Iconography of Representation : Carl Schmitt and Image

TANAKA Jun

1. Dialectic of Concrete Historical Image It is known well that the concept at the core of the Carl Schmitts publicism is "Reprsentation (representation)."i Representation was the ordering principle of the Catholic church and the 17th century absolutist state, and was the main principle of the society, art, and thoughts that were formed there. According to the definition in Schmitt's Verfassungslehre (Constitution Theory, 1928), "to represent means to make visible and present an invisible entity through an entity which is publicly present (Reprsentieren heit, ein unsichtbares Sein durch ein ffentlich anwesendes Sein sichtbar machen und vergegenwrtigen)."ii The invisible is assumed to be absent but simultaneously made present through representation. In this lies the "Dialektik (dialectic)" of the concept of representation. The represented cannot be an existence with a low value. What can be represented and visualized to the public as one role of the person (Person) is a certain enhanced existence and an idea. Representation is the dramatic "representation" of such an idea. Such representation must be visible. Although representation is by no means synonymous with the image, we can analyze this "visibility" from the viewpoint of image theory because Schmitt emphasizes the visibility of representation. This paper analyzes the role of the image in the Schmitts thought, with a particular focus on his Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes (The Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes's state theory, 1938). In his contribution to a volume commemorating Ernst Jnger's 60th birthday in 1955iii, Schmitt criticizes Jnger's essay Der Gordische Knoten (The Gordian Knot, 1954), and uses Jean Gottmanns concept of "iconographie rgionale (regional iconography)." iv Gottmann is the French geographer famous for introducing the concept of the "megalopolis" from US urban studies. Different world images form unique spaces, and historical memory, saga, myth, legend, symbol, taboo, and symbolic expressions of feeling, thinking and language form the iconography of a certain specific space (Raum). Schmitt says that the concept of iconography is more suitable than that of ideology to refer to such objects, because iconography gains its historical concreteness by being recognized in geographical spatiality. Since "all demarcations (Verortung) of concrete place are already a kind of visibility (Sichbarkeit),"v icons and iconographies will be everywhere, as will be the possibility of iconoclasm according to this. Gottmann says, "Iconography is the Gordian knot of a national community." Schmitt asks "Who is Alexander the Great who cuts off this knot?" According to Schmit, three "iconoclastic invasions

(ikonoklastische Einbrche)"vi to the old conventional iconography have arisen, and involve the fall in value of a traditional iconography: the first is psychoanalysis, the second modern painting, and the third industrial technologization. Schmitt does not follow the process of such iconoclasm in detail in this book. Rather, he related it to the political situation of east-and-west confrontation in those days, and developed a historical analysis based on the confrontation between land and sea which had already appeared in his Land und Meer (Land and Sea, 1954) and Der Nomos der Erde (The Nomos of the Earth, 1950). Schmitt explains that Britain as island changes from land into a "ship" through the shift to a maritime existence, and describes the confrontation between a maritime and a terrestrial existence as the confrontation between a ship and a house. This is a perfect example of the "regional iconography" of historical space called modern Europe. Because this kind of investigation is the historical analysis of the iconography of a specific space, we should call it "iconology," a practice which originated in the text of Aby Warburg, and was used by Erwin Panofsky as a meta-level of iconography. Although Schmitts spatial iconology takes not only visual images but also linguistic expressions as its object, the "visibility" which appears simultaneously with the formation of the concrete space accompanying a place demarcation is also important here. Although the visible "image (Bild)" -- the concrete-historical image (das konkret-geschichtliche Bild)
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is at the center of the iconology of space, it is not a non-historical image, as it is in the "polarity (Polaritt)" of Jnger (and Goethe and Schelling). In the thought of Schmitt, who tries to be thoroughly concrete and historical, an image contains "a dialectical strain (eine dialektische Spannung)"viii of a one-time historical process which cannot be repeated. According to Schmitt, here the word "dialectical" means "the question and answer structure (Frage-Antwort-Struktur)"ix which is inherent in all historical situations, and implies that man's historical acts and actions are answers to questions imposed by history itself (here he refers to Collingwood and Toynbee). Unlike the polar image, which consists of a confrontation which co-exists simultaneously, the continuous process of a question and an answer is condensed in the concrete historical image. While it is difficult to conduct a strict examination here, the image containing a dialectical strain can be compared with the "dialectical image (dialektisches Bild)" Walter Benjamin uses in his Passagen Werk. We can do this because Benjamin's dialectical image too appears where "this now (das Jetzt)" and "what existed once (das Gewesene)" meet in a kind of question and answer structure.x However, even if Benjamin and Schmitt share a commonality in that they reject an archaic polar image, Schmitts concept does not have the epistemology of the history as mourning remembrance (Eingedenken) that exists in Benjamin's thought. Digressing from his main point, Schmitt touches on the function of animal fables that reveal man's

