recent"# pub"ished reve"ation ,denied b# the ?EA. that bin Laden tried, 8ust a #ear after CD11, to en"ist :o"ombian cocaine barons in a scheme to spi(e massive amounts of the i""ega" drugs with poison and (i"" thousands of Americans is further evidence, if an# more were needed, of the terrorists' penchant for evi" invention) 6he differences between the nited !tates and London, and between the ;est and the rest of the wor"d, a"so need to be ta(en into consideration as ;ashington rushes to confront this new threat du 8our) *n the case of suicide bombs, the genera""# tight/fitting c"othes used in the ;est ma(e it somewhat "ess "i(e"# that "arger exp"osive devices wi"" be successfu""# concea"ed than in countries where bi""owing appare" is worn) And in most of ;estern Europe, a tighter rein is (ept on "ega" exp"osives than in much of the wor"d, arguab"# inc"uding the )!) &n a positive note, for the )!), it is genera""# be"ieved that *s"amicists have a much sma""er infrastructure and support networ( here than in man# countries of ;estern Europe, or *srae") *n addition, important American Mus"im "eaders have gone to greater "engths to denounce terrorism and support "aw enforcement than their peers in man# of those countries) :arafano and others ma(e a convincing case that the best strateg# to prevent terrorist attac(s is a pro/active one that see(s out wou"d/be evi"/doers before the# stri(e, with other mone# spent we"" to mitigate the effects of an# successfu" terrorist outrage) <ringing the countr#'s more than 100,000 sworn po"ice officers into greater partnership with anti/terrorism efforts is one wa# to he"p do this) 6he obvious decentra"iBation of A" Eaeda/inspired attac(s wor"dwide since CD11 ma# mean greater re"evance for state and "oca" "aw enforcement in detecting and preventing attac(s b# *s"amicists who c"ear"# have tightened their own operationa" securit# b# operating in sma"" ce""s and finding "oca" s#mpathiBers wi""ing to do their bidding)
    2

    A"read#, man# po"ice departments around the countr# have created or beefed up existing inte""igence units, anti/terrorism too"s that can gain even greater pub"ic acceptance and support if the# scrupu"ous"# respect civi" "iberties) ?@!'s *mmigration and :ustoms Enforcement ,*:E. unit has a"so he"ped recent"# b# bringing state and "oca" po"ice into greater partnership in enforcing immigration "aws, a (e# anti/terrorist too") 6he counter/ terrorism fusion centers, partnerships between the ><* and state and "oca" "aw enforcement, being estab"ished and expanded around the countr# are another ver# good idea) Even more support, inc"uding much improved communications eFuipment and training, is needed, however) Aa#ing greater attention to the interface between home"and securit# and pub"ic hea"th wou"d a"so he"p, particu"ar"# if nationa" emergenc# medica" service assets were wrested from a d#sfunctiona" ?epartment of @ea"th and @uman !ervices and p"aced in the ?epartment of @ome"and !ecurit#, where the# c"ear"# be"ong) >ina""#, some of the best measures that might be ta(en to he"p prevent suicide bombings here invo"ve much "ower cost and "ower tech a"ternatives to what are being proposed b# some of those $!eptember 12th% experts) *n a countr# in which G2 mi""ion peop"e use trains, subwa#s and buses to commute to wor( ever# da#, how "i(e"# is it that expensive bomb/detecting eFuipment // some of which costs between 0500,000 and 01 mi""ion each // wi"" be purchased to cover ever# possibi"it#= &ne wa# of bringing some "ow/tech, "ow cost s#mmetr# to the as#mmetrica" war being waged against us b# A" Eaeda wou"d be for our side to un"eash the $dogs of war% // dramatica""# increasing the number of canines used b# federa", state and "oca" "aw enforcement agencies in bomb detection wor(, particu"ar"# in mass transit) 6hose who (now these things sa# that innocent peop"e who might be afraid of a snar"ing ?oberman or even a 5erman !hepherd wou"d not be inconvenienced b# such a move // winsome Labradors, a"ert Eng"ish !panie"s and a"" sorts of terriers are best for that (ind of wor() $An# of #our rat dogs are good,% said one we""/trave"ed securit# specia"ist) 5ood for us, and ma#be ver# bad for &sama's s(u"(ing minions) *f, of course, "esser/(nown substances "i(e peroxide acetone are incorporated as part of the dogsH training dri"")

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