behavioral patterns.xi The relation between political power and animals is a theme that often appears in Schmitt's writings, and he had already expressed the same opinion in his Der Leviathan in 1938. It is well known that the confrontation between the huge sea-animal Leviathan and land-animal Behemoth discussed in this book on Hobbes's theory relates to the confrontation of sea and land that was Schmitts major theme after the 1940s. Perhaps Schmitt's most detailed iconological analysis of a concrete historical image containing a dialectical strain is in Der Leviathan.

2. The Anatomy of Leviathan From the beginning of the text, Schmitt emphasizes intensity of the Leviathan image by the use of expressions such as "a mythological symbol which bore hidden deep meaning," "the most intense image," and "its extraordinary mythological force."xii At first, Schmitt intently pursues the iconography of this "image" covered with mythological, theological, and cabalistic interpretation like an iconographer. I cant discuss here the evolution of the Leviathan image, which originated in the Book of Job of the Old Testament. Schmitt mentions the Christian symbolization of Leviathan as a fish finally taken in to God and the Judaic mythogenesis of the cabalists who regarded Leviathan as the monster which symbolizes the maritime state of pagan nations as the two dominant strains of interpretation. Schmitt calls the latter symbolization especially "a surprising political myth,"xiii and introduces his interpretation that the Jews look on the fighting between a pagan terrestrial state (Behemoth) and maritime state (Leviathan), and that they eat the meat of the slain nation. This is a doubtful interpretation from an unknown source, and suggests Schmitt's own anti-Semitism. Even if the Talmud has a description of God making a meal for the righteous from the meat of Leviathan, the political dimension Schmitt emphasizes which connects Leviathan to a pagan state is not found in the Jewish tradition.xiv According to Schmitt's view, European nations have been driven to various complicated interpretations of Leviathan when they must solve huge political problems because they felt that deep mythological relations were at work in it. In this way, Leviathan turned into a powerful political mythological symbol by virtue of being a concrete historical image containing the dialectical strain of a question and answer structure. Based on the iconological analysis of such Leviathan images until the 17th century, Schmitt goes on to interpret Hobbess Leviathan. Schmitt observes first that the title "Leviathan," the unique frontispiece which has a somewhat mythological impulse force itself, and the contents of this book are contradictory and give no united impression. At first, the title evokes Leviathan images such as a dragon, a sea animal, a snake, an alligator or a whale (Fig.2). But in the copperplate engraving of the frontispiece, a giant who consists of countless human

beings is standing with a sword in his right hand and a crosier in his left (Fig.3). Schmitt says that such a simultaneous and direct juxtaposition of the associations with huge animals and the image of a giant is not a fault at all, but gives rather an intense impression. This is because "man and a beast are united in many myths, and a mythological phenomenon comes to be believed more by unifying a giant with a huge animal."xv Schmitt goes on to examine Hobbess references to Leviathan, and ascertains that the Leviathan in Hobbes's book is exactly a fusion of four images: a giant, a huge animal, an artificial machine, and mortal God. For Hobbes, the mechanism and the machine still had a mythological meaning, and when these four images were united, they formed a unique mythological image. The Leviathan image as a mixture of huge animal and huge machine comes to have a mythological force especially in the natural state between states. Because international society is the place of vivid fights between many elemental powers, Leviathan appears as a huge animal (it is here that the power of animal fables is mentioned). On the other hand, because a state is a centralized command mechanism armed with knowledge and exercised with one switch, it appears as a huge machine. The very duality of the Leviathan image as huge animal and huge machine serves as a source of its force. This paper is interested in the iconology of political symbols, and Schmitts analysis of Hobbes's theory of the State itself cannot be discussed. It is well known that Schmitt finds the cause of the failure of Hobbes's theory of the State in the distinction of inside and outside, and in the predominance of the inside, invisible, and private character over the external, visible, and public. In other words, its failure is to have allowed the un-public nature to dominate the order of representation. Without distinguishing clearly between the failure of a political symbol called Leviathan and that of Hobbes's systematic theory, Schmitt's argument gives a very complicated impression. Regarding Leviathan as a political symbol, the mythological force of the Leviathan image and its failure originate in Hobbes's having wakened powers of an old equivocal myth. Hobbes's theory of the State was realized not in Britain but in continental countries, and conversely, a sea animal became the symbol of continental countries. However, the sea animal was not a suitable symbol for the military states of the continent. Moreover, indirect powers fighting against a state attacked Hobbes with the traditional vicious images of Leviathan as symbol. In both cases, the traditional interpretation was more powerful than that of Hobbes. Hobbes's book was overwhelmed by the mythological image based on a traditional iconography, and his clear logic entered the magnetic field of symbol which awakened there. Hobbes's image of Leviathan was not adapted for the system of ideas with which it should have been connected in historical reality, and it has been decomposed into separate meanings. According to Schmitts analysis, although Hobbes approached the myth through his Leviathan image, its polysemy prevented him from showing his enemy

clearly and therefore, he failed in his formation of a political myth. Schmitt says that Hobbes used the image of Leviathan only because of the caprices of "English humor," and points out the historical circumstances in which the symbol of Leviathan had already lost its mythological force by about the middle of the 17th century. Nevertheless, once awakened from their sleep the symbolic images are nourished by the discrepancy to the frontispiece or state theory and revive mythological power in a new form. What Schmitt is analyzing is the process of this transformed revival, which is a meaning unique to the Leviathan image in the specific historical stage of Britain in the mid-17th century. It is a concrete historical image containing the dialectical strain as an "answer" Hobbes posed to the "question" out of a specific historical situation. The past mythological image is not reproduced identically here and it is important that Schmitt pointed out the discrepancy of the image of sea animal, frontispiece, and state theory, because the historicity of the Leviathan image of Hobbes is simply there. Warburg compared the symbolic image (a "Pathosformel (pathos formula)" in his words) originating in ancient times to the Leyden jar. He argued that it is discharged by contact with each following period, and that different specific meanings were actualized for every period. This process may lead to the inversion of the original meaning of ancient times. Can we not find the same inversion in Leviathans transformation from demonic fearful huge animal into a mortal God who makes peace (even if by "fear" of its power) in Hobbes's state theory? Schmitt's analysis is closer to the Warburg schools iconological analysis of the "the survival of classical antiquity" than it is to Ernst Cassirer's myth theory, precisely because it has dug down into the concrete historical stratum of mythological images of Leviathan. He mentions Marc Bloch's "King's Miracle" and Warburg school member Percy Ernst Schramms research into the symbols of sovereignty, and refers to the Karl Giehlows research into allegory, which influenced Aby Warburg, when he discusses the relation between Hobbes and occult thought. In 1938, Schmitt said that Leviathan could not become the symbol of a technological period, and that it did not give an uncanny impression any more, and branded it for a museum. However, after World War II, Leviathan came to be regarded as symbol of totalitarianism. For Schmitt, this was nothing but mistaken "mythological actualization."xvi In 1965, he said that the political myth of Leviathan was still so strong that it made Hobbes himself a mythological person. Symbolic images continue to live even as they transform. Schmitt himself had participated in such modification of the Leviathan image by his troubling statements about the cabalistic interpretation of Leviathan. In fact, Schmitt's "answer" to the "question" of 1938 comes intself such a modification of the image. In 1945, when he used the pseudonym "Benito Cereno" to call his Der Leviathan an "esoteric

book," it must be the same "answer" accompanied by self-mythogenesis.xvii

3. The Political Iconography of Time Postwar, Schmitt thinks that a sovereign is the faade of power (e.g. relations such as Louis XIII/Richelieu and the Emperor/Wallenstein), and that Leviathan is a faade. While faades are not mere appearance but prestige, honor, representation, and omnipotence, they are still only external omnipotence. The psychology and the sociology which strip a mask removed the baroque faade and completed the disclosure of the pure cores of power.xviii This may be what Schmitt called the iconoclastic invasion into traditional iconography. Schmitt finds the same faade-character in the secret curtain hung (Fig.4) in the center of the lower part of the Leviathan frontispiece, which suggests that something has been left behind, hidden, and not told here.xix It is at this point that Schmitt suggests Hobbess relation to occult thought, and this also the origin of Schmitts repeated emphasis of Hobbes's esoteric character. Regarding this understanding of the faade as representation, i.e. Leviathan as representation, I want to refer to Horst Bredekamps iconological analysis of the frontispiece to Hobbess Leviathan.xx After Bredekamp identifies the author of this frontispiece and reconstructs the process of production in detail, he interprets the meaning of this image for Hobbes. According to him, Hobbes placed high value on the image as medium. This frontispiece is not a mere addition, but a symbol to show the unity of the body politic (political body) of a state as a sign shared by all. Its relation with the "effigies" called "representations" or "images" used in the 15th to 17th centuries at the funerals of the kings of Britain or France is especially important (Fig.5, 6). Hobbes himself might have seen such an effigy at the funeral of James I in 1625. Leviathan was regarded by Hobbes as an automaton, and we can recognize some resemblance between Leviathan and the effigy which was not a mere doll but whose joints moved. The effigy as a temporary body of a king was invented to close the fissure of the legitimacy of sovereignty. In the exceptional emergency of the time of vacancy, the effigy must shut a fissure of time so that civil war between disassembled groups does not break out. As an artificial sovereigns image with the same mechanism as an effigy, Hobbes's Leviathan compensates for the sovereigns absence so that a state might escape from a state of nature. In an earlier draft, the crowds who form the body of the monster face the viewer, but in the plate published in Leviathan, they turn their backs to our eyes (Fig.7, 8). This can be regarded as an expression of the moment when a state is founded, instead of the time when the state is working. In Hobbess case, the exceptional emergency of the time of a vacancy on the throne is the basic condition of human

existence, and the purpose of the image of Leviathan as "representation" is to continue the moment of such foundation of a state. It is an expression of the eternal repetition of this moment. Hobbes used an image like an automaton which governs the time of a vacancy exactly to create this effect of such "transposition of time to the continuation from an exceptional moment."xxi Seen in this way, the image of Leviathan in the frontispiece is "the political iconography of time."xxii

4. The Overcompensation of Representation It is not certain whether Schmitt found this "political iconography" which was expressed by the "representation" as an effigy or at least was even aware of the suggestion of it in Hobbes's Leviathan image. However, since "representation" is the main concept of Schmitt's publicism, and Christian theology is deeply concerned there, I will develop the iconological investigation into "visibility" of "representation" from this point a little more. The effigy, i.e. a king's temporary body literally named a "representation" or an "image," was an object showing the order principle of an absolute state which used as its prototype the Catholic church with its "mystical body (corpus mysticum)" of Christ. It is known well that the medieval political theology behind the effigy as "representation" was discovered and discussed in detail by Ernst Kantorowicz, the author of The King's Two Bodies, and his student, Ralph Giesey.xxiii As Kantorowicz shows, the concept of the "mystical body" meant the consecrated Host in Carolingian times when it began to spread. This converted turned into the concept which indicates the church in its institutional aspect. Kantorowicz gave the Host only a secondary meaning in his analysis of the theory of the king's two bodies in medieval political theology. But Carlo Ginzburg thinks that the declaration of "the doctrine of transubstantiation" in the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 played the decisive role in the birth of effigy of king as "representation."xxiv "The doctrine of transubstantiation" is a doctrine that the substance of the bread and the wine is changed to Christ's body and blood in the liturgy of Communion. Ginzburgs hypothesis is as follows: All other evocations and manifestations of the sacred -- such as relics and images --cannot but become dim and feeble when compared to the intense reality of this very special religious sign called the Host, at least on the theoretical level. Thus the fear of idolatry decreased, and ways were found of domesticating images. Medieval Europes ambivalent attitude to images, one which wavered between relic worship and image prohibition, was conquered by the doctrine of transubstantiation. A return to imagery through sculptures and pictures followed, and Christian arts came to the Renaissance. Ginzburg also points out the relation between the miracles of the Eucharist and the persecution of the Jews. Many legends of miracles like blood flowing out of the Host, or the Host changing into a baby were

born after the Lateran Council. Parallel to this phenomenon, after the middle of the 12th century Jews began to be blamed for ritual murder and profaning the Host. It is the religious imagination about the sacrifice that was working there.xxv Scmitt's image of Jews who eat meat of pagan killed groups as symbolized by Leviathan is rooted in this tradition. Ginzburg says that the doctrine of transubstantiation can be interpreted as extreme "abstraction," because it denies sense data in the name of a profound and invisible substance. He argues that a king's effigy called "representation" is the concrete symbol of such an "abstraction" of the state, and that Christ's concrete, corporal presence (or super-presence) in the sacrament enabled its formation. If we dare to express this "abstraction" in the "iconoclastic" concept, it is nothing other than the logic of fetishism, because it denies "knowledge" of visible reality on the basis of "faith" in the "presence" of invisible reality.xxvi According to Ginzburg's hypothesis, the doctrine of the Catholic church, the theory of the king's two bodies in medieval political theology and the imagery of the Christian world which is the shadow of the Eucharist are all deeply connected to this fetishism. Schmitt found the dialectic of the concept of representation in that "the invisible is assumed to be absent but simultaneously made present through representation." This definition of representation is same "abstraction," and it is exactly the logic of fetishism. In his Glossarium, Schmitt indicated that the Re of Reprsentare has the meaning of "(overcompensated) emphasis," and is accompanied by the feeling of unreality.xxvii Although an invisible thing is made to be present by "overcompensation," it cannot help but produce a feeling of unreality simultaneously as a by-product. Furthermore, etymologically the Re of Reprsentation or Reprsentare has no meaning of "again," but Schmitt dared to find in it a relation with "revival (Restauration)" as the nuance of "overcompensation." As a result of the overcompensation of "representation" in the structure of fetishism, reality is strengthened to a surreal or even unreal degree. This is the effect of Leviathan as "faade." The "mystery" and the "esoteric" do not hide behind a curtain, but are the product of the curtain as representation. Schmitt's concept of "representation" belongs to such regional iconography. For him, political symbols including Leviathan must have been such "representations". Schmitt tried to find in the Leviathan image of Hobbes not only the survival of the symbolic image of an ancient myth, but also a dialectical strain which the historical reality of his time made by invading this image. He tried to explore the mechanism of symbols as "representation" which enhances one-time historical reality to a political myth. The thought of Schmitt, a "17th century man of the 20th century,"xxviii has not stopped its provocation to thinking about the body politic of modern democracy through his untimely concept of "representation." Criticism of Schmitt's political thoughts requires us to engage in the iconological analysis of the European "regional iconography" of "representation" and "image" in which he was rooted. One such analysis is the

work of Giorgio Agamben, which has developed in a different direction research into not only Schmitt, but also Kantorowicz and Giesey and discovered the banned body of "homo sacer."xxix At the end of this paper, I quote the image of the miniature (Fig.9, 10) drawn on the Hebrew Bible of the 13th century which is the frontispiece of Agamben's book L'aperto: L'uomo e l'animale.xxx Leviathan, Behemoth and the monstrous bird Ziz are drawn on the upper part of the image, and the scene of the Messianic banquet of the righteous is depicted under it. Each figure of the righteous is strangely animal-headed. Agamben does not mention Schmitt in L'aperto. However, this mysterious image could be political iconography concerning the origin of the division between the animal and the human. It must be deeply connected with such Schmittian divisions as those between land and sea, and between enemy and friend: homo homini lupus.xxxi

Notes Cf. WANI Akira: kyokai kohogaku kokka: shoki Karu=Shumitto no kohogaku (Kirche, "Publizistik", Staat. Versuch ber Carl Schmitt unter bes. Bercksichtigung seines Frhwerks (1910-1927/28)). Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1990. Hasso Hofmann: Repsentation : Studien zur Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 1974. ii Carl Schmitt: Verfassungslehre. Neunte Auflage. Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2003, S.209. iii Carl Schmitt: Die geschichtliche Struktur des heutigen Welt-Gegensatzes von Ost und West. Bemerkungen zu Ernst Jngers Schrift: "Der Gordische Knoten". In: Armin Mohler (Hg.): Freundschaftliche Begegnungen; Festschrift fr Ernst Jnger zum 60. Geburtstag. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1955, S.135-167. iv Jean Gottmann: La politique des tats et leur gographie. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952, p.220. v Schmitt, Die geschichtliche Struktur, S.141. vi Ibid., S.140. vii Ibid., S.147. viii Ibid. ix Ibid., S.151. x Cf. Walter Benjamin: Das Passagen-Werk. In: ders.: Gesammelte Schriften. Bd.V. Hg. von Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991, S.578. xi Schmitt mentions "the political meaning of animal fables." Cf. Schmitt, Die geschichtliche Struktur, S.150. xii Carl Schmitt: Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols. 2. Auflage. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1995, S.9-10. xiii Ibid., S.16. xiv Cf. Raphael Gross: Carl Schmitt und die Juden. Eine deutsche Rechtslehre. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000, ch.4. xv Schmitt, Der Leviathan, S.29. xvi Carl Schmitt: Die vollendete Reformation. Zu neuen Leviathan-Interpretationen (1965). In: Schmitt, Der Leviathan, S.156. xvii Cf. Gross, op.cit., ch.5. In 1973, Schmitt suggested that his article of 1937, "Der Staat als Mechanism bei Hobbes und Descartes", had implicitly criticized Benjamin's Der Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, especially Benjamin's failure to deal with the symbolism of the Leviathan (Schmitt, letter to Hansjrg Viesel, 11 May 1973, in: Viesel, Jawohl, der Schmitt: Zehn Briefe aus Plettenberg, Berlin: Support-Ed. Gabler & Lutz, 1988, S.16). Furthermore, Schmitt explained that his Der Leviathan was
i

intended as an answer to Benjamin's Trauerspiel (Schmitt, letter to Viesel, 4 Apr. 1973, in: Viesel, op.cit., S.14). Cf. Horst Bredekamp: From Walter Benjamin to Carl Schmitt, via Thomas Hobbes. In: Critical Inquiry, vol.25, no.2, 1999 (Winter), p.261. xviii Cf. Carl Schmitt: Glossarium. Aufzeichnungen der Jahre 1947-1951. Hg. von Eberhard Freiherr von Medem. Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 1991, S.39-42. xix Ibid., S.39; Schmitt, Die vollendete Reformation, S.151. xx Horst Bredekamp: Thomas Hobbes, Der Leviathan. Das Urbild des modernen Staates und seine Gegenbilder ; 1651 - 2001. 2., stark vernd. Aufl. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003. xxi Ibid., S.108. xxii Ibid., S.132. xxiii Cf. Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz: The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Ralph E. Giesey: The Royal Funeral Ceremony in Renaissance France. Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance, 37. Genve: E. Droz, 1960. xxiv Cf. Carlo Ginzburg: Occhiacci di legno. Nove riflessioni sulla distanza. Milano: Feltrinelli, 1998, pp.93-95. xxv Cf. Wolfgang Palaver: Globalisierung und Opfer. Carl Schmitts Lehre vom Nomos. In: Bernhard Dieckmann (Hg.): Das Opfer - aktuelle Kontroversen. Mnster: Lit; Thaur: Druck- und Verlaghaus Thaur, 2001, S.181-206. The last plate, plate 79, of Warburg's picture atlas MNEMOSYNE shows the many aspects of this religious imagination (See fig.11). Cf. TANAKA Jun: Aby Warburg: kioku no meikyu (Aby Warburg: Labyrinth of Memory). Tokyo: Seido-sha, 2001, pp.302-312. xxvi Cf. Sigmund Freud: Fetischismus. In: ders. : Gesammelte Werke. Bd.XIV: Werke aus den Jahren 1925-1931. London: Imago, 1948, S.311-317. Octave Mannoni: Clefs pour l'imaginaire; ou, L'autre scne. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969, pp.9-33. Giorgio Agamben: Stanze : la parola e il fantasma nella cultura occidentale. Torino: G. Einaudi, 1977, pp.174-176. Edgar Wind: Warburgs Begriff der Kulturwissenschaft und seine Bedeutung fr die sthetik. In: Aby M. Warburg: Ausgewhlte Schriften und Wrdigungen. Hg. von Dieter Wuttke. Baden-Baden: Valentin Krner, 3., durchgesehene und durch ein Nachwort ergnzte Auflage, 1992, S.409-410. xxvii Cf. Schmitt, Glossarium, S.116. xxviii Gnter Maschke: Zum "Leviathan" von Carl Schmitt. In: Schmitt, Der Leviathan, S.215. xxix Cf. Giorgio Agamben: Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita. Torino: Einaudi, 1995. Agamben pointed out that in Hobbes's De cive it is precisely the body's capacity to be killed that founds both the natural equality of men and the necessity of the "Commonwealth" and the metaphor of the Leviathan, whose body is formed out of all the bodies of individuals, must be read in this light. xxx Cf. Giorgio Agamben: L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002. In Homo sacer, Agamben referred to the connection between homo sacer and the werewolf. xxxi Schmitt wrote on the day of the foundation of Federal Republic of Germany, 21 Sep. 1949: "Auf der Basis der reinen Humanitt, des bloen homo homini homo, hat die Humanisierung des Krieges keine lange Dauer. Der Mensch wird vielmehr zum Wesen aller Wesen; er wird Gott und Tier, und der Feind mu dann einfach als Tier behandelt werden, weil man ihn nicht vergttlichen kann." (Schmitt, Glossarium, S.270.